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Senators Push Trump to Endorse Major Sanctions Bill

By Kyle Anzalone | The Libertarian Institute | June 3, 2025

A bipartisan coalition of Senators is lobbying President Donald Trump to endorse legislation that will add new sanctions on Russia. The bill has sweeping bipartisan support in the Upper Chamber with over 80 co-sponsors.

According to The Hill, Senators are prepared to pass the legislation that would place a 500% tariff on countries that import Russian energy. Republicans in the Upper Chamber are waiting for Trump’s endorsement before moving forward with the bill.

Trump has used the bill as a threat to ramp up the economic war on Russia if the Kremlin does not reach an agreement with Ukraine to end the war. However, Trump has not explicitly given his support for the legislation.

The Guardian reports that Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has played a key role in prodding Trump to take a more aggressive stance towards Russia in private meetings. “Senator Graham deserves a lot of credit for making the case for tougher pressure on the Kremlin,” said John Hardie, of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a hawkish think tank. “Carrots clearly haven’t worked, so it’s time to start using some sticks, including by going after Russia’s oil revenue. This economic pressure should be paired with sustained military assistance for Ukraine.”

Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD) said the bill could receive a vote this month. “[The White House is] still hopeful they’ll be able to strike some sort of a deal, but … there’s a high level of interest here in the Senate on both sides of the aisle in moving on it,” he said. “I think a genuine interest in doing something to make clear to Russia that they need to come to the table … I think that would have a big impact.”

The White House is considering instructing Republican Senators to vote according to their conscience on the legislation. Such a move would give the GOP lawmakers the ability to vote for the bill without Trump giving an explicit endorsement.

On the other side of the aisle, Democratic leadership is demanding immediate action on the bill. “The single best thing President Trump can do to strengthen Ukraine’s hand right now is to show that the U.S. stands firmly behind them and squarely against Russia. But so far, Trump has not done that,” Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) said.

The legislation also has support in the House. Republican Speaker Mike Johnson said Monday, “There’s many members of Congress that want us to sanction Russia as strongly as we can. And I’m an advocate of that.”

If passed into law, the legislation would represent a significant escalation in the US economic war with Russia, and a break from Trump’s campaign pledge to end the war in Ukraine and improve ties with Moscow.

Graham has described it as “the most draconian bill I’ve ever seen in my life in the Senate.”

The bill would also spike tensions with China and India, as the two Asian giants would be slapped with 500% tariffs for importing Russian oil. The Senators hope that the threat of tariffs would lead Delhi and Beijing to end imports from Moscow and bankrupt the Russian war machine.

“I have coordinated with the White House on the Russia sanctions bill since its inception. The bill would put Russia on a trade island, slapping 500% tariffs on any country that buys Moscow’s energy products. The consequences of its barbaric invasion must be made real to those that prop it up.” Graham wrote last week, “If China or India stopped buying cheap oil, Mr Putin’s war machine would grind to a halt.”

The European Union believes its members will avoid the tariffs even as some of its members still import Russian gas and nuclear fuel. The bill has the endorsement of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

Following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, President Joe Biden claimed a western economic war would cripple the Russian economy and prevent Moscow from waging war. However, the Kremlin has weathered a number of Western economic measures, including having its assets frozen, sanctions, and price caps, while increasing the size of its military.

June 4, 2025 Posted by | Economics | , , , , | Leave a comment

George Beebe: Negotiations & Attack on Russia’s Nuclear Forces (fmr CIA Director of Russia Analysis)

George Beebe and Glenn Diesen
Glenn Diesen | June 3, 2025

George Beebe is director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute. Beebe was the former director of the CIA’s Russia analysis and a staff advisor on Russia matters to Vice President Cheney. Beebe outlines why Trump should not walk away from negotiations, and why the attack on Russia’s nuclear forces (possibly with NATO support) was extremely dangerous.

June 4, 2025 Posted by | Militarism, Video | , , , , | Leave a comment

‘America Must Avoid Following Europe into the CO2 Storage Rabbit Hole’

Texas Public Policy Foundation

Brussels Forces Energy Companies Into Expensive Climate Theater

The European Commission just delivered a wake-up call that Americans ignore at their own peril. In a sweeping new mandate, Brussels is forcing 44 oil and gas companies across Europe to build massive underground CO2 storage facilities by 2030.

Under the newly adopted Net-Zero Industry Act, European energy producers must collectively provide 50 million tons of annual CO2 injection capacity by 2030. The requirements, and costs, for individual companies are massive. Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij, the Dutch energy giant, now faces a mandate to store 6.35 million tons of CO2 annually. OMV PETROM must handle 5.88 million tons, while Romania’s SNGN ROMGAZ is on the hook for 4.12 million tons.

These companies have until June 30, 2025, to submit detailed plans showing exactly how they’ll meet these arbitrary government targets. European officials frame this as making oil and gas companies “part of the solution,” but the reality tells a different story. This massive regulatory burden will force energy companies to redirect billions of dollars from their core mission—producing reliable, affordable energy—into speculative technology with a deeply troubled track record.

The Inconvenient Truth About Carbon Capture

Here’s what Brussels bureaucrats don’t want to admit: carbon capture and storage simply doesn’t work as advertised. Despite decades of development and billions in investment worldwide, not one single CCS project has ever reached its target CO2 capture rate. The industry loves to talk about achieving 95% capture rates, but no existing project has consistently captured more than 80% of carbon emissions.

Projects from Algeria to Texas tell the same story: cost overruns, delays, and performance failures. For the hundreds of CO2 disposal projects currently being proposed around the world, there’s remarkably little solid information about whether their underground storage sites will actually work long-term.

Even if these technologies worked perfectly, the numbers are sobering. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that carbon capture will account for only 2.4% of global carbon mitigation by 2030. Capturing and storing CO2 from power plants still costs more than $100 per ton of CO2, higher than even the Biden administration’s estimate for the social cost of carbon. Needless to say, cost-benefit analysis must be thrown out when there is a “climate crisis” to solve.

The Real Cost: Your Energy Bill

What does this mean for ordinary Europeans? Higher energy costs, plain and simple. When governments force energy companies to spend billions on unproven technology instead of investing in reliable energy production, consumers pay the price. Every euro diverted to these mandated CO2 storage projects is a euro not spent on maintaining and expanding the energy infrastructure that keeps the lights on and homes warm.

This isn’t theoretical. European families are already struggling with some of the world’s highest energy costs, and these new mandates will only make things worse. Energy companies will have no choice but to pass these massive compliance costs on to their customers. The result is less money in family budgets that are already paying the world’s highest energy prices, and higher costs for European businesses trying to compete in global markets.

America’s Dangerous Drift Toward European-Style Energy Policy

Unfortunately, the United States is already following Europe down this costly path. The Inflation Reduction Act expanded and extended the 45Q tax credits that subsidize carbon capture projects. These credits offer $85 per ton for capturing CO2 from power plants and industrial facilities and an eye-watering $180 per ton for direct air capture technology. The Treasury Department estimates that the credits will cost taxpayers $25 billion over the next 10 years.

