Possible consequences and prospects of Vladimir Putin’s visit to DPRK
By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – 12.07.2024
The consequences of the visit of the Russian leader to North Korea and the documents signed there are so significant that they can propel the trend of global turbulence. How have Seoul, Beijing and Washington reacted to such a rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang and what will be Moscow’s response to the steps taken by Seoul and its allies?
Seoul’s response
Until a certain point, Seoul was ‘the friendliest of the unfriendly countries’ – the Russian president recently noted in a positive way. As Vladimir Putin said on June 5, 2024, within the framework of the International Economic Forum in St Petersburg, “Russia highly appreciates the refusal of ROK to directly supply lethal weapons to Ukraine”.
However, such a demonstrative rapprochement between Pyongyang and Moscow cannot be ignored by Seoul, especially since the content of the Treaty (which contains a military component along the lines of the Soviet-North Korean treaty of 1961) has turned out to match the worst expectations of South Korean analysts.
Even before the visit, South Korean diplomats hinted to the author that Seoul would definitely respond to such a level of cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, at least for domestic political and reputation reasons. This response would most likely entail boosting Seoul-NATO cooperation to a similar level. The United States, along with its allies and systemic right-wing politicians, are putting pressure on President Yoon Suk Yeol to take a more anti-Russian stance, especially on the Ukrainian track; Seoul is constantly being convinced that since Pyongyang has been ‘proven’ to be aiding Russia, South Korea has the right to provide similar support to Ukraine, despite all possible risks of retaliatory measures and a significant cooling of relations with Moscow.
In a statement on June 20, 2024, former Ambassador to Russia and current National Security Adviser to the President Chang Ho-jin noted: “Four ships, five organisations and eight individuals from third countries, as well as Russian and North Korean organisations involved in the supply of weapons and oil transshipment between Russia and North Korea, are on the list of independent sanctions… We have also included 243 new items to the list of sanctioned goods exported to Russia, bringing the total number to 1,402 items…We plan on reconsidering the issue of military support for Ukraine, as the government has so far maintained the position that it will not supply lethal weapons to this country”.
Chang’s statement, on the other hand, could not but evoke a threatening reply from Moscow. Vladimir Putin almost immediately declared that the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine would be a “very big mistake” and that Moscow would in this case make “the appropriate decisions, which the current leadership of South Korea will most likely not appreciate”. However, the Russian president expressed hope that such a thing would not happen.
There was also a natural exchange of reprimands. On June 21, 2024, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of ROK Kim Hong Kyung summoned Russian Ambassador Georgy Zinoviev to convey Seoul’s official position on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and DPRK from June 19. The vice minister called on Russia to “immediately cease military cooperation with North Korea and comply with UN Security Council resolutions”. He made it clear that ROK, along with the international community, will “resolutely resist any actions that threaten its security”.
Zinoviev said that cooperation between Russia and DPRK is not directed against third countries, complies with the principles and norms of international law and is aimed at strengthening peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Russia is ready to continue to make political and diplomatic efforts to form an architecture of long-term peace and stability based on the principle of indivisible security”, the ambassador stressed.
Meanwhile Seoul slowly began to backtrack. On June 23, 2024, in a speech on the KBS channels, Chang Ho-jin made it clear that the question of whether South Korea will supply lethal weapons to Ukraine will depend on Russia; if it starts sending high-precision modern weapons to North Korea, then nothing will stop South Korea from helping Ukraine. Among the options under consideration are 155 mm artillery shells and air defence systems.
In essence, the parties formally voiced to each other the long-known, informal red lines: South Korea is not to be engaged in direct supplies of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine and Russia is not to be engaged in the development of the North Korean military potential. It is important for Seoul to prevent the supply of dangerous modern weapons and technologies to the North, and North Korean shells (which are allegedly provided to the Special Military Operation) are a nuisance, but not yet a disaster.
It is worth remembering that, despite his high position, Chang still does not have the right to speak on behalf of the state unlike the president, the prime minister and the foreign minister. If such statements were to come from them as well, then it would indeed be a cause for concern. For now, though, one should wait and see, considering how, on the eve of his visit to the United States, Yoon Suk Yeol stated that the Republic of Korea could start supplying weapons to Ukraine if the Russian Armed Forces were to commit an atrocity.
Thus, the point of no return in relations between Moscow and Seoul has not yet been passed, but we are close. The author hopes for the best, as Moscow and Seoul understand that when crossing the ‘red’ line, Russia will also have to take action in response and South Korea may lose its status as ‘the friendliest of the unfriendly’.
