Europe Economic Panic
By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 18, 2026
When a prime minister advises his staff to rest because the coming year will be much more difficult, it is neither black humor nor fatigue. It is a moment of sincerity, the kind that only emerges when internal projections no longer support the public narrative.
Giorgia Meloni was not addressing the electorate. She was addressing the machinery of the state itself, the administrative core charged with implementing decisions whose effects can no longer be hidden. Her observation was not about a normal increase in workload. She was talking about constraints, about limits being reached, about a Europe that has moved from crisis response to a phase of controlled contraction, fully aware that 2026 is the year when deferred costs will eventually converge.
What has leaked out is what European ruling circles have already understood: the Western strategy in Ukraine has run up against material limits. Not with Russian messages, not with disinformation, not with populist dissent, but with steel, ammunition, energy, manpower, and time. Once these realities assert themselves, political legitimacy begins to erode.
The EU cannot sustain this war economically. Europe can strike poses of readiness. It cannot manufacture war.
After years of high-intensity conflict, both the US and Europe are rediscovering a long-forgotten truth: wars of this nature cannot be sustained with speeches, sanctions, or the abandonment of diplomacy. They require bullets, missiles, trained personnel, maintenance cycles, and industrial production that consistently exceeds battlefield losses. None of this exists, not in sufficient quantities, and it is not feasible in the timeframe preached in Brussels.
Russia is producing artillery ammunition in quantities that Western officials now openly admit exceed NATO’s total production. Its industrial base has shifted to near-continuous wartime production, with centralized procurement, streamlined logistics, and state-led manufacturing, without even total mobilization. Estimates place Russian production at several million artillery shells per year, already delivered, not just projected.
Europe, meanwhile, spent 2025 congratulating itself on targets it is structurally incapable of achieving. The EU’s stated commitment of two million shells per year depends on facilities, contracts, and labor that will not be available by the decisive period of the war, if ever. Even if achieved, the figure would still be less than Russian production. The US, despite emergency expansion, expects about one million shells per year once full ramp-up is complete, and only if that happens. Even on paper, combined Western production struggles to match what Russia is already producing in practice. The imbalance is clear.
This is not just a deficit, but a misalignment of timing. Russia is producing now. Europe is planning for the future. And time is the only factor immune to sanctions.
Washington, in fact, cannot indefinitely compensate for Europe’s eroded capacity because it faces its own industrial difficulties. Patriot interceptor production remains in the order of a few hundred per year, while demand simultaneously concerns Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and the replenishment of US stocks: an imbalance that, as Pentagon officials admit, cannot be resolved quickly. Shipbuilding tells a similar story: submarines and surface ships are years behind schedule due to labor shortages, aging infrastructure, and skyrocketing costs, pushing significant expansion toward 2030. The assumption that America can indefinitely support Europe is no longer in line with reality. This is a systemic Western problem.
Unfounded war rhetoric
European leaders talk about a “state of war” as if it were a rhetorical position, but in reality, it is an industrial condition that Europe does not meet.
New artillery lines take years to reach stable production. Air defense interceptors are produced in long, batch-based cycles, not in sudden spikes. Even basic components such as explosives remain a critical issue, with plants that closed decades ago only now reopening and some not expected to reach full capacity until the late 2020s. This timeline is in itself an admission.
Europe’s weakness is not intellectual, but institutional: huge sums have been authorized, but procurement inertia, fragmented contracts, and a depleted supplier base have meant that deliveries are years behind schedule. France, often described as Europe’s most capable arms manufacturer, is capable of building advanced systems, but only in limited quantities, counted in dozens, while a war of attrition requires thousands. EU ammunition initiatives have expanded capacity on paper, while the front has exhausted ammunition in a matter of weeks.
These are not ideological shortcomings, but administrative and industrial failures, which are exacerbated in stressful situations. It is yet another example of the failure of European Community policy, so much so that the structural contrast is stark. Western industry has been optimized for shareholder returns and peacetime efficiency, while Russian industry has been reoriented to withstand pressure. NATO announces aid packages. Russia counts deliveries. You can already guess what the outcome of this situation will be, right?
This industrial reality explains why the debate on asset freezing was so important and why it failed. Europe did not pursue the seizure of Russian sovereign assets out of legal ingenuity or moral determination, but because it needed time: time to avoid admitting that the war was unsustainable in Western industrial terms, time to replace production with financial maneuvers.
When the effort to confiscate some €210 billion in Russian assets failed on December 20, blocked by legal risks, market repercussions, and opposition led by Belgium, with Italy, Malta, Slovakia, and Hungary opposing total confiscation, the Brussels technocracy settled for a reduced alternative: a €90 billion loan to Ukraine for 2026-27, with interest payments of around €3 billion per year. This further mortgages Europe’s future. This is not a strategy, but emergency triage. A collapsing political hospital. Pure panic.
Narrative, crisis, disaster
The deeper reality is that Ukraine is no longer primarily a military dilemma, it is a question of solvency. Washington recognizes this, because it cannot absorb the reputational discomfort, but they cannot take on unlimited responsibility forever. A way out is being explored, discreetly, inconsistently, and shrouded in rhetorical cover.
Europe cannot admit the same necessity, because it has ultimately adopted ‘Putin’s version’, i.e. it has framed the war as existential, civilising, moral – but do you remember when European politicians enjoyed calling Putin crazy for talking about a clash of civilisations?
Compromise has become appeasement, negotiation surrender. In doing so, Europe has eliminated its own escape routes. Well done, ladies and gentlemen!
On the narrative front, greetings to all. The aggressive enforcement of the EU’s Digital Services Act has less to do with security than with containment: building an information perimeter around a consensus that cannot survive open scrutiny. Translated: censorship as a solution. The truth of the matter must not be made known, and those who try to do so must be suppressed in an exemplary manner. This also explains why regulatory pressure now extends beyond European borders, generating transatlantic friction over freedom of expression and jurisdiction. Confident systems welcome debate. Fragile ones suppress it. In this case, censorship is not ideology, but a form of insurance.
The information crisis, rest assured, will very soon become… a social crisis ready to detonate into domestic conflict.
And the crisis is also one of resources and energy. We are witnessing the securitization of decline, whereby obligations are postponed while the productive base needed to sustain them continues to shrink. It’s a cat chasing its tail. Here too, you know how it will end, don’t you?
Europe has not only sanctioned Russia. It has sanctioned itself. European industry will continue to pay energy prices well above those of its competitors in the United States or Russia throughout 2026. Take a trip around Europe, read the headlines in local newspapers, look at people’s faces: the fabric of small and medium-sized enterprises, the true beating heart of entire EU countries, is quietly disappearing. And this is logically reflected in large companies too. This is why Europe cannot increase its production of ammunition and why rearmament remains an aspiration rather than a concrete operation.
Energy, we said. Low-cost energy was not a convenience, it was essential. If it is eliminated through self-inflicted damage, the entire structure is emptied. Even the most ambitious plans preached for years, such as the IMEC corridor, are still a mirage. There is a stampede towards Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to try to scrape together a few kilowatts. A ridiculous attempt to save what is now tragically unsalvageable.
China, observing all this, represents the other half of Europe’s strategic nightmare. It controls the world’s deepest manufacturing base without having entered into a position of war. Russia does not need China’s full capacity, only its strategic depth in reserve. Europe has neither.
A frightening 2026
2026 therefore looks set to be a terrible year, I’m sorry to say. The European elites find themselves losing control on three fronts at once. On finance, because the budget will be bitter and the money for the insane support to Kiev will no longer be the same. On narrative, because the question citizens will ask themselves will be ‘what was the point of all this?’. On the cohesion of the Alliance, both NATO and the EU, because Washington’s disengagement will force a review of the balance of power on the European continent to the point of no return and, perhaps, a break between the two sides divided by the ocean.
Panic, again. Not a sudden defeat, but the slow erosion of legitimacy as reality creeps in through gas that costs as much as gold, closed plants, empty stockpiles, obsolete rifles, and a future that is turning away.
This is not just a difficult situation for Europe, but a matter of civilization. A system incapable of producing, supplying, speaking honestly, or retreating without collapsing in credibility has reached its limit. When leaders begin to prepare their institutions for worse years, they are not anticipating inconveniences, but recognizing structural failure.
Empires proclaim victory loudly. Declining systems quietly lower expectations or, in this case, momentarily say the quiet part out loud. But the truth is that nothing is the same as before, and it is obvious.
For most Europeans, the reckoning will not come as an abstract debate about strategy or supply chains, but as a simple realization: this was never a war they consented to. It did not defend their homes, their prosperity, or their future. And so, again, how do you think it will end?
An ideological war has been fought in the name of imperial ambition and financed through declining living standards, industrial decline, and the prospects of their children. In the name of big pro-European capital, of the privileged few with robes, stars, and crowns.
For months, even years, it was said that “there was no alternative” and that this was the only course of action. And now?
Europeans are tired. They want peace, stability, and the quiet dignity of prosperity: affordable energy, a functioning industry, and a future unencumbered by conflicts they NEVER chose and, above all, they do not want the decline of millennia-old civilizations.
And when this awareness has taken hold, when the fear has faded and the spell has been broken, the question Europeans will ask themselves will not be technical or ideological. It will be existential. And all existential questions lead to radical choices, even terrible ones.
May this dramatic fear keep the mad leaders of this Europe awake at night.
Ukraine is defending itself with money Europe doesn’t have
By Ian Proud | Strategic Culture Foundation | January 17, 2026
The ugly truth is that an end of the Ukraine war may have as devastating economic and political consequences for Europe as its continuance.
Ukraine already faces a $63 billion U.S. dollar funding shortfall in 2026 and I would be surprised if this figure doesn’t increase if the war continues. Ukraine’s massive fiscal splurge is driven by two factors
- The enormous cost of maintaining a standing army of almost one million people;
- The vast expense of importing weapons from the west to fight the war.
Weapon purchases are not sources of productive investment as they are literally burned in the heat of battle. The same, of course, is true for Russia. Both countries saw reducing economic growth in 2025, with Ukraine’s at 2.1% and 1.5%. And, western pundits would point to this as evidence that Ukraine’s economy is performing better.
But the opposite is true. Russia’s economy is around twelve times larger than Ukraine’s nominally and just over ten times larger when you look at GDP using purchasing power parity.
You can see this in the defence spending numbers.
Russia spent a record $143 billion on defence in 2025 compared to around $60 billion for Ukraine, so around 2.3 times higher. Yet, Russian defence spending amounted to just 6.3% of its GDP whereas for Ukraine it was 31.7%. So, massive spending on defence is a much less pivotal issue for Russia in terms of its economic fortunes.
Defence spending represents a far smaller proportion of total economic activity than it does for Ukraine. And Russia can afford to pay for its defence needs with its own finances, while Ukraine is entirely dependent on money from western donors to keep the war going.
Despite the massive cost of war, Russia ran a fiscal deficit of just 1.7% of GDP in 2025. That is still well below the EU fiscal rule of 3% of GDP with some countries like France and Poland having deficits at or more than double that figure.
Ukraine’s fiscal deficit on the other hand was around 20% of GDP. That gap had to be filled by foreign funding as it has debt of 107% of GDP and is cut off from foreign lending.
So, hence the EU stepping up with a loan of 90 billion Euros, two thirds of which is earmarked for defence.
Russia on the other hand has debt of around 15% of GDP and doesn’t really need to borrow heavily to keep its war effort afloat. By the way, 15% of GDP is far lower than the U.S. or any European nation, many of which, like Ukraine, have debt levels of over 100% of GDP.
Ukraine is defending itself with money Europe doesn’t have.
Despite the shock of sanctions, Russia doesn’t have to break the bank nor boost its lending significantly.
This also means that when the war eventually ends, Russia will be able to make the economic transition back to peace in a less painful way. Russia will be under no pressure to impose massive cuts to defence spending to live within its means and can instead do so gradually.
Ukraine on the other hand faces a massive financial cliff edge when the war ends.
Ukrainian economic growth according to the OECD is set to fall further to 1.7% in 2027 if the war continues.
And that assumes continued large injections of capital from outside countries. In 2025, Ukrainian defence spending made up 31.1% of Ukrainian GDP, and two thirds of state budgetary expenditure. None of that spending goes into improving Ukraine’s weak economy.
With all of the support that it receives, Ukraine’s GDP in 2025 amounted to just under $210 billion according to the IMF.
Bear in mind here that Ukraine received $52.4 billion in external financing in 2025, or around one quarter of its GDP at the end of the year.
Take away foreign funding and Ukraine suddenly sees its economy shrink by over 20%.
Or, put it another way, take away the war and Ukraine sees its economy shrink by over 20%.
Russia simply does not face the same problem.
Rather, an end to the war may help Russia to get inflation – perhaps its biggest economic challenge – under control as economic activity returns to its normal rhythm.
But still the question arises, how come Ukraine has grown so little when it received so much foreign funding?
One big reason is that Ukraine recorded a trade deficit of $30 billion over the same period, a record according to the National Bank of Ukraine.
So, $52 billion in foreign money came into Ukraine during the year and $30 billion went straight back out again. Because Ukraine’s massive trade deficit is fuelled by two things.
First, a huge increase in the import of weapons from western suppliers which have doubled since 2022, not least as they are no longer being provided free of charge.
Second, Ukraine has increased its imports of natural resources, in particular a massive increase in gas imports, because domestic production has been hit hard by the war. Coal is another area, as Russia has swallowed up important coal mines in the Donbas.
Not all of that deficit in trade will be recoverable even after the war ends, even if Ukraine was able to reduce the overall size of its trade deficit.
By comparison, Russia’s surplus of trade in goods was already at over $100 billion by October 2025, although the overall trade picture is narrower, at around $36 billion because of a significant deficit in services trade, including from large numbers of Russians who have moved overseas since the war started.
An end to the war, if anything, may allow Russia’s trade surpluses to grow further. A future relaxation on the import of natural resources into Europe could mean that Russia benefits from already increased trade with Asia and renewed trade with Europe.
In any case, the consistent surpluses that Russia pulls in both help shore up economic growth and foreign exchange reserves, which in 2025 grew by over $135 billion to a whopping $734 billion.
And just to be clear, Russia put their reserve funds almost completely into gold which now stand at over $310 billion.
One big reason for Russia storing its reserves in gold is to keep them clear of the stealing hands of western bureaucrats, who froze around $300 billion in reserves at the start of the war.
This means that Russia has a surplus of $434 billion in foreign exchange reserves which is almost completely insulated from western expropriation. The $10 billion rise in foreign currency reserves in 2025 was undoubtedly caused by an accumulation of reserves in non-dollar, Euro and sterling currencies, suggesting the move to greater trade in Chinese Yuan and Indian rupees.
An end to the war may at some point lead to the unfreezing of immobilised Russian assets in the U.S., Europe and Japan.
Ukraine’s reserve position is also comparatively strong, at $57.3 billion at the start of 2026, a record figure. However, that rise is completely down to inflows of foreign capital to fund the war effort. An end to the war would likely shrink Ukraine’s reserves as its stubborn trade deficit was not being offset by foreign inflows of funds as they had been during war.
But it’s the sudden and shocking loss of foreign funding that accompanies an end to the war which will cause Ukraine’s economy to shrink dramatically.
But fear not, Europe is determined that Ukraine maintain an army of 800,000 personnel when the war ends. However, this seems more about economic survival than about security.
Ukraine would not be able to pay for such as large army with its own money, as it doesn’t have any money. So, once again, Europe will be forced to step in to meet Ukraine’s financing needs to pay the salaries of soldiers who are no longer in war fighting mode.
This will lead to debt and taxes rising in Europe, according to a recent Kiel Institute study. But it will also lead to a loss of business for European defence firms. Because peace time will inevitably mean a sharp drop in the munitions and military material being burned on a daily basis in the fog of war.
Two thirds of the EU’s recent 90 billion Euro loan to Ukraine will be spent on military support, including weaponry. That has sparked an argument between Germany and France over a proposed ‘buy European’ clause, with France wanting to prevent Ukrainian purchases of U.S. equipment. Perhaps with one eye on the future, the French in typical fashion, are trying to ensure that their firms get a decent share of what could amount to dwindling Ukrainian orders for weapons.
A bit like the French army, Europe is reversing itself inevitably into economic defeat when the war ends.
Obligated to keep an economically failed Ukraine on life support.
Having to increase its debt and taxes to support bad foreign policy decisions it has been taking since 2014.
Trying to boost its defence industrial complex but losing business with the end of war.
For the mainstream political parties in Europe, this adds to the trend of them heading towards electoral Armageddon when they start putting themselves to the polls from 2027 onward.
Until then, they are stuck, knowing that continuing the war will kill them electorally, and knowing that ending the war will too. To quote my old British soldier dad, they are like the mythical oozlum bird, continually going round in circles until they disappear up their own backsides.
Donald Trump, A Responsibility to Protect President
By Adam Dick | Ron Paul Institute | January 16, 2026
Publicly denouncing war and liberals was a regular part of Donald Trump’s communication in his 2024 presidential campaign. Yet, as president, Trump has been relying on the responsibility to protect idea associated with liberals he would normally ridicule as a basis for the US engaging in wars abroad.
In October of 2016, the month before Donald Trump won the race to succeed Barack Obama as president, David Stockman wrote about an example of the terrible damage the US following a responsibility to protect standard in foreign policy can yield. In particular, Stockman wrote about Syria being “a lawless, bombed-out, economically decimated failed state today owing to Washington’s heavy-handed intervention at the behest of the War Party’s bloody twin sisters.” Those “twin sisters,” continued Stockman, are “the neocons — led by the contemptible Kagan clan — and the R2P liberal interventionist claque around Hillary Clinton, including UN Ambassador Samantha Powers and National Security Council head Susan Rice.”
Stockman here used the term “R2P” to reference responsibility to protect.
For some more details on what responsibility to protect entails, consider this excerpt from “Humanitarian Intervention: Destroying Nations to Save Them” by Ibrahim Kazerooni and Rob Prince from 2013:
What distinguishes the more recent forms of humanitarian intervention is that thanks to the writings of the likes of Samantha Powers and Susan Rice, humanitarian intervention now has a more comprehensive theoretical justification, i.e., the pretexts for military intervention have become more refined, coated with phony concern for “the people.” It was used to justify the military intervention in Libya, and until less than a month ago was the emotional cutting edge for greater military intervention in Syria.
As an elaborate excuse is needed to justify unprovoked aggression – all in the name of the public good – humanitarian intervention serves the purpose well. But at its heart, strike it down to its basics and it [is] little more than liberal racism – i.e., “we” = one neo-colonial power or another = magnanimously no less – are invading a country for its own good because those poor dumb folks don’t have the wherewithal to protect themselves and need our kind assistance to prevent disasters.
As suggested by Stockman, responsibility to protect, or R2P, is a reason for United States government intervention that is commonly associated with liberals or Democrats. But, Trump as president has recently appeared to embrace it publicly as a sufficient basis for the US to attack other countries. Consider, for example, Trump’s comments in the last few months regarding his reasoning for supporting US military attacks in Nigeria and Iran.
In November, Trump indicated in a post at Truth Social that he was directing that the US military plan to go into Nigeria with “’guns-a-blazing,’ to completely wipe out the Islamic Terrorists” Trump wrote were killing Christians. There was no mention of any threat to America, to Americans, or even to the often broadly and squishily defined US “national interests.” Instead, the message was people are being harmed so the US should attack to help address the problem.
When I wrote in November regarding Trump’s post, I noted that Trump’s post was followed by comment by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth that “killing of innocent Christians in Nigeria — and anywhere — must end immediately” and comment by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz that US government should be concerned with persecution of Christians spanning “78 countries, 330 million Christians being persecuted around the world.” This one sort of alleged harm thus could open the door to a vast US military intervention across the world.
Come Christmas, the US military attacked in Nigeria, with Trump stating the attack came in response to harm done to Christians in Nigeria. Stated Trump in a December 25 Truth Social post: “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”
This week, Trump has been promoting the US going to war in another country based entirely upon responsibility to protect reasoning. Trump, in a Truth Social post on Tuesday, stated his encouragement of protesters in Iran to take revolutionary actions and promised that “HELP IS ON THE WAY” for the protesters. He even told them to “[s]ave the names of the killers and abusers” who he wrote “will pay a big price” — apparently due to US action. Here is what Trump wrote:
Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING – TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!! Save the names of the killers and abusers. They will pay a big price. I have cancelled all meetings with Iranian Officials until the senseless killing of protesters STOPS. HELP IS ON ITS WAY. MIGA!!! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
“MIGA” here is likely a reference to Make Iran Great Again, a phrase used by uber-warmonger Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) in a Truth Social post that Trump reposted three days earlier. Graham, in his bellicose post, in addition to declaring “Make Iran Great Again,” praised a comment by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that the US “supports the brave people of Iran.” “To the regime leadership: your brutality against the great people of Iran will not go unchallenged,” also threatened Graham in his post.
Earlier, on January 2, Trump had already asserted he was ready to send the US military to attack Iran based just on the conclusion that protesters in Iran were killed. Then, Trump wrote in a Truth Social post:
If Iran shots [sic] and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go. Thank you for your attention to this matter! President DONALD J.TRUMP
Attacking Iran is not a new idea for Trump. The US military did just that in June, upon Trump’s order. That time a primary argument Trump asserted was that he wanted to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. That bombing also came to the aid of Israel that had gotten in over its head by attacking Iran over a week earlier and whose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had long been urging Trump to take military action against Iran.
The responsibility to protect argument Trump keeps trotting out for a US attack on Iran joins other arguments that he has proffered over time. For example, on December 29, with Netanyahu by his side, Trump threatened to “knock the hell out of” Iran if it tries to “build up again” from damage inflicted earlier in the year by Israel and the US.
Trump likes to ridicule liberals for their ideas that he depicts as kooky, absurd, or dangerous. At the same time, Trump is out touting his adherence to one of the most kooky, absurd, and dangerous ideas associated with liberals — trying to justify the US going to war based on the responsibility to protect argument that it is appropriate for the US to use military force for the sole purpose of stopping or punishing the infliction of harm on people oversees. It is a formula for foreign intervention without restraint. It is also incompatible with the peace candidate status Trump sought to establish for himself in the 2024 presidential race.
Adam Dick worked from 2003 through 2013 as a legislative aide for Rep. Ron Paul. Previously, he was a member of the Wisconsin State Board of Elections, a co-manager of Ed Thompson’s 2002 Wisconsin governor campaign, and a lawyer in New York and Connecticut.
US Navy Insanity in Japan
Tales of the American Empire | January 15, 2026
The US Navy has two large bases in Japan. Sasebo provides logistics in the Western Pacific, but will be knocked out of action in the first hour in a war with China. It also has a three ship amphibious group homeported there since the end of the Vietnam war. These large ships are of no value in a war with China and will be sunk during the first day of a conflict. They might be able to flee before war begins, but why base them at Sasebo if they must flee during wartime, leaving their crew families behind?
On the other side of Japan is the larger base at Yokosuka. It is further from China and better protected on the east coast, but still within easy attack range. Amazingly, the US Navy has a huge multi-billion-dollar aircraft carrier based there, even though hundreds of friendly airfields in the region are available. Moreover, it sits pierside most of the time and can be photographed during a daily boat tour by any tourist. If war suddenly begins. China will unleash at least 200 missiles at this prize in one minute. This may seem unaffordable, but 200 medium range missiles cost less than a billion dollars and will destroy an aircraft carrier that costs many times more. Several of these missiles will hit the carrier while others miss yet destroy nearby facilities.
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Related Tale: “Military Insanity in WestPac”;
• Military Insanity in WestPac
“Vacate Sasebo”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2012; http://www.g2mil.com/sasebo.htm
“Has China Been Practicing Preemptive Missile Strikes Against U.S. Bases?”; Thomas Shugart; “War on the Rocks”; February 6, 2017; https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/has…
“U.S. Set to Expand Naval Base in Papua New Guinea”; Zach Abdi; USNI News: April 6, 2024; https://news.usni.org/2024/04/06/u-s-…
Why are EU leaders suddenly being nice to Russia?
By Tarik Cyril Amar | RT | January 16, 2026
Sometimes a surprising statement made almost in passing on a minor occasion can pack a lot of political oomph. And sometimes, it’s just a slip and won’t tell you much about either the present or the future. But how do you know?
That is the challenge posed by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent – and very unusual – talk about a “compromise” (“Ausgleich” in German) with Russia, which, he also stressed, is “a European country,” indeed “our greatest European neighbor.”
Outside the context of current Western and, in particular, German and EU politics, such a statement may seem almost commonplace. Obviously, it would make sense for Berlin – and Brussels, too – to work toward a peaceful, productive, mutually beneficial relationship with Moscow. Equally obviously, this is not merely an option but, in reality, a vital necessity (as Merz may have been hinting at when emphasizing that Russia is Germany’s greatest European neighbor: Greatest as in indispensable?).
Yet once you add the actual context of escalating German and EU policies toward Russia since 2014 at the very latest, Merz’s sudden insight into the obvious appears almost sensational. For over a decade, German and EU policy toward Moscow has been based on three simple – and self-damagingly insane – ideas: First, Russia is our enemy by default and “forever” (see the refreshingly frank admission by German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul). Second, using Ukraine (and a lot of Ukrainians), we can defeat that enemy with a combination of economic and diplomatic warfare and a very bloody proxy war on the ground. Finally, there is no alternative: it is VERBOTEN to even think about genuine give-and-take negotiations and any compromise that would also be good enough for Moscow.
Merz, moreover, has no record as a doubter of these moronic dogmas. On the contrary, he has been a consistent uber-hawk, combining the requisite constant Russophobic undertone with a long series of hardline initiatives and positions. Just a few months ago, for instance, Merz fought tooth and nail for confiscating Russian sovereign assets frozen in the EU. That he lost that fight was due to resistance from Belgium – which would have been exposed to absurdly irrational risks by permitting that robbery – and France and Italy, whose leaders tripped up their hapless German “ally” at the last minute.
In a similar combination of public belligerence and final futility, Merz had long been a proponent of delivering advanced German Taurus cruise missiles – particularly well-suited for destroying things such as Russia’s Kerch Bridge – to Ukraine, before abandoning that awful idea. Ultimately and wisely, he shied away from involving Germany even more deeply in the proxy fight against Russia, most likely under the impression of very firm warnings from Moscow.
Just this month, the German chancellor declared he is ready to send German soldiers to secure a “ceasefire” in Ukraine. Yes, that would be that ceasefire that Moscow has ruled out as a dishonest half-measure. It is true that Merz hedged this announcement with conditions that make it irrelevant. But, nonetheless, it was not a contribution to de-escalation with Russia.
Yet here we are. Speaking not in Berlin, but the provincial metropolis of Halle in Eastern Germany, Merz used the occasion of a fairly humdrum meeting under the auspices of a regional IHK (Industrie und Handelskammer) meeting to speak about Germany’s relationship with Russia.
The IHK is a chamber of industry and commerce, an economic association of some weight. But it is not the parliament in Berlin or, for instance, even a foreign-policy information war outfit/think tank. Most of Merz’s remarks, unsurprisingly, concerned the German economy, which, he had to admit, is not in a good state, but, he promised, will be better soon. He also gave his word to fight and reduce bureaucracy, not only in Germany but the EU as well. That sort of stuff, nothing special, political potboiler.
But then, in the middle of the absolutely predictable and rather boring meeting, the chancellor suddenly extended a hand to Moscow. Or did he? Merz himself knows that his having anything to say about Russia that comes without foam at the mouth is extraordinary: he took care to assure his listeners that it was not the location “in the East” (that is, the former East Germany) that made him strike such a new tone regarding Russia.
His audience may or may not have been convinced by that all-too-quick denial. Halle is not only a major city in Germany’s East, but also, more specifically, the second-largest conurbation in the Land of Saxony-Anhalt. That is where, polls suggest, the new-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party may well win a crucial election in September, particularly by outdistancing Merz’s own mainstream conservatives (CDU). A similar scenario is possible in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, also in Germany’s East.
In both places, even a relative (not absolute) AfD majority, which seems certain at this point, would expose the traditional parties and especially the CDU to one of their worst nightmares: the end of the so-called “firewall,” that is, the harebrained and undemocratic policy of simply freezing the AfD out of the building of ruling coalitions. Merz personally has been an iron proponent of the “firewall.” Razing it, even regionally, will cost him his political career or force him into a brutal, humiliating 180-degree turn.
One important reason voters in Germany’s East are unhappy with the traditional parties is their policy of relentless, self-damaging confrontation toward Russia and equally relentless, really masochistic support for Zelensky’s regime in Ukraine. Just now, one of Germany’s highest courts has finally, in essence, recognized the fact that Ukraine was deeply involved in the worst vital-infrastructure attack in postwar German history, the destruction of most of the Nord Stream pipelines. Many Germans have had enough, not only but especially in Germany’s East.
That is why Merz knows that any apparent concessions to Moscow will meet healthy skepticism there. He also has a solid and well-deserved reputation for breaking his promises. His listeners in Halle may well have dismissed the new Merz sound as nothing but cheap pre-electoral manipulation.
And perhaps that is all it was. But there are good reasons to keep an open mind. For one thing, Merz has not been the only EU leader striking a more conciliatory note recently. As the Russian government has noted, similar statements have been made in France and Italy. The leaders of both countries, Emmanuel Macron and Georgia Meloni, have been no less bold than Merz in stating the obvious, namely – to summarize – that not even talking to Moscow is a daft policy.
It is not hard to see why EU politicians may be prepared to pursue diplomacy again. Their imperial overlord in Washington has made it clear that the Ukraine war will be their problem and theirs alone, while also displaying a brutality towards the world, including the clients/vassals in Europe, that is unusually open even by American standards.
After the tariff wars, the new US National Security Strategy, Venezuela, and the threats against Denmark over Greenland, could it be that, at very long last, some in Europe are slowly waking up to the fact that the worst threat to the sorry remains of their sovereignty, their economies, and also their traditional political elites is Washington, not Moscow? It would be very rash to assume so. But we can hope.
Tarik Cyril Amar is a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War, and the politics of memory.
France Escalates Warmongering by Expanding Intelligence Support for Ukraine
Sputnik – 16.01.2026
While last year, Ukraine was overwhelmingly dependent on American intelligence, today “two-thirds of those capabilities are provided by France,” revealed French President Emmanuel Macron speaking to BFMTV.
France has readily stepped in to make sure the West’s proxy war doesn’t lose steam — even if the US hesitates.
Last November, reports indicated that US officials had warned the Zelensky regime that intelligence support could be halted if Ukraine rejected Donald Trump’s proposed peace framework.
While Western leaders talk relentlessly about “peace,” in reality France and its allies in the so-called Coalition of the Willing are doubling down on escalation, doing everything to keep the conflict kept alive.
In the event of a ceasefire, Europe’s hawks are planning ‘military hubs’ in Ukraine – even though Russia has repeatedly emphasized any NATO troop presence there is unacceptable and would be viewed as a direct threat.
US Sending Troops to Middle East Over Trump’s Threats Against Iran – Reports
Sputnik – 16.01.2026
WASHINGTON – The United States is sending troops to the Middle East over the consideration of potential strikes on Iran by President Donald Trump, Fox News reported on Thursday, citing military sources.
At least one US aircraft carrier is moving toward the region amid the growing tensions, the report said.
“US military assets are preparing to move to the Middle East, likely to include at least one aircraft carrier and additional missile defense systems that will operate from air, land and sea,” Fox News’ Chief National Security Correspondent Jennifer Griffin said on air.
However, it is unknown whether it is USS Abraham Lincoln, which is currently operating in the South China Sea, or one of the two carriers that left US bases earlier this week, the report added.
President Donald Trump has been presented with military options and favors any action being “swift and decisive,” while avoiding a wider regional war, according to the report.
Iranian state media, cited by Fox News, issued a warning to Washington: “You hit. We hit.”
Trump’s Options in Iran Limited By Military Buildup in Latin America
By Kyle Anzalone | The Libertarian Institute | January 14, 2026
President Donald Trump has a more limited range of options for attacking Iran now than he did in June. The US has moved military assets out of the Middle East in recent months, including moving an aircraft carrier strike group to the Caribbean.
Since the US and Israel’s war against Iran last year, the US has moved two aircraft carrier strike groups out of the Middle East. The USS Nimitz is now at a US port, and the USS Ronald Regan is in Latin America.
An advanced American air defense system that was deployed to the Middle East in June is now back in East Asia. Politico notes, “The Trump administration also has been eating away at dwindling US weapons stockpiles with the fast pace of military operations in the Red Sea, Iran and Venezuela.”
Trump has made several pledges to back Iranian protesters and attack Iran. The lack of available military resources in the region could limit Trump’s operations for attacking Iran, although the US still maintains the capability to strike the Islamic Republic.
Over the past decade, the pace of US military interventions has spread across the globe. Under President Joe Biden, the US flooded weapons to Ukraine and Israel. President Donald Trump has bombed seven countries. Additionally, the US used a significant portion of its arsenal of interceptors to defend Israel from Iranian retaliation in June.
Why Washington will take Greenland
By Timofey Bordachev | RT | January 14, 2026
American political culture is drifting openly toward the annexation of Greenland. This may sound surreal to European ears, but it is not an exotic idea in Washington. It follows a logic that is deeply rooted in how the US historically became a great power and how it still proves its strength today.
The United States rose through territorial expansion at the expense of weaker neighbors. It seized land from those who could not defend it. There is no serious reason to assume that this instinct has disappeared. The only reliable guarantee of borders is the ability to fight for them. And history shows something very simple: the US does not attack those who can resist.
Modern world politics suggests that Western Europe is no longer among those who can resist.
That is why, from Washington’s point of view, the real question is not whether Greenland will eventually be absorbed into direct American control, but when. Western European states, and Denmark specifically, are among the least dangerous targets imaginable. They are harmless not only militarily, but psychologically: they are unlikely to respond in any serious way.
In American strategic culture, refusing to exploit such an insignificant position would contradict the fundamentals of foreign policy thinking. The conclusion becomes unavoidable: the annexation of Greenland, peacefully or by force, is inevitable.
Over the past few days we have seen an escalating series of statements and initiatives from American representatives. They range from internet “teasers” and political provocation to official remarks and even draft bills in Congress. The overall message is clear: Greenland should fall under direct US control. And just as importantly, the discussion itself is meant to create an impression in Europe, and in the wider world, that the outcome is pre-determined.
Western European politicians have responded with predictable panic.
Germany, for instance, has proposed a joint NATO mission called Arctic Sentry. The initiative is absurd, but revealing. It is Berlin’s attempt to respond to claims from the American president and others that Greenland is threatened by Russia and China, and that the island is supposedly defenseless. Direct consultations between senior German and American diplomats are reportedly scheduled in the coming days.
But it is difficult to imagine Washington taking Germany’s proposal seriously, because the issue is not about deterring mythical threats from Moscow or Beijing. It is about Washington’s own intentions.
The German idea draws inspiration from NATO’s Baltic Sea operation Baltic Guardian, which has been running for several years. But the Baltic Sea has little to do with American military or economic interests. Even the least intelligent member of the Finnish parliament should be able to understand this. That is precisely why NATO and Western Europe are free to play their games there.
Greenland is different.
Any attempt to frame Greenland as a NATO matter only exposes the alliance as a theater production, performing threats in order to justify foreign policy rituals. These Europeans are accustomed to imitating danger and imitating response. They appear to believe they can do it again.
It is unlikely to work.
