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Iran Has Won the War, It Will Be Up to the US to Secure the Peace: Mohammad Marandi

Sputnik – 11.04.2026

Whether or not Iran-US peace negotiations succeed depends entirely on the American side, renowned international affairs commentator Dr. Mohammad Marandi told Sputnik, commenting on Saturday’s unprecedented face-to-face talks in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Iran didn’t start the war, it wasn’t the one to escalate it, and it wasn’t the one to call for a halt in hostilities. Accordingly, the crisis can be resolved in one of only two ways, Marandi says.

“Either the Americans are sincere or they’re forced to be sincere, and they implement what they said they will do, or not. If they are unwilling to do so, the Iranian delegation will go back to Tehran,” the Gulf crisis will continue and the global economic picture will continue to deteriorate.

Iran Cares About Facts on the Ground, Not Signals or Signatures

“For the Iranians, what is important is that the facts on the ground change. The signature of the US vice president or president has no value for Iranians,” Marandi stressed.

Iran remembers that twice in less than a year, the US engaged in negotiations while conspiring to attack. Accordingly, whether talks succeed or not, “Iran is prepared” for what comes next, including a continuation of the war if necessary.

Marandi emphasized that the strength and resilience shown by Iran and the Axis of Resistance over the past weeks are the only reasons the US is at the negotiating table today.

US Must Choose: ‘Israel First’ or ‘America First’

Significant progress in negotiations with Iran can be achieved if the Trump administration pursues a genuinely America First policy, the academic believes.

“If they continue to be under the influence of Israeli Firsters, then I think the Iranians will be prepared to go back to Tehran without any agreement whatsoever. For Iran, both scenarios are acceptable. We are not concerned either way,” Marandi said.

US in No Position to Dictate Terms

The US “has not succeeded on the battlefield” and “there’s no reason for them to believe that they will win at the negotiating table,” the observer noted.

“What the Iranians are demanding is justice, and Iran is not making any excessive demands,” Marandi said, referencing Tehran’s 10-point ceasefire plan.

One of these demands is war reparations.

Iran “will get those reparations from the Strait of Hormuz, whether the Americans like it or not. But if the Americans want to prevent the collapse of the global economy they will discontinue obeying the Zionist Lobby and make decisions based on their interests,” Marandi stressed.

Whatever happens, “Iran is not going to give up its sovereignty… and the Axis of Resistance is unwilling to submit to the Empire,” he summed up.

April 11, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Iran Has Won the War, It Will Be Up to the US to Secure the Peace: Mohammad Marandi

Iran condemns assassination threats against Iranian negotiators amid US talks

Press TV – April 11, 2026

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei has called for public condemnation of the assassination threats leveled against Iranian negotiators amid ongoing talks with the United States that are aimed at permanently ending the US-Israeli aggression against the country.

In a post on his X account on Saturday, Baghaei said threats in the US government and media space for assassinating the Iranian negotiators, in case the current talks fail, are part of a discourse that seeks to normalize extortion through violence.

“Is this not, in effect, a policy discourse that normalizes extortion through the threat or public incitement of terror, violence, and manslaughter?” he said in the post.

The spokesman, who is himself accompanying the Iranian delegation in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad for the negotiations with the US, said the threats have come amid claims by the US government accusing Iran of lacking good faith and engaging in extortion amid the talks.

“This express public incitement for state terrorism must be denounced by all,” said Baghaei.

Experts believe the far-right political camp in the US is obviously dismayed by the outcome of the US-Israeli aggression on Iran, which began in late February and ended in a Pakistani-mediated two-week ceasefire last week.

The aggression started and continued with the assassination of senior Iranian political and military leaders, aimed at bringing about a regime change in Iran.

However, the US government finally accepted Iran’s conditions as a baseline for launching the current negotiations in Pakistan.

Iranian authorities have indicated that they would seek compensation for all assassinations committed by the US and the Israeli regime in Iran.

April 11, 2026 Posted by | Mainstream Media, Warmongering, War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Iran condemns assassination threats against Iranian negotiators amid US talks

Israel’s Iran War: Myth and Reality

Israel’s press paints a very different picture than that circulated by its flunkies and apologists

By Mouin Rabbani | April 11, 2026

According to the Hasbara Symphony Orchestra, Israel’s latest war against Iran was an astounding triumph and the country remains dizzy with success.

More precisely, we should speak of Israel’s invaluable contribution to an enormous US strategic victory, because the suggestion that the war primarily served Israeli rather than US interests, or that Israel played a central role in Washington’s decision to launch this war is an anti-Semitic blood libel.

Yet the Israeli press tells a very different story. Its views are of course not uniform, but across the political spectrum a fairly consistent assessment emerges:

1. Israel’s greatest success was Netanyahu’s ability to persuade Trump to launch this war. In Trump, Netanyahu finally found his mark.

2. This achievement is also a very sharp double-edged sword. It was from the outset an unpopular war in the US, dividing even the MAGA right. If responsibility for this war is placed at the feet of Israel, and particularly if it is seen in the US as a failed adventure that weakens the US position regionally and globally, the negative ramifications for Israel could have strategic consequences. Not so much because of reduced US power, but rather on account of the fallout this could have on the US-Israeli relationship.

3. Israel scored many tactical successes but failed to achieve its war objectives. If the war ends, and the Islamic Republic is not overthrown, it will have been a costly failure. Debate continues over whether Israel’s objectives were realistic and attainable, and whether Israel’s leadership raised false expectations among the Israeli public.

4. Despite the damage inflicted on Iran it has thus far emerged strengthened from this war. The Islamic Republic did not collapse, it demonstrated an ability to retaliate and inflict damage of its own throughout the war, and most importantly was able to establish its control over the Strait of Hormuz with all this entails for the global economy. In other words, Israel’s war objectives will not be extracted from Iran by the US around the negotiating table, because Tehran has no reason to capitulate.

5. If Israel is compelled to end its war against Lebanon before defeating Hizballah, this will be a political catastrophe.

6. The main losers of this war are the Arab states, particularly those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The good news for Israel is the sharp deterioration in their relations with Iran. But Arab governments are unlikely to respond by strengthening relations with Israel, and perhaps also not with the US, because they see Washington and particularly Israel as responsible for their misfortune. And when push came to shove they proved to be exorbitantly expensive yet unreliable allies. (On this point commentary is more divided, and some anticipate closer relations).

