The Summit That Wasn’t
By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – November 12, 2025
On October 29-30, 2025, US President Donald Trump visited the Republic of Korea as part of his tour of Asia and limited participation in the APEC summit. Several significant meetings took place during this event, but we shall discuss the one that did not happen.
Possible meeting between Trump and Kim?
When it became clear that Trump was going to South Korea, some Western and especially South Korean experts began actively promoting the idea that it would be good if Trump met with Kim Jong Un during the visit. Such reflections were based both on Kim’s statement that “If the United States abandons its empty obsession with denuclearization and hopes for sincere peaceful coexistence with North Korea based on the acceptance of reality, we have no reason not to sit down at the negotiating table with the United States” and on the experience of 2019, when during Trump’s visit to the Republic of Korea, he met Kim at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In addition, as early as September 30, 2025, the White House announced that Donald Trump remains open to talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “without any preconditions”.
The US president himself occasionally hints at this. On October 27, Donald Trump stated: “I’d love to meet with him. If he’d like to meet,” although on the same day a Rodong Sinmun editorial pointed out that “it is equivalent to self-destruction to try to move forward or progress with the help of others”.
The South Korean side was the most active in this matter. A Trump-Kim summit held on South Korean territory could at least be counted as the merit of South Korea, which “organized the platform.” Although on October 20 the South Korean presidential administration claimed that it did not know anything about preparations for a US-North Korean summit, a number of its representatives, especially Minister of Reunification Chung Dong-young, repeatedly urged the leaders of North Korea and the United States not to miss a great opportunity for dialogue. Conservatives and their media expressed concern about the same issue: “Trump’s visit to Korea must not mean recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status”.
On October 23, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung personally expressed hope that during his upcoming trip to Asia, Donald Trump would act as a peacemaker and that the leaders of the United States and South Korea would be able to engage in dialogue.
Even then, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui defiantly departed for a visit to Russia and Belarus, during which she was received by President Putin. Some South Korean experts and officials, including Minister Chung, continued to speculate about the possibility of a meeting. “I sincerely hope that the negotiations left unfinished during the meeting between the leaders of the United States and North Korea can resume,” stated Chung. National Security Adviser Wi Sung Lac also emphasized readiness for any scenarios.
On October 27, deputy head of the South Korean Office of National Security Oh Hyun-joo said that although a meeting between Trump and Kim was “extremely unlikely,” Seoul is ready to organize a venue.
Nevertheless, on October 29, 2025, Trump did make a statement that this time he could not agree on a schedule with Kim Jong Un for a meeting but could soon return to Asia to meet with the North Korean leader. After that, Wi Sung Lac stated that the conditions for DPRK-US negotiations had not yet matured, and a South Korean national intelligence representative noted that the US-North Korean summit would be possible after South Korea and the US hold joint exercises in March next year.
No, they can’t! (Yet)
It is very interesting when politicians or experts first form an image of an event in their head and then begin to express disappointment that it did not happen in reality. Therefore, the author will have to repeat some ideas about why—if such a meeting ever takes place (the probability is low)—it will be more ceremonial in nature. Both Trump and Kim are pragmatists, and they have no desire to meet purely for the opportunity to stand next to one another and smile for the journalists.
To begin with, negotiations should have an agenda. Kim Jong Un noted at the session of the Supreme People’s Assembly that the DPRK is not against negotiations with the United States if they move away from the topic of denuclearization. Meanwhile, the entire agenda of the American side still boils down to the question of whether it is possible to somehow arrange the nuclear disarmament of the DPRK, despite the fact that its nuclear status is included in its constitution. Thus, disarmament as seen by the Americans is possible only after regime change, or rather the loss of Pyongyang’s sovereignty, something Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow will not allow.
Thus, the United States lacks leverage over Pyongyang, and this applies to both the “carrot” and the “stick.” The DPRK’s military potential has grown significantly, and the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Russia has eliminated the possibility of using force to put pressure on the DPRK. It will also not be possible to increase sanctions pressure, because an attempt to impose UN sanctions that are mandatory for all countries will be blocked by Moscow and, perhaps, Beijing, and an increase in Russian and Chinese aid may be the answer to unilateral sanctions. Finally, in 2020-2023, when the DPRK went into “self-isolation,” for three years the country existed in conditions indistinguishable from a complete economic blockade, which showed that the DPRK has the opportunity to survive for a while even without external assistance in the event of an embargo.
