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‘New order’ in Strait of Hormuz: IRGC Navy mandates authorization for all vessels

Press TV – April 17, 2026

The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy says a “new order” is now in place over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, outlining strict new regulations for all maritime traffic.

In a statement released on Friday, the IRGC Navy commander announced that all commercial vessels will only be permitted to transit through routes designated by Iran.

The announcement also reaffirmed that military vessel transit through the strategic chokepoint firmly under Iranian control remains strictly prohibited.

According to the IRGC Navy, all transits, commercial or otherwise, will only be allowed with the explicit authorization of the IRGC’s naval forces.

The statement further stated that these transits are being conducted in accordance with the agreement established under the ongoing Iran-US ceasefire and following the implementation of the ceasefire in Lebanon late on Thursday.

The new measures signal Iran’s firm grip over the waterway, through which approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil passes, after the 40-day war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran by the American-Israeli coalition.

Earlier on Friday, following the implementation of a ceasefire in Lebanon, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced the reopening of the strategic Strait of Hormuz to commercial vessels.

“In line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the passage for all commercial vessels through Strait of Hormuz is declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire, on the coordinated route as already announced by Ports and Maritime Organisation of the Islamic Rep. of Iran,” Araghchi wrote on his X handle.

It was followed by foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei’s remarks, explaining that the foreign minister’s tweet was within the framework of the April 8 ceasefire agreement.

The passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz, he stressed, will take place along the route designated by Iran and in coordination with Iran’s competent authorities.

The Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway nestled between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, is a strategically vital waterway that forms the pulse of the global energy economy and, simultaneously, a potent asset for the Islamic Republic to fundamentally reshape the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and around the world.

According to experts, Iran is uniquely positioned to exert absolute control over the northern and most critical part of the strait, with its coastline stretching more than 1,600 kilometers along the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.

The strategic waterway has been in the news since February 28, when the US-Israeli alliance launched an unprovoked aggression against the Islamic Republic, prompting strong retaliation from Iranian armed forces, including the closure of the critical chokepoint to US and allied vessels.

Iran’s Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, in a TV interview, also dismissed US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric of naval blockade, saying no one listens to him.

Trump, he said, has imposed a “naval blockade” on his friends, not on the Islamic Republic of Iran, calling it “banditry and piracy.”

“To this day, we have not allowed US and Israeli aircraft carrier strike groups and marines to enter the Sea of Oman,” Rear Admiral Irani stated.

April 17, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on ‘New order’ in Strait of Hormuz: IRGC Navy mandates authorization for all vessels

Persian Gulf oil production can take two years to recover from war: IEA chief

The Cradle | April 17, 2026

It could take up to two years for oil production in West Asia to return to levels from before the start of the US-Israel war on Iran in late February, Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), told Bloomberg on 17 April.

“There is a general belief that the minute we see the strait open … we come back to the level of production before – which is, in my view, misleading,” Birol stated.

West Asia oil production was disrupted by the US-Israeli bombing campaign, which targeted Iranian oil and energy infrastructure.

Iran retaliated by targeting Gulf oil and gas infrastructure. It also threatened to target ships linked to the “enemy” in the Strait of Hormuz, effectively closing the waterway through which most Gulf oil is exported.

“The recovery will be gradual as damage from the conflict has affected oil fields, refineries, and pipelines across the Persian Gulf,” Birol said.

The IEA chief emphasized that the effective closure of Hormuz has caused world markets to lose hundreds of millions of barrels of crude and refined fuels.

The full resumption of liquefied natural gas (LNG) production could take even longer, with some terminals taking more than two years to repair after suffering damage in attacks, Birol added.

If a resolution to the conflict is not reached soon, energy-importing emerging economies, especially in Asia and Africa, will be hardest hit, Birol warned.

He added that early signs of demand destruction are already visible, including rationing and reduced activity, which could further reduce oil demand moving forward.

Meanwhile, US oil and gas exports have soared since the beginning of the war. Reuters reported on 15 April that the US has nearly become a net crude exporter for the first time since World War II as Asian and European buyers scramble to replace oil supplies lost due to the Iran war.

The difference between US oil imports and exports narrowed to 66,000 barrels per day (bpd) last week, the lowest on record, according to US government data. At the same time, exports reached 5.2 million bpd, the highest in seven months.

Reuters noted, however, that the US is rapidly approaching its maximum export capacity.

Iran has also increased its oil exports amid the conflict, boosting daily loadings and exports to around 2 million barrels over the past three months.

China has stepped up its purchases of Iranian crude by more than 300,000 bpd to a total of 1.6 million bpd.

Since the war began, India has resumed oil purchases from Iran, receiving at least 2 million barrels this month. New Delhi had halted its purchases of Iranian crude in 2019.

Iranian crude has recently been sold to some Chinese buyers at prices even higher than the Brent benchmark, which marks a reversal from before the war, when Iran was forced to sell oil to China at a discount due to US sanctions.

April 17, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Persian Gulf oil production can take two years to recover from war: IEA chief

Washington hiding billion-dollar combat losses to Iran’s precision strikes: Report

Press TV – April 17, 2026

Following 40 days of unrelenting US-Israeli aggression, mounting evidence reveals that the US Department of War is deliberately concealing catastrophic, billion-dollar military losses inflicted by highly effective Iranian retaliatory strikes, the Daily Mail reports.

In the latest episode of the Daily Mail’s Photo Evidence, the British paper “scrutinizes new satellite images that reveal how America’s Department of War may not be telling the full truth about the scale of its losses during the Iran war,” it said.

Since the launch of the joint US-Israeli terrorist bombing campaign against Iran, the Islamic Republic has retaliated by targeting American military assets across the Persian Gulf with waves of missile and drone strikes.

As the Mail explains, “Iran’s war strategy has been anything but conventional. Rather than targeting fighter jets or bombers, the IRGC has systematically attempted to blind and cripple America’s command and control layer, launching attacks against radar and air defense systems”.

“It is these costly losses in strategic equipment that the Department of War is not being fully transparent about,” the paper wrote.

Its report “is borne out by looking at the latest EU Sentinel satellite images and cross referencing these with open source flight tracking data, ground photography and pictures issued by Iran’s state media,” the Mail added.

The US Department of War has asked Planet Labs, the world’s largest commercial satellite imagery provider, to withhold all images of the war region, including the bases of ally nations, indefinitely and the company has submissively complied.

According to the Mail, the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia provides an example of this lack of transparency. The Prince Sultan is one of the main bases from which America is fighting its war with Iran. The base is where the US keeps its logistics and support planes.