Meanwhile, most of the world views this spectacle with indifference. Russia, China, India and many others see the Greenland drama primarily as another lesson in how relations inside the so-called “collective West” are structured. It is simply a more visible version of what has always been there.
There is nothing new in the fact that Americans are prepared to violate norms, including international law. The difference is that this time they are openly testing these norms against their own allies.
From Russia’s perspective, the situation does not pose a direct threat to our interests. The US can deploy weapons in Greenland even today. Its presence does not fundamentally change the military situation in the Arctic, nor does it threaten shipping along the Northern Sea Route. The US still lacks a serious fleet of military icebreakers, and it remains unclear when – or whether – it will acquire one.
China, too, is essentially indifferent to Greenland becoming American property. Greenland does not threaten China’s trade in the Arctic because the only real issue of interest to Beijing is the Northern Sea Route. And the US military presence on the island does not materially affect Chinese security interests.
On the contrary, in the context of Taiwan, Beijing watches with curiosity as the Americans undermine their own empire’s ideological foundations, including the principles of international law. Once the balance of power settles, it is always possible to return to old norms. Or indeed to codify new ones.
But for Western Europe, Washington’s aggressive noise around Greenland feels like the death sentence for what remained of the half-continent’s relevance.
For decades, its politicians considered themselves a “special” element of global affairs. Not fully sovereign perhaps, but privileged. They were happy to violate the sovereignty of other states across the world, insisting that this was humanitarianism, democracy, civilization. Yet they never seriously imagined the same logic could be applied to them.
The entire content of what Western Europeans loudly call “transatlantic solidarity” or a “community of values” lies precisely in this exceptional status. Their part of Europe’s role was to serve as a morally decorated extension of American power, a satellite that believes it is a partner.
Now it is the US itself that is delivering a potentially fatal blow to that illusion.
Even if the annexation of Greenland is postponed, watered down, or delayed by unforeseen complications, the fact that it is being discussed seriously is already catastrophic for Western European political legitimacy. It undermines what remains of their credibility in the eyes of their own citizens and the rest of the world.
Every state must justify its existence.
Russia’s legitimacy rests on the ability to repel external threats and pursue an independent foreign policy. China justifies itself through organization, stability and prosperity for its citizens. India’s legitimacy is grounded in holding together peace in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious civilization.
In every case, legitimacy is tied to the state’s ability to influence the most important aspects of people’s lives. Not to mention being able to rely on internal resources to do so.
But modern Western European states justify themselves differently. They justify their actions to their citizens through the idea of exceptional status, the right to look down on other countries and civilizations. If Americans can simply deprive the EU of territory, then they become equal to countries like Venezuela or Iraq: states which Washington attacks with impunity.
This is why Greenland matters more than Greenland.
Western European politicians still do not understand the main point. The US wants Greenland, of course, because it is valuable Arctic territory. Geography that matters in a changing world. Direct control over territory is often preferable to indirect use through allies.
But the deepest motive is more psychological and political: Washington wants to act as it sees fit.
In the US, disregarding all external norms – recognizing only internal American rules – is increasingly part of how the state gains legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. The ability to seize something from a weaker neighbor becomes proof that such a state is not only strong, but necessary.
Donald Trump was elected precisely because he promised to restore American statehood. Greenland will not be the only issue where this restoration expresses itself.
In other words: Greenland is not a dispute about the Arctic. It is a demonstration of how American power is validated, and a demonstration that Western Europe is no longer protected by the very system it helped to build.
Timofey Bordachev, Program Director of the Valdai Club
Israel–Syria security pact stumbles as Tel Aviv rejects withdrawal: Report
The Cradle | January 14, 2026
Israel has refused any withdrawal from Mount Hermon and the other areas of Syria it occupied after the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s government, while rejecting Russian patrols in the country’s south and demanding that Damascus be prohibited from ever possessing air defenses, Hebrew media revealed.
“The Israeli position is clear and non-negotiable: there will be no withdrawal from Mount Hermon,” an Israeli official was cited as saying by Hebrew newspaper Maariv on 14 January.
According to the report, talks are stalling due to Damascus’s demand that a security agreement with Tel Aviv be linked to a withdrawal of Israeli army forces from Syria.
The Israeli report added that Tel Aviv is concerned with a Syrian attempt to re-establish a Russian military presence in southern Syria. Israel considers this move a direct threat to its “freedom of action,” Maariv claimed.
The source told the newspaper that Israel is obstructing plans to deploy Russian forces in southern Syria, and that Tel Aviv has conveyed to Damascus, Moscow, and Washington that it will not allow a Russian presence.
Russian media had reported last year that the Syrian government was requesting a resumption of Russian military patrols in the south in order to help limit continuous Israeli raids and incursions.
The sources add that Tel Aviv is following with concern reports that Damascus is hoping to purchase weapons from Russia and Turkiye.
“The Israeli message conveyed to all relevant parties [is that] Israel will not agree that in any future security arrangement, Syria will have strategic weapons, primarily advanced air defense systems and weapons that could change the regional balance of power,” according to Maariv.
“The Israeli goal is clear: freezing the existing situation – without an IDF withdrawal from Mount Hermon, without Syrian reinforcements, and without a foreign military presence that limits the IDF.”
In particular, Israel is demanding a complete demilitarization of southern Syria. “Israel’s security-strategic interest comes first. For now, Trump accepts this position.”
The report also says that the two rounds of Syrian–Israeli talks in Paris last week made “no breakthrough was achieved,” only a “limited understanding” for “the establishment of a coordination mechanism aimed at preventing clashes on the ground, with active US involvement.”
A joint statement by Washington, Tel Aviv, and Damascus on 6 January said that Syria and Israel have agreed to establish a US-supervised “joint fusion mechanism” to “share intelligence” and pursue de-escalation.
Damascus and Tel Aviv “reaffirm their commitment to strive toward achieving lasting security and stability arrangements for both countries,” the statement said, adding that they agreed to “establish a joint fusion mechanism – a dedicated communication cell.”
This mechanism aims “to facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on their intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and commercial opportunities under the supervision of the US.”
