How Iran defeated Trump’s Israel First GOP
By Max Blumenthal | The Grayzone | November 4, 2026
Trump launched a failed war on Iran for Israel last February, as his NSC director and Secretary of State Marco Rubio admitted. Now, the war has come home.
Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz became a vice grip around the neck of Trump and the GOP, especially in the heartland, where diesel prices are 70% higher than a year ago, and farmers have been forced to leave crops in the ground. 74% of Americans told pollsters the failed Iran war was a crucial or major factor in their vote tonight, and over 60% said they were voting against the Republicans because of it.
Democrats won senate races in Kansas and Nebraska, agro producer states where Republicans always roll to victory like a big wheel through a corn field. They also flipped a seat in Iowa, which Trump won by 12 points in 2024, giving them control of the senate.
A Democrat has taken the seat of Lindsey Graham, the late neocon who advised Netanyahu on how to manipulate Trump into the war, resoundingly defeating his sister in South Carolina. In this deep red Southern bastion, a Democrat has not won a senate race since the days of Fritz Hollings, a now-extinct brand of conservative populist who opposed the Gulf war and railed against the neocons.
Trump’s promise of $15 billion in aid to farmers getting hammered by surging diesel costs failed to stop the bleeding. And it’s now another cost of the war.
The GOP strategy of hanging Hasan Piker and his pro-Palestine politics like an albatross around the neck of Democrats was also doomed from the start, as most swing state voters had never heard of the podcaster. Worse, the ploy reminded them how fanatically Israel-centric the Republicans had become under Trump. The Democrats had much more success weaponizing Jeffrey Epstein as a symbol of Trump’s corruption whose ghost subtly invoked malign Israeli influence over the US government.
Hours before polls closed, Trump issued a desperate pledge to end $4 billion in annual aid to Israel. He seemed determined to repeat the con he pulled off in Dearborn, MI at the end of 2024, where he promised to end the Gaza genocide that Biden and Harris backed. Later that night, after the Democrats took the Senate, Trump gave up any pretense of independence and declared: “If people ever got tired of me in the US, I’ll move to Israel and become prime minister.”
Where the “special relationship” with Israel was once a matter of bipartisan unity among party elites, it’s become a polarizing wedge issue and a poison pill for any president. Trump was expected to launch a third assault on Iran immediately after the midterms, but his inner circle is now positioned in a circular firing line, with the neocons who served as Netanyahu’s proxies – Mark Levine, Mark Dubowitz, Ben Shapiro et al – blaming everyone but themselves for the Blue Wave, while pleading to remain in Trump’s good graces.
Tomorrow, Zionist forces will pull back and retrench. Schumer, Jeffries and presidential prospects like Josh Shapiro will become their next line of defense, and possibly their last reliable one in a party whose base is now passionate about ending America’s attachment to Israel.
De-escalating the conflict: What the OSCE, the UN, and Europe are (not) doing to prevent war
By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | November 4, 2026
Three signs of the same crisis
I want to ask all our readers – and you, the one reading this – a question: Do you want war?
Regardless of political, military, national, or ideological preferences, this is a serious question. Who really wants war?
We must all ask ourselves this question – and even more so, it should be asked by the politicians, technocrats, and power brokers in European chancelleries who continue to foment war.
We won’t discuss moral issues right now – we’ll write about those on another occasion. Let’s start with the institutional facts and try to understand whether and how anyone has attempted to bring about de-escalation – or not. Because when we read the Western press, there’s a constant impression that European leaders are the world’s best diplomats, constantly striving to solve global problems and ensure peace. Yet, there is a lack of sources, data, and concrete evidence. And where are all those institutions that were supposedly created to ensure peace for the entire world?
On September 30, 2026, Moscow delivered a non-paper to NATO declaring its readiness to deploy its entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons, should the Alliance attempt to isolate the Kaliningrad region. The document explicitly mentions the possibility of striking the decision-making centers of member countries from the very early stages of a conflict, and a senior European defense official noted that a threat phrased in these terms had not been heard since the end of the Cold War. Two weeks later, in Warsaw, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe responded that a Russian attack would be entirely futile. That same month, Russian border guards detained a German merchant ship in the Gulf of Finland for several hours.