As for the “carrot,” options such as various forms of assistance will not work, because everything that the United States could give to North Korea, the latter could receive from Russia or China. Therefore, in order to really involve the North in the dialogue, serious concessions will have to be made, e.g., easing the sanctions regime or replacing the denuclearization agenda with an arms control agenda, which in itself means the de facto recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear power. However, Trump will not be able to take such decisive steps for domestic political and reputational reasons. Western public opinion will perceive this as unacceptable concessions to a tyrannical regime, and even if Trump decides to do something similar, his entourage and the notorious “deep state” will not allow such a policy to fully materialize.
Lastly, there are issues related to Seoul. According to the modern North Korean doctrine, there are two hostile states on the Korean Peninsula, and although the South is no longer perceived as the territory of the DPRK temporarily occupied by American puppets, but as a separate Republic of Korea, Pyongyang does not want to have any dealings with it. Firstly, from the point of view of the North Korean leadership, the South is devoid of subjectivity and therefore cannot be negotiated with, and, secondly, since the Republic of Korea still considers the entire peninsula to be its territory—and this is written into the constitution—its goal is to absorb the DPRK, and the democrats or conservatives in power differ only in their methods to achieve this. Therefore, any attempt by the South Korean leadership to interfere in the US-North Korean negotiations in order to present itself as a mediator and score political points is more likely to reduce the likelihood of a US-North Korean summit than to increase it. Had the decision to organize a meeting between the leaders been made, they would have faced the very serious question of how to host a summit without the participation of the South Korean leader while in South Korea.
Therefore, from the very beginning, the author pointed out the extremely low probability of a summit between the leaders of the United States and the DPRK in South Korea, despite the fact that there is still a small chance of this meeting in the foreseeable future. One of the elements of US strategy in the confrontation with China is to try to weaken ties between China and its allies and ideally make the allies neutral or drag them into its camp. With regard to the DPRK, this is, of course, a difficult task, but a number of US experts admit this possibility, exaggerating North Korean-Chinese contradictions and recalling how the DPRK maneuvered between Moscow and Beijing during the Cold War era. The Americans will keep trying, and we shall see what this will lead to over the next year.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
Nuclear Reduction in the New Age
By Bill Buppert | The Libertarian Institute | November 12, 2025
Responsible Statecraft tends to have a more common sense approach to the profligate spending on the part of the American defense establishment.
The retirement of the entire ICBM arm and cancellation of the Sentinel successor would save enormous amounts of money wasted on very vulnerable strategic assets.
It’s time to consider a complete reappraisal of the three arms of the nuclear response in IRBMs and ICBMs and reduce them over time to zero and then to decide on the disposition of the bomber launched gravity bombs and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. The drone technology emerging now and the concomitant stasis of the aforementioned weapons systems makes them incredibly vulnerable left of bang.
A complete reappraisal is in order to rely completely on the much more secure Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) fleet option.
Given that its budget is soaring towards $1 trillion per year, and that it wastes untold billions on overpriced components and excess bureaucracy, there’s no question that the Pentagon can find money to reinvest in other priorities. But a better approach would be to apply a good portion of the savings to reducing the department’s top line.
Cuts in overall spending could come from the reduction or elimination of dysfunctional, overpriced, or dangerous weapon systems like F-35 combat aircraft, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, or heavy, vulnerable fighting ships like a new generation of aircraft carriers. It could save billions. It could also clear the way for the development of more reliable, effective replacements that are simpler to operate, easier to repair, and more relevant to the most likely conflicts of the future.
Eliminating ICBMs from America’s nuclear arsenal would be a particularly smart move. Not only is the cost of the new system growing at an alarming rate – an 81% increase in projected costs in just a few years time – but independent experts like former Clinton administration defense secretary William Perry have pointed out that they are among the most dangerous weapons possessed by the U.S. military.
The time is now to consider retirement and reduction of nuclear assets in the US inventory.
Read the rest:
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/pentagon-budget-200-billion/
Matthew Hoh: Domestic Divisions Threaten the US Empire
Glenn Diesen | November 11, 2025
Matthew Hoh is a former U.S. Marine Officer and State Department Official. Hoh discusses the growing divisions within the US, which threaten the US empire.
