The Summit That Wasn’t
By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – November 12, 2025
On October 29-30, 2025, US President Donald Trump visited the Republic of Korea as part of his tour of Asia and limited participation in the APEC summit. Several significant meetings took place during this event, but we shall discuss the one that did not happen.
Possible meeting between Trump and Kim?
When it became clear that Trump was going to South Korea, some Western and especially South Korean experts began actively promoting the idea that it would be good if Trump met with Kim Jong Un during the visit. Such reflections were based both on Kim’s statement that “If the United States abandons its empty obsession with denuclearization and hopes for sincere peaceful coexistence with North Korea based on the acceptance of reality, we have no reason not to sit down at the negotiating table with the United States” and on the experience of 2019, when during Trump’s visit to the Republic of Korea, he met Kim at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In addition, as early as September 30, 2025, the White House announced that Donald Trump remains open to talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “without any preconditions”.
The US president himself occasionally hints at this. On October 27, Donald Trump stated: “I’d love to meet with him. If he’d like to meet,” although on the same day a Rodong Sinmun editorial pointed out that “it is equivalent to self-destruction to try to move forward or progress with the help of others”.
The South Korean side was the most active in this matter. A Trump-Kim summit held on South Korean territory could at least be counted as the merit of South Korea, which “organized the platform.” Although on October 20 the South Korean presidential administration claimed that it did not know anything about preparations for a US-North Korean summit, a number of its representatives, especially Minister of Reunification Chung Dong-young, repeatedly urged the leaders of North Korea and the United States not to miss a great opportunity for dialogue. Conservatives and their media expressed concern about the same issue: “Trump’s visit to Korea must not mean recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status”.
On October 23, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung personally expressed hope that during his upcoming trip to Asia, Donald Trump would act as a peacemaker and that the leaders of the United States and South Korea would be able to engage in dialogue.
Even then, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui defiantly departed for a visit to Russia and Belarus, during which she was received by President Putin. Some South Korean experts and officials, including Minister Chung, continued to speculate about the possibility of a meeting. “I sincerely hope that the negotiations left unfinished during the meeting between the leaders of the United States and North Korea can resume,” stated Chung. National Security Adviser Wi Sung Lac also emphasized readiness for any scenarios.
On October 27, deputy head of the South Korean Office of National Security Oh Hyun-joo said that although a meeting between Trump and Kim was “extremely unlikely,” Seoul is ready to organize a venue.
Nevertheless, on October 29, 2025, Trump did make a statement that this time he could not agree on a schedule with Kim Jong Un for a meeting but could soon return to Asia to meet with the North Korean leader. After that, Wi Sung Lac stated that the conditions for DPRK-US negotiations had not yet matured, and a South Korean national intelligence representative noted that the US-North Korean summit would be possible after South Korea and the US hold joint exercises in March next year.
No, they can’t! (Yet)
It is very interesting when politicians or experts first form an image of an event in their head and then begin to express disappointment that it did not happen in reality. Therefore, the author will have to repeat some ideas about why—if such a meeting ever takes place (the probability is low)—it will be more ceremonial in nature. Both Trump and Kim are pragmatists, and they have no desire to meet purely for the opportunity to stand next to one another and smile for the journalists.
To begin with, negotiations should have an agenda. Kim Jong Un noted at the session of the Supreme People’s Assembly that the DPRK is not against negotiations with the United States if they move away from the topic of denuclearization. Meanwhile, the entire agenda of the American side still boils down to the question of whether it is possible to somehow arrange the nuclear disarmament of the DPRK, despite the fact that its nuclear status is included in its constitution. Thus, disarmament as seen by the Americans is possible only after regime change, or rather the loss of Pyongyang’s sovereignty, something Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow will not allow.
Thus, the United States lacks leverage over Pyongyang, and this applies to both the “carrot” and the “stick.” The DPRK’s military potential has grown significantly, and the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Russia has eliminated the possibility of using force to put pressure on the DPRK. It will also not be possible to increase sanctions pressure, because an attempt to impose UN sanctions that are mandatory for all countries will be blocked by Moscow and, perhaps, Beijing, and an increase in Russian and Chinese aid may be the answer to unilateral sanctions. Finally, in 2020-2023, when the DPRK went into “self-isolation,” for three years the country existed in conditions indistinguishable from a complete economic blockade, which showed that the DPRK has the opportunity to survive for a while even without external assistance in the event of an embargo.