Taken together, these incidents reflect the current dynamic: verbal deterrence on both sides, low-intensity incidents, and the absence of any mechanism capable of defusing them before they escalate into a crisis. This article argues that de-escalation between Europe and Russia does not depend primarily on the goodwill of governments. It depends on rebuilding a risk-containment architecture that Europe has allowed to erode over the course of twenty years. That architecture does not need to be invented from scratch: it already exists, in a dormant form, within the mechanisms of the OSCE and the United Nations system. These are the only multilateral forums in which Europe and Russia still sit together as full members, and for this very reason, they are the only ones capable of producing agreements that both sides can consider their own.
Each side interprets the other’s rearmament as offensive preparation. In Moscow, it is claimed that NATO and the European Union are preparing for a confrontation around 2030; in various Western military circles, the 2028–2030 window is specifically identified as the period during which a Russian attack would become possible. These are mirror-image predictions, and mirror-image predictions tend to become self-fulfilling, because every defensive measure confirms the adversary’s suspicion. It’s the security dilemma – elementary, Watson.
Compared to the Cold War, however, one decisive element is missing. Back then, the rivalry was framed by treaties, hotlines, notifications of military exercises, and mutual inspections. That framework has largely disappeared today. The INF Treaty expired in 2019, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe has been abandoned, the Open Skies regime has been gutted, and New START is set to expire in February 2026 without a successor. Two armed powers face off along a line stretching from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, and they do so without a safety net.
Added to this is a more strictly political problem. Europe is the object of the conflict but not a party to the negotiations. Talks on Ukraine are mediated by Washington: on October 11, the U.S. president announced an energy truce that neither Moscow nor Kiev has confirmed; at the end of the month, a local ceasefire went into effect in Oleški, and a new round of negotiations is expected in mid-November. Europe appears in this context as a financier and potential guarantor, but remains far from the table where the terms are being defined. Yet whatever agreement emerges from that table will reshape the continent’s security order. The paradox is clear: Europeans have institutions built precisely for this purpose, yet they have stopped using them.
The absurdity of a conventional war – repetition helps
Before discussing the tools, it is worth stating frankly what rarely appears in official statements: for Europe, a conventional war against Russia would be a strategic absurdity, and Europe is not willing to fight it. We have already written this many times, it is true, but as the ancients used to say, “repetita iuvant” – repetition helps. This statement holds true in three respects.
The first is material. Four and a half years of war in Ukraine have shown that high-intensity conflict in our century is a war of attrition: victory is achieved by producing ammunition, drones, and equipment faster than the adversary can destroy them, and by replacing troops faster than they are lost. Russia has restructured its economy for this purpose. At the 2025 Hague Summit, European allies decided to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035: a ten-year timeframe that amounts to an implicit admission that such capacity does not exist today. Industries remain fragmented into dozens of incompatible weapons systems, stockpiles have been depleted to support Kiev, and the capabilities that make a modern campaign possible – from satellite intelligence to in-flight refueling – depend largely on the United States.
The second aspect is social and political. European societies are neither prepared nor willing to endure losses in the tens of thousands of men. Debates over the reinstatement of conscription in Germany and other countries show just how open and divisive the issue remains. No European government could ask its citizens to make a sacrifice on that scale for any purpose other than the immediate defense of its national territory.
The third implication is the most serious. A conventional war with a nuclear power does not remain conventional for long. The September non-paper states this in no uncertain terms: in a conflict of this kind, there would be no distant front line and no safe rear, because European capitals would be the front line. Preparing to defend oneself is legitimate and necessary. Believing that one can win such a war – or even simply fight it without losing what one intends to defend – is a miscalculation. For this reason, de-escalation is not just one moral choice among many: it is the only rational policy available to Europe. It remains to be determined what tools to use to achieve it.