“On March 27th, we know Iran managed to effectively destroy an AWACS aircraft during an attack on the base. Looking at before and after satellite images, you can see the black roto dome of the aircraft is completely gone and there’s a black scorch mark on the tarmac,” the paper said.

Beyond the loss of the AWACS, evidence shows “how as many as seven KC-135 refueling tankers may have been destroyed or damaged in the March 27 strike,” it added.

Images of the air base’s main apron, released by Iran’s media, which claim three KC-135 tankers were destroyed and four more damaged in the strike, tally with independent EU satellite imagery, the Mail further said.

“In the EU image, you can clearly see a scorch mark on the ground which tallies with where the tankers were in the Iranian image,” it said.

“Looking at one airbase on just one day of the Iran war, it appears probable that the US lost over a billion dollars worth of equipment. The UK’s entire defense budget for 2026 was £62.2 billion,” the paper added.

“America is not being entirely honest with the damage being caused by the war,” said Daily Mail reporter Catherine Barnwell who scrutinized new satellite images.

“It has stopped US satellite companies from publishing imagery which shows us the damage that other sources and photographers on the ground are revealing.

“Officials have given off the record briefings confirming that Prince Sultan Air Base was hit on March 27, but have said nothing about the destruction of the aircraft,” she added.

The loss of just one AWACS plane costs the American taxpayer $724 million.

Furthermore, Iranian state media released images showing that strikes on the base devastated America’s aerial refueling capabilities, effectively destroying or damaging multiple KC-135 Stratotankers. Replacing a single KC-135 with a modern equivalent costs up to $240 million.

According to reports, the US lost at least 39 military aircraft by mid-April, with another 10 damaged. Experts estimate the US suffered at least $1.4 billion worth of combat losses in just the first six days of the fighting.

Iranian air defenses systematically dismantled the myth of US air superiority. Among the most humiliating defeats was the downing of a prized MQ-4C Triton drone in the Persian Gulf. Valued between $200 million and $250 million, it stands as the costliest single US air asset lost.

American stealth technology also proved vulnerable to Iran’s layered defenses. The F-35 Lightning II, marketed as highly survivable and costing $100 million per unit, suffered its first-ever combat loss when it was struck by Iranian ground fire.

Official Iranian tallies confirm the downing of two F-35s, alongside four F-15s (three in Kuwait and one in Tehran), two F-16s (one in central regions and one in the south), and one F-18 in the south. Furthermore, Iranian short-range air defenses successfully shot down over 160 US and Israeli drones during the war.

The US drone fleet suffered massive numerical attrition. By early April, Iranian surface-to-air missiles destroyed 24 MQ-9 Reaper drones—many around Shiraz and Kish Island—resulting in an estimated $720 million loss.

The severe operational pressure on US forces was further highlighted during a disastrous mission in Isfahan. US Special Forces were forced to destroy two of their own MC-130J Commando-II aircraft—costing $120 million each—after failing to take off. They also destroyed four AH-6 Little Bird helicopters, valued at $7.5 million per unit, to prevent them from falling into Iranian hands.

Obtained images reveal the destruction and severe damage inflicted upon strategic US equipment at regional bases, including advanced fighter jets, high-priced drones, and critical logistical facilities.

Satellite imagery from airbases in Jordan, Kuwait, and the UAE exposes the destruction of 3 F-35 stealth fighters, as well as significant damage to B-21 bombers and the American drone fleet.

Further satellite photos from the Port of Fujairah and southern bases show massive infernos consuming huge fuel depots intended to support prolonged US operations. The value of the destroyed fuel alone is estimated at over $800 million.

Looking at just one air base on a single day, it is probable that the US lost over a billion dollars in equipment, exposing a massive gap between the Pentagon’s official narrative and the devastating reality of Iran’s defensive capabilities.

April 17, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Washington hiding billion-dollar combat losses to Iran’s precision strikes: Report

Israel Considers Ceasefire a Betrayal

Iran opens the Strait of Hormuz during 10-day ceasefire

By Kurt Nimmo | Another Day in the Empire | April 17, 2026

The Prime Minister of Lebanon, Nawaf Salam, thanked President Trump for a ten-day ceasefire announced on Truth Social that took effect at 5PM on Thursday, April 16. Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to the US-brokered deal, but with the same caveat imposed after Hamas conducted its Operation Al-Aqsa Flood breakout and offensive on October 7, 2023.

Israel reserves the right, the US State Department said, to carry out strikes in Lebanon “at any time” under Article 3 of the agreement. Netanyahu’s carte blanche states:

“Israel shall preserve its right to take all necessary measures in self-defense, at any time, against planned, imminent, or ongoing attacks. This shall not be impeded by the cessation of hostilities. Besides this, it will not carry out any offensive military operations against Lebanese targets, including civilian, military, and other state targets, in the territory of Lebanon by land, air, and sea.”

A similar double standard permitted Israel to violate the Gaza ceasefire agreement at least 2,400 times from October 10, 2025 to April 14, 2026, killing more than 700 Palestinians in the process.

“Israel has made a mockery of the supposed ceasefire agreements in both Lebanon and Palestine,” writes Maryam Jameela for The Canary. “They’re able to keep killing people, and to keep restricting the necessary conditions for life because international governments continue to allow them to.”

In Lebanon, Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh insisted his country is part of the US-brokered ceasefire arranged between Iran and Israel. Ibrahim al-Moussawi, a Hezbollah lawmaker, said the group would respect the deal if Israel did not target Hezbollah.

Trump said Hezbollah is party to the ceasefire and added that the government of Joseph Aoun will work to disarm the resistance group. “They’re going to be having a ceasefire and that will include Hezbollah,” the president told reporters. He added that he hopes “Hezbollah will behave.”

The paramilitary group, formed in the early 1980s during the Lebanese Civil War in response to an Israeli invasion and occupation of south Lebanon, insists it will not disarm. “We will not surrender or give up to Israel,” said Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem last July. “Israel will not take our weapons away from us.” In November, after assassinating Hezbollah’s Chief of Staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, Netanyahu called on the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah, a task it is not capable of accomplishing.

Israeli Media: Ceasefire is a “Double Submission”

In Israel, response to the ten-day ceasefire was met with anger and hostility by officials, journalists, and analysts. According to Israeli Channel 14, Netanyahu’s cabinet members reacted angrily at learning of the deal through social media. Israeli media framed the ceasefire as a betrayal and sellout to Hezbollah.

Marwa Osman, a journalist and television show host in Beirut, summarized the reactions on her X account.

Tamir Morag of Channel 14: “The way President Trump announced the ceasefire was embarrassing for Israel. It was clear that Israel’s interest was to continue fighting against Hezbollah.”

The nationalist opposition leader of Yisrael Beiteinu (“Israel is Our Home”), Avigdor Lieberman, complained, “The ceasefire in Lebanon is a betrayal of the residents of the north. The war must not end without a decisive outcome and the elimination of Hezbollah; this October 7 government has learned nothing.”

Ariel Kahane, a senior Israeli journalist and diplomatic correspondent for Israel Hayom daily, declared, “Donald Trump’s move reflects a double submission to Iran: Trump is aligning with Iran’s linking of the war in its territory to Lebanon. He is leaving one of Iran’s arms alive, active, and dangerous.”

Benny Ben Muvchar, head of the Mevoot Hermon Regional Council in northern Israel: “Hezbollah is still strong and waiting for us… the [Arab dominant] Galilee is being emptied of its residents, and we are being led by Trump’s whims.”

Israel’s i24 News characterized the ceasefire as a gift to Iran. “A more alarming development is that Iran itself informed the Americans that it wants to see a ceasefire in Lebanon, in order to advance negotiations between Tehran and Washington. What is happening amounts to a gift to Tehran at the expense of the northern settlements,” while Channel 13 complained the “ceasefire in Lebanon was imposed on Israel.”

“Residents of the north feel once again that they have been betrayed,” Channel 13 also reported. “We felt it during the ‘Iron Swords’ war [response to al-Asqa Flood], and we feel it again today. The fact that the U.S. President announced the ceasefire only highlights the distance between the Israeli Prime Minister and the people in the north and their reality.”

Critics claim Netanyahu delivered a coup de grâce when he “rejected a request by members of the security cabinet to vote on the ceasefire decision in Lebanon,” according to the Israeli newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth.

On April 15, before the ceasefire in Lebanon, Netanyahu asserted that Israel was not obligated to adhere to Trump’s ceasefire agreement with Iran. Consequently, the Israeli military continued its attacks on Lebanon, despite the original agreement explicitly including Lebanon in the ceasefire.

Roaring Lion: 90% of Israelis Support Illegal Attack on Iran

The ceasefire between the United States and Iran is viewed negatively by settlers in northern Israel, according to the results of a survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute. In regard to Israel’s Operation Roaring Lion, concurrent with Trump’s Operation Epic Fury, the survey showed that “more than 90% gave the IDF a positive performance rating,” although the poll did not investigate Israeli responses to the concerns of international law experts, human rights organizations, and UN officials.

Israeli strikes resulted in significant civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure, including residential buildings. On February 28, 2026, a joint US-Israel attack struck a primary school in Minab, southern Iran, killing over 170 people, most of whom were children. Israeli strikes on Iranian oil depots on March 7, 2026, were also flagged for potentially causing long-term health and environmental damage to civilians.

In response to the attacks on Iran, over 100 international law experts signed a letter condemning them as violations of the UN Charter and potentially war crimes. Additionally, UN experts condemned the aggression against Iran and Lebanon, warning of the catastrophic impact on civilians and urging an immediate ceasefire.

Conversely, Iran’s retaliation, including the use of cluster munitions, has been condemned by Amnesty International. Civilian deaths in Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv, Yehud, and Bat Yam have come under investigation. A missile that struck Beit Shemesh that killed nine civilians is being investigated as a war crime.

Strait of Hormuz Open to Commercial Traffic

Following the ceasefire agreement, Israel Defense Minister Katz said the ongoing campaign against Hezbollah is far from over. According to Katz, the IDF has achieved several significant victories. However, certain areas in southern Lebanon have not yet been fully cleared. Weapons and combatants may still be present in these zones, and their removal is deemed crucial, he said.

According to the Lebanese army, there had been “a number of violations of the agreement, with several Israeli attacks recorded, in addition to intermittent shelling targeting a number of villages.” French President Emmanuel Macron expressed concern that the ceasefire has been compromised by ongoing military operations, as reported by AFP.

The Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, responded to the tenuous ceasefire by announcing the temporary opening of the Strait of Hormuz. “In line with the ceasefire in Lebanon,” Araghchi said, “the passage for all commercial vessels through Strait of Hormuz is declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire.”

The price of Brent oil fell below $84 on the announcement and West Texas Intermediate futures, the US benchmark, dropped by 10% on the news of Araghchi’s announcement. Additionally, the Dow rose 640 points, around 1.2%, the S&P 500 gained 0.7%, and the Nasdaq rose 1%. “The stock market is good,” Trump declared, “the oil prices are coming down, and it’s looking very good that we are going to make a deal with Iran.”

However, considering Israel’s history of ceasefire violations, and the response by Hezbollah and Iran, it is entirely possible hostilities will resume and the strait will once again be closed to tanker and carrier traffic, thus dashing hope the war is now winding down and there is a peace deal on the horizon. As noted above, Israel has indicated it will continue military operations at its discretion.

April 17, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Israel Considers Ceasefire a Betrayal

Iran Opens Strait of Hormuz for Duration of Lebanon Ceasefire

RT | April 17, 2026

Passage for all commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz is now completely open, Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi declared on Friday. He added that the waterway will remain open for the remainder of the ceasefire in Lebanon.

Araghchi’s announcement came shortly after a 10-day truce came into force between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon, which has been one of the major obstacles to a peace deal between Iran and the US.

Writing on X, the Iranian minister stated that “in line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the passage for all commercial vessels through Strait of Hormuz is declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire.”

He noted however, that the vessels would be allowed to move along the “coordinated route as already announced by Ports and Maritime Organisation of the Islamic Rep. of Iran,” suggesting that the strait will remain under Tehran’s control.

US President Donald Trump has responded to Araghchi’s announcement on his Truth Social account, appearing to thank Tehran for fully reopening the “strait of Iran.”

The Strait of Hormuz has been shut down ever since the US and Israel launched an unprovoked attack on Iran in late February. The closure has driven up energy prices and rattled the global economy, disrupting one of the world’s most important trade arteries, which handles around 20% of global crude exports.

In the minutes following Araghchi’s announcement, oil prices plummeted by more than 10%, with Crude oil dropping to just over $83 per barrel and Brent coming in at around $88.