As for the “carrot,” options such as various forms of assistance will not work, because everything that the United States could give to North Korea, the latter could receive from Russia or China. Therefore, in order to really involve the North in the dialogue, serious concessions will have to be made, e.g., easing the sanctions regime or replacing the denuclearization agenda with an arms control agenda, which in itself means the de facto recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear power. However, Trump will not be able to take such decisive steps for domestic political and reputational reasons. Western public opinion will perceive this as unacceptable concessions to a tyrannical regime, and even if Trump decides to do something similar, his entourage and the notorious “deep state” will not allow such a policy to fully materialize.
Lastly, there are issues related to Seoul. According to the modern North Korean doctrine, there are two hostile states on the Korean Peninsula, and although the South is no longer perceived as the territory of the DPRK temporarily occupied by American puppets, but as a separate Republic of Korea, Pyongyang does not want to have any dealings with it. Firstly, from the point of view of the North Korean leadership, the South is devoid of subjectivity and therefore cannot be negotiated with, and, secondly, since the Republic of Korea still considers the entire peninsula to be its territory—and this is written into the constitution—its goal is to absorb the DPRK, and the democrats or conservatives in power differ only in their methods to achieve this. Therefore, any attempt by the South Korean leadership to interfere in the US-North Korean negotiations in order to present itself as a mediator and score political points is more likely to reduce the likelihood of a US-North Korean summit than to increase it. Had the decision to organize a meeting between the leaders been made, they would have faced the very serious question of how to host a summit without the participation of the South Korean leader while in South Korea.
Therefore, from the very beginning, the author pointed out the extremely low probability of a summit between the leaders of the United States and the DPRK in South Korea, despite the fact that there is still a small chance of this meeting in the foreseeable future. One of the elements of US strategy in the confrontation with China is to try to weaken ties between China and its allies and ideally make the allies neutral or drag them into its camp. With regard to the DPRK, this is, of course, a difficult task, but a number of US experts admit this possibility, exaggerating North Korean-Chinese contradictions and recalling how the DPRK maneuvered between Moscow and Beijing during the Cold War era. The Americans will keep trying, and we shall see what this will lead to over the next year.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
Nuclear Reduction in the New Age
By Bill Buppert | The Libertarian Institute | November 12, 2025
Responsible Statecraft tends to have a more common sense approach to the profligate spending on the part of the American defense establishment.
The retirement of the entire ICBM arm and cancellation of the Sentinel successor would save enormous amounts of money wasted on very vulnerable strategic assets.
It’s time to consider a complete reappraisal of the three arms of the nuclear response in IRBMs and ICBMs and reduce them over time to zero and then to decide on the disposition of the bomber launched gravity bombs and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. The drone technology emerging now and the concomitant stasis of the aforementioned weapons systems makes them incredibly vulnerable left of bang.
A complete reappraisal is in order to rely completely on the much more secure Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) fleet option.
Given that its budget is soaring towards $1 trillion per year, and that it wastes untold billions on overpriced components and excess bureaucracy, there’s no question that the Pentagon can find money to reinvest in other priorities. But a better approach would be to apply a good portion of the savings to reducing the department’s top line.
Cuts in overall spending could come from the reduction or elimination of dysfunctional, overpriced, or dangerous weapon systems like F-35 combat aircraft, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, or heavy, vulnerable fighting ships like a new generation of aircraft carriers. It could save billions. It could also clear the way for the development of more reliable, effective replacements that are simpler to operate, easier to repair, and more relevant to the most likely conflicts of the future.
Eliminating ICBMs from America’s nuclear arsenal would be a particularly smart move. Not only is the cost of the new system growing at an alarming rate – an 81% increase in projected costs in just a few years time – but independent experts like former Clinton administration defense secretary William Perry have pointed out that they are among the most dangerous weapons possessed by the U.S. military.
The time is now to consider retirement and reduction of nuclear assets in the US inventory.
Read the rest:
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/pentagon-budget-200-billion/
Matthew Hoh: Domestic Divisions Threaten the US Empire
Glenn Diesen | November 11, 2025
Matthew Hoh is a former U.S. Marine Officer and State Department Official. Hoh discusses the growing divisions within the US, which threaten the US empire.
