The EU’s new rearmament strategy, outlined by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, lacks funding and shifts the financial burden to member states, Euractiv writes, citing senior EU officials.
Von der Leyen has proposed that EU nations spend about $840 billion on defense, calling it a response to “the most dangerous of times” and “grave” security threats. Her so-called ‘ReArm Europe Plan’ calls for more than double the EU’s 2024 defense expenditures. However, the ambitious proposal depends largely on borrowed funds and loosened fiscal rules rather than existing reserves, sparking concerns regarding its economic feasibility and long-term impact.
The plan “includes close to no fresh money,” leaving member states to secure “the real cash” themselves, Euractiv reported on Wednesday.
The $840 billion figure is based more on “hopes and guesses” than concrete reforms addressing the EU’s defense under-investment and production shortages, the report argued.
The goal is to “support achieving a rapid and significant increase in investment in Europe’s defense capabilities now and over this decade,” an unnamed senior EU official said, noting that the money would help “reduce costs.”
Von der Leyen has proposed less controversial financial tools, including joint borrowing of up to $158 billion. The European Commission plans to raise funds through capital markets and lend them to member states, provided that they purchase weapons together which were manufactured within the bloc or its regional allies. The requirement could involve at least three EU countries or two EU countries plus Ukraine. However, loan approval criteria and the prioritization of EU-made equipment remain undecided, the report pointed out.
Another measure includes easing EU budget rules via a national “escape clause” for defense spending, allowing governments to shift funds within EU accounts “rather than coming up with fresh money,” according to Euractiv.
While increased deficits could generate nearly $700 billion, it’s uncertain if the measure applies to all countries or only those meeting NATO’s 2% GDP target. Another senior EU official told Euractiv that over time, governments must offset spending by raising taxes or cutting costs.
Von der Leyen’s push for increased defense spending comes amid growing pressure from Washington. US President Donald Trump has distanced himself from supporting Ukraine while urging the EU to take greater responsibility for its defense.
The shift intensified this week, with news agencies’ reports on Monday suggesting that Trump had ordered a pause in military aid to Kiev. The US president has repeatedly accused Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky of refusing to negotiate peace with Russia and exploiting US support for his own gain.
EU leaders will discuss von der Leyen’s proposals at a special summit on Thursday. According to a senior EU official, the measures should work “very fast and very efficiently” and require only a majority vote for adoption.
Some experts, however, warn that increasing military spending could strain national budgets already under pressure.
You don’t have to be a genius to work out that if you exclude Russia and just look at the three groups who are vying for war, or whining for peace, that no one is being very honest about their intentions. Previously, I tackled head on how Trump is not being very honest when he talks of peace as he has the means to enforce it at the drop of a hat, but chooses to drag his feet and hold out for deals. This is not simply Trump Basic who we all know well – where’s the deal? – but also Trump playing out a longer game with Russia, looking at where the sweet spot could be. Trump’s tour de force is always to create a crisis and then position himself to be the only person on the planet who is capable or willing to resolve it. His personality is always paramount to everything.
And so the stunt in the White House needs to be seen in the correct context. Zelensky was not honest in coming to the White House in the first place as it was believed that he was to meet Trump and JD Vance to sign a mineral deal which he agreed to and retracted from signing a number of times leading up to the visit. This became apparent when he met with Trump behind close doors and so the Plan B was to lower Zelensky into a trap and make him look ungrateful, arrogant and entirely impossible to work with. But what’s the real story behind Zelensky’s decision? Again, we see the puppet Zelensky having his strings pulled by others. Is it a coincidence that just days earlier British PM Keir Starmer arrives in the White House where, just a matter of hours earlier he announces in the British parliament that defence spending will be increased, in line with Trump’s demands for European members of NATO? Was it merely that Starmer needed to show some goodwill to Trump even to get the meeting, or was Starmer preparing for choppier waters to come, when Trump would finally hear the rumours? According to some reports, Zelensky has sold all the mineral rights already to the UK, so he was playing a game with Trump all along.
But there are more lies and games to come.
If we look at Zelensky’s European partners can we honestly say they are being honest with the public which elected them? While Macron announces a no-fly zone rule, Starmer tells his own people that Britain will send its own troops to Ukraine. Has the world gone mad, or are these leaders actually serious about their intentions? How many of UK soldiers, airmen and sailors could Starmer actually send out of a total of barely 150,000 in uniform? In reality, probably only a third at best. And presumably this move would be without the support of the U.S., who would keep out of it? If that isn’t the craziest batshit idea, there is more madness to follow. Zelensky, since arriving in the UK for the emergency meeting of mostly EU leaders who support him – including Erdogan of Turkey – has started saying some very odd things to the press, while he picks up these huge checks for military support. He keeps talking about getting a peace deal with Russia.
As Starmer prepares to send British troops to Ukraine, he continues to jail people for posting nasty messages in Facebook, in particular when they slur his own party members – an irony that only Joe Stalin would appreciate, as it’s straight from the dictators’ handbook. Starmer preaches about supporting a free and democratic Ukraine while persecuting anyone who doesn’t agree with his views or uses social media to complain about the state of Britain. In reality it’s one despot supporting another and it’s hard to see how many days this could last with body bags coming back to the UK while pensioners get plain clothed policeman come to their houses and threaten them with imprisonment – or even more cuts to the poor. Of course the body bags will be hidden by a tawdry deal struck between the government and the British press, just as so many ‘no-go zones’ were agreed beforehand. But citizen journalism will call them out as the families won’t stay quiet. Starmer and Macron seem to think that just as Churchill pulled a few stunts to draw the U.S. into the Second World War, that European soldiers on Ukrainian soil will override any agreement that the U.S. and Russia could pull off. The move by Starmer is so idiotic that it leaves many wondering whether he is being controlled by Mossad or the Obamas, comes from the same camp which so fabulously made so many poor predictions from the beginning – namely Russian sanctions.
There is only one conclusion to it, although it leaves Trump and Putin with two options, neither particularly edifying. One, to let the Europeans go ahead with their stunt and watch the collapse of NATO as a credible organization worthy of its funding; or two, to pull the rug out from under the feet of Zelensky and force presidential elections, where of course Trump will install his own puppet to replace the incumbent one. The huge mistake Starmer is making is that he is assuming British troops need not be sent to the front line, but can encircle Kiev to show political support for Zelensky. Yet, each day Russian troops will gain ground and move closer to the Ukrainian capital. For Trump to attempt regime change will be harder of course with a strong contingent of European soldiers on the ground as the State Department and all its dirty tricks doesn’t normally encounter such resistance. Is Zelensky’s ‘we want peace’ mantra a trick so that time can be bought to re-arm? Likely. Monty Python would have had a lot of fun with these clowns. Blessed are the peace brokers.