Taxpayer money flows to unproven technology while reliable energy sources face increasing regulatory pressure. And while Congress looks set to heavily scale back tax credits for wind and solar, it is not touching these 45Q credits.

Thankfully, the Trump administration is set to overturn the newest iteration of the Clean Power Plan, which was set to mandate CO2 capture for all gas and coal power plants. We hope that in due time the Supreme Court will put an end to the insanity of the federal government’s attempts to regulate CO2 emissions and that Congress will bury the 45Q program. Until then, Life:Powered will be fighting to save your electric bill and your tax bill from the cost of fruitless carbon capture mandates and subsidies.

June 3, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Malthusian Ideology, Phony Scarcity | , | Leave a comment

‘I lack the imagination of how to proceed now’ – German establishment very unhappy with Polish election outcome

Remix News | June 2, 2025

Following Poland’s presidential election last night, which saw the victory of conservative Karol Nawrocki, many establishment German politicians have expressed unhappiness and borderline despair with the outcome. Undoubtedly, the candidate overwhelmingly favored to win by the German government and the left lost the election, Rafał Trzaskowski, did not prevail.

Paul Ziemiak, chairman of the German-Polish parliamentary group and a member of the ruling Christian Democrats (CDU), admitted he’s at a loss regarding the future of bilateral relations.

“It is not easy with the new President Karol Nawrocki,” Ziemiak stated on Monday’s ARD “morning magazine,” while pointing to what he said was Nawrocki’s use of anti-German rhetoric during his campaign. Despite this, Ziemiak said that Chancellor Friedrich Merz remains convinced of the fundamental importance of strong cooperation between France, Germany, and Poland for Europe, especially during challenging times.

Ziemiak characterized the election outcome as a protest against “previously well-known faces” in Polish politics. As Remix News wrote before the election, Germany and many powerful voices in the left-liberal establishment in Brussels had much riding on a different outcome. Not only will Nawrocki’s victory complicate bilateral relations between Germany and Poland, but it will make it harder for the left to advance its agenda at the EU level.

Nawrocki’s victory grants him veto power over policies and laws put forward by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, leading Ziemiak to question how the two factions will proceed: “I lack the imagination of how to proceed now,” he said, suggesting that either compromises must be found or early elections might be necessary.

Nawrocki has tremendous power compared to other presidents in Europe. As Polish president, he wields a powerful veto, is the leader of the Polish armed forces, can introduce bills in parliament, and generally dictates foreign policy. In other words, he has the power to generally stifle any moves Tusk makes, to the point that some are speculating Tusk may resign as prime minister following his party’s loss during the election.

The German Green Party also reacted skeptically to the Polish election outcome. Katrin Göring-Eckardt, former vice president of the Bundestag, commented on “a divided country, in the middle of Europe,” predicting “difficult times for everyone who loves freedom.”

Knut Abraham, the new Federal Government Commissioner for Poland, also described a “difficult” road ahead for Poland. Speaking on Berlin broadcaster RBB’s “Radioeins,” Abraham pointed to deep divisions between Poland’s liberal cities and its more rural areas in the east and south.

Abraham singled out areas such as judicial reform and abortion, which may become particularly difficult for the Tusk government to reform.

“So a very, very, very difficult coordination can be expected,” he said.

Perhaps some of the most dramatic words came from Free Democrats (FDP) politician Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, known for her extremely hawkish stance towards the war in Ukraine. She said that the Polish government should now “prepare for total opposition from a hostile president who will do everything possible to overthrow the Tusk government, as announced in the election campaign.”

She said it was a major setback for Europe, and described the outcome as “not a good morning for the largest peace project in the world.”

Strack-Zimmermann’s view may have to do with Nawrocki’s opposition to Ukraine joining NATO. Her FDP party, notably, was voted out of the German parliament in the last federal elections.

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took a more neutral approach to the news, congratulating Nawrocki on X.

“So let us work to ensure the security and prosperity of our common home,” she wrote.

In response to her post, MEP Piotr Müller, a member of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS), wrote:

“Good relations should be based on the truth! Poles are waiting for the truth about the Pact on Migration and Asylum, the Green Deal, and the EU – Mercosur Agreement! Tusk lied, Trzaskowski lied, and you with the EU bureaucracy helped them!” he wrote.

June 2, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Malthusian Ideology, Phony Scarcity | , | Leave a comment

Poland’s New Prez Nawrocki: Not Your Typical Pro-Ukraine Hero

By Svetlana Ekimenko – Sputnik – 02.06.2025

Opposition candidate Karol Nawrocki has been elected as the president of Poland, according to data published on the official website of the election commission. Nawrocki received 50.9% of the votes, just ahead of Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski (49.1%), Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s ally.

Poland’s stance on the Ukrainian crisis may change after the presidential election, as the country’s politicians and ordinary people alike seem increasingly reluctant to support Zelensky’s regime.

Here is a closer look at where Karol Nawrocki stands on Ukraine and other major issues.

No Free Pass for Ukraine

Nawrocki does not see it in either the European Union or NATO until bilateral issues like the 1943 Volyn massacre committed by Ukrainian nationalists during WWII are addressed.

  • While promising support, he blasted Volodymyr Zelensky for “ingratitude”.
  • Accused “European elites” (plus their “butler” Tusk) of fueling the war.
  • Unequivocally will not deploy Polish troops to Ukraine.
  • Accused Ukrainian refugees of taking advantage of Polish generosity, vowed to shield Polish farmers and truckers from unfair Ukrainian competition.
  • Opposes any Ukraine-EU trade liberalization.

On Russia

Karol Nawrocki swerved from telling Radio ZET that maintaining diplomatic ties with Russia was “not good for Poland,” to claiming he was ready to sit down at the negotiating table with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

As former head of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), he oversaw demolition of Soviet war monuments—earning himself a spot on the Russian Interior Ministry’s “wanted” list of Polish nationals in 2024.

Skepticism Towards EU

  • Karol Nawrocki called the EU weak and chaotic, citing its exclusion from Ukraine peace talks.
  • He pledged to not allow the liberalization of trade between the EU and Ukraine.
  • Nawrocki vowed to keep Poland on the zloty, not the euro.

June 2, 2025 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , | Leave a comment

‘Brussels hijacked our future’ – Orban

RT | June 1, 2025

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has unveiled a proposal to increase the power of EU members and limit the authority of its bureaucracy. Calling it a “patriotic plan” for the bloc, he said in a series of weekend social media posts that it will revive the “European dream.”

The EU elites in Brussels have exploited every crisis to amass more power, Orban claimed in a post on X. This course has so far only translated into less sovereignty for member states and “failed policies,” according to the prime minister. “Brussels hijacked our future” by disrupting public safety through migration and eroding prosperity with “green dogmas,” he stated in another post.

“Europe can’t afford this any longer, it’s time to take back control,” he said.

The PM’s plan is based on what he calls four pillars: a path toward peace on the continent and defusing tensions with Russia, removing Brussels’ “centralized control” over finances, “bringing back free speech” and strengthening Europe’s Christian identity, and tightening control over immigration.