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US Officers Cannot Explain Why So Much Military Needed for Strikes in Caribbean – Reports
Sputnik – 11.11.2025
WASHINGTON – US senior Special Operations officers in a briefing last month did not provide a comprehensive explanation why the Trump administration needed a massive military presence in the Caribbean for strikes on a few small boats allegedly used by drug cartels, CNN reported on Tuesday, citing sources with the knowledge.
At the moment, there is no public information from the Pentagon on what the military is using to conduct the strikes, but the sources told CNN that MQ-9 Reaper drones are used for US attacks on alleged drug boats, as well as AC-130J gunships and fighter jets.
The sources told CNN that the Pentagon officials also could not provide an exact amount of taxpayers’ dollars spent on the counternarcotics campaign. However, administration officials have stated that each strike costs up to hundreds of thousands of dollars, the report said.
A significant part of all deployed US naval assets worldwide have been located in US Southern Command since last month, and even more US military assets are about to be placed in the Caribbean, the report added.
Earlier this week, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said that the United States conducted strikes on two drug trafficking vessel in the Eastern Pacific, killing six people.
To date, the US military has conducted 19 strikes, destroyed 20 boats, and killed 76 people as part of a counternarcotics campaign, CNN reported.
In late October, the Trump administration held a briefing in the US Congress to lay out its legal justification for the strikes on Venezuelan ships. However, only Republicans were invited to the briefing, causing negative responses and vast criticism among Democrats.
United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres believes that US attacks in the Caribbean contradict international law, and so does UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk.
Europe cannot do without Russian gas despite attempts at diversification

By Ahmed Adel | November 11, 2025
As the latest data on European Union imports have shown, the bloc cannot do without Russian gas and will continue to find ways to buy it despite announcements to completely oust this energy source from the European market by 2028. Confusingly, the EU made this decision precisely when, despite strong anti-Russian sanctions, it actually increased its gas purchases from Russia.
In October, a record 1.68 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia reached the EU via the Turkish Stream, the highest monthly volume since the pipeline began operating in 2020. The pipeline’s average capacity utilization in October was 96%, and imports were 13% higher than in October last year.
The EU has also increased its imports of liquefied natural gas from Russia, with the value up by 7% compared to the same period last year. Russian LNG, as reported by EUObserver, accounted for 16% of total imports into the EU.
At the same time, the EU cannot completely replace Russian gas in two years, especially since US Secretary of the Interior Doug Bergham recently stated that although the United States has enough resources to replace Russian gas, this would require major infrastructure investments in Eastern Europe. In other words, he is calling for the Turkish Stream and the Russian gas in it to be replaced by an American Stream, even if it comes at a huge economic cost for the Europeans.
The US probably has enough gas in its reserves, but private companies do not want to jeopardize their financial position by investing in the infrastructure on American soil necessary to convert natural gas into liquid and transport it to Europe. This liquefied gas must then be returned to its gaseous state in Europe and then transported by pipeline to the end user—a complicated and expensive task.
That is why Europe has imported much more Russian gas than usual. American gas is more expensive, and no one has money to throw away, especially in the faltering European economy, where Germany, the engine of its development, has been struggling with a long recession. In effect, Europe’s economy will be buried if it relies only on American gas.
Although there is constant talk of gas from Azerbaijan, it never arrives in quantities above usual levels. Given the amount of gas the Caucasian country produces and sells, they are not enticed to invest huge sums in new deposits and significantly increased gas production that might not have a buyer in Europe in the future.
The EU cannot do without Russian gas because the bloc lacks the funds to build the necessary infrastructure. The Trump administration would certainly not finance the necessary infrastructure on European soil for LNG delivery and regasification. The pipeline required, and Europe, with its economy, is not able to finance the American Stream.
Even if a terminal for the reception and regasification of American LNG is built in the Black Sea in two years, the same amount of time as the Greek one in Alexandroupolis in the Aegean Sea, which was put into operation a year ago, is built, it is clear that its capacities are modest. The Bulgarian-Greek interconnector, which receives gas from Alexandroupolis, has a capacity of only 3 billion cubic meters per year.
Nonetheless, if it were that large in the Black Sea, it would be more than modest compared to the capacity of the Balkan Stream. Even the Turkish Stream, with a capacity of 31 billion cubic meters of gas, of which the Balkan Stream is a branch, is insufficient to meet Europe’s needs.
The EU has recently received a warning from Qatar, whose LNG imports account for around 14% of its imports. Qatar has threatened to stop supplying gas to the EU if it imposes a 5.0% fine on companies that fail to respect human rights and environmental standards. If this were to occur, Europe could eventually be left without both Russian and Qatari gas, as well as without sufficient American gas.
It cannot be expected that there will be any automatic change when peace is achieved in Ukraine because Russia will not turn its back on its new major partners, such as India. Europe is increasingly being left behind as other parts of the world, the main consumers of Russian energy, come into the spotlight. These countries are the main consumers, and as their industries develop, they will need more oil and gas. In effect, as Russian energy exports to the non-Western World grow, the constant threats by Europe to end imports will have little impact on the Russian economy and will boomerang on Europe, as all other sanctions packages have.
Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
Behind the Dances and Deals: Trump’s Quiet Pivot in Asia
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – November 11, 2025
The photo ops from Trump’s Southeast Asia tour hid a deeper shift in US thinking. Washington’s new China strategy, shaped by the Pentagon, now calls for restraint, mutual legitimacy, and shared rules rather than confrontation.
In short, America’s foreign policy hawks are quietly preparing for coexistence, not conquest. Trump’s visit was to showcase this change. The question, however, remains: will the US find success ultimately?
Trump’s visit
Trump came as a peacemaker. He wanted to demonstrate that the US still matters in the region, reminding regional powers of Washington’s seriousness that it really means business going forward. Therefore, while the headlines focused on his dance performances in Malaysia and the signing ceremonies, the trip produced two notable outcomes: a peace accord between Thailand and Cambodia and a series of trade and investment frameworks with key ASEAN economies. The Thailand–Cambodia agreement, signed at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur and witnessed by Trump, commits both sides to a cease-fire, land-mine clearance, and the release of detainees, marking a rare US-brokered diplomatic success in the region. On the economic front, Trump announced new or expanded trade arrangements with Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam—some finalized, others still in negotiation—covering areas like critical minerals, supply chains, and energy investment. Washington also upgraded its partnership with Malaysia to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” signaling a deeper US pivot toward Southeast Asia’s economic and geopolitical center. Yet, much of this remains more symbolic than substantive for now, as the real test lies in whether these deals translate into durable peace and concrete trade outcomes—or fade as another episode of diplomatic theatre.
Much of the possible success of this visit and the durability of its outcomes is tied directly to the extent to which the Trump administration can implement its own new geopolitical thinking towards the region more generally and China more specifically—a country that it wants to primarily counter in Asia and the Pacific. This new geopolitical thinking is anchored in a recent report published by the Pentagon-backed RAND corporation.
The new thinking
The RAND report delivers a striking argument: Washington must abandon—after trying it unsuccessfully for years—the fantasy of defeating China and instead learn to manage an enduring, structured rivalry. The report frames the contest as the defining axis of twenty-first-century geopolitics—an unavoidable clash of systems and ambitions—but warns that a US strategy driven by dominance, containment, or ideological confrontation risks pushing both powers toward catastrophic instability. RAND’s central proposal is not détente, but what it calls a disciplined modus vivendi: a framework that accepts competition as inevitable yet seeks to prevent it from spiraling into open conflict. This is especially important for Washington insofar as it allows it to present to the wider Southeast Asian region that it is not seeking Cold War-like alliances where regional countries must choose sides. Therefore, the authors lay out six core principles to stabilize the relationship: both sides must internalize that coexistence, not victory, is the only sustainable outcome; recognize the political legitimacy of each other’s systems, however distasteful; construct shared norms and institutions in areas of friction such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technology; exercise restraint in developing capabilities that threaten the other’s deterrence systems; agree on basic rules for world order; and strengthen crisis-management channels to prevent miscalculation.
To translate this into policy, the report recommends six deliberate moves for the US. First, Washington should clarify that its goal is not China’s overthrow but a stable, rules-based rivalry. Second, it must reestablish senior-level communication channels to rebuild minimal trust. Third, it should institutionalize crisis-management mechanisms, particularly around Taiwan and maritime disputes. Fourth, it should negotiate limited accords to restrain cyber and AI competition. Fifth, the US and China should mutually recognize each other’s nuclear deterrence and avoid doctrines that invite preemption. Finally, Washington should pursue narrow cooperative projects—climate, health, scientific exchanges—to maintain some connective tissue in an otherwise adversarial relationship.
