US sanctions Serbian oil major over Russia ties
RT | October 10, 2025
US sanctions on Serbia’s Russian-majority-owned oil company, NIS, have been activated, prompting neighboring Croatia to halt crude deliveries and raising the risk of a shutdown at Serbia’s only refinery.
Washington had granted Belgrade several temporary exemptions from restrictions imposed in January on NIS (Petroleum Industry of Serbia), in which Russia’s Gazprom and Gazprom Neft hold a majority stake. The most recent waiver, issued on October 1, was valid for only one week.
NIS confirmed Thursday that the US Treasury Department had not extended the waiver, leaving the company under full sanctions. It said it was “working to overcome the situation” and would engage with the US authorities to seek delisting.
The new sanctions have forced Croatia to stop crude supplies, pushing Serbia’s only refinery to the brink of a shutdown, President Aleksandar Vucic said on Thursday. He warned the facility, a critical supplier of gasoline and jet fuel, faces closure by November 1 unless deliveries resume.
“These are extremely severe consequences for our entire country. It’s not just about the functioning of one company,” Vucic said in a televised speech.
The sanctions effectively bar the company from purchasing crude oil or exporting refined products.
Croatian pipeline operator JANAF, the sole supplier of crude to the refinery, has already announced it will halt all business with NIS. Analysts say the company’s only recourse is for the US to reverse the sanctions or for its Russian shareholders to divest.
The impact swiftly reached consumers, as NIS notified customers that its network of some 350 stations would no longer accept American Express, Mastercard, or Visa cards.
NIS is a leading Balkan energy company with an oil refinery in Pancevo, near Belgrade, and a retail network of more than 400 filling stations. Gazprom Neft is the largest shareholder with a 44.85% stake, Gazprom holds 11.3%, and the Serbian state owns 29.87%.
Although Serbia formally seeks to join the EU, it has refused to take part in Western sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine conflict. Brussels and Washington have repeatedly pushed Belgrade to sever its energy ties with Moscow, a key historical partner.
Europe’s Nord Stream headache: Poland, Germany, and Ukraine turn on each other over arrest
By Uriel Araujo | October 11, 2025
The Nord Stream saga has taken a new twist. A Ukrainian citizen detained in Poland at Germany’s request over the 2022 pipeline sabotage has now become the center of a diplomatic storm. Ukraine’s reported pressure on Poland is straining ties with Warsaw and Berlin, reopening questions European leaders have tried to bury.
Polish authorities have resisted Germany’s extradition request for the detained Ukrainian, citing national interest and judicial independence. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated bluntly that it was “not in Poland’s interest” to hand the suspect over to Berlin — a statement that speaks volumes about the deepening mistrust within the European Union. He added that “the problem of Europe… is not that Nord Stream 2 was blown up, but that it was built.”
This is symptomatic of Europe’s broader crisis: a continent that once aspired to “strategic autonomy” now grapples with American influence, tensions over the “Ukranian Question”, and internal divisions.
The destruction of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in September 2022 effectively ended decades of German-Russian energy cooperation, forcing Europe into costly dependence on American LNG. From that moment onward, every official narrative seemed to deflect attention away from one key question: who truly benefited?
One may recall that in August, Italian police arrested Ukrainian national Serhij K. for alleged involvement in the 2022 Nord Stream sabotage. According to Der Spiegel, he coordinated a Ukrainian team that planted explosives from the yacht “Andromeda.” The operation was reportedly approved by Ukraine’s military.
At the time, I wrote that the Nord Stream case has been a tale of confusion and cover-ups. I pointed out that a so-called “Ukrainian diver” suspect (unnamed to this very day) could be a lone scapegoat, a proxy, or just a minor operative in a much larger operation. All signs, I argued, pointed to the US as the main orchestrator, with Ukraine likely playing a supporting role on the ground.
According to Pulitzer Prize–winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh’s sources, the CIA is behind the deed. Ukraine’s latest behind-the-scenes pressure on Poland suggests Kyiv has more to hide than to reveal. The Eastern European country has long been a key hub for CIA operations.
Indeed, one must ask: why would Ukraine intervene at all, unless it feared what an open extradition to Germany might uncover? Berlin’s prosecutors have hinted that their investigation connects the detained suspect to a wider network tied to Ukrainian intelligence. If that thread were ever pulled, it could expose not just Kyiv’s denials, but also shake the credibility of the entire Western narrative since 2022.
The Polish position is equally telling. Tusk’s refusal to comply with Germany’s request exposes the uneasy balancing act that Poland now faces. On the one hand, it remains a staunch supporter of Ukraine in its proxy war with Russia. On the other, it has domestic political reasons to resist appearing subservient to Berlin — and perhaps also to shield itself from unwanted entanglement in the Nord Stream mystery.
Poland, after all, was one of the loudest voices calling for the pipelines to be dismantled long before the explosions happened. The fact that the blasts occurred in waters close to Denmark and Sweden, yet remains unsolved three years later, is remarkable enough.
The European Union’s silence is thus deafening. While media attention focuses on minor procedural disputes, the larger strategic implications are quietly ignored. The Nord Stream sabotage was no mere act of vandalism — it was a geopolitical earthquake that permanently reshaped Europe’s energy map. By destroying the infrastructure that connected Germany to cheaper Russian gas, someone ensured Europe’s long-term dependence on transatlantic energy imports. It is worth remembering that American officials, including then President Biden himself, had publicly threatened to “end” Nord Stream 2 before the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict even began. That is too much of a coincidence.