April 17, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on Iran Opens Strait of Hormuz for Duration of Lebanon Ceasefire

The Iran War Exposes the Emptiness of American ‘Strength’ in East Asia

By Joseph Solis-Mullen | The Libertarian Institute | April 16, 2026

For decades Washington has advertised its air and naval supremacy as the indispensable guarantor of global order. Recent events have shown this to be little but increasingly expensive theater. The 2026 Iran War has paused not with Iranian capitulation but in a cascade of humiliations that have permanently altered the strategic landscape. Washington’s vaunted power-projection capabilities proved unable to shield even its own forward bases, depleted critical munitions stockpiles, and ultimately ceded effective control of the Strait of Hormuz to Tehran. These lessons will not be lost on Beijing or Taipei. If the United States cannot impose its will on Iran, or previously the Houthis, it cannot credibly claim it could defend Taiwan against the far more formidable People’s Liberation Army.

Begin with the facts on the ground. Iranian retaliation rendered at least a dozen U.S. facilities across the Gulf effectively unusable. Satellite imagery revealed craters where hardened aircraft shelters once stood at Al-Udeid in Qatar, Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia, and installations in the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Damage estimates reached easily into the hundreds of millions in the first two weeks alone. U.S. casualties climbed into the hundreds wounded, with over a dozen killed. Meanwhile, the Houthis, far from being neutralized by years of prior American and British airstrikes, continued to threaten Red Sea shipping and tie down U.S. naval assets. The net result was unmistakable: Washington lost operational basing, prestige, and the aura of invulnerability, all while expending interceptors at a rate its defense industrial base cannot sustain.

The munitions problem is particularly acute. Analysts estimate that roughly a quarter of America’s upper-tier interceptor inventory, THAAD, Patriot, and SM-3 interceptors, were expended in a matter of weeks. Replenishment will take years: the production capacity simply does not exist at the necessary scale. China, by contrast, fields a missile arsenal that is both larger and cheaper to sustain. The PLA can produce ballistic and cruise missiles at a fraction of the cost of U.S. interceptors and in volumes that would overwhelm American magazines within days in a Taiwan contingency. The cost-exchange ratio is brutally asymmetric: a single American SM-3 or PAC-3 arrayed against swarms of cheaper rockets and drones.

This disparity matters all the more because the geography that doomed U.S. basing in the Gulf applies with even greater force in the Western Pacific. China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architecture—particularly its DF-21D and DF-26 “carrier killer” missiles, land-based hypersonics, integrated air defense networks, and a growing submarine fleet—turns the waters within the first island chain into a kill zone for surface vessels. U.S. naval planners have long acknowledged, if only in private, that carrier strike groups cannot operate within the Strait or its immediate approaches without incurring unacceptable risk. The 2026 Middle East experience merely confirms what those worst-case assessments have long suggested: when an adversary can launch salvos measured in the hundreds from mobile, hardened, or subterranean positions, forward-deployed U.S. forces become targets rather than instruments of deterrence.

The industrial base mismatch compounds the problem. China’s shipyards, missile factories, and drone assembly lines increasingly resemble a wartime footing. The United States, by contrast, struggles to produce even basic artillery shells at scale, let alone the sophisticated guided munitions required for sustained high-intensity conflict. Pentagon wargames have repeatedly shown that in a Taiwan scenario, the United States would exhaust its long-range anti-ship and land-attack missiles within two to three weeks: The Middle East has now provided a real-world demonstration that even these projections may be optimistic.

It is therefore hardly surprising that Taiwanese political actors are adjusting their posture. In the immediate aftermath of the Hormuz debacle, elements of the island’s opposition undertook a high-profile “peace mission” to Beijing. Invoking the legacy of Sun Yat-sen and calling for renewed cross-strait dialogue, they signaled a growing recognition that unconditional reliance on American military intervention is no longer a viable long-term strategy. While Taipei’s current leadership continues to reject Beijing’s claims, the political winds are shifting.

None of this is particularly surprising. For years, even the Pentagon’s internal assessments have warned that China’s growing quantitative and qualitative advantages in the Western Pacific are eroding the foundations of traditional U.S. power projection—in November Hegseth said it openly. What the Iran War provided was not new information, but political clarity. The same voices who dismissed Houthi drones and Iranian missiles as manageable nuisances are now confronted with the reality that a peer competitor could achieve similar effects on a vastly larger scale—and at far lower cost.

The fiscal implications are no less sobering. When the full spectrum of defense-related expenditures is accounted for, U.S. military spending already approaches $1.5 trillion annually. Every interceptor expended over the Gulf represents resources diverted from capabilities that, in any case, may not survive in a Taiwan scenario. The American taxpayer is thus underwriting a deterrent that no longer deters and a forward presence that has become a forward liability.

The lesson for the high priests of Washington’s global primacy is straightforward: the United States cannot function as the world’s policeman because the world has outgrown the role. From the libertarian perspective, the lesson is likewise straightforward: Empire is not only expensive; it is fragile and ultimately self-defeating. The 2026 Middle East campaign was not an aberration but the logical culmination of decades of strategic overreach. Washington’s inability to impose its will on Iran, a nation of ninety million with an economy smaller than that of Massachusetts, reveals the limits of air and naval power against determined, decentralized resistance. To imagine that this same model could be scaled successfully against a peer nuclear power with the world’s largest navy by hull count and an economy oriented toward protracted conflict is not strategy. It is hubris.

The appropriate response is not to double down on commitments that cannot be honored. It is to recognize that the security of Taiwan, like that of the Gulf, ultimately rests with the states most directly involved. Diplomacy and economic engagement offer more realistic paths than continued reliance on a Seventh Fleet that can no longer reliably reach, or survive in, the theater of operations.

The sooner Washington internalizes the lessons of its latest strategic own goal, the less likely it is to stumble into the next, and far more costly, one.

April 16, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Comments Off on The Iran War Exposes the Emptiness of American ‘Strength’ in East Asia

Fact-Checking the “Placebo Control” Fact Checkers

By Aaron Siri | Injecting Freedom | April 13, 2026

The fact is, not a single routine injected childhood vaccine on the CDC schedule was licensed based on a placebo-controlled trial, nor was any vaccine used as a control to license any such vaccine.

I was recently sent the following two links which claim that placebo-control groups were used to license routine childhood vaccines:

If you read these two articles, you will notice they contain no actual evidence and no link to any clinical trial. That is because the reality is that not a single routine injected childhood vaccine on the CDC schedule was licensed based on a placebo-controlled trial. Nor, when another vaccine was used as the control, was that vaccine licensed based on a placebo-controlled trial. And so on and so forth down the chain.

Unlike these two nonsense articles, which claim to be “fact checks,” below are the actual facts with the actual evidence from the FDA showing exactly what the control was when licensing each routine childhood vaccine. (You can also read a more fulsome, fun, narrated version of this list in Chapter 10 of Vaccines, Amen.)