China’s position
The reaction to the visit by the Chinese media and government agencies was between neutral and positive; they did [not] provide any statements of judgement and simply noted that this was an important and serious event. The Chinese Foreign Ministry called the DPRK’s desire to develop relations with Russia normal, and the Global Times noted that this cooperation could perhaps even make the United States afraid.
Western media actively wrote that China was not happy with the rapprochement between Russia and the DPRK that Putin’s visit to North Korea and Vietnam was actually anti-Chinese in nature and that having a parallel 2+2 dialogue shows China’s desire to be friends with Seoul, showing its tough stance to Pyongyang.
This is not exactly true. Firstly, coordination between Moscow and Beijing on the Korean issue has always been and is very close. A look at the joint statements on the Korean issue made during Putin’s visit to China is enough to prove this. This means that the essence of Moscow and Pyongyang’s agreements with Beijing was probably discussed in advance.
Secondly, on June 18 negotiations did indeed take place in Seoul. They were attended by senior officials from the foreign and defence ministries of ROK and China in a 2+2 format.
Before the start of the talks, the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Lim Soo-suk, believed that “issues of cooperation between Russia and North Korea will be discussed, since dialogue is taking place simultaneously with the scheduled visit of the Russian president to North Korea”. Professor of the Hankuk University of Foreign Affairs Kang Jung-young said that “having this dialogue is in itself is a clear signal to North Korea that China will not support Pyongyang’s attempts to create a trilateral bloc with Beijing and Moscow”.
The Korean approach to the 2+2 format is as follows: representatives of Seoul expressed deep concern to their Chinese colleagues about the visit of the Russian president to DPRK and the deepening of ties between Moscow and Pyongyang amid rising tensions on the Korean peninsula. They stressed that the Russian leader’s visit to North Korea should not undermine peace and stability in the region or lead to the strengthening of military cooperation between the two countries. Additionally, ROK called on China to play a constructive role in ensuring peace, stability and security on the Korean peninsula, emphasising that the deepening of Russian-North Korean military cooperation and its consequences run in contradiction to Beijing’s interests. In turn, China confirmed its unchanged position on the Korean peninsula, expressing its readiness to take an active part in solving the problems of the region.
A ‘bloc’ as a limiting factor
Almost immediately after the signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between the Russian Federation and North Korea, the Russian president noted that there were no fundamentally new points in it and that the document was similar to the 1961 treaty, including Article 4 on ‘automatic military intervention’. According to Putin, the provisions of the new Agreement stipulate that military assistance is provided only in case of aggression, and therefore ROK has nothing to worry about, since there are no known plans of the South to attack the North. The Russian president also expressed the opinion that the Agreement would to some extent limit the threat of the crisis on the Korean peninsula entering a ‘hot phase’.
The author supposes that the cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang within the framework of a possible military bloc reduces the likelihood of conflict on the Korean peninsula rather than increases it. The fact that the opposing sides are two serious military blocs reduces the likelihood of an escalation of the conflict, as it could too easily escalate to become nuclear, and neither Moscow nor Pyongyang are suicidal.
One more detail: on the one hand, article 4 of the Agreement is harsher than article 5 of the NATO treaty. On the other, it clearly indicates that a state of war is required for comprehensive assistance, and if we recall the 1961 treaty, then it is worth paying attention to the events of 1968 when Moscow clarified to Pyongyang in which situations military assistance would be cancelled.
We should likely expect a confrontation similar to the Cold War. There will be an arms race, muscles will be flexed, loud statements and minor incidents will take place, but the parties are well aware of the red lines and do not intend to cross them. Being prepared for war, including the development of preemptive strike plans as a way of self-defence in a critical situation, is not the same as the desire to initiate a conflict.
The fate of UNSC sanctions
The demonstrative liquidation of UN Security Council sanctions, which was expected in the West, has still not taken place. Both Putin’s article and the additional decree emphasise cooperation in the fields of education, healthcare and science and maintain that the unjust sanctions should be lifted.
For now, though, Moscow says it will comply with the sanctions it previously voted for.
It is likely that the lifting of sanctions may occur following the next round of escalation because regardless of whether there were actually arms deals or not, the West will still blame Moscow and Pyongyang for colluding and take retaliatory measures.
The appearance of a North Korean labour force in Russia is a sign that a de jure or de facto decision to ignore a part of the sanctions has been made. Price, quality, safety and keeping a low profile are the strengths of North Korean builders, and talks of their employment have been going on for a long time.