“This mechanism will serve as a platform to address any disputes promptly and work to prevent misunderstandings,” according to the statement, published by the US State Department after the two rounds of Paris talks.
The Israeli army occupied large swathes of southern Syria as soon as Assad’s government fell, declaring the 1974 Disengagement Agreement null. It has since established permanent outposts and has seized control over vital water sources – practically encircling the Syrian capital.
The occupation continues to expand as Israeli forces carry out almost daily raids. In a span of one year, the Israeli army attacked Syria over 600 times.
Tel Aviv and the new Syrian government have been engaged in direct talks for nearly a year to reach a security arrangement. Damascus has vowed that it has no interest in confronting Israel and has reportedly made commitments to coordinate with Tel Aviv against Iran, Hezbollah, and the Axis of Resistance.
Despite this, Israel has shown no willingness to pull out of Syria.
Negotiations stalled for several weeks before Hebrew media reported in late December that “significant progress” had been made and that a deal could be announced “soon.”
A Syrian source told Israeli outlet i24 on 27 December that there was the possibility of a meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Syria’s self-appointed President Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former Al-Qaeda chief.
US President Donald Trump is reportedly pressuring both sides to reach a deal quickly.
The Ukraine Snare Still Beckons
By Ted Galen Carpenter | The Libertarian Institute | January 14, 2026
Despite the widespread expectation that President Donald Trump would end Washington’s entanglement in NATO’s proxy war using Ukraine against Russia, it is increasingly evident that the fundamental features of U.S. policy remain unaltered. Trump personally has sent an array of mixed signals about his intentions. Although he has pressured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to accept the reality that Kiev must be willing to make territorial concessions to Moscow in any peace accord, he also has been receptive to Zelensky’s demand that Ukraine be given reliable “security guarantees” in such a settlement. Indeed, during the recent summit meeting between the two leaders, the main point of disagreement appeared to be that Zelensky wanted a commitment lasting fifty years, whereas Trump was prepared to offer only fifteen years.
Not only is Kiev insisting on a firm, detailed guarantee of protection, but also Ukraine’s European supporters in NATO are doing so. Worse, Trump seemed to sign onto a new 20-point “peace plan” being pushed by Zelensky and his European backers. Only Russia’s curt rejection of the scheme has so far prevented it from further consideration.
A potentially deadly snare lies in wait for the United States which our leaders must avoid at all costs. Throughout the years of the Ukraine crisis, most attention has focused on Kiev’s desire for formal membership in NATO and Russia’s repeated refusal to tolerate that option. Indeed, the principal cause of the current war was the clash between Russia and NATO regarding that issue.
However, the substantive issue has never been merely the prospect of Ukraine’s formal membership in NATO. Instead, the real threat to Russia’s security, from Moscow’s viewpoint, has been NATO’s attempt to turn Ukraine into a significant military asset for the alliance. It matters little whether that development occurs because of Kiev’s official membership in NATO or because of new, separate Western security guarantees.
Indeed, the ties would not have to be all that formal to constitute a dangerous provocation toward Moscow. Several NATO governments have repeatedly engaged in loose talk about sending their troops as “peacekeeping personnel” to Ukraine to enforce a settlement. Indeed, some of those countries appear willing to incur such a risky commitment to implement a mere “truce” between the feuding parties. Both Great Britain and France have stated that they intend to establish “military hubs” across Ukraine with their forces. In one of his more reckless, irresponsible moments, President Trump expressed his willingness to consider having the United States “backstop” such European efforts.
Washington must emphatically reject any attempted ploys of that nature. Even a paper security guarantee to Kiev would put any and all guarantor powers at risk. A decision to deploy so-called peacekeeping forces would be even worse. The Kremlin has made it emphatically clear that the presence of any troops by a NATO member in Ukraine is intolerable. Moscow likely would view a troop presence by NATO’s European contingent, much less the United States, as an existential threat to Russia’s security.
It would be folly for U.S. policymakers to rely excessively on the language contained in the North Atlantic Treaty to limit the danger of an undesirable military entanglement. Article 5 obliges NATO signatories to regard an act of aggression against any NATO member state as an attack against them all. The actual language regarding the obligation under Article 5, though, is so vague as to be meaningless, if a member seeks to evade taking serious action. The provision merely requires allies to render (undefined) assistance to the victim of aggression. Crucially, there is no commitment to launch military strikes against the alleged aggressor or to send troops into combat to aid the beleaguered ally. Merely providing logistical aid could fulfill a member’s obligation. The NATO countries that have sent weaponry or provided targeting and other intelligence data to Ukraine have easily met or exceeded any implied Article 5 obligation, even if Kiev had been a member of the alliance.
But in the real world, multiple NATO governments would seek to inflate the U.S. commitment under Article 5 to deepen Washington’s entanglement in the Alliance’s proxy war against Moscow. A pervasive myth persists in America and the rest of the world that the United States has an official treaty obligation to go to war if another NATO country comes under attack. Giving Ukraine a security guarantee would consolidate and strengthen that myth. In other words, U.S. leaders would find themselves under enormous pressure to launch a direct military intervention to support NATO peacekeepers in Ukraine regardless of the actual language contained in Article 5.
That is why any NATO troop presence in Ukraine, or any official security guarantee to Kiev, would be so dangerous. Given the enormous political and military pressures that would be coming from Kiev’s fan club throughout the West, it is highly improbable that U.S. leaders could avoid an armed clash with Russian forces merely by citing the limited, conditional language in Article 5. Legalistic quibbling is not the way events proceed when raw, wartime emotions are in play.
Trump administration officials need to spurn proposals for any alliance security guarantee to Ukraine, much less a deployment of NATO peacekeepers. Washington must emphatically reject schemes that would include a U.S. military presence of any size or nature in Ukraine. President Trump’s casual musings about supporting a NATO peacekeeping contingent not only are irresponsible, but also constitute a betrayal of his political supporters in the last election. They believed that their candidate was committed to extricating the United States from an unnecessary and debilitating geopolitical venture. Unfortunately, Donald Trump appears to be on course to disappoint advocates of a more prudent U.S. foreign policy yet again.