As far as Israeli media is concerned this is not a final verdict, because the war is not necessarily over and even when it is it will take time for its full impact to be revealed. But thus far, at least, it is painting a very different picture than that served up by its flunkies and apologists abroad.

Between the lines, the conclusion is clear: in Iran, Israel’s new national security doctrine of eliminating any challenge to its regional hegemony, and of ensuring that any threat is nipped in the bud before it emerges, has been overtaken by reality.

April 11, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Israel’s Iran War: Myth and Reality

Between war and industrial breakdown: The US-Israeli attrition crisis

The Cradle | April 10, 2026

The US–Israeli war on Iran has laid bare a structural crisis at the heart of Washington’s war machine – one that calls into question its ability to sustain prolonged conflict, let alone replenish what it expends.

In the opening weeks alone, vast stockpiles of missiles, aircraft, and precision-guided munitions – from Tomahawk and ATACMS to Patriot, THAAD, and Arrow interceptors – were burned through at a staggering pace.

Battlefield attrition is rapidly translating into an industrial reckoning, exposing the limits of US and Israeli capacity to reproduce high-end weaponry at the pace modern war demands.

Firepower without endurance

According to a report issued by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 24 March, the first 16 days of the war saw the use of 11,294 munitions at a direct cost of $26 billion. Reparations could push that figure beyond $50 billion. But the financial toll only tells part of the story.

In the first 96 hours alone, coalition forces launched 5,197 munitions across 35 categories – one of the most intense air campaigns in modern warfare. The scale of consumption quickly overwhelmed the logic of industrial replenishment.

Air defense systems bore the brunt. US and Gulf batteries fired 943 Patriot interceptors in just four days – roughly equivalent to 18 months of production. THAAD systems followed a similar trajectory, with 145 missiles expended, consuming more than a third of the estimated stockpiles.

On the Israeli side, the pressure was even sharper. Arrow interceptor reserves dropped by more than half within the same period. Rebuilding that stockpile could take nearly 32 months. What initially appeared as heavy usage rapidly revealed itself as a structural imbalance.

The cost of those first four days alone ranged between $10bn and $16bn, rising to $20bn when factoring in aircraft and system losses. Worse still, degradation of radar and satellite infrastructure reduced interception efficiency, forcing operators to fire multiple missiles at single targets – in some cases up to 11 interceptors for one incoming threat.

Strategic weapons, empty warehouses

Offensive systems followed the same pattern. In the opening phase, 225 ATACMS and PrSM missiles were fired – core assets designed for deep precision strikes. Alongside them, more than 500 Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched over 16 days.

Replenishing those Tomahawks alone could take up to 53 months – more than four years of uninterrupted production. In practical terms, this means the US cannot replicate the same level of sustained bombardment in any near-term confrontation.

JASSM-ER missiles (precision-guided air-to-ground missiles), each costing over $1 million, were used in large numbers against Iranian radar and communications nodes. Their production cycles depend on advanced electronic components already under strain from global supply bottlenecks. HARM anti-radiation missiles were also heavily deployed, eating into stockpiles originally intended for the European theater.

Precision came at a strategic cost. Every successful strike depleted assets that cannot be quickly replaced.

The use of eight GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators in the first 96 hours – nearly a quarter of available inventory – underscored the intensity of the opening assault on hardened Iranian facilities. Thousands of JDAM kits followed, draining stocks of the guidance systems that convert conventional bombs into precision weapons.

Small-diameter bombs were used in what the report described as near “suicidal” quantities, particularly against mobile launchers. Meanwhile, bunker-busting BLU-109 bombs were expended continuously, pushing global inventories toward depletion within two weeks.

When air superiority breaks

The downing of an F-15E Strike Eagle inside Iranian territory on 3 April marked a turning point. It shattered the assumption of uncontested air dominance and revealed the cascading costs of even a single tactical loss.

The incident triggered a complex rescue operation that quickly spiraled. Alongside the destroyed fighter jet, an A-10 Thunderbolt II was lost, helicopters were hit, and additional assets were damaged or abandoned.

At the peak of the operation, US forces destroyed two MC-130 transport aircraft and four special operations helicopters to prevent their capture. MQ-9 drones were also shot down, adding to the tally.

Direct losses from this single incident exceeded $500 million. But the real cost lies elsewhere.

The rescue mission involved 155 aircraft, hundreds of personnel, and stretched over two days inside hostile territory. To recover a single crew, Washington expended vast operational resources, exposing a deeper vulnerability: high-value platforms can trigger disproportionate losses when confronted with layered defenses.

Iranian air defenses also reportedly struck an F-35 and downed multiple drones, while friendly fire incidents added further strain. Superiority, once assumed, is now conditional.

Supply chains as the new battlefield

US war spending surpassed $45 billion within just over a month, according to tracking data based on Pentagon reporting to Congress. Daily costs eventually reached $1 billion.

Yet the more consequential crisis lies not in expenditure, but in production.

Rebuilding munitions used in the first four days alone requires 92 tons of copper, 137 kilograms of neodymium, 18 kilograms of gallium, 37 kilograms of tantalum, seven kilograms of dysprosium, and 600 tons of ammonium perchlorate – a critical component for solid-fuel rockets.

The US depends on a single domestic source for ammonium perchlorate. At the same time, China dominates global supply chains, controlling 98 percent of gallium production, 90 percent of neodymium processing, and 99 percent of dysprosium.

Rebuilding just the first four days of munitions expenditure alone would require tens of tons of critical minerals and hundreds of tons of rocket propellant inputs, tying any recovery effort directly to these constrained supply chains.

Military power is now tethered to geoeconomic realities beyond Washington’s control, turning industrial recovery into a strategic vulnerability. Replenishment runs up against supply chains shaped by global resource flows that sit firmly outside the Atlanticist sphere.

In practical terms, this means that even unlimited funding cannot accelerate production without access to these materials, placing a hard ceiling on how quickly stockpiles can be rebuilt.

The cost imbalance trap

Beyond sheer consumption, the war exposes a deeper flaw in how interception works.

Air defense systems rely on expensive interceptors to neutralize low-cost threats. Iranian drones and missiles, often built at a fraction of the cost, have pushed the US and its allies into an unsustainable exchange ratio.

Even as Iranian attack rates dropped by 80 to 90 percent after the opening phase, pressure did not ease. Daily barrages of roughly 33 missiles and 94 drones continued to drain defensive stockpiles.

