Prof. Ted Postol: US–Iran War? Israel’s Fatal Gamble
Dialogue Works Highlights, hosted by Nima R. Alkhorshid | February 16, 2026
This interview with Theodore Postol, professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), specializing in nuclear weapons technology, missile defense, and national security policy, examines rising tensions between the U.S., Iran, and Israel. Ted Postol argues that Israel crossed from military to urban targets, opening the door to devastating retaliation. He claims Iran’s growing ballistic missile numbers and improving accuracy could bring Israeli cities to a halt, while missile defenses are overstated. The discussion expands to nuclear risks, great-power involvement, and parallels with Ukraine, warning of strategic miscalculation and dangerous escalation.
Transcript: Resistance News
Host: We are somehow concerned about a new war in West Asia between the United States and Iran, which we know would include Israel as well, and which would be devastating for all the parties involved, in my opinion.
When we look at the current situation, the United States is bringing a lot of weapons to the region. The Iranians are not like in the 12-day war; they are prepared. They know the attack is coming. Israelis are prepared. Americans are prepared. Iranians are prepared. How do you see the current situation? And how do you see a confrontation between the two parties?
Ted Postol: Well, at a political level, I must admit I am a little baffled by the whole thing. It is clear that the leader of Israel, Netanyahu, is hellbent on attacking Iran and taking Iran’s military capacity away from it. I should point out that Iran has not instigated any attacks against Israel except in retaliation to attacks made by Israel against Iran. The rhetoric in the West is not very informed, unfortunately. Basically, the situation is being driven mostly by Israel and also by the United States.
It seems—I cannot be sure, since I am not what I would call a deeply knowledgeable political observer—that things did not go well between Netanyahu and Trump in the very recent meeting that just ended. It is clear that Netanyahu wanted the Americans to go against Iran again. It may well happen, given all the weapon systems that are being moved into place. But it does appear that Trump at least did not indicate to Netanyahu that he was just going to go ahead, which again does not necessarily mean he won’t, because this man is so erratic.
The problem really is that the Israelis have really made what I consider an extraordinary strategic blunder. I will talk a little about this so your audience understands what I mean by it. This strategic blunder is basically putting the Iranians in a position where they are justified in attacking Israeli cities.
Prior to the most recent situation, the Iranians were very careful to focus their attacks on Israeli military installations. But the most recent attack by the Israelis—I don’t know why they believe they could do it, but basically an attempt to take off the head of the Iranian government and cause it to collapse—involved a large number of attacks on urban installations. What that did was make it justifiable—and it is justifiable, sad but justifiable, in terms of retaliation—for the Iranians to focus on Israeli cities.
Israel has several big cities, but only a few. It is a small country. As I will show with some of my briefing slides, as Iran’s capacity with ballistic missiles increases—and it is going to increase, and I will explain what I mean by that shortly—as Iran’s ability increases with its ballistic missiles, it is going to become more and more possible for Iran to cause catastrophic disruptions of Israeli urban areas. I mean catastrophic.
It won’t be at the level of what the Israelis have done to Gaza, but it will in some ways begin to approach that kind of damage and disruption. Societies are organized systems. When you do damage to a society, you cannot measure the full extent of the damage by saying, “We destroyed 20 percent of the buildings.” If 20 percent of those buildings are embedded in a structure where they are connected to 75 percent of the other buildings in terms of supplies, relationships, services, etc., you are crippling a society in a major way.
Iran either already has, or soon will have, the ability to do that to Israel. That is not going to be tolerable for the Israelis. I do not know what they can do about it. I guess they could retaliate with nuclear weapons against Iran, but that would be suicidal, because Iran has the capacity to build nuclear weapons and use them.
It is one thing for the Iranians not to go ahead and build nuclear weapons, as they say they are not doing, and as American intelligence seems to agree that it’s not what they’re doing. But they have the capacity. The one way to assure that a country will use nuclear weapons on you, if they have the capacity, is to use nuclear weapons on them.
So it is a dilemma. It is a deep dilemma for Iran, but it is just as deep a dilemma for Israel. Iran is a bigger country. Nuclear weapons are enormously destructive, but you have to use a significant number of them if you are going to destroy urban areas and military assets. The number of military assets and cities in Iran is tremendously larger than what exists in Israel. This is not a good mathematical relationship from the point of view of the Israelis.
They have, in effect, opened the door to a potentially very dangerous confrontation and ladder of escalation of some kind. But the biggest immediate problem is the non-nuclear threat that Iran now has and will predictably grow.
It is not just that they have it now. As the size of Iran’s ballistic missile forces grows—by size, I mean numbers—as the numbers grow and the accuracy improves, it will have increasing meaning. The Russians are now talking about helping the Iranians improve their accuracy technology in ballistic missiles. That seems to be an arrangement the Russians are working on with the Iranians, and that is going to have big significance, as I’ll show you shortly.
China could choose to do that as well, because they have advanced missile guidance and control technology. Iran is only a small step away from improving its accuracy significantly. It already has tremendous technical capabilities, but it could get a good boost from either Russia or China. The increase in accuracy does not have to be enormous.
The evidence suggests that the accuracy of most of Iran’s ballistic missiles, as measured from the 12-day war, is probably around one thousand meters—a kilometer. When you have one-kilometer accuracy, getting to 500 meters is not a gigantic step. Getting to 100 meters would be a lot, but getting to 500 meters is not a lot in terms of improvements and technology.
Iran is poised to be able to do that, especially with Russian help. As this confrontation continues over time, Iran will have more missiles, because it is clear they understand these missiles are a unique tool to threaten and stand off Israel. As the guidance and control systems improve and accuracy increases, the effectiveness of those missiles for disrupting, possibly even closing down, the function of civil society in Israel will increase dramatically.
The clock is not on Israel’s side. This strategic blunder—among many strategic blunders—has put Israel in a very bad situation that can only get worse over time, and significantly worse.
So why don’t we start with slide two? I have a couple of simple slides.
The point I made earlier is that the attack on Tehran was a gigantic strategic blunder. In slide three, the reason for it is that it crossed the line from attacks on purely military targets to attacks on cities.
If we go to slide four, all we are saying is that Israel only has a small number of cities. The combination of large numbers of ballistic missiles and improved accuracy will, over time, give Iran an extraordinary and growing strategic lever against Israel.
Two factors will increase this capability to leverage against Israeli society. The first is obvious: the number of missiles will grow. The second is less obvious: the improved accuracy of those missiles.

Slide 6 [the 5 first slides only contain text that was read out loud]
Slide six is a conceptual slide. Small problems in shutting down the rocket motor—when you are trying to place the rocket at a certain speed before the motor shuts down—create small differences in the angle at which the rocket is flying when the motor shuts down. Those small differences must be reduced if you want to increase the accuracy of the missile.