One last thing, as for the definition of what is a “placebo,” per the FDA, in its guidance regarding placebo-controlled trials: “Placebos, defined as inert substances with no pharmacologic activity.” Also see this FDA source: “placebo control … group that receives an inert treatment…” And per the CDC, “A substance or treatment that has no effect on living beings.” With that, here is the list:

  • HepB vaccine (Birth 1M 6M)
    • Recombivax HB (Merck) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control & 5 days of safety monitoring after injection. See Package insert § 6.1.
    • Engerix B (GSK) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control & 4 days of safety monitoring after injection. See Package insert § 6.1.
  • DTaP vaccine (2M 4M 6M 15M 4Y)
    • Infanrix (GSK) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control (DTP vaccine used as a control) & up to 30 days of safety review after injection. See Package insert § 6.1. (Note that DTP was not licensed in a placebo-controlled trial and increases mortality.)
    • Daptacel (Sanofi) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control (DT or DTP vaccine used as control) & 2 months of safety review after injection except one trial which was 6 months with no control, 1,454 children, and “[w]ithin 30 days following any dose of DAPTACEL, 3.9% subjects reported at least one serious adverse event.” See Package insert § 6.1. (See note regarding DTP under Infanrix, above.)
  • PCV vaccine (2M 4M 6M 12M)
    • Prevnar 13, PCV-13 (Wyeth, part of Pfizer) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control (Prevnar 7 used as a control, and Prevnar 7 was licensed based on trial in which the control was another experimental vaccine) & 6 months of safety review after injection which found, “Serious adverse events reported following vaccination in infants and toddlers occurred in 8.2% among Prevnar 13 recipients and 7.2% among Prevnar 7 recipients.” See Package insert § 6.1. (Note the package insert for Prevnar 7 states the control in its licensing trial was an “Investigational meningococcal group C conjugate vaccine.”)
    • Vaxneuvance PCV-15 (Merck) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control (Prevnar 13 used as the control) & up to 6 months of safety review after injection, finding that, “Among children who received VAXNEUVANCE (N=3,349) or Prevnar 13 (N=1,814) … serious adverse events up to 6 months following vaccination with the 4-dose series were reported by 9.6% of VAXNEUVANCE recipients and by 8.9% of Prevnar 13 recipients.” Deemed “safe” because, “[t]here were no notable patterns or numerical imbalances between vaccination groups.” See Package insert § 6.1.
    • Prevnar 20, PCV-20 (Pfizer) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control (Prevnar 13 was used as the control) & up to 6 months of safety review after injection that again showed high rates of serious events (this time broken up into two categories – “serious adverse events (SAEs)” and “newly diagnosed chronic medical conditions (NDCMCs)”) in both vaccine groups but deemed “safe” because “no notable patterns or imbalances between vaccine groups.” See Package insert § 6.1; Clinical Review.
  • Polio vaccine (2M 4M 6M 4Y)
    • IPOL (Sanofi) licensed in 1990 for babies based on trials with no placebo control & 3 days of safety review after injection. Sanofi reports that, “Although no causal relationship has been established, deaths have occurred in temporal association after vaccination of infants with IPV.” See Package insert at 14-17. (Note that IPOL is an injected polio vaccine and is the only polio vaccine used in the U.S. for over two decades. It is a very different product than the polio vaccine developed by Salk in the 1950s—and, as noted above, ceased being used in the U.S. in the 1960s—and hence the trials of Salk’s vaccine from the early 1950s were not relied upon to license IPOL.)
  • Hib vaccine (2M 4M 6M 12M)
    • ActHIB (Sanofi) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control (Hepatitis B vaccine used as control) & 30 days of safety review after injection during which 3.4% experienced a serious adverse event but “[n]one was assessed by the investigators [Sanofi] as related to the study of vaccines.” See Package insert § 6.1; Basis of Approval at 8.
    • Hiberix (GSK) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control (ActHIB used as the control) & 31 days of safety review after injection. See Package insert § 6.1; Clinical review at 20-21.
    • Liquid PedvaxHIB (Merck) licensed for babies based on trials with no placebo control (Lyophilized PedvaxHIB used a control) & 3 days of safety review after injection. See Package insert at 6-8. (Note that Lyophilized PedvaxHIB was tested in a trial in which controls were given lactose, aluminum adjuvant, and thimerosal and there is no indication Lyophilized PedvaxHIB was ever licensed.)
  • Rotavirus vaccine (2M 4M 6M) (Note that every vaccine on the CDC childhood schedule is given via injection, except for one flu vaccine given by nasal spray and the rotavirus vaccines, which are given by oral drops .)
    • Rotarix (GSK) licensed for babies based on trials without a placebo control (the control group received an oral drop that included Dextran, Sorbitol, Amino Acids, Dulbecco’s Modified Eagle Medium, and Xanthan) & 31 days of safety review after oral dose and up to a year in some trials for cases of intussusception. There were more deaths in the group receiving Rotarix than the purported placebo. As disclosed by the FDA and GSK: “During the entire course of 8 clinical studies (Studies 1 to 8), there were 68 (0.19%) deaths following administration of ROTARIX (n = 36,755) and 50 (0.15%) deaths following placebo administration (n = 34,454). The most commonly reported cause of death following vaccination was pneumonia, which was observed in 19 (0.05%) recipients of ROTARIX and 10 (0.03%) placebo recipients (RR: 1.74, 95% CI: 0.76, 4.23).” See Package insert § 6.1 (claims used a placebo); Clinical review at 23-24 (admits the purported “placebo” included all the foregoing ingredients).
    • RotaTeq (Merck) licensed for babies based on trials without a placebo control (the control group received an oral drop that included Polysorbate-80, Tissue Culture Medium, Fetal Bovine Serum, and Sodium Phosphate) & 42 days of safety review after each oral dose and up to a year for cases of intussusception. See Package insert § 6.1 (claims used placebo); Clinical reports at 445 etc. (admits the purported “placebo” included all the foregoing ingredients).
  • Covid-19 vaccine (6M 8M and then Annually)
    • Comirnaty (Pfizer) authorized for emergency use in babies based on trial with a placebo control (finally!) & 6 months of safety review after injection. See Package insert § 6.1. (Note that Pfizer’s EUA was revoked and it is not currently licensed for children under age 5.) Also, while Comirnaty’s trial had a placebo control group, that group was unblinded and most were vaccinated during the 6-month safety review period. The 16- and 17-year-old data is not separated from the adult data, but the 12- to 15-year-old data is separated and included only 1,131 children who received a vaccine, and the case of one participant reflects how this trial was conducted.)
    • Spikevax (Moderna) authorized for emergency use in babies based on trial with placebo control. Depending on the age group, the median duration of blinded safety follow-up was 51 to 71 days. Placebo controls were unblinded and mostly vaccinated during the trial. See Package insert at § 6.1; FDA Briefing at 10.
  • Flu vaccine (6M 7M and then Annually)
    • The formulation for each influenza vaccine changes annually and there is no clinical trial carried out for each new formulation. (In any event, none of the clinical trials for the original formulation of any injected influenza vaccine for children had a placebo control group, see letter pp.13-14, even though some adult trials did, showing it could have been done. See FDA documentation and compare child and adult portions of Section 6.1 of each flu vaccine package insert. The one inhaled influenza vaccine’s original trial had a placebo but, again, its formulation changes every year and is not safety tested in any trial.)
  • MMR vaccine (12M 4Y)