Summa summarum, there is a lot of uncertainty in the future and the situation is similar to that described in the book ‘The Guns of August’ by Barbara Tuchman: nobody wanted war, so war was inevitable. However, it cannot be said that the visit of the President of the Russian Federation to the DPRK has significantly aggravated the situation.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Korean Studies Center of the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Kremlin comments on Türkiye’s SCO bid
Türkiye’s obligations to the US-led military bloc are not consistent with the Eurasian organization’s values, Moscow has said.
RT | July 12, 2024
Türkiye’s bid to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is not compatible with its membership in NATO, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday.
Last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended a summit of the Eurasian mutual defense group, in which his nation has observer status. While returning home from Kazakhstan, he told journalists that Ankara wants to “further develop” ties with the SCO and its founding members Russia and China. During the NATO leaders’ summit in the US this week, he said Türkiye wants to join the SCO as a permanent member.
Asked by journalists when Turkish accession could be expected, Peskov said there was a problem with such a proposal.
“There are certain contradictions between Turkish commitments and [its] position on fundamental issues as a NATO member and the worldview formulated in the founding documents of the SCO,” he explained.
The expansion of the SCO is of interest to many nations and remains on its agenda, but there is no specific timeline for accepting new members, he added. Commenting later during a press call on bilateral relations with Türkiye, Peskov said Russia was “open for attempts to reach agreements based on a certain worldview.”
Moscow perceives NATO as a hostile, aggressive military organization, which serves US geopolitical interests and is currently conducting a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine.
Despite being a NATO member state, Türkiye has maintained a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict, refusing to impose economic sanctions on Russia and serving as an intermediary between Moscow and Kiev on several occasions. Ankara helped to mediate a nascent peace deal in the early months of the hostilities, which Kiev eventually ditched in favor of continued fighting. The Russian government believes that the US and its allies, particularly the UK, forced Ukraine to reject the proposal.
The SCO was founded in 2001 and currently has ten full members: Russia, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus. Kazakhstan holds the rotating presidency this year and hosted the leaders of member states on July 3 and 4 in Astana.
One of the key pledges to which SCO members subscribe is not to seek the improvement of their own national security at the expense of the national security of other parties. NATO policy does exactly that, according to its critics, including Russia.
US plan to deploy missiles in Germany a ‘direct threat’ – Moscow
RT | July 11, 2024
US plans to deploy long-range missiles in Europe are a threat to global security and could pave the way for an escalation of already tense relations between Moscow and NATO, Russian Ambassador to Washington Anatoly Antonov has said.
On Wednesday, the US and Germany issued a joint statement that America “will begin episodic deployments of the long-range fires capabilities of its Multi-Domain Task Force in Germany in 2026, as part of planning for enduring stationing of these capabilities in the future.”
Washington also said that the systems will include SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles with ranges of up to 460km and 2,400km, respectively, as well as developmental hypersonic weapons. Those assets have a “significantly longer range than current land-based fires in Europe,” the statement added.
In a post on Telegram on Thursday, Antonov denounced the move as “a serious mistake by Washington.” “Such extremely destabilizing steps are a direct threat to international security and strategic stability,” he said.
The envoy stressed that the planned deployment “increases the risks of a missile arms race,” adding that it could unleash “uncontrolled escalation amid dangerously soaring Russia-NATO tensions.”
Antonov also said that Russia has always sought to reduce the risks posed by disagreements over missile capabilities. “Instead of the desire for peace that Russia has demonstrated many times, the Americans have embarked on the dangerous path of militarism,” according to the ambassador.
He emphasized that Russia’s tolerance for encroachments on its security is “not unlimited.” “Doesn’t Germany understand that the emergence of American missile assets on German soil will lead to these facilities ending up in Russian crosshairs? This is not saber-rattling, it is the simple logic of a normal person,” Antonov explained.
He went on to blast the US for not thinking about how to minimize the fallout from the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Signed in 1987 at the end of the Cold War, it barred Moscow and Washington from possessing many types of nuclear and conventional missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500km.
The US unilaterally withdrew from the treaty in 2019, citing alleged Russian non-compliance, a charge denied in Moscow. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov suggested earlier this week that the US pulled out of the agreement to create formerly banned missile systems to put pressure on China.
At the same time, Russia has said that it intends to keep abiding by the INF’s terms, but warned that it could reverse that policy if Washington starts deploying missiles covered by the treaty in any region of the world.