“We want peace, we don’t need a new Eastern front,” Orban said, commenting on his plan and stating that the bloc should not accept Ukraine as a member. “We don’t want our money poured into someone else’s war,” he added.

A military buildup and defense increase actively promoted by some EU nations could easily lock the bloc in an “arms race” with Russia, Orban warned. Such a development would “devour… taxpayers’ money,” he said. Instead of pouring more resources into the military, the bloc needs to contribute to the peace process between Moscow and Kiev, the prime minister maintained, praising US President Donald Trump’s efforts in this regard.

The EU needs to start “arms limitation talks with the Russians as soon as possible. Otherwise, all our money will be swallowed by the arms industry instead of being spent on peaceful… goals,” Orban argued.

European nations once united to create the “safest and the most advanced continent” in the world but this dream was “stolen,” the prime minister charged, calling on EU nations not to allow Brussels to use the Ukraine conflict “as an excuse to take more of our money.”

June 1, 2025 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Full Spectrum Dominance, Militarism, Russophobia | , | Leave a comment

Europe punching above weight for nothing

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – June 1, 2025

Recent European (UK plus EU) sanctions on Russia amid ongoing US-backed efforts to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine aim to assert Europe’s perceived ability to “correct” the course of events.

However, the continued reliance on sanctions also underscores the limits of what Europe can—and cannot—achieve in ultimately shaping geopolitical outcomes.
Sanctions amid Talks

In geopolitics, timing is often more telling than the event itself. Such is the case with the European Union’s and the UK’s recent decision to impose fresh sanctions on Russia—announced just a day after former President Donald Trump held a two-hour “serious” conversation with Vladimir Putin. This is not the first time European states have sanctioned Russia, nor will it be the last. But this round is different, not in content but in context. The timing sends a clear message: Europe is uneasy, not just about Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but also about the growing strategic vacuum left by an increasingly disengaged United States.

Despite the recent round of dialogue between Ukrainian and Russian officials—and other rounds expected to follow—European leaders remain skeptical of where this path may lead. Their fear? That a negotiated settlement—particularly one brokered without robust Western unity—could leave Russia in a stronger position than before the conflict began.

That anxiety is compounded by waning American commitment to NATO under the Trump administration. In the absence of a coherent transatlantic front, European powers are trying to assert their own leverage. This latest sanctions package, targeting Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” of oil tankers and the financial networks enabling sanctions evasion, is as much a political statement as it is an economic measure.

According to German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, the sanctions are a response to Russia’s refusal to agree to an “immediate ceasefire without preconditions.” But here’s the strategic problem: Europe acted alone. Washington, notably silent, announced no corresponding measures. In fact, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that threatening sanctions now could derail ongoing talks rather than advance them. “The president … believes that right now, you start threatening sanctions, the Russians will stop talking,” Rubio told lawmakers in the US.

This divergence reveals a deeper strategic disconnect between Europe and the US. Despite intense lobbying from European capitals, the Trump administration remains hesitant to jeopardize fragile diplomatic progress. In the eyes of many analysts, this marks a foreign policy failure for Europe, unable to rally its closest ally at a critical juncture. Still, the broader implication is troubling: these sanctions are unlikely to shift Moscow’s calculus or alter the trajectory of ceasefire negotiations. Instead, they may highlight Europe’s limited influence in the absence of American backing—and underscore a growing realization that, in the new era of great power politics, Europe may have to fend more for itself. If the goal is to contain Russian power and shape the post-war regional order, sanctions without transatlantic unity are unlikely to suffice. Without Washington on board, Europe’s message is loud—but not necessarily strong.

Anatomy of Sanctions

As the conflict in Ukraine drags into its fourth year, Europe finds itself in a strategic bind. While its leaders continue to voice solidarity with Kyiv, the reality beneath the rhetoric is unmistakable: Europe’s message is not strong enough. But the more pressing question is—why is this message so weak?

The answer lies not in a lack of compassion or political will, but in the cold calculus of power, capability, and consequence. After years of bloodshed, destruction, and stalemate, European leaders increasingly grasp the sobering truth: hard military power has its limits. In this war, force has not produced victory and may never do so. But sanctions, Europe’s go-to instrument in lieu of military engagement, have proven even weaker. Despite wave after wave of economic penalties imposed on Russia—freezing assets, targeting oligarchs, cutting trade—Moscow has adapted.

Faced with this double bind—military impotence on one hand, economic ineffectiveness on the other—some European policymakers have flirted with the idea of escalating their involvement. The suggestion of deploying troops or enforcing a no-fly zone in Ukraine has crept into public discourse. Yet such options bring their own dangers, dangers that many in Europe are not prepared to face. The reality is stark: without the United States, neither NATO nor any coalition of European powers has the muscle to militarily confront Russia directly.

Moreover, sending European troops into Ukraine or deploying aircraft over Ukrainian skies risks a direct confrontation with a nuclear-armed state. It is a step that would almost certainly invite retaliation on European soil. The conflict, in other words, would no longer be something happening “over there”—it would be an immediate, domestic reality. And this, more than anything else, is the psychological wall European leaders are reluctant to breach.

This is the heart of Europe’s dilemma: a conflict it cannot win, a peace it cannot broker, and a strategic imperative it cannot fulfill without paying a heavy cost. Until Europe reconciles its ambitions with its capabilities, its message will remain what it is today—resolute in tone, but tragically weak in substance.

Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.

June 1, 2025 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , , , | Leave a comment

Kerry’s MH17 Misinformation

By Eric van de Beek – Propaganda In Focus – March 14, 2025 

The downing of flight MH17 in Eastern Ukraine, on July 17, 2014, led to a tectonic shift in relations between the EU and Russia. The American Secretary of State, John Kerry, paved the way by spreading misinformation and agitprop.

On July 17, 2014, a Malaysian passenger plane that had departed from Amsterdam and was en route to Kuala Lumpur crashed in Donbass, eastern Ukraine, where at that time a battle was raging between Ukrainian government troops and pro-Russian insurgents. All 298 occupants of flight MH17, most of them Dutch, were killed. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) investigated the technical cause of the crash. In 2015 it concluded that the plane was downed by a Buk missile. The criminal investigation was led by a team of Dutch, Belgian, Australian, Ukrainian and Malaysian police officers and prosecutors – the Joint Investigation Team (JIT). In 2019, it announced that the Dutch Public Prosecution Service would prosecute one Ukrainian, Leonid Kharchenko, and three Russians, Igor Girkin, Sergey Dubinsky and Oleg Pulatov. They were tried in The Netherlands, by the Hague District Court. In 2022, Pulatov was acquitted. The court sentenced the other defendees to life imprisonment for complicity in murder and the downing of an aircraft. The concrete involvement of the three convicts is alleged to have included: expressing the need for and requesting an air defense system with crew; indicating a suitable firing location for that system; transporting, escorting, guarding and concealing it. Those who were directly involved in the downing of the plane are still at large. The JIT assumes they are hiding in circles of the 53rd anti-aircraft brigade in Kursk, Russia. A Buk Telar air defense system from that brigade allegedly crossed the border into Ukraine with crew and all on July 17, 2014, where it fired the fatal missile the same day. However, the JIT has no idea who pushed the button, who gave the order to shoot, and for what reason. In 2023, the JIT anounced that it had halted the investigation.