Trump’s visit reflected this thinking very much. For example, throughout this tour, Trump made no mention of the QUAD—an anti-China alliance comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia. It means that Washington is moving away from its strategy of building economic and military alliances with anti-China states, such as India and Japan, to use them as counterweights to China’s influence. This narrative aligns with what the RAND report refers to as recognizing the legitimacy of China and its ruling party.
Beyond Ambitions
Having said this, none of this means that a complete reset has taken place, or will take place soon. Undoubtedly, several bones of contention have been healed, but several remain. Trump’s meeting with Xi, for instance, produced a tactical easing of tensions rather than a strategic breakthrough. Both leaders agreed to cut US tariffs on Chinese imports from roughly 57 to 47 percent, while Beijing pledged to resume large purchases of American soybeans and temporarily lift its export restrictions on rare earth minerals—an issue Trump declared “completely resolved” for now. China also committed to tightening controls on the export of fentanyl precursors, offering Trump a domestic win. Yet these agreements are largely short-term gestures: most are limited to a year, and none address the deeper structural rifts over Taiwan, technology export controls, or military rivalry. In effect, the meeting delivered a pause—a breathing space for both sides to stabilize strained supply chains and political optics—rather than a genuine reset of relations. The underlying strategic mistrust remains intact, making this more a tactical truce than a transformation of US-China relations.
Trump’s tour and his carefully choreographed diplomacy signal that Washington is experimenting with a softer, more disciplined form of competition—one that seeks to manage, not eliminate, China’s rise. Yet the contradictions at the heart of this strategy remain unresolved. The US still ultimately wants to lead Asia while pretending to share it; it seeks coexistence but clings to primacy. The Pentagon’s call for mutual legitimacy and restraint may sound pragmatic, but it runs up against the political and ideological reflexes of an America that views China as a rival to be outlasted, not accommodated. Trump’s gestures toward peace and partnership may buy time and goodwill to achieve this objective ultimately. China, however, will be very mindful.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
West in no position to comment on Iranian missiles’ range: Security chief
Press TV – November 10, 2025
Iran’s top security official says the West is using the country’s missile capabilities as a means of pressure, stressing it is in no position to comment on the issue.
“The current debate on Iran’s missiles is not out of genuine security concerns but rather serves as a tool to exert pressure and restrict the country’s defensive power,” Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani said on Monday.
He added that it is irrelevant for the West to comment on the range of Iran’s missiles, questioning their involvement in the matter.
“What does it have to do with the West that it comments on the range of Iran’s missiles?” he asked.
Larijani, who was a former nuclear negotiator, emphasized that Western countries also use the nuclear issue as a pretext to harbor animosity towards the Iranian nation, saying the US and Europe are raising issues about the range of Iran’s missiles with the aim of imposing control and dominance.
“No country is entitled to interfere in the Iranian nation’s defensive power,” which is a matter of independence, Larijani pointed out.
The United States and its European allies have repeatedly called for any future agreement on Iran’s nuclear activities to include its ballistic missile program as well.
Tehran has consistently rejected that demand, saying its military capabilities are non-negotiable.
Iran held five rounds of talks on a replacement for the 2015 nuclear deal prior to the US-Israeli airstrikes on the country and its nuclear facilities in mid-June.
In his remarks, Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither seeking control [over other nations] nor is submissive to the dominance of any power.”
Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither imperialistic nor submissive to the dominance of any power.”
Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran has increased its trade relations with the East, Muslim countries, and the neighbors, although for years the West was Iran’s primary trading partner, the SNSC secretary noted.
He slammed the West’s arrogant policies with respect to political and security issues, saying the policy resulted in a crisis in its cooperation with Iran.
Larijani stressed the importance of maintaining Iran’s independence “because freedom, culture, and economy will not remain stable in the absence of independence.”
The West, under the guise of advocating human rights and peace, has been the main obstacle to the independence of nations for centuries, he asserted.
Iran’s top security official described national unity as the “greatest asset” of the country, warning of plots to weaken the will of the Iranian people.
He said the Iranian nation has proved over the past four decades, particularly during the US-Israeli war in mid-June, that it will never compromise over its independence.
“Iran will not retreat from its path of independence and dignity, even if it means facing full-scale confrontation,” he emphasized.
He reaffirmed the Iranian nation’s will to stand strong and rational in the face of “modern brutality.”
