Pakistan, the Gulf, and the high cost of Zionist alignment
By Junaid S. Ahmad | MEMO | January 6, 2026
Geopolitics is most dangerous not when it erupts, but when it reorganises quietly — when the ground shifts beneath familiar alliances while elites continue to speak the language of yesterday. The Gulf today is in precisely such a moment. What once masqueraded as a coherent bloc has fractured into rival power models, incompatible strategic visions, and diverging relationships to empire, Israel, and popular legitimacy. And Pakistan, true to form, is responding not with strategic intelligence but with institutional reflex — confusing obedience with balance and habit with foresight.
The rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is no longer a matter of speculation or diplomatic gossip. It is an open contradiction — political, military, and infrastructural. Yemen has exposed it. Israel has radicalised it. The United States, particularly under Trumpism, has weaponised it. And Pakistan’s ruling elite — military and civilian alike — has chosen to drift toward the most toxic pole of this fracture while reassuring itself that it is merely being “pragmatic.” It is not. It is being complicit.
Two Gulf projects, one moral abyss
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are still lazily grouped together by analysts who mistake shared authoritarianism for shared strategy. This is intellectual malpractice. The two monarchies are pursuing fundamentally different regional projects.
Saudi Arabia’s current posture — hardly virtuous, often cynical, and deeply reactionary — nevertheless reflects a begrudging recognition of reality. After years of disastrous interventionism, Riyadh wants consolidation. It wants borders quieted, fires contained, and regional fragmentation slowed. Its outreach to Iran, cautious engagement with the
Houthis, and growing hostility to separatist militias are not gestures of enlightenment but acts of self-preservation. Endless chaos undermines Saudi ambitions at home.
The Emirati project is the opposite — and far more dangerous. Abu Dhabi does not seek order through states; it seeks domination through fragments. Ports, islands, militias, mercenaries, logistics corridors, surveillance hubs — these are its tools. Sovereignty is irrelevant. Fragmentation is not a failure; it is a business model.
If Saudi Arabia is a reactionary status-quo power, the UAE is a hyperactive destabiliser — an empire of nodes, happy to burn regions so long as trade flows and leverage compounds.
Yemen: Where the lie finally died
Yemen is where the fiction of Gulf unity collapsed beyond repair. What began as a joint intervention has devolved into a struggle over whether Yemen will exist at all as a state. The House of Saud — bloodied, embarrassed, and exposed — now insists on a unified Yemeni authority capable of enforcing borders and agreements. The UAE has invested
instead in carving out a southern enclave: separatist militias, port control, island bases, and economic chokeholds.
For Riyadh, this is existential. A fragmented Yemen exports instability directly into Saudi territory and sabotages any negotiated settlement with the Houthis. For Abu Dhabi, fragmentation is leverage — control of chokepoints matters more than Yemen’s survival as a polity.
That Saudi Arabia has now openly bombed weapons shipments linked to UAE-backed forces and issued public warnings is extraordinary. Gulf disputes are traditionally smothered in silence. When they go kinetic and public, it signals not a spat but a structural rupture. Pakistan’s establishment sees this — and chooses denial.
Israel: The cancer at the core
To understand the Emirati recklessness, one must confront the real axis around which it revolves: Apartheid, genocidal Israel.
The Abraham Accords were not peace agreements; they were an integration pact into Zionist regional supremacy. Israel does not merely occupy Palestine; it exports a model — militarised impunity, surveillance capitalism, permanent war dressed as security. The UAE did not normalize with Israel reluctantly. It embraced Israel as a force multiplier.
Israel provides Abu Dhabi with access to Washington’s coercive machinery, advanced surveillance, cyberwarfare, and a propaganda ecosystem that converts mass death into “stability.” In return, the UAE provides geography, ports, islands, mercenaries, and political insulation — doing Israel’s dirty work where Tel Aviv prefers not to appear.
Sudan. Somaliland. Socotra. Cyprus. The Red Sea. These are not isolated projects; they are components of a Zionist–Emirati expansion strategy designed to insulate Israel from economic pressure and accountability while strangling any resistance corridor before it matures.
Israel is the disease. The UAE is its most enthusiastic carrier.
Pakistan’s elite: Zionism in uniform and suits
Pakistan’s tragedy is not that it lacks options. It is that its ruling elite lacks dignity.
Rather than reassess its position amid this fracture, Pakistan’s military–civilian elite clings to the rhetoric of “balance” while deepening structural entanglement with the Emirati–Israeli axis. Ports, airports, logistics terminals, military-linked corporations — these are not neutral investments. They are instruments of alignment.
Pakistan’s generals and their civilian accessories imagine they are playing geopolitics. In reality, they are being used as infrastructure — cheap, deniable, disposable. Their behaviour is not naïveté. It is covert Zionism: collaboration without confession, obedience without ideological honesty. They mouth solidarity with Palestine while embedding Pakistan’s economy and security apparatus deeper into a regional order built to protect Israel from consequences. This is not pragmatism. It is moral and strategic bankruptcy.
Venezuela: When empire drops the mask
The illusion that empire prefers subtlety should have died long ago. Venezuela put the lie to it.
When sanctions failed and proxy pressure proved insufficient, the United States escalated —directly. US special forces were involved in a scandalous operation that culminated in the kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. This was not deniable proxy warfare. It was naked imperial contempt for sovereignty.
And what happens if Washington’s decapitation move fails at complete regime change in Caracas? Silence. Zero accountability. Empire simply moves on.
This is the future Pakistan’s elite is courting. When alignment fails to deliver stability, the costs will not be borne by Washington, Tel Aviv, or Abu Dhabi. They will be borne by Pakistan. Empire does not protect collaborators. It discards them.
Saudi Arabia: A lesser evil, still an evil
Saudi Arabia deserves no absolution. The House of Saud remains a reactionary monarchy, structurally hostile to popular sovereignty and deeply entangled with empire. Its version of “stability” is still oppression — merely quieter than the Emirati inferno.
Yet the difference matters. Saudi Arabia understands that Zionist expansionism generates perpetual instability. The UAE celebrates it. Riyadh conceals its servitude; Abu Dhabi flaunts it.
Pakistan’s elite has chosen to tilt slightly more towards the louder master.
Trumpism: Empire without shame
Hovering over this landscape is Trumpism — the ideological nakedness of empire. Trump dispenses with liberal hypocrisy entirely. Loyalty is transactional. Morality is a joke. Strongmen are preferred to institutions. Israel is sacred. Everyone else is expendable.
The UAE fits this worldview perfectly: ruthless, efficient, unburdened by public opinion. Pakistan’s rulers mistake proximity to this axis for relevance. In truth, it entrenches their subordination.
When things go wrong — as they inevitably will — Trumpism will shrug. Pakistan will bleed.
The reckoning Pakistan is avoiding
The Gulf is not merely fracturing; it is sorting. States will be forced to choose — between sovereignty and fragmentation, between justice and normalisation, between dignity and managed submission.
Pakistan’s establishment has already chosen. It just lacks the courage to admit it. History will not judge Pakistan for failing to be the Mafia Don of West Asia. It will judge it for failing to recognise a moral and strategic crossroads when it stood directly upon it.
The UAE will continue to burn regions in service of Zionism. Israel will continue its genocidal project. The United States will continue to kidnap, sanction, and discard. Saudi Arabia will continue to pretend restraint equals virtue.
And Pakistan — unless it breaks from habit — will continue confusing servitude for strategy.
Proxy Regime: Understanding the UAE-Israeli Conspiracy in Yemen, Saudi Arabia
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | January 2, 2026
The reason why the recent feud between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen is important is that it paves the way to a totally different reality on the ground.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia were once viewed as a unified power in Yemen; any semblance of such an alliance is now crumbling. As Riyadh and Abu Dhabi remain at loggerheads, it is clear that Tel Aviv is a key driver of the escalation across Yemeni territory.
Saudi Arabia had recently released a sternly worded statement condemning their Gulf neighbors in the United Arab Emirates, following the armed takeover of the Hadramaut and al-Mahra provinces by the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces. Saudi airstrikes were also launched, largely on soft targets as a warning, which prompted the UAE to announce the withdrawal of all its forces from the country.
The war in Yemen is one of the most underreported and misrepresented conflicts in the region, which often makes it difficult to decipher what is truly transpiring. What is important to understand here is that Abu Dhabi’s role inside Yemen is in large part driven by Israeli interests, which will not only potentially lead to blowback against the UAE itself, but also aims to destabilize the entire Arabian Peninsula. This is part and parcel of forging a way forward toward the “Greater Israel Project”.
The reason why the recent feud between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Yemen is important is that it paves the way to a totally different reality on the ground. In 2015, the Ansarallah movement took over the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and received the backing of roughly two-thirds of the nation’s armed forces in doing so.
As a revolutionary Islamic movement, Ansarallah’s seizure of power was interpreted as an immediate challenge to the rulers across Arabia. Considering the long history of violence between Yemen and Saudi Arabia in particular, it was no surprise that tensions immediately rose. Yet, the Saudi-led coalition that initiated the war on Yemen to overthrow the newly ushered in Ansarallah leadership (often incorrectly referred to as “the Houthis”), was not driven by its own interests alone.
In fact, the US, UK, and Israel were in the picture from the very start and it was former American President Barack Obama who gave the green light for the war, which eventually resulted in the deaths of around 400,000 people. Saudi Arabia, for its part, decided to back the deposed president of Yemen, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, using his position and control over what is called the “internationally recognized government” of Yemen as its excuse for legitimacy for action inside the country.