In that light, the current Polish-German-Ukraine triangle takes on a new meaning. It reveals the uncomfortable truth that Europe’s supposed allies are now quietly at odds. Germany apparently wants to restore a semblance of legal order by investigating the crime, while Poland wants to preserve its political leverage. Ukraine wants to avoid revelations that could alienate its Western backers. Washington in turn seems content to keep the entire affair buried under layers of confusion and selective leaks.
The deeper irony is that the Nord Stream pipelines were not merely Russian assets — they were European lifelines. Their destruction accelerated deindustrialization and skyrocketed energy prices, while American energy exporters reap the profits. The most obvious suspects remain Washington and Kyiv.
Yet European leaders cling to transatlantic loyalty. Berlin’s alignment with American policy verges on economic self-harm, while Brussels pushes “solidarity” as factories close and households struggle with high energy costs. The result is a Europe that’s strategically adrift and economically weakened — a dynamic that suits Washington.
If this Poland-Germany-Ukraine scandal deepens, it could force a reckoning. Europe will have to confront what everyone avoids: was the Nord Stream sabotage an act of war — and by whom? Until then, diplomacy remains a messy game where allies distrust each other, and truth is sidelined for convenience.
The Nord Stream affair may be remembered not just as sabotage, but as the moment Europe lost its last illusion of autonomy. It could confirm how dependent the continent has become on external powers — even in matters of justice. Politically, this could be as explosive as the pipelines blasts themselves.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
From NATO’s flank to Eurasia’s core: Türkiye’s break with the West begins
By Farhad Ibragimov | RT | October 10, 2025
For decades, Turkish nationalism marched under the NATO flag. But now, one of Türkiye’s most influential right-wing leaders is calling for a turn East – toward Russia and China. His proposal may mark the country’s clearest ideological break with Atlanticism since joining the Alliance.
In September, Türkiye’s political landscape was shaken by a statement that many experts called sensational and potentially transformative. Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a long-time ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan within the People’s Alliance, proposed the establishment of a strategic trilateral alliance involving Türkiye, Russia, and China to counter the “US-Israel evil coalition.”
Bahceli emphasized that such an alliance is “the most suitable option, considering reason, diplomacy, the spirit of politics, geographical conditions, and the strategic environment of the new century.” The proposal extends far beyond the usual nationalist agenda, positioning Türkiye as a player capable of initiating new formats of international cooperation.
To grasp the importance of this statement, we must note the historical context. Turkish pan-Turkism has traditionally been oriented toward the West, and nationalists were seen as staunch defenders of the pro-Atlantic course. In this light, Bahçeli’s call for an alliance with Moscow and Beijing marks a symbolic break from that tradition, reflecting growing distrust toward NATO and the US within Türkiye’s political landscape.
Bahceli’s comments are not random. Over the past few years, he has steadily ramped up his criticism of the West, advocating for Türkiye’s sovereign development “beyond blocs and alliances.” But this is the first time he has explicitly named Russia and China as preferred partners.
Reactions inside Türkiye were mixed. Right-wing circles called Bahceli’s words “revolutionary,” while leftists saw them as confirmation of a broader anti-Western consensus. Internationally, the statement underscored Ankara’s growing distance from Western power centers and its gradual rhetorical shift toward the East and Greater Eurasia.
Shortly afterward, Erdogan made a cautious comment, saying he was “not fully familiar” with Bahceli’s initiative but adding, “Whatever is good, let it happen.” The ambiguity is typical for Erdogan, who avoids publicly rejecting the ideas of key allies while keeping his political options open.
On one hand, the president is wary of provoking open conflict with Western partners, given Türkiye’s economic vulnerabilities. On the other, his comments suggest that Bahçeli’s initiative could serve as leverage – a way to pressure the US and EU by signaling that Ankara might strengthen ties with Moscow and Beijing.
A day later, Bahceli clarified his position, saying, “We know what we are doing. Türkiye should not be the implementer of regional and global projects put forward by others, but rather must be the leading actor of its own unique projects.”
In other words, Bahçeli not only intensified his anti-Western rhetoric but also asserted Türkiye’s claim to be an independent power center in the emerging multipolar world order. His stance reflects the desire of part of Türkiye’s leadership to move from being a peripheral NATO ally to a pioneer of alternative alliances in Eurasia.
From NATO loyalism to Eurasian realism
For decades, Türkiye was one of NATO’s most loyal allies. Since the Cold War, the Turkish elite believed that integration into Euro-Atlantic structures was the only viable strategy. A world order based on American leadership seemed stable and predictable.
Erdogan shared similar views when he first became prime minister in 2002. But as global competition intensified, disagreements with Washington deepened, and multipolar trends gained momentum, he realized that the unipolar system could not last. Türkiye, he concluded, must adapt – and play a role in shaping the new order.
Seen in this light, Bahceli’s proposal is more than nationalist fervor. It reflects an understanding among parts of Türkiye’s leadership that the country’s future lies in greater strategic autonomy and in building ties with alternative centers of power. His words echo those within Erdoğan’s circle who believe Türkiye can assert itself only through closer engagement with Russia and China.
This shift reveals how Türkiye’s elites have moved from trusting the stability of a Western-centric system to recognizing its limits – and searching for new frameworks in which Ankara can act as a key player rather than a subordinate.
Redefining Türkiye’s place in the world
Bahceli’s remarks highlight deep shifts within Turkish nationalist circles and Ankara’s growing readiness to reconsider its global role. He argues that neither China nor Russia is Türkiye’s enemy, despite efforts by Western ideologues to claim otherwise. Instead, he sees the West as the true obstacle – determined to prevent Türkiye from becoming an independent power center and confining it to a role of “watchdog” in the Middle East.
In his latest statement, Bahceli stressed the need for a new strategy:
“We believe that Türkiye, located at the center of Eurasia, which is the strategic focus of the 21st century, should pursue multidimensional and long-term policies aimed at strengthening regional peace and stability and developing cooperation opportunities, especially with countries in the Black Sea and Caspian Basin, including Russia, China, and Iran. Considering the changing and complex structure of international relations, producing permanent and comprehensive solutions to global issues such as terrorism, illegal migration, and climate change is a responsibility that no country can achieve alone.”
Essentially, Bahceli is saying that Türkiye must transcend old constraints and stop being a tool in the hands of external forces. His stance embodies a new paradigm: only through an independent, multilateral, and Eurasian policy can Türkiye become a true architect of regional stability and a major player in the future global order.
The end of oscillation
Türkiye has long oscillated between Atlantic alignment and independent ambition. These cycles rarely evolved into a lasting doctrine. But the current geopolitical environment is forcing Ankara to make a choice.
Economic dependency, regional instability, and Israel’s aggressive behavior – including attacks on Iran and Qatar – have created a sense of urgency. In Ankara, some now fear that Türkiye itself could become a target.
Globally, the old unipolar order is losing balance, and an alliance with Russia and China may offer Türkiye not guarantees, but strategic advantages – especially in securing its autonomy and status as an independent power center.
At the UN General Assembly, US President Donald Trump urged Erdogan to stop buying Russian oil and even floated bringing Türkiye into the anti-Russia sanctions regime. For Ankara, that would mean economic damage and deeper dependence on the West – a risk the leadership is no longer willing to accept.
Bahceli’s initiative, and Erdogan’s carefully measured reaction, mark a pivotal moment. Türkiye is beginning to institutionalize its search for an alternative political philosophy – one grounded in multipolarity, strategic pragmatism, and a redefined vision of its place in the 21st century.
Farhad Ibragimov – lecturer at the Faculty of Economics at RUDN University, visiting lecturer at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Turkiye to boost US gas imports, cut reliance on Iran and Russia
The Cradle | October 9, 2025
Turkiye is moving to cover more than half of its natural gas demand by 2028 through domestic production and increased US liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, decreasing reliance on Iran and Russia, according to analysts cited by Reuters on 8 October.
The plan follows a White House meeting on 25 September, during which US President Donald Trump urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to curb Russian energy purchases, as part of the US push to press allies to scale back ties with both Moscow and Tehran.
Ankara’s strategy centers on expanding LNG terminals and boosting local output through the state-owned energy firm, Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO).
According to Turkiye’s Energy Exchange (EPIAS), the country’s LNG terminals can now import up to 58 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas each year, enough to meet its entire domestic demand.
Domestic production and contracted LNG imports are projected to exceed 26 bcm annually from 2028, compared with 15 bcm this year.
That would account for more than half of Turkiye’s 53 bcm gas demand, sharply reducing its need for Russian and Iranian pipeline supplies.
“Turkiye has been signalling that it will take advantage of the [global] LNG abundance,” said Sohbet Karbuz of the Paris-based Mediterranean Organisation for Energy and Climate (OMEC).
Although Russia remains Turkiye’s largest supplier, its share of the market has fallen from over 60 percent two decades ago to 37 percent in the first half of 2025.
Moscow’s long-term pipeline contracts – covering 22 bcm annually via Blue Stream and TurkStream – are nearing expiry. Iran’s 10 bcm contract ends next year, while Azerbaijan’s 9.5 bcm deals run until 2030 and 2033.
To replace these, Ankara has signed $43 billion worth of LNG agreements with US suppliers, including a 20-year deal with Mercuria in September.
Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said in a recent interview that Turkiye “must source gas from all available suppliers,” which includes Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan, but noted that US LNG offers cheaper alternatives.
Analysts believe Ankara will likely burn Russian and Iranian gas domestically while re-exporting imported LNG and its own output to Europe, where a full ban on Russian energy is expected by 2028.
Turkiye’s state energy company BOTAS has already begun small-volume exports to Hungary and Romania as part of its efforts to become a regional gas hub.
The Mystery of Trump, Ukraine, and Russia
By Jacob G. Hornberger | FFF | September 18, 2025
Hardly anyone in the mainstream press addresses the mystery of how Trump went from what was supposedly a secret agent of the Russians to an ardent opponent of Russia in the Ukraine-Russia war. My hunch is that the commentators in the mainstream press are so excited that Trump has turned pro-Ukraine that they don’t care that they were, not so long ago, accusing him of being a secret agent of Russia.
After all, who can forget the daily refrain during Trump’s first term in office. “Robert Mueller is going to save us!” We had to be subjected to that refrain from both Democrats and the mainstream press for more than a year. The notion was that Trump was, as president of the United States, secretly serving the interests of Russia. Democrats and most of the mainstream press were convinced that Robert Mueller, a lawyer who had been appointed as special counsel to investigate the matter, was going to save us all by concluding that Trump was, in fact, serving as a secret agent of Russia, which would then result in Trump’s removal from office through impeachment.