At the far end of the trajectory, errors are also introduced by the atmosphere. The missile may wobble a bit. But those kinds of errors can be reduced tremendously. The evidence suggests that the Iranians already know how to do that.
So, to significantly improve their accuracy—from about 1,000 meters to 500 meters—they mainly need to do better at shutting down the rocket motor at the right time and ensuring that the orientation of the missile at shutdown is accurate enough. They will likely get help with that from the Russians, if not from the Chinese.

If we look at the situation, what we know —we go to slide seven— is that we have an estimate of the accuracy of these ballistic missiles from the attack on the Nevatim Air Base during the October war in 2024. They obviously wanted to damage the base. The distribution of warheads shows what their accuracy capabilities were at that time. One of the warheads actually hit a building and probably destroyed an F-35 inside. There is a lot of discussion about that. These are probabilistic events.
The distribution shown is how you estimate the accuracy of Iran’s ballistic missiles at that time. That does not mean it cannot improve. It will improve, and that has meaning in a different situation from the one people tend to focus on.
The possibility that the accuracy of Iran’s ballistic missiles will become so high that they can selectively target aircraft and shelters and things like that is very low in the near future. The technologies involved are extremely advanced and will be very difficult to implement, even for an advanced country like Iran. These technologies are very difficult to master for ballistic missiles.
Iran’s cruise missiles, however—I’m not talking about their drones—have demonstrated tremendous accuracy. In the attack on the Saudi Arabian oil fields, we saw evidence that Iranian cruise missiles have the ability to lock on to an object of a certain shape and home toward the center of that object. I could show that evidence in another discussion. So cruise missiles are extremely accurate, but ballistic missiles are a long way from there.
To understand what kind of damage ballistic missiles could do to an urban area, we need to understand what damage an explosion might cause.

Slide eight shows the ranges at which certain levels of blast overpressure from a general-purpose bomb would occur. These are very general qualitative curves. For example, a 1,000-kilogram warhead, at about 100 meters you might get around two pounds per square inch. It could be 120 meters or 130, but approximately 100 meters. At 50 meters, you might get about five pounds per square inch. At around 15 meters, you might get over 40 pounds per square inch, which is enough to knock down a concrete and steel wall.
Let us look at slide nine to get a sense of what damage might look like.

This is an image from Gaza. We are looking through a hole in the wall of a building. That hole was probably produced by the blast wave from a roughly 500- or 1,000-kilogram bomb that landed 50 to 100 meters away. It depends on the strength of the wall, but this is the kind of damage you can expect at that distance.
At the far end of the image, you can see what a direct hit looks like on a significant structure, concrete and steel, reinforced structure. The structure slightly forward of it was damaged not by a direct hit, but by secondary shock waves, perhaps from a bomb or bombs that landed 30 or 40 meters away.
The point is that there is a lot of damage beyond the point where a bomb hits.
On the left side, we see a building where the exterior walls have largely been knocked out, while the roof and floors appear intact. That was probably done by a blast 40 or 50 meters away, and the walls just collapsed or were blown inward. That is significant damage from bombs that did not directly hit the target.

On the next slide, we see the interior of an apartment in Israel. This apartment was probably 100 to 150 meters away from a 500- to 1,000-kilogram ballistic missile explosion. At that distance—perhaps 50 to 100 meters—there is substantial general damage. The exterior window is blown out, and there is general disruption inside. If the blast had been at half that distance, the exterior wall could have been blown out.

Slide 11 shows damage from a bomb that probably landed 50 or 60 meters away. The walls were shattered, and the interiors were badly damaged. There is evidence of fires in the building, which often occur in such events. There is usually no one around to fight the fires because people are injured or evacuating, and tremendous damage results.
Now that we have a sense of what the damage looks like, let us go to slide 12.

This is a simulated missile impact diagram. In the upper left corner, there is a key explaining the circles. The outer yellow circle represents about two pounds per square inch—damage similar to the apartment we saw earlier, where there was general internal damage without the walls being knocked down.
The five-psi contour shows the range at which a bomb landing nearby would severely damage the exterior walls of a building. It might not knock them down completely, but it would cause serious structural damage.
The 40-psi contour, shown in red, represents the range at which the structure itself would likely collapse or suffer severe structural damage.
This simulation shows 100 missiles with 1,000-meter accuracy, assuming a one-ton warhead. A 500-kilogram warhead would produce similar general conclusions.
If you were firing at Tel Aviv—and we know the Iranians were—a significant number of warheads would land in the downtown area, which we know occurred. There was considerable damage in downtown Tel Aviv, although the Israelis tried to mask it all. But if you went and talked to somebody who was in downtown Tel Aviv, they’d tell you there was bomb damage all over the place, you know. Very very damaging. Real problem. The Israelis tried to downplay it, but there was certainly a lot of reaction from the Israeli population.
And in fact I believe — I conjecture, I don’t know — that a lot of the discussion about running out of missile interceptors, or interceptors not working perfectly, is just a smokescreen. The defense interceptors were not working very well to begin with. These missiles basically came in unopposed, to a first approximation. There may have been some intercepts, but the number was very low—perhaps around five percent. I would be very surprised if it is as much as one in ten. I would be very surprised if it is that high.
There is a mythology that the Israelis have been trying to promulgate, which they cannot hide from their population because the Iranians showed their population what could happen. There is a big set of lies being promulgated to the Israeli people and to other organizations—that the defenses are simply running out of interceptors, that there are minor problems with intercept rates, and similar claims. In fact, these systems have never been effective at all.
Most of what the Iranians fired came through. When you have 1,000-meter precision, many warheads will simply fall into the Mediterranean, for example. That is what happens when you have a weapon that is not very accurate. Now what happens when 100 missiles have 500-meter accuracy rather than 1,000-meter accuracy, as shown in the next slide.

Things look a lot worse. A lot worse. You can see that the downtown Tel Aviv area gets at least twice the density of impacts. That is not a good sign if you are Israeli.
This simulation is for 100 missiles. Iran does not have to restrict itself to that number. Over time, Iran will not only improve its accuracy but also increase the number of missiles it can launch.
Let us look, in the next few slides, at what a 500-missile attack with 500-meter accuracy could look like.


You see two roughly orange circles. One marks 1,000 meters of distance; the other marks 2,000 meters. A very large percentage of the warheads land within the urban built-up area of Tel Aviv.

Slide 16 is a close-up. You can see the buildings and the density of impacts, to try and understand what it means. The red circles show areas where the blast intensity would be enough to knock down the buildings or large parts of them. That would be severe damage.
The blue lines show areas where extensive general damage would occur: interior apartment walls knocked out, fires initiated in many buildings, people injured by flying debris, evacuation under chaotic conditions, and widespread fires.
The yellow lines indicate areas of more general damage—broken windows and more in streets and buildings.
This entire area is covered with general damage and severe damage. It is just one arbitrarily selected area.