Close-in systems like C-RAM fired over 509,500 rounds at a cost of just $25 million, while interceptor missiles consumed at least $19 billion. This imbalance forces advanced militaries to burn through their most sophisticated systems far faster than their adversaries can replace losses, unless viable “cheap defeat” options are developed.

An industrial base that cannot surge

The structure of the US defense industry compounds the problem. Despite rising demand, production has not meaningfully increased.

Defense contractors remain hesitant to expand capacity without guaranteed long-term contracts. Repeated cycles of political promises followed by funding reversals have left industry wary of overcommitting.

Key facilities, such as the Holston Army Ammunition Plant – the backbone of US ammonium perchlorate production – operate under fixed capacity, exposing a critical bottleneck at the heart of the US missile supply chain.

The consequences extend far beyond the Iran theater. Every missile fired here reduces Washington’s ability to project power elsewhere.

The depletion of more than 500 Tomahawks, alongside dwindling interceptor reserves, weakens US deterrence across multiple fronts – from East Asia to Eastern Europe. The war imposes a “second front tax,” forcing the US to choose between sustaining current operations and preserving its broader deterrence posture.

A myth unraveling

The war on Iran strips away the illusion of limitless western military superiority. Technological advantage remains, but it no longer guarantees endurance.

Missiles can hit their targets. Aircraft can penetrate defenses. But without the industrial capacity to sustain operations, every strike draws down future capability.

This war exposes the limits of US-Israeli power and points to a new strategic equation, where industrial resilience outweighs firepower. The ability to sustain production, rather than deliver precision strikes, increasingly defines military power in a prolonged conflict.

In that equation, Washington is no longer dominant.

April 11, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | | Comments Off on Between war and industrial breakdown: The US-Israeli attrition crisis

Pressure builds on Iran to ‘drop’ Lebanon ceasefire demand as Islamabad talks hang in balance

The Cradle | April 11, 2026

Pakistani officials are pressuring the Iranian delegation in Islamabad to enter talks with their US counterparts by “dropping” demands for a ceasefire in Lebanon, according to information obtained by Lebanese journalist and The Cradle columnist Dr. Mohamad Hassan Sweidan.

“The authorities in Lebanon have agreed to postpone the ceasefire and to discuss it directly with Tel Aviv; therefore, you cannot exert pressure in a direction that contradicts what the Lebanese themselves have accepted,” the Iranian delegation was informed on 11 April, according to Sweidan’s sources.

Nevertheless, Iranian officials have expressed that their position on a region-wide ceasefire remains firm, revealing that a final resolution to halt the attacks is a “condition for the success of the negotiations — not merely a request.”

“If the Iranian delegation reaches the conviction that the US side is not serious and that the negotiations will not lead to the desired results, it will withdraw and return to Tehran,” Sweidan stressed.

According to his sources, coordination exists between the Iranian delegation and the leadership of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Officials from Iran and the US arrived in the Pakistani capital on Saturday for the first round of indirect negotiations toward a possible ceasefire.

The Iranian delegation is led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

US Vice President JD Vance is leading the delegation for his country. He is accompanied by Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and special envoy Steve Witkoff.

According to reports on Iranian TV, Tehran has set clear red lines for Saturday’s talks: control of the Strait of Hormuz, war reparations, the release of frozen assets, and a permanent ceasefire on all fronts in the region.

Soon after Iran and the US agreed to a brittle ceasefire earlier this week, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam demanded his country not be included in the process.

Since then, the Lebanese government has agreed to hold direct talks with Israeli officials in Washington, which many in the country view as an attempt to normalize relations with Israel and “weaken” the Lebanese resistance by prolonging the war.

The push to be excluded from the regional ceasefire came despite a wave of Israeli terror attacks across Lebanon this week that killed over 300 Lebanese and injured over 1,000, including several members of the state security forces.

According to Lebanese journalist Hassan Illaik, in recent days, Arab and European diplomats were told by a close adviser to Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, “The war must continue until Hezbollah is eliminated.”

Senior Hezbollah official and member of Lebanese parliament, Hassan Fadlallah, on Saturday condemned the push by Beirut as a “blatant violation of the national pact, constitution, and laws.”

“The move by those controlling the government deepens internal divisions at a time Lebanon needs unity to face ongoing Israeli attacks, preserve civil peace, and protect coexistence,” Fadlallah said, adding that authorities “should have prioritized national interests” by benefiting from the international opportunity created by Iran’s support for Lebanon.

April 11, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on Pressure builds on Iran to ‘drop’ Lebanon ceasefire demand as Islamabad talks hang in balance

In another clash report, US denies agreement to release Iran’s assets

Al Mayadeen | April 11, 2026

The United States has denied reports stating it agreed to release Iran’s frozen assets in Qatar and other foreign banks, one of Tehran’s prerequisite for negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan.

A senior Iranian source had stated that the United States in fact agreed, describing the move as a sign of “seriousness” ahead of potential negotiations in Islamabad, according to a report by Reuters.

According to the source, the unfreezing of assets is “directly linked” to ensuring safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

This is not a first for Washington. Reports previously indicated that the US agreed to a ceasefire that would include Lebanon and other regional fronts. While Trump and Netanyahu denied, US media asserted that the inclusion of Iran’s regional allies in the ceasefire was always in agreement.

Moreover, among the Iranian demands was its right to enrich uranium, another provision the US agreed to. However, only hours after the agreement was declared, Donald Trump claimed Iran would not be allowed to enrich uranium, further exposing Washington’s unreliable positions.

Iran ties ceasefire to Lebanon, ‘Israel’ sabotages agreement

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf previously conditioned talks with the US with a ceasefire in Lebanon and the release of Iran’s blocked assets. He emphasized that both conditions are essential before any diplomatic process can move forward. “These two matters must be fulfilled before negotiations begin,” he added.

Tehran’s 10‑point proposal, accepted by Washington as the framework for talks during the two-week ceasefire, includes ending all US and Israeli military operations against Iran and its allies, as well as halting Israeli attacks on Lebanon and other countries in the region. Iran’s negotiators stress that without a permanent stop to aggression on all fronts, any ceasefire would be meaningless and allow enemy forces to regroup.

Netanyahu, however, made it clear that “Israel” has no intention of halting its campaign, explicitly excluding Lebanon from any ceasefire arrangement. “I insisted that the temporary ceasefire with Iran not include Hezbollah, and we continue to strike them forcefully,” he said, reaffirming the occupation’s commitment to continued aggression.