    • M-M-R-II (Merck) licensed based on a trial with no placebo control & 42 days of safety review after injection in a trial with a total of only 834 children of which a third developed gastrointestinal issues and a third respiratory issues. See Clinical reports. (This patently deficient, underpowered, unblinded, and non-randomized trial is unsurprisingly not even listed in the safety section of M-M-R-II’s package insert. Also note that the original MMR’s clinical trial was similarly deficient and also showed a high and concerning rate of gastrointestinal, respiratory and other issues, as compared to the small untreated control group—see pages 12 and 13. In any event, the original MMR was a different product that did not include millions of pieces of human DNA and cellular debris, as does M-M-R-II, which is likely why it was not used as a control in the trial for M-M-R-II).
    • Priorix (GSK) licensed based on trials with no placebo control (M-M-R-II used as the control) & 6 months of safety review after injection in which both vaccine groups had a high rate of serious adverse events, emergency room visits, and new onset of chronic diseases (e.g., autoimmune disorders, asthma, type I diabetes, vasculitis, celiac disease, thrombocytopenia, and allergies). See Package insert § 6.1; Sup materials at 12.
  • Varicella (chicken pox) vaccine (12M 4Y)
    • Varivax (Merck) licensed based on trials with no placebo control & 70 days of safety review after injection. In the one controlled trial of 956 children, around half received Varivax and half received the “placebo” injection of 45 mg of neomycin per milliliter. There was one trial in which 32 children received Varivax and 29 children received nothing and then received Varivax eight weeks later; during this eight-week period, the Varivax group had double the rate of ear infection and a 50% increase in respiratory infection. As for serious adverse events, Merck did not consider any related to Varivax. See Package insert § 6.1; Merck study at 2; Clinical reports.
  • HepA vaccine (12M 18M)
    • Havrix (GSK) licensed based on trials with no placebo control (Engerix-B was used as a control) & 31 days of safety review after injection with a phone call follow-up at 6 months. See Package insert § 6.1.
    • Vaqta (Merck) licensed based on trials with no placebo control (an injection of AAHS, an aluminum adjuvant, and thimerosal, a form of mercury, were used as a control) & up to 42 days of safety review after injection. See Package insert § 6.1 (using term “placebo”); Merck study at 454 (admits the purported “placebo” included all the foregoing ingredients). (Note that trials for Havrix and Vaqta occurred at roughly the same time and, because there was no licensed Hepatitis A vaccine at that time, there was no excuse for not using a placebo control in these trials. It is also startling that Engerix-B, which had 4 days of safety monitoring in its trial, was used as the control for Havrix, and that an injection of known cyto-and-neuro toxic substances, AAHS and thimerosal, were used as a control for Vaqta instead of just a saline injection.)
  • Tdap vaccine (11Y)
    • Adacel (Sanofi) licensed based on trials with no placebo control (Td, for adult use, was used as a control) & up to 6 months of safety review after injection. See Package insert § 6.1.
    • Boostrix (GSK) licensed based on trials with no placebo control (DECAVAC or Adacel was used as a control) & up to 6 months of safety review after injection. See Package insert § 6.1.
  • HPV vaccine (9Y 9 ½Y)
    • Gardasil 9 (Merck) was licensed based on trials in which safety was reviewed after injection for 1 month in five of the clinical trials, 6 months in a lot consistency trial, and 4 years in one trial of women aged 16 to 26 years (reflecting that a safety trial of a more appropriate duration is possible). These Gardasil 9 trials were either not controlled or used Gardasil 4 as the control, except for one trial in which 306 participants received a placebo but only after receiving the full series of Gardasil 4 injections. See Clinical review at 17-19. (Note that in Gardasil 4’s clinical trial, controls received an aluminum adjuvant, AAHS, except 320 people labeled “Saline Placebo” that actually received all vaccine ingredients except antigens and AAHS. Also, across all these trials, 2-3% of participants receiving vaccine or aluminum adjuvant—used to induce autoimmunity—had a suspected autoimmune disorder.)
  • MenACYW vaccine (11Y 16Y)
    • Menactra (Sanofi) licensed based on trials with no placebo control (Menomune used as the control, and amazingly the safety section of the package insert for Menomune lists this same trial in which it is being used as a control) & up to 6 months of safety review after injection. See Package insert § 6.1.
    • Menveo (GSK) licensed based on trials with no placebo control (Menactra, Boostrix, or other vaccines used as a control) & up to 6 months of safety review after injection. See Package insert § 6.1.
    • MenQuadfi (Sanofi) licensed based on trials with no placebo control (Menveo or other vaccines used as a control) & up to 6 months of safety review after injection. See Package insert § 6.1. (The three Men4 vaccines provide another good example of the vaccine safety pyramid scheme because Menomune was licensed without a placebo-controlled trial and then used as the control to license Menactra; Menactra is then used as the control to license Menveo; and then Menveo is used as the control to license MenQuadfi. The actual safety profile, putting aside the limited 6-month safety period, is unknown since Menomune’s safety baseline was never established in a placebo-controlled trial.)
  • NON-ROUTINE VACCINE: MenB vaccine (16Y 16 ½Y + if indicated)
    • Bexsero (GSK) licensed based on trials with no placebo control group (either uncontrolled or control group was given an injection of aluminum hydroxide and, in one trial involving 120 adolescents, a saline injection followed by an injection of Menveo and hence FDA labels this an “active control” and not a “placebo control” trial) & 30 days of safety review after injection. See Summary basis at 14-15; Clinical review at 40.
    • Trumenba (Pfizer) licensed based on trials with no placebo control group other than 12 people in a dose ranging phase II study (otherwise the controls were injection of Gardasil+placebo, dTaP-IPV+placebo, HepA+placebo, or Menactra+Adacel+placebo) & 30 days of safety review after injection for one of the three trials and up to 11 months in the other two trials. See Summary basis at 4; Clinical review at 9-10.
  • NON-ROUTINE VACCINE: PPSV23 vaccine (2Y+ if indicated)
    • Pneumovax 23 (Merck) is licensed for children 2 years and older but there is no indication that there was any clinical trial involving anyone younger than 16 years of age that the FDA relied upon to license this vaccine. See FDA documentation.
  • NON-ROUTINE VACCINE: Dengue vaccine (6Y+ if previously had dengue and live in area dengue is endemic)
    • Dengvaxia (Sanofi) licensed based on a trial with 11,474 children receiving a placebo control (saline injection) & 5 years of safety review after injection. Meaning, the 17th and last vaccine on the CDC’s childhood vaccine schedule, is apparently the first vaccine that underwent a longer-term placebo-controlled trial prior to licensure! This trial stands as the proof that a longer-term placebo-controlled trial of a childhood vaccine is possible! See Statistical review at 10; Package insert at 4. (Note for this vaccine, it was learned that children under 6 years old had an increased risk of severe harm and death from this vaccine—harm that would likely never have been uncovered by the trials performed for any of the other 16 vaccines. It was also found that children older than 6 who had never had dengue and received this vaccine likewise had a seriously increased risk of severe harm and death. Hence, this vaccine is only to be given to older children who have previously had dengue. As disclosed by the FDA and Sanofi: “Those not previously infected are at increased risk for severe dengue disease when vaccinated and subsequently infected with dengue virus.” This vaccine is only recommended for children in endemic dengue areas and dengue is not endemic in the United States.)