The institutions Europe seems to have forgotten
The OSCE is the successor to the 1975 Helsinki Conference, the only forum in which, at the height of the bipolar confrontation, rival blocs managed to codify common principles: the inviolability of borders, the non-use of force, economic cooperation, and human rights. The 1990 Charter of Paris and the Charter on European Security adopted in Istanbul in 1999 added the principle of the indivisibility of security, according to which no state may strengthen its own security at the expense of others’. It is a principle that both Moscow and Western capitals invoke today, interpreting it in opposite ways. Precisely for this reason, it serves as a starting point: the parties do not debate whether security is indivisible, but rather what this entails in practice.
Behind these principles lies a technical framework that few outside of experts are familiar with. The Vienna Document governs the prior notification of military activities, the annual exchange of information on military forces, and assessment visits. The Forum for Security Cooperation is the venue where participating States discuss conventional arms control. The Conflict Prevention Center manages the communications network linking the capitals and can activate urgent consultation mechanisms in the event of unusual military activities. In 2016, the OSCE also launched a Structured Dialogue on threat perceptions, doctrines, and force deployments: an exercise that was discontinued but which nevertheless constitutes the closest precedent to what Europe needs today. Finally, it should be noted that the Organization has declared itself a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter: its initiatives can therefore operate within a framework of universal legitimacy.
The most significant operational experience is the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, active from 2014 to 2022 with several hundred unarmed civilian observers. Its limitations were real: restricted access, no coercive power, and reports contested by both sides. Yet for eight years, it was the only impartial, daily source of information on ceasefire violations in the Donbas, and its end – when Russia refused to consent to the renewal of its mandate – coincided with the transition to the full-fledged SMO. The Organization emerged weakened, with budgets approved only with great difficulty and presidencies hampered by cross-vetoes, but it is not dead. Russia neither withdrew nor was expelled, and the Swiss presidency for 2026 has openly stated its intention to prepare the OSCE to monitor a potential ceasefire: monitoring the contact line, verifying violations, and even providing electoral assistance. Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis has acknowledged that the Organization can deploy only a few dozen people on short notice, while the front line stretches for about 1,300 kilometers. What is needed, therefore, is a significant political and financial commitment from the participating states. That commitment is exactly what Europe could and should offer.
Alongside the OSCE is the United Nations system, which Europeans tend to view as paralyzed by the Russian veto. This is an incomplete assessment. The Security Council adopted Resolution 2202 in 2015 in support of the Minsk Agreements and, in February 2025, Resolution 2774 calling for a swift end to the conflict – with Russia voting in favor. In July 2022, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, negotiated by the United Nations together with Turkey, demonstrated that even in the midst of fighting, a functional and limited agreement can hold for an entire year if it is managed by a joint coordination center with verifiable rules. Since September 2022, experts from the IAEA, a UN agency, have maintained a permanent presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – the only stable international presence on a front line. Geneva, the European headquarters of the United Nations, already hosted trilateral talks between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine in 2026.
From this perspective, the veto power takes on a new meaning. An observation mission authorized by the Security Council would require Russian consent, and for this very reason, Moscow could not view it as a hostile measure. The same applies to the consensus rule within the OSCE. What appears to be a limitation is in fact the condition of legitimacy: a safeguard mechanism that the other party helped establish is one that the other party has an interest in not sabotaging. This is the essential difference between a reassurance force composed of European national contingents – which Moscow has already declared unacceptable – and a multilateral presence with a UN mandate and an OSCE operational structure.
Four levels of de-escalation
On this basis, four levels of intervention can be distinguished, ordered from the most urgent to the most ambitious. For each, European multilateral forums already offer a starting point.
The first is incident management. The Baltic Sea is currently the theater most vulnerable to unintended escalation: heavy traffic, the Kaliningrad enclave, the so-called “shadow fleet,” undersea cables, and nearly daily aerial intercepts. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on Incidents at Sea at the height of the bipolar rivalry. It worked because it did not require trust, but only predictability, with rules on distