IRAN GOT NOTHING FROM the MoU – Nima Alkhorshid
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – July 10, 2026
The alliance is building a European production network for Tomahawks, ATACMS, Patriot interceptors, and Ukrainian strike drones
By Dmitry Kornev | RT | July 11, 2026
The NATO summit in Ankara hasn’t been dubbed a “missile summit” by anyone – yet it probably should be. More than anything else, the meeting marked the launch of several major missile programs that could fundamentally reshape Europe’s military landscape over the coming decade.
Germany is getting Tomahawks
Chancellor Friedrich Merz got what he had been pushing for – and not just him. The United States has effectively given Berlin the green light to acquire American Tomahawk cruise missiles.
”On the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara we also agreed with the American government that Tomahawk missiles would be purchased by us and stationed in Germany. With this we are closing an important strategic gap in our defense. And at the same time we will work on developing our own European systems and deploying them in Europe,” Merz announced.
The details remain unclear. Berlin has yet to specify exactly which Tomahawk variant it intends to buy. Most likely, however, these will be the ground-launched versions, meaning either the Typhon missile system or a new launcher built around the same family of cruise missiles.
What does this actually mean?
In practical terms, Germany would gain the ability to strike virtually any target in the western part of Central Russia. If similar systems were eventually deployed in the Baltic states, their range would extend as far as the Urals.
One can assume that the German leadership will sleep a little easier knowing it has such capabilities at its disposal. A few billion dollars may seem like a reasonable price for that kind of reassurance.
And what do the Americans get?
They no longer have to deploy their own Tomahawks across Europe to reassure NATO allies. Europe gets to strengthen its own defenses – and pay for them itself. From Washington’s perspective, that’s a remarkably efficient arrangement.
Patriot missiles – Made in Ukraine?
Arguably the biggest missile-related announcement for Ukraine came from President Donald Trump, who revealed plans to grant Kiev a license to manufacture missiles for the Patriot air defense system.
No European country currently possesses such a license. Japan is the only nation outside the United States that produces Patriot interceptors.
Trump said American and Ukrainian technical teams would now begin working on the practical details – drafting agreements and preparing production. For the moment, however, this remains a political declaration rather than an industrial reality.
Ukraine certainly retains significant missile expertise. But launching serial production of one of the world’s most technologically sophisticated interceptor missiles under current wartime conditions would be an extraordinarily difficult task.
Modern PAC-3 interceptors are produced only in the United States and Japan, while manufacturing many of their critical components remains tightly controlled.
Technology, however, isn’t the biggest obstacle. The war is.
Building a facility capable of producing Patriot missiles while Russian aerospace forces retain the ability to strike targets across Ukraine borders on fantasy.
Which means that “Ukrainian production” would likely end up being Ukrainian mostly on paper, while the actual factories would operate somewhere else in Europe.
And there is already no shortage of volunteers.
Everyone wants in
Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has already announced that Warsaw is prepared to help Ukraine establish serial Patriot missile production.
That statement wasn’t accidental.
At the same NATO summit, Poland joined a four-country European consortium that will create a regional competence center responsible for servicing Patriot missiles.
For a country that currently lacks a production license, cooperating with Ukraine could offer a path into one of the West’s most important missile supply chains. Historical grievances and nationalist rhetoric suddenly become far less significant when industrial opportunities emerge. Apparently, this is different.
Germany has even stronger incentives.
Defense giant Rheinmetall is already deeply involved in multiple joint programs with Ukraine and would almost certainly welcome the opportunity to manufacture Patriot missiles as well.
The company already possesses the technological expertise, industrial infrastructure, financial resources, and long-established partnerships needed to launch production quickly.
And once the assembly lines exist, there would be little reason to produce missiles solely for Ukraine. Rheinmetall could eventually supply customers throughout Europe – and beyond.
Nothing personal. Just business.
Germany will also build Ukraine’s ‘Bars’ cruise drones
The Patriot project isn’t the only new German-Ukrainian missile initiative.
As part of the Build with Ukraine program, Berlin and Kiev agreed to organize production of Ukrainian-designed Bars jet-powered cruise drones in Germany.
The agreement was signed in Ankara by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrey Sibiga and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.