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US Officers Cannot Explain Why So Much Military Needed for Strikes in Caribbean – Reports
Sputnik – 11.11.2025
WASHINGTON – US senior Special Operations officers in a briefing last month did not provide a comprehensive explanation why the Trump administration needed a massive military presence in the Caribbean for strikes on a few small boats allegedly used by drug cartels, CNN reported on Tuesday, citing sources with the knowledge.
At the moment, there is no public information from the Pentagon on what the military is using to conduct the strikes, but the sources told CNN that MQ-9 Reaper drones are used for US attacks on alleged drug boats, as well as AC-130J gunships and fighter jets.
The sources told CNN that the Pentagon officials also could not provide an exact amount of taxpayers’ dollars spent on the counternarcotics campaign. However, administration officials have stated that each strike costs up to hundreds of thousands of dollars, the report said.
A significant part of all deployed US naval assets worldwide have been located in US Southern Command since last month, and even more US military assets are about to be placed in the Caribbean, the report added.
Earlier this week, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said that the United States conducted strikes on two drug trafficking vessel in the Eastern Pacific, killing six people.
To date, the US military has conducted 19 strikes, destroyed 20 boats, and killed 76 people as part of a counternarcotics campaign, CNN reported.
In late October, the Trump administration held a briefing in the US Congress to lay out its legal justification for the strikes on Venezuelan ships. However, only Republicans were invited to the briefing, causing negative responses and vast criticism among Democrats.
United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres believes that US attacks in the Caribbean contradict international law, and so does UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk.
Behind the Dances and Deals: Trump’s Quiet Pivot in Asia
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 11, 2025
The photo ops from Trump’s Southeast Asia tour hid a deeper shift in US thinking. Washington’s new China strategy, shaped by the Pentagon, now calls for restraint, mutual legitimacy, and shared rules rather than confrontation.
In short, America’s foreign policy hawks are quietly preparing for coexistence, not conquest. Trump’s visit was to showcase this change. The question, however, remains: will the US find success ultimately?
Trump’s visit
Trump came as a peacemaker. He wanted to demonstrate that the US still matters in the region, reminding regional powers of Washington’s seriousness that it really means business going forward. Therefore, while the headlines focused on his dance performances in Malaysia and the signing ceremonies, the trip produced two notable outcomes: a peace accord between Thailand and Cambodia and a series of trade and investment frameworks with key ASEAN economies. The Thailand–Cambodia agreement, signed at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur and witnessed by Trump, commits both sides to a cease-fire, land-mine clearance, and the release of detainees, marking a rare US-brokered diplomatic success in the region. On the economic front, Trump announced new or expanded trade arrangements with Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam—some finalized, others still in negotiation—covering areas like critical minerals, supply chains, and energy investment. Washington also upgraded its partnership with Malaysia to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” signaling a deeper US pivot toward Southeast Asia’s economic and geopolitical center. Yet, much of this remains more symbolic than substantive for now, as the real test lies in whether these deals translate into durable peace and concrete trade outcomes—or fade as another episode of diplomatic theatre.
Much of the possible success of this visit and the durability of its outcomes is tied directly to the extent to which the Trump administration can implement its own new geopolitical thinking towards the region more generally and China more specifically—a country that it wants to primarily counter in Asia and the Pacific. This new geopolitical thinking is anchored in a recent report published by the Pentagon-backed RAND corporation.
The new thinking
The RAND report delivers a striking argument: Washington must abandon—after trying it unsuccessfully for years—the fantasy of defeating China and instead learn to manage an enduring, structured rivalry. The report frames the contest as the defining axis of twenty-first-century geopolitics—an unavoidable clash of systems and ambitions—but warns that a US strategy driven by dominance, containment, or ideological confrontation risks pushing both powers toward catastrophic instability. RAND’s central proposal is not détente, but what it calls a disciplined modus vivendi: a framework that accepts competition as inevitable yet seeks to prevent it from spiraling into open conflict. This is especially important for Washington insofar as it allows it to present to the wider Southeast Asian region that it is not seeking Cold War-like alliances where regional countries must choose sides. Therefore, the authors lay out six core principles to stabilize the relationship: both sides must internalize that coexistence, not victory, is the only sustainable outcome; recognize the political legitimacy of each other’s systems, however distasteful; construct shared norms and institutions in areas of friction such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technology; exercise restraint in developing capabilities that threaten the other’s deterrence systems; agree on basic rules for world order; and strengthen crisis-management channels to prevent miscalculation.
To translate this into policy, the report recommends six deliberate moves for the US. First, Washington should clarify that its goal is not China’s overthrow but a stable, rules-based rivalry. Second, it must reestablish senior-level communication channels to rebuild minimal trust. Third, it should institutionalize crisis-management mechanisms, particularly around Taiwan and maritime disputes. Fourth, it should negotiate limited accords to restrain cyber and AI competition. Fifth, the US and China should mutually recognize each other’s nuclear deterrence and avoid doctrines that invite preemption. Finally, Washington should pursue narrow cooperative projects—climate, health, scientific exchanges—to maintain some connective tissue in an otherwise adversarial relationship.
Trump’s visit reflected this thinking very much. For example, throughout this tour, Trump made no mention of the QUAD—an anti-China alliance comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia. It means that Washington is moving away from its strategy of building economic and military alliances with anti-China states, such as India and Japan, to use them as counterweights to China’s influence. This narrative aligns with what the RAND report refers to as recognizing the legitimacy of China and its ruling party.
Beyond Ambitions
Having said this, none of this means that a complete reset has taken place, or will take place soon. Undoubtedly, several bones of contention have been healed, but several remain. Trump’s meeting with Xi, for instance, produced a tactical easing of tensions rather than a strategic breakthrough. Both leaders agreed to cut US tariffs on Chinese imports from roughly 57 to 47 percent, while Beijing pledged to resume large purchases of American soybeans and temporarily lift its export restrictions on rare earth minerals—an issue Trump declared “completely resolved” for now. China also committed to tightening controls on the export of fentanyl precursors, offering Trump a domestic win. Yet these agreements are largely short-term gestures: most are limited to a year, and none address the deeper structural rifts over Taiwan, technology export controls, or military rivalry. In effect, the meeting delivered a pause—a breathing space for both sides to stabilize strained supply chains and political optics—rather than a genuine reset of relations. The underlying strategic mistrust remains intact, making this more a tactical truce than a transformation of US-China relations.
Trump’s tour and his carefully choreographed diplomacy signal that Washington is experimenting with a softer, more disciplined form of competition—one that seeks to manage, not eliminate, China’s rise. Yet the contradictions at the heart of this strategy remain unresolved. The US still ultimately wants to lead Asia while pretending to share it; it seeks coexistence but clings to primacy. The Pentagon’s call for mutual legitimacy and restraint may sound pragmatic, but it runs up against the political and ideological reflexes of an America that views China as a rival to be outlasted, not accommodated. Trump’s gestures toward peace and partnership may buy time and goodwill to achieve this objective ultimately. China, however, will be very mindful.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
Gordon Hahn: The Strange Death of Europe
Glenn Diesen | November 10, 2025
Gordon Hahn discusses Europe’s ideological fundamentalism, detached leadership, Russophobia, subservience to the US, and other causes for the death of the old continent.
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Zelensky should halt ‘senseless’ attacks on Russia – Finnish politician
RT | November 10, 2025
Vladimir Zelensky should end “senseless” attacks on Russia as they merely end up worsening the security situation in Ukraine due to retaliatory strikes by Moscow, Euroskeptic Finnish politician Armando Mema said on Monday.
Long-range strikes on Russian regions using domestically produced drones have become a central element of Kiev’s military approach. Zelensky has repeatedly pledged to cause blackouts in Moscow and other places to “bring the war” to the Russian people. Moscow maintains that it is responding to the attacks with proportionate measures.
“Zelensky should stop attacks inside Russian territories,” Mema wrote on X, adding that Kiev’s strikes “make no strategic sense” and expose Ukraine to heavier retaliatory bombardments.
Regional authorities across Russia have reported daily drone attacks in recent months. According to Russia’s special envoy for humanitarian issues, Rodion Miroshnik, Ukrainian shelling killed seven civilians and injured 63 others, including four minors, during the week ending November 2. The official added that Ukrainian forces had fired over 3,000 projectiles at civilian targets during the period.