US to deploy long-range weapons in Germany
RT | July 10, 2024
The US will station long-range missiles in Germany from 2026 onwards, the governments of both countries have announced. These weapons, including the SM-6 and Tomahawk systems, were banned on the continent until Washington tore up a landmark Cold War-era treaty in 2019.
According to a joint statement published by the White House, the US will “begin episodic deployments of the long-range fires capabilities of its Multi-Domain Task Force in Germany in 2026, as part of planning for enduring stationing of these capabilities in the future.”
The statement was released following talks between American and German officials at NATO’s annual summit in Washington on Wednesday.
The weapons systems deployed to Germany will include the SM-6 anti-air missile, which has a range of up to 460km (290 miles), and the Tomahawk cruise missile, which can reportedly strike targets more than 2,500km away.
The White House said that “developmental hypersonic weapons” will also be stationed in Germany, and will have a “significantly longer range than current land-based fires in Europe.”
The US has yet to successfully field a hypersonic weapon, and has canceled every hypersonic project since its first successful test in 2017.
Land-launched missiles with a range between 500km and 5,500km were banned on European soil under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. Along with the START-I and START-II agreements, the INF treaty helped defuse nuclear tensions in Europe after the West and the USSR came perilously close to nuclear war during NATO’s Able Archer military exercise in 1983.
The US pulled out of the INF treaty in 2019, with the State Department claiming that some of Russia’s cruise missiles had breached the agreement. Moscow denied this, and Russian President Vladimir Putin warned then-US President Donald Trump that the demise of the treaty would “have the gravest consequences.”
Russia continued to abide by the treaty and imposed a moratorium on the development of missiles that it prohibited. However, Putin announced earlier this month that the Russian defense industry would resume development of such armaments, citing the “hostile actions” of the US.
“We now know that the US is not only producing these missile systems, but has also brought them to Europe, Denmark, to use in exercises. Not long ago, it was reported that they were in the Philippines,” Putin explained at the time.
US and Danish forces trained with SM-6 missiles last September, while the Pentagon deployed its Typhon Weapon System – which can fire both SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles – to the Philippines in April.
High-tech Western weapons ‘useless’ in Ukraine conflict – WSJ
RT | July 10, 2024
Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities have rendered precision-guided Western munitions “useless” in the Ukraine conflict, the Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday. With their guidance systems scrambled, some of these weapons have reportedly been retired within weeks of hitting the battlefield.
When the US announced the delivery of GPS-guided Excalibur artillery shells to Ukraine in 2022, pro-Kiev outlets predicted that the $100,000-per-shot projectiles would make “Ukrainian artillery a whole lot more accurate” and “cause Russia a world of pain.”
However, the Russian military adapted within weeks, Ukrainian commanders told the Wall Street Journal. Russian signal-jamming equipment was used to feed false coordinates to the shells and interfere with their fuses, causing them to veer off course or fall to the ground as duds.
“By the middle of last year, the M982 Excalibur munitions, developed by RTX and BAE Systems, became essentially useless and are no longer employed,” the newspaper stated, paraphrasing the Ukrainian commanders.
The Soviet Union invested heavily in electronic warfare (EW) during the 1980s, viewing jamming technology as a crucial bulwark against the guided missiles and shells that the US was beginning to develop at the time. While weapons such as the 1990s-era Excalibur shells were used by the US to devastating effect in Iraq and Afghanistan, officials and analysts in Washington have since concluded that they are far less effective against a peer-level opponent like Russia.
“The Russians have gotten really, really good” at interfering with guided munitions, US Deputy Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante told the WSJ.
Retired US General Ben Hodges, who once predicted that Western weapons would help Ukraine seize Crimea by last winter, told the newspaper that “we probably made some bad assumptions because over the last 20 years we were launching precision weapons against people that could not do anything about it… and Russia and China do have these capabilities.”
Some of NATO’s most advanced weapons systems have met a similar fate in Ukraine. The newly-developed Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB), a joint project of Boeing in the US and Saab in Sweden, was given to Ukraine earlier this year, with Kiev’s troops firing these GPS-guided munitions before their American counterparts. However, it has since been pulled from the battlefield after it proved completely ineffective against Russian EW.
Likewise, Russian EW has significantly blunted the accuracy of Ukraine’s Western-provided GMLRS missiles, which are fired from the HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system, Ukrainian soldiers told the WSJ. As with the Excalibur shells, GMLRS missiles were once described by pro-Kiev pundits and analysts as a “game changer” that would swing the conflict in Ukraine’s favor.
