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Zelensky sells false illusion of building powerful air force capable of overcoming Russia

By Ahmed Adel | February 25, 2026

The claim that Ukraine is developing a fleet of 250 modern Western-made combat aircraft is a public relations stunt by President Volodymyr Zelensky, not a practical military plan, because the scale of such a project exceeds the country’s and its Western partners’ financial, industrial, and infrastructural capacities.

“Ukraine has agreements on the supply of 150 Gripen and 100 Rafale combat aircraft. These are the best aircraft, in our opinion, in the world,” Zelensky announced during a conversation with students and teachers of the Kyiv Aviation Institute earlier this month.

The Ukrainian president also recalled that Ukraine has F-16 aircraft in its arsenal, but not new ones.

According to him, the provision of appropriate aircraft by partners should significantly strengthen the capabilities of Ukrainian aviation.

Zelensky’s announcement of purchasing 150 Swedish-made Gripen fighter jets and 100 French Rafales should be questioned, as implementing such a plan would take years. The claim about buying hundreds of modern aircraft is unrealistic because factories cannot produce that many aircraft in a short period. Manufacturers already have other orders and are operating at full capacity, so from a production and delivery standpoint, it is not realistic to expect a significant number of new aircraft to be available for Ukraine in the near term.

Regarding deliveries from the current Air Force fleet, such as those from Sweden or France, options are limited because both countries would be left without their fighter fleets. For Ukraine, only older aircraft nearing retirement or designated for replacement are realistically available, and this is true across all NATO countries. At most, these may be F-16 aircraft slated for replacement by F-35 fighters.

Zelensky’s claim about 250 aircraft is not backed by solid, binding contracts. For example, a statement of intent was signed with Sweden, but it is not a binding contract or agreement. They agreed that one party would purchase, while the other would produce and sell. The signed documents also do not commit to financing, production, or delivery.

The purchase of 250 fighter jets would cost Ukraine, according to media estimates, about €50 billion. The price of a modern Rafale in the latest version exceeds $100 million, and the aircraft includes extensive maintenance equipment, spare parts, and weapons, all of which are expensive. Most importantly, not only the pilot but also the entire technical staff, including airport personnel, need to be trained.

Ukraine has historically used Soviet aircraft, such as MiGs and Sukhois, and the transition to the American-made F-16 required the long-term development of the entire infrastructure for their operation. The F-16 is the most common model in NATO countries, and the countries that delivered them to Ukraine did so because they are transitioning to the more modern fifth-generation F-35.

If Zelensky wants to acquire Rafales or Gripens, he will also need to develop the supporting infrastructure—each model requires extensive facilities. Switching to new technology and buying new aircraft are time-consuming and expensive processes. The process would involve not only acquiring aircraft but also completely rebuilding aviation infrastructure: airports, hangars, logistics hubs, training pilots and technical staff, as well as establishing service and repair capabilities for each aircraft type.

Although the so-called agreement is based solely on words, without realistic conditions for actual implementation, Zelensky claims that Kiev is acquiring “completely new aircraft” and describes the Gripen and Rafale as “the best aircraft in the world.”

The Ukrainian Air Force is in very poor shape, as practically the entire fleet has been destroyed by Russia. This is why Ukraine is seeking a new air force: the country has limited control over its airspace.

Even Western media outlets have indicated that neither Ukraine nor France has the means to finalize a large contract for Rafales in the next decade. The possibility of financing the purchase of Swedish Gripens using frozen Russian assets has also been considered, but such a model currently lacks legal or political support.

Even if fighter jets could be delivered and pilots trained immediately, many other issues would still need to be addressed.

The Rafale costs approximately €20,000 per flight hour due to its complex systems and high parts consumption. Rafales do not take off from highways or damaged runways, as Soviet aircraft do, and require fully equipped airfields with precise coverage, which are scarce in Ukraine. Although the Gripen is simpler than the Rafale, it still requires Western infrastructure, such as specialized hangars, which Russian aviation forces would immediately destroy.

Zelensky is once again selling illusions to Ukrainians that he will build the most powerful air force in Europe capable of overcoming Russia. However, Ukrainians are not interested in allocating €50 billion to fighter jets when energy, water, and transportation infrastructure, among others, urgently require repair or reconstruction.

Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

February 25, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Economics, Militarism | | Comments Off on Zelensky sells false illusion of building powerful air force capable of overcoming Russia

Drug traffickers trained in Ukraine attack state forces in Mexico

By Lucas Leiroz | February 24, 2026

In recent days, Mexico has made headlines worldwide due to the increase in internal violence in the country. After the local government launched an offensive against drug trafficking and eliminated a major criminal leader, the country’s main drug cartel began a series of attacks against state forces, killing several soldiers and civilians, destroying military equipment and infrastructure.

The combat capacity of the criminal forces is surprising world public opinion, but little has been said about how the professionalization of organized crime in Mexico is directly related to the current situation in the Ukrainian conflict.

The wave of violence began after the Mexican government launched a special operation against the Jalisco Cartel. Using police and military troops and with broad support from the army, state forces eliminated Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, better known as “El Mencho,” identified by experts as the leader of the Jalisco Cartel.

The action was praised by the international press, as well as by US authorities, such as Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, who called the operation a “great development for Mexico, the US, Latin America, and the world” – thus easing months of tensions between the US and Mexico, which had been escalating since Donald Trump’s inauguration.

“I’ve just been informed that Mexican security forces have killed ‘El Mencho,’ one of the bloodiest and most ruthless drug kingpins. This is a great development for Mexico, the US, Latin America, and the world (…) The good guys are stronger than the bad guys,” Landau said.

However, the operation was quickly met with extreme violence by the criminals. Police officers began to be hunted down in the streets in various regions of the country, mainly in the suburbs of Jalisco. Cartel members blocked roads, attempting to prevent basic supplies from moving in the country. Photos and videos circulate on the internet showing scenes of extreme violence in the streets of Jalisco, where police officers, soldiers, and innocent civilians were indiscriminately murdered by the criminals.