I had the great pleasure of speaking with Karin Kneissl and Alexander Mercouris about Europe’s decline and tendency to double down on failed policies. Kneissl is the former Foreign Minister of Austria. We discussed why NATO’s defeat in the Ukraine proxy war will fragment the alliance, why the Europeans are no longer capable of engaging in diplomacy with Russia, how strategic thinking was replaced with ideological slogans, why unity and democracy within the EU is weakening, and why the economic decline will be difficult to reverse. Removing the dividing lines in Europe and restoring peace with Russia, as the largest state in Europe, would be an important part of reversing Europe’s growing irrelevance. However, the Europeans appear to be preparing for a showdown against Russia instead.
I had the great pleasure to discuss with Judge Napolitano the efforts by Trump to pressure Zelensky into starting negotiations to end the war. Trump is challenging the legitimacy of Zelensky and even cutting military support to push him to the negotiation table. It is very possible that Trump will also start to mount pressure on the Europeans as they are seen to also oppose his peace plan. By cutting military spending, Trump hopes to also deprive Zelensky and the Europeans of the alternative to keep the war going. The war summit in Paris organised by the Europeans demonstrates that they are not able to mobilise the political will and unity required to replace the US. The Europeans also do not have the money or military power to continue the war, yet they do not have the political imagination beyond doubling down on a failed war. If the Europeans continue to resist Trump’s peace efforts, then NATO itself could end up being dissolved.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed that member states spend about $840 billion on defense to strengthen their military self-sufficiency – an amount more than double total EU defense expenditure in 2024.
In a statement on Tuesday, the EU chief cited the “most dangerous of times” and the “grave” threats facing the bloc as reasons to assume greater responsibility for its own security.
“We are in an era of rearmament,” von der Leyen declared, adding that she had sent a letter outlining her ‘ReArm Europe Plan’ to member state leaders ahead of the European Council meeting later this week.
“ReArm Europe could mobilize close to €800 billion ($840 billion) for a safe and resilient Europe,” she said. “This is a moment for Europe. And we are ready to step up.”
Official data shows the bloc’s total defense spending reached an estimated $344 billion last year, marking an increase of more than 30% since 2021.
The new plan includes $158 billion in loans available to member states to invest in what von der Leyen described as “pan-European capability domains,” including air and missile defense, artillery systems, missiles and ammunition, drones, and anti-drone technology. It will also address other needs, from cybersecurity to military mobility.
The proposed five-part strategy is also designed to address the “short-term urgency” of supporting Ukraine, the EU chief said.
Von der Leyen did not specify a detailed timeline, but emphasized that defense spending must increase “urgently now but also over a longer period over this decade.”
Her announcement came just hours after news agencies reported on Monday that US President Donald Trump had ordered a pause on military aid to Ukraine. Trump has repeatedly accused Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky of refusing to negotiate peace with Russia and exploiting US support for his own gain. Following Zelensky’s public clash with Trump and US Vice President J.D. Vance on Friday, the US president said America would no longer tolerate the Ukrainian leader’s attitude.
The EU has historically depended significantly on the US for its security, primarily through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the Trump administration has recently signaled a major policy shift, urging European nations to take the lead in their own defense, as well as Kiev’s. Last month, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth said that Washington intended to refocus its military priorities on countering China, warning the EU not to assume that American forces would remain in the region indefinitely.
Trump has previously warned that under his leadership the US would not defend NATO countries that fail to meet their financial commitments. He has floated the idea of raising mandatory defense spending by members to 5% of GDP, though none – including the US – currently meet that threshold.
His push for increased defense spending has drawn mixed reactions, with some EU officials questioning its economic feasibility. European officials have occasionally raised concerns that Trump could pull the US out of the organization.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko recently warned that NATO appears to be preparing for war with Moscow, arguing that its current course poses a threat both to Russia and to overall security architecture.
Friday night’s dramatic events at the White House, featuring Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky, have placed Western Europe in an extremely difficult position. Many of the region’s leaders, who range from moderate to intense skeptics of US President Donald Trump, have nonetheless attempted to preserve the traditional transatlantic alliance. They have pushed Washington to find a resolution to the Ukraine conflict that aligns with European interests. But the now-public rupture between Zelensky and Trump has stripped them of that opportunity.
Whether by design or by accident, Zelensky has forced the United States to clarify its stance: Washington is a mediator, not a combatant, and its priority is ending escalation, not taking sides. This marks a stark departure from the previous position, in which the US led a Western coalition against Russia in defense of Ukraine. The message is clear – American support for Kiev is not a matter of principle but merely a tool in a broader geopolitical game.
Western Europe’s Limited Options
The EU has loudly declared that it will never abandon Ukraine. But in reality, it lacks the resources to replace the United States as Kiev’s primary backer. At the same time, reversing course is not so simple. The price of trying to defeat Russia is too high, and the economic toll too severe, but a sudden shift in policy would force Western European leaders to answer for their past decisions. In an EU already grappling with internal unrest, such a reversal would hand ammunition to the political opponents of the bloc’s leaders.
Another key reason Western Europe remains on this path is its post-Cold War reliance on moral arguments as a political tool – both internally and in its dealings with external partners. Unlike traditional powers, the EU is not a state. Where sovereign nations can pivot and adjust policies with relative ease, a bloc of more than two dozen countries inevitably gets bogged down in bureaucracy. Decisions are slow, coordination is imperfect, and mechanisms often fail to function as intended.
For years, Brussels attempted to turn this structural weakness into an ideological strength. The EU, despite its complexity, was supposed to represent a new form of cooperative politics – a model for the world to follow. But it is now clear that this model has failed.
At best, it may survive within Western Europe’s culturally homogeneous core, though even that is uncertain. The world has moved on, and the inefficiencies remain. This makes the dream of an independent, self-sufficient “Europe” – one capable of acting without American oversight – an impossibility.
Adapting to Washington’s New Reality
Western Europe may attempt to endure the turbulence of another Trump presidency, just as it did during his first term. But this is not just about Trump. The shift in US policy is part of a deeper political realignment, one that ensures there will be no return to the golden age of the 1990s and early 2000s.