The Bars is a lightweight high-speed strike drone carrying a warhead weighing between 30 and 100 kilograms, with a range of up to 800 kilometers and a cruising speed of roughly 500 km/h.
Germany currently produces no weapons of this type.
For the German defense industry, the project offers an opportunity to gain experience with an entirely new class of weapon systems. The Bundeswehr likewise gains familiarity with technology it does not yet field.
The primary customer, however, will be Ukraine itself.
At least initially, every drone produced under the program is expected to be delivered to the Ukrainian military, while Germany finances the entire project.
A fairly convenient arrangement.
A European Patriot ecosystem
The summit also produced another notable agreement.
The United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden signed a memorandum launching preparations for a European maintenance network for PAC-3 Patriot missiles.
The facilities will inspect, repair, and service missiles without sending them back to the United States.
Eventually there will likely be several such centers, one in each participating country.
Officially, these facilities are intended only for maintenance. Unofficially, virtually everyone understands where this is heading. Today’s repair center can become tomorrow’s production line.
For now, Washington appears reluctant to hand Europe full-scale manufacturing rights, preferring to preserve control over its most advanced technologies.
But that position may not last forever.
From an American perspective, collecting licensing royalties from European production could ultimately prove far more profitable than trying to supply an ever-growing European demand from shrinking US stockpiles.
From a business standpoint, that logic is difficult to ignore.
Germany again: ATACMS goes European
One more agreement attracted less attention than it probably deserved.
Lockheed Martin and Rheinmetall signed a memorandum to manufacture ATACMS ballistic missiles at Rheinmetall’s facility in Unterlüß, Germany.
It will be the first production of ATACMS missiles outside the United States.
The choice of location is hardly accidental.
The Unterlüß complex has operated for more than 125 years and now employs roughly 4,000 workers while continuing to expand.
Last year the site opened a new artillery ammunition production line.
A rocket motor factory is currently under construction and is scheduled to begin producing engines and missile components in 2027.
Rheinmetall expects full-scale ATACMS production to begin that same year, with output expanding significantly through 2028 and 2029.
Current European demand alone is estimated at between 600 and 800 missiles annually.
The bottom line
Given everything announced in Ankara, it’s difficult not to view this as NATO’s “missile summit.”
If even a significant portion of these plans materializes, Europe’s missile industry will look radically different within just a few years – and European taxpayers will foot nearly the entire bill.
Operational-tactical missiles? Yes.
Patriot interceptors? Yes.
Cruise missiles? Yes.
And this may only be the beginning.
Ukraine’s Fire Point company is already promoting its proposed FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles, systems that currently have no direct European equivalent. Add to that the Freya missile defense program, which envisions combining European components with Ukrainian interceptor technology, and the picture becomes even more ambitious.
As one famous fictional character of the twentieth century put it: “What a celebration this is!”
Europe certainly has reasons to be optimistic. It may well become a true missile power.
Or all of these announcements may ultimately end up where countless ambitious defense initiatives have before them – in a pile of press releases and billions of dollars spent without delivering the promised results.
That happens too.
Al-Manar | July 11, 2026
Iran has firmly rejected speculation that it initiated negotiations with the United States, while doubling down on its pledge to meet any American violation of commitments with immediate and reciprocal countermeasures.
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei categorically dismissed claims of a unilateral Iranian request for dialogue with Washington during a televised interview on Friday. However, he acknowledged that Tehran did engage with a Qatari delegation in the northeastern city of Mashhad—but clarified that the meeting occurred solely at the behest of a regional mediator seeking to facilitate discussions on recent developments, not as a US-directed overture.
Reaffirming the Islamic Republic’s steadfast doctrine of “commitment for commitment,” Baqaei stressed that Iran will not implement any obligation without corresponding action from the American side. He accused Washington of serial infractions, noting that the United States has breached the recently signed memorandum of understanding multiple times within just 22 days of its endorsement.
Specifically, Baqaei cited newly announced US restrictions on Iranian oil sales and the imposition of additional sanctions as flagrant violations of the agreement’s core articles. “Iran has already activated the necessary reciprocal responses, and this approach will continue with full force,” he declared.