April 16, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Timeless or most popular | | Comments Off on Fact-Checking the “Placebo Control” Fact Checkers

An Open Letter To President Donald Trump (My Response) | Candace

Candace Owens – April 10, 2026

My response to Trump’s latest unhinged rant on Truth Social name dropping me.

April 15, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Deception, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Video, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on An Open Letter To President Donald Trump (My Response) | Candace

Another Trump Flip Flop: From ‘Kill FISA’ to ‘Clean Renewal’

By Alan Mosley | The Libertarian Institute | April 15, 2026

With its April 20 deadline for congressional renewal looming, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is back in the spotlight. The provision, first adopted in 2008 as a part of the FISA Amendments Act as an update to the original 1978 Act, allows U.S. intelligence agencies to target “non-US persons located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information” as a response to perceived technology gaps exposed in the years after 9/11. It achieves this by compelling American telecom companies to collect intelligence on foreign targets and turning over data to federal officials.

Many aspects of Section 702 are concerning to civil libertarians. The provision includes a “backdoor search” loophole that allows agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation to search the database for communications belonging to U.S. citizens without a warrant. On the topic of warrants, individual warrants for each target are not required by Section 702. Instead, the government gets annual approval via the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to conduct broad spying operations with little to no oversight, with no requirement that the government proves to the court that a specific target is even suspected of being an agent of a foreign power.

Recently, President Donald Trump asked Republicans to unify to extend the program with no changes in oversight or accountability. Trump posted on Truth Social, “When used properly, FISA is an effective tool to keep Americans safe. For these reasons, I have called for a clean 18-month extension.” The adjective “clean” is not politically neutral: it implies that attempts to reform the program are partisan clutter, and that re-evaluating the practical or constitutional application of such a tool is a waste of time.

But this isn’t the position shared by those who have been wrongly targeted by the intelligence community, including President Trump himself. In May 2020, Trump urged Republicans to vote “NO” on FISA, explicitly tying the law to fears of abuse, including against his own re-election campaign. Four years later, he told lawmakers to “KILL FISA,” claiming it had been “illegally used” against him and that officials had “spied on my campaign.” On Monday, Rep. Lauren Boebert (R-CO) wrote to National Security Agency Director Joshua Rudd to address “deeply troubling abuses of power” by NSA analysts, alleging the agency has used Section 702 to search the private communications of individuals ranging from dating apps to rental agreements. In his latest departure with the administration, Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) said, “I vote with GOP 91% of the time, but that’s about to go to 90%. I won’t vote to let feds spy on you without a warrant. FISA 702 allows the government to search for your information in vast databases compiled with targeting foreigners.”

That charge of “vast databases” of Americans’ private data is precisely the overreach that Edward Snowden blew the whistle on in 2013 when he revealed that the NSA was using its authority to collect telephone records in bulk. But the Fourth Amendment’s logic does not dissolve in the presence of large databases. According to the Supreme Court, a search that intrudes on a reasonable expectation of privacy requires a warrant supported by probate cause. In Carpenter v. United States, SCOTUS held that the government’s acquisition of historical cell-site location information was a Fourth Amendment search, emphasizing how modern technology can transform ordinary records into comprehensive tracking. Intelligence gathering at such a sheer scale, while politically attractive to those who crave power, is constitutionally dubious for all the ways it could be used to target individuals, even if the initial data collection is impersonal.

The secrecy and structure of the reviewing court compound the problem. Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz described FISA proceedings as “ex parte,” with only the government appearing, which deprives the process of “adversarial testing.” In ordinary constitutional practice, laws that burden speech, association, and privacy are tested by said adversarial litigation to force factual development, limiting principles, and public reasoning. This leaves the FISC’s decisions and operations shrouded in secrecy. Annual statistics help to explain why civil liberty advocates criticize the FISC as a compliance venue rather than a constitutional barrier. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that in 2024 the FISC granted or modified the overwhelming majority of items before it, with no applications denied in full. In 2025, it only denied four applications in full while continuing to grant or modify most of the remainder. While these numbers do not necessarily prove bad faith by the judges involved, they do underscore the institutional asymmetry: a secret court hearing only one party (the state) is predisposed to side with it without due courtesy to the target of the government’s ire.

A surveillance state that cannot be meaningfully challenged in court is not merely powerful, it is structurally insulated. In another SCOTUS ruling, Clapper v. Amnesty International, the court ruled that the plaintiffs, including lawyers, journalists, and human-rights advocates, lacked the standing to challenge FISA Section 702 because they could not prove their alleged injuries. In other words, since potential government surveillance of their activities is done in secret, they can’t be sure that such surveillance took place, even if possible or even likely. The practical result is a legal regime in which the people most likely to become targets of the surveillance state are told, in effect, that they must wait until the government admits to its own wrongdoing, if it ever does. Such doctrine rewards opacity, discourages accountability, and converts constitutional limits into after-the-fact internal policy debates. A free society does not need to prove it is being watched before it can object to the creation of institutions engineered to snoop first and justify later.