More importantly, Ukraine has become the catalyst for these changes. The EU does not have the luxury of waiting things out. Its leaders must decide – quickly – how to respond. Most likely, they will attempt to maintain the appearance of unity with Washington while adapting to new US policies. This will be painful, especially in economic terms. Unlike in the past, modern America acts solely in its own interests, with little regard for the needs of its European allies.
One indicator of Western Europe’s shifting posture may be the upcoming visit of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to Washington. At present, Merz presents himself as a hardliner. But if history is any guide, he may soon shift positions, aligning more closely with Washington’s new direction.
The alternative: Europe vs. America?
There is, of course, another possibility – the EU could attempt to unify and resist Trump’s America. But given the lack of capable leadership and the deep divisions within the bloc, this seems unlikely. Ukraine could serve as a rallying point for European solidarity, but public sentiment within many EU nations makes this improbable.
At the same time, the aggressive way in which Washington now interferes in European domestic politics – actively supporting populist movements sympathetic to Trump – could create an unexpected effect. Western European elites may find themselves forced to consolidate in response, while nationalists, who have long railed against external influence, may struggle to position themselves against this new reality.
Regardless of the outcome, what we are witnessing is an internal crisis within the so-called “collective West.” The very notion of Western unity is at stake. Historically, the political West is a recent construct, largely a product of the Cold War. And even then, the relationship between the Old World and the New was often uneasy. In the 1940s and 1950s, despite its rivalry with the Soviet Union, the US actively encouraged the dismantling of European colonial empires, asserting its own dominance in the process.
The answer to Western Europe’s diminishing global influence back then was deeper integration. Trump now calls the European project a failure, but for decades, Washington saw it as a useful means of streamlining Western politics and economics under American leadership. Today, that calculus has changed. The US no longer views a strong, unified EU as an asset, and it is not shy about making that clear.
If Western European leaders do decide to confront America, it will mark the beginning of a new chapter – one that could signal the definitive end of the Cold War framework that has shaped Western politics for decades.
Russia’s perspective
For Russia, a unified and coordinated EU holds no strategic value. The era in which Moscow entertained the idea of continental integration – including Russia – is long gone. Experience, more than time, has put an end to those illusions.
Moscow’s focus is now on pragmatic opportunities. The internal struggle within the West should be viewed solely from the perspective of what tangible benefits can be derived. Long-term strategic plans are irrelevant in a time of such rapid geopolitical shifts. Right now, the priority is to act decisively, capitalize on the ongoing fractures, and secure Russia’s interests amid the changing global order.
Fyodor Lukyanov is the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club.
This article was first published by the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and has been translated and edited by the RT team
And yet, look more closely, and they are not so different: They are all either inside the EU and NATO (Germany and Romania) or attached to these two organizations as an outside yet important strategic asset (the case of Moldova – despite and in de facto breach of its constitutionally anchored neutrality, as it happens). And also, all three have serious problems with conducting fair and clean elections. What a coincidence. Not.
Let’s take a quick look at each case: In Germany’s recent federal election, the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) failed to cross the threshold to representation in parliament – 5% of the national vote – by the thinnest of margins: The party officially garnered 4.972% of the vote. In absolute numbers, almost 2,469,000 Germans voted for the BSW (with the decisive so-called “second vote”). Only 0.028% – about 13,000 to 14,000 votes – more and the party would have passed the 5% barrier.
Even extremely tight results can, of course, be real and legitimate. The problem in Germany now is that there is steadily accumulating evidence that the elections were compromised by serious flaws and repeated errors. What makes this even more urgent is the fact that there seems to be a clear pattern with mistakes occurring not randomly but mostly at the cost of the BSW.
We already know about two key problems, although not much more than one week has passed after the election on February 23: First, about 230,000 German voters live abroad, but many of them could not cast their vote because the necessary documents reached them too late, sometimes even only after the elections. Of course, we cannot tell how exactly these voters would have voted if given the chance. But that is not the point. The fact alone that they could not participate casts severe doubt on the legitimacy of the results. And especially in the case of the BSW where so few additional votes would have been enough to principally change the outcome, that is, secure seats – and probably two to three dozen – in the next parliament.
The second even more disturbing issue is that there is ever more evidence of actual BSW votes inside Germany being allocated to another party. In the case of the major city of Aachen, for instance, a result of 7.24% for the BSW was registered for the “Bündnis für Deutschland” (an entirely different and much smaller party with no chance of parliamentary representation to begin with). The BSW vote was erroneously registered as 0%. Only protests by local BSW voters brought the scandal to light.
German mainstream media are trying to depict what happened in Aachen as an exception. Yet by now there are reports of similar “errors” from all over Germany – and don’t forget that the process of looking for these cases has only just started. In sum, there are good reasons – and they are getting better by the day – for believing that, for the BSW, the difference between correct and incorrect election procedures actually amounts to the one between being and not being in parliament. That implies, of course, that all those citizens who have voted for the BSW may well have been deprived of their proper democratic representation as foreseen by law.
Is there a motive for foul play? You bet. The BSW, an insurgent party combining leftwing social with rightwing cultural and migration-policy positions, has been hounded as too friendly toward Russia because it is demanding peace in Ukraine; it also has been outspoken about its opposition to basing fresh US missiles in Germany and to Israel’s crimes as well.
In Germany as it is now, these are all reasons for neo-McCarthyite smear campaigns and repression by – at least – dirty media tricks, all of which has already happened. It is entirely possible that a wave of deliberate local “mistakes” was added to that nasty tool box. And, a slightly different issue, asserting the BSW’s legal rights now will be especially difficult, in particular because a revision of the election result to include the party in parliament would immediately upset the complicated arithmetic of government coalition building. The BSW and its voters, in short, may well have been cheated, and they may be cheated again in case they seek redress.
The fact that one problem with those German elections has to do with voters living abroad rings a bell called Moldova, of course. There, last November, Maia Sandu narrowly won a presidential election that involved massively manipulating the outside-the-country vote. In essence, Moldovans abroad, especially in Russia, likely to vote against her were, in effect, disenfranchised by making it impossible for them to actually cast their vote; Moldovans more likely to vote for her, in the West, faced no such problems.
This crude trickery was decisive: Without it Sandu would have lost and her left-wing rival Alexandr Stoianoglo would have won. In the West, whose candidate Sandu has been, this outcome was, of course, hailed as a victory for “democracy,” a pro-EU choice, and a defeat of “Russian meddling.” As so often, it is hard to decide what is more jaw-dropping: the Orwellian reversal of reality or the Freudian projection of the West’s own manipulation on the big bad Russian Other.