These photos and videos are also surprising internet users by revealing the true level of combat power of Latin American cartels. It’s possible to see in the images soldiers armed with heavy weaponry and wearing modern and sophisticated tactical uniforms. At first glance, anyone would think those men were officers of the Mexican army, but they are just members of local cartels.

It has long been known that Mexican cartels – and Latin American cartels in general – have become rapidly and dangerously professionalized. These criminal organizations in Mexico already possess access to complex equipment such as armored vehicles, anti-aircraft batteries, suicide drones, and grenade launchers, as well as various types of short- and medium-range rockets. The criminals also frequently use flamethrowers, landmines (both anti-tank and anti-personnel), and other advanced military equipment.

It is regularly stated by various experts that in Mexico, cartels have already acquired a combat capability superior to that of regular police and military forces. This is a natural consequence of the fact that these organizations have acquired considerable financial power over time – with their funds being equivalent to the GDP of some small countries – which guarantees the possibility of acquiring military equipment on the black market.

However, there is a factor being ignored in the Western media coverage of the case: Ukrainian influence. Since the beginning of the conflict, thousands of Latin American mercenaries have fought for the Kiev regime. When they survive the harsh fighting against Russian forces, these criminals return to their countries and pass on the knowledge and experience acquired on the battlefield to their partners.

Over time, Mexican cartels (as well as Colombian and Brazilian cartels) have created a systematic scheme for sending their members as mercenaries to Ukraine, which has allowed for rapid military professionalization and the acquisition of combat experience for these criminals, giving them an advantage against state forces – which act according to laws that restrict the use of force and lack war experience.

Several reports have been published by specialized websites showing that Mexican criminals are using techniques learned in Ukraine. In images of current hostilities, it is even possible to see the Ukrainian flag on some uniforms and armored vehicles of the criminals. Also, the use of drones has become one of the main specialties of the drug traffickers, largely learned during the Ukrainian conflict – in which drones are an essential factor in the dynamics of combat.

To solve the problem, the Mexican state will need to do much more than simply eliminate a cartel leader. “Decapitation” attacks don’t work in the long term because criminals quickly recruit new leaders from within their ranks. It is necessary to confront the ranks of criminals in the long term, with constant military attrition, in addition to destroying the drug production and transportation infrastructure used by criminals.

On the other hand, it will also be necessary to create measures to cut off the source of knowledge and military equipment that supplies organized crime in Mexico. Sophisticated intelligence operations must be established to sever contact between local cartels and the Kiev regime, arresting mercenaries and neutralizing arms smuggling – since it is known that many Western weapons sent to Ukraine end up in the hands of these criminals, further increasing their fighting power.

If Mexico is not efficient in addressing this problem, there will be a much deeper crisis in the country, considering the American interest in expanding its regional interventionism using the excuse of “anti-trafficking operations.” Trump himself does not rule out the possibility of using force on the Mexican side of the border in an “anti-terrorist operation.”

Obviously, this is just an excuse to defend American interests abroad, but the only way Mexico can disrupt US plans is precisely by being efficient in combating crime alone or with the support of countries genuinely interested in the same objective. Naturally, the Mexican government should seek Russian support, since it is in Moscow’s interest to neutralize the international ties of the Kiev regime, including arms trafficking and the recruitment of mercenaries.

February 24, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Drug traffickers trained in Ukraine attack state forces in Mexico

U.S. General Caine Warns: STRIKING IRAN is a HUGE RISK /Glenn Diesen & Lt Col Daniel Davis

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – February 23, 2026

The Pentagon is raising concerns to Trump about an extended military campaign against Iran, advising that war plans being considered carry risks including U.S. and allied casualties, depleted air defenses and an overtaxed force.

The warnings voiced by Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, within the Defense Department and during meetings of the National Security Council, current and former officials said, but other Pentagon leaders also have noted similar worries.

Such discussions are always part of the contingency-planning process before military operations, some officials said, noting that military leaders—especially the Joint Chiefs chair—provide prudent estimates of possible casualties and other potential costs of military operations.

February 24, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Video | , , , , , , | Comments Off on U.S. General Caine Warns: STRIKING IRAN is a HUGE RISK /Glenn Diesen & Lt Col Daniel Davis

Iran war What if today’s Iran is resigned to a long, hellish war with the US?

By Sajjad Safaei | Responsible Statecraft | February 23, 2026

Trump’s decision in June 2025 to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities in the final days of Israel’s war on Iran removed any lingering doubts about his administration’s willingness to cross the longstanding U.S. red line of directly attacking Iran’s nuclear program.

As a result, every subsequent American military threat, against Iran as well as the rest of the world, was imbued with a credibility that only the precedent of naked aggression can impose. The U.S. military’s abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January only reinforced that credibility.

But the U.S. strike on Iran, or Operation Midnight Hammer, has also set in motion two consequences that run directly counter to his vision of coercing Iran into submission.

First, the brief U.S.-Iran dustup following Operation Midnight Hammer communicated to Iran that while Washington was now more likely to pull the trigger, it was by no means eager to enter a costly and open-ended firefight. Indeed, it did not escape the attention of the Iranians that while the Trump administration warned Tehran that any Iranian response to Operation Midnight Hammer would trigger a devastating U.S. response, Iran’s ballistic missile retaliation against U.S. bases in Qatar elicited not Trump’s wrath but his framing of the episode as an opportunity to move toward “peace and harmony.” This was then promptly followed by his brokering of a ceasefire between Iran and Israel.

Second, the joint U.S.-Israeli war on Iran in June liberated Iran from its own fear of total war. In the months and years leading up to the 12-Day War, Tehran’s intoxicating belief that war could and should be avoided — at every turn and at any cost — had infused the Iranian decision-making apparatus with a paralyzing caution that, on the one hand, deterred Iran from retaliating decisively against Israeli attacks while at the same time emboldened Israel to repeatedly push the limits of escalation with impunity.

But that edifice of fear would collapse under the weight of Israel’s war on Iran in June 2025, and the United States’ direct participation in that war. In its place emerged a sober recognition that Iran was no longer standing on the brink of a war it could prevent but was already fully immersed in a recurring cycle of limited Israeli and American wars inside Iranian territory.

Iran’s generals understood that the only reliable way to conclusively break that cycle was to drive the confrontation beyond Washington’s comfortable terrain of swift, manageable military interventions and into a realm where the costs of continued escalation would become unbearable for the United States and Israel alike. In the recent warning of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, “If they start a war this time,” he cautioned, “it will be a regional war.”

For Washington, this shift in Iranian consciousness could not have occurred at a worse moment in time. Iran has been thrust into a state of full-mobilization for a regional war at the very moment when it has become unmistakably clear that Washington’s appetite for military adventures does not extend beyond spectacular, swift, and high-impact demonstrations of military dominance.

The suggestion here is by no means that the Iranian armed forces are somehow on par with, let alone superior to, those of the U.S. military. Rather, an acute asymmetry has emerged in the two sides’ resolve and pain tolerance, an asymmetry in which, paradoxically, the militarily weaker party is structurally less constrained in its willingness to both endure and impose costs, resulting in a strategic posture far less favorable to the U.S. than the raw balance of military power would suggest.

More paradoxical, still, is that this sharp imbalance in resolve has crystallized at precisely the moment when Iran’s overall regional position is far more precarious than at any point in recent decades, a precarity made possible by the collapse of Assad’s rule in Syria and the significant weakening of Hezbollah’s operational depth in Southern Lebanon.

This asymmetry in resolve has found political expression in the recent resumption of talks between Iran and the United States over the nuclear program, assuming, of course, that the current negotiations reflect a sincere U.S. effort to reach an agreement and not, as was the case during last year’s negotiations, an attempt merely to lull the Iranians into complacency ahead of war.

The talks are not, as is often claimed, evidence of U.S. success in coercing Iran to come to the negotiating table. Instead, the talks reflect a growing realization within the Trump administration that Washington’s options are limited: either climb to the next and final rung of the escalation ladder, which is a full-scale war with Iran, whose duration and intensity would likely escape U.S. control, or return to a negotiated settlement of the nuclear dispute.

Should current talks result in a resolution of the nuclear file, they will stand as yet another outward expression of the realization in Washington that a total war with Iran is a monstrous black box the United States has no desire to open. For if Trump truly believed the U.S. could win militarily against Iran in the time-frame, shape, and intensity of his choosing, he would already have started this war, just as he did in the operation to abduct Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

What has prevented him from doing so, more than anything else, is Iran’s very real and sizable capacity to drag the United States and the entire region into a grinding, drawn-out war of attrition that would further accelerate the decline of U.S. global hegemony in ways previously thought unimaginable.

To be sure, the current impasse offers precious little by way of novelty. On the contrary, almost all of its defining features were either knowable or predictable before Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. Indeed, President Obama’s pursuit of nuclear diplomacy was driven chiefly by the same military realities that have until today prompted Trump to pursue diplomacy with Iran.

Nine years after Trump first set out to overwrite the legacy of Obama’s deal, the paths available to Washington are clearer than at any point since the 1979 Islamic Revolution: a total regional war whose limits would not be set by Washington, or a nuclear settlement that, while not perfect from Trump’s standpoint, would pull the United States back from the brink of an open-ended and intractable regional war with an Iran.

If Washington’s participation in Israel’s June 2025 war with Iran elevated U.S. military force to a perfectly viable instrument of the United States’ Iran policy, the success of current talks would signal the formal undoing of that logic. But should the failure of talks pave the way for another full-scale war, the United States and Israel will be fighting an Iran vastly different from June. For the Iran of today appears to have made its peace with the grim conclusion that while a decisive slog with Israel and the United States is sure to be agonizing, it is preferable to the recurring attrition of repeated wars and a chronic strategic vulnerability that only emboldens adversaries to target Iran and its regional allies.

This cold calculus is captured with unsettling clarity in an oft-quoted Iranian proverb: marg yek bar, shivan yek bar—“death once, wail once.”

Sajjad Safaei, PhD, is a multidisciplinary researcher, lecturer, and analyst based in Germany. Previously a postdoctoral researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, he has also taught at the Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Zurich. His writings on Middle Eastern geopolitics, Iranian domestic and foreign policy, nuclear diplomacy, regional security dynamics, and arms control have appeared in outlets such as Foreign Policy, Responsible Statecraft, Aljazeera, DAWN, and The National Interest.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Iran war What if today’s Iran is resigned to a long, hellish war with the US?

Iran in the face of the armed diplomacy of imperialism

By Sayid Marcos Tenorio | MEMO | February 23, 2026

The ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran, mediated by Oman and recently held in Geneva, have been presented by Western diplomacy as a technical effort to contain nuclear risks. This version is a carefully constructed farce.

What is at stake is not the so-called “non-proliferation”, but a direct dispute between national sovereignty and imperial domination, conducted in order to preserve the regional hegemony of “Israel” and to keep the Middle East under the strategic tutelage of the US–Zionist axis.

The United States does not negotiate in the name of peace or international security. It negotiates as the diplomatic and military arm of the Zionist regime, tasked with neutralising any regional power that escapes the colonial control imposed after the Second World War.

Iran is today the principal target of this machinery because it dares to assert political, scientific, and strategic autonomy in a region that Washington and Tel Aviv treat as a protectorate.

The real nature of these “negotiations” becomes evident in the adopted method. While speaking of dialogue, the US reinforces its military presence in the Gulf, deploys aircraft carriers, issues public threats, and makes it clear that the alternative to an agreement is violence.