The United Arab Emirates had instead thrown its weight behind southern separatists in Yemen’s south, with the goal of securing the strategic port city of Aden. Prior to 1990, Yemen was divided between north and south, yet there has always been the presence of separatist elements there. Without delving into the nation’s long history, the British had strategically occupied southern Yemen, utilizing the strategic port of Aden as a tool of empire; the UAE clearly sees the geostrategic weight of this location also.
After years of horrifying war, mass starvation due to the Saudi-US-imposed blockade, and a situation that began to come to a stalemate, by early 2022 Yemen’s Ansarallah-led government had not only established a strong, rooted rule, but the Yemeni Armed Forces under its command had clearly made breakthroughs in military technology. It had launched devastating long-range drone and missile attacks against not only Saudi Arabia, but also the UAE, even making a point of striking the Emiratis while Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited.
It wasn’t long until a ceasefire was reached, brokered by the United Nations, one that has largely held until now. Following the ceasefire, in April of 2022, the Saudi government created what is known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). The PLC’s leader, sometimes referred to as the internationally recognized president of Yemen, is a man named Rashad al-Alimi, presiding over an eight-member council that is not elected by the Yemeni people.
The PLC, or “internationally recognized government,” was then based in Aden, and three of its seats were granted to members of the Emirati proxy group called the STC, the separatist militia that Abu Dhabi backed to seize Aden. Despite promising prosperity to the people in southern Yemen and not being under the same sanctions as Ansarallah’s government in Sana’a, the living conditions in the south continued to deteriorate and have since led to countless protests and even riots.
In early December, the STC suddenly swept over the eastern provinces of al-Mahra and Hadramaut, even forcing some Saudi-backed PLC officials to flee Aden. The Emirati proxy separatists have since openly declared their intent to divide Yemen and separate southern Yemen from the north, which is controlled by Ansarallah. This takeover meant that some 80% of the country’s oil resources fell into the hands of the Emirati-backed STC.
The takeover of these provinces also proved a massive threat to both Saudi and Omani security in the eyes of their leadership. The primary armed faction that fights for the southern separatist cause is called the “Southern Giants Brigades”, a large element of which are Salafist extremists, with former Al-Qaeda fighters forming the most experienced core of the militant organization.
Just as the UAE has been backing ISIS-linked gangs in the Gaza Strip to fight Hamas, it utilizes Salafist extremists in Yemen to fight its battles for it also. Evidently, such a powerful militia force is viewed rightly as a threat to regional stability.
Riyadh saw these recent developments as a major challenge to its regional project and stability. Not only because of the potential issues along its border, but also the birth of a new reality on the ground inside Yemen that will further weaken the “internationally recognized government” that they back.
If the UAE’s proxy forces succeed, despite the Emiratis withdrawing their own forces, then the STC will push for separation and undermine the Saudis’ role entirely. There is also a good chance that the Emirati proxy forces will launch an offensive aimed at seizing the Red Sea port city of Hodeidah from Ansarallah. Israel was seeking this outcome in early 2025, when it convinced the Trump administration to fight Ansarallah on its behalf, an attack which resulted in a resounding failure.
The Israelis not only maintain close ties with the Emirati-backed STC but have also directly participated in training their forces. Israel and the UAE have also established joint military positions in areas of Yemen, like the island of Socotra.
Recently, Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland as a nation. Little attention has been paid to the fact that the UAE has quietly recognized Somaliland also; in fact, the UAE-Israeli cooperation and support for the separatist movement in Somalia goes well beyond recognition.
The Somaliland connection is key here. Some analysts have mentioned the value of the Berbera Port area to Israel and focused on the Israeli desire to build a military presence there for the sake of attacking Yemen. While this is true, it was actually the UAE that began to build the Berbera airbase in Somaliland back in 2017 and has invested greatly in establishing a military foothold there.
The UAE-Israeli alliance to establish dominance in North Africa and the Horn of Africa is directly tied to Yemen. So much so that the Emiratis used militants from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—who are currently carrying out genocidal acts against the people of their own country—to fight in Yemen against Ansarallah.
All of this being said, if the UAE proxy forces succeed, it will certainly prove a major issue and lead to enormous bloodshed, yet the STC will not likely defeat Ansarallah, even with high-altitude air support provided by Israel. In fact, once Saudi Arabia is effectively out of the picture, Ansarallah will have one primary enemy to confront with full force: the United Arab Emirates.
The UAE, unlike Saudi Arabia, is a tiny country that is primarily made up of immigrants and foreign workers; it does not have a capable military, despite its Hollywood-style parades that it uses to try and demonstrate this. A sustained missile and drone attack campaign from the Yemeni Armed Forces will very likely be enough to force the UAE to wave the white flag.
Even if some kind of agreement is eventually reached as a result of the UAE being battered into submission—one that does not bring about an Ansarallah takeover that unifies the country—the Saudis will end up having to sign an agreement with Sana’a to properly end the conflict.
Riyadh understood this all well, which is why it quickly acted to draw red lines. It is more in Saudi Arabia’s interests to keep the status quo for now, because the UAE’s moves could end up creating a nightmare situation for it in the future. Saudi Arabia does not want a strong, unified Yemen under the control of Ansarallah; it will only accept a Yemeni leadership that bows to it, and like past Yemeni governments, bows to the West, while refusing to utilize the nation’s immense resource wealth and harness the power of its location.
Israel, on the other hand, most certainly will not accept a united Yemen under Ansarallah’s rule, but is adamant about “making them pay” for daring to impose a Red Sea blockade and fight in defense of Gaza. Therefore, the Israelis are willing to work with the UAE to totally destabilize the region in order to take a stab at dealing a major blow to Ansarallah and asserting their dominance.
It is unclear where exactly this is all heading, but it is possible that we may eventually see a drastic change in the situation on the ground, one which will perhaps lead to Saudi Arabia adopting a different posture toward the UAE altogether. It also appears that Tel Aviv is angry about Riyadh refusing to normalize ties, which could well have factored into this latest move. It is important to consider that the Emiratis will not move a fingernail without Israeli approval in this regard; they are, in essence, a proxy regime of Tel Aviv at this point.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Israeli-UAE Aggression In Yemen Could Backfire Enormously
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle |December 26, 2025
Although the Yemeni Armed Forces have halted their ballistic missile and drone attacks against Israel, adhering to the Gaza ceasefire, officials in Tel Aviv are continuing to insist that their front against Sana’a is not over.
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has been busy seizing territory from Saudi-backed forces and signalling an intent to declare southern Yemen’s independence. Far from simply domestic disputes between armed groups, these developments will have major regional implications.
On December 3, the STC seized Hadramout province from forces aligned with Saudi Arabia, followed by a takeover of al-Mahra province. The UAE-backed separatists even went a step further, with a number of officials declaring their intent to break away and declare southern Yemen an independent state.
For context here, the UAE and Saudi proxies in Yemen were operating a joint governing body out of southern Yemen’s port city of Aden. For years, the Saudi-led coalition had attempted to prop up deposed Yemeni President, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, with the backing of the US, UK, and Israel. Hadi was therefore referred to as the “internationally recognised” leader of the Yemeni State, when in reality he had no such power.
Despite the glaringly obvious fact that Ansarallah had set up and was operating a government in the nation’s capital, enjoying a lot of popular support, the United Nations continued to play along with the West’s demands to recognise Saudi’s puppet proxy regime. In 2022, Riyadh then created what is known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which was endowed with the powers of the Presidency and serves as the “internationally recognised government”.
The head of the PLC is a man named Rashad al-Alimi, who is an unelected leader and is part of the eight-member body. As of May 2023, three of the eight seats in the PLC were handed to officials belonging to the UAE-backed STC, which recently ran Saudi-backed officials out of Aden.
The STC’s recent territorial gains have posed an active security threat to Saudi Arabia and Oman, deepening the ongoing feud between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The UAE, for its part, also appears to have been sizing up an offensive campaign against Ansarallah at some stage, as it acts in coordination with the Israelis.
The recent developments in Yemen have triggered anxiety amongst Zionist analysts in Washington, as they see a UAE-Saudi conflict in Yemen between their proxies as detrimental to the fight against Ansarallah in Sana’a. In line with this way of thinking, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) recently published a Policy Analysis piece arguing that such a UAE-Saudi conflict should be avoided and instead both should focus on Ansarallah.
It is clear that the primary goal of the Israelis is to see their Emirati allies use the STC to try and seize the port city of Hodeidah, thus securing dominance over the Red Sea. This is important to Tel Aviv as it means weakening the Yemeni Armed Forces and preventing them from being able to effectively impose a blockade on their ships. Israel even pushed the Trump administration to launch a war in Yemen for over a month in an attempt to break the blockade in the Red Sea, which resulted in resounding failure.
The Zionist think-tank WINEP has warned that any conflict between Saudi proxies and Emirati proxies could open the door for Ansarallah’s forces to seize the oil-rich region of Marib, a major catastrophe for the Israelis and Americans. Yet, so far, no UAE-Saudi understandings appear to have come about to find any solution to their competition in Yemen.
Instead, the major agreement that was just brokered came between the Yemeni government in Sana’a and Saudi Arabia, the largest prisoner exchange deal since the beginning of the war. This meant agreeing upon the release of 1,700 Ansarallah detainees in exchange for 1,200 opposition prisoners.
Another important clarification is that the Ansarallah government is often labelled “the Houthis” in the Western media, and the Saudi proxy opposition is called the “Yemeni government”. This can sometimes get confusing, but it is important to point out that this propagandistic rhetoric is used to shape the conflict in a way that reflects Western bias, not the objective reality on the ground.
Some will try to argue that the Saudi proxy opposition is the “internationally recognised government” according to the United Nations, which is true, but again, this has little bearing on the reality on the ground. There simply aren’t enough powerful States or even smaller nations that are willing to bat for recognising the government in Sana’a, therefore the West and their Arab allies have managed to prevent any reflection of reality reaching the United Nations or even the international media.