Turning to multilateral forums, the spokesman dismissed the recent United Nations Security Council session on Iran’s nuclear file—convened at the request of the United States, Britain, and France—as entirely inconsequential. He argued that UN Security Council Resolution 2231 expired on October 18, 2025, rendering any subsequent reports on its implementation legally invalid and devoid of merit.
Baqaei also condemned persistent Western calls for inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities that were damaged in attacks by the Israeli regime and the United States. He criticized the international community for its failure to condemn those strikes, asserting that the silence constitutes a blatant disregard for clear violations of international law.
In a separate development, Baqaei confirmed that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is set to travel to Oman on Saturday for high-level consultations focused on the Strait of Hormuz and regional maritime safety. The visit follows several rounds of technical discussions between Tehran and Muscat aimed at facilitating secure navigation and finalizing arrangements for maritime services in the strategic waterway.
A shorter declaration masks deeper tensions, as Washington pushes to reshape NATO’s role from Europe to West Asia and Asia-Pacific.
By Mehmet Ali Guller | The Cradle | July 11, 2026
The six-point final declaration of the NATO Ankara Summit is among the shortest in recent years, similar to last year’s five-point declaration from The Hague. In contrast, the 2021 Brussels Summit declaration contained 79 points, Madrid in 2022 had 22, Vilnius in 2023 included 90, and Washington in 2024 featured 38.
The sharp reduction reflects ongoing tensions between the US and Europe. The declaration is brief because areas of agreement remain limited. The debate over NATO as a “paper tiger” has not been resolved, only set aside.
In the declaration, this issue is temporarily addressed through the slogan “a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO.”
Ankara Declaration targets Russia and Iran
The first article of the six-point Ankara declaration reaffirms commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, while the final article offers thanks to the host country.
The remaining four articles center on Russia, outline a $70 billion support package for Ukraine, expand defense spending, reference $50 billion in arms deals, and briefly touch on Iran.
The Donroe Doctrine and NATO 3.0
Washington is seeking to adapt NATO to what it frames as a new strategic phase, described here as NATO 3.0. The so-called Donroe Doctrine centers on consolidating dominance in the Western Hemisphere, shifting more responsibility onto allies in Europe and elsewhere, and encircling China in the Asia-Pacific through partnerships.
In practice, this takes three forms:
The political economy of NATO 3.0
Washington views militarization as the lever for the transformation of NATO 3.0. It has two key objectives: raising NATO members’ defense spending to 5 percent of GDP and building a new arms production chain. The first step was initiated in The Hague last year, and the second advanced in Ankara.
Pushing defense spending to 5 percent would generate a vast financial pool within a few years. Including NATO partners such as Japan would further expand the scale, creating a market that draws broad interest. The US aims to distribute this pool in a way that sustains the NATO 3.0 framework.
Alongside this sits the effort to construct a new arms supply chain. The approach is to retain control over core components while distributing subcomponent production across allies, linking them to one another and ultimately to Washington.
The $50 billion arms deals referenced in the declaration mark an initial step. The $10 billion NATO–South Korea agreement, which grants Seoul access to NATO’s joint defense procurement market, fits within this model.
A new military-industrial economy
For the Erdogan government, securing a share of expanding defense spending has become a priority. Ankara sees this as an opening for its defense sector, particularly through the state firm ASELSAN and the private company BAYKAR.
The Defense Industry Forum, long held as a side event at NATO summits, was included in the official program in Ankara for the first time, reflecting that shift.
Countries seeking a share of this expanding market and Washington’s effort to allocate that share in line with its strategy have converged.
The idea of a NATO Defense Bank is also on the agenda. Nine countries laid its groundwork during the Ankara summit. If realized, it would tie a military-industrial model more closely to financial capital.
Turkiye 3.0: NATO’s central frontline state
For Turkiye, NATO 3.0 also signals a new phase.
NATO 1.0 covers the period from the alliance’s founding to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In that time, Turkiye was integrated into US strategy, diluting its founding emphasis on independence and anti-imperialism, eroding aspects of its secular character through the Green Belt project, and absorbing its human capital within anti-communist programs.
NATO 2.0 spans the period from 1991 to 2026. In these years, NATO expanded toward Russia, dismantled Yugoslavia, and intervened across West Asia. Turkiye’s role was again shaped within US strategy, this time through “moderate Islamism.”