This is the old gunboat diplomacy, in which the empire demands concessions under blackmail. This is not negotiation between sovereign states; it is political extortion disguised as a diplomatic process.

Washington’s central argument, wrapped in an alleged Iranian nuclear risk, does not withstand any honest analysis. Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, has not announced any intention to produce them, and accepts international verification mechanisms. The real problem is not nuclear; it is geopolitical.

What troubles the US and “Israel” is the existence of a state that refuses to integrate into the West’s colonial security architecture, that maintains its own deterrent capability, and that politically and morally supports the peoples of the region against occupation and aggression.

This is why the demand for “zero enrichment” reappears as a mantra of the Zionist consortium. It is an illegal, discriminatory, and politically obscene imposition. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons explicitly recognises the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Even so, this right applies only to allies of the empire. “Israel”, a clandestine nuclear power outside the NPT, with an atomic arsenal that has never been inspected, remains untouched. Iran, by contrast, is required to submit completely. That is the double standard that sustains the current international system.

Sanctions play a central role in this hybrid war. They are not legal instruments, but weapons of collective punishment, used to strangle the Iranian economy, generate social suffering, and attempt to produce internal fractures.

Washington uses civilian suffering as a bargaining tool, hoping to force political concessions that it would never obtain under normal circumstances. It is a form of economic warfare that openly violates the most elementary principles of international law.

When the US attempts to expand the agenda of the negotiations to include Iran’s missile programme and defensive capability, it reveals its intentions even more clearly. Asking a country to negotiate its own defence is equivalent to demanding prior surrender.

No sovereign power would accept such an imposition. Iran has firmly rejected this manoeuvre, making it clear that its defensive capability is not under negotiation and never will be.

Iranian distrust does not arise from ideological paranoia, but from concrete historical experience. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the previous nuclear agreement, dismantled multilateral commitments, and, in 2025, went so far as to bomb peaceful Iranian nuclear facilities during ongoing negotiations.

This record renders any demand for “trust” on the part of Washington laughable. Imperialism does not inspire trust. It inspires caution and preparation.

Even so, Iran negotiates. And this point is central. It negotiates because it is a responsible state, aware of the gravity of the regional scenario, and willing to seek structured solutions. It accepts verification, accepts technical commitments, accepts dialogue. But it resists, and will continue to resist, because it is sovereign. To negotiate does not mean to kneel.

As repeatedly stated by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatullah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Iran does not build its foreign policy under threat, nor does it accept agreements imposed in the shadow of aircraft carriers.

Iranian diplomacy walks side by side with deterrence because recent history has shown, brutally, that unilateral concessions to imperialism do not produce peace, only new aggressions.

What is unfolding in Geneva, therefore, is not a technical debate about centrifuges or enrichment percentages. It is a chapter in the structural crisis of American imperial power, which can no longer impose its will without resorting to brute force and blackmail.

It is also a desperate attempt to preserve the regional supremacy of “Israel”, now shaken by the resistance of the peoples, and by the military and political failure of the Zionist project.

Ultimately, this is a historical choice: sovereignty or submission. The United States acts as the diplomatic arm of the Zionist regime, attempting to impose on Iran what it never demands of “Israel”: limits, inspections and obedience. Iran negotiates because it is responsible. But it resists because it is sovereign.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Iran in the face of the armed diplomacy of imperialism

The US build-up around Iran constitutes strategic war option, not ‘deterrence’

By Amro Allan | Al Mayadeen | February 23, 2026

The confrontation forming around Iran is increasingly defined not by diplomacy or de-escalatory statecraft, but by infrastructure: aircraft, tankers, ships, interceptors, forward bases, and the logistics that bind them into a usable strike system. What is being assembled around Iran is coercion by force posture—a regional arrangement designed to make the use of violence not only possible, but administratively routine.

The danger is not simply that the United States is “sending a message.” It is those messages, once backed by operational capability and sustained logistics, that develop their own momentum—especially in a region where a single incident, whether staged, misattributed, or opportunistically interpreted, can push escalation beyond the point where political actors can plausibly reverse it. That is how wars become “inevitable”: not because they must happen, but because the architecture is built until restraint begins to look like an admission of weakness.

What is underway is best understood as a transition from episodic pressure to a posture designed to make sustained operations feasible. Deterrence theatre is reversible: it can be intensified, paused, or theatrically concluded. War-enabling posture is different. It organizes the region for a campaign that could last weeks, not hours—requiring refuelling depth, airborne command, electronic warfare, forward munitions, missile defense, and a permissive regional geography. In other words, it is not the language of crisis management; it is the language of readiness for force.

The Israeli role

Any realistic scenario involving major strikes on Iran necessarily includes Israeli capabilities, even if formal command structures remain ambiguous. The Israeli Air Force is not simply a parallel instrument. It is a forward-deployed capacity that can be synchronized with US regional power while allowing Washington to stage-manage deniability until the moment of activation.

“Israel” maintains a large combat fleet with a long-range strike capacity built around multiple platforms: approximately 66 F-15 aircraft (including F-15I variants configured for longer-range strike), roughly 173 F-16 fighters, and about 48 F-35I stealth aircraft in service, with additional units expected over time. The operational implication is a structure suited to repeated waves rather than a single, demonstrative raid: stealth assets prioritized for penetration and suppression, with conventional fighters sustaining the bulk of strike and support roles once corridors are opened.

Defense planning in “Israel” also signals expectation of retaliation on a scale that exceeds symbolic exchange. The layered interception network—Arrow, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and THAAD—is designed to deal with different classes of incoming fire, from rockets and drones to ballistic threats, and it functions as a prerequisite for any prolonged confrontation in which Israeli and US regional assets become primary targets.