Russia has long insisted that no amount of Western weapons systems will prevent it from achieving victory. Supplying these weapons is a “futile project” that will only encourage Kiev to “commit new crimes,” Moscow’s ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Antonov, warned last week.
Ukraine violates Chemical Weapons Convention – Russian MoD
RT | July 9, 2024
Russia has found evidence that Ukraine has violated the Chemical Weapons Convention, a top military commander stated on Monday.
Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, who leads Russia’s chemical and biological defense forces, said that the engineering troops discovered a laboratory that was apparently used to produce hydrogen cyanide – an extremely dangerous and highly toxic agent that had been used as a chemical weapon during World War I.
The facility is located near Avdeevka, a fortified Donbass town liberated by Russia in February, the general said. The improvised laboratory itself was found inside a partially destroyed building in an industrial area, which also had a chemical processing plant. The facility had a rotary evaporator and several chemical reactors. Protective clothes, including US-made gas masks and Polish hazmat suits, were found on the site.
According to Kirillov, the samples taken from the facility and analyzed in Russian military laboratories contained traces of sulfuric acid and sodium cyanide, which can be used to produce hydrogen cyanide. Traces of cyanide anions – poisonous chemical compounds of the cyano group – were on multiple equipment, the general said.
The evidence “clearly shows that the laboratory was used to manufacture poisonous substances,” Kirillov stated. According to the Russian Defense Ministry’s estimates, the facility was capable of producing at least three kilograms of chemical agents per day if operated by just two or three people. Hydrogen cyanide can kill a person if they inhale just 70 to 80 milligrams of the agent.
During his briefing, Kirillov noted hydrogen cyanide is among the Chemical Weapons Convention’s so-called “Schedule 3 chemicals” – agents with large-scale industrial uses that have the potential of being used for chemical warfare. He added that, in May 2024, civilians in the Avdeevka region showed symptoms consistent with the hydrogen cyanide poisoning after Ukrainian military drones dropped bombs in the area. Another case was reported in Russia’s Belgorod Region, where Ukrainian ammunition fragments were found that had traces of hydrogen cyanide, Kirillov said.
Kirillov also cited a Ukrainian POW, whom he identified as Sergey Batyr, as confirming that laboratories that stored chemical agents were also used to make kamikaze drones.
In March 2022, Russia accused Ukraine of running a secret biological weapons program with the help of the US. Kiev has denied having biological weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. The Pentagon has described Russia’s claims as “absurd” and “laughable.”
Russia Rules Out All Nuclear Talks With US Until Washington Adopts a ‘Sane’ Approach
By Kyle Anzalone | The Libertarian Institute | July 8, 2024
A top Russian diplomat stressed that the Kremlin is unwilling to engage with the White House on arms control issues due to the Biden administration’s Russophobic stance. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov argued that President Donald Trump left the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) to provoke China.
In an interview with The International Affairs published on Monday, Ryabkov explained Moscow’s position on arms control talks with Washington. “We do not have the foundation right now and we are not even close to shaping one in order to launch a tentative dialogue, not talks even, in this field. This is a result of Washington’s destructive policy course,” he stated.
“Until [the US] clearly show some change for the better in their policy, at the very least, demonstrate that this boundless and unabashed Russophobia has been set aside and is replaced with a slightly more sane approach,” he said, adding, “until this happens, there simply can be no dialogue on strategic stability.”
Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has abandoned a series of agreements that limited the US and Russia’s conventional as well as nuclear arsenals. Additionally, the Kremlin left the New Start Treaty in response to the White House’s support for Kiev.
The deterioration of the global arms control agreement has coincided with a rise in spending on nuclear weapons and arms overall. Both Beijing and Moscow view the launchers as highly provocative. Ryabkov argued Trump left the INF Treaty to build intermediate-range missiles to intimidate China.
“Americans needed to withdraw from the treaty in order to create such systems to intimidate the People’s Republic of China,” Ryabkov said. “And it is no coincidence that we have recently had a sharply intensified discussion about when and where the Americans might begin to deploy their medium-range weapons in the Asia-Pacific region.”
Recently, Washington and Moscow have taken steps to use arms limited by the INF Treaty. The agreement barred land-based missiles, and launchers, with a range of 300-3,400 miles. The US has deployed a covert launcher for intermediate-range missiles to Denmark and the Philippines for war games.
On Friday, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Moscow would begin producing weapons that the INF Treaty outlawed. “We need to start production of these strike systems and then, based on the actual situation, make decisions about where — if necessary to ensure our safety — to place them,” he stated.