NATO 3.0 is defined by Europe taking on security responsibility against Russia, the pursuit of a West Asian order under Israeli dominance, and a strategic shift toward the Asia-Pacific.
Within this framework, Turkiye is positioned as a security enforcer for Europe, encouraged to normalize relations with Tel Aviv to secure a place in the regional order, and drawn into efforts aimed at countering Iran.
In effect, Turkiye is being placed at the center of NATO’s frontline. The naval command under construction in the Bosphorus is directed toward Russia, while the new NATO Corps headquarters in Adana is oriented toward West Asia and Iran.
Washington’s ‘Asian NATO’ objective
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte effectively represents US leadership within the alliance. His statements reflect Washington’s position rather than Europe’s.
His remarks before and during the summit pointed to a longer-term objective. Rutte argued that Russia was working closely with North Korea, China and Iran, adding that NATO “cannot be naive” and had to remain united.
At its core, NATO 3.0 reflects an effort to use the alliance first against Beijing’s partners—Russia and Iran—and, over time, against China itself. The push to reorient NATO toward Asia follows from this.
For the past four years, leaders of the IP4 countries have been invited to NATO summits. In Ankara, discussions with these states focused on expanding cooperation in defense industries and advanced technologies.
Washington is pressing these partners toward closer military alignment, at times resembling a sub-alliance—an “Asian NATO.” Proposals to open a NATO liaison office in Tokyo—though contested, notably by France—form part of this effort.
Washington, however, has continued to push for a broader NATO role in Asia. As Rutte put it, “The security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are closely interconnected,” reinforcing efforts to extend the alliance’s focus beyond its original geographic remit.
Expectations from NATO 3.0
Following the Ankara Summit, NATO 3.0 is expected to serve different priorities:
For countries across the Global South, NATO is widely viewed as an outdated military alliance whose role has run its course.
By Cindy Harper | Reclaim The Net | July 10, 2026
Federal officials set out to erase the online voices of Americans who said Covid vaccines had hurt them. A new appeal asks the Fifth Circuit to give those Americans their day in court.
The New Civil Liberties Alliance filed its opening brief on July 7, asking the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to revive Dressen v. Flaherty.
We obtained a copy of the brief for you here.
A federal judge in Texas had thrown the case out before a single document changed hands in discovery. The suit accuses the Biden administration of running a joint government and private censorship operation against people who went online to talk about vaccine injuries.
Brianne Dressen alleges she was injured after she volunteered for an AstraZeneca vaccine trial. Shaun Barcavage, Kristi Dobbs, Nikki Holland, and Suzanna Newell each reportedly suffered serious, debilitating injuries after Covid vaccination. Ernest Ramirez was vaccinated without incident and then lost his healthy 16-year-old son five days after the boy received his first Pfizer dose. The autopsy pointed to an enlarged heart and myocarditis.
They did what people in pain tend to do. They went to social media to trade medical research, look for treatments, share hopeful stories, and find others who understood. For many of them, closed online support groups became a lifeline.
The government treated that lifeline as a threat. The Surgeon General’s Office, the CDC, HHS, DHS, CISA, and the White House leaned on social media companies to flag this speech as “misinformation,” shadow-ban it, or delete it outright.
The operation reached across agencies and into the platforms themselves, coercing and colluding with the companies that decide who gets to be heard.
Stanford supplied the machinery. The now-defunct Stanford Internet Observatory and its “Virality Project” tracked posts and handed the platforms lists of speech to suppress.
The Virality Project targeted Covid-vaccine speech that broke from the administration’s preferred policies, whether or not that speech was accurate. Real accounts of real injuries got flagged because they were inconvenient, not because they were false.
The censors were specific about their targets. Their tracking called out Bri Dressen by name. A woman reportedly injured in a vaccine trial, describing what happened to her own body, became something a federal effort wanted the public not to see.
None of that was enough for the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which dismissed the case at the pleading stage. The plaintiffs had laid out a detailed factual account of a nationwide censorship conspiracy, and the court closed the door before discovery could begin.