At this phase, the UAE’s STC appears to be in control of the majority of opposition-held territory in Yemen, greatly undermining Saudi Arabia’s role. However, the STC is not exactly a movement with the popular support to sustain and operate a lasting, or stable, southern Yemeni State. The STC has faced countless protests against their rule, after failing to deliver even basic services to the people living under its control. Blatant corruption, combined with criminal activities and a lack of basic governing skills, has left people with very little. Even in the Hadramout and al-Mahra provinces, there is significant opposition that could lead to their swift overthrow.
Amidst this, if the STC decides to commit to offensives against the Yemeni Armed Forces of Ansarallah, the strategy to defeat the UAE-proxy forces is rather simple. Ansarallah will not only most likely batter these armed militants on the ground, but need only direct drone and missile fire towards the real headquarters of the STC, Dubai. If ballistic and cruise missiles, along with drones, flood Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the Emirati plot will quickly collapse.
When it comes to Saudi Arabia, it is a much larger nation and has the capacity to endure a lot more than the much smaller Emirates, making Riyadh a more formidable foe than Abu Dhabi. If the STC proxy forces become the main opposition and Saudi Arabia can no longer maintain any significant foothold in Yemen, the recipe for Yemeni unification becomes much simpler.
A war between Ansarallah and the STC has a very easy solution: flooding the UAE with missiles and drones for a sustained period, which will force them to give up and depart from Yemen. If this happens, Riyadh will have no choice but to reach a broader agreement with Sana’a, effectively ending the war altogether.
In the eyes of the Israelis and the United States, this outcome would be a catastrophe. If Ansarallah, even under a power-sharing styled agreement, reigned supreme over all of Yemen and became its officially recognised leadership, it would significantly increase its power and pose an even greater threat to Israel. In Tel Aviv’s eyes, this would be Iran 2.0 in the Arab World, an Islamic government that is openly hostile to Israel and a staunch supporter of the Palestinian resistance.
No matter which way you slice it, the US and Israel have no answer for the predicament they face in Yemen. The only option is to try and keep the nation in perpetual war, tightening the sanctions and ensuring immense suffering amongst its civilian population, all to avoid the inevitable rise of an Ansarallah-controlled Yemeni State, equipped with a military arsenal that will continue to develop.
Israeli military superiority undermines US interests: Report
Al Mayadeen | December 23, 2025
When US President Donald Trump announced in November 2025 that he would approve selling advanced F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately sought assurances from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The US was quick to affirm an unwavering commitment to preserving “Israel’s qualitative military edge” over all countries in West Asia.
And this commitment is not merely political; it’s the law. According to an analysis by Josh Paul, a former State Department director who spent over 11 years in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs before resigning over Gaza policy in 2023, this legal requirement is producing outcomes that directly contradict US strategic interests in the region.
Writing in Responsible Statecraft, Paul draws on his insider experience to argue that what was intended as a tool for maintaining regional order aligned with American interests may now be fueling instability.
Cold war era policy
The concept of “Israel’s” “qualitative military edge” (QME) emerged in the 1970s as a mechanism to ensure a regional balance of power favorable to US interests by guaranteeing Israeli military superiority. Paul traces how this informal policy became codified in 2008 legislation that defines QME as “Israel’s” ability to “counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damages and casualties.”
The law requires the State Department to assess every major US arms transfer to West Asian and North African countries, from Morocco to Iran, to ensure it doesn’t threaten “Israel’s” military dominance. In practice, since Iran has not purchased US weapons since 1979, this applies exclusively to Arab states, effectively institutionalizing a regional hierarchy with “Israel” at its apex.
Paul describes a classified process involving multiple agencies and Israeli input: “At the annual Department of Defense Joint Political Military Group meeting, the Israelis typically make a presentation that includes a list of systems they deem threatening to their QME.”
Three options, three problems
When Arab countries seek advanced US weapons, Paul explains, the US government is faced with three choices, each with significant drawbacks.
The first is compensating “Israel” with superior technology. When the Obama administration proposed selling F-16s to the UAE in 2013, it had to simultaneously offer “Israel” advanced radars to detect those very aircraft. But this approach, Paul argues, directly fuels regional arms races, potentially violating other US laws that explicitly aim to “discourage arms races.”
The second option involves limiting sales through quantity restrictions, geographical constraints, or technological downgrades. But these limitations, Paul notes, can strain relationships with Arab partners who face genuine security threats.
The third option, denying sales outright to preserve “Israel’s” edge, may produce what Paul calls “perverse incentives.” Arab governments denied US weapons often turn to China, Russia, or France instead, reducing US influence over their defense capabilities and potentially introducing systems Washington cannot monitor or constrain.
This shift threatens the very regional order the QME policy was designed to maintain, as it allows competing powers to establish military footholds in West Asia.
The diplomatic cost of military dominance
Beyond arms sales logistics, Paul identifies a more fundamental problem: guaranteed military superiority may discourage Israeli affairs. “Because Israel remains assured that the United States will help it retain military superiority over the entire region, Tel Aviv may feel able to rely on such superiority rather than engaging in diplomacy,” he writes.
He argues that “Israel’s” recurring reliance on military force “arguably contributes to instability across the Middle East as a whole,” creating a paradox where the policy designed to enhance Israeli security and maintain a “stable” regional order may actually generate the very threats it aims to prevent.
An outdated framework?
Paul questions whether the QME framework still makes sense given recent diplomatic developments. Israeli officials themselves argued during the 2020 F-35 sale to the UAE that the country had become “an ally in confronting Iran” and the sale wouldn’t violate US commitments. Yet Paul notes from his government experience that pro-“Israel” advocacy groups like AIPAC continued opposing such sales “behind closed doors,” regardless of intensifying normalization efforts between Arab states and the entity.
More fundamentally, Paul argues that military technology is evolving in ways that may make the QME unsustainable. Military analysts increasingly suggest the world faces a revolution characterized by “low-cost weapons systems capable of overcoming high-tech capabilities,” a shift that could render “Israel’s” technological edge less decisive and the entire framework obsolete.
Paul concludes that US and Israeli policymakers should explore alternatives to what he calls “Israeli military hegemony and the inherent fragility that it brings to the region.” He argues that “diplomacy and compromise, including the need for real progress on Palestinian self-determination, promises the only real exit from the isolation that the QME has allowed Israel to impose on itself.”
For Paul, who left his State Department career over these very contradictions, the message is clear: a policy conceived to ensure a regional order favorable to US interests through military dominance may now be achieving the opposite, undermining both regional peace and American strategic influence in the process.
Kuwait set to sign multibillion-dollar port deal with China
The Cradle | December 19, 2025
Kuwait will sign a contract next week with China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) to complete the Mubarak al-Kabeer Port project, Kuwaiti Public Works Minister Noura al-Mashaan announced on 18 December.
The contract is valued at about $3.97 billion, according to a government document seen by Reuters.
The Central Agency for Public Tenders approved on 1 December a contract between the Public Works Ministry and CCCC for engineering, procurement, and construction of the first phase of the port, according to the official gazette.
Mashaan said Kuwait’s prime minister will attend the signing ceremony with the Chinese side.
Mubarak al-Kabeer Port, located on Bubiyan Island in northern Kuwait, is described as a strategic project aimed at creating a secure regional corridor and commercial hub, one that China has sought to include within its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Kuwait hopes the project will support economic diversification, boost GDP, and help restore its regional commercial and financial role in West Asia, with the government saying around 50 percent of the first phase of the Mubarak al-Kabeer Port project has been completed so far.
The Mubarak al-Kabeer Port project is part of a broader set of large-scale initiatives Kuwait is pursuing with Chinese support, spanning infrastructure, energy, environmental services, and urban development.
Kuwait and China have expanded cooperation in recent years, including the signing of multiple memorandums of understanding (MoU) during a 2023 visit to Beijing by then-crown prince Sheikh Mishal Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, who later became emir.
Officials on both sides have framed these projects as part of a wider effort to deepen long-term economic ties, with a growing emphasis on infrastructure development, diversification, and connectivity.
Chinese firms are involved in several major projects across Kuwait, reflecting a shift toward broader strategic and economic engagement between the two countries beyond traditional trade relations.
China’s expanding economic footprint in West Asia has also extended to Saudi Arabia, where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently said that Beijing is ready to be Riyadh’s “most trustworthy and dependable partner” following high-level talks in the kingdom.
The meetings reaffirmed Saudi support for the one-China principle and emphasized deeper cooperation in energy, infrastructure, and emerging industries, aligning with Beijing’s broader BRI-linked engagement across the region.
UAE-backed militia in Yemen reaches out to Israel for alliance against ‘common foes’: Report
The Cradle | December 18, 2025
The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) has reached out to Tel Aviv and pledged to recognize Israel in the event that its goal of an independent, secessionist state in south Yemen is achieved, Hebrew media reported.
According to Israel’s Broadcasting Corporation (KAN), the STC has called on Israel to support “independence” in southern Yemen, and that this would enhance a common agenda between the two sides.
A diplomatic source close to the STC was cited as saying by KAN that Israeli support for the secessionist cause in southern Yemen could contribute to “protecting maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab, in addition to combating the smuggling of Iranian weapons to Ansarallah and the terrorist cells affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood that cooperate with Sanaa.”
The source added that the STC needs Israeli backing in military, security, and economic fields in order to form a “new state,” stressing that the two share “common enemies.”
The STC announced on 15 December the start of a new military operation in the southern Yemeni province of Abyan, tightening its grip on the south.