In response, Russia has intensified long-range strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, with the stated aim of degrading Kiev’s arms production and military logistics.
Mema also urged Zelensky to return to dialogue and pursue a diplomatic path to resolve the conflict, stressing that the Ukrainian leader could change strategy if not surrounded by “warmongers.”
Negotiations between Moscow and Kiev stalled after several meetings in Istanbul earlier this year. Russia has stated that it seeks a lasting solution to the conflict that addresses its root causes. Ukraine and its Western backers have repeatedly called for an immediate ceasefire, which Russia insists would only allow Ukraine to regroup its military and receive more weapons.
NATO to deploy 800,000 troops in case of war with Russia – German general
RT | November 8, 2025
Berlin is prepared for a war with Moscow and stands ready to facilitate the deployment of 800,000 NATO troops towards the Russian border, the head of the nation’s joint operations command, Lieutenant General Alexander Sollfrank, has said.
The hypothetical deployment is part of Operations Plan Germany, which was revealed last year. The 1,000-page-long document governs Berlin’s response if Article 5 of the NATO treaty is triggered in a confrontation with Moscow. It includes turning Germany into a major logistics hub for the deployment of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and pieces of equipment from various NATO nations against Russia. The deployment must be completed within 180 days of the start of the conflict.
According to Sollfrank, the plan may be implemented sooner rather than later. “Russia possesses a very large military potential despite the war in Ukraine,” he told an annual Bundeswehr conference in Berlin on Friday, adding that “Russia is already capable of [launching] a limited attack on the NATO territory.”
Speaking to Reuters the same day, the general claimed that Moscow could do it “as early as tomorrow.” German officials have increasingly spoken of the alleged Russian threat while taking an increasingly belligerent stance towards Moscow.
Chancellor Friedrich Merz has previously declared that diplomatic options for resolving the Ukraine conflict are “exhausted” and doubled down on providing weapons to Kiev.
On Friday, both he and Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that Germany’s existence in its present form was threatened by Russia. “It is not alarmism… when I say that our way of life is in danger,” Pistorius told the military conference.
Moscow has repeatedly stated it has no intention of attacking NATO. It also dismissed Berlin’s claims as “nonsense” aimed at justifying skyrocketing military spending. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has previously warned that Germany demonstrates “clear signs of re-Nazification.”
Politico reported last month that Germany’s rearmament plans would cost it €377 billion ($440 billion).
Finnish Politician Warns NATO Chief: Stop Arming Ukraine or Risk Nuclear War
Sputnik – 09.11.2025
Armando Mema, a member of Finland’s Freedom Alliance party, said on Sunday that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte should stop supplying weapons to Ukraine to avoid a nuclear war.
“Secretary Rutte should stop sending weapons to Ukraine if he is truly concerned about a nuclear War. NATO should stop expanding to Ukraine, if we don’t want to end up in a nuclear War,” Mema said on X.
Rutte, despite his supposed concern about nuclear rhetoric, “forgot to rebuke” Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken for his threats to “wipe out Russia with nuclear weapons,” Mema added.
On Saturday, Rutte told Welt am Sonntag newspaper that NATO intends to place greater emphasis on its nuclear capabilities to deter adversaries more effectively in the future. He said that Russia is using “dangerous and reckless nuclear rhetoric,” and people in the West should not panic because NATO has a strong nuclear deterrent that helps preserve peace.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that Russia is not brandishing its nuclear weapons, but is pursuing a policy of nuclear deterrence. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov has said that the West’s destructive actions have undermined the foundations for constructive dialogue between nuclear-armed countries.
The Russian Foreign Ministry has said that a number of persistent challenges have accumulated in the strategic sphere, primarily related to destabilizing doctrinal approaches and military-technical programs of Western countries.
US Informs Russia Extension of New START Restrictions Under Consideration – Lavrov
Sputnik – 09.11.2025
MOSCOW – The United States has informed Russia through diplomatic channels that it is considering Russian President Vladimir Putin’s idea of maintaining the restrictions laid down in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) beyond February 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told Sputnik in an interview published on Sunday.
“There has been no substantive response from Washington yet. As we were told through diplomatic channels ‘the matter is under consideration,’” the minister said.