NCLA’s brief says the district court got the law wrong in several ways. The judge set too narrow and exacting a bar on personal jurisdiction and used it to wave off the Stanford defendants and the individual government officials.
The court also misread the Supreme Court’s decision in Murthy v. Missouri, which weighed whether a different set of NCLA clients had shown enough to win a preliminary injunction. No injunction is being sought here, so that higher standard does not govern this case.
The brief argues, the court made a further error on the civil-rights conspiracy claim. It tossed the plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S. Code Section 1985(3) on the theory that they had not alleged racial discrimination. The statute never mentions race. It protects “any person or class of persons” stripped of their rights through an invidiously discriminatory conspiracy, and the Supreme Court has said the provision can reach non-racial classes.
“To call what happened to our clients ‘troubling’ is a massive understatement. After suffering devastating medical injuries following Covid vaccination, they turned to social media as a lifeline for support and connection with others who understood. Rather than compassion or aid, the Government responded with relentless censorship, maligning them as liars and conspiracy theorists and cutting off the lifelines that they depended on.
“Their only offense was that their lived experiences, pain, and even private conversations in online support groups contradicted the Administration’s preferred Covid-vaccine narrative. The cruelty and injustice are difficult to overstate,” said Casey Norman, Litigation Counsel at NCLA.
The appeal also presses a point the district court skipped over. Censorship harms more than the person silenced.
“We are confident the Fifth Circuit will correct the District Court’s numerous errors in dismissing the complaint, which included taking an inappropriately narrow view of personal jurisdiction and ignoring that not just speakers, but also potential listeners, suffer harm resulting from unlawful government censorship,” said Caitlin Moyna, Senior Litigation Counsel at NCLA.
The stakes reach past these six plaintiffs. If courts keep reading Murthy as a wall against every censorship suit, the government gains a template for silencing people with almost no risk of accountability.
“Lower courts are misapplying the Supreme Court’s Murthy v. Missouri decision, and the ruling below here is a prime example. The Murthy decision set a high bar for standing in the context of a preliminary injunction to stop future censorship. But no PI was sought here, so the Murthy standard is not applicable. If Bri Dressen cannot satisfy standing—when the defendants called her out by name in their censorship tracking—then no one will,” said Mark Chenoweth, President and Chief Legal Officer of NCLA.
According to NCLA, the campaign still burdens its clients’ ability to speak, to associate privately, and to exchange information with others in closed support groups.
The question in front of the Fifth Circuit is whether Americans silenced by their own government can even make their case to a jury, or whether the courthouse door stays shut before anyone looks at the evidence.
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – July 10, 2026
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – July 10, 2026
Al Mayadeen | July 10, 2026
Türkiye has sold its S-400 air defense systems to an unnamed Gulf country, with the announcement expected to be made on Friday.
Turkish newspaper, Hürriyet journalist Abdulkadir Selvi reported that an informed source told him Ankara finalized the sale of its S-400 systems after a deal was approved overnight on Friday.
He added that the speculated buyers are either the UAE or Qatar, noting that the information will remain unknown until an official statement is made.
Selvi noted that the US assets in the UAE being targeted by retaliatory Iranian strikes during the war on Iran were a cause for wanting an increased air defense presence. He added that the attacks “crippled the UAE’s tourism-based system,” adding that it “has been trying to acquire alternative defense systems” after the Iranian retaliation.
He also brought up the Israeli attack on Qatar last year as a significant reason why Doha may want new air defense systems, as Qatar’s Patriot missile system did not activate during the attack on the Hamas officials in the capital city due to “Israel” being coded as a friendly country.
“Qatar learned from this shock attack that it was unprotected against Israel,” Selvi said.
The Hürriyet journalist reported that regardless of which Gulf state the S-400 goes to, Türkiye seeks to gain freedom from US sanctions from the sale.
Ankara is currently a target of the American sanctions package, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which mandates penalties for entities that participate in “significant transactions” with the Russian defense or intelligence sectors.
The sale of the Russian-made S-400 systems could give Türkiye the break it needs to relieve itself of these sanctions that have barred it from the F-35 fighter jet program.
It is worth noting that US President Donald Trump signaled at returning Türkiye to the F-35 fighter jet program after a years-long ban, which caused tears in the relationship between Ankara and Washington.