The impact of the MH17 crash on relations between Russia and Europe cannot be overestimated. Although American and European sanctions were already in force against Russia before July 17, 2014, due to the seizure of Crimea, relations between Russia and most countries of the European Union were still friendly. The European economy benefitted from trade relations with Russia and the import of cheap natural gas. The Obama Administration tried to change this. It urged Brussels to impose additional, tougher sanctions on Russia, The Washington Post reported on June 25. At that time, there were divisions within the E.U. Some countries feared sanctions would hurt their relations with Russia. This changed overnight on July 17. “We hope it is a wake-up call for some countries in Europe that have been reluctant to move,” US Secretary of State John Kerry said in a televised interview three days after the MH17 crash. “We think frankly that the sanctions may need to be tougher. It may well be that the Dutch and others help lead that effort.” Kerry referred to the sanctions package that the US had already imposed on July 16. It was an example for Europe to follow. That package included sanctions against numerous Russian companies in the energy sector, banking and arms industries. Americans were prohibited by law from doing business with individuals who had interests in these companies.

On July 21, the day after Kerry’s TV address, American UN Ambassador Samantha Power and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans Timmermans gave emotional speeches at the UN Security Council in New York. They accused the separatists of denying investigators access to the crash site, suppressing evidence, engaging in looting, disrespecting the victims’ bodies and hindering their recovery. “To my dying day I will not understand that it took so much time for the rescue workers to be allowed to do their difficult job, and that human remains should be used in a political game,” Timmermans stated, before flying to Brussels to give a reprise of his speech. Several EU ministers reportedly had tears in their eyes when Timmermans said he had known personally some of the 194 Dutch passengers among the 298 people who died on the plane. Reuters characterized the meeting in Brussels as “a turning point in Europe’s approach towards Russia”. Countries that were previously on the brakes, such as Germany and Italy, now suddenly agreed to the measures desired by the US. “Within days of Timmermans’ address, senior EU diplomats had agreed the broad outlines of potential sanctions on Russian access to EU capital markets, defence and energy technology,” Reuters wrote. “Timmermans’ impassioned speech, several diplomats said, made it difficult for others to hold a firm line against sanctions at Tuesday’s meeting. […] But like a supportive family, EU partners rallied around the bereaved Dutch, putting national economic interests aside and for the first time going beyond asset freezes and visa bans on individuals to envisage curbs on entire sectors of the Russian economy that could turn the screw on President Vladimir Putin.” On July 31, the significantly stricter EU sanctions against Russia became a reality.

The MH17 disaster not only led to economic damage for Russia. The country’s reputation also suffered a serious blow. Various Western media and politicians immediately pointed the finger at the Kremlin. President Vladimir Putin had a 298-fold murder on his conscience. While Russia could previously count on some understanding among many in the West for sending “green men” to Crimea, it was now a rogue state in the eyes of the masses. The separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk also experienced nothing but misery from the disaster.

The repercussions for Russia and the separatists stand in stark contrast to the outcome for the anti-Russian coup government in Kiev. It has benefited greatly from the MH17 crash. Until July 17, fear of a large-scale Russian invasion prevailed and there was concern about the poorly run ‘anti-terrorist operation’ along the border with Russia in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The MH17 disaster changed this overnight. On July 21, 2014, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko appeared on CNN. He qualified the MH17 as a terrorist attack. “I don’t see any difference between the tragedy of 9/11 and the tragedy in Grabovo in Ukraine,” he said. “So now we have to demonstrate the same reaction. This is a danger to the whole world, to global security.” It sounded like a call for the West to take military action, as had happened in response to the alleged terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001. The Americans then successively invaded Afghanistan and Iraq.

Poroshenko almost got his way. An advanced plan by The Netherlands and Australia to take the crash area by force of arms from the insurgents was called off at the last minute. Nevertheless, the MH17 disaster brought the Kiev government much of what it wanted from the US and Europe: political and military support for Ukraine and tough punitive measures against Russia. On December 18, 2014, US President Barack Obama signed the so-called Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which paved the way for $350 million in military aid to Kiev. According to statements from the US Department of Defense, Washington donated one and a half billion dollars worth of military goods and training to Kiev from 2014 to 2019. NATO ‘intensified’ – in its own words – its cooperation with Ukraine. The tougher attitude of Brussels towards Moscow, so fervently desired by Kiev, also took shape.

Was MH17 really downed by a Russian Buk-crew? According to the The Hague District Court, the Dutch Prosecution Service, the JIT and the western legacy media the answer is in the affirmative. According to the author of this article, who attended all 69 court sessions of the criminal trial, no convincing — let alone conclusive evidence — was presented for the Russian Buk scenario. There are reasons to believe that something completely different may have happened. (I will discuss this in extenso in a book that I will publish this year.)

The fact is that in the public mind, Russia was convicted even before the official criminal investigation had started. Secretary of State John Kerry played a major role in this campaign by spreading misinformation and agitation propaganda that was subsequently echoed by others among whom were President Barack Obama, US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans Timmermans. Let’s take a look at the five tv interviews Kerry gave on Sunday, July 20, 2014. On this day he appeared on CNN, Fox, ABC, NBC and CBS.

Claim 1: “We know for certain that in the last month there’s been a major flow of arms and weapons. There was a convoy about several weeks ago, about 150 vehicles with armed personnel carrier, multiple rocket launchers, tanks, artillery, all of which crossed over from Russia into the eastern part of Ukraine and was turned over to the separatists.”

This may be true. I did not study this subject. I concentrated on the Buk allegations. I’ve seen imagery of a military transport in rebel territory, filmed on July 15, 2014. The vehicles in the transport were either provided by Russia or captured by the separatists from the Ukrainian army. In any case, U.S. intelligence has not detected a Buk Telar crossing the Russian-Ukrainian border. No western intelligence agency has identified any Russian Buk system in Ukraine; only Ukrainian Buk systems. This has been acknowledged by the Dutch Public Prosecution Service during the MH17 criminal trial in the Netherlands. In court it showed a map of all known positions of Ukrainian Buk systems in eastern Ukraine in June and July 2014, based on a memo of the Dutch Military Intelligence Service MIVD.

Claim 2: “We know for certain that the separatists have a proficiency that they’ve gained by training from Russians as to how to use these sophisticated SA-11 systems.” (SA-11 is the American designation for the Buk system.)