In recent weeks, UAE-backed STC forces have captured the provinces of Hadhramaut and Al-Mahra, and have seized the presidential palace in the southern city of Aden – where both the STC and the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) have been based for the past several years.
This prompted Saudi military forces to withdraw from Aden. Riyadh has since called for an immediate withdrawal of the STC from the areas it has captured – a demand which was rejected by the Emirati-backed group during negotiations last week.
The STC now controls practically all the territory that makes up the secessionist state it aspires to form along the borders of the pre-1990 southern Democratic Republic of Yemen.
The country will “never be unified again,” the STC has told western diplomats, according to a report by The Times from last week.
The report also revealed that the STC has sent delegates to meet with Israeli officials recently and discussed their “common cause” with Tel Aviv. The KAN report was not the first to reveal contact between Israel and the STC.
In December 2023, Hebrew media cited a source close to STC as saying that Israel will earn itself a partner in the fight against Ansarallah if it recognizes the secessionist aspirations of the STC.
The UAE was a major partner in the Saudi-led war launched against Yemen and the Ansarallah-led government in Sanaa, which began in 2015.
Despite this, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have been embroiled in a rivalry for control and influence in Yemen over the past few years. Critics accuse both countries of seeking to divide Yemen to control its natural resources and strategic ports within their respective spheres of influence.
Since the start of the war, the UAE and Israel have established a joint occupation of the islands surrounding Yemen.
In 2023, Saudi Arabia and the Ansarallah-led government in Sanaa were close to reaching a peace deal. The agreement was never finalized or implemented, and the Saudi military continues to shell Saada and other border areas.
Despite this, the peace process halted a major Ansarallah and Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) offensive against Marib province, which would have brought Sanaa’s forces to the borders of Hadhramaut and Shabwa.
The STC reportedly took a firm stance against the peace talks between Saudi Arabia and Ansarallah at the time.
After the start of the STC advance across Yemen several weeks ago, Saudi-backed tribal forces called for “all forms of resistance” against the UAE-backed militia.
According to The Guardian, up to 20,000 Saudi-backed troops are gathering on the border. Forces backed by the kingdom are also reportedly withdrawing from their positions in Aden and redeploying elsewhere.
Riyadh supports a tribal alliance of armed factions known as the Hadhramaut Protection Forces. It also backs the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islah Party and the forces of Yemen’s internationally-backed government – the PLC.
While the PLC and STC are at odds with one another, the two are closely linked. Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the deputy head of the PLC, also serves as the president of the STC.
“We hope this can be resolved peacefully, but what happened in Hadhramaut is a dangerous development and negatively impacts the legitimate state institutions. Irregular forces not under state control have invaded stable and secure governorates throwing everything into chaos. Saudi Arabia is determined that these forces must leave and return to their own places. The legitimate government is being fragmented, and the only beneficiary of these intensified divisions will be the Houthis,” said Islah Party Secretary-General Abdulrazak al-Hijri, adding that Ansarallah “[does] not see Yemenis as people” but rather as “slaves.”
His comments contradicted reports from last year that Sanaa and the Islah Party improved their relations after Ansarallah began pro-Palestine operations against Israel.
Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia’s uneasy détente
By Tamjid Kobaissy | The Cradle | December 2, 2025
In West Asia, where sectarian politics and external meddling collide with local power struggles, few rivalries have been as entrenched or as symbolically loaded as that between Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia.
For decades, it embodied the broader confrontation between Iran and the Persian Gulf kingdoms – a proxy war defined by ideology, oil, and shifting battlefronts. But today, under the weight of new regional calculations, rising Israeli belligerence, and the cracks in American hegemony, that once-intractable hostility is giving way to a more ambiguous and tactical coexistence.
What is developing is neither an alliance nor even reconciliation. But for the first time, Hezbollah and Riyadh are probing the edges of a relationship long defined by zero-sum enmity. A pragmatic detente is emerging, shaped less by goodwill than by the shared urgency to contain spiraling instability across the region.
Tehran, Riyadh, and the long shadow of history
The long arc of the Hezbollah–Saudi confrontation is impossible to separate from Iran’s post-revolutionary clash with Riyadh. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini toppled the Shah in 1979 and declared the House of Saud a reactionary tool of western imperialism, the rupture was both ideological and strategic.
The Saudis responded by bankrolling Saddam Hussein’s devastating war against Tehran, and in 1987, relations cratered after Saudi security forces massacred Iranian pilgrims in Mecca. Khomeini’s message was scathing:
“Let the Saudi government be certain that America has branded it with an eternal stain of shame that will not be erased or cleansed until the Day of Judgment, not even with the waters of Zamzam or the River of Paradise.”
Decades later, the so-called Arab Spring of 2011 reopened the wound. While Tehran stood by its state allies in Damascus and Baghdad, Riyadh threw its weight behind opposition movements and fanned the flames of sectarian conflict.
In Yemen, the kingdom launched a military campaign against the Ansarallah movement and allied forces, which Tehran backed politically and diplomatically. After Saudi Arabia executed outspoken Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in 2016, Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran, prompting Riyadh to sever diplomatic ties. The two regional powers would only resume relations as part of Chinese-backed mediation in 2023.
From Hariri’s abduction to assassination plots
Within this regional maelstrom, Hezbollah became a prime Saudi target. When the Lebanese resistance captured two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006, to secure the release of prisoners, Riyadh dismissed it as “uncalculated adventures” and held Hezbollah responsible for the fallout.
In Syria, Hezbollah’s deployment alongside former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s army placed it in direct opposition to Saudi-backed militants. In Yemen, the movement’s vocal support for the Ansarallah–led government in Sanaa triggered Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sanctions and terrorist designations.
Matters escalated in 2017 when Saudi Arabia detained then-Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri and coerced him into announcing his resignation on television from Riyadh. Late Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah slammed the move as an act of war against Lebanon. The situation de-escalated only after French mediation.
In a 2022 TV interview, Nasrallah revealed that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) was ready to authorize an Israeli plot to assassinate him, pending US approval.
Quiet channels, Iranian cover
The Beijing-brokered rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh changed the regional tone but did not yield immediate dividends for Hezbollah. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia intensified its efforts to roll back Hezbollah’s influence in Beirut, especially following Israel’s October assault on Gaza and southern Lebanon.
Riyadh pressured Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to implement the so-called “Barrack Paper,” aimed at politically sidelining Hezbollah and stripping its arms. Speaking to The Cradle, a well-informed political source reveals that the kingdom informed the former Lebanese army commander – now the country’s president – Joseph Aoun, that it would proceed with its plans even if they triggered civil war or fractured the military. The source describes this as emblematic of Riyadh’s short-term crisis management, mirroring Washington’s reactive regional strategy.
Despite this, signs of a tactical shift began to emerge. In September, Nasrallah’s successor, Sheikh Naim Qassem, publicly called for opening a “new chapter” in ties with Riyadh – an unprecedented gesture from the movement’s leadership. According to the same source, this was not a spontaneous statement.
During a visit to Beirut, Iranian national security official Ali Larijani reportedly recieved a message from Hezbollah to Riyadh expressing its openness to reconciliation. In a subsequent trip to the kingdom, Larijani presented the message to MbS.
While initially dismissed, it was later revisited, leading to discreet backchannel coordination directly overseen by Larijani himself.
Tehran talks and guarded understandings
The Cradle’s source adds that since then, three indirect rounds of Hezbollah–Saudi talks have reportedly taken place in Tehran, each under Iranian facilitation. The first focused on political de-escalation, while the latter two addressed sensitive security files, signaling a mutual willingness to test limited cooperation.
One provisional understanding emerged: Saudi Arabia would ease pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon and drop immediate demands to disarm the movement. In exchange, Riyadh asked Hezbollah to keep its weapons out of Syria – echoing a broader Gulf consensus – and assist Lebanese authorities in curbing drug smuggling networks.
In private, Riyadh reportedly acknowledges Hezbollah’s military resilience as a strategic buffer against Israel’s regional belligerence. The Persian Gulf states no longer trust Washington to shield them from Tel Aviv’s increasingly unilateral provocations – as was seen in the Israeli strikes on Doha in September. But Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon remains a challenge to Riyadh’s political influence.
Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, and the Iranian umbrella
The Hezbollah–Saudi contacts are just one strand in a broader strategic dance between Riyadh and Tehran. According to The Cradle’s source, Saudi Arabia has assured Iran it will not join any Israeli or US-led war, nor allow its airspace to be used in such a scenario. In return, Tehran pledged not to target Saudi territory. These commitments are fragile, but significant.
The source also reveals that US President Donald Trump had authorized MbS to explore a direct channel with Iran, tasking him with brokering understandings on Yemen and beyond. Larijani conveyed Iran’s openness to dialogue, though not to nuclear concessions. MbS reportedly stressed to Trump that a working accord with Tehran was essential to regional stability.
In parallel, Lebanese MP Ali Hassan Khalil, a close advisor to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, is expected to visit Saudi Arabia soon following meetings in Tehran. This suggests continued shuttle diplomacy across resistance, Iranian, and Saudi nodes.
Strategic divergence, tactical convergence
Still, no one should confuse these developments with a realignment. Rather than a reset, this is merely a tactical repositioning. For Riyadh, the old boycott model – applied to Lebanon between 2019 and 2021 – failed to dislodge Hezbollah or bolster pro-Saudi factions. Now, the kingdom is shifting to flexible engagement, partly to enable economic investments in Lebanon that require minimal cooperation with the dominant political force.
The pivot also serves Saudi Arabia’s desire to project itself as a capable mediator rather than a crude enforcer. The 7 October 2023 Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has tilted regional equations, while Israeli expansionism has become a destabilizing liability. A Hezbollah–Israel war would not stay confined to the Blue Line. Gulf cities, energy infrastructure, and fragile normalization deals would all be at risk.