That projection, in any case, is also in play in Romania. Indeed, at this point, the Romanian case of electoral foul play is clearly the most brutal one. There, the gist of a long saga beginning last November, too, is simple: Calin Georgescu, an insurgent newcomer is very likely to win presidential elections. Yet he is being denounced as a far-right populist and – drum roll – as somehow in cahoots with Russia, too.
The consequences were not surprising, except in how drastic things have gotten: First, when Georgescu was close to winning one election, the Constitutional Court abused its power to cancel the whole exercise. The pretext was a file of pseudo-evidence cobbled together by Romania’s security services that, by now, even Western mainstream media admit is ridiculously shoddy.
As you would expect, this open assault on their right to vote has made Romanians support Georgescu more, not less, as polls show. Since the next try at elections is now due to take place in May and Georgescu is still the frontrunner, the authorities have followed up with even more ham-fisted repression. This time, Georgescu was temporarily and dramatically detained – on the way to registering his renewed candidacy – and then accused of half a dozen serious crimes. His access to social media has been curtailed; his team and associates are being raked with searches, charges, and, of course, media attacks. It is possible that he will be deprived of his right to stand for the election.
Georgescu’s supporters have held large demonstrations; he himself has appealed for help in his struggle against Romania’s “deep state” to the Trump administration in Washington. Trump’s de facto right-hand man, tech oligarch Elon Musk, has used his X platform to signal support for Georgescu. And not long ago, US Vice President J.D. Vance warned the Europeans over the first round of attacks on Georgescu.
Yet Romania’s key role in NATO strategies is certain to be a key reason the NATO-skeptic and sovereigntist Georgescu has run into such massive trouble, not only from Romanian mainstream elites but also, behind the scenes, those still running the EU. With Washington now revising its approach to both Russia and its NATO clients in Europe, Georgescu’s fate could well hinge on one of the greatest geopolitical shifts of this century. And that shift might favor him.
Maia Sandu’s crooked victory in Moldova is not up for revision. The chances for the BSW of finding redress should be good, but, in reality, they are not, unfortunately. Georgescu’s luck, though, may turn again. He already has massive electoral support; he may well get even more precisely because of the escalation of dirty tricks used against him, and he has the US de facto on his side.
What is certain, in any case, is one simple fact: the “garden” West, with its endless talk of “values” and “rules” does not, in practice, believe in real elections. Instead, geopolitics prevail. And, tragically, those geopolitics are not only overbearing but stupid. Driven by an obsession with fighting Russia (and China, of course; and the Trumpist US, too, if need be) and rejecting diplomacy as such, this is a West ready to sacrifice whatever little democracy it may have left to a delusion of grandeur that will be its downfall.
Tarik Cyril Amar ia a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War, and the politics of memory.
Now that Zelensky has been battered by Trump and abandoned by Starmer, he can fall back of Europe’s leading diplomat, Kaja Kallas. God help us all.
The earth is still shaking from President Trump and Vice President Vance’s tag team annihilation of Volodymir Zelensky at the White House. The 27 February meeting between Trump and Keir Starmer was a more convivial affair, with the British Prime Minister quiet on Ukraine while promoting the idea of much prized trade talks with America. That was the first signal of the UK getting real about its foreign policy disaster in Ukraine and recognising that it needs trade with America far more than it needs the huge cost of propping up an unwinnable war.
This leaves Zelensky’s fate in the hands of the European Union. And with Kaja Kallas, the current EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the omens aren’t promising.
Kallas’ problem is threefold.
First, she is not diplomatic.
If the biggest foreign policy challenge in Kallas’ in-tray right now is the war in Ukraine, then her ingrained hatred of Russia makes her a singularly bad choice as Europe’s lead diplomat.
Her worldview is carved out of her experience growing up in the Soviet Union the child of a woman who was deported to Siberia in 1949. She looks at Russia through a shattered lens of Estonia’s suffering during the so-called communist terror after the end of World War II.
How she sees events in Ukraine today is simply a continuum of the folklore of her life. Russia is the hated enemy, and, at some point, Russia will return to conquer Estonia once more. In her statements before war in Ukraine started, Kallas reaffirmed her view that Estonia could be the next country that Russia invades. As a NATO country, I have never seen any evidence that Russia has a plan to do this.
Kallas has called for NATO troops to be deployed to Ukraine, to ensure Russia’s total defeat. She has suggested that Russia be broken up into a series of smaller states. She once implied that Ukraine should inflict more civilian casualties on Russian citizens, to balance the number of casualties in Ukraine. Even as President Trump has said that NATO membership for Ukraine is unrealistic, she has continued to push for this to be kept on the table, despite it having been a redline for Russia for nineteen years.
Almost everything that she says is rooted in her unshakeable belief that defeating Russia is vital for the world to become a safer place.
The world is full of extremists, of course. However, she claims to be the leading diplomat of Europe. She seems singularly ill-suited to that role. But will nonetheless still support Zelensky, I’m sure.
Which ushers in her second problem, the absence of a democratic mandate.
Countries that are sceptical about the European project often express concerns about the lack of democratic accountability of EU institutions.
No one voted for Kallas to occupy her office in Brussels. While Zelensky has only been unelected since May of 2024, Kallas will only ever be an unelected apparatchik.
When the European Union’s role was focussed on creating a united economic, social and cultural space among nations after the ravages of World War II, it found peace by opening up borders. However, as it has grown, Europe has become increasingly bureaucratic. Following agreement of the Lisbon Treaty, the creation of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security with a newly formed European External Action Service, continued this centralising trend.
Without any democratic mandate, occupants of the High Representative role have struggled for relevance. Outside of trade policy, individual Member States still manage their own bilateral diplomacy. And as the war in Ukraine has backfired on Europe through economic decline and political dissent, so Europeans countries have sought their divergent paths.
That has left ineffectual figures like Josep Borrel and ideologues like Kallas unable to play the sort of coordinating role that they yearn for.
So, in practice, Kallas’ influence on the actions of Member States is limited, although she has considerable power to cause harm through inflammatory public statements. This is a huge challenge when dealing with countries like Russia, where the leaders there understand fully the limitations on Kallas’ role and ignore her. Instead, Russia focusses its influencing efforts on key EU members states, especially in Central Europe.
Even though Kallas can call for the continued isolation of Russia as support for Zelensky rapidly crumbles, she has no real power to enforce that. She lacks a mandate.