As we all know, Robert Mueller did not save us because there was nothing to save us from. The entire matter was one great big ridiculous conspiracy theory on the part of the mainstream press and Democrats. After a year of extensive investigation by a huge and very expensive staff of lawyers, Robert Mueller ended up concluding that the allegation was bogus.
Nonetheless, most everyone thought that Trump would do everything possible to establish friendly and peaceful relations with Russia. Such a policy, of course, wouldn’t make him a secret agent of Russia, any more than President Kennedy’s efforts in that direction made him a secret agent of Russia.
Yet in his first term in office, Trump ended up taking a fairly adversarial stand toward Russia. It was reasonable to conclude, however, that one reason he did that was an effort to bend over backwards to show that the secret-agent accusations were entirely bogus.
This time around as president, however, there was nothing that Trump had to prove. During his 2024 campaign, he made it clear that he intended to bring an end to the Ukraine-Russia war as soon as he took office. Of course, the easiest and fastest way to have done that was to immediately cut off all U.S. foreign aid to Ukraine. For a while, it appeared that that was precisely what Trump was going to do. When Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky visited Trump and Vice President Vance in the White House, both of them berated, insulted, humiliated, and dressed down Zelensky in public. Zelensky ended up leaving that meeting with his tail between his legs. Trump even stated that it was Ukraine that had started the war. The message seemed clear — U.S. aid to Ukraine was going to terminate, which would, of course, have been the logical course of action given Trump’s conviction that it was Ukraine that started the war.
However, sometime afterward, Trump did an about-face and began berating Russia and Russian president Vladimir Putin for not doing enough to end the war. He began threatening Putin with more economic sanctions. He made it clear that the U.S. government would continue supporting Ukraine, especially with weaponry. He has also taken an increasingly aggressive position toward Russia and Putin.
The mainstream press treats all this as perfectly normal. I myself find it extremely mysterious. How does a guy who is accused of being a Russian agent go all the way to becoming a Russian adversary? For me, that’s quite a switch.
The following is my opinion as to what has happened to bring about this very radical turnaround. As longtime readers of my blog know, I have long maintained that it is the national-security branch of the federal government — i.e., the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA — that is in charge of the federal government, especially in foreign affairs, and that the other three branches simply operate in support of the national-security branch.
It was the national-security branch that used NATO to successfully provoke Russia into attacking Ukraine. It did that by having NATO, an old relic from the Cold War racket, move eastward toward Russia’s borders knowing full well that Russia would object and ultimately invade Ukraine, after which they could condemn Russia for its “aggression.” The objective was to use a war with Russia to “degrade” Russia, give Russia its own “Afghanistan,” and bring about regime change within Russia. The U.S. would supply the weaponry and cash to Ukraine to accomplish this. It would only be Ukrainian soldiers, not American soldiers, who would be dying and so the American people wouldn’t care about what the national-security branch had done to bring about the war.
What the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA failed to confront was the distinct possibility that Russia would end up winning the war, which would necessarily mean a defeat of the United States. After the deadly 20-year U.S. fiasco war in Afghanistan and the installation of a pro-Iranian regime in the U.S. war of aggression against Iraq, the last thing the national-security branch wants is the humiliation of another military defeat, especially at the hands of Russia — its adversary in its old Cold War racket.
So, it’s my opinion that the national-security establishment has put the squeeze on Trump and made him see how important it is to “national security” that Russia not be permitted to win this war. It is my opinion that Trump has caved in to such pressure, just like Congress and the federal courts have long deferred to the national-security branch. That, to me, is a logical explanation for Trump’s about-face on Russia and also why he no longer heavily emphasizes the need to “drain the swamp” and bring an end to the “deep state.”
NATO eyeing ‘forceful’ response to Russia – FT
RT | October 9, 2025
NATO is considering easing restrictions on pilots to allow them to fire at unauthorized Russian aircraft, and drastically increasing its military footprint on the country’s border, the Financial Times reported on Thursday, citing sources. This comes amid Western claims that Russia violated EU airspace, which Moscow has denied.
Last month, Estonia and Poland claimed that Russian aircraft illegally entered their airspace. Western media has also speculated that Russia may be behind drone incidents in other EU nations, which at times disrupted air traffic. Moscow has said the West has not provided any evidence for the claims.
Several NATO members are now debating “a more forceful response” to Russia, according to the Financial Times.
The reported proposals include arming surveillance drones that currently gather intelligence on Russian military movements and lowering the threshold for fighter pilots on NATO’s eastern border to take down perceived threats. Other options under discussion involve conducting military exercises directly along the Russian border, the report said.
Two NATO officials told the FT that one urgent task is to simplify the rules of engagement, which now differ among member states. Some nations require pilots to visually identify targets before firing, while others permit engagement based on radar data or the perceived direction and speed of an approaching aircraft.
FT sources noted that the talks, initiated by states bordering Russia and backed by France and the UK, later developed into a bloc-wide discussion – which, however, is said to be in the early stages. Some governments reportedly advocate for strong deterrence policies, though others urge restraint to avoid direct confrontation.
The article comes on the heels of last week’s EU summit on creating a ‘drone wall’ to deter alleged Russian incursions, with Politico reporting that the meeting “descended into a familiar stalemate.”
Russia has accused NATO of escalating tensions near its borders through expanded military deployments and exercises. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has also stated that NATO is “de facto at war” with Russia due to the bloc’s support for Ukraine.