The Americans have never substantiated this claim. It cannot be true either. A Ukrainian Buk expert who was consulted by the JIT has said that a Buk system is more complex to operate than the most advanced fighter jet. At the time MH17 was shot down, the conflict in eastern Ukraine had been going on for only three months. In such a short period it is impossible to learn how to operate a Buk system. According to Ukrainian ex-Buk commander Tarankov, who was interviewed by the JIT, this takes years. The commander of a Buk Telar has undergone five years of training; his subordinates spend a year or more before they are allowed to deploy, Pulatov’s lawyers revealed in court. According to the ex-commander of a Finnish Buk battalion, Esa Kelloniemi, who was consulted by the author of this article, it is out of the question for an untrained crew to receive permission from higher-ups to go out with a Buk. Moreover, without specialist knowledge, it would be impossible to fire a Buk missile. That would require much more than turning the ignition key and pressing the launch button. “The firing mechanism blocks the launch of a missile if a target has not first been detected, locked-on to and tracked, and if this target is still outside the calculated firing range,” Kelloniemi says.

Kerry’s suggestion that MH17 was brought down by separatists runs counter to the view of the JIT and the Dutch Public Prosecution Service. They propagated the hasty suggestion that MH17 was downed by a Russian crew.

Claim 3. “We know that they had this system to a certainty on Monday the 14th beforehand because the social media was reporting it and tracking it.”

According to the JIT and the prosecution the Buk that downed MH17 entered Ukrainian territory on July 17. This therefore cannot be the Buk that Kerry talked about.

On July 14 a Ukrainian military transport plane, an An-26, was downed. According to Kiev, this had happened at a high altitude and with a system more powerful than anything the insurgents had fired with up to that time. It probably came from Russia, they said. On social media there was talk that it was downed by a Buk missile, but this wasn’t substantiated in any way.

It seems the seperatists were in posession of Buk Telars. In Donetsk and Luhansk they captured air bases where Buk systems were deployed. The Ukrainians had already withdrawn from there, taking their equipment with them, but they may have left some behind. According to the prosecution the separatists found at least one Buk-Telar in an air base near Donetsk. It showed photos of this Telar in court. It looked non-functional. The electronics section was clearly damaged. In Luhansk the Ukrainians also seem to have left at least one Telar behind. On 20 July 2014 a video appeared of Valery Bolotov, the political leader of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). In it Bolotov expressed his condolences to the relatives and reported in the same breath that he had a non-functional Telar. He did not say how he got it. He invited the JIT to come and inspect the Telar and called on technical experts to repair it so that it could be used for the air defense of the LPR. The investigators of JIT never accepted Bolotov’s invitation. They never set a foot in Luhansk.

Claim 4. “On Thursday of the event, we know that within hours of this event, this particular system passed through two towns right in the vicinity of the shoot down. We know because we observed it by imagery.”

“We know they had an SA-11 right in the vicinity, hours before this shoot. The social media has documented this.”

“We know that they had an SA-11 system in the vicinity literally hours before the shootdown took place. There are social media records of that. The social media showed them with this system moving through the very area where we believe the shoot down took place hours before it took place.”

There are six videos and three photos of the transport of a Buk Telar across territory that was controlled by the separatists. Eight of them were posted on social media after the crash. Only one video, filmed in the city of Torez, and one photo, made in Donetsk, came into the hands of JIT before they were presented to the public. The identity of most photographers and filmmakers is unknown. Only two were identified. Of these two, only one was interviewed by the JIT. With his dash cam, he had filmed the transport of a Buk Telar in Makeevka. The metadata of his video indicated that it was shot in 2012. He said he didn’t remember the day of his encounter with the transport. One video was made by “a secret surveillance unit” of the Ukrainians in Luhansk. It was put on a YouTube channel of Ukraine’s secret service SBU the day after the crash. (See claim 9).

According to the Americans, the JIT and the prosecution the fatal missile was launched south of the city of Snizhne, from an agricultural field near the village of Pervomaiskyi. There’s one photo of a Buk driving under its own power in Snizhne and one video of a Buk leaving Snizhne, driving south. It is unknown who produced this imagery and the JIT wasn’t able to obtain the original files. The photo and video are of deplorable quality. Not a single detail can be seen on them. Zooming in creates a pixel salade.

Claim 5: “At the moment of the shoot down, we detected a launch from that area and our trajectory shows that it went to the aircraft.”

“We know to a certainty that we saw the launch from this area of what we deem to be an SA-11 because of the altitude, 33,000 feet, and because of the trajectory. We have the trajectory recorded. We know that it occurred at the very moment that this aircraft disappeared from the radar screen.”

“We picked up the imagery of this launch. We know the trajectory. We know where it came from. We know the timing. And it was exactly at the time that this aircraft disappeared from the radar.”

The Hague District Court has not received any satellite data from the Americans, despite repeated requests by the prosecution service and the Dutch next of kin. Some, among whom former CIA officer Ray McGovern, say this indicates that no missile had been launched from rebels’ held territory at all.

A memorandum the prosecution received from the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) states: “At the time that flight MH17 dropped out of contact, the U.S. intelligence community detected an SA-11 surface-to-air missile launch from approximately six kilometers south of the town of Snizhne in eastern Ukraine.” The DNI did not comment on the exact time of the launch, but Pulatov’s lawyers concluded from the memorandum that the observed launch could not possibly have been from the missile that brought down MH17. After all, a missile cannot be launched and simultaneously knock a target off the radar. A missile takes some time to reach a specified target. According to the investigators of the Dutch National Aerospace Laboratory NLR the Buk missile that hit MH17 must have travelled for about 32 seconds, if the missile was launched from the agricultural field south of Snizhne. So the launch the Americans allegedly observed must have been from a different missile than the one that hit MH17. (More about this in my upcoming book The MH17 trial.)

Both the Russians and the Ukrainians provided the JIT with primary radar data. On these, no missile or any other object can be seen near MH17. According to experts who were consulted by the JIT this can be explained by technical factors like the high speed of the missile (mach 3).

Claim 6: “We also know to a certainty that the social media immediately afterwards saw reports of separatists bragging about knocking down a plane. And then the so-called defense minister, self-appointed of the People’s Republic of Donetsk, Igor Strelkov, posted a social media report bragging about the shoot down of a transport plane, at which point when it became clear it was civilian, they pulled down that particular report.”

“We know that the so-called defense minister of the People’s Republic of Donetsk, Mr. Igor Strelkov, actually posted a bragging social media posting of having shot down a military transport. And then when it became apparent that it was civilian, they pulled it down from the social media.”

“The defense minister, so-called self-appointed of the People’s Republic of Donetsk, Mr. Igor Strelkov, actually posted a bragging statement on the social media about having shot down a transport. And then when it became apparent it was civilian, they quickly removed that particular posting.”