European officials have warned that excluding Lebanon risks collapsing any broader agreement, as the war increasingly takes on a regional character linking Gaza, Iran, and Lebanon into a single confrontation.

April 11, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on In another clash report, US denies agreement to release Iran’s assets

Why no power can undermine Iran’s eternal dominance over the Strait of Hormuz

By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | April 10, 2026

The Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway nestled between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, is not merely a geographical passageway or a shipping lane on the world map to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is a strategically vital waterway that forms the pulse of the global energy economy and, simultaneously, a potent asset for the Islamic Republic to fundamentally reshape the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and around the world.

Iran seeks not merely to protect or monitor this strait but to exercise absolute, intelligent and legitimate control that, in the short term, applies economic pressure on any adversary to force it into retreat, negotiation, or acceptance of Iranian terms, and in the long term, to convert this control into permanent and inexhaustible strategic advantage.

This unchallenged authority on the strategic chokepoint, which carries around a quarter of global seaborne oil trade, includes regulating maritime traffic, collecting passage tolls, influencing global supply chains, and reconfiguring power dynamics in the region in alignment with the Axis of Resistance.

Backed by immutable geographical realities, international legal frameworks, precise economic data, and Iran’s asymmetric military capabilities, we examine how no military threats nor diplomatic pressure can alter this fundamental and unalterable reality.

Geographically, the narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz measures just 21 nautical miles — roughly 39 kilometers — in width. This extremely narrow gap places all key shipping routes, including two two-mile-wide carriageways and a two-mile buffer strip, entirely within Iranian and Omani exclusive territorial economic waters.

Iran is uniquely positioned to exert absolute control over the northern and most critical part of the strait, with its coastline stretching more than 1,600 kilometers along the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. This extensive coastline includes not only mainland shores but also numerous strategic islands that serve as natural strongpoints.

Unlike the Suez Canal or Panama Canal — artificial waterways that can be circumnavigated — the Strait of Hormuz is the only natural, mandatory route for crude oil, liquefied natural gas, and chemical products exiting the Persian Gulf en route to the Indian Ocean and global markets.

No viable alternative to bypass Iran’s control

There is no economically viable or practically feasible alternative to bypass it.

The geography is also immutable: the mountains, rocky coasts, and shallow water depths in key formations make it impossible or prohibitively expensive to open parallel routes or construct new canals. No power on earth, irrespective of its military prowess, can overcome this geographical reality through insignificant actions, the occupation of tiny islands, or even the deployment of naval forces.

Iran’s long and impenetrable coastline is a natural wall that would require manpower and logistical support far beyond the capacity of the world’s largest armies to capture or hold.

Legally, the Strait of Hormuz falls under the purview of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), though its interpretation has consistently and appropriately followed the line advanced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Because the strait’s width is less than 24 nautical miles, the entire waterway is not considered part of international waters or an international shipping route. The governing legal regime is not free and compulsory transit passage, but rather innocent passage.

Iran, having signed but not fully ratified the 1982 Convention, has always maintained that vessel passage must not prejudice the sovereignty of coastal states in any way, and that any passage threatening Iran’s national security is invalid.

This unique legal status grants Tehran the option of selective and conditional control over vessel traffic without necessarily infringing upon international law as interpreted by Western powers.

This is why the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s real unsinkable aircraft carrier: an inseparable asset that costs virtually nothing to maintain daily, yet offers strategic and deterrent value inestimable to the global economy.

This legal position, combined with its geographical reality, has placed Iran in a situation where it can exercise practical dominance and unquestionable authority over the waterway without maintaining a permanent surface force presence.

Economically, the Strait of Hormuz is rightly called the true chokepoint of the world economy.

According to the most recent data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), approximately 20.9 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products transit through the strait daily — equivalent to 20 percent of all oil consumed worldwide and 25 to 27 percent of global oil imports and exports.

Moreover, over 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade — roughly 11.4 billion cubic feet per day, mostly from Qatari fields — also passes through this route.

Influence of the Strait of Hormuz beyond oil

But the waterway’s influence extends far beyond the oil industry. Iran is the world’s largest source of urea — a nitrogen fertilizer vital to agriculture — and the broader Persian Gulf region dominates this trade.

Iran alone ranks among the top five urea exporters globally, and any disruption in transit automatically drives international urea prices up by 25 to 30 percent.

This price surge directly disrupts fertilizer supply chains for major importing countries such as India, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and most African countries. The consequence is a large-scale food crisis: soaring wheat, rice, and other agricultural commodity prices, worldwide food inflation, and a direct threat to the food security of billions of people.

Thus, the Strait of Hormuz is the chokepoint of the global food supply — a weapon Iran can use to influence the currents of the global economy and generate unprecedented pressure by seizing control of food and energy chains without launching a single missile or drone.

For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Strait of Hormuz serves as an asymmetric weapon or economic nuclear. It can hold the world economy at ransom by the implementation of selective but intelligent control of the waterway, without the requirement that involves direct war, without incurring huge costs of armaments and even the use of advanced nuclear weapons.

This strategy can be used to impose colossal and rapid economic strain that compels the opposing side to either flee in haste, bargain, or accept Iran’s terms, with no other options.

The long-term goal could be to transform this temporary control into a structural and permanent arrangement: collecting passage tolls from vessels, selectively regulating traffic (free passage for friendly ships in the Persian Gulf, restrictions and bans on hostile ones), and completely redefining the rules of engagement in the Persian Gulf in alignment with the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Axis of Resistance.

During periods of tension, Iran implements a calculated approach by raising the threat to the point of execution without necessarily ever closing the waterway completely, as was seen in operations True Promise 1, True Promise 2, and True Promise 3.

This strategy imposes continuous economic costs on the enemy without inflicting any harm on Iran. Even though Iranian oil exports and its own products are indirectly affected in the short term, selective transit management and toll collection create new revenue streams, ultimately swinging the economic war in Tehran’s favor.

Iran’s balance of action closely mirrors that of Gamal Abdel Nasser when he nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. Nasser dared to seize the canal, scuttled ships at its entrance, and effectively closed the oil lifeline to Europe.

That action brought the British and French empires to their knees, triggered the Suez Crisis, and symbolized the fall of British colonial rule in the West Asia region.

Just as Nasser, with a single strategic stroke, turned a major energy canal into an instrument of influence and power shift, Iran has now moved to nationalize the Strait of Hormuz through actual action, asymmetric military strength, and unyielding political determination.

This nationalization of the Strait of Hormuz can be seen as the beginning of the de facto demise of American power in the Persian Gulf region, just as the nationalization of Suez heralded the end of the British Empire. The only difference is that Iran employs less advanced, less costly, and more efficient means to enforce this power and authority.

Iran’s efforts to implement a passage toll system in the operational and executive spheres have been intelligent and multifaceted. Enemies or vessels lacking the required permission face direct threats, while friendly vessels — particularly those from Eastern countries and key allies like China, Russia or Pakistan — pay tolls in Chinese yuan, Russian rubles, or cryptocurrencies such as USDT or Bitcoin, securing safe and uninterrupted passage.

This policy not only provides a direct and permanent revenue stream for the Iranian economy but also significantly reduces Iran’s reliance on the US dollar, which is dying a slow death.

Through the comprehensive use of China’s international payment system (CIPS), other banking networks, and digital payment systems, Tehran has successfully moved to eliminate the dollar from the commercial equations of the Strait of Hormuz and is working toward currency multipolarity and the dismantling of Western financial supremacy.

Iran’s legitimate control over Strait of Hormuz

This initiative is part of a broader economic warfare strategy that renders further struggle or pressure on Iran far more expensive and burdensome for the opponent than capitulating to Tehran’s demands. Iran’s intelligent and legitimate control over the Strait of Hormuz is thus absolute and enduring, resting on three unchangeable foundations.

First is the irrevocable nature of geography and the impossible cost of seizing it by force. Iran is literally impregnable with its 1,600-kilometer coastline. Any invading force attempting to assert control over a 100-kilometer front and fully reopen the strait would require over one million men, a vast naval fleet, and unparalleled logistical support — a force that even the world’s strongest military would struggle to assemble.

Moreover, Iran’s control over the strait does not depend on fixed ground positions surrounding the waterway; complete control can be exercised through anti-ship missiles, long-range drones with a range of nearly 2,000 kilometers, and integrated radar command systems.

The second justification is Iran’s absolute superiority in both low-intensity and high-intensity asymmetric warfare. Large-scale mining of the Strait — not using surface ships but rather Fajr-5 rockets fired from a range of 70 kilometers — is entirely within Iran’s capabilities.

These rockets can deploy magnetic, intelligent, and advanced mines along the entire length of the strait, rendering shipping traffic completely uneconomical. Clearing such mines from this waterway would require no less than six months, during which the global economy would be crippled in terms of energy supply and food security.

The ancillary cost of such warfare to Iran is minimal — thousands of dollars per mine — while the enemy suffers billions of dollars in daily losses, not to mention the devastating disruption to global supply chains.

The third foundation is Iran’s long history and precise strategic calculus. Iran has on many occasions in the past spoken of shutting down the Strait but has not acted on it, as demonstrated during the crises of the 1980s, in 2011-2012, and the last few years.

The threat itself is an effective deterrent. Any force that attempts to respond to Iran’s language of direct threat with its own language of direct threat instantly faces the prospect of a global energy shock, extreme inflation, economic downturn, and domestic opposition.

Records in the contemporary world have revealed that Iran will push the threat to the final stage of execution and will ultimately compel the opponent to withdraw and accept new realities, and it has been clearly and unquestionably demonstrated in the past 40 days.

Finally, Iran does not insist on a permanent and destructive closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but rather on intelligent and selective control. This domination includes non-dollar toll collection, selective passage management of vessels, and the transformation of all external threats into opportunities to reformulate the rules of engagement in the Persian Gulf.

Iran soars above this waterway because its permanence — rooted in immutable natural geography, low-cost and effective asymmetric technology, and most importantly, its unshakable determination — has secured it forever.

This fact cannot be altered by any power on earth, regardless of massive military pressure or international coercion. Any attempt to counter Iran in the Strait of Hormuz would simply cost the global economy far more and ultimately force adversaries to accept the new reality in the Persian Gulf: this waterway will no longer be anyone’s backyard, but rather the territory of the established, solid, and indestructible deterrent power of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Why no power can undermine Iran’s eternal dominance over the Strait of Hormuz

Iran war will leave long-term ‘scar’ on Wall Street, investors warn

Al Mayadeen | April 10, 2026

Investors have warned that the US-Israeli war on Iran will leave “scar tissue” in global markets, with commodity prices and bond yields unlikely to quickly return to prewar levels even if a lasting deal is reached.

Energy prices remain far above prewar levels even after the United States and Iran announced a fragile two-week ceasefire on Tuesday, with investors saying that damage to Gulf infrastructure and the loss of confidence after Tehran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz will weigh on any recovery.

“It goes beyond the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. I think there would be longer-lasting scar tissue that would need a higher risk premium in markets, even if a permanent ceasefire was agreed,” said James Vokins, head of core income and investment grade credit at Aviva Investors.

Markets rallied but remain fragile

Stocks and bonds tumbled throughout March as US and Israeli attacks on Iran led Tehran to close the narrow waterway through which a fifth of the world’s oil and gas transits. Markets rallied quickly on the truce, with European government bonds and stock markets posting their best day for years on Wednesday.

Yet the international oil benchmark Brent crude remains nearly 35 percent higher than its price on the eve of the war, despite falling sharply in recent trading sessions. Bond yields, which have surged as traders slashed their bets on interest rate cuts by major central banks, remain elevated.

The yield on the interest rate-sensitive two-year Treasury note is 0.4 percentage points higher than it was before the aggression began. In Europe, where energy-importing economies are particularly vulnerable to global oil prices, yields have risen even further. Two-year yields in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy remain more than 0.5 percentage points higher than they were on the eve of the war.

A worse outlook than before the war

Bill Papadakis, macro strategist at Lombard Odier, said: “Even if the ceasefire proves to be a lasting one, the conflict was long enough, and leaves enough damage behind, that any reasonable macro scenario as of today looks meaningfully worse than the pre-conflict outlook.”

The US dollar and Treasuries have historically been seen as risk-free assets, used around the world for reserves. But President Trump’s alienation of allies and the ballooning national debt, made worse by the war on Iran, has lifted risk levels on those assets.

“Absolutely there is a bigger risk premium priced into US assets than before the war,” said George Pearkes, macro strategist at Bespoke Investment Group.

International investors losing confidence in the dollar

Andrew Jackson, head of investments at Vontobel, said his firm’s clients were increasingly concerned about the US dollar. “International investors are worried about the US dollar because of debt sustainability and the US’s relationship with the rest of the world. The US dollar curve is probably not the risk-free curve now,” he said.