This is where the political and military lines converge. Israeli leadership has long framed Iran as the central strategic adversary, and war planning has repeatedly been presented as a means of reshaping regional balances. Whatever language is used—“pre-emption”, “self-defense”, “containment”—the practical effect is to normalize the idea that Iran’s sovereignty can be overridden by an external security narrative. In that framework, escalation is not an accident; it is a policy option that is repeatedly rehearsed as common sense.

What the United States has built

The most revealing element in the US posture is not any single platform, but the way assets are being layered into an integrated strike system.

Open sources indicate that, on the air side, the forward package includes at least 30 F-35A fighters deployed in theatre, 24 F-15E aircraft, and an additional 36 F-16s moving toward the region. Electronic attack support includes 6 EA-18G Growlers, alongside 8–12 A-10 aircraft. Around a dozen additional F-16s are operating from Prince Sultan and possibly Al Dhafra, supported by 3 E-11A communications aircraft. In addition, a deployment of 12 F-22 stealth fighters is underway, with part of the force already forward-positioned and the remainder expected to continue toward regional bases.

The intelligence and command layer expands this into something far beyond a “show of force”: the movement or deployment of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, an RC-135 signals-intelligence platform, a WC-135 nuclear-detection aircraft, and additional E-3 AWACS aircraft preparing for redeployment to forward bases—strengthening airborne battle management and command capability.

Operational persistence depends on fuel and lift. The posture is underpinned by up to 22 tanker aircraft operating from regional hubs, and sustained transport activity by C-17, C-5M, and C-130 aircraft delivering troops, equipment, and air-defence systems to forward locations.

At sea, the naval component includes the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group moving toward the region while the USS Abraham Lincoln group operates in the Arabian Sea, alongside multiple Arleigh Burke destroyers positioned across key waterways (the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean). The posture is reinforced by the USS Georgia, an Ohio-class guided-missile submarine capable of launching a large volume of cruise missiles.

Individually, each of these deployments can be framed as “routine”. Collectively, they form something more consequential: an operational environment in which launching a campaign becomes logistically straightforward. That is the essence of coercion-by-infrastructure. It does not announce war. It makes war easier to begin.

The aircraft carrier story

Washington foregrounds naval deployments because they are legible, dramatic, and politically manageable. Ships can be repositioned without forcing host governments into public commitments. Carrier strike groups allow Washington to appear decisive while keeping escalation thresholds ambiguous. This is useful domestically and diplomatically: it reassures partners, pressures adversaries, and sustains a narrative of control.

Yet the obsession with carriers often obscures the real center of gravity: land-based access, refuelling depth, persistent surveillance, and the defensive systems that keep regional bases operational. A serious campaign aimed at degrading Iran’s missile forces, air defenses, energy infrastructure, or nuclear-related facilities requires sortie generation and basing access that naval aviation alone cannot supply. The decisive question is not what is sailing; it is what is already positioned on land and in the air.

Iran reads this not as theatre, but as preparation. That reading is rational. When an adversary constructs a system designed for sustained strikes, it is the targeted state—not the deploying one—that is forced to plan for worst-case scenarios.

The geography of war

The enabling infrastructure of any sustained campaign sits in fixed locations. The operational map spans the Gulf and the Levant.

From Al Udeid in Qatar—often described as the operational heart of US Central Command—Washington can coordinate high-tempo operations supported by ISR and refuelling. Al Dhafra in the UAE extends its reach with advanced platforms and command integration. Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia, if politically activated, shortens flight times and increases sortie density. The Harir airbase in Erbil provides forward access for strike and surveillance missions, while Jordanian airfields open western approach corridors. US positions in eastern Syria facilitate drone and reconnaissance activity along Iran’s western flank.

Beyond the Arab theatre, “Israel’s” bases operate in close alignment with US operational planning, forming an integrated environment even if formal command lines remain blurred. To the north, Azerbaijan offers potential basing or surveillance access along Iran’s sensitive frontier. Strategically, long-range bombers operating from the continental United States or Diego Garcia can be integrated through aerial refuelling and forward command nodes—adding strike capacity not captured by carrier-focused narratives.

This geography also clarifies what Washington rarely foregrounds: regional states become the battlefield’s enabling terrain. The bases, depots, radars, command centres, and runways that make sustained operations possible also sit within Iran’s retaliatory envelope. Iran does not need to neutralize a carrier to impose strategic and political costs. It can target the infrastructure that keeps the campaign running: runways, fuel depots, hangars, radar nodes, and the host-nation systems that sustain them.

If escalation occurs, the political question for host governments will not be abstract. It will be immediate: whether they are willing to absorb retaliation for choices made in Washington and Tel Aviv. That is precisely why the build-up is destabilizing. It expands the list of actors exposed to consequences while narrowing the space for de-escalation.

This is where the moral and legal questions sharpen. If host states provide launchpads, they are not passive bystanders; they become parties to the escalation. Yet these governments are rarely treated, in Western coverage, as societies that will absorb the consequences. They are treated as facilities—terrain, not people. Iran, by contrast, is treated as a problem to be managed.

Missile defense

If the escalation logic runs through bases, the defensive requirement runs through interceptors. Missile defense in this doctrine is a central operational requirement rather than a supporting function.

Patriot and THAAD batteries protect major airbases and logistics nodes across the Gulf and the Levant, integrated with early-warning radars, airborne surveillance, and regional command networks. Following the US withdrawal from Ain al-Assad in western Iraq, defensive emphasis shifted toward fewer but more politically sustainable bases: Al Udeid and Al Dhafra remain heavily protected, while positions in Jordan and eastern Syria rely on combinations of Patriot systems, shorter-range counter-drone defenses, and persistent surveillance.

“Israel” constitutes a distinct but integrated pillar in this interception architecture. Its layered air-defense network—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Patriot, and Arrow—is linked to US early-warning and interception planning, forming a shared defensive envelope rather than a purely national shield.