US likely already sent new light JLTV ‘Tomahawk’ launchers to Neo-Nazi junta
By Drago Bosnic | October 8, 2025
Supplying the “Tomahawk” cruise missiles to the Kiev regime has been “on the table” for years. The troubled Biden administration never delivered them, despite repeatedly suggesting it would. Interestingly, Donald Trump regularly criticized such moves as escalatory, insisting that the United States shouldn’t be involved and that it’s only antagonizing Russia. Ironically enough, as soon as he took office, this stance changed dramatically. In a matter of weeks, Trump’s initial promise of “ending the war in 24 hours” degenerated into the same sort of belligerent rhetoric (and moves) as during the Biden era. The new US administration increased American involvement, with military sources suggesting that the Pentagon is close to delivering the aforementioned “Tomahawk” missiles.
Worse yet, some claim that this has already happened and that Washington DC even raised the stakes by supplying new light launchers for the US-made cruise missiles. Namely, since 2019, the Pentagon has been acquiring the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), better known as the Oshkosh Light Combat Tactical All-Terrain Vehicle (L-ATV). It was designed to replace the AM General High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), better known as the Humvee. One version of the JLTV has been modified for use by the US Marine Corps (USMC) under the Long Range Fires (LRF) program, designed to launch cruise missiles, specifically the infamous “Tomahawk”. The Pentagon intended to give the USMC similar capabilities to those of the US Army, which has the ground-based “Typhon”.
There’s been some confusion even in the US Congress regarding the official designation for the program, with some documents referring to it as the Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF), while others still use the LRF. Either way, the US military’s ability to use operational and strategic weapons on such a small platform can certainly provide it with a significant advantage in terms of risk mitigation. Namely, because the launcher is essentially a modified JLTV truck that’s now in wide use (well over 20,000 have been delivered so far), it makes it very difficult to detect “Tomahawk” carriers. This enables shoot-and-scoot (sort of like hit-and-run) strikes at targets that are 1,600 km away, although some sources claim that it’s 2,500 km for the latest Block V iteration of the “Tomahawk”.
The latest reports suggest that these cruise missiles have already been delivered to the Neo-Nazi junta forces through the main logistics hub for NATO-occupied Ukraine in Rzeszów, southeastern Poland, and are now waiting for the “zero hour” somewhere in Western Ukraine. The Kiev regime lacks the necessary ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities to effectively use the “Tomahawk” to the maximum, meaning that the US/NATO would need to provide the targeting data. This has already been the case with other Western cruise missiles, most notably the Anglo-French “Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG” and the German “Taurus” (the latter is yet to be officially delivered and deployed). Both types are newer and more advanced than the 1980s-era US-made “Tomahawk”.
However, the aforementioned Block V would certainly give them a run for their money, especially if deployed from the highly mobile JLTV trucks. Its ability to move quickly through heavily forested areas makes it extremely difficult to detect, meaning that it could effectively act as some sort of a single-shot “Iskander-K” (uses the 9M728/R-500, with a range of up to 500 km and the Novator’s 9M729, which Western sources claim has a staggering range of up to 5,500 km). The launcher could instantly deploy at virtually any firing position, while its relatively low cost offers the key advantage in terms of mitigating losses. Military sources report that the US could produce 100-200 such units per month, while the number of missiles supplied in each batch can reach over 500 units.
In other words, such a mass production would make it a much bigger challenge than the expensive and overhyped Western European missiles that the United Kingdom, France and Germany can produce in single or double digits, at best. Obviously, this is not to say that the Russian military could be defeated solely with the use of “Tomahawks”, but it could certainly complicate logistics and other operations far behind the immediate frontline. The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and its surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have accumulated extensive experience in countering various types of missiles and drones; however, the mass deployment of different kinds of cruise missiles can pose a significant challenge. Namely, Russia is the largest country on the planet, making it extremely difficult to defend all of its territory.
Thus, the aviation, air defenses and ISR assets will need to work together and closely coordinate their actions in order to defend the most critically important areas (military-industrial facilities, bridges, thermal and nuclear power plants, substations, etc). A&WAC (airborne early warning and control) aircraft such as the A-50U will play a crucial role in this, as they can detect and track very low-flying cruise missiles. The sheer range of the “Tomahawk” puts virtually all of European Russia within striking distance, while the Block V expands that well into Western Siberia, putting even ICBM fields in jeopardy, including the Dombarovsky Red Banner Division of the 31st Missile Army of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN). This unit is armed with the monstrously destructive R-36M2 “Voyevoda” ICBMs (and likely the RS-28 “Sarmat”).
These missiles are also capable of deploying the Yu-71/74 “Avangard” HGVs (hypersonic glide vehicles), the world’s most advanced hypersonic weapon. The US calculus is pretty clear – deploying these missiles in NATO-occupied Ukraine puts Russia into an incredibly dangerous strategic position. It’s very similar to the geopolitical impact of having “Tomahawk” missiles permanently deployed in the Philippines and Japan, as these put Beijing and most major Chinese cities in range.
Thus, America has the capacity to strike both (Eur)Asian giants with medium-range weapons, while the two can only respond with their strategic arsenals. Although this effectively gives Washington DC the ability to dictate the pace of potential escalation, it still makes the world a far more dangerous place, forcing Moscow and Beijing to contemplate immediate strategic retaliation in order to defend themselves.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.