Oklo’s Valuation: Nuclear on Welfare (joining wind, solar, batteries)
By Robert Bradley Jr. – Master Resource – November 5, 2025
Commercial nuclear power has turned into the welfare energy de jure. It is politically correct despite many decades of failure to compete against other forms of thermal energy. Uranium might be the ultimate energy density-wise, but nuclear fission (and more so nuclear fusion) is the most complicated, expensive, fraught way to boil water.
Commercial nuclear power was government-created in the 1950s and remains government dependent today. (Stay tuned: my primer on the history of this energy source is forthcoming. [1]). Regarding the present, consider this example from Jamie Smyth, editor of US Energy, who wrote:
Nuclear technology company Oklo has no revenues, no licence to operate reactors and no binding contracts to supply power. But this has not stopped the Silicon Valley-based start-up from riding a wave of investor enthusiasm that has propelled its stock market valuation above $20bn, a rise of more than 500 per cent since the turn of the year.
He provided the background.
The company, backed by technology boss Sam Altman and with close ties to Donald Trump’s energy secretary, has set ambitious targets to deliver commercial power to its first customers in 2027, having broken ground on its pilot in Idaho last month.
Oklo, led by the husband-and-wife team Jacob and Caroline DeWitte, envisages a future powered by a new generation of small modular reactors that use liquid sodium rather than water as a coolant. The company is seeking to become a leader among businesses that will supply energy hungry data centres with the power they need to fuel the artificial intelligence boom.
Yet the surge in its shares, buoyed by enthusiasm from retail investors who make up an outsized proportion of its shareholders, has worried experts who fear the stock has become wildly overheated. It is among the highest valued pre-revenue businesses listed in the US.
I commented:
A government play, like Tesla. Political capitalism with the US DOE ready to subsidize commercial nuclear power. Nuclear is the new subsidy baby, or welfare queen, the politically correct replacement for wind/solar/batteries under a new political regime.
The siren song of “competitive” nuclear power continues into its seventh decade. Taxpayer and ratepayers beware.
———————
[1] “Nuclear Power: A Free-Market Perspective.” American Institute for Economic Research, forthcoming.
Iran’s oil exports hit new post-sanctions record
Press TV – November 9, 2025
Iran has set a new record in its oil exports despite the continued pressure of US and UN sanctions, according to the latest data from a leading energy analytics firm.
The Tankers Trackers said in a post on its X account on Sunday that Iran had exported an average of 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil over the past four weeks.
“These are numbers we haven’t seen since the early half of 2018,” the post said.
Iran’s oil exports came under sweeping US sanctions in May 2018, when Washington withdrew from a landmark international deal on Iran’s nuclear program, known as the JCPOA.
The sanctions affected Iranian oil shipments when they were tightened in May 2019, but they gradually became ineffective as Iran managed to restore and expand its exports, particularly to private buyers in China.
The Tanker Trackers had already reported a seven-year record in Iran’s oil exports in September when shipments reached nearly 2 million bpd.
That report came just before the United Nations re-imposed six sanction resolutions on Iran that had been lifted in 2015 when the country signed the JCPOA with world powers.
The US and allies in Europe, who triggered the so-called snapback of UN sanctions on Iran, had expected that the sanctions could curb the flow of oil from Iran to major customers like China.
However, experts and authorities in Iran have consistently downplayed concerns raised about the country’s oil exports, arguing that UN sanctions wouldn’t affect Iran’s oil trade or its access to international markets.
Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said in early October that UN sanctions would not add any new pressure on the country’s oil exports as he insisted that the country had overcome some of the harshest American sanctions targeting its oil industry in recent years.
US went after Bangladesh government over reluctance to condemn Russia – ex-minister
RT | November 9, 2025
The unwillingness of Bangladesh to condemn Russia over the Ukraine conflict was one of the reasons the US wanted to oust Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, former cabinet minister and chief negotiator Mohibul Hasan Chowdhury has said in an interview with RT.
Hasina, who led Bangladesh for 15 years, fled the country in August 2024, following weeks of violent student-led protests which claimed 700 lives, according to some estimates.
Chowdhury, who served as the country’s shipping minister, was at the heart of negotiations between the authorities in Dhaka and demonstrators during the crisis. The country has been led by an interim government since then, which pledged to hold an election in 2026.
Chowdhury told RT in an exclusive interview to be aired on Monday that the uprising was instigated by NGOs linked to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Clinton family.