Notably, the defensive geography is widening. Cyprus has deployed Israeli-made air-defense systems, and Greece is moving toward integrating Israeli interception technology into its own architecture—developments that point to the gradual emergence of an Eastern Mediterranean interception depth, built around interoperable sensors and strategic alignment rather than formal collective defence commitments.

At sea, US Aegis-equipped destroyers add a mobile interception layer capable of engaging aircraft, cruise missiles, and limited ballistic threats—again supplementing, not replacing, land-based interception.

This matters because missile defense introduces a vulnerability that carrier narratives often conceal: interceptor stocks are finite, and a sustained high-volume exchange strains them. In a scenario of large-scale missile and drone retaliation, the question becomes not simply “can you intercept?” but “for how long?”—and at what political cost to host governments whose territory becomes the absorbing surface for escalation.

Tehran’s strategic logic

Iran’s deterrence logic has been recalibrated by lived confrontation, namely the “12-day war”. The central conclusion drawn in Tehran is that survivability precedes deterrence. Missiles, air-defense systems, command-and-control, missile production, and retaliatory capabilities must be structured to endure the opening shock of war, not to dominate it.

In the opening phase of that confrontation, Iran’s air defenses suffered rapid degradation: fixed or semi-mobile systems were destroyed early, their locations effectively pre-mapped, and their network dependence exploited through precision strikes, electronic warfare, and intelligence integration. Mobile missile systems—long assumed to be the backbone of survivable retaliation—also proved vulnerable once movement became detectable under persistent surveillance and integrated strike networks. The conclusion Tehran extracts is structural: in a conflict dominated by satellite tracking and real-time targeting, anything that must move, emit, or communicate openly at the onset of war is at elevated risk of rapid attrition.

That assessment drives the turn toward underground infrastructure. Iran’s missile force is being reconfigured around hardened tunnels, concealed storage, underground silos, and pre-positioned launch infrastructure designed to reduce exposure time and reliance on vulnerable command links. In this model, air defense still matters, but its role is framed as damage limitation rather than denial: complicating targeting, absorbing strikes, and preserving enough capability to ensure retaliation after the opening exchange.

Disruptions cascade into command delays and coordination bottlenecks, so Tehran’s preparations increasingly prioritise hardened domestic infrastructure, reduced external dependencies, and decentralized command authority to ensure retaliation does not hinge on uninterrupted connectivity. Parallel to this is the elevation of the domestic front—civil defense, continuity, internal stability—as a core component of deterrence rather than an auxiliary concern.

This is not the posture of a state seeking war. It is the posture of a state that has learnt—through repeated threat and episodic attack—that its adversaries prefer to treat its security as negotiable. Tehran’s strategic lesson is bleak but coherent: if the US and “Israel” reserve an expansive right to strike, then Iran must reserve the ability to respond even after absorbing the first blow. This is not radical; it is the minimal condition of sovereignty.

The escalation problem

A central risk is that escalation is unlikely to remain geographically contained. Even if Washington frames an initial operation as “limited”, allied forces and partner theatres are not mechanically separable. Under conditions of sustained strikes on Iran, groups and allied actors across Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq face their own strategic pressures, with intervention becoming a function of credibility and survival rather than preference.

Meanwhile, regional governments that host US assets occupy an exposed position. They may privately prefer de-escalation, but their bases and airspace can become operational requirements once Washington activates the posture it has assembled. Washington has 35,000–40,000 personnel deployed around Iran, expected to carry out the main attack in the event of war—an estimate that underscores how deeply the region is already militarily interlocked with any potential campaign.

This is where political constraint becomes as dangerous as military capability. When leaders publicly elevate threats, they increase the domestic cost of restraint; when adversaries interpret restraint as weakness, they increase the cost of compromise. In such conditions, accidental escalation—triggered by a strike, a misattributed attack, or a rapid chain of retaliation—can become more plausible than deliberate strategic design. And in an environment saturated with narrative warfare, the line between “accident” and “pretext” is rarely as clear as officials insist.

The build-up manufactures the conditions for war

The build-up is not reducible to theatre. It is a layered strike-and-defense system: forward stealth fighters and conventional strike aircraft; electronic warfare; airborne command and ISR; tanker depth and heavy lift; carrier groups and missile-capable submarines; a regional lattice of bases; and an expanding interception architecture stretching across the Gulf, the Levant, and into the Eastern Mediterranean. The combined effect is to make sustained operations technically feasible, while widening the geography of vulnerability and entanglement.

The strategic irony is that the more “prepared” this posture becomes, the less space remains for political off-ramps. Host governments become exposed. Interceptor sustainability becomes a decisive variable. Tehran’s retaliatory doctrine evolves toward survivability and endurance rather than symbolic signalling. In such an environment, the question is no longer whether war is “intended”. It is whether the operational infrastructure of war is now sufficiently in place that a single trigger—miscalculation, provocation, or opportunism—can transform a posture into a campaign faster than political channels can arrest it.

Iran’s reading of this is neither paranoia nor ideology. It is a basic inference. When a superpower constructs the machinery for a sustained strike and embeds it across neighbouring territories, the targeted state will plan accordingly. The real moral burden, then, lies not on Iran’s preparations for survival, but on the political decision—repeatedly rehearsed in Washington and Tel Aviv—that a regional order can be engineered through coercion and air power, while everyone else is expected to absorb the consequences.

If the international community is serious about preventing war, it should stop treating Iran’s defensive doctrine as the primary problem while granting the US-Israeli posture the presumption of legitimacy. The liability of proof lies with those constructing a regional strike system and calling it “stability”. There is nothing stabilizing about embedding a war option across neighbouring territories, then demanding that the targeted state behave as though this is normal. The region has seen this script before: coercion presented as protection, escalation presented as necessity, and catastrophe presented—after the fact—as an unfortunate surprise.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on The US build-up around Iran constitutes strategic war option, not ‘deterrence’

China supplies Iran with radar, surveillance tech to track US stealth aircraft: Report

The Cradle | February 23, 2026

China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has provided Iran with new technology in an effort to prevent infiltration by US and Israeli intelligence, and to help Tehran defend itself from advanced US and Israeli warplanes in the case of a renewed war, according to a 10 February report by Modern Diplomacy.