From Hezbollah’s side, the outreach reflects both constraint and calculation. The resistance faces growing pressure: an intensified Israeli campaign, a stagnating Lebanese economy, and the need to preserve internal cohesion. A tactical truce with Riyadh offers breathing space, and possibly, a check against Gulf-backed meddling in Syria.
When Sheikh Naim Qassem declared that Hezbollah’s arms are pointed solely at Israel, it was also a signal to the Gulf: we are not your enemy.
The real enemy, for both sides, is the unpredictable nature of Israeli escalation. Riyadh fears being dragged into an Israeli-led regional war that it cannot control. Hezbollah fears encirclement through economic, political, and military pressure. Their interests may never align, but for now, they are no longer mutually exclusive.
Will Saudi Arabia fund Israel’s grip over Lebanon?
By Mohamad Hasan Sweidan | The Cradle | Novmber 27, 2025
In the wake of Israel’s November 2024 apparent ceasefire with Lebanon, Tel Aviv has moved to reshape the post-war order in its favor. Treating Lebanon as a weakened and fragmented state, Israel seeks to impose a long-term, unilateral security and economic regime in the south, bolstered by US backing.
Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia has thrust itself into the reconstruction process as the main Arab financier. But the kingdom risks becoming a junior partner in an Israeli-American project that sidelines it from real decision-making. The question facing Riyadh is clear: Will it bankroll its own marginalization?
Tel Aviv’s vision: Disarmament, deterrence, domination
Israel’s strategy for Lebanon extends far beyond the oft-repeated demand to disarm Hezbollah. It envisions a sweeping transformation of Lebanon into a demilitarized satellite state governed under a US-Israeli security framework. Nowhere is this clearer than in Tel Aviv’s insistence on remaining inside Lebanese territory until Hezbollah is stripped of its deterrent capabilities, not just south of the Litani River, but across the country.
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz and former Northern Command chief Uri Gordin have both publicly outlined this goal. Gordin even suggested establishing a permanent buffer zone inside Lebanon to serve as a “bargaining chip” for future negotiations, while Katz confirmed that Israeli forces would remain indefinitely in the south. Tel Aviv no longer seeks temporary deterrence, favoring permanent subordination.
Katz, for his part, has stated “Hezbollah is playing with fire,” and called on Beirut to “fulfill its obligations to disarm the party and remove it from southern Lebanon.”
Most recently, while addressing the Knesset, he warned that “We will not allow any threats against the inhabitants of the north, and maximum enforcement will continue and even intensify.”
“If Hezbollah does not give up its weapons by the year’s end, we will work forcefully again in Lebanon,” Katz reiterated. “We will disarm them.”
According to this blueprint, Lebanon is not considered a sovereign neighbor, but a security appendage to Israel’s northern frontier. State institutions are expected to serve as administrative fronts for a de facto Israeli-American command center. International aid, including funding from Arab states of the Persian Gulf, is being weaponized to enforce this new security-economic order.
From the perspective of Israel, the goals in Lebanon are not limited to the disarmament of Hezbollah. They go beyond that toward a deeper project of transforming Lebanon – especially the south – into a kind of security-economic colony.
This includes consolidating a long-term military presence, imposing new border arrangements, and paving the way for settlement projects or institutionalized buffer zones, as evidenced by current maps showing the presence of Israeli forces at several points inside Lebanese territory.
Saudi Arabia’s options: Pressure or partnership
Enter Riyadh. The Saudi Foreign Ministry has repeatedly called for Lebanese arms to be confined to the state and endorsed the implementation of the 1989 Taif Agreement.
In September, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, stressed that:
“Saudi Arabia stands with Lebanon, supports everything that strengthens its security and stability, and welcomes the efforts of the Lebanese state to implement the Taif Agreement (1989), affirm its sovereignty, and place weapons in the hands of the state and its legitimate institutions.”
The Saudi envoy to Lebanon, Yazid bin Farhan, reiterated Riyadh’s position: the exclusive right to possess arms must lie with the Lebanese state. In private information, during a meeting between Bin Farhan and Sunni leaders in Lebanon, the diplomat stressed that pressure must be put on disarming the party, even if that requires reaching a civil war.
On the surface, Saudi and Israeli objectives appear aligned. Tel Aviv applies military pressure. Riyadh applies economic and political pressure. Both demand the end of Hezbollah’s armed presence. But while Israel’s aim is absolute control over Lebanon’s security order, Saudi Arabia still seeks a political system that reflects its influence. In this, Tel Aviv’s ambitions collide with Riyadh’s.
However, Israel has no intention of sharing influence with any Arab state – nor even Turkiye. Its model is exclusionary. It views Riyadh not as a partner, but as a bankrolling mechanism to finance the dismantling of Lebanon’s axis of resistance under Israeli terms. As former deputy director of the National Security Council, Eran Lerman put it, Saudi Arabia is merely a pressure tool to bring Lebanon to heel.
Thus, the crux of the matter is this: Riyadh may envision itself as a key stakeholder in post-war Lebanon, but Israel sees it as a disposable auxiliary.
The 17 May redux: Recolonizing south Lebanon
To grasp the depth of Israel’s project, one need only look to its precedents. In 1983, Israel, alongside the US and under Syrian oversight, tried to enshrine a similar model via the 17 May Agreement. That deal called for an end to hostilities, gradual Israeli withdrawal, a “security zone” in the south, and joint military arrangements. In practice, it turned Lebanon into a protectorate tasked with safeguarding Israeli security interests.
Today, after the 2024 war, Tel Aviv is resurrecting that same formula. Israeli forces have remained stationed at multiple points inside Lebanon despite the ceasefire terms mandating full withdrawal. Airspace violations and near-daily raids persist under the pretext of preventing Hezbollah from “repositioning.” Think tanks in Tel Aviv, alongside joint French-US proposals, are now pushing phased disarmament: first the south, then the Bekaa, then the Syrian border, ultimately ending all resistance capabilities.
International support is being dangled as a carrot. Aid from the US, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and others is contingent on Lebanon executing a disarmament plan under International Monetary Fund (IMF) oversight and within a strict timeline. This is the economic arm of the Israeli security project.
More dangerously, Israeli studies suggest that reconstruction of southern villages should be explicitly tied to the removal of resistance forces, while preserving “full freedom of action” for the Israeli army in Lebanese air and land space.
Can Riyadh afford Tel Aviv’s trap?
In parallel with this vision, western analyses close to decision-making circles in Washington and Riyadh show that Saudi Arabia itself sees Lebanon as a pivotal arena in its conflict with Iran. Any serious return to the Lebanese file is linked to the weakening of Hezbollah’s influence.
But the key divergence between the Saudi and Israeli approaches lies in a critical question: Who ultimately holds the keys to decision-making in Lebanon?
Riyadh aims to use its financial and political capital to recalibrate the Lebanese political order in its favor, minimizing Iranian sway while reinforcing its own influence. But Israel’s plan is more radical: to redefine Lebanese sovereignty altogether, placing it under perpetual Israeli security oversight.
In this model, Saudi Arabia – and any other Arab state – is reduced to the role of financier, tasked with implementing terms written in Tel Aviv and Washington rather than contributing an independent Arab vision for the region.
From this angle, Tel Aviv’s persistent invocation of the “military option” in Lebanon works against Gulf interests. It positions Riyadh and its allies as the paymasters for reconstruction, forced to foot the bill for a post-war settlement they had no role in shaping.
If Saudi Arabia concedes to this logic – and fails to leverage its influence in Washington, in Arab diplomatic circles, and in donor mechanisms – it risks forfeiting Lebanon to a joint Israeli-American order.
That order would mirror the defunct 17 May Agreement, only more deeply entrenched. Lebanon would not only be demilitarized. It would become a living model of “security-economic conjugation,” designed to recalibrate regional influence away from the Arab world and toward an Israeli-dominated Levant.
A Gaza Plan that Sidelines the Palestinian State
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 25, 2025
The UN may have blessed Washington’s new Gaza plan, but it reads less like a peace blueprint and more like a manual for managing occupation. Behind the diplomatic fanfare lies a resolution so riddled with contradictions that it could bury — not revive — the prospect of Palestinian statehood.
The “Peace” Plan
The US-backed “peace” plan may bring a halt to active fighting, but it does not — and cannot — deliver peace for Palestinians. At best, it promises a managed quiet under continued Israeli domination. The Trump administration has framed the initiative as a “pathway” to a political resolution, yet the plan carefully avoids the one political reality that matters: Israel’s entrenched refusal to permit Palestinian statehood in any meaningful sense. Within Israel, the backlash to any hint of Palestinian sovereignty has been immediate and ferocious. Last week, far-right ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich publicly demanded that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repudiate all references to statehood, with Ben-Gvir threatening to collapse the governing coalition if Netanyahu failed to comply. Netanyahu has since reassured them — and Washington — that no Palestinian state will be created under his watch. That political reality is already shaping Israel’s conduct on the ground: despite the nominal ceasefire embedded in the plan, Israel continues to bomb Gaza, implying that “security operations” are exempt. Yet the UN Security Council resolution endorsing the US plan offers no enforcement mechanism, no timetable, and no conditions to bind Israel to any political endgame. In practice, it hands Israel full discretion to shape the conflict’s trajectory and its eventual outcome in real time.