Slide 17 shows what the whole city looks like, in this case with 500-meter accuracy missiles: the density of impacts is so great that it blocks out the city. Each red dot represents severe damage to concrete and steel buildings—big, strongly built structures—along with widespread secondary damage to surrounding buildings and interiors.
After an attack like this, Tel Aviv is no longer a functioning city. Haifa is no longer a functioning city. Beersheba is no longer a functioning city. These cities could be shut down completely by a few thousand ballistic missiles with 500-meter accuracy, which you can be sure that in the next let’s say five years, Iran will have. Because Israel cannot stop them from building ballistic missiles. They will have, I think, the outreach from Russia and China, you know, they’ll be plenty of materials available, made available to Iran to continue manufacturing these ballistic missiles. And the technology for improving their accuracy is well in hand, as Iran is a sophisticated country with advanced engineering capabilities. All it needs is a little help from Russia or China or both to refine these missiles to 500-meter accuracy.
So we’re talking about a very big strategic problem that the Israelis have brought upon themselves by this aggressive behavior.
So let me go to slide 21, because I made a point about lying to the Israeli people. This is a slide from 1991. I think this may have occurred in Saudi Arabia, where Patriots were used to defend Saudi Arabia.

A spectacular photograph. Most people misunderstood it. And in fact, the Raytheon Corporation took a great… Let’s just look at what it says: “When a system does everything in combat it was designed to do and more, that’s proof of performance.” This was in Aviation Week & Space Technology, and it ran two pages. Two pages. A total lie by Raytheon, the company that is still building Patriots and claiming they work when they don’t.
This time-lapse photo—let’s stop for a second and understand how it works. The camera is focused on the skyline, and the aperture is open. It does not open and close like a regular photograph; it is just open. When a Patriot interceptor is launched, it has a rocket motor that burns. The rocket motor looks like a point of light, and that point of light traces a line on the film because this is a time exposure.
You see the line in both cases disappears because the Patriot burns out. It finishes its powered flight, then flies like a bullet and maneuvers by changing its orientation in the atmosphere.
Now you see those two dots in the sky. Those two dots are the explosions of the Patriot warheads. They have nothing to do with intercepting a Scud.
We found this engagement on a video camera and analyzed it frame by frame. One Scud came in. They missed it with both explosions. If they had hit the Scud, it should have appeared as a track on the black photo. The Scud was bright enough that you should have seen it as a track. Somebody took that track and blacked it out. So this was consciously a fraudulent photo.
This is what the Israelis tell their own people. This is what American contractors tell the Saudis, the Poles, the Ukrainians, and whoever else is foolish enough to spend money on their system for anti-missile.
It is a very effective system against aircraft, I want to be clear. You do not want to fly against Patriots if you are in an airplane. But as a ballistic missile defense, it is worthless, as we know from Ukraine as well.
What we have here is an example of layers upon layers upon layers of fraud that have been foisted off on the populations of different countries, and on the American taxpayer, who has bought most of these Patriots for other countries, including Israel and Ukraine.
What we have is nothing but a fraud against the American taxpayer, the Israeli public, and the Ukrainian population.
Ukraine is a horrific situation because we, the Americans have put the Ukrainians in a position where their country has been destroyed and will continue to be destroyed if it does not negotiate with what is left of it and with the Russians.
You can still find articles in The New York Times, the paper that is supposed to be the paper of record. Just the other day there was an article —I shouldn’t laugh, because it’s so serious— about how Prosk in Donbass had just fallen. Prosk fell two or three months ago. The New York Times is now reporting it? This is a crime.
You have unbelievably courageous Ukrainian soldiers fighting for their country, for what they believe is the survival of their country, and they are dying at a tremendous rate for nothing. This can all be stopped by carrying out a realistic negotiation.
But the political administration in Ukraine—my best analogy is Hitler letting all these Germans die as the Russians closed in on Berlin when the best thing to do would have been to surrender. The war was over. Why cause all these people to die? They were even executing their own people in the streets for not fighting.
It is this kind of fascism, and it is fascism, that is contributing to the complete destruction of Ukraine. I mean complete, because all of these dying soldiers are altering the demography of Ukraine for the next 20 years. There will be an incredible dip in the birth rate. There already is. Ukraine could potentially even disappear as a culture. I do not think it will, but it could.
All these extremists—banderites, white supremacists—who think they are saving Ukrainian ethnicity are destroying it.
We have all this complexity going on in the world in front of us, and the cynical political leadership of NATO and the United States as well is resulting in extraordinary loss of life. I am beside myself when I think about the loss of life in Ukraine for no reason.
Just negotiate. Stop trying to make yourself an existential enemy of the Russians. Just live beside them and stop this unbelievable slaughter, because the Russians are going to stop it anyway. They can stop it by reaching an understanding, or they can stop it by basically completely destroying Ukraine as a viable state, which I think is what will occur, unfortunately.
Sorry to jump around, but from the point of view of a technologist like myself, who is most deeply concerned with violence in the world and its negative consequences, I look at this with despair.
This talk is simple in some sense. The diagrams took a long time to put together. I did not just make them up. I wanted to make them understandable so you could visualize what 500-meter CEP means. When you see it laid out on a map, you begin to understand what the consequences are. We are visual animals. Our ability to learn is based on visual capabilities, and abstractions come after that.
That is what I have to share on this issue.
UK prosecutors drop aggravated burglary charges against 24 Palestine Action activists
The Cradle | February 18, 2026
The UK’s Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) dropped aggravated burglary charges against 18 of the Filton 24 activists on 18 February, citing a “reconsideration of the sufficiency of the evidence” after earlier acquittals in the same case at Woolwich Crown Court.
At a case management hearing in south London, prosecutor Deanna Heer KC told the court, “The prosecution has reconsidered the sufficiency of the evidence … In light of those verdicts and in respect of all the remaining defendants the prosecution offers no evidence on count one, aggravated burglary.”
The aggravated burglary charge linked to the Elbit factory raid carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
The decision came two weeks after six co-defendants – Charlotte Head, Samuel Corner, Leona Kamio, Fatema Rajwani, Zoe Rogers, and Jordan Devlin — were acquitted of aggravated burglary on 4 February 2026. Jurors had deliberated for more than 36 hours before returning not guilty verdicts on that count.
Heer confirmed the CPS will seek a retrial on other allegations where no verdict was reached.
She told Mr Justice Johnson, “We now confirm the prosecution intention to seek a retrial in respect of all those allegations which no verdict was returned by the jury.”
Those include criminal damage against all defendants, violent disorder against three, and, in Corner’s case, causing grievous bodily harm with intent.
Rajwani, Rogers, and Devlin were cleared of violent disorder, while the jury failed to reach verdicts on that charge for Head, Corner, and Kamio.
None of the six were convicted of any offence, with all except Corner being released on conditional bail after about 18 months in custody.
Corner remains on remand over the unresolved Section 18 grievous bodily harm charge.
The remaining 18 continue to face criminal damage charges, with some also facing violent disorder allegations.
Thirteen defendants have applied for bail, while one, Sean Middlebrough, failed to return to custody while on conditional release in October last year.
Israel ‘dictating terms’ to US – Turkish professor
Washington is following the Jewish State’s demands on Iran and the Middle East as a whole, Hasan Unal has told RT
RT | February 18, 2026
Israel is effectively dictating US foreign policy, particularly on Iran and the wider Middle East, in a way that is historically unprecedented for a global superpower, a Turkish international relations professor has told RT.
Hasan Unal, who teaches at Baskent University in Ankara, spoke to RT’s Rick Sanchez this week about what he described as a highly unusual power imbalance between Israel and the US.
”We are living in a world now where a small country like Israel is dictating terms to a superpower like the United States on anything and everything, particularly anything pertaining to Israel and to the Middle East,” he said, calling the situation “totally unacceptable.”
Unal added that some analysts have even described it as an “occupation” of US policymaking by Israel, a characterization he said was “almost true.”
He went on to say that pro-Israel lobby influence and the personal involvement of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were shaping American positions, recalling episodes when Netanyahu “gets on his plane immediately” and flies to Washington “to simply dictate what [US President Donald] Trump should say and should negotiate in the negotiations with the Iranians.”
Unal claimed such a pattern has left Washington “dogging behind the Israeli demands all the time” and cautioned that it risks further destabilizing the Middle East.
Netanyahu has made multiple high profile visits to Washington to engage directly with senior US officials on regional policy. In the past year alone, he has met Trump at the White House at least six times to discuss issues ranging from Gaza and Iran’s nuclear program to military cooperation. His latest trip took place last week, ahead of the second round of indirect US Iran talks in Geneva. Netanyahu later said he had pressed Trump to ensure that Tehran is barred from enriching uranium. The renewed diplomatic push followed joint Israeli-US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities last year, officially justified as an attempt to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons – an ambition the Islamic Republic denies.
Trump has since sent an ‘armada’ to the Middle East and threatened further attacks unless Iran agrees to a deal on both its nuclear and missile programs. Last week, he raised the prospect of regime change and announced a second carrier strike group deployment, with media reports claiming the US military was ordered to prepare for a sustained multi-week operation if talks fail.
Asked whether Iran poses a direct threat to the US, Unal replied that Tehran does not seek to attack American assets as such and that many of the tensions are tied to Israel’s security calculations.
Unal also suggested what he called the gradual collapse of a “big empire,” referring to the Western-led order, and the emergence of a more multipolar system in which countries such as Russia, China, and Türkiye have greater room to maneuver. – video
Erdogan wants nukes: What a Turkish bomb would mean for the Middle East
Ankara is telling the world that a selective and force-driven approach to the Iranian nuclear issue could ignite a chain reaction
By Murad Sadygzade | RT | February 18, 2026
In Ankara, the idea of Türkiye one day seeking a nuclear weapons option has never been entirely absent from strategic conversation. Yet in recent days it has acquired a sharper edge, as the region around Türkiye is sliding toward a logic in which raw deterrence begins to look like the only dependable language left.
Türkiye’s foreign policy has expanded far beyond the cautious, status-quo posture that once defined it. It has positioned itself as a mediator on Ukraine and Gaza, pursued hard security aims through sustained operations and influence in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and inserted itself into competitive theaters from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long framed this activism as a corrective to an international order he portrays as structurally unfair. His slogan that the world is bigger than five – referring to the UN Security Council – is a statement of grievance against a system in which a narrow group of powers retains permanent privileges, including an exclusive claim to ultimate military capability.
Within that narrative, nuclear inequality occupies a special place. Erdogan has repeatedly pointed to the double standards of the global nuclear order, arguing that some states are punished for ambiguity while others are insulated from scrutiny. His references to Israel are central here, because Israel’s assumed but undeclared nuclear status is widely treated as an open secret that does not trigger the same enforcement instincts as suspected proliferation elsewhere. That asymmetry has long irritated Ankara, but it became more politically potent after the war in Gaza that began in 2023, when Erdogan openly highlighted Israel’s arsenal and questioned why international inspection mechanisms do not apply in practice to all regional actors.
Still, for years this was mostly an argument about fairness and legitimacy rather than a declaration of intent. What has changed is the sense that the regional security architecture itself is cracking, and that the cracks are widening at the very moment the US and Israel are escalating pressure on Iran. Türkiye’s leadership has warned that if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, others in the region will rush to follow, and Türkiye may be forced into the race as well, even if it does not want dramatic shifts in the balance.
This is the key to understanding the new intensity of the debate. Ankara’s signaling is not primarily an emotional reaction to Tehran. Türkiye and Iran remain competitors, but their frictions have also been managed through pragmatic diplomacy, and Türkiye has consistently argued against a military solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Erdogan has again presented Türkiye as a mediator, insisting on de-escalation and rejecting military steps that could drag the region into wider chaos.
The driver is the fear that the rules are no longer the rules. When enforcement becomes selective, and when coercion is applied in ways that appear to disregard broader stability, the incentives change for every middle power caught in the blast radius. The signal from Ankara is that if the Middle East moves into a world where nuclear capability is treated as the only ironclad guarantee against regime-threatening force, then Türkiye cannot afford to remain the exception.
That logic is dangerous precisely because it is contagious. It turns proliferation into an insurance policy. In an unstable region where trust is thin and the memory of war is always fresh, the idea of nuclear weapons as a shield against interference can sound brutally rational. If possessing the bomb raises the cost of intervention to unacceptable levels, it can be perceived as the ultimate deterrent, a guarantee that outsiders will think twice. But the same logic that appears to promise safety for one actor produces insecurity for everyone else. In practice it fuels an arms race whose end state is not stability, but a crowded deterrence environment in which miscalculation becomes more likely, crisis management becomes harder, and conventional conflicts become more combustible because nuclear shadows hover over every escalation ladder.
The renewed urgency also reflects a broader global drift. Arms competition is intensifying well beyond the Middle East. The erosion of arms control habits, the normalization of sanctions as a tool of strategic coercion, and the return of bloc-like thinking in many theaters all contribute to a sense that restraint is no longer rewarded. For Türkiye, a state that sees itself as too large to be merely a client and too exposed to be fully autonomous, the temptation is to seek leverage that cannot be negotiated away. Nuclear latency, even without an actual bomb, can function as a strategic bargaining chip.
Yet the jump from ambition to capability is not straightforward. Türkiye does have important ingredients for a serious civil nuclear profile, and those capabilities matter because they shape perceptions. The country has been building human capital in nuclear engineering and developing an ecosystem of research institutions, reactors for training and experimentation, accelerator facilities, and nuclear medicine applications. Most visibly, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project with Russia has served as an engine for training and institutional learning, even if technology transfer is limited and the project remains embedded in external dependence.
Türkiye also highlights domestic resource potential, including uranium and especially thorium, which is often discussed as a long-term strategic asset. Resource endowments do not automatically translate into weapons capability, but they reduce one barrier, the need for sustained and vulnerable supply chains. As a result, Türkiye can credibly present itself as a state that could, if it chose, move from peaceful nuclear competence toward a latent weapons posture.
The real bottleneck is not simply material. It is political and legal. Türkiye is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it operates inside a web of international commitments that would make an overt weapons program extremely costly. Withdrawal from the treaty or large-scale violations would almost certainly trigger sweeping sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and a rupture with major economic partners. Unlike states that have adapted their economies to long-term siege conditions, Türkiye is deeply integrated into global trade, finance, and logistics. The short-term shock of a proliferation crisis would be severe, and Ankara knows it.
This is why the most plausible path, if Türkiye ever moved in this direction, would not be a dramatic public sprint. It would be a careful, ambiguous strategy that expands latency while preserving diplomatic maneuvering room. Latency can mean investing in expertise, dual-use infrastructure, missile and space capabilities that could be adapted, and fuel cycle options that remain justifiable on civilian grounds. It can also mean cultivating external relationships that shorten timelines without leaving fingerprints.
Here the debate becomes even more sensitive, because proliferation risk is not only about what a country can build, but also about what it can receive. The Middle East has long been haunted by the possibility of clandestine technology transfer, whether through black markets, covert state support, or unofficial security arrangements. In recent months, discussions around Pakistan have become particularly salient, not least because Islamabad is one of the few Muslim majority nuclear powers and has historically maintained close security ties with Gulf monarchies.
Saudi Arabia has repeatedly signaled that it will not accept a regional balance in which Iran alone holds a nuclear weapon. Saudi leaders have at times implied that if Iran acquires the bomb, Riyadh would feel compelled to match it for reasons of security and balance. Those statements are not proof of an active weapons program, but they are political preparation, shaping expectations and normalizing the idea that proliferation could be framed as defensive rather than destabilizing.
There have also been unusually explicit hints in regional discourse about nuclear protection arrangements, including arguments that Pakistan could, in some scenario, extend a form of deterrence cover to Saudi Arabia. Even when such claims are partly performative, they underscore how the region’s strategic conversation is shifting from taboo to contingency planning.
Once that door is open, Türkiye inevitably enters the picture in regional imagination. Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are linked through overlapping defense cooperation and political coordination, and analysts increasingly discuss the emergence of flexible security groupings that sit alongside or partially outside formal Western frameworks. The idea that technology, know-how, or deterrence guarantees could circulate within such networks is precisely the nightmare scenario for nonproliferation regimes, because it compresses timelines and reduces the visibility that international monitors depend on.
For Ankara, this creates both opportunity and risk. The opportunity is that Türkiye could enhance its deterrent posture without bearing the full cost of overt development. The risk is that Türkiye could become entangled in a proliferation cascade that it cannot control, while simultaneously inviting a Western backlash that would reshape its economy and alliances.
This is where the question becomes deeply geopolitical. A nuclear-armed Türkiye would not simply change the Middle East. It would alter Europe’s security landscape and challenge the logic that has governed Türkiye’s relationship with the West for decades. Western capitals have tolerated, managed, and constrained Türkiye through a mixture of incentives, institutional ties, defense cooperation, and pressure. Türkiye’s NATO membership, its economic links to Europe, and the presence of US nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik as part of alliance arrangements have all been elements of a broader strategic framework in which Türkiye was seen as anchored, even when politically difficult.
If Türkiye acquired its own nuclear weapons, that anchoring would weaken dramatically. Ankara would gain a form of autonomy that no sanction threat could fully erase. It would also gain the capacity to take risks under a nuclear umbrella, a dynamic that worries Western capitals because it could embolden more confrontational regional behavior. Türkiye’s disputes with Western partners are already intense on issues ranging from Eastern Mediterranean energy politics to Syria, defense procurement, and the boundaries of alliance solidarity. A nuclear deterrent could make those disputes harder to manage because the ultimate escalation dominance would no longer sit exclusively with the traditional nuclear powers.
At the same time, a Turkish bomb could accelerate Türkiye’s drift away from the West, not only because the West would react with pressure, but because the very act of building such a capability would be an ideological statement that Türkiye rejects a Western-defined hierarchy. It would be Ankara’s most dramatic way of saying that it will not accept a subordinate place in a system it considers hypocritical.
None of this means Türkiye is on the verge of producing a weapon. Political obstacles remain huge, and technical challenges would be substantial if Ankara had to do everything indigenously while under scrutiny. A credible weapons program requires enrichment or plutonium pathways, specialized engineering, reliable warhead design, rigorous testing regimes or sophisticated simulation capabilities, secure command and control, and delivery systems that can survive and penetrate. Türkiye has missile programs that could in theory be adapted, but turning a regional missile force into a robust nuclear delivery architecture is not trivial.
The more immediate danger is not that Türkiye will suddenly unveil a bomb, but that the region is moving toward a threshold era, in which multiple states cultivate the ability to become nuclear on short notice. In such an environment, crises become more perilous because leaders assume worst-case intentions, and because external powers may feel pressure to strike early rather than wait. The irony is that a weapon meant to prevent intervention can increase the likelihood of intervention if adversaries fear they are running out of time.
The escalation by the US and Israel against Iran, combined with the broader arms race logic spreading across the Middle East and globally, is making this spiral more plausible. Uncertainty is the fuel of proliferation, because it convinces states that the future will be more dangerous than the present, and that waiting is a strategic mistake.
Türkiye’s rhetoric should therefore be read as a warning as much as a threat. Ankara is telling the world that a selective and force-driven approach to the Iranian nuclear issue could ignite a chain reaction. It is also telling regional rivals that Türkiye will not accept a future in which it is strategically exposed in a neighborhood where others have ultimate insurance.
The tragedy is that this is exactly how nuclear orders unravel. They do not collapse when one state wakes up and decides to gamble. They collapse when multiple states simultaneously conclude that the existing rules no longer protect them, and that deterrence, however dangerous, is the only available substitute. In a stable region, that conclusion might be resisted. In the Middle East, where wars overlap, alliances shift, and trust is scarce, it can quickly become conventional wisdom.
If the goal is to prevent a regional nuclear cascade, the first requirement is to restore credibility to the idea that rules apply to everyone and that security can be achieved without crossing the nuclear threshold. That means lowering the temperature around Iran while also addressing the deeper asymmetries that make the system look illegitimate in the eyes of ambitious middle powers. Without that, Türkiye’s nuclear debate will not remain an abstract exercise. It will become part of a wider regional recalculation, one that risks turning an already unstable region into a nuclearized arena where every crisis carries the possibility of catastrophe.
Murad Sadygzade, President of the Middle East Studies Center, Visiting Lecturer, HSE University (Moscow).
Israeli firms transform cars into intelligence devices: Reports

Al Mayadeen | February 17, 2026
Modern vehicles have evolved into internet-connected digital ecosystems, a transformation that is reshaping the global intelligence market, with “Israel” paying special attention to this rising domain, according to a new investigation by Haaretz.
In intelligence circles, information harvested from vehicles is known as “CARINT,” short for car intelligence. Today’s vehicles function as “computers on wheels,” equipped with built-in SIM cards, GPS systems, Bluetooth connectivity, and multimedia platforms that continuously transmit data.
The report reveals that at least three Israeli companies are operating in this expanding sector, developing tools that enable government clients to track vehicle movements in real time, cross-reference vast databases, and identify specific targets among thousands of cars on the road.
Industry sources cited in the investigation described the use of AI-powered “data fusion” systems that combine vehicle telemetry, roadside camera feeds, advertising data, and cellular metadata to construct comprehensive intelligence profiles. Rather than directly hacking a device, agencies are increasingly assembling what sources describe as a surveillance mosaic from legally or commercially available data streams.
The case of Toka
Among the companies identified is Toka, co-founded by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and former Israeli military cyber chief Yaron Rosen.
According to documents and industry sources cited by Haaretz, Toka developed a product capable of infiltrating a vehicle’s multimedia system, pinpointing its location, and remotely activating microphones or dashboard cameras. The system was reportedly approved by “Israel’s” Security Ministry for presentation and eventual export.
The company said that as part of its 2026 product roadmap, it no longer sells the hacking tool.
Experts noted that exploiting vehicle vulnerabilities remains technically complex, as each manufacturer employs distinct digital architectures. However, the possibility of remote access to in-car microphones and cameras has raised acute privacy and security concerns.
Another Israeli firm, Rayzone, has reportedly begun selling vehicle-tracking tools through its subsidiary TA9. Unlike offensive hacking products, Rayzone’s system focuses on aggregating and cross-referencing data, including SIM-card tracking, Bluetooth signals, and license-plate recognition feeds.
The investigation suggests that the intelligence industry is gradually shifting away from high-profile phone-hacking technologies associated with firms such as NSO Group and toward large-scale, AI-enabled data analytics platforms.
In the United States, companies such as Palantir Technologies analyze license plate databases and vehicle registries, integrating them into broader intelligence systems. Israeli firm Cellebrite also works extensively with US law enforcement agencies in extracting and processing digital evidence, including vehicle-related data.
Vehicle intelligence expanded post Oct. 7
The Haaretz investigation further highlights that in the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Israeli authorities, with support from the private sector, developed advanced capabilities to locate vehicles stolen from army bases and border communities. According to the report, these tools were later integrated into military systems.
The article also points to China’s longstanding regulatory framework requiring domestic car manufacturers to transmit vehicle data to state authorities. It further notes that the Israeli Occupation Forces imposed restrictions on certain Chinese electric vehicles entering military facilities, citing security concerns.
Security analysts warn that the accelerating digitization of vehicles not only expands surveillance capabilities but also increases cybersecurity risks. Ethical hackers have previously demonstrated, in controlled environments, the ability to manipulate steering systems or disable engines remotely. Industry sources cited in the investigation indicate that some government clients are increasingly expressing interest in remote vehicle-disabling technologies.
At global intelligence exhibitions such as ISS World, often referred to as the “Wiretapper’s Ball”, artificial intelligence and real-time data fusion dominate discussions. AI systems now enable the rapid processing of millions of disparate data points, including vehicle telemetry, audio streams, and video feeds, transforming them into actionable intelligence with unprecedented speed.
Industry insiders argue that as vehicles become more connected, they will inevitably play a more central role in intelligence gathering. Privacy advocates, however, caution that the same connectivity that enhances consumer convenience may also underpin a powerful and potentially intrusive surveillance infrastructure.
The Haaretz investigation concludes that while directly hacking individual vehicles remains technically complex, AI-driven aggregation of vehicle-generated data could make such intrusions increasingly unnecessary, raising significant questions about privacy, regulation, and the future of digital mobility.
Palantir, Dataminr help build Gaza AI-Driven digital prison system
A +972 Magazine investigation reveals that US firms Palantir and Dataminr are embedded in the US-Israeli post-war plan for Gaza through the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC), a US-run hub coordinating Trump’s 20-point plan. A Palantir “Maven Field Service Representative” tied to Project Maven has been assigned to the center, integrating battlefield AI into Gaza’s future control structure.
Project Maven fuses satellite imagery, drone feeds, intercepted communications, and metadata into an AI platform described as “optimizing the kill chain.” Rights groups argue these AI-enabled systems have accelerated the genocide in Gaza, scaling up killings with minimal human oversight. UN figures show nearly 70% of verified fatalities are women and children, with entire families wiped out in strikes allegedly guided by AI systems.
Palantir has expanded cooperation with Israeli occupation forces since 2024, doubling its Tel Aviv presence and supporting war-related missions. Amnesty International lists the company among firms whose services helped facilitate genocide and starvation in Gaza. Dataminr, specializing in real-time social media surveillance, has also been integrated into the framework, feeding AI-driven threat intelligence into the evolving security architecture.
Under the so-called “Alternative Safe Communities” model, Palestinians would be forcibly relocated into fenced, heavily monitored compounds under US-Israeli control. Within these zones, AI systems would track phones, movements, and online activity, flagging individuals as “security risks,” effectively turning Gaza into an AI-driven digital prison and kill-list system.
This architecture has been compared to Nazi concentration camps in its logic of isolating, surveilling, and managing an entire population as a security threat, reducing civilians to data points under total algorithmic control.
Zionist-controlled companies to surveil British citizens

Press TV – February 17, 2026
The implications of the British state using technology produced by Zionist-controlled companies to surveil British citizens are beyond belief.
The cornerstone of a sovereign nation is the absolute control over its own justice, its own data, and its own watchmen. Yet today, the very machinery of British law enforcement is being quietly and systemically outsourced.
The British government has allowed the digital and physical infrastructure of the state to become a high tech extension of a foreign power, driven by the pernicious influence of Zionism, an ideology that prioritizes the expansion of a foreign entity over the rights of people in the UK.
This is not merely a matter of procurement. It is a surrender of independence.
By embedding Zionist-linked firms into the heartbeat of British society, the government is importing a surveillance philosophy rooted in the subjugation of one people and applying it to their own subjects.
These are combat-proven technologies forged in the fires of the Gaza genocide, and they are now the primary eyes and ears of the metropolitan police.
The police use Israeli intelligence firm Cellebrite to unlock the phones and private lives of their own citizens. They also use BriefCam to track people’s movements through video synopsis.
BriefCam is a company co-founded by Gideon Ben-Zvi, a veteran of the IOF elite unit 8200 Intelligence Corps, who openly admits to using unit 8200 criteria to lead his ventures.
The reach of foreign intelligence into the streets is even more direct through Corsight AI, which provides facial recognition throughout the country.
Born as a subsidiary of Cortica, it was founded by Igal Raichelgauz, another alumnus of the Zionist military intelligence apparatus.
When our faces are scanned by software overseen by the architects of the occupation of Palestine, can we truly say that the British public is being policed by British consent?
But the intrusion goes deeper than software. It reaches the very hands of our officers on the front lines.
ISPRA, an Israeli specialist in riot control, has historically supplied the crowd management munitions used to police the streets.
When the tools used to suppress dissent in the UK are manufactured by a firm specializing in the containment of occupied territories, the line between domestic policing and foreign military occupation begins to blur.
Furthermore, Motorola Solutions, a company listed by the United Nations for its links to illegal settlements, is now deep inside our research projects.
Through initiatives like CREST and Connections, they’re building predictive policing tools designed to monitor the social media content and online lives of the British public.
When a company that facilitates surveillance in the West Bank is the same one mapping the future crimes of Londoners, we have fundamentally compromised our domestic integrity.
Links between Zionist movement and Lionel Idan
Lionel Idan is a key British prosecutor serving as the Chief Crown Prosecutor for the CPS and also the National Hate Crime Lead Prosecutor.
He’s currently being heavily lobbied by a network of powerful Zionist groups.
We’re not just talking about casual meetings.
Idan has held repeated engagements with the Israeli embassy and Zionist lobby groups, the board of Deputies of British Jews and the Community Security Trust, CSD, an organization headed by convicted fraudster Gerald Ronson.
The objective is clear, to ensure the Crown Prosecution Service, CPS, fully adapts the IHRA definition of anti-semitism, a definition weaponized against anti-Zionists, as we saw during the attacks on Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party.
Lionel Idan has not hidden these alliances. In an op-ed for the Jewish News, he boasted that the CPS sits on the anti-semitism Working Group alongside the CSD and the Jewish leadership council.
He confirmed that lobby groups, the CSD and the Antisemitism Policy Trust, are now core members of the CPS External Consultative Group on Hate Crime.
Perhaps most concerning is that the national prosecution guidance is being shaped by these very groups. Idan has admitted that their involvement helps the CPS define the line where anti-Zionism becomes a criminal offense.
When the person overseeing London’s prosecutions attends Israel lobby annual dinners to celebrate new security task forces, where is the independence of the UK legal system?
It should be demanded that the CPS remain an impartial body free from the influence of political lobbyists and foreign interests.
Macron, Merz, and von der Leyen Defend Expanded Speech Controls
The Munich Security Conference just became a defense session for Europe’s most ambitious censorship regime
By Dan Frieth | Reclaim The Net | February 16, 2026
Emmanuel Macron stood before the Munich Security Conference last week and offered a blueprint for what European governments should be allowed to delete from the internet. The French president wants mandatory identity verification for social media users, one account per person, algorithm transparency on the government’s terms, and the legal authority to block platforms that refuse to comply.
“We have to be sure there is one single person with one account,” Macron said. “If this is an AI system, if this is bot or organized by big organization, it should be just forbidden.”
The statement describes a system where every social media user would have their identity verified by platforms and tied to a single permitted account. Anonymous speech, pseudonymous commentary, and the ability to maintain separate personal and professional presences online would effectively end for anyone using platforms that serve the European market.
Macron suggested this as a way to protect democracy. The mechanism would give governments a powerful tool to identify, track, and silence any user whose speech they find objectionable.
France is moving to ban social media access for anyone under 15, a policy that requires verifying every user. Macron defended this by characterizing free expression online as a form of brainwashing.
“Free speech would mean I will give the mind, brand the heart of my teenagers to algorithm of big guys,” he said. “I’m not totally sure I share the values, or Chinese algorithm without any control. We are crazy.”
The argument runs as follows: letting young people encounter ideas online without government permission is insanity. The solution requires every user to prove their age to access platforms where public discussion happens.
Macron suggested that speech illegal in newspapers should remain illegal when moved online. “How is that the craziest and most harmful narratives can go unchecked in our digital space, where they will fall under the law if published in print?”
The question assumes “harmful narratives” is a category the government should define. It also assumes the government should have the power to prevent people from encountering ideas it has labeled crazy.
Macron invoked the Digital Services Act as the foundation for expanded censorship across Europe. “This is a very important regulation because for the first time we created the framework to regulate this platform.”
The DSA gives EU regulators the authority to demand content removal from platforms. Macron called for going further: using the law to “excuse those who clearly decide not to respect our rules and our regulation” and to “block all those [who allow] interferences in our systems.”
He offered a familiar list of speech categories he wants suppressed: “racist speech, hateful speech, anti-Semitic speech.” These terms have no fixed legal definition that applies uniformly across EU member states. Who is racist, what constitutes hatred, which criticism of which policies counts as anti-Semitism: these determinations would be made by regulators and platforms operating under government pressure.
Macron described limits on speech as somehow inherent to democracy itself: “When you have free speech, you have respect, you have rules, and the limit of my freedom is the beginning of your freedom.”
This formulation treats speech as equivalent to physical coercion. Your words are framed as a boundary violation against others simply by existing. The speech that most requires protection is speech that offends, that challenges consensus, that the powerful would prefer to suppress. Macron’s framework offers no protection for any of it.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who opened the conference, echoed the European position that speech protections should end where government-defined values begin.
“A divide has opened up between Europe and the United States,” Merz said. “And Vice President JD Vance said this very openly here at the Munich Security Conference a year ago, and he was right. The battle of cultures of MAGA in the US is not ours. Freedom of speech here ends where the words spoken are directed against human dignity and our basic law.”
“Human dignity” is the phrase German law uses to justify prosecuting speech. The Constitutional Court has interpreted it to cover insults, Holocaust denial, and an expanding category of expression that authorities determine undermines respect for persons or groups. It is the legal mechanism under which German police have raided homes over social media posts and prosecuted people for memes.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen joined the censorship chorus with a declaration of territorial authority over online expression.
“I want to be very clear: our digital sovereignty is our digital sovereignty,” she said, adding the EU “will not flinch where this is concerned.”
Von der Leyen described European speech regulation as under attack from the United States, “which has wielded the threats of tariffs on partners to secure preferential access and has decried the EU’s digital rules as an assault on free speech.”
The EU’s digital rules are an assault on free speech. The DSA empowers bureaucrats to demand platforms remove content, under threat of massive fines.
The EU has opened formal proceedings against X for its policies. European regulators have forced platforms to suppress content that would be legally protected in the United States.