Another perspective to judge such unconstitutional surveillance is the imposed cost, even when not aimed at a particular citizen. In Clapper, the plaintiffs described costly precautions taken to protect confidential communications, precautions the Court treated as self-inflicted for standing purposes. Yet those precautions are better understood as the rational price of uncertainty: when citizens cannot know whether their interactions with foreign sources, clients, colleagues, or family are subject to state capture, prudence demands self-censorship, detours, and silence. This burden falls especially hard on professions that depend on confidentiality, such as investigative journalists, advocacy groups, and legal counsel. The effect is fewer inquiries, fewer candid conversations, and fewer whistleblowers that might be identified by an algorithm or an analyst. As a result, the same surveillance state that should be met with a multitude of challenges from civil rights advocates chills its opposition into less resistance.

Americans should oppose Section 702 because it builds a durable exception to the Fourth Amendment. It vests immense surveillance discretion in the executive branch and invites political abuse, as the president knows from personal experience. It conscripts private companies as unwilling deputies to the intelligence community and treats the public like criminals-in-waiting. Predictably, citizens trim speech and associations when they suspect the state can catalog their correspondence. “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear” has never been an acceptable argument for the curtailment of privacy. A free people should not live by such a gross exception to liberty.

April 15, 2026 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Full Spectrum Dominance | , | Comments Off on Another Trump Flip Flop: From ‘Kill FISA’ to ‘Clean Renewal’

AIPAC ‘slimeball’ Eric Swalwell leaves the stage

Eric Swalwell’s office door highlights his utility to the forces that propelled his career.
By Max Blumenthal | The Grayzone | April 15, 2026

When he staged his first run for Congress in 2012, Eric Swalwell’s seemingly underdog campaign was aggressively propelled by AIPAC, Big Pharma, and corrupt land developers. Their target was Rep. Pete Stark, a legendary reformer and antiwar stalwart who had infuriated the Israel lobby with his consistent opposition to wars on Iraq and Lebanon.

At the end of their only debate, Stark called Swalwell a “slimeball,” a “fucking crook,” accused him of bribery, and predicted, “you’re going to jail.” Mainstream media condemned Stark as a bully in the throes of cognitive decline, while Swalwell became their darling. After the centrist 31-year-old prosecutor eked out a victory, The New Republic hailed him as a “costume-donning, prop-loving thirty something who ousted Pete Stark.” No mention was made of the bathrobe he donned in his now-notorious role as a liquor-sodden lothario.

In Congress, Swalwell provided a reliable rubber stamp for military aid to Israel while distinguishing himself as the most cartoonish promoters of the Russiagate hoax. When he ran for president in 2019 – polling around 0% throughout his campaign – he branded himself the “Guns and Russia” candidate, meaning he would restrict guns for Americans while forking over billions in military aid to Ukraine.

With Swalwell’s demise, Pete Stark may have gotten the last laugh. But in a Democratic Party that is hostile to class politics, overrun by corporate lobbyists and occupied by Israel, Swalwell was a prototype. In his wake, new slimeballs will rise to the surface.

April 15, 2026 Posted by | Corruption, Russophobia, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on AIPAC ‘slimeball’ Eric Swalwell leaves the stage

UAE to close its flagship Burj Al Arab hotel for 1.5 years after Iranian strikes

Press TV – April 15, 2026

The United Arab Emirates is to close its flagship Burj Al Arab hotel for one and a half years amid a sharp drop in tourist visits to the Persian Gulf country, caused by Iran’s retaliatory attacks against US bases in the region, a report says.

The Wednesday report by Middle East Eye said that Burj Al Arab’s owner company said in a statement a day earlier that it would begin a lengthy refurbishment operation amid a drop-off in tourism activity in the UAE and the wider region as a result of Iranian operations.

The Reuters news agency also quoted a staff member of the hotel as saying that guests with prior bookings will be accommodated in alternative nearby hotels during the closure period.

The famous sail-shaped hotel which is located in the city of Dubai, suffered damage from the unsuccessful interception of an Iranian drone in March, when Iran was carrying out attacks on US bases and interests in regional countries.

The attacks came after the US and Israel launched an aggression on Iran, bombing civilian targets across the country.

Iran swiftly responded by targeting US bases and companies across the region, including in the UAE, a key US ally in the region that allowed its soil to be used for attacks against the Islamic Republic.

Burj Al Arab’s owner company admitted in its statement that Iranian attacks on the UAE and other countries in the Persian Gulf had caused an exodus of foreign expats and tourists from the region.

Reports say that Iranian reprisal attacks have caused stock markets in Dubai and Abu Dhabi to lose more than $120 billion since the start of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran in late February.

The UAE has also been forced to cancel some 18,400 flights over the period.

Iran carried out nearly 1,500 attacks on targets in the UAE, reports suggest, making the country the second most notable target of such attacks after the Israeli regime over March and early April.

April 15, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on UAE to close its flagship Burj Al Arab hotel for 1.5 years after Iranian strikes

US-Israeli Mideast war damage to energy infrastructure may cost $58bln

Al Mayadeen | April 15, 2026

The cost of repairing energy-linked infrastructure damaged during the recent US-led escalation in the Middle East could reach as high as $58 billion, underscoring the scale of destruction inflicted across the region, Rystad Energy reported.

Rystad Energy estimates that oil and gas facilities alone could account for up to $50 billion of that total, reflecting extensive damage to some of the region’s most critical assets. The figure marks a sharp increase from $25 billion just weeks earlier, with the firm noting that “the scope of damage has expanded materially” as strikes intensified before a temporary ceasefire was reached between Washington and Tehran.

The bulk of the damage is concentrated in oil and gas infrastructure, the backbone of regional economies, with repair costs in this sector alone reaching up to $50 billion. Rystad noted that downstream refining and petrochemical assets account for the largest share of losses due to their technical complexity and the extent to which they were targeted in later stages of the war. However, the impact has extended further, affecting essential civilian and industrial facilities, including desalination plants, steel factories, and aluminum production sites, adding another $3 billion to $8 billion in losses.

Global fallout

Rystad stressed that the consequences extend far beyond the region, warning that rebuilding damaged infrastructure does not generate new energy capacity but instead diverts global resources, leading to project delays and inflationary pressure worldwide. The firm described the situation as “a stress test for the global energy supply chain,” noting that the same contractors, equipment, and engineering capacity required for repairs are already committed to major LNG and offshore projects launched in recent years.

This overlap is expected to slow the execution of new energy developments, as operators prioritize restoring existing production over advancing expansion projects.

As a result, recovery is increasingly shaped not by capital availability but by competition for access to constrained supply chains, logistics, and specialized labor.

April 15, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on US-Israeli Mideast war damage to energy infrastructure may cost $58bln

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