The idea of maintaining the restrictions outlined in the New START agreement beyond February 2026 is simple and does not require in-depth discussion, Lavrov added.
“The constructive initiative put forward by President Putin in the post-New START sphere speaks for itself. It has no hidden agenda and is extremely easy to understand. Its practical implementation will not require any specific additional efforts. Therefore, we see no need for in-depth discussion of our idea,” he said.
Russia is not going to persuade the US to accept Putin’s proposal, Lavrov also said.
“We are not going to persuade anyone. We believe that our act meets the interests of both parties and the entire international community. We are prepared for any developments. However, we hope that the outcome will be positive,” he said.
The initiative requires only reciprocity on the part of the US, and Russia will adhere to voluntary restrictions only if and as long as the other side does the same, the minister added.
Putin has announced that Russia was ready to continue adhering to the restrictions under the START treaty for one year after February 5, 2026. The Russian president has explained that the steps taken to comply with the START restrictions would be effective if the US reciprocated. US President Donald Trump reportedly called Putin’s proposal on the INF Treaty a good idea.
EU economies will suffer without tapping Russia’s assets, Brussels warns – FT
RT | November 9, 2025
European Union member states will face ballooning deficits and debt unless they agree to use frozen Russian assets as collateral to fund Ukraine, the European Commission has warned in a document seen by the Financial Times.
The paper was circulated to EU capitals following last month’s failure to reach consensus on the so-called “reparations loan” of around €140 billion ($160 billion), the FT reported on Friday.
Without tapping Moscow’s immobilized central bank reserves, the EU would need to either authorize joint borrowing or issue direct grants – both of which would “directly affect” national budgets and increase public debt, the Commission warned. It remains unclear whether the option of not bankrolling Kiev was even considered.
The potential cost to EU economies is substantial, as servicing a collective loan of that size could result in up to €5.6 billion in annual interest payments. The Commission cautioned that borrowing at such a scale could also raise general EU borrowing costs and undermine other financial instruments.
Kiev expects its Western backers to cover a nearly $50 billion deficit next year, with its 2026 draft budget projecting some $114 billion in spending and only $68 billion in revenue – nearly all of which is earmarked for military purposes. Most non-military government expenses, including salaries, pensions, healthcare, and education, will rely entirely on foreign aid.
Belgium continues to oppose the use of Russian assets as loan collateral, citing serious financial and reputational risks. The frozen funds, totaling around $300 billion globally, with roughly $200 billion held at Belgium’s Euroclear, are technically not confiscated and could be reclaimed by Moscow if EU sanctions are not continually renewed. The EU has already stretched legal definitions by classifying the interest generated on these frozen funds as windfall profits not belonging to Moscow, and using them to arm Kiev.
The new plan hinges on the assumption that Moscow will eventually repay the loan as part of a future peace settlement – an outcome Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has described as improbable. On Friday, EU Commission officials once again failed to convince Belgium to back the asset seizure.
Moscow has repeatedly said it would regard any use of its frozen assets as theft, and could retaliate by seizing €200 billion ($172 billion) in Western assets held in Russia by foreign governments and companies.
Russia calls Trump’s bluff on Tomahawks for Ukraine
Strategic Culture Foundation | November 7, 2025
For more than a month, U.S. President Donald Trump has been conjuring with the idea of supplying nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. This week, however, he told reporters that he had backed away from the prospect.
Several weeks ago, shortly after Trump announced he was considering arming Ukraine with Tomahawks, our weekly editorial on October 3 warned that “all bets are off for a peace deal”. We contended that the American president, by considering such a move, was not genuine in his diplomatic efforts to end the nearly four-year conflict. “Trump is acting as a big-mouth poker player who has very few cards to play… betting that his boorish tough talk and the hype about sending Tomahawks to Ukraine… will somehow intimidate Russia to sit at the negotiating table and accept a half-baked peace deal.”
Moscow has not been intimidated to rush a peace deal on Trump’s or NATO’s terms of an immediate ceasefire, insisting instead that a resolution to the conflict must involve a substantive international security treaty and the eradication of root causes, including the Nazi nature of the Kiev regime and NATO’s historic expansionism.
When Trump was asked this week if he was still considering supplying the iconic missile to Ukraine, he said: “No, not really.”