The plan’s proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF) is presented as the key instrument for “restoring order” in Gaza, but the details reveal a deeply asymmetric security architecture. The force will operate under Israel’s operational umbrella — not under an independent UN peacekeeping mandate, and certainly not as a neutral guarantor of civilian protection. Israel has already narrowed the mission to a single objective: disarming Hamas, a demand Hamas has categorically rejected. For states such as Pakistan, which have signalled support for the ISF, the mission is framed in broader terms — the demilitarization of Gaza as a whole. Yet demilitarization, under this plan, is a one-way street. Israel retains full military freedom: ground deployments, aerial strikes, and intelligence operations can continue without restriction. Palestinians, by contrast, are expected to surrender not only armed resistance but any organised capacity to resist Israel’s occupation, settlement expansion, or annexation — even peacefully. This is not a roadmap to stability; it is a security regime designed to institutionalise Palestinian political paralysis. By stripping Palestinians of all coercive or collective leverage while preserving Israel’s overwhelming military advantage, the plan guarantees an imbalance so severe that no political process can emerge from it. Supporters of the ISF may hope the force will facilitate reconstruction or governance, but the structure of the mandate ensures the opposite: it entrenches Israeli control while outsourcing its enforcement to international actors. Far from opening the door to statehood, the plan cements the very conditions that have made such a state impossible. Under these terms, the prospects that the plan will deliver anything of value to Palestinians — let alone genuine sovereignty — are virtually nil.
The Plan and the Arab world
The plan’s swift acceptance across much of the Arab world is not a reflection of regional confidence in its substance. Rather, it reflects geopolitical fatigue and shifting priorities. After a year of devastating images from Gaza, Arab governments face intense domestic pressure to do something, yet lack either the leverage or the appetite to meaningfully confront the US or Israel. Endorsing the plan allows them to claim diplomatic engagement without assuming responsibility for achieving what the plan itself refuses to deliver. For many Arab capitals, particularly those already normalizing ties with Israel or dependent on US security guarantees, the plan functions less as a political blueprint than as a diplomatic escape hatch.
Nowhere is this contradiction clearer than in Saudi Arabia’s position. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) travelled to the United States this month for high-level meetings, including with President Trump. Publicly, MBS restated Riyadh’s long-held line: Saudi Arabia is willing to join the Abraham Accords, but only if there is a clear and irreversible roadmap to a Palestinian state. Yet Riyadh has conspicuously refrained from criticizing a plan that contains no such roadmap. This silence is not accidental; it is strategic. Saudi Arabia’s overriding objective is to secure a sweeping defence pact with Washington, one that would formally guarantee US protection and enable the kingdom to acquire advanced weapons systems. During his visit, a sweeping defense package was signed, which elevated Saudi Arabia to the status of a “major non-NATO ally,” a move that opens the gates to easier arms transfers and logistical cooperation. On the same trip, Trump confirmed a sale of F-35 jets to Riyadh, marking the first time such fifth-generation fighters would be sold to an Arab country.
That deal, however, is politically impossible for Washington unless Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel are moving toward normalisation. The Trump administration, unlike the Biden administration before it, sees Saudi–Israeli normalisation as the centrepiece of its regional architecture. Trump called both Israel and Saudi Arabia great allies. MBS understands this and is carefully calibrating his moves, signalling rhetorical support for Palestinian statehood to maintain credibility within the Arab and Muslim worlds while avoiding any criticism that could jeopardize US willingness to finalize the defence agreement. Riyadh’s acceptance of a plan that objectively undermines Palestinian aspirations is therefore not a policy contradiction; it is a diplomatic performance. The kingdom is balancing between two audiences — one domestic, sentimental, and politically sensitive; the other strategic, transactional, and sitting in Washington.
For the Palestinian cause, however, this choreography is devastating. It signals that the Arab world’s most powerful state is willing to sidestep Palestine’s central demand — an enforceable path to sovereignty — in exchange for advanced fighter jets and more. In this sense, the plan is not only shaped by US and Israeli priorities; it is enabled by Arab governments that have recalibrated their regional ambitions away from Palestinian self-determination and toward their own national security bargains.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
Aramco Betting Big on a New Energy Future
By Vanessa Sevidova – New Eastern Outlook – November 23, 2025
In eastern Saudi Arabia, a strategic pivot is underway that could reshape the global energy landscape for decades to come. Saudi Aramco, the world’s most profitable oil company, long synonymous with crude, is steering a significant portion of its colossal resources toward a different fuel: natural gas.
This isn’t a tentative exploration but a full-throated strategic shift. The company has publicly raised its gas production growth target for 2030 to a staggering 80% above 2021 levels, a sharp increase from its previous goal of 60%. In an era of volatile oil prices and intense global pressure for an energy transition, Aramco is not retreating; it is repositioning, betting that gas will be the cornerstone of its future resilience and growth.
Navigating a shifting oil market
Aramco’s gas push reflects the company’s calculated long-game it continues to play in the oil sector. The kingdom, and by extension Aramco, operates from a position of unparalleled strength. As revealed by CEO Amin Nasser, the cost of producing a barrel of oil in Saudi Arabia is a mere $2, with associated gas coming in at just $1 per barrel of oil equivalent. This is the lowest cost base in the world, a fact that grants the kingdom immense strategic patience.
When oil prices dip, as they have in recent months, hovering around or below $70 a barrel, high-cost producers – particularly U.S. shale drillers – feel the pressure. Analysts note that profitability for many in the shale patch becomes difficult when prices remain under $70, as their drilling and completion costs rise. For Riyadh, a period of lower prices serves a dual purpose: it ensures continued global demand for oil while pressuring rivals and forcing cutbacks in investment that could lead to market share gains for low-cost producers like those in OPEC.
This strategy is backed by unwavering confidence in long-term oil demand. Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman has been a vocal critic of what he famously termed the “La La Land” scenario pushed by the International Energy Agency (IEA), which had predicted an imminent peak in oil demand. For years, he insisted that hydrocarbons were “here to stay” and that the IEA had transformed from a neutral analyst into a “political advocate.”
In a striking validation of this stance, the IEA recently made a dramatic turn. In its latest World Energy Outlook, the agency acknowledged that global demand for oil and gas could continue to grow until 2050, a direct retreat from its previous peak-demand predictions. OPEC welcomed this as a “rendezvous with reality.” This shift underscores the enduring role of fossil fuels and vindicates Saudi Arabia’s insistence on the need for continued investment in oil and gas supply.
Gas is no longer just a transition fuel
Against this backdrop of oil-market realism, Aramco’s aggressive move into gas is a masterstroke of diversification. But this is not just about finding a cleaner-burning alternative. Within the halls of Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran, the narrative around gas has fundamentally evolved.
“Natural gas is no longer viewed merely as a transition fuel but has now become an essential and permanent part of the global energy landscape,” said Ashraf Al-Ghazzawi, Aramco’s Executive Vice President of Strategy & Corporate Development. This statement marks a significant rhetorical and strategic shift. Gas is now seen as a critical pillar in its own right.
The drivers for this are twofold. Firstly, there is a pressing domestic demand. For years, Saudi policy has aimed to use more natural gas for electricity generation and industry, freeing up millions of barrels of crude for export rather than burning them at home. This directly boosts national revenue.
Secondly, and perhaps more compelling, is the emergence of a powerful new source of global demand: the digital economy. “It is a key factor in supporting demand growth linked to artificial intelligence and data centers,” Al-Ghazzawi added. The explosive growth of energy-hungry AI data centers is creating a voracious and constant demand for reliable power, which gas is uniquely positioned to provide.
CEO Amin Nasser, in a recent CNBC interview, confirmed that gas is now receiving the lion’s share of the company’s capital investments. He revealed that Aramco is looking to establish its first lithium extraction plant by 2027, a move that ties into the ecosystem of new technologies and energy storage, but gas remains the central focus.
The Jafurah field
The engine of this gas transformation is the Jafurah field, the largest unconventional gas project in Saudi Arabia and one of the largest in the world. Jafurah is the cornerstone of the kingdom’s ambition to become a major global gas player. The increased production target of 80% is expected to lift Aramco’s total gas and liquids output to around six million barrels of oil equivalent per day.
Analysts at JPMorgan noted that this “represents a tangible increase of more than 500,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day compared to previous estimates,” signaling a clear acceleration in the company’s ambitions.
The financial rationale is also compelling. Aramco estimates that its gas expansion will add between $12 billion and $15 billion to its annual operating cash flow by the end of the decade. While gas may be less profitable on a per-unit basis than oil in the current market, it offers a stable and secure income stream. As Jamie Ingram, Managing Editor of Middle East Economic Survey, pointed out, gas represents a “guaranteed and stable source of income because its prices are fixed and the local market is continuously expanding.”
Gas and AI
Aramco’s strategy presents an interesting synergy: it is betting on gas to power the AI revolution, while simultaneously using AI to make its own operations more efficient. The company leverages over 10 billion data points daily and a 90-year historical record to analyze and optimize its performance. Nasser stated that these digital efforts have already yielded $6 billion in added value between 2023 and 2024.
This means that the same AI technology driving up global energy demand is also helping Aramco extract and deliver that energy more cheaply and efficiently, further cementing its low-cost advantage.
New energy reality
The convergence of these factors – Aramco’s gas pivot, the IEA’s revised outlook, and the unrelenting demand from both traditional industries and new technologies – paints a clear picture. The world is entering a more complex energy era than the simple “renewables-only” narrative suggested.
Saudi Arabia, through Aramco, is positioning itself as a master of this complexity. It is leveraging its low-cost oil as a strategic tool to maintain market dominance while simultaneously building a gas behemoth to secure its financial future and power the next wave of technological growth. The message from Dhahran is clear: the future of energy is not a choice between old and new, but a pragmatic, diversified portfolio where oil, gas, and technology are deeply intertwined. In this new reality, Aramco intends to remain the supplier of choice.
Vanessa Sevidova, post-graduate student at MGIMO University and researcher on the Middle East and Africa
Advance at Farzad B signals Iran’s homegrown leap in complex energy projects
Press TV – November 23, 2025
On Saturday it was announced that Iranian companies will soon begin drilling at the strategically important Farzad B gas field in the middle of the Persian Gulf.