Russia Hits Ukrainian Military Targets in Retaliation, Labels Kiev’s Civilian Strike Claims as False
Sputnik – 08.07.2024
The Kiev regime’s provocative statements about alleged Russian strikes on civilian targets are related to the NATO summit and the pursuit of further funding, the Russian Ministry of Defense has said.
The Russian military conducted coordinated strikes using long-range precision weapons on Ukrainian military-industrial targets and air bases on Monday in retaliation for Kiev’s attempts to damage Russian energy and economic facilities, the Russian Defense Ministry has stated.
“This morning, in response to the Kiev regime’s attempts to damage Russian energy and economic facilities, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation conducted a coordinated strike with long-range precision weapons on Ukrainian military-industrial targets and air bases. The strike objectives have been achieved, and the designated targets have been hit,” the military department stated in its report.
Commenting on the Ukrainian claims of an intentional Russian strike on civilian targets, the ministry said they are a blatant lie, adding that the destruction was caused by a falling Ukrainian air defense missile.
“Claims by Kiev representatives about an alleged intentional Russian missile strike on civilian objects are completely untrue,” the statement said.
It was noted that numerous published photos and videos from Kiev clearly confirm that the destruction resulted from a falling Ukrainian air defense missile launched from within the city.
“We particularly emphasize that similar hysterics from the Kiev regime have been occurring for years, especially before each NATO summit. The goal of such provocations is to secure further funding for the Kiev regime and to continue the war to the last Ukrainian,” the Russian Defense Ministry highlighted.
Russian Experts Gain Access to Storm Shadow Missile Warhead
Sputnik – July 7, 2024
Russian specialists have studied the cumulative warhead of European Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles, determining the penetration depth and detonation distance above the ground, an engineer and weapons specialist told Sputnik.
“The primary cumulative projectile of the Storm Shadow/SCALP missile consists of the nose cap, the primary charge, and then the main warhead. It is necessary for the initial penetration of an obstacle. It creates holes using the cumulative effect, through which the inertial warhead penetrates, causing an explosion. We understand the penetration depth, the detonation distance from the surface, the types of target sensors used, and the potential penetration depth,” the specialist said.
The cumulative warhead of the Storm Shadow/SCALP missile is a cylindrical object about half a meter in length with approximately the same diameter. The nose section is shaped like a cone, directed inward towards the body.
The study of the missile by Russian specialists will enable the implementation of countermeasures to protect against such weapons, including the creation of shelters with the necessary characteristics, the specialist explained.
The Storm Shadow is a low-observable, air-launched cruise missile. It is launched from aircraft and has a strike range of 250 to 560 kilometers, depending on the modification. It was developed jointly by France and the United Kingdom (in France, it is named SCALP and is produced by the MBDA consortium). The Ukrainian Armed Forces have been actively using the Storm Shadow since last year.
The Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG cruise missiles can approach their targets stealthily by using navigation correction via American satellites, Lieutenant General Andrey Semenov, Commander of the Air Defense and Missile Defense Forces and Deputy Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces earlier said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that Moscow may respond asymmetrically to the supply of long-range weapons to Ukraine. The transfer of high-precision long-range weaponry to Kiev is a path to very serious problems, he emphasized.
What Will Iran’s Foreign Policy Be Under New President Pezeshkian?
Sputnik – 06.07.2024
Masoud Pezeshkian has emerged as the winner of the presidential runoff in Iran this week, receiving 54 percent of the votes.
The newly elected President of Iran Masoud Pezeshkian spoke to Sputnik on the eve of the election about the main priorities of Iran’s foreign policy, which include: strengthening relations with Russia and China; Iran’s active presence in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the lifting of sanctions.
“Russia is a friend and partner of Iran, and I consider it a priority to deepen and expand relations with Russia and China, as well as intensify foreign policy activities in the Asian direction in general,” Pezeshkian said. “And we, of course, at all levels – bilateral, regional and international – will continue our efforts to expand interaction with the Russian Federation.”
According to him, Iran “opposes the policy of unidirectionality” and supports “the principle of multipolarity.”
“One of the priorities of my foreign policy program is regional cooperation, and for this purpose, Iran will expand its presence in BRICS and the SCO, as well as strive for more active cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union to more fully realize the potential of trade and economic relations with the member countries of these organizations,” Pezeshkian explained.
Regarding the JCPOA, Pezeshkian pointed out that it is “an international agreement approved by the UN,” and that the United States’ unilateral withdrawal from this agreement “caused serious damage to Iran and the Iranian people.”