The report states that Beijing is urging its ally, Tehran, to abandon US and Israeli-made software and replace it with closed, encrypted Chinese systems that are difficult to penetrate.

This includes supplying Iran with advanced Chinese sensor systems and radars, such as the YLC-8B, capable of tracking stealth aircraft and conducting electronic surveillance.

Defense Security Asia stated that according to one analyst, the “YLC-8B is one of the few radars of its type in the world which can continuously detect and track a Western fifth-generation (stealth) aircraft at long range.”

The YLC-8B was developed by China’s Nanjing Research Institute of Electronics Technology. It uses UHF-band low-frequency surveillance to undermine the effectiveness of radar-absorbent shaping used by advanced US aircraft such as the F-35 warplane and B-2 bomber. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) reportedly has 48 F-35 stealth fighter jets in its fleet.

Beijing is also encouraging Iran to transition to the Chinese BeiDou satellite navigation system as an alternative to the US-created GPS system to avoid manipulation and prevent US intelligence from using it to track Iranian targets within the country, Modern Diplomacy reported.

The report comes as the US has amassed a significant amount of its naval and air power in the West Asia region, threatening a major attack on Iran.

China is seeking to assist Tehran to protect its massive investments in Iran, made as part of a 25-year strategic agreement signed under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Beijing also fears the loss of access to Iranian oil if Washington launches an attack, leading Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran is China’s largest supplier of oil, while some 20 to 30 percent of the world’s crude passes through the strategic straits on Iran’s southern coast.

Despite seeking to assist Iran with new technology, Beijing has made it clear it will not intervene militarily to assist Iran in the case of a war, Modern Diplomacy noted.

China has extensive economic relations with both the US and Israel.

Instead, China is expected to limit its support to the diplomatic sphere and condemn any unprovoked US or Israeli attack as a serious violation of international law and the UN Charter.

“Beijing remains wary of sliding into a full-blown conflict that could threaten the flow of oil from the Gulf. This is what prompts it to consistently call for restraint and a return to diplomatic solutions to avoid ‘catastrophic consequences’ for the global economy,” Modern Diplomacy added.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Comments Off on China supplies Iran with radar, surveillance tech to track US stealth aircraft: Report

Zelensky rejects territorial concessions to Russia

RT | February 23, 2026

Kiev will never rescind its territorial claims on formerly Ukrainian regions lost to Russia and is set on seizing them back in the future, Vladimir Zelensky has stated, once again ruling out withdrawing from Donbass.

In an interview with the BBC published on Monday, Zelensky reiterated his refusal to withdraw from the areas of Donbass still under Ukrainian control, claiming such a move would only “divide” the country’s society.

A withdrawal has been one of the key Russian demands and the main issue of the ongoing US-mediated talks between Moscow and Kiev. Moreover, the Ukrainian leader said the country remains set on getting back all the territories it has lost to Russia.

“We’ll do it. That is absolutely clear. It is only a matter of time,” he stated.

Zelensky admitted that Ukraine is currently unable to accomplish this because it lacks both sufficient funds and troops.

“To do it today would mean losing a huge number of people – millions of people – because the [Russian] army is large, and we understand the cost of such steps,” he said. “And we also don’t have enough weapons. That depends not just on us, but on our partners.”

The Ukrainian leader repeated his longstanding talking point about getting all the territories within the 1991 borders, when the country became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Seizing all the land back would constitute “victory of justice for the whole world,” Zelensky asserted.

The territories in question include Crimea, which broke away from Ukraine in the aftermath of the Western-backed 2014 Maidan coup and joined Russia via a referendum shortly after. The Donetsk (DPR) and Lugansk (LPR) People’s Republics declared their independence early on in the post-Maidan conflict in then-Ukrainian Donbass. The DPR and LPR joined Zaporozhye and Kherson Regions in being incorporated into Russia in late 2022 following referendums in which the overwhelming majority of the regions’ respective populations supported the move.

While Russia controls the entire territory of the LPR, Kiev’s forces still hold roughly 20% of the DPR. Moscow’s control of Kherson and Zaporozhye remains partial, with the respective namesake capital cities of the two regions held by Ukraine.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , | Comments Off on Zelensky rejects territorial concessions to Russia

German leader of EU’s largest faction sounds the alarm of possibility of right-wing forces coming to power in France, Poland

Manfred Weber, a vocal critic of any EU state that pushes back against a more powerful Brussels, has openly embraced Orbán’s opponent in Budapest

Remix News | February 23, 2026

German politician Manfred Weber, the leader of the European People’s Party (EPP), spoke on ZDF about a common European army, saying, among other things, that the European Union must “draw conclusions from its own experiences, including in military matters.”

Weber spoke about the danger to the EU establishment posed by the presidential elections in France and the parliamentary elections in Poland, both to be held in 2027. Weber is concerned that there is a high probability of victory for forces that do not support the continuation of the EU’s centralization; forces that instead advocate for a Europe of sovereign nations. He said that EU must have the strength necessary, even by way of a common military, to presumably counter such possible outcomes.

Specifically mentioning Poland’s Law & Justice (PiS) leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, and France’s National Rally (RN) leader, Jordan Bardella, he said: “I hope that we now have the strength… to create a Europe that cannot be destroyed and that will weather the storms of the world order together… Now we need the same approach on the military front. We must prepare for scenarios in which Bardella becomes president of France and Kaczyński returns to power in Poland.”