So herein lies her third problem.
Kaja Kallas has no strategy.
There is a huge risk that Kallas is seen as a single-issue High Representative, as her main effort appears to be on the war in Ukraine.
She appears intent only on sustaining the decade-long European zeitgeist on non-engagement with Russia, whatever the economic cost. But in that regard, not only is she not bringing new ideas on foreign policy, her lack of flexibility will make her look out of touch at a time when Europe is facing significant economic and political challenges caused by the war. Arriving into the job in December, Kallas has brought plenty of heat, but no light.
Donald Trump has now arrived heralding a seismic shift in U.S. policy and she still thinks the earth is flat. She has criticised President Trump’s radical shift towards direct engagement with Russia without offering a compelling alternative vision.
The ‘Russia is coming for Europe next’ continues to be the rhetorical life-raft that she clings to as she tries desperately to help the now stranded Zelensky fight to the last Ukrainian.
Kallas is certainly not the author of the EU policy that has tried explicitly to isolate Russia on the world stage. But she has worked tirelessly to keep it alive, together with all the other tropes about how to handle Russia and why an end to the war can never be contemplated.
Of course, that position may have been sustainable while Joe Biden was still in power and the U.S. were arguably more gung-ho about pushing an unwinnable war in Europe.
But Donald Trump’s devastating take-down of Zelensky in the White House will force an immediate reckoning on the European policy establishment about what to do for Ukraine, and for Zelensky. Kaja Kallas has neither the skills, the mandate nor the plan to chart a credible way forward.
Since World War II, Russia and the US have been fierce rivals, but with Donald Trump’s re-election and Russia’s rise as a superpower, the US is now shifting toward fostering cordial ties.
Russia’s Resurgence and the Evolving US-Russia Relations
The Cold War resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union, creating a unipolar world order led by the United States. Since the culmination of the Cold War, the US has been following a more hardline foreign policy towards its rivals and allies, tarnishing its soft image around the globe. However, its economic and military supremacy helped it to sustain its position as the sole superpower of the world for almost 3 decades. The United States has been alluring third-world countries through economic aid to achieve its geopolitical interests in different regions. It also coerced weak countries militarily to support its foreign policy interests.
Nonetheless, the rapid rise of Russia and China has provided third-world countries with new military and economic giants, transforming the global geopolitical landscape. Russia’s influence is rapidly rising among the Muslim and African countries. It is also known as the leading country of the BRICS organization. Moscow is also leading the de-dollarization movement under the banner of the BRICS. Global oil trade in non-US dollar currencies has already reached 20 percent in 2020-23 from a mere 2 percent in 2000-2010. More than 40 countries are demonstrating their interest in the BRICS membership, signaling the decline of the US-led unipolar world order. The rise of BRICS has significantly enhanced Russia’s diplomatic influence. Most third-world countries seek to establish cordial relations with Moscow due to its policy of noninterference and its inclusive foreign policy.
The Strain in US-Israel Relations and Russia’s Global Stature
On the other hand, the US support to Israel in its war crimes in Gaza and its veto of the UN ceasefire resolutions have ruptured its international image. Israel has been the largest recipient of US aid since its creation. Despite all international condemnations and appeals, the Biden administration provided billions of dollars of US aid, both military and financial, to Israel. It also provided diplomatic support to Israel, further deepening the international resentment against the United States. Meanwhile, the Putin administration proved to be a staunch supporter of human rights and justice by speaking for the rights of Palestinian citizens. In the past few years, President Putin has become one of the strongest voices against Islamophobia.
Due to his vision, Russia has regained its position as the superpower of the world. Russia’s soft image has risen to an unprecedented level under his presidency. Moreover, the failure of the US sanctions to bankrupt Russia is often attributed to his leadership skills. It is also due to his leadership that the United States has been unable to isolate Moscow diplomatically. The Biden administration’s policy of weakening Russia by ensnaring it in an invincible conflict with Ukraine also seems to be collapsing due to the victories of the Russian forces.
US and Russia’s Changing Relations
The incumbent US President Donald Trump has always admired the leadership skills and personality of President Putin. He has consistently criticized Ukraine’s unwarranted provocation of Russia. President Trump is aware that the U.S. is not in a position to defeat or compete with Russia’s rise. The recent summit between Sergei Lavrov, the Secretary of State of Russia, and his American counterpart, to lay a foundation for the meeting of the leaders of the two countries and Trump’s aggressive rhetoric towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is a big diplomatic win for Moscow. President Trump has also praised President Putin for his seriousness to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict. All these developments have further elevated the diplomatic stature of Russia internationally.
In a surprising move, the United States voted against a Ukrainian resolution, blaming Moscow for its invasion, in the United Nations, marking a significant shift in the US policy under President Trump. Instead, the U.S. introduced a new resolution, titled The Path to Peace, which featured neutral language and called for a lasting peace. This sent a chill down the spines of the European leaders, as they knew that Ukraine could not win against Russia without the US support. This development holds immense significance and can be seen as a diplomatic win for Russia and Washington’s acceptance of defeat as a global hegemon. It is this sense of defeat that encourages the US to foster ties with Moscow.
Although President Trump has repeatedly threatened the BRICS nations about the de-dollarization campaign, the growing interest of the middle powers in the BRICS membership and their tilt towards Russia indicates that the US needs to establish cordial ties with Moscow to avoid isolation in the new multipolar world order. Washington stood victorious in the first Cold War, but the current developments demonstrate that it has already lost the Cold War 2.0. Russia, as always, seems to be open to diplomatic negotiations with the United States and is also ready for a peaceful solution to its conflict with Ukraine, but it will never compromise on its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
They (the Euro-élites) don’t have a chance: “If Trump imposes this tariff [25%], the U.S. will be in a serious trade conflict with the EU”, the Norwegian Prime Minister threatens. And what if Brussels does retaliate?
“They can try, but they can’t”, Trump responded. Von der Leyen has, however, already promised that she will retaliate. Nonetheless, the combined suite of the Anglo administrative forces is still unlikely to compel Trump to put U.S. military troops on the ground in Ukraine to protect European interests (and investments!).
The reality is that every European NATO member – to varying degrees of self-embarrassment – admits publicly now that none of them want to participate in securing Ukraine without having U.S. military troops provide ‘backstop’ to those European forces. This is a palpably obvious scheme to inveigle Trump into continuing the Ukraine war – as is Macron and Starmer’s dangling of the mineral deal to try to trick Trump to recommit to the Ukraine war. Trump plainly sees through these ploys.