Sputnik – 10.07.2026
The Russian military’s strategy of combined aerial attacks, involving waves of strike drones followed up by ballistic, cruise or hypersonic missiles, has proven highly effective not only in the Ukrainian theater, but Iran’s defense against US and Israeli aggression, says Russian defense analyst Alexander Stepanov.
The tactic, almost impossible to defend against, involves:
Patriots, the last line of defense in Kiev’s arsenal, have four missiles per launcher in their PAC-2 variant, and up to 16 in PAC-3. Typically, two missiles are assigned to a single target.
Playing the Numbers Game
When Russia launches hundreds of projectiles across multiple waves, defense essentially becomes impossible, and involves expending interceptors which cost tens if not hundreds of times more than the strike systems they’re targeting ($4.2-5.3M per Patriot interceptor, compared to tens of thousands of dollars in the case of Geran drones).
“All these points create extreme vulnerabilities for SAM operators forced to respond quickly to serious threats, including in the context of massive combined attacks,” Stepanov says.
“Even if they manage to repel the first wave of attack drones, [the next waves include] ballistic weapons, high-precision missiles that can fly along a quasi-ballistic trajectory, including Iskanders, and hypersonic ones, like Zircons and the air-launched Kinzhals.”
“There is a clear understanding that the equipment being shipped, primarily through NATO countries and the United States, are incapable of countering these speeds. We saw this as well in the Iranian campaign, when expensive systems, including THAAD over-the-horizon interceptors, failed to cope with attacks and were destroyed, along with expensive radars and the regional component of the US’s global early warning system,” Stepanov summed up.
By Lucas Leiroz | July 10, 2026
Tensions between the US and Denmark over Greenland continue to rise. US President Donald Trump refuses to change his stance regarding the alleged “need” for the US to control Greenland, while the Danish government emphasizes that it will defend its territory by all possible means – even using military force, if necessary. The major issue, however, is that both countries are members of the same military alliance. Denmark believes it would be supported by its partners in a potential conflict with the US, ignoring the fact that NATO is historically led by Washington.
The issue of Greenland was one of the topics discussed at the recent NATO summit in Ankara. During a joint press conference with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Trump confirmed that he remains interested in acquiring control of the region. He argued that Greenland should not remain associated to Denmark, as the two entities provide no mutual benefit and are, in practice, supposedly already de facto separate. He therefore believes there should be a definitive transition to American control, given that the US has greater interests and a better capacity to “help Greenland” than Denmark does.
“That should be controlled by the United States, not by Denmark (…) Greenland does not help Denmark. Denmark does not really spend money to help Greenland,” he said.
His statement was immediately responded by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, who also attended the meeting in Ankara. She not only affirmed Denmark’s readiness to defend its territory – including through military means – but also stated that NATO would defend Denmark in such a scenario. According to her, NATO’s collective defense clause applies to any instance of military aggression against a member state, regardless of the aggressor state. Consequently, if the US were to attack Danish territory to annex Greenland, the entire alliance would be expected to stand with Denmark against the US.
“[The US is] an erstwhile friend (…) We are ready to defend any inch of NATO, including our own territory (…) [And] the same goes for the US,” she said.
In theory, the Danish Prime Minister is correct. NATO should protect its members, even in the event of a war against another member of the alliance. However, in practice, that is not what would happen. The US is the leading nation within NATO. The organization was established during the Cold War as a collective defense bloc for Western nations, all of which are under the American nuclear umbrella. Although NATO member states formally retain sovereignty, in practice, the alliance is nothing more than an “international army” at the service of Washington [and ultimately Israel]. Therefore, it is entirely illogical to expect NATO to go to war against the US to protect a European country.
Tensions between the US and Europe have been rising since Trump took office. The US president demands greater defense investment and combat readiness from Europeans to assist the US (especially in the Middle East). Europeans are failing to meet the alliance’s financial targets and refuse to participate in the conflict in the Middle East. On the other hand, they remain engaged in an irrational war campaign against Russia and are promoting a plan for continental militarization, attempting to gain greater defense “autonomy”.