Von der Leyen framed resistance to this regime as a threat to Europe’s “democratic foundation.” She claimed Europe has “a long tradition in freedom of speech” while defending a legal structure designed to ensure certain speech never reaches European audiences.
“The European way of life – our democratic foundation and the trust of our citizens – is being challenged in new ways,” she said. “On everything from territories to tariffs or tech regulations.”
The phrasing groups speech regulation with tariffs and territorial disputes. All three are matters where Europe will defend its sovereignty. What Europeans are permitted to say, read, and share online is treated as equivalent to where national borders fall.
The leaders who gathered in Munich spoke of protecting democracy while proposing tools that would let governments identify and punish dissent. They invoked free speech while demanding the power to decide which speech is free. They claimed to defend Europe while stripping Europeans of the ability to speak freely online.
‘Israel’ threatens to genocide Gaza if Hamas refuses disarmament
Al Mayadeen | February 16, 2026
Senior Israeli officials have threatened to renew the genocide in Gaza if Hamas does not disarm within a proposed 60-day period, although the Israeli occupation continues its attacks on the Strip daily, never adhering to the ceasefire agreement.
Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs, a senior adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, said that the occupation government intends to give Hamas two months to relinquish its arms. If it does not comply, the Israeli military would “complete the mission” in Gaza, he threatened.
The warnings came against the backdrop of the US-led “Board of Peace”, under which Washington dictated the 60-day deadline.
According to Fuchs, Hamas would be required to surrender all weapons, including small arms such as AK-47 rifles. He emphasized that the Israeli regime would evaluate the outcome at the end of the period.
Netanyahu also reiterated that disarmament must include small arms, claiming that such weapons were used during the October 7 operation. Israeli officials allege that tens of thousands of rifles remain in Gaza.
Reports in The New York Times suggested that a draft proposal discussed by US mediators could initially allow Hamas to retain some small arms while surrendering weapons deemed capable of striking “Israel”. The document is reportedly expected to be shared with the Palestinian Resistance in the coming weeks.
Devastation and aggression despite ceasefire
Despite the ceasefire agreement, officially effective as of October 11, 2025, the Israeli regime has maintained its occupation of vast areas across the Gaza Strip, and continues to attack the Palestinian territory’s infrastructure and civilians.
Since then, over 591 Palestinians, including women and children, have been killed, and more than 1,598 others have been injured.
Since October 7, 2023, more than 72,051 Palestinians have been killed, and over 171,706 have been injured, making the war on Gaza one of the most brutal in modern history. Many victims are still in dire need of treatment. However, hospitals across Gaza have been systematically targeted over the past three years, forcing operations to minimal function, sometimes to a halt.
Israel’s new West Bank registration process declares Palestinian land ‘state property’
The Cradle | February 16, 2026
The Israeli government has approved a land registration process, which will allow Israel to claim territory in the occupied West Bank as “state property” if Palestinians cannot prove ownership, a move that has been described as “de facto annexation.”
Israel’s Broadcasting Corporation (KAN) reported that the proposal was submitted by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, Justice Minister Yariv Levin, and Defense Minister Israel Katz.
“We are continuing the revolution of settlement and strengthening our hold across all parts of our land,” Smotrich said.
Katz called the move a vital security measure and an “appropriate response to illegal land registration processes promoted by the Palestinian Authority.”
Israel’s Foreign Ministry said the registration process will allow for “transparency” and will help resolve land disputes.
The bar for proving Palestinian land ownership is extremely high due to Israel’s restrictive legal system.
Palestinian claims of ownership are rarely granted. Many families rely on decades-old Ottoman documents, or have never had their land properly registered.
Similarly, Israel rarely grants building permits to Palestinians, allowing troops to demolish homes across the occupied West Bank. According to Israel’s Channel 14, Smotrich has established a paramilitary unit whose job is the destruction of Palestinian property.
The registration measures approved on Sunday were frozen in 1968.
Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas called the approval of the land registration process “de facto annexation.”
“The decision to classify West Bank land as state land under Israeli authority constitutes a direct threat to security and stability. The measure amounts to de facto annexation of occupied Palestinian territory and signals the beginning of the implementation of annexation plans aimed at entrenching the occupation through illegal settlement expansion,” the PA presidency said in a statement on Sunday.
Since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government came to power, it has been rapidly advancing plans to illegally annex the West Bank – occupied by Israel in 1967.
Israel’s security cabinet approved new measures on 8 February aimed at drastically overhauling the occupied West Bank’s legal and civil framework, allowing Tel Aviv to further expand illegal settlements and strengthen its grip on the territory.
Last year, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signed off on reviving the controversial E1 settlement project. The project aims to link Maale Adumim to occupied East Jerusalem, which is viewed as integral to a future Palestinian state.
Israel’s cabinet also voted in 2025 to take full responsibility for land registration in Area C of the occupied West Bank – an area comprising around 60 percent of the territory and home to the vast majority of Israeli settlements. That move was also described as a de facto annexation.
Two children killed in Palestinian Authority ambush in West Bank; Hamas slams attack as ‘black mark’
Press TV – February 16, 2026
Two children have been killed after Palestinian Authority (PA) forces opened fire on a vehicle carrying their father, a resistance fighter, in the town of Tamoun in the northeastern part of the occupied West Bank.
The three-year-old daughter of Samer Samara succumbed to her wounds on Sunday after being shot by the forces, Palestinian media outlets reported.
Her 16-year-old brother, Ali, was killed after being shot in the head. Their father was wounded and later abducted by PA forces.
According to the reports, the forces shot Samara in the legs before abducting him.
Local reports said units from the PA’s so-called Preventive Security Service and a special unit set up the ambush and fired heavy gunfire at the car during an operation to abduct Samara, who is wanted by Israeli occupation forces.
Following the killings, the youths of the town of Tamoun launched a demonstration and a general strike. Reports said the PA sent reinforcements to suppress the demonstration.
The Gaza Strip’s Hamas resistance movement condemned the atrocities, holding the Authority fully responsible for the consequences of targeting resistance fighters and killing children.
In a statement, the group described what happened as a “serious crime” and a “black mark in the record of the security services that continue to overpower our people instead of protecting them.”
The movement warned that the policy could damage Palestinian internal cohesion and demanded accountability.
It called for “holding all those involved accountable, stopping the pursuit of wanted Palestinians, and releasing political detainees.”
The Committee of Families of Political Prisoners also condemned the shooting, describing it as the result of a “systematic policy targeting resistance fighters.”
It said the incident represented a “dangerous deviation” that placed security services in confrontation with the population rather than protecting them.
Human rights organizations say such incidents risk deepening internal tensions at a time when Palestinians in the West Bank also face ongoing Israeli military raids and settler violence, contributing to what observers describe as a climate of compounded insecurity for civilians.