The fly in the ointment, however, is that Zelensky seemingly fears a ceasefire, more than he fears losing further ground on the battlefield. He too, seems to need the war to continue (to preserve continuing in power, possibly).
Trump calling time on the Ukraine war that has been lost has seemingly caused European elites to enter some form of cognitive dissonance. Of course, it has been clear for some time that Ukraine would not retake its 1991 borders, nor force Russia into a negotiating position weak enough for the West to be able to dictate its own cessation terms.
“Trump has torn a huge rip in the interface layer of the fantasy bubble … the governing élite [in the wake of Trump’s pivot] can see not just an electoral setback, but rather a literal catastrophe. A defeat in war, with [Europe] left largely defenceless; a de-industrialising economy; crumbling public services and infrastructure; large fiscal deficits; stagnating living standards; social and ethnic disharmony – and a powerful populist insurgency led by enemies just as grave as Trump and Putin in the Manichean struggle against vestiges of liberal times – and strategically sandwiched between two leaders that both despise and disdain them …”.
“In other words, through the tear in the fantasy bubble, Europe’s elites see their own demise …”.
“Anybody who could see reality knew that things would only get worse on the war front from autumn 2023, but from their fantasy bubble, our élites couldn’t see it. Vladimir Putin, like the ‘Deplorables’ and ‘Gammons’ at home, was an atavistic daemon who would inevitably be slain on the inexorable march to liberal progressive utopia”.
Many in the Euro ruling-strata clearly are furious. Yet what can Britain or Germany actually do? It has quickly become clear that European states do not have the military capacity to intervene in Ukraine in any concerted manner. But more than anything, as Conor Gallagher points out, it is the European economy, circling the drain – largely as a result of the war against Russia – that is dragging reality to the forefront.
The new German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has shown himself to be the most implacable European leader advocating both military expansion and youth conscription – in what amounts to an European resistance model mounted to confront Trump’s pivot to Russia.
Yet Merz’s winning CDU/CSU achieved only 28% of votes cast, whilst losing significant voter share. Hardly an outstanding mandate for confronting both Russia – and America – together!
“I am communicating closely with a lot of prime ministers, and heads of EU states and for me it is an absolute priority to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible, so that we achieve independence from the U.S., step by step”, Friedrich Merz said.
Second place in the German election was taken by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) with 20% of the national vote. The party was the top vote getter in the 25-45 year-old demographic. It supports good relations with Russia, an end to the Ukraine war, and it wants to work with Team Trump, too.
Yet AfD absurdly is outcast under the ‘firewall rules’. As a ‘populist’ party with a strong youth vote, it becomes automatically relegated to the ‘wrong side’ of the EU firewall. Merz has already refused to share power with them, leaving the CDU as pig-in-the-middle, squeezed between the failing SPD, which lost the most voter share, and the AfD and Der Linke, another firewall outcast, which, like AfD, gained voter share, especially among the under-45s.
The rub here – and it is a big one – is that the AfD and the Left Party, Die Linke (8.8%), which was the top vote getter in the 18-24 demographic, are both anti-war. Together these two have more than one third of the votes in parliament – a blocking minority for many important votes, especially for constitutional changes.
This will be a big headache for Merz, as Wolfgang Münchau explains:
“For one thing, the new Chancellor had wanted to travel to the NATO summit this June, with a strong commitment to higher defence spending. And even though the Left Party and the AfD hate each other in every other respect, they agree that they won’t give Merz the money to strengthen the Bundeswehr. More important, though, is the fact that they won’t support a reform to the constitutional fiscal rules (the debt brake) that Merz and the SPD are desperate for”.
The Rules are complicated, but in gist dictate that if Germany wants to spend more money on defence and aid to Ukraine, it had to be saved from elsewhere in the budget (most likely from social spending). But politically, saving on social spending to pay for Ukraine hasn’t played well with the German electorate. The last coalition failed on precisely this issue.
Even with the Greens, Merz still will be short of the two-thirds majority necessary to make constitutional changes, and the ‘Centre’ just doesn’t have the fiscal space for challenging Russia without U.S. funding. Von der Leyen will try to ‘magic’ money for defence from somewhere, “but German youth are voting against the Establishment parties who are hated. They can build a few Leopards if they want. They won’t get recruits”.
Whilst the EU and Britain are proposing to raise billions to arm themselves against some imaginary Russian invasion, it will be done against the backdrop of Trump saying explicitly – on the threat of a Russian invasion of NATO – “I don’t believe that; I don’t believe it, not one little bit”.
Another Euro-shibboleth ripped by Trump.
Thus, how will the European public, which has largely soured on the Ukraine war, react to higher energy costs and more tax and social service cuts, in order to pursue an unwinnable war in Ukraine? Starmer already has been warned that the (government debt) ‘bond vigilantes’ will react badly to yet more UK government debt as the fiscal situation wobbles precariously.
There are no obvious solutions to Europe’s current predicament: It is, on one hand, an existential conundrum for Merz. And on the other, it is the same one that dogs the EU as a whole: To get anything done, a parliamentary majority is a basic necessity.
The ‘firewall’, though primordially intended to protect the ‘Centrists’ in Brussels from Rightist ‘populists’, was subsequently turbo-charged in Brussels by Biden’s issuing of a foreign policy determination to all U.S. foreign policy ‘actors’ to the effect that populism was a ‘threat to democracy’ and must be contested.
The practical outcome however, has been that across the EU, blocking coalitions were formed of odd (minority party) bed-fellows agreeing to keep the Centrists in power, but which rather has led to endless stasis and an ever increasing detachment from ‘we, the people’.
Angela Merkel governed in this way, kicking the can of reform down the road for years – until the situation ultimately became (and still is) insoluble.
“Can another coalition of short-sighted centrists arrest the decline of the economy, fix the failure of leadership, and free the nation from its pernicious political trap? I think we know the answer”,writes Wolfgang Münchau.
There lies a bigger problem however: As Vance very explicitly warned at the recent Munich Security Forum, Europe’s enemy lies not with Russia; It lies within. It derives, Vance implied, from the fact of having a permanent bureaucracy, assuming to itself the exclusive prerogative of autonomous governing power, yet incrementally becoming ever-more remote from its own base.
Tear down the firewalls, Vance advocated, in order to return to the (abandoned) principles of that earlier democracy originally shared between the U.S. and Europe. Implicitly, Vance is targeting the Brussels Administrative (Deep) State.