If European militarization plans succeed, Denmark might secure some international support in the event of a conflict with the US. However, it is entirely irrational to expect US-led NATO to fight against the US itself. In a scenario involving military engagement between the US and Denmark (or any other alliance member), NATO countries would face only two options: support the US or remain neutral.
However, it is questionable whether Frederiksen truly believes her own words. She may be promoting such rhetoric just to encourage European militarization or to appease Danish public opinion, thereby attempting to project an image of political strength that she has failed to cultivate until now. In any case, Trump is serious about annexing Greenland, as control over this territory is vital to his plans for American expansion into the Arctic. Trump considers European nations unable to assist with his Arctic strategy and therefore wants the US to control key territories in the region.
As the crisis deepens, both Denmark and the US seem to ignore the will of the local Greenlandic people. The region is inhabited by an indigenous Inuit majority. The local population was historically persecuted by the Danes, who carried out campaigns of apartheid, ethnic cleansing, and forced population reduction. Now, the US – which also has a history of severe persecution against indigenous peoples – seeks to annex the region without even consulting the local population.
The international community – especially international law and human rights organizations – should intervene directly in this matter, emphasizing the need to prioritize the Greenlandic people’s right to self-determination.
Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert.
You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.
By Harrison Berger | The American Conservative | July 5, 2026
Amid record-high public hostility toward Israel and the wars taxpayers are financing on its behalf, the Israel lobby has mobilized to pass a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2027 which includes language designed to sustain the years long wealth transfer from Americans to Israelis and cement that relationship in ways that would be less transparent and more difficult to challenge through democratic processes.
At the same time, a coalition led by outgoing Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) has launched a counteroffensive to block a separate track of funding for Israel’s wars, targeting the transfer of $3.3 billion to Israel embedded within the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2027, which is also up for vote this summer.
The first bill—the NDAA—was highlighted by The American Conservative earlier this month. It includes language within its Section 224 (since renumbered Section 219 in the House) that would direct the Pentagon to identify Israeli-origin technologies “for potential integration into United States systems and programs of record” and to build “United States-based co-production or manufacturing partnerships with Israeli industry.” Section 219, if enacted, “would be unprecedented,” Annelle Sheline of the Quincy Institute told TAC. “No other foreign country has an executive agent in the Pentagon to integrate our military industrial complex with theirs.”
Along with merging Israeli and American weapons technology and data, Section 219 would shift funding for Israeli weaponry from Congress to the Pentagon’s murky procurement system.
“This so clearly seems to be an attempt to shield money from cratering public opinion,” Sheline said. She noted that “Americans do not want to fund a country engaged in genocide and which led us into the Iran War,” adding that, rather than representing public opinion and cutting off Israel’s funding, Congress has moved to conceal it.
Such a merger carries inherent national security risks. The presence of foreign components in U.S. systems raises the threat those systems’ integrity will be compromised, a danger heightened in this case by Israel’s demonstrated capability and willingness to weaponize supply chains, as exhibited in their 2024 attack that involved the detonation of thousands of pagers which had been engineered into remote-controlled bombs. Joe Kent, the former director of the National Center for Counterterrorism, argues similarly that “the dangers of allowing any other nation to access our sensitive military technologies are obvious, including the fact that back doors and spyware can be installed that will most certainly be used by the Israelis to influence U.S. policy.”
But Section 219 of the NDAA would hinder American national security in much more immediate ways, principally by reducing the leverage Washington currently maintains to influence Israeli behavior in the region. “At present,” Sheline explains, “Israel is dependent on U.S. weapons and components, particularly their air force.” That U.S. support has enabled the Israelis to perpetrate a genocide in Gaza, ethnically cleanse southern Lebanon, and launch two wars against Iran, with Israel’s defense minister recently threatening a third.
“The U.S. could at present use leverage to change that Israeli behavior,” Sheline says. But by merging U.S. and Israeli weapons development, “this legislation would reverse it so that the [Israelis] could do that to us.”
Despite the various threats to American national security posed by the provision, section 219 this week moved closer to its expected final passage, with the House Rules Committee on Monday rejecting a bipartisan amendment introduced by Reps. Ro Khanna (D-CA) and Thomas Massie (R-KY) that would have stripped the “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative” from the NDAA.