Kerry suggested that MH17 was shot down by mistake by referring in particular to two messages that appeared on July 17 at 16:37 and 16:50 on the news account “strelkov_info” of the social media site VKontakte. According to these reports, an Antonov transport plane of the Ukrainian Air Force, an Antonov An-26, had been downed. Kerry attributed it to Girkin, whose battle name was “Strelkov”, and who at the time was commander-in-chief of the Donetsk People’s Army. In posting the message, he allegedly “bragged” about shooting it down and then deleted it when he noticed that a passenger plane had crashed. But none of that was true. The account strelkov_info was a fan account, by and for admirers of Girkin. Statements by Girkin were sometimes published on strelkov_info, but they were always accompanied by a banner saying, “Girkin reports”. That banner was not with the first and also not with the second message about the downed An-26. The prosecution acknowledged that the two social media posts did not come from Girkin or subordinates of his. It therefore did not put forward the posts as evidence in its closing speech.

The person who first reported that an An-26 had been downed was, nota bene, the pro-Kiev Twitter account @ua_ridna_vilna. The unknown person behind the account sent out a tweet with this announcement at 4:30 p.m., only to delete the tweet and replace it at 4:32 p.m. with a tweet saying it was “probably” an An-26. The prosecution completely ignored the utterances on this account.

A plane came down. It makes sense that those who had heard about it or watched it from a distance assumed that a military aircraft had been hit. After all, that had happened sixteen times before. In four cases, it involved a military transport aircraft, including an An-26 on July 14. It was to be expected. Social media went wild. Thus the rumor got out that the crashed plane was an An-26.

Claim 7: “We know from intercepts, voices, which have been correlated to intercepts that we have, that those are, in fact, the voices of separatists talking about the shoot down of the plane.”

“We have voices that we have overheard of separatists in Russia bragging about the shoot down.”

“We have intercepted voices that have been documented by our people through intelligence as being separatists who are talking to each other about the shoot down.”

“Social media, which is an extraordinary tool, obviously, in all of this, has posted recordings of separatists bragging about the shoot down of a plane at the time right after it took place.”

Within a few hours after the crash the SBU posted on its YouTube channel an intercept of a phone conversation of a commander of the separatists, Igor Bezler. In it, he reports that a plane had been downed. A week after the crash the SBU posted another intercept, this time with someone reporting to Bezler that a ‘birdie” was coming his way. The JIT interviewed Bezler. At the start of the trial the prosecution stated that none of Bezler’s phone conversations were related to the downing of MH17. According to Bezler the conversations were about the downing of a Ukrainian Sukhoi jet a day before the MH17 crash. Indeed, on July 16, two Sukhois had been downed. It later turned out that the SBU had omitted part of Bezler’s conversation about shooting down a plane. In the omitted part, Bezler says it was a ‘Sushka’, meaning a Sukhoi jet. This was revealed by a Ukrainian blogger, Anatoly Shariy, who got his hands on the original wiretap.

Claim 8: “They have shot down some twelve planes, aircraft in the last months or so, two of which were major transport planes.”

In fact sixteen Ukrainian military aircraft were downed before the MH17 crash, among which four were military transport planes.

Claim 9: “And now we have a video showing a launcher moving back through a particular area there, out into Russia with at least one missing missile on it. So we have enormous sort of input about this, which points fingers.”

“We know that we have a video now of a transporter removing an SA-11 system back into Russia and it shows a missing missile or so.”

On the day after the crash, the Ukrainian secret service SBU posted a video on their YouTube channel of the transport of Buk Telar carrying three missiles in stead of four, which it normally carries if a Buk is being deployed. According to the Ukrainians, the transport was filmed in the early morning of July 18. The prosecution confirmed this and concluded that the video was shot on the outskirts of the city of Luhansk where at that time a battle was going on between the separatists and the Ukrainian army. So, the video was not shot in the border region as Kerry said. According to the prosecution, investigators of the JIT studied the original video file. The metadata indicated the video was shot in the early morning of July 18. The lawyers, however, revealed that the Luhansk video was missing from the SD card on which “a secret surveillance unit” allegedly recorded the event. A Dutch police officer who received the camera and the card from the hands of the SBU determined that the video file had been erased. The lawyers, therefore, said they didn’t understand how the investigators had managed to examine the original file.

It is possible that the Luhansk video is from before July 18. Indeed, at a press conference that was held in the afternoon of July 17, a spokesman for the Ukrainian government, Andrey Lysenko, reported that a video had been shot of a Buk Telar in Luhansk. Lysenko did not present this video, nor was it ever presented thereafter. Why not? Was this perhaps to conceal that the Ukrainians used the video to falsely claim it was made on July 18? Could it be that the Buk on the Luhansk video, that had one missile missing, had been involved with the downing of the Antonov An-26, on July 14?

Claim 10: “We know with confidence that the Ukrainians did not have such a system anywhere near the vicinity at that point in time. So it obviously points a very clear finger at the separatists.”

Dutch military intelligence service MIVD reported that there were several Ukrainian Buk systems present in Eastern Ukraine at the time of the crash. Western intelligence had not detected a single Russian Buk system in Ukraine. According to the prosecution the Buk that shot down MH17 was brought in on July 17 and hastily removed on the night of July 17-18. This would therefore be the reason Western intelligence services overlooked the Buk. The services would only have spotted Buks that had been in the same place for an extended period of time.

There is no evidence of an Ukrainian Buk that was within firing range of MH17. But, as MH17 police investigation chief Wilbert Paulissen correctly noted during the September 2016 press conference of the JIT: “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Just because there is no evidence of such a Buk does not mean it was not there and did not fire. A Ukrainian Buk Telar may have been put in position without anyone noticing.

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry provided the JIT with a list of all the locations in the east of the country where it had Buk systems. Missing from that was a Buk system on a military base in Dovhenke in the Kharkiv Oblast, just on the border of the rebel-held Donetsk Oblast. The MIVD determined that a Buk system had been located there. Why had Kiev concealed its presence?

Claim 11: “Pro-Russian separatists have reportedly removed almost 200 bodies from the crash site and are continuing to refuse to allow investigators full access to the site.”

“We want the facts and the fact that the separatists are controlling this in a way that is preventing people from getting there, even as the site is tampered with, makes its own statement about culpability and responsibility.”

“There are reports of drunken separatist soldiers unceremoniously piling bodies into trucks.”

“They are interfering with the evidence in the location. They have removed, we understand, some airplane parts.”

The authorities of the Donbass Peoples Republic (DPR) have not refused any investigators access to the crash site. A team of Dutch air-crash investigators was kept in Kiev by the Ukrainian and Dutch authorities, as has been extensively documented in the book MH17: Onderzoek, feiten en verhalen, commissioned by the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) and in a report by the University of Twente, Evaluatie nationale crisisbeheersingsorganisatie vlucht MH17. In a July 20 press conference, DPR Prime Minister Alexander Borodai complained that the investigators were nowhere to be seen. “It will soon be the 4th day after the event. Where are the experts? We are not in the middle of nowhere, the North Pole or Antartica, in a place where you can cannot travel easily. If you look at the map, you see we are in the middle of Europe. The road from Kiev to here takes four of five hours.” The DSB air crash investigators never went to Donetsk. In August they went back home.