Asked about what Washington’s problem with Hasina’s government was, he pointed to “Bangladesh’s position during the time of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.”
“There was a resolution that was brought in the UN. And there was intense lobbying for Bangladesh to vote against Russia. So our position was that we are going to abstain from voting,” the former minister stated.
Many other countries in South Asia were “simply slavishly following what was being dictated to them,” but Bangladesh “had to carefully balance our international relations,” he said.
“Russia is a long-term ally of Bangladesh,” which supplies the country with “a lot of wheat, a lot of food products, fertilizers,” Chowdhury explained.
“The people in the Global South suffer the most” due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is being “escalated by certain powers,” he said, adding: Hasina’s government “called for peace” and “recognized [that] warmongering… [was] leading to a humanitarian catastrophe. So, that was not liked by certain countries.”
Bangladesh abstained from voting on several UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Moscow over the Ukraine conflict and calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops in 2022 and 2023. The Russian embassy in Dhaka thanked Bangladesh for its stance.
Lots of ‘mess’ to clear up in Russia-US ties – Lavrov
RT | November 9, 2025
Russia sees readiness from the administration of US President Donald Trump to continue dialogue but undoing the damage done to bilateral ties under Joe Biden will take significant time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said.
In addition to ongoing discussions on resolving the Ukraine conflict, Russia and the US held two rounds of high-level talks in Saudi Arabia and Türkiye earlier this year, dedicated to restoring the proper functioning of diplomatic missions and other forms of cooperation. A planned third round of negotiations did not take place, with Moscow saying it was canceled by the US.
In an interview with RIA Novosti on Saturday, Lavrov said there are “many irritants in Russian-American relations, inherited from the previous US administration [of Joe Biden],” adding that “it will take a long time to clear up the mess.”
After the arrival of the Trump administration in January, Moscow “sensed willingness to resume dialogue. It is happening, but not as quickly as we would like,” the foreign minister stressed.
According to Lavrov, US-Russia discussions must not solely focus on the work of diplomatic missions, but also address the issues of the return of “illegally” seized Russian diplomatic property and the restoration of air links between the two countries.
Russia and the US drastically limited the number of each other’s diplomatic staff as relations deteriorated over the past decade. In late 2016, the administration of outgoing US President Barack Obama restricted Russian diplomats’ access to residences in New York and Maryland, and later seized additional Russian properties. The suspension of flights and closure of US airspace to Russian carriers were among the sanctions imposed on Moscow by the Biden administration after the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022.
“Our proposals regarding both diplomatic real estate and air travel have been conveyed to the US side. Working contacts are currently underway regarding the possibility of continuing dialogue,” Lavrov said.
Last month, Trump imposed sanctions on Russian oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil, citing lack of progress in peace talks on Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that the “unfriendly move” would not hurt Russia’s economy, but could hamper the normalization process with Washington.
US Informs Russia Extension of New START Restrictions Under Consideration – Lavrov
Sputnik – 09.11.2025
MOSCOW – The United States has informed Russia through diplomatic channels that it is considering Russian President Vladimir Putin’s idea of maintaining the restrictions laid down in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) beyond February 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told Sputnik in an interview published on Sunday.
“There has been no substantive response from Washington yet. As we were told through diplomatic channels ‘the matter is under consideration,’” the minister said.
The idea of maintaining the restrictions outlined in the New START agreement beyond February 2026 is simple and does not require in-depth discussion, Lavrov added.
“The constructive initiative put forward by President Putin in the post-New START sphere speaks for itself. It has no hidden agenda and is extremely easy to understand. Its practical implementation will not require any specific additional efforts. Therefore, we see no need for in-depth discussion of our idea,” he said.
Russia is not going to persuade the US to accept Putin’s proposal, Lavrov also said.
“We are not going to persuade anyone. We believe that our act meets the interests of both parties and the entire international community. We are prepared for any developments. However, we hope that the outcome will be positive,” he said.
The initiative requires only reciprocity on the part of the US, and Russia will adhere to voluntary restrictions only if and as long as the other side does the same, the minister added.
Putin has announced that Russia was ready to continue adhering to the restrictions under the START treaty for one year after February 5, 2026. The Russian president has explained that the steps taken to comply with the START restrictions would be effective if the US reciprocated. US President Donald Trump reportedly called Putin’s proposal on the INF Treaty a good idea.