Massie’s efforts to stop a separate track for Israel funding attached to the State Department’s spending bill may be more successful. His other amendment—which seeks to eliminate $3.3 billion in annual funding for Israel tied to a 10-year, $38 billion MoU—has reportedly provoked panic among House Democrats, who face pressure from constituents with record-low views of Israel.
Punchbowl News reported that House Democrats “expressed alarm” in a closed meeting and were “begging for leadership guidance” on how to vote while Axios reported on Wednesday that Democrats “fear intense backlash from their base if they oppose” Massie’s amendment to halt Israel funding. Democrats who continue to support wealth transfers from the American tax base to Israelis are aware that doing so comes with the heightened risk of being unseated for it, with the recent ouster of Israel First Democrats Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY) and Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO) serving as a warning to any Democrats who continue to defy the will of the Democratic Party base.
The Massie amendment to cut off funds for Israeli offensive weaponry “may end up being the last time these sorts of votes are meaningful,” says Sheline. “If we proceed with defense industrial integration (Section 219), congress won’t be able to vote on it again.”
Harrison Berger is a correspondent at The American Conservative. He has contributed to Drop Site News, The Nation, and Responsible Statecraft. Previously, he was a researcher and producer for System Update with Glenn Greenwald. His work focuses on civil liberties and U.S. foreign policy. He studied Political Science and Russian Studies at Union College (NY).
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | July 9, 2026
The drama over the Strait of Hormuz escalated on Wednesday with Donald Trump declaring the MoU with Iran is dead and vowed more attacks on Iran. Trump continues to insist that Iran has no right to interfere with any ship trying to transit the Strait of Hormuz, but the fact is that Iran is acting within its rights under the terms spelled out in paragraph five of the MoU (which I discussed in my previous post). The US attack on Iranian outposts along the shore of the Persian Gulf on Tuesday was a set up — i.e., the US coordinated with Qatar and Saudi Arabia to have their ships defy the Iranian protocol to register the voyage with the IRGC, which precipitated the Iranian attack on those vessels. While falsely claiming this was a violation of the MoU, Donald Trump hit Iran with bombs starting late Tuesday night/early Wednesday morning Iranian time.
Unlike the previous incidents on June 25 and June 26, where Iran hit non-compliant ships and the US did a one-off airstrike on Iranian positions on the shore of the Strait of Hormuz following each incident, Trump launched a new series of attacks on Iran on July 8 (Wednesday) even though Iran had not attacked another ship. Why did Trump do this? Was it retaliation for some anti-ship missiles fired at the US Carrier Strike Group operating 200 miles off the coast of Iran? That’s my hypothesis… One or more missiles hit one or more US vessels, causing some damage that has not been reported publicly.
Trump’s Wednesday strikes doubled the size of the ones he ordered on Tuesday. Iran, in response, launched ballistic missiles and drones at US bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Muwaffaq al Salti airbase in Jordan. I have no reports regarding physical battle damage. However, the Trump attack prompted an ominous warning from the spokesman for Iranian Parliament’s National Security Committee, who stated that a renewed US attack will be answered with a change in nuclear doctrine. He also said:
➡ In any future confrontation, the enemy will face a comprehensive, all-out surprise offensive from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
➡ We have many options available that were not even used during the 40-day war.
➡ Options such as withdrawal from the NPT, changing nuclear doctrine, and closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait alongside the Strait of Hormuz are on the table for review.
➡ A bill for NPT withdrawal is also ready for review in parliament — and if Iran faces an existential threat, a change in nuclear doctrine could also be put on the agenda
Pressure is growing in Iran to withdraw from the MoU. The US has violated almost every section of the MoU while Iran has assiduously adhered to it — including keeping Hezbollah from going on the offensive against the Israelis. Trump’s Secretary of the Treasury announced on July 7 that the US would reinstate oil sanctions on Iran, which marks another clear violation of the MoU.
According to vesselfinder.com, the activity in the Strait of Hormuz as I write this article is scant, but the ships transiting the straight are abiding by Iran’s PGSA protocols. If Trump opts to continue attacking Iran on Thursday then I believe that Iran will expand the scope and severity of its retaliatory strikes. Without some immediate concessions from the US, I believe that Iran will agree with Trump — i.e., “The MoU is dead.”