However, three Dutch forensic investigators of the LTFO, specialized in victim identification, managed to reach the site. They were welcomed by Borodai, on July 21, the day after Kerry had accused the DPR authorities of refusing investigators access. To their surprise, they found themselves surrounded by journalists from all over the world. “There was press from Australia to the US, there must have been fifty camera teams,” one of them, Peter van Vliet, recalled. “I don’t know how they got there. But it took us three days, without sleeping and with all the dangers that entailed.” On July 21, also a Malaysian delegation arrived. To them Bordodai handed over the black boxes of the plane just after midnight. According to the Malaysians, they had secretly left Kiev. The Ukrainian government had tried to keep them there.

Contrary to what Kerry claimed, no separatist soldiers were involved in the recovery of the victims. The recovery was performed by a specialized team. The local Ukrainian State Emergency Service (SES) recovered human remains between 17 July and 21 July 2014. The SES is a federal organisation which has local teams that, among other things, are responsible for the protection of the population in case of disasters. When a disaster occurs, the SES is given authority over other services. In the case of flight MH17, the SES was assisted in the recovery by local fire brigades, police, farmers and miners.

On July 21, the Dutch forensic investigators of LTFO, observed that there were no more human remains visible at the locations accessible to them. In a statement to the international press, Van Vliet praised the SES: “They did a hell of a job in a hell of a place.” On July 22, a train, carrying the human remains that were recovered by the SES, left Donetsk heading for territory controlled by the Ukrainian authorities in Kiev. In a letter sent in August 2014 the Dutch embassy in Kiev conveyed its gratitude to the SES. “The experts in The Netherlands, who currently work on the identification of the human remains, have been deeply impressed by the professional handling of the bodies by the emergency services in Donetsk.”

Kerry and other American officials never substantiated their claim that the separatists covered up evidence by removing airplane parts. It later turned out that an Australian-Ukrainian journalist, who was covertly working for the Ukrainian government, had collected pieces of evidence from the crash site for “safekeeping and out of reach of the forces of the Russian Federation” and had handed them over to the Ukrainian authorities.

Also, Dutch air crash investigators didn’t seem to be in a hurry to recover the wreckage. The Dutch started a recovery mission only four months after the crash. The lawyers revealed that only 30 percent of the wreckage was transported to The Netherlands. The plane was partly reconstructed. The lawyers found that parts that were not used for the reconstruction had ended up in eighteen containers. The prosecution did not grant them access to these containers. The court did not overrule this decision.

Eric van de Beek is an investigative journalist. He studied journalism at Windesheim University and philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. For years he worked as a journalist for Dutch leading weekly Elsevier. In recent years he contributed to Diplomat Magazine, Novini, Sputnik, and Uitpers. He currently writes for Dutch weekly De Andere Krant. In 2024 a book of Van de Beek’s was published about the MH17 plane crash in Ukraine. On Substack you can read his English language blog about the subject. In 2024 he was awarded the Dutch Julian Assange Prize ‘for public service’.

June 1, 2025 Posted by | Book Review, Deception, Mainstream Media, Warmongering, Timeless or most popular | , , , , | Leave a comment

Fyodor Lukyanov: Behind Closed Doors – The US-Russia Diplomatic Games

Glenn Diesen | May 31, 2025

Fyodor Lukyanov is Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, a Research Professor at the Higher School of Economics, Editor in Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs Journal, and the Research Director at the Valdai Discussion Club. Prof. Lukyanov outlines how the US and Russian frameworks for ending the war are coming together. Ukraine is incrementally dragged into the format, and the Europeans are ignored as they are seen to be unrealistic and unreliable.

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May 31, 2025 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

EC launches European fact-checking funding network to advance “Democracy Shield” and expand censorship

A €5 million fact-checking project becomes the velvet glove on the iron fist of EU content governance

By Cindy Harper | Reclaim The Net | May 30, 2025

The European Commission has launched a €5 million initiative presented as a fact-checking support program; but beneath the surface, it reads as yet another calculated step toward institutionalizing censorship across the European Union.

This call for proposals is marketed as a tool to “protect democracy” and combat “disinformation,” but the structure, goals, and affiliations of the program point clearly to the opposite: a top-down, publicly funded apparatus for narrative enforcement.

Slated to run until September 2, 2025, the project is open not only to EU Member States but also to candidate countries like Ukraine and Moldova; jurisdictions framed as highly vulnerable to “foreign interference,” especially pro-Kremlin disinformation.

This strategic framing serves a dual purpose: justifying increased surveillance of content and securing narrative dominance in geopolitically sensitive areas.

The program’s core deliverables; protecting fact-checkers from so-called “harassment,” creating a centralized repository of “fact-checks,” and building emergency “response capacity;” sound benign to some. But stripped of the euphemism, this is a blueprint for constructing a continent-wide content control grid.

The “protection scheme” offers legal and cyber assistance to fact-checkers, but more crucially it reinforces the narrative that opposition to these groups constitutes abuse rather than legitimate disagreement.

The “fact-check repository” enables centralized curation of what counts as “truth,” and the “emergency response” function gives the Commission a pretext to fast-track suppression efforts in politically sensitive moments.

Most telling is the program’s requirement that participating organizations be certified by either the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).

Many of their members, such as AFP and Full Fact, already work directly with major social media platforms like Meta under third-party moderation schemes. This effectively means the EC is reinforcing an exclusive gatekeeper class, already aligned with corporate censorship programs, now endowed with taxpayer funds and the backing of the European bureaucracy.

At least 60% of the funding will go to third parties, who must co-finance their participation.

The Commission claims this initiative supports the “European Democracy Shield,” a term that in practice functions as rhetorical armor for suppressing free expression.

Every policy facet of this initiative is tied to managing or mitigating “disinformation,” yet no clear or objective criteria for what constitutes disinformation are provided.

This vagueness enables the flexible application of suppression to a broad range of unwelcome speech.

May 31, 2025 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Full Spectrum Dominance | , | Leave a comment

Trump bracing for a longer Ukraine war

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | May 30, 2025

One of the mysteries of the Ukraine endgame is that President Donald Trump did not issue an executive order on January 20 withdrawing all support for Ukraine. That would have been the easiest way to end the war. 

The conditions were propitious — Candidate Trump didn’t mince words that it was a hopeless war that cost the US dearly in treasure; he thought poorly of President Volodymyr Zelensky as a shameless free rider; he saw the war as impeding his foreign-policy priority of the US’ transition to a multipolar world order; and, he felt no compulsion to inherit ‘Biden’s war’. 

But instead, Trump plunged himself with gusto into the Ukraine question, although Washington lacked the means to leverage Russia to compromise on its core interests in what Russian people regarded as an existential war. 

Quite possibly, some of Trump’s advisors prevailed upon him to undertake the theatrical diplomatic effort on the basis of a flawed reading of the state of play in the war. Trump believed that western sanctions lethally weakened the Russian economy; that Russia’s casualty figures ran into hundreds of thousands and such a high level of attrition was unsustainable; that Zelensky would sign up on the dotted line; that an improvement in Russian-American relationship would be a ‘win-win’ with massive economic benefits accruing to both sides and so on. 