Bill Campbell, a bond portfolio manager at DoubleLine, added that the conflict had encouraged him to further diversify away from the United States.

As the war on Iran enters its seventh week, the economic consequences continue to ripple outward. Even with a temporary ceasefire in place, investors are warning that the damage done to global markets and to confidence in US assets may not be easily repaired. The “scar tissue” that Aviva’s Vokins spoke of could take years to heal, if it ever does.

For the United States, a country already burdened by record debt and a president who has alienated traditional allies, the long-term cost of this war may be measured not only in dollars, but in the erosion of the very foundations of its economic power.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , | Comments Off on Iran war will leave long-term ‘scar’ on Wall Street, investors warn

How Iran decimated US power projection in West Asia: Military lessons of 40-day war

By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | April 10, 2026

As the ceasefire comes into effect after 40 days of aggression against the Islamic Republic, with violations continuing on the Lebanese front, military analysts worldwide are just beginning to unpack one of the most unexpected outcomes of modern military confrontation.

They are examining how the Islamic Republic of Iran, against the full American air and naval power backed by the finest allied systems, managed not only to survive but to inflict high costs and ultimately achieve a historic victory despite overwhelming odds.

Iran’s success did not come through matching the United States in crude technological adequacy or superior system quantities. Rather, it resulted from an advanced, multidimensional asymmetric approach integrating mass, accuracy, mobility, electronic warfare, and unremitting innovation.

This strategy turned historically strong American capabilities in air superiority and power projection into liabilities, while exposing the vulnerabilities of costly, high-tech defensive systems facing prolonged, low-cost saturation attacks.

Anti-access/area denial in the Persian Gulf: Holding US carriers at bay

Among the clearest evidence of Iranian military effectiveness was its maritime defense. The backbone of American power projection — US Navy carrier strike groups — was never free to operate without detection in proximity to Iranian waters.

Iranian coastal defense doctrine established a dense network of mobile anti-ship missile batteries, creating an impassable no-go zone.

Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles — such as the Noor (range approximately 120-170 km), the Qader (range approximately 200-300 km), and longer-range systems like the Abu Mahdi (some versions reaching 1,000 km) — forced American surface combatants to standoff range.

US carriers and their escorts never dared to approach within 300 km of the Iranian coast. Iranian forces fired multiple salvos of anti-ship cruise missiles at both short-range (300 km) and long-range (1,000 km) targets, typically accompanied by swarms of loitering munitions and fast-attack boats.

Although these attacks did not necessarily result in sinkings, they forced US forces to expend vast quantities of defensive missiles and divert air assets to protection missions, significantly impairing American offensive momentum.

Combined with sea-skimming profiles, terminal maneuvering, and saturation tactics, this made interception an extremely expensive affair. The US Navy found itself in an archetypal cost-benefit trap: pitting expensive multimillion-dollar interceptors against cheaper cruise missiles in a highly constrained littoral battlespace where response time was minimal.

Ballistic missile excellence and defeat of theater missile defense

Iran’s ballistic missile force proved to be the decisive strategic weapon. Throughout the 40-day war, Iran maintained a very high volume of fire, launching waves of advanced missiles combining liquid and solid fuel systems with increasing accuracy and survivability.

The Kheibar Shekan (and its modernized versions) played a particularly significant role. This medium-range ballistic missile features a maneuverable reentry vehicle capable of making terminal-phase adjustments at high speed, making reliable interception by Patriot PAC-3 systems extremely difficult.

The combination of speed, altitude profile, and evasive maneuvers stretched the kinematic limits of several Western interceptors. The United States and its allies expended thousands of Patriot and THAAD missiles — costing billions of dollars — yet leak rates remained high enough to damage bases and infrastructure multiple times over.

Targeting the eyes of the US missile defense

One of the enablers of Iran’s astounding success was the systematic targeting of the US missile defense system’s “eyes.” At the beginning of the war, Iranian retaliatory attacks — using both ballistic missiles and drones — damaged or destroyed at least four AN/TPY-2 radars associated with THAAD stations in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

These powerful X-band radars are essential for providing the long-range, high-resolution tracking needed to achieve exo-atmospheric intercepts. As several of these mission-critical sensors were either blinded or impaired, the effectiveness of the layered US-led missile defense architecture plummeted significantly.

The destruction of early-warning and discrimination capability meant that even advanced THAAD interceptors could no longer reliably engage incoming threats — particularly when Iran combined ballistic missiles with decoys and saturation salvos.

Short-range air defense: The stealthy killers of sophisticated aircraft

Although long-range capabilities dominated headlines, it was Iran’s short- and very-short-range air defense systems that inflicted some of the most crushing damage on US airpower. Electro-optically guided, low-signature launchers such as the Majid (AD-08) and the Qaem-118 — with ranges of approximately 10-15 km — proved incredibly successful.

These systems lack radar emitters, making them nearly invisible to conventional radar warning receivers until a missile is already in flight. During the war, Iranian short-range air defenses were reported to have shot down over 160 drones and several manned aircraft, including F-15E Strike Eagles and A-10 Thunderbolt IIs. Most astonishingly, Iran claimed — and provided evidence of having downed or damaged at least one F-35 Lightning II.

This was widely regarded as nearly impossible before the war. The F-35’s AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS) provides 360-degree infrared coverage and can detect incoming missiles, cue countermeasures, and even command evasive maneuvers without pilot input.

The jet is also equipped with advanced infrared countermeasures, including cutting-edge flare dispensers and other systems designed to counteract optically guided threats. Nevertheless, Iranian electro-optical systems repeatedly achieved locks and hits — possibly indicating higher sensor sensitivity, superior image processing, or effective tactics that reduced warning time beyond the F-35’s defensive capabilities.

These short-range systems formed a dense, mobile, and highly integrated air defense grid. Iranian crews adapted quickly as the war progressed: they refined engagement envelopes, improved camouflage and relocation strategies, and closed off previously exploitable avenues.

What began as an occasional threat became a tightening noose. According to American pilot reports, they experienced an ever-shrinking operating range, an increasing risk profile during close air support and strike missions, and a continued deterioration of freedom of maneuver.

The result was a slow strangulation of US air superiority — not necessarily through attrition of aircraft numbers, but through a drastic rise in the risk and cost of every sortie.