The development marks a rare breakthrough for the country’s energy sector after years of delays, sanctions pressure and missed opportunities.
It signals that Iran has finally gained the technical confidence and institutional capacity to push ahead with one of its most complicated shared fields without relying on hesitant foreign partners.
Farzad B lies near the maritime border with Saudi Arabia, close to Farsi Island, in a geologically difficult zone known for high pressures, high temperatures and fractured formations. Those conditions make it significantly more challenging to develop than South Pars, the country’s flagship offshore field.
Yet for nearly two decades, Farzad B remained stuck in negotiations, mostly with Indian companies that once planned to produce gas there and turn it into LNG for export. Each time political conditions shifted, the project stalled.
India pulled out during the first round of sanctions, returned briefly once sanctions were eased, and again withdrew during the Trump-era restrictions even after Tehran accepted New Delhi’s terms, including dropping its LNG ambitions, to keep the partnership alive.
While Iran waited, Saudi Arabia moved forward. Working with a Canadian-led consortium, it began producing gas from the shared field in 2015 and lifted output to roughly 34 million cubic meters a day the following year.
That imbalance carried economic consequences. Iran holds about 70% of the reservoir, and in shared fields, the country that produces less risks losing pressure in its part of the formation, allowing gas to migrate toward the neighbor extracting more aggressively.
In a period when Iran’s domestic demand has been rising and supply strains have become increasingly visible during winter peaks, the long delay at Farzad B was more than a strategic concern. It risked turning a national asset into a gradually shrinking one.
The administration’s response has been to push a broader strategy that focuses on shared fields as part of strengthening economic resilience. It has already delivered results in South Pars, where Iran eventually overtook Qatar in daily extraction, and in the West Karun region along the Iraqi border.
Bringing Farzad B into full development is now seen as a key part of that policy. With foreign partners unable or unwilling to commit, the government turned inward.
In 2017, the National Iranian Oil Company assigned Petropars to manage the project under a master contract covering subsurface analysis, conceptual design, drilling oversight and preparation for full field development.
The decision was a gamble on domestic capacity at a time when sanctions limited access to global finance, equipment and specialist technology.
But it also reflected a shift in economic planning; rather than wait for sanctions relief and return of foreign investors, authorities pushed national contractors to take the lead on the $1.78 billion project.
Over the past two years, that shift has produced visible results. Most notable is the completion and offshore installation of the 2,650-tonne jacked designed and built inside Iran by local companies.
The operation, led by Petropars and executed by the Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company, required a level of engineering competence that industry analysts once assumed was out of reach for domestic firms working without international support.
The roll-up and installation at sea under demanding conditions demonstrates that Iran can carry out heavy offshore construction at a standard that matches global norms.
The technical hurdles go beyond the platform. The gas composition at Farzad B requires advanced metallurgy and specialized alloys for safe transmission. Laying the offshore pipeline is considered one of the most difficult marine engineering challenges attempted in the country.
Processing the high-pressure, high-temperature gas adds another layer of complexity. Yet Iranian engineers say they have now developed the design, equipment sourcing and operational planning needed to manage those conditions.
For a sector accustomed to relying on international contractors for the most complex offshore work, this represents a meaningful shift.
There is also momentum onshore. Officials have finalized the site of the gas processing plant after a series of environmental, geotechnical and risk assessments that included natural hazards, social and economic impact, access to infrastructure and proximity to offshore installations.
The level of preparatory work reflects a determination to avoid the kind of planning weaknesses that contributed to earlier delays.
The expected economic impact is significant. Once operational, Farzad B is projected to add roughly one billion cubic feet of gas per day to Iran’s supply.
That increase matters for a country that has struggled at times to meet domestic demand, manage seasonal shortages and maintain output in aging fields. It also reduces the risk of further reservoir losses to Saudi Arabia and helps safeguard Iran’s majority share of the field.
The project has become a symbol of the benefits of investing in domestic engineering capacity rather than waiting for foreign partnerships that may be derailed by geopolitics.
Petropars, once a secondary contractor in joint projects, has emerged as the emblem of that approach. Its leadership of Farzad B is evidence that Iranian firms can handle highly complex offshore developments even under sanctions and with restricted access to global suppliers.
The recent progress has pushed Farzad B past the stage of plans and declarations into active development.
For an economy navigating sanctions, rising energy needs and long-term pressure on shared fields, that shift marks a phenomenal achievement.
How Saudi F-35s would not erode Israeli air superiority: Report
By Ali Halawi | Al Mayadeen | November 19, 2025
The Trump administration’s move to advance a potential sale of Lockheed Martin F-35s to Saudi Arabia might mark a significant turning point in regional military dynamics. Yet the central question remains: would the acquisition truly grant Riyadh a decisive edge, or will “Israel’s” deeply entrenched air superiority remain firmly intact?
The announcement, made as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) visited Washington, does not itself consummate a transfer. Any sale would require formal notification to, and likely scrutiny by, the US Congress, and would reopen the fraught question of how Washington preserves “Israel’s” qualitative military edge (QME) while exporting one of the world’s most advanced fighter aircraft. While the operational edge of Israeli pilots and aircrew is evident, the US retains the ability to constrain Saudi F-35 capabilities through technical and software-based controls.
The deal on the table and the road to congressional approval
When a US president signals willingness to sell F-35 aircraft, the next formal step is notification under the Arms Export Control Act and a review period during which Congress can raise objections or seek certifications. For decades, US administrations have treated QME for “Israel” as a legal and political constraint on certain arms transfers; that tradition has informed reviews of past F-35 discussions with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Any proposed sale to Riyadh will therefore be judged not only on price and offset packages but on assurances that “Israel’s” operational superiority will remain intact; a determination that is both technical and political and could trigger contentious hearings. Members of both parties have in the past conditioned or slowed high-end sales over human-rights concerns, counter-proliferation assessments, and explicit demands to preserve the QME.
However, competing pressures further complicate Washington’s calculus as the Trump administration attempts to solidify its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia, secure a landmark normalization agreement with one of West Asia’s most influential powers, and counter the expanding Russian and Chinese footprint in the Kingdom’s defense and technology sectors.
Who in the region flies fifth-generation aircraft today
As of today, the Israeli Air Force is the only air force in West Asia operating the F-35s.
Abu Dhabi negotiated for the aircraft in 2020 but later suspended the talks; other Gulf air forces operate advanced fourth-generation fighters but not fifth-generation stealth airframes.
The practical consequence is that a US sale to Riyadh would not simply add another modern fighter to the region; it would introduce a category of capability that, until now, has been regionally singular.
Why the airframe is only half the story
It is important to separate the aircraft’s physical attributes from the invisible systems that make it decisive in combat. The F-35’s important advantages include low observable design or stealth, powerful sensors, sensor fusion, and integrated electronic warfare, which enable pilots and commanders to detect, identify, and engage threats at ranges and with a fidelity earlier generations cannot match.
Much of the F-35’s real combat power does not lie in the airframe but in the software stack that governs nearly everything the jet does:
- Mission-data files (MDFs)
- Electronic-warfare threat libraries
- Radar-emitter databases
- Electronic-attack and jamming profiles
- Sensor-fusion logic
- Weapons-employment algorithms
Most critically, the US controls every layer of this ecosystem for all export customers, except “Israel”.
“Israel’s” F-35I “Adir” has a special agreement allowing the integration of sovereign Israeli-made sensors, electronic warfare systems, and locally developed software add-ons. While the core flight software remains a US product, “Israel” can add its own “plug-and-play” systems and has the authority for some domestic maintenance and upgrades, giving it a level of independence not afforded to other customers. In practice, the platform’s combat potential is as much a product of data and code as it is of metal and jet engines.
This creates a built-in mechanism for Washington to tilt the operational balance decisively toward “Israel,” even if other states receive the same aircraft on paper.
Update priority, withholding certain mission-data libraries, limiting weapons-integration permissions, and controlling sustainment services are all practical mechanisms to maintain an advantage for one operator over another.
“Israel’s” F-35I “Adir” and operational freedom
Israel negotiated an unusually broad set of privileges for the Adir. Unlike most customers, the Israeli regime has been permitted deep customization, integration of indigenous sensors and weapons, unique mission-data development, and a degree of independence from the US sustainment cloud that most operators use.
Those permissions give the Israeli Air Force both practical freedom of operation and a pathway to maintain and evolve its fleet in ways other buyers cannot match.
Israeli mission data files are infused with intelligence drawn from decades of regional aggression. Their electronic-warfare tuning reflects specific threat libraries, and the backlog of locally developed weapons integrations further differentiates the Adir from standard F-35As.
The aircraft can fire the Israeli Python‑5 and Derby/Derby‑ER air‑to‑air missiles, giving it a sovereign engagement capability independent of US munitions. It also carries advanced stand‑off strike weapons such as the SPICE‑1000 and SPICE‑2000 precision‑guided kits and the Delilah loitering cruise missile, enabling deep, accurate attacks against heavily defended targets. Added to this is a bespoke Israeli C4I architecture and a classified electronic‑warfare suite installed directly into the aircraft’s systems, granting the Israeli Air Force full control over threat libraries, jamming profiles, and data links.
The airframe itself has also been adapted to support these systems. The Israelis received rare permission to incorporate custom apertures, access points, and internal wiring channels into the fuselage in coordination with Lockheed Martin, enabling installation and maintenance of its electronics. In addition, “Israel” is the only country known to operate F‑35s equipped with Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs), which add 600–800 gallons of fuel along the fuselage without compromising stealth or weapons capacity. These tanks extend the Adir’s operational range, reduce reliance on aerial refueling, and allow longer, deeper-strike missions, providing a level of flexibility and endurance unavailable to any other F‑35 operator.