That was after weeks of demurring; he might, he might not, we’ll see, and so on. What changed his mind?
In the last phone call between Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin, on October 16, it was reported that Putin sternly warned that supplying Ukraine with Tomahawks was an escalation too far. He indicated that the weapon would not change the battlefield situation in Ukraine’s favor but that it would bring the U.S. and Russia directly into confrontation.
Sixty-three years after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, with John F Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, this was an uncanny echo of that critical moment when the world faced nuclear war.
Trump subsequently claimed that he asked Putin, “Would you mind if I send Tomahawks to Ukraine?” We can only imagine Putin’s terse response.
The lame question from Trump suggests that the American president was not actually serious about the proposal and that the whole prior and subsequent reporting of his musings was a bluff aimed at unnerving Moscow.
The Tomahawk has a range of about 2,000-2,500 km and is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. It would also require U.S. participation to launch it from Ukrainian territory. If the missile were fired at St Petersburg or Moscow, Russia would have no choice but to consider it a possible preemptive nuclear attack.
Thus, it is averred, Trump was told that if he went ahead with his insane idea to supply Ukraine, then he had better be prepared to accept responsibility for starting World War III.
The day after the phone call with Putin, on October 17, Trump hosted the Ukrainian puppet president at the White House, whereupon Trump started backpedaling on the Tomahawks. He said that the U.S. needs to retain stockpiles for its own security interests and may not be able to supply Ukraine. “We need Tomahawks for the United States, too. We can’t deplete our country,” said Trump.
Though pointedly, last week, the Pentagon announced that there were no inventory limitations and that the White House was clear to send Tomahawks to Ukraine if President Trump made that determination.
Well, it looks like Trump has chosen caution to be the better part of valor, or should we say, bluffing. At least for now, anyway.
Still, the insanity of NATO’s war psychosis is always looming. Trump’s erratic and egotistical whims make him an unreliable interlocutor.
Following his “disappointing” meeting with the Ukrainian puppet, Vladimir Zelensky, last month, the European NATO warmongers have stepped up lobbying for the Tomahawks. NATO chief Mark Rutte met with Trump in the White House on October 22 to discuss the matter, no doubt reflecting the anxiety of the European elite that Trump was going soft on the idea.
This week, the former NATO chief, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, came up with the scheme of Germany supplying its Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine as a way to pressure Trump to follow up with Tomahawks.
Ukraine’s ambassador to Washington, Olha Stefanishyna, also reportedly claimed that “discussions” with the Trump administration for the cruise missile are “still ongoing”.
In this context, there are reports of British intelligence working on a false-flag provocation to blow up the Zaporozyhe Nuclear Power Plant, the biggest civilian plant in Europe, causing mass casualties and blaming it on Russia, even though Russia is in control of the ZNPP. Such an extreme provocation could be used to sway the White House.
For now, it seems, Trump has encountered the uncomfortable reality of his and NATO’s psychological games by desisting from supplying Tomahawks to Ukraine.
Similar reality checks are going on elsewhere. The imminent defeat of NATO’s Ukrainian proxy army in Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) and Kupyansk is one such rude awakening from NATO’s illusions that Western media have been spinning for the past four years. Only last month, Trump was talking about green-lighting a counter-offensive by Ukraine against Russia and taking back territory.
Pertinent, too, was the unveiling last week of Russia’s breakthrough nuclear-capable weapons, the Burevestnik cruise missile that can fly unlimited distances, and the Poseidon torpedo, both of which are invulnerable to U.S. defenses. That would also seem to be a moment of realization for the NATO warmongers that their fantasies of defeating Russia are futile.
Another dousing with cold water is the potential deployment of Russian hypersonic missiles in Venezuela to upgrade the Latin American country’s air defenses amid U.S. aggression. It is reported this week that Trump is now having second thoughts about his (illegal) threats to attack Venezuela, fearing the military operation could end in abject failure with deaths of U.S. servicemen, at a time when voters are souring big time on the 47th president.
Bullies usually only operate with impunity and delusions about their strength until reality punches them in the face.
Trump’s throwing around the idea of Tomahawks to Ukraine seems to have hit him like a boomerang. One might hope that he can retain some common sense and restrain the transatlantic War Party.