“As the Russian side has repeatedly emphasized, Iran has fulfilled its obligations, and we see our task as returning the other participants to this agreement as soon as possible and achieving the lifting of sanctions. I am confident that the friendly governments of Russia and China will support Iran and assist it in resolving this issue,” he added.
Israel vs Hezbollah: Strategic stakes and regional implications
By Shivan Mahendrarajah | The Cradle | July 5, 2024
There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. — Former US secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld
As tensions escalate between Hezbollah and Israel, analysts are meticulously wargaming potential conflict scenarios. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his religious-nationalist coalition, a confrontation with the Lebanese resistance movement is more than speculation – it is a strategic consideration. This coalition views a potential war as a means to address longstanding security concerns and strengthen its political position.
A key part of Tel Aviv’s strategic thinking is the hope that the US might be forced into taking a more active role in confronting Israel’s adversaries – Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran – thereby neutralizing threats that have persisted for decades. This concept of “clearing the decks” of regional enemies remains a central theme in Israeli strategic discussions.
Historical roots of Israel’s strategic confidence
For the occupation state, this potential conflict is a “war of choice” driven by historical and ethnonationalist motivations. But it is also premised on past Israeli military advantages that are long gone in today’s missile-laden West Asia.
The Six-Day War of 1967 fostered a belief in the invincibility of the Israeli military, the superiority of Zionism, and the manifest destiny of its ‘chosen people.’ It was with similar hubris that Adolf Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union in 1941. Fast forward eight decades, and today, Israelis are informing US officials “that it can pull off a ‘blitzkrieg’” in Lebanon.
In 1967, the psychological impact on neighboring Arab states was profound due to the decisive defeat of their armies. This sentiment persisted until 2006, when Lebanon’s Hezbollah emerged politically victorious, shattering the perception of Israeli invulnerability and altering regional power dynamics.
Further shaping Israeli delusions of military superiority is the ethnonationalist rhetoric prevalent in Tel Aviv’s policy decision-making circles, embodied by extremist ministers like Betzalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, who have revived the ideologies of the once-banned Meir Kahane. While a few sober military voices in Israel advocate for a diplomatic solution to the northern border crisis, hubris and ethnonationalism currently dominate the discourse.
Strategic imperatives for Hezbollah and Iran
Conversely, for Hezbollah and Iran, this conflict is a “war of necessity,” something neither can publicly admit nor provoke directly. Both have been marginalized and sanctioned by the US on Israel’s behalf, causing untold domestic pressures and economic hardships – an untenable situation that demands a direct challenge of Israeli policies.
But reversing sanctions cannot happen at the negotiating table. Israelis are arrogant and obstinate; they will not negotiate in good faith. Take, for example, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the Iran nuclear deal. When former US president Barack Obama finalized the agreement, Netanyahu whined that Israel needed “compensation.” Obama offered Israel a military package, but as soon as he left office, Netanyahu, Jared Kushner, and AIPAC manipulated the “very stable genius,” former president Donald Trump. JCPOA was annulled. The compensation package, by the by, was not returned to US taxpayers.
Iran–Hezbollah must drag Israel to the edge of the precipice. Tel Aviv must stare into the abyss and realize that with a gentle push by the region’s Resistance Axis, it will lie mangled at the bottom of the chasm. Iran–Hezbollah, however, cannot push it over the edge, as this could lead to a nuclear nightmare. Today, in its “war of choice,” Israel has already hinted at using “unprecedented” and “unspecified” weapons against Hezbollah, implying a possible nuclear threat.
The Axis must instead show Israel a path back from the edge: a treaty that settles outstanding concerns. Tehran offered Tel Aviv and Washington a “Grand Bargain” in 2003 but was rejected. A new grand bargain is indispensable for Israel and the Axis of Resistance, yet the conditio sine qua non for a lasting treaty is Israel’s military defeat by the Axis.
The threats and counter-threats are flying, each aiming to gain “leverage” and deterrence.
Earlier this month, Iranian foreign affairs adviser to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Kamal Kharrazi, said that were Israel to launch an all-out offensive against Hezbollah, the Islamic Republic and other factions of the Axis of Resistance would support Lebanon with “all means” necessary.
Iran has previously warned that it may be compelled to revise its nuclear doctrine in response to Israeli aggression. It is suspected that Iran may have already crossed the nuclear threshold. Even without nuclear capabilities, Iran has the ballistic missile and warhead capabilities to destroy Tel Aviv, Haifa, and other major cities. Israel is a “one-bomb country”: it is minuscule, and its population is concentrated in a few central hubs. Iran and the Axis do not have any need for multiple nuclear warheads.