Software and sustainment
The F‑35’s combat edge lies less in its airframe than in the software, mission-data, and sustainment systems that govern nearly every aspect of its operations. Historically, the US has used software-centric restrictions to preserve the advantage of favored partners, ensuring that certain operators maintain a decisive qualitative edge.
Key instruments include mission-data files (MDFs), which encode threat signatures, radar and SAM profiles, and geospatial threat maps. Operators with richer, bespoke MDFs detect and classify threats more quickly and respond more effectively. Denying or limiting MDF depth to a buyer is therefore a direct mechanism to sustain another operator’s superiority. Similarly, restricting electronic-warfare software, including emitter libraries, advanced jamming and deception modes, and the timing of mission-data updates, can materially degrade an F‑35’s ability to detect, classify, and suppress hostile radars. The operational effect is slower threat identification, narrower jamming envelopes, and less accurate geolocation for Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations, giving the Israeli Air Force a persistent edge even if both sides operate the same airframe.
These fundamental differences could prove decisive in a theoretical Saudi-Israeli confrontation. An export-restricted Saudi F-35, with its potentially downgraded software, might detect Israeli emitters seconds later and with reduced precision. In contrast, the Israeli F-35I Adir, equipped with bespoke software, proprietary threat libraries, and its electronic warfare systems, could identify, geolocate, and suppress Saudi radar networks first.
These software controls illustrate how the US could maintain Israeli superiority should the Saudi deal move forward. While technically effective, such safeguards carry grave political and operational costs for the buyer, the same concerns Abu Dhabi cited when it stepped back from F‑35 talks in 2021.
Basing, geography, Israeli red lines
Unlike the UAE, whose main airbases are distant from Israeli interests, parts of Saudi Arabia lie relatively close to Israeli settler populations and military centers. Israeli officials have publicly signalled concern that basing F-35s in western Saudi Arabia would materially shorten flight times into Israeli airspace and therefore elevate risk perceptions in Tel Aviv. Reports also indicate “Israel” is pressing Washington to condition any sale on formal normalization and legally binding basing limits.
Those basing preferences are intimately linked to the software and sustainment controls described above. Even if Riyadh accepted software tiering, “Israel” still wants to condition the basing of F-35 jets to be outside Western Saudi Arabia airstrips.
Why Abu Dhabi balked despite normalization
The UAE’s experience is a near-perfect case study for what Riyadh may face. Abu Dhabi negotiated a package in 2020 under a broader normalization agreement but informed US officials in December 2021 that it would suspend discussions, citing “technical requirements, sovereign operational restrictions, and cost-benefit analysis” as reasons.
Three interlocking fault lines explain why. First, as explained, export conditions on software, weapons, and mission systems sharply limit a buyer’s operational autonomy. Doing anything beyond the approved list requires US authorization and often a long, costly certification process. For a state that prizes independent strike options and rapid operational adaptation, those limits impose real political and tactical costs.
Second, sustainment architecture locks customers into US logistics and updates ecosystems. The F-35’s logistics and health-monitoring systems (ALIS originally, now the ODIN framework) and the global sustainment enterprise mean that maintenance and updates become levers Washington can control.
Third, and more prosaically, the practicalities of preserving stealth require specialized sustainment. Low-observable coatings, seam integrity, and specialized repairs demand trained personnel, approved materials, and certified processes; many of those tasks are regulated and performed under Lockheed-approved protocols or at regional hubs designated by the program. Buyers often cannot fully sustain the low-observable characteristics that make the jet survivable without continuing contractor or US support.
Finally, political and geostrategic concerns compounded the technical ones. Washington’s scrutiny of buyers’ ties to third parties, notably China, and congressional insistence on preserving “Israel’s” QME raised further strings the UAE found difficult to accept, from restrictions on sensitive supply-chain partners to conditioned access to high-end sustainment and software features.
“The Americans want to sell the Emiratis the planes but they want to tie their hands,” a Gulf source told Reuters at the time. The source, speaking on condition of anonymity, said defense deals include requirements for purchasing nations, but that the restrictions in this deal made it unfeasible.
Geopolitical considerations, only amplified by Riyadh’s larger strategic weight and geography, will determine whether Saudi Arabia accepts comparable limits, if imposed by Washington, or walks the same path as Abu Dhabi.
Featured Video
Tucker Carlson reports on Paul Singer (2019)
or go to
Aletho News Archives – Video-Images
Documentary Review
Israel authorises electronic tracking of Palestinians
MEMO | January 7, 2026
Israel has authorised the use of electronic tracking devices on Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, formalising real-time surveillance of civilians who have not been charged, tried or convicted of any crime, according to a new directive issued by the Israeli army.
The order allows Israeli authorities to compel Palestinians placed under administrative movement restrictions to wear or carry electronic monitoring devices and criminalises any attempt to tamper with them. The measure embeds electronic tagging within Israel’s system of military rule over the occupied territory, further expanding the regime of surveillance imposed on the Palestinian civilian population.
Significantly in another example of the Israel’s apartheid rule, defence minister, Israel Katz, has explicitly excluded illegal Jewish settlers in the West Bank from the directive, underscoring the discriminatory nature of the policy and its application along ethnic and national lines. The order was issued following coordination between the Israel Defense Forces, the Israel Security Agency, Israel Police, the Ministry of Justice and the military’s legal authorities responsible for the occupied West Bank.
Human rights observers note that the policy applies to civilians subjected to Israel’s system of administrative control, a framework that routinely denies Palestinians due process and relies on secret evidence. Palestinians placed under such measures often face severe movement restrictions, prolonged surveillance and the constant threat of detention without trial.
The new directive reflects what journalist and filmmaker Antony Loewenstein has described as Israel’s “Palestine Laboratory”, a system in which Palestinians are used as testing grounds for advanced military and surveillance technologies later exported abroad. In his work, Loewenstein argues that Israel exports not only weapons but a comprehensive model for controlling what it labels “difficult populations”, combining military force, mass surveillance and spatial domination.
This model is explored in Al Jazeera’s latest documentary How Israel tests military tech on Palestinians, part of The Palestine Laboratory series. The film documents how Israeli checkpoints function as experimental sites for so-called “frictionless” technologies, including AI-enabled remotely operated weapons that fire stun grenades, tear gas and sponge-tipped bullets. These systems are deployed at checkpoints where Palestinians are routinely subjected to intrusive searches and data collection. … continue
Blog Roll
Recent Comments
aletho on Somaliland and the ‘Grea… John Edward Kendrick on Somaliland and the ‘Grea… aletho on Donald Trump, and Most America… John Edward Kendrick on Donald Trump, and Most America… aletho on The US Has Invaded Venezuela t… John Edward Kendrick on The US Has Invaded Venezuela t… papasha408 on The US Has Invaded Venezuela t… loongtip on Palestine advocates praise NYC… Bill Francis on Did Netanyahu just ask Trump f… Rod on How Intelligence, Politics, an… papasha408 on Trump Says Hamas Will Be Given… papasha408 on Is Israel About to Return to G…
Aletho News- Is the Psychiatric Drugging of Children a Form of Child Abuse?
- Israel authorises electronic tracking of Palestinians
- Tucker Carlson reports on Paul Singer (2019)
- Syria is Normalizing Ties With Israel, Here’s Why – Analysis
- UK and France unveil troop commitments for Ukraine
- US to ease Venezuela oil sanctions after Maduro kidnapping: CNBC
- Somaliland and the ‘Greater Israel’ project
- Donald Trump, and Most Americans, Do Not Understand the Monroe Doctrine
- US Boarding of Marinera Vessel in Open Waters Violates UN Convention – Russia’s Transport Ministry
- Russian MFA Spox Dismayed by US Statement on ‘Bloodless’ Operation in Venezuela
- If Americans Knew
- Israel is starving Gaza, ‘asphyxiating’ West Bank – Not a ceasefire Day 90
- Israel Targeted Churches, Mosques, and Markets during the Genocide.
- ‘We Saved the Child From Drowning’: In Gaza, Winter Storm Makes Displacement Even Deadlier
- Palestinian church committee urges churches worldwide to protect aid work in Gaza
- BlackNest: Inside Canary Mission’s Secret Web of Unlisted Sites
- Gaza staggers under 80% unemployment rate – Not a ceasefire Day 89
- Israel has detained Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya without charges for a year. Why has the New York Times refused to cover his case?
- Israel’s role in Trump’s attacks on Venezuela
- Shrinking Gaza: Israel moves Yellow Line again – Not a ceasefire Day 88
- This is how Israeli settlers, backed by the military, erased a Palestinian village from existence last week
- No Tricks Zone
- Modeling Error In Estimating How Clouds Affect Climate Is 8700% Larger Than Alleged CO2 Forcing
- Berlin’s Terror-Blackout Enters 4th Day As Tens Of Thousands Suffer In Cold Without Heat!
- Expect Soon Another PIK Paper Claiming Warming Leads To Cold Snaps Over Europe
- New Study: Human CO2 Emissions Responsible For 1.57% Of Global Temperature Change Since 1750
- Welcome To 2026: Europe Laying Groundwork For Climate Science Censorship!
- New Study Finds A Higher Rate Of Global Warming From 1899-1940 Than From 1983-2024
- Meteorologist Dr. Ryan Maue Warns “Germany Won’t Make It” If Winter Turns Severe
- Merry Christmas Everybody!
- Two More New Studies Show The Southern Ocean And Antarctica Were Warmer In The 1970s
- Der Spiegel Caught Making Up Reports About Conservative America (Again)
Aletho News 