Delayed adaptation and cost-imbalance strategy

Iran’s overall strategy rested on three pillars: mass (large quantities of cheaply produced drones and missiles), precision and maneuverability (enhanced guidance packages and terminal-phase evasion), and resilience (mobile launchers, underground bases, and rapid repair capabilities).

This dragged the United States and its allies into a war of attrition in which high-cost, limited-quantity munitions were traded against low-cost, mass-produced Iranian weapons.

Patriot and THAAD interceptors cost millions of dollars each and were often fired in two- or three-shot salvos against each incoming threat. The problem was exacerbated by swarms of drones, which forced defenders to choose between expending expensive interceptors or suffering successful attacks. The result was that US and Persian Gulf inventories were depleted, logistics systems were repeatedly overstretched, and political pressure mounted to de-escalate.

Iran also demonstrated remarkable operational learning. Air defense crews continuously adjusted frequencies, emission control protocols, and ambushing strategies. Missile forces rotated between fixed and mobile positions, employed decoys, and maintained launch efficiency despite persistent American and Israeli airstrikes.

Air corridors that had previously been open became highly contested, forcing American planners to either accept greater risk or reduce operational tempos.

A new model of regional deterrence

Neither side was able to win the Ramadan war on its own traditional battlefield. But in strictly military terms, Iran achieved its fundamental objectives: it deterred a full-scale ground invasion, foiled the “regime change” plots hatched by the enemy, and demonstrated that American troops and airspace were no longer safe havens of American hegemonic power.

This war highlighted a dynamic reality of modern warfare: the absence of qualitative technological superiority can be countered by quantity, asymmetry, and multi-domain integration.

Iran’s ability to combine ballistic missiles that defeat or saturate theater defenses, anti-ship attacks that keep capital ships at standoff range, and short-range electro-optical air defenses proven effective against fifth-generation stealth aircraft — all of this demonstrates that Iran has built an effective A2/AD bubble far stronger than pre-war estimates suggested.

As the dust settles and both sides count the lessons, one inescapable fact remains: the mighty US military is no longer able to dictate its terms at an acceptable pace and cost against a resolute, well-armed regional power equipped with modern asymmetric capabilities.

The Iranian military’s performance has rewritten chapters of the military playbook for future confrontations in the West Asia region — and has sent a powerful message that the era of unparalleled US domination in the region is past.

The ceasefire may have prevented the continuation of a devastating war that could spill over beyond the region, but the military lessons of the ‘Ramadan War’ will continue to shape deterrence calculations, force planning, and alliances in the region for years to come.


Mohammad Molaei is a Tehran-based military affairs analyst.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Comments Off on How Iran decimated US power projection in West Asia: Military lessons of 40-day war

Iran’s report details US-Israeli war crimes in targeting schools, hospitals, livelihoods

Press TV – April 10, 2026

Iran’s Human Rights Headquarters has condemned the US-Israeli attacks that “deliberately” targeted civilian places directly affecting people’s daily lives and livelihoods as a “clear violation” of the most basic humanitarian and legal principles, stressing that they amount to “war crimes”.

In a statement on Friday, the office strongly condemned “the repeated and deliberate attacks by the Zionist regime and the United States against a wide range of civilian targets, including residential homes, hospitals, medical and relief centers, vital infrastructure, economic centers, bridges, schools, as well as vessels and barges used for people’s livelihoods”.

The statement referred to the attack on four fishing boats in the Lengeh port and other civilian vessels set ablaze, saying the attacks have directly violated “fundamental human rights, including the right to life, the right to work and the right to development.”

These acts of aggression “may amount to war crimes”, it said, referring to threats by US President Donald Trump and his war secretary Pete Hegseth to return Iran to the “Stone Age” and attack its vital infrastructure as “a clear evidence of the war crime intent of this aggressor regime.”

The statement noted that the fundamental principle of separation – the principle of distinction between military and civilian – in international humanitarian law obliges all parties to the conflict to avoid targeting civilian persons and property.

“Systematic attacks against ordinary people, the country’s vital arteries and development infrastructure are a gross violation of these principles and constitute a war crime.”

The statement also emphasized that the US and Israeli practice of “collective punishment” of the Iranians breaches the principle of prohibition of the threat and use of force in international law.

“This inhuman approach, which is devoid of the logic of law, morality and human conscience, reveals the true mentality” of those behind these “brutal” attacks, it added.

The statement urged the international community, human rights institutions and the United Nations to take immediate, decisive action against the US and the Israeli regime for committing these crimes and holding them accountable for these crimes.

It warned that any silence or indifference on the part of international institutions constitutes “approval and complicity” in these crimes.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Iran’s report details US-Israeli war crimes in targeting schools, hospitals, livelihoods

NATO’s Slow Fracture: How Trump’s Iran War Exposed the Instrument of Hegemony

By Adrian Korczyński – New Eastern Outlook – April 10, 2026

The myth was always more durable than the machinery. NATO presented itself as a collective security architecture; in practice, it functioned as a billing arrangement for American imperial overhead, in which European governments paid in treasure, territory, and political will for the privilege of hosting Washington’s forward operating positions. The Iran war has not broken the alliance. It has simply made the arrangement too expensive to maintain the fiction. When Spain closed its airspace to U.S. flights on 31 March 2026, and Italy denied Sigonella to transiting bombers, it was not a minor rift or hesitation. It was the first visible moment in decades in which the instrument of European subordination refused to execute commands. NATO, as a mechanism of American coercion, has encountered limits.

The Myth of the Monolith

Europe’s formal commitments, ceremonial meetings, and Article 5 promises created an impression of unity. Yet 28 February 2026 revealed the monolith for what it was: a thin shell over a transactional system. The United States and Israel struck Iran first, without consultation, without a Security Council mandate, and without Iranian aggression against U.S. territory. The assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei was the execution of a sitting head of state, an act that violated international law. Iran’s partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz is a defensive response, not an act of aggression. European refusal to participate is not mere obstinacy; it is recognition of the legal asymmetry. Compliance was optional the moment the operation violated the norms Europe had quietly internalized.

Compliance, Refused

The operational picture is unequivocal. Spain barred U.S. aircraft from Rota and MorónItaly prevented Sigonella landingsFrance blocked munitions intended for IsraelPoland refused to redeploy its Patriot batteries. These refusals are not symbolic; they are concrete disruptions to U.S. planning. Bases, airspace, and munitions are tools of war; withholding them alters outcomes. NATO’s bureaucratic structure remains, but the logic of obedience—the lifeblood of the instrument—has fractured.