The Eurocrats see in this new front an alternate American-supported attack on their Administrative State – and perceive therein their own demise.
In the U.S., there is acknowledgement that there is an “institutional resistance to Trump” in the DOD, DOJ and the FBI. It proves, Margot Cleveland argues, that those touting the need for “institutional resistance” and the supposed independence from the executive branch, are the opponents to democracy – and to Trump.
Given the close nexus between the U.S., the British and European Deep States, the question arises as to why there is such strong parallel resistance to Trump amongst European leaders also.
Ostensibly, it is not in Europe’s interest to mount a concerted resistance against the U.S. President over a failed war. Is the European frenzy then fuelled by a wider (U.S.) Deep State desire to neuter the ‘Trump Revolution’ by demonstrating, in addition to the U.S. domestic opposition at home, that Trump is causing havoc amongst the U.S.’ European allies? Is Europe being pushed further down this path than they would otherwise have chosen to venture?
For Germany to change course – albeit unthinkable for Merz – it would require only a minimal amount of imagination to envision Germany again linked to Eurasia. The AfD gained 20% of the vote on just such a platform. Really, there probably is little other option.
Following the reactions of European leaders to the on-camera spat at the White House between Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 28, relations between the US president and much of the European Union establishment are reaching a breaking point. The EU establishment has firmly sided with Zelensky and his warmongering policies, contrary to common sense and the peace efforts of Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.
On March 2, an informal meeting of European leaders and Canada was held in London. Following the meeting, it was announced that Ukraine would receive more military aid and sanctions on Russia, territories would be returned to Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, with other nations, would form a military coalition to get boots on the ground.
By reacting the way they did, EU leaders have once again shown that they are undermining peace, just as then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson did when he sabotaged the peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul in early 2022. However, just as Johnson was not punished for prolonging death and war in Ukraine, it is unlikely that EU leaders will ever be held accountable for their actions, especially German, Polish and Baltic politicians, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and many others in Brussels who agree on a policy of aligning with Zelensky and anti-Trump policies.
Following the spat between the US and Ukrainian presidents, European leaders sent messages of solidarity with Kiev. Many European leaders posted a uniform message on their social media accounts that they “stand with Ukraine.”
A sign of the growing rift between Washington and Brussels, particularly after the chaotic meeting between Trump and Zelensky, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said: “Today, it became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.”
It is also recalled that during his visit to the White House on February 24, French President Emmanuel Macron tried to deceive Trump and drag him down a path the US president did not want to take. It became clear to Trump that he could not count on European politicians.
If it was not clear following the meeting with Macron, it certainly became clear to Trump when British Prime Minister Keir Starmer was a guest in the Oval Office on February 27, particularly after US Vice President J.D. Vance blasted Britain’s descent into authoritarianism and lack of free speech.
It is expected that in the coming period, there will be very strong obstructions from the EU to any agreement between Trump and Putin. There will also be such obstructions within the US, especially from the remnants of the Deep State and the mainstream media that are still critical of Trump and loyal to ultraliberal policies. The very core of the EU – the European Commission, the leadership of the European Council, the majority in the European Parliament, as well as the leading EU leaders are also of the same view, which is opposite to the rest of the world that advocates for peace.
The EU itself is divided into states that supported peace efforts and distanced themselves from Brussels—primarily the political leaderships of Slovakia and Hungary, but also the leaders of the second-largest party in Germany, the AfD, Marine Le Pen in France, and the leaders of other sovereigntist parties across Europe.
European leaders have not changed their support for war since an attempt was made to end the conflict under conditions that were even more favorable for Kiev at the time. Now, as Trump highlighted in his meeting with Zelensky, Ukraine does not “have the cards right now.”
“You’re not in a good position. You don’t have the cards right now. With us, you start having cards. You’re playing cards. You’re gambling with the lives of millions of people. You’re gambling with World War III,” Trump said to a shocked Zelensky.
Of course, Zelensky denied Trump’s statements, stuttering, “I’m not playing cards” and “What are you speaking about?”
The US president’s main priority is normalizing relations with Moscow, including ending the conflict in Ukraine. Normalization will remain a priority even if the Kiev regime and European leaders do not agree to it.
Nonetheless, it appears that parts of Europe have not yet given up on the Trump administration, like Kaja Kallas has. Starmer announced on March 2 that Britain, France, and Ukraine have agreed to work on a ceasefire plan to present to Washington.
“We’ve now agreed that the United Kingdom, along with France and possibly one or two others, will work with Ukraine on a plan to stop the fighting, and then we’ll discuss that plan with the United States,” Starmer told the BBC.
This was followed by Zelensky announcing on the same day as Starmer’s statement that he was “ready to sign” the minerals agreement with Trump.
However, given the EU’s growing hostility to Trump and resistance to peace, the US president has little incentive to take the Franco-Anglo peace plan seriously since they have been harbingers to continue the war. Trump will continue pursuing a peace plan, even if it intensifies hostility between Europe and Washington.
Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
Following the Oval Office showdown, US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has suggested that Volodymyr Zelensky might have to step down to enable a US-Ukraine deal. But as Zelensky refuses, what leverage does President Donald Trump hold over him?
Direct Pressure Tactics
Cutting all aid. Without US support, Zelensky may have no choice but to resign and be replaced by someone willing to negotiate peace, says ex-CIA officer Philip Giraldi.
Sweeping audit of US aid. A deep probe into Ukraine’s use of US funds could expose corruption and “neutralize” Zelensky, according to ex-Ukrainian MP Oleg Tsarev.
Freezing Zelensky’s cash. Blocking foreign accounts of Zelensky and his team could undermine the Kiev regime, Tsarev suggests.
Shutting down Starlink. Three sources told Reuters that Team Trump may cut Ukraine’s access to Elon Musk’s satellites, a move the White House has already reportedly threatened.
Zelensky’s expired legitimacy. His presidential term ended in May 2024, making all actions since then legally questionable. Trump could challenge his right to govern.
Trump’s Indirect Leverage via Europe
Pressuring European allies. Europe remains dependent on the US, writes economist Dr. Paul Craig Roberts. With no weapons left to send and money-printing its only option, Trump could force its hand.
NATO withdrawal threat. Trump may pull US security guarantees from warmongering European states throwing sand in his gears or even threaten a NATO exit, warned ex-Pentagon officer David Pyne. That could motivate Europe to rein Zelensky in.