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has repeatedly asserted that the European People’s Party (EPP) is an ardent supporter of the war in Ukraine against Russia, a war Orbán has maintained Hungary will not be drawn into. Notably, Orbán’s Fidesz party used to belong to the EPP grouping before parting ways to found the Patriots for Europe faction, with members committed to EU member states that want to preserve their sovereignty and traditional, conservative values. Now, Weber has been a strong promoter of the opposition leader, Péter Magyar, ahead of Budapest’s April parliamentary election.

During his interview, Weber was vocal about his concerns that the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) may come to power in Germany. “During a visit to the Greek parliament, someone asked me, ‘What would happen if Germany built the largest land army, and at the same time the AfD had 25-30 percent?’” he told the station.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Militarism | , , , | Comments Off on German leader of EU’s largest faction sounds the alarm of possibility of right-wing forces coming to power in France, Poland

Putin: Developing Russia’s nuclear forces ‘absolute priority’

Press TV – February 23, 2026

President Vladimir Putin says developing Russia’s nuclear forces is now an “absolute priority” following the expiry of its last remaining nuclear treaty with the US.

“The development of the nuclear triad, which guarantees Russia’s security and ensures effective strategic deterrence and a balance of forces in the world, remains an absolute priority,” Putin said in a video speech on Sunday to mark Russia’s “Defender of the Fatherland Day.”

Putin pledged to further reinforce the army and navy, and draw on military experience gained during the nearly four-year conflict in Ukraine.

Moscow and Washington, the world’s two largest nuclear powers, are no longer bound by any arms control agreement following the expiration of the “New START” agreement earlier this month.

Russia and the US possess more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.

As of January 2025, Russia had more than 4300, and the US had approximately 3700 nuclear warheads.

Analysts say both the US and Russia are modernizing their nuclear forces, effectively fueling an arms race already underway.

With nuclear weapons gaining renewed prominence and no breakthrough from talks such as Trump and Putin’s Alaska meeting last year, New START’s end signals a more volatile and dangerous phase in global security.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , | Comments Off on Putin: Developing Russia’s nuclear forces ‘absolute priority’

Hungary Blocks 20th Package of Anti-Russia Sanctions, $106B Loan to Ukraine – Szijjarto

Sputnik – 23.02.2026

Hungary blocked the 20th package of anti-Russia sanctions, as well as the 90 billion euro ($106 billion) loan to Ukraine, due to Kiev’s shutdown of the Druzhba oil pipeline, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said on Monday.

“At today’s meeting, I made it clear that we do not support the 20th package of sanctions and do not give permission for this. And I made it clear that we would not agree to Ukraine receiving a military loan of 90 billion euros. Because the Ukrainians cannot blackmail us, they cannot jeopardize the security of Hungary’s energy supply by conspiring with Brussels and the Hungarian opposition,” Szijjarto told reporters, following a meeting of the EU Council of Foreign Ministers.

Hungary considers Ukraine’s suspension of Russian oil transit through Druzhba as encroachment on its sovereignty, Szijjarto concluded.

The termination of Russian oil supplies via Druzhba pipeline was the result of collusion between Kiev and Brussels, Szijjarto said.

“It turned out to be a shocking fact that Ukraine is really colluding with Brussels, really colluding with the European Commission headed by von der Leyen in terms of blocking the supply of [Russian] oil [via Druzhba pipeline]. It was finally revealed and proven today,” Szijjarto told reporters, following a meeting of the EU Council of Foreign Ministers.

On February 18, Szijjarto said that Hungary stopped supplying diesel fuel to Ukraine. He said this was a response to Kiev’s blackmail, as Ukraine is not resuming the transit of Russian oil to Hungary via the Druzhba pipeline for political reasons, trying to cause an energy crisis in the country and influence the April elections.

The EU countries are preparing for a protracted conflict in Ukraine and want to send their troops there as soon as possible, the minister added.

Ukraine demands 155 billion euros ($183 billion) from the EU only for the maintenance of the army in 2026, a loan of 90 billion euros is not enough for it, Peter Szijjarto said.

“Colleagues have made it clear that the 90 billion euros previously agreed upon and now blocked by Hungary are not enough to meet Ukraine’s financial needs, and in the near future it is necessary to make a decision on sending even more resources, even more money to Ukraine. This was also confirmed by the Foreign Minister of Ukraine, who said that this year they need 155 billion euros only for the maintenance of the army,” Szijjarto told Hungarian journalists, following a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU countries.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Russophobia | , , | Comments Off on Hungary Blocks 20th Package of Anti-Russia Sanctions, $106B Loan to Ukraine – Szijjarto

NATO Must Return to 1997 Borders for Peace in Ukraine – Finnish Politician

Sputnik – 23.02.2026

NATO must revert to its 1997 borders to secure lasting peace in Ukraine, while European leaders pursue de-escalation and respect the alliance’s pledge against eastward expansion “one inch” toward Russia, Armando Mema, member of the Finnish national-conservative party Freedom Alliance, said on Monday.

“In order to achieve a lasting Peace in Ukraine and Europe, NATO must return to 1997 borders … The EU leaders must work in the coming years for a de-escalation, respect NATO historical promises of not expanding to one inch toward Russia,” Mema said on X.

NATO’s “disastrous policies of enlargement” will exact a heavy toll on Europeans, as well as Europe’s rapid rearmament and its “disastrous policies in Ukraine” send dangerous signals for the future, the politician said.

“Finland and Sweden should be among first countries to exit NATO as soon as possible,” he added.

In recent years, Russia has raised concerns about unprecedented NATO buildup along its western borders. The Kremlin argues that Russia poses no threat to anyone, but will not ignore actions potentially dangerous to its interests. In an interview with US journalist Tucker Carlson, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Russia had no intention of attacking NATO allies and accused Western politicians of scaremongering.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , , , | Comments Off on NATO Must Return to 1997 Borders for Peace in Ukraine – Finnish Politician

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