But all these premises turned out to be wrong notions. Putin has steered the economy to a state of permanent western sanctions (which was the Soviet experience, too). Russian entrepreneurs have successfully replaced the fleeing western businesses in the wake of sanctions and will now resist any re-entry by the latter.

Russia’s casualty figures are much lower than the self-serving western estimates put it, as the high level of recruitment to the army suggests. Zelensky is bent on prolonging the war with support from European powers per Biden’s script to ‘Trump-proof’ the war. Europeans not only have a Plan B but have collaborators within the US some of whom may even be in Trump’s team. 

Suffice to say, Trump has been on a learning curve, as he began sensing that the Kremlin is determined to realise the objectives it had set for itself (as outlined in Putin’s historic speech last June at the foreign ministry). According to a Reuters report two days ago, “Putin wants a ‘written’ pledge by major Western powers not to enlarge the US-led NATO alliance eastwards — shorthand for formally ruling out membership to not only Ukraine and Georgia and Moldova and other former Soviet republics as well.”

“Russia also wants Ukraine to be neutral, some Western sanctions lifted, a resolution of the issue of frozen Russian sovereign assets in the West, and protection for Russian speakers in Ukraine” — per Reuters. 

Europeans will scoff at such demands. Therefore, as things stand, a breakthrough at the Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul on June 2 seems unlikely. Unsurprisingly, Russia is pressing ahead with an offensive campaign in all directions, throwing in all its forces with a culmination planned for summer or early autumn. 

The least bad option

Trump has three options under the circumstances. One is to simply refuse to own responsibility for the war and walk away for good. But then, can Trump deny his own part in it in his first term? While the Trump administration identified its approach to foreign policy as ‘principled realism’, late Joseph Nye’s characterisation of Trump as an “idiosyncratic realist” was perhaps closer to the truth. 

The official administration policy on Ukraine during Trump’s first term was a continuation of the policy pursued by the Obama administration. It recognised Crimea as part of Ukraine, condemned Russia’s occupation and eventual annexation annexation of the peninsula; it underscored Russia’s primary responsibility for the instigation, continuation and conduct of the conflict in eastern Ukraine; it even identified the Russian interference in Ukraine as part of a wider pattern of aggression towards other states and as proof of Moscow’s challenge to the fundamental principles of international order. 

For these reasons, the Trump administration maintained that the US should help Ukraine to defend itself and should penalise Russia both through sanctions and diplomatic isolation (eg., membership of the G7). Curiously, shades of this thought process resurface even today occasionally in Trump’s Truth Social outbursts. Trump seems unaware he’s carrying a can of worms as his Ukraine legacy. 

So, the second option today is to convey Trump’s dissatisfaction over Russia’s perceived intransigence in dictating terms for settlement and its alleged lack of interest in peace talks. Trump even hinted at Russia’s hidden agenda to conquer Ukraine. Trump is hinting at punishing Russia both through sanctions and supplying weapons to Ukraine. German chancellor Friedrich Merz’s provocative announcement of giving long-range weapons to Zelensky was probably green lighted by some people in Trump’s team. After all, Merz is no stranger to Wall Street.  

However, this is a recipe for an extremely dangerous NATO – Russia confrontation. If long range German missiles hit Russia, Russia will retaliate in a way that could potentially cripple NATO’s operational readiness in a hypothetical war. Belarus State Secretary of Security Council Alexander Volfovich has said that the Oreshnik missile system is “planned to be stationed in Belarus by the end of the year. The locations for its deployment have already been determined. Work is under way.” The spectre of World War III may seem a bit of a stretch, but Trump will have to consider the dangers of climbing the escalation ladder, which could destroy his MAGA presidency. 

Washington has no means to intimidate the Kremlin. The bottom line is, Trump is actually left with only a third option, the least bad option — viz., walking away from the Ukraine conflict at this point and return when the war has been lost and won, possibly by the end of the year. This will not damage Trump’s reputation.

Trump may already be displaying his credentials as ‘peacemaker president’ if the US-Iran talks, which seem to be making progress, results in a nuclear deal. Besides, US-Russia normalisation needs more time to gain traction. Senator Lindsey Graham’s hard-hitting sanctions bill against Russia with 81 co-sponsors in the senate signals that Russia is a very toxic subject in the US domestic politics.

Also, Russia-Ukraine talks is only one track. The Russians have sensitised Trump’s team that while Moscow engages with Kiev, the root cause of the war — absence of a European security architecture — still remains to be addressed, which is something that only Russia and the US can work out jointly. The US shouldn’t shirk its responsibility, being both the original instigator of NATO expansion and sponsor of the Ukraine war. 

The reaction by the US special envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg has been positive when he told ABC News in an interview that the US understands that it is a matter of national security for Russia that NATO may stop accepting new Eastern European countries into its ranks — ie., not only Ukraine but Moldova and Georgia as well.

Kellogg said he considered the Russian side’s concerns to be justified. He did not rule out the possibility of reaching an agreement during negotiations between the US and Russia. This is a big step forward.  

May 30, 2025 Posted by | Militarism, Russophobia | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Veto ban would spell the end of EU – Fico

RT | May 30, 2025

The EU’s reported plan to scrap member states’ veto power would spell the end of the bloc and could become “the precursor of a huge military conflict,” Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has warned.

Slovakia and its Central European neighbour Hungary have long opposed the EU’s approach to the Ukraine conflict, criticizing military aid to Kiev and sanctions on Russia. Both governments have repeatedly threatened to use their veto powers to block EU actions they view as harmful to national interests.

To bypass the dissent, Brussels is reportedly weighing a shift from unanimous voting, a founding principle of EU foreign policy, to qualified majority voting (QMV), arguing that it would streamline decision-making and prevent individual states from paralyzing joint actions.

Fico, however, condemned the proposal on Thursday during the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Hungary.

“The imposition of a mandatory political opinion, the abolition of the veto, the punishment of the sovereign and the brave, the new Iron Curtain, the preference for war over peace. This is the end of the common European project. This is a departure from democracy. This is the precursor of a huge military conflict,” he said.

EU sanctions on Russia currently require unanimous renewal every six months, with the current term set to expire at the end of July. Brussels is also preparing an 18th package of sanctions aimed at tightening restrictions on Russia’s energy sector and financial institutions.

Earlier this month, during a visit to Moscow for Victory Day commemorations, Fico assured Russian President Vladimir Putin that Slovakia would veto any EU-wide attempt to ban imports of Russian oil or gas.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has taken a similar stance. While Hungary has not formally blocked a sanctions package, it has delayed several rounds to extract concessions.

Orban has also warned that removing the veto would strip smaller nations of their sovereignty.

“We want Brussels to show us, as all other member countries, the same respect, not only symbolically, but also by taking our interests into account,” he said last month.

Both Slovakia and Hungary have resisted increased military support to Kiev, with Budapest blocking several key decisions citing concerns over national interests and the potential for escalation. Fico has emphasized the need for peace negotiations over continued military engagement.

May 30, 2025 Posted by | Militarism, Russophobia | , , | Leave a comment