Tariffs on Europe. A 25% tariff on EU imports could cost 1.5% of EU GDP, per Bloomberg. Trump already threatened this, claiming the EU was created to “screw the US”.
🗣 Trump: Zelensky saying the end of the conflict is far away is the worst statement and the US will not put up with it for much longer.
The verbal shootout at the Oval Office last Friday brought out President Vladimir Zelensky’s fury that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are very close to a deal on Ukraine, while the conclave in Lancashire House in London on Sunday involving 18 European leaders messaged that Zelensky is in good company.
Connecting the dots, the incisive mind of Stephen Bryen, a leading expert on security, strategy and technology who previously held senior positions in the Pentagon and Capitol Hill, wrote on Substack: “Trump invited [French president] Macron and [UK prime minister] Starmer to Washington to brief them, which he apparently did. The French went away fairly unhappy, but Starmer seemed to be in general agreement. Starmer made a pitch to include Article 5 and NATO in any deal; Trump rejected that appeal. Putin, meanwhile, talked to [Chinese president] Xi by telephone and sent Sergei Shoigu (who heads Russia’s Security Council, something like the NSC) to Beijing to meet with Xi.
“Trump invited Zelensky. The cover for Zelensky’s appearance in Washington was the “Minerals Deal” which the two leaders were supposed to sign… The real reason for the Zelensky visit was to brief him on the Putin negotiations and to gain his support.”
In the event, Trump could neither brief Zelensky on the Ukraine deal nor sign the “Minerals Deal” because the Ukrainian president took great exception to any negotiations with Putin. He did this in public, to Trump’s face, and in front of the press. The result was there was no private meeting and Trump told Zelensky, “he would be welcomed back only when he was ready for peace.”
This is where things stand. The strategy session that Trump is due to take later today with his top advisors will signal what happens next. There is a strong likelihood that Trump may cut off arms deliveries and/or financial assistance to Ukraine.
Now that the Rubicon has been crossed, Trump is unlikely to change course on Russia — unless, of course, Zelensky falls in line in abject surrender, which seems unlikely too. Russians of course welcome his ouster.
It is highly unlikely that Trump will be cowed by the temper tantrums of the EU or impressed by Britain’s grandstanding. Germany is without a government for the next several weeks; itweakens the Europeans’ punch.
Indeed, the back channel communication between Moscow and Washington has gained traction. Moscow assesses that Trump has the upper hand. This is reflected in the growing optimism in Putin’s remarks last Thursday while addressing the Board of the Federal Security Service (collegium of Russia’s top foreign intelligence officials.)
Putin began by saying that the world and the international situation are changing rapidly and “the first contacts with the new US administration inspire certain hopes.”
He said: “There is a reciprocal commitment [with Trump] to work to restore interstate relations and to gradually address the enormous amount of systemic and strategic problems in the global architecture which once provoked the crises in Ukraine and other regions… Importantly, our partners demonstrate pragmatism and a realistic vision of things, and have abandoned numerous stereotypes, the so-called rules, and messianic, ideological clichés of their predecessors.”
Putin estimated that conditions exist for a dialogue “on bringing a fundamental solution to Ukraine crisis… a dialogue on creating a system that will truly ensure a balanced and mutual consideration of interests, an indivisible European and global security system for the long term, where the security of some countries cannot be ensured at the expense or to the detriment of the security of other countries, definitely not Russia.”
However, Putin also flagged that sections Western elites “are still committed to maintaining instability in the world, and these forces will try to disrupt or to compromise the newly resumed dialogue” and, hence it is vital that “every possibility offered by dialogue and special services to thwart such attempts” needs to be leveraged.
Indeed, the New York Times disclosed today that Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has ordered U.S. Cyber Command to halt offensive operations against Russia “as part of a larger re-evaluation of all operations against Russia.” Equally, reports have appeared that Putin has given similar instructions restraining the Russian agencies.
What lends enchantment to the view is that many of the US’ most sophisticated operations against Russia are run out of Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters, the storied intelligence agency that broke the Enigma codes in World War II. Suffice to say, the US seems to be cutting itself free from longstanding joint operations with Britain directed against Russia.
A Guardian newspaper report has separately corroborated the Times disclosure of a shift in the US policy. It added that the warming of US-Russia relations is apparent also in certain recent other incidents which indicate that the US is “no longer characterising Russia as a cybersecurity threat.”
The paper claimed that analysts in the super secret Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (Cisa) of the United States spoke to the Guardian on the condition of anonymity that theywere “verbally informed that they were not to follow or report on Russian threats, even though this had previously been a main focus for the agency.”
Quite obviously, a crisis of confidence has arisen in the US-UK “special relationship” — or, to put it differently, the Trump administration is taking steps to sequester the Cisa from rogue operations.
There is a Cold War history of rogue operations by spy agencies. One of the most celebrated cases was the incident on 1st May, 1960 when an American U-2 spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers flying [‘unbeknownst’ to Eisenhower] at an altitude of 80,000 feet was shot down over Soviet air space triggering a diplomatic crisis that caused the collapse of a summit conference in Paris between then US president Dwight Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev — and the sudden death of the two leaders’ closely nurtured dream of détente.
An analogical situation exists today. Both Washington and Moscow are conscious of it. The need for such a veil of secrecy around the high level dialogue between the Kremlin and the White House is self-evident. There are too many detractors in the collective West who won’t settle for anything short of a Russian defeat in Ukraine and would rather keep the war going.
In such a fraught scenario, on the Russian side, the Kremlin’s writ ultimately prevails despite whatever dissenting voices exist in the military-industrial complex or amongst super hawks with revenge mentality. But that is not the case in the US where remnants of the old regime still hold sensitive positions, as the Guardian report vividly brings out. In the final analysis, therefore, it may well turn out that — to quote Stephen Bryan — Trump “will let Ukraine collapse but may seek a deal with Putin on Ukraine once Zelensky is gone.”
By Khalid Amayreh, in occupied East Jerusalem | The People’s Voice | October 18, 2010
A major Jewish religious figure in Israel has likened non-Jews to donkeys and beasts of burden, saying the main reason for their very existence is to serve Jews.
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, spiritual mentor of the religious fundamentalist party, Shas, which represents Middle Eastern Jews, reportedly said during a Sabbath homily earlier this week that “the sole purpose of non-Jews is to serve Jews.”
Yosef is considered a major religious leader in Israel who enjoys the allegiance of hundreds of thousands of followers. … continue
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