Poland illustrates the alliance’s contradictions most starkly. Warsaw has cultivated the image of the United States’ most reliable European client: hosting expanded troop rotations, spending 4.8% of GDP on defence in 2026, providing Patriot batteries, absorbing the economic costs of Ukraine-related sanctions. Operation Epic Fury arrived without consultation. Washington’s subsequent request to redeploy Polish Patriots to the Persian Gulf met a clear refusal. Defence Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz stated: “Our Patriot batteries are used to protect Polish airspace and NATO’s eastern flank. Nothing is changing in this regard.” The message is stark: loyalty is no longer a currency that guarantees influence. Even the most obedient client confronts limits when the cost of compliance exceeds both legality and national interest. Every denial signals a reassertion of European discretion, previously constrained by financial and political leverage wielded by Washington.

Trump, Rubio, and the Transactional Doctrine

Trump’s public denunciations of NATO—calling it a paper tiger and European governments cowards—and Rubio’s remarks on Fox News are doctrinal, not emotional. Trump suggested that U.S. membership itself is under reconsideration. Rubio asked why America should maintain NATO when the operational support is denied. What they articulate is a formal redefinition: the transatlantic relationship is no longer a guarantee of security; it is a transaction. European compliance in operations like Hormuz now exchanges political obedience for U.S. defence assurances. The logic is imperial, not allied. Empires do not seek permission; they dictate terms and issue invoices. When clients decline, threats of withdrawal follow. This is not a NATO crisis; it is the moment when the protection racket stops pretending to be a mutual defense treaty.

Historical Echo: From Suez to Iran

The lessons of Suez, 1956, resonate here. Britain and France acted militarily without consulting Washington; Eisenhower threatened financial retaliation, forcing withdrawal. Europe learned that independent military initiative without U.S. consent carries unmanageable cost. Iran 2026 reverses the dynamic. Washington acts unilaterally; Europe refuses operational support. The instruments of coercion—financial leverage, dollar dominance—are no longer sufficient. Europe possesses central bank reserves, fiscal tools, and industrial capacity to resist. Suez taught Europe to follow. Iran may be teaching it to lead.

Yuan in Hormuz

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is now operating a live pilot for post-dollar maritime commerce. Ships wishing to transit the Strait are assessed for U.S. or Israeli connections. Friendly vessels—from China, India, Turkey, or neutral states—pay transit fees in Chinese yuan or cryptocurrency. Rates are significant: oil tankers carrying two million barrels face starting fees of one dollar per barrel. Washington launched a war to defend the rules-based international order; in real time, Iran is constructing an alternative settlement infrastructure that bypasses the dollar entirely. The petrodollar system, once the backbone of American financial hegemony, is not debated in conferences—it is bypassed, barrel by barrel, yuan by yuan, as the U.S. Navy observes from afar. This is not a theoretical shift. It is operational, measurable, and immediate.

Europe Responds and the Quiet Proof

European capitals retreated into legal formalism not out of cowardice but calculation—the calculation that the cost of compliance now exceeds the cost of refusal. Macron called the operation illegal, yet deployed the Charles de Gaulle for French interests. Starmer emphasized national priorities. Steinmeier denounced the operation as dangerous. Spain and Italy blocked airspace and bases. France restricted ammunition transit. Simultaneously, a coalition outside Washington—Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey—began mediating Ormuz transit. States are acting to preserve navigational freedom, financial sovereignty, and operational independence without U.S. supervision.

Economic behavior confirms the operational shifts. EU-Iran trade in 2025 reached €3.72 billion, with Germany exporting €963 million and importing €218 million. Italy exported €447 million, and imported €132 million. The Netherlands served primarily as a logistics hub. These flows constitute two-thirds of total EU-Iran commerce. INSTEX remains operative, facilitating transactions despite secondary sanctions. Machinery, transport equipment, and chemical products move across borders under a deliberately maintained European framework. The numbers require no interpretation. While Warsaw was applauding in Davos, Berlin was exporting machinery to Tehran. Strategic autonomy was always practiced. It simply wasn’t named.

The Architecture of Compliance

Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, noted: “Military alliances are, at their core, based on trust. It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” The alliance exists in form; obedience does not. European investment in defense, industrial capacity, and energy diversification accelerates independently of U.S. preferences. NATO survives as a bureaucratic structure, but the instrument of American hegemony—the mechanism through which Washington coerced compliance—is no longer operational.

What matters is what emerges where the old order once dominated: a mediation coalition outside U.S. influence, yuan-denominated shipping through Hormuz, European defence funded by its own borrowing, independent industrial capacity, and sustained trade with Iran. These are not marginal adjustments; they are the outlines of a multipolar order actively taking shape. The architecture of compliance is intact. The compliance itself is not. In geopolitics, that distinction is everything.

April 10, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on NATO’s Slow Fracture: How Trump’s Iran War Exposed the Instrument of Hegemony

Chinese jet fuel and the myth of energy independence

Inside China Business | April 8, 2026

Except for in Russia and (ironically) Iran, the war in the Persian Gulf has blown up energy markets everywhere. Worldwide, no country is self-sufficient in all its energy needs, and disruptions in a supply chains anywhere result in major problems everywhere. China is the largest refiner of jet fuel in Asia-Pacific, and has enormous reserves of crude stashed away, which can last months. But immediately after the war on Iran began, China locked down its exports of jet fuel. The effect on prices across Asia was felt immediately, with costs more than doubling in just six weeks. In the United States, fuel prices also soared, and also by over 100%. 

Resources and links:

$140, and going higher: That’s the real price of oil, right now. Oil traders will be wiped out.    • $140, and going higher:  That’s the real p…  

Singapore’s major oil source is blocked and experts warn Australians will pay https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-0…

Australia and Japan face jet fuel supply crunch as China cuts exports https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-ec…

Daily Jet Fuel Spot Prices https://www.airlines.org/dataset/argu…

America’s energy independence https://no01.substack.com/p/americas-…

US crude oil exports decreased by 3% in 2025 despite higher production (+3%) https://www.enerdata.net/publications…

Petroleum & Other Liquids, Imports by Country of Origin https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move…

China set to extend fuel export ban with small exemptions, sources say https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pa…

South Korea to enforce 5-day vehicle rotation system as Mideast conflict hits energy supplies https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific…

April 9, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on Chinese jet fuel and the myth of energy independence