As General Hajizadah explained in a speech, the Khorramshahr missile can deliver 80 warheads. If the IRGC launched 100 missiles, that’s 8,000 warheads on major Israeli cities. Israel would be foolish to trust in its integrated air defense system after the IRGC’s successful strikes on 13 April.
2024 is not 2006
Comparing the potential 2024 conflict with the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war is a popular frame of reference, but both sides have learned lessons since then. In particular, there have been significant advancements in military technology and tactics over the past 18 years.
Hezbollah has developed new tactics and weapons, such as the Almas Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM), which has proven effective against Israeli military assets. Additionally, Hezbollah’s air defense capabilities have posed new challenges for Israeli drone offensives.
The Israeli air force ruled the skies in 2006, but whether it can do so in 2024 is unclear. Hezbollah has air defense capacity (such as the Sayyad-2 medium-range surface-to-air missile). It is not known if it has newer models, like Iran’s Khordad-3. This could be a surprise.
Israeli intelligence assessments of Hezbollah’s capabilities are likely to be imprecise. Past successes against groups like the PLO and Black September are no longer relevant. Recent failures, such as Tel Aviv’s inability to foresee Hamas Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October, underscore the limitations of Israeli intelligence.
US involvement
This has been Israel’s objective since 9/11: have Americans fight Israel’s wars. Although Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Charles Brown stated that the US may be unable to assist Israel, this must not be taken as a serious military assessment. It is a political statement on behalf of the Biden Administration, which does not want to join a major war until after the 5 November election. Netanyahu, however, knows that Israel controls Congress and American media. Congressman Thomas Massie is the exception, among 435 Representatives and 100 Senators, who AIPAC has not bought. Once war begins, Israel’s minions in the White House, media, and Congress will campaign for US military participation. As Netanyahu said, “I know what America is. America is a thing you can move very easily; move it in the right direction.” He is correct.
If the US intervenes – a high-probability event – Hezbollah and Iran will (reluctantly) welcome it. For the Axis to secure a “Grand Bargain,” it must inflict catastrophic damage on US land-based and sea-based assets in West Asia. Washington will only abandon Israel if ships, bases, and hundreds (or thousands) of American lives are destroyed because of Israel.
Russia
Russia is a wildcard, a “known unknown.” The US security apparatus warring against Russia and supporting Israel is top-heavy with Zionists/neo-cons. Iran’s enemies and Russia’s enemies are nearly congruent: Victoria Kagan née Nuland; Kagan family (Robert, Fred, Kim, their ISW); Antony Blinken (grandson of a founder of Israel); Avril Haines (Director of National Intelligence); deputy director CIA David Cohen, Alejandro Mayorkas (Secretary of DHS), and more. It behooves Russia to punish its tormentors by damaging the only country to which they are loyal: Israel.
Moscow has been chafing at US support for Ukraine. Elena Panina, Director of the Institute of International Political and Economic Strategies, wrote on her Telegram channel in December 2023, “The best option for Russia is to respond to America in a similar way: with a hybrid war far from its own borders. The most obvious at the moment is a proxy attack on American forces in the Middle East.” In May 2024, Putin said the same thing. Terror attacks in Belgorod and in Sevastopol on a religious holiday may tip the scales in favor of Iran, especially if the US jumps into the fray. Defeating the US will increase popular support for Russia among global Muslims and help eject the US from West Asia – a goal supported by Russia and China. Iran is “too big to fail”: Moscow has made military and economic investments and alliances with Tehran, particularly after the Ukraine War began, and is on the cusp of signing a new comprehensive cooperation agreement with Tehran. The Kremlin cannot allow Iran to be defeated and the republic to collapse. It will most likely provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support through Russian satellites and aircraft in Syria. Russia allows IRGC to use its Humaymim/Khmeimim air base in Syria because IDF tries to prevent supplies from Iran from arriving at airports in Aleppo and Damascus. Russia could (if not already, given recent air traffic between Russia and the air base) deliver air defense batteries, missiles, and more for the Syrian Army and Hezbollah.
Unknown unknowns
The factors outlined above, along with China and North Korea’s investments in and relationships with Iran, complicate any predictions about the looming war between Israel and the Lebanese resistance. While their direct military participation is unlikely, these nuclear powers could supply Iran with essential weapons and ammunition. The “known unknowns,” a few of which are noted, are enough to complicate wargaming, but the “unknown unknowns” may render such scenarios moot.