Russia ratifies military deal with Cuba amid US escalation
Al Mayadeen | October 8, 2025
Russia’s Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, ratified an intergovernmental agreement on military cooperation with Cuba on Wednesday, formalizing a framework for strengthened defense collaboration between the two nations.
Legal framework for bilateral cooperation
The explanatory note accompanying the draft highlighted that ratification will facilitate the development and expansion of military cooperation, provide the necessary legal basis to define objectives, directions, and forms of collaboration, and ensure the protection of Russian personnel operating in Cuba from local jurisdiction.
The agreement allows both nations to coordinate military activities while safeguarding the interests of their personnel and national security objectives. It is worth noting that the agreement was originally signed in March 2025.
Moscow’s response to US threats
Military expert Alexander Stepanov, from the Institute of Law and National Security at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, told TASS that the ratification represents a symmetrical response to Washington’s threats to supply Tomahawk cruise missiles to the Kiev government.
“This is about a symmetrical response to the potential supply of Tomahawks,” Stepanov explained.
“The ratified agreement maximally expands our military cooperation and allows, within the framework of bilateral interaction and in coordination with the government of the Republic of Cuba, to deploy virtually any offensive systems on the island’s territory.”
Strategic implications
The move comes amid heightened tensions over US plans to enforce Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Moscow has warned that supplying Tomahawk missiles would represent a new level of escalation, prompting Russia to secure its strategic interests and regional alliances.
Earlier on Thursday, US President Donald Trump signaled a tougher stance toward Moscow, declaring that Washington would “get Russia taken care of somehow” as part of efforts to end the ongoing war in Ukraine. His remarks, delivered in an interview with One America News Network, come amid a deepening stalemate in peace talks between Moscow and Kiev.
“We’ll get Russia taken care of somehow. We’re going to get that [conflict done],” Trump said, suggesting a shift toward a more assertive US posture as the conflict enters a new and volatile phase.
‘Our goal should not be to defeat Russia, but to end the war,’ says Slovak PM Fico
By Thomas Brooke | Remix News | October 6, 2025
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has again denounced the European Union’s handling of the war in Ukraine, declaring that Slovakia’s goal is not Russia’s defeat but peace between “Slavs killing each other.”
Speaking during a televised discussion marking the 81st anniversary of the Battle of the Dukla Pass, Fico said that “the war could have ended three months after it started,” accusing Western powers of prolonging the conflict to fight Russia indirectly.
“War is no solution. If the EU had spent as much energy on peace as it does on supporting the war in Ukraine, the war could have ended long ago. I will never be a wartime prime minister,” Fico said, insisting that if Slovaks wanted such a leader, “they should elect someone else.”
The prime minister added that he would “never allow Slovakia to be dragged into any war adventure,” citing “no moral, historical, or legal reasons” for the country to become involved in the conflict.
“It is not our war,” he said. “It is a regional conflict with historical roots. Why should Slovakia talk about war now?”
Fico also dismissed recent EU discussions on creating an anti-drone defense wall along the bloc’s eastern flank. “Let the experts talk about it. What can a prime minister who has never fired a gun say about drone protection? That is an expert question,” he remarked.
He also confirmed that a new round of talks between the Slovak and Ukrainian governments would take place in Michalovce on Oct. 17.
Marking the wartime commemoration, Fico warned against what he described as historical amnesia, saying that Europe was “forbidding” celebrations of the end of World War II and dismantling Red Army monuments. “We have to talk about what the hell is happening today,” he said, condemning leaders who “speak so lightly about war” and “talk about defeating Russia” without recalling “the terrible suffering” of past generations.
Fico’s comments are in sharp contrast to those made last week by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who told the Warsaw Security Forum that the Ukraine war is “our war.” Tusk described it as “central to Europe’s security and values,” warning that “if we lose this war, the consequences will affect not only our generation but also the next generations in Poland, all of Europe, in the United States, everywhere in the world.”
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán swiftly rebuked Tusk, posting on X: “Dear Donald Tusk, you may think that you are at war with Russia, but Hungary is not. Neither is the European Union. You are playing a dangerous game with the lives and security of millions of Europeans.”
The divide highlights the deep fracture running through Central Europe’s response to the conflict. Orbán and Fico, both critical of EU sanctions and weapons deliveries, have positioned themselves as advocates for an immediate ceasefire and negotiations with Moscow.
They have also acquired a new ally over the weekend in Prague after Andrej Babiš’s ANO movement won national elections, leaving Tusk isolated within the Visegrád Group.
Babiš has pledged to withdraw from a Czech-led initiative to procure artillery shells for Ukraine and declared that Kyiv is “not ready” for EU membership. “We have to end the war first,” Babiš told a Ukrainian journalist. “Of course, we can cooperate with Ukraine. But you are not ready for the EU.”
Ukrainian drone targets nuclear plant inside Russia – operator
RT | October 7, 2025
A Ukrainian drone has targeted a nuclear power station in Russia’s Voronezh Region overnight, Rosenergoatom, a state-run company which operates the country’s nuclear power plants, has said.
The UAV hit a cooling tower of the sixth power-generating unit at the Novovoronezh NPP after being diverted by electronic warfare means, the company said in a statement on Telegram on Tuesday.
There was no damage or injuries as a result of the incident, the statement read. A dark mark was left in the spot where the drone struck the tower, it added.
The attack did not affect the operations of the station, with the radiation level on site remaining unchanged and corresponding to natural levels, Rosenergoatom said.
“This is yet another act of aggression by the Ukrainian military against the Russian nuclear power plants. Previously, it had attempted attacks against the main facilities of the Kursk and Smolensk Nuclear Power Plants,” the company stated.
How a low-key remark by Putin reveals a deeper economic shift
By Henry Johnston | RT | October 3, 2025
During his Valdai speech on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin made the following rather dry statement:
“It’s impossible to imagine that a drop in Russian oil production will maintain normal conditions in the global energy sector and the global economy.”
It certainly wasn’t the highlight of the night, and I haven’t seen it in the headlines of any of the recaps. The statement is, of course, true. Putin is in a sense saying: “you can’t kick us out.”
But let’s unpack this a bit and try to get a bird’s eye view of what this mundane statement implies in a much deeper sense – not in the sense of counting barrels of oil and the Brent price, but in terms of understanding the shifting tectonic plates.
Let’s first imagine what a Western leader might have said in the same tone, circa January 2022.
“It’s impossible to imagine that a country that loses access to dollars and Western capital markets will maintain normal economic conditions.” I don’t know if anybody actually said such a thing in as many words, but that’s exactly what many were thinking.
Now, recall the G10 Rome meetings in late 1971, as the Bretton Woods-established gold peg of the dollar was being dismantled, when US Treasury Secretary John Connally famously told his European counterparts: “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.” It is an oft-cited instance of American hubris.
In other words, despite its global use in trade and finance, the dollar would be managed for American economic interests.
When the collective West placed what were supposed to be crushing sanctions on Russia in 2022 in light of the Ukraine crisis, the idea was, again, “our currency (system), your problem.”
The message: the dollar will be managed for American geopolitical interests.
According to the conventional thinking, being cut off from the dollar system should have spelt doom for Russia. The many forecasters predicting exactly such a dire outcome weren’t necessarily simply Russophobes. They were working within a certain paradigm. Without access to its now frozen central-bank reserves, how would Russia stabilize the ruble? Without access to correspondent banking in dollars/euros, how would trade be settled? And without access to foreign capital markets, wouldn’t a funding crisis ensue? This type of thinking gave rise to these types of comments:
“We will provoke the collapse of the Russian economy,” in the words of French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire about ten days into the war.
But the Russian economy didn’t collapse and in fact stabilized far faster than anyone expected. The thing is Russian oil and gas was still needed. And those who thought they didn’t need it (read the EU) found out the hard way that they did – even if the Europeans obscured the ramifications as much as possible through large fiscal support and subsidies. But it is no coincidence that ‘deindustrialization’ has become a household word in Europe. And somehow the political will to really clamp down hard on Russian energy never seems to materialize.
All of a sudden we have, from a Russian perspective: “Our commodities, your problem.”
The question now is: does this mean we’ve suddenly awoken to a strange new world? Are we now in a system where access to real things (like commodities) now trumps access to paper promises (like dollars)? Western policymakers’ futile attempts to cut Russian energy out of the world economy show that they understand only the monetary side of things. They see energy as a source of revenue for the Russian state – revenues thanks to which Russia is able to sustain its war effort. That the economy might actually fundamentally be an energy system and not a monetary system is incomprehensible to them. It is, in the strict Kuhnian sense, a different paradigm.
The BRICS countries talk a lot about a monetary reset being underway and about how new financial architecture is being created. It is fair to say that some of this rhetoric has been premature and that reports of the demise of the dollar system have been overstated. There have been a lot of checks written that BRICS and the Global South aren’t ready to cash.
Nevertheless, change is afoot, and what is taking shape has roughly the following contours: commodities are beginning, at the margins, to act as system-level collateral. By contrast, up to now, the system relied on trust in the issuer of paper claims (dollars, US Treasuries, euro-denominated assets). Gold accumulation by central banks has been massive – it is a quiet de-dollarization of reserves. Oil-for-yuan deals are modest but growing. And what can the commodity seller do with the yuan it receives? Convert it to gold on the Shanghai Gold Exchange. This may not yet be widespread, but the plumbing is there.
The anchor is shifting from debt claims to real assets – and this is bad news for countries whose economies are perched precariously atop a mountain of debt claims. Think of this as part hedge against Western sanctions and weaponization of the system, and part recognition that commodities have intrinsic durability that paper claims can’t always guarantee.
Ultimately, of course, paper promises can be inflated. It’s not lost on anybody in the Global South that the dollar is down some 111% against gold in just two years and that US debt seems to be spiraling to infinity.
If the current system is one where money, credit, and financial assets are king, this means the constraints in this system are money-related. The crises tend to start with something like a spread blowing out, liquidity drying up, or collateral chains breaking. This is basically a money problem, not a real-economy problem. Remember the 1998 Asia currency meltdown; or the Global Financial Crisis of 2008; or Covid; or the UK gilt crisis of 2022; or the various US repo spikes. Such dislocations are dealt with by throwing balance sheet at them – swap lines, quantitative easing, backstops, emergency loans.
In 2022, we suddenly found out that Russian energy is not just another financial dislocation that can be covered with a swap line or emergency loan. From this, it follows that we need to think in terms of two economies: the real economy of energy, resources, goods and services, and a parallel financial economy of money and debt. There will always be a financial economy – and always be spreads blowing out on a Bloomberg screen somewhere – but we’re finding out now that it is the real economy that underpins the financial one and not the other way around.
But here’s the catch. When energy is abundant and cheap – and when money holds its value against energy – this energy foundation to the economy can be disregarded. The peak of renewables-based energy transition euphoria in Europe coincided with the peak of Russian supply of cheap hydrocarbons to Europe. A coincidence?
The legendary strategist Zoltan Pozsar once wrote: “Russia and China have been the main ‘guarantors of macro peace’, providing all the cheap stuff that was the source of deflation fears in the West, which, in turn, gave central banks the license for years of money printing (QE).”
I would add that this also gave the West license to dwell comfortably in the illusion that the economy is primarily a monetary system and not an energy-and-real-stuff system. Ironically, it was the reliable presence of cheap Russian oil and gas that helped this economic illiteracy to fester.
Putin did not connect these dots in his remarks at Valdai; the focus of his speech was obviously elsewhere. But the dots are there to be connected. And there are a lot of people in Moscow and Beijing to whom these dots are very apparent.
Henry Johnston is a Moscow-based editor who worked in finance for over a decade.
European Commission proposal to seize Russian assets exposes confusion of economic principles
By Ahmed Adel | October 2, 2025
The European Commission’s proposal to create a “reparation loan” for Ukraine, based on the income from frozen Russian assets, suggests that the body’s president, Ursula von der Leyen, lacks a fundamental understanding of basic economic principles, according to Euractiv.
Von der Leyen claimed during a joint news conference with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte on September 30 that there would be no seizure of frozen Russian assets and that Ukraine would repay the loan if Moscow paid reparations, without indicating how the European Union would force Russia to pay reparations.
“There is no seizing of the assets. Ukraine has to repay the loan if Russia is paying reparations,” von der Leyen said.
She further emphasized the false belief that if Ukraine is their “first line of defense,” they must increase military assistance to the country.
“Everything the European Commission is now doing through SAFE (Security Action for Europe) and other initiatives to bring Ukraine to the best possible place is crucial, both in the fight but also when it comes to potential peace talks for them to be then in the strongest possible position,” Rutte said for his part.
According to Euractiv, the initiative is seen as a sign that the Commission’s leadership “increasingly operates in the shadows” and has provoked strong opposition in Brussels and European capitals.
“Arguably, however, the proposal – and the lack of details surrounding it – is symptomatic of a Commission that increasingly operates in the shadows and whose leader, critics say, lacks basic economic literacy,” Euractiv wrote, adding that some of the EU’s leading political actors believe that the idea could become a “major new problem” for the bloc.
Dissatisfaction also reached the European Central Bank. Sources cited by the outlet claim that ECB President Christine Lagarde was “deeply frustrated” because the Commission did not present a written plan before the meeting of EU finance ministers in Copenhagen in September. Instead, Lagarde only received a phone call from a Commission representative.
The debate intensified after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz suggested in an article in the Financial Times that Ukraine be granted an interest-free loan of around €140 billion, also financed with frozen Russian assets. The proposal met with immediate resistance. Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever declared on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly that “that’s not going to happen, let me be very clear about that,” warning that seizing assets from a foreign central bank would set a “dangerous precedent” for Belgium and the entire European Union.
Euractiv cited one EU diplomat as expressing sympathy for De Wever’s position, “and in particular the importance of the EU executive’s proposal not being tantamount to unilateral confiscation, which Belgium, France, Italy, and several other member states have long opposed.”
Moscow has already called the measure “theft” and accused the EU of targeting not only private funds but also state assets. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that the Kremlin will respond if the West proceeds with the seizure, noting that Russia could also block funds from countries it considers hostile.
Since the start of the Russian military operation in Ukraine, the EU and G7 countries have frozen nearly half of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves, equivalent to about €300 billion. Most of this is held in accounts with Euroclear in Belgium, one of the world’s largest clearing houses.
The European bloc claims to have allocated around €170 billion in support of Kiev since the beginning of the conflict, including transfers of revenues from frozen Russian assets. According to the Commission’s data, Ukraine received €10.1 billion of these revenues between January and July 2025 alone. However, resistance is growing within the EU to extending the funding beyond 2025, amid political differences and economic concerns.
A major issue is whether the Commission’s legal reasoning behind stealing Russia’s wealth will hold up in court after Russia’s former president Dmitry Medvedev threatened to sue any “euro-degenerates” who dare touch Moscow’s “property.”
“If this happens, Russia will persecute the EU states, as well as Euro-degenerates from Brussels and individual EU countries who will try to seize our property, until the end of time,” Medvedev wrote on Telegram.
Russia would pursue them in “all possible international and national courts … and in some cases, extrajudicially,” the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia added.
Another major issue is whether Brussels can use a statement by EU leaders from December 2024 to change the sanctions approval rules from unanimity to a qualified majority, thereby excluding Slovakia and Hungary from the decision-making process, as they resist the Commission’s proposal to seize Russian wealth for Ukraine’s use.
Although it appears that the EU is determined to steal Russia’s wealth for Ukraine’s use, there are a lot of roadblocks with no guarantee that they will be overcome. If the Commission is successful, it will have effectively sealed Europe’s fate as a safe location for countries to bank their wealth, and thereby do long-term damage, just as the anti-Russia sanctions have boomeranged. For this reason, resistance within the EU will remain dogged.
Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

Traditional food was food. Not organic food. Not slow food. Not wellness food. Food. Bone broth was food. Raw milk was food. Fermented vegetables were food. Butter was food. Eggs were food. Honey was food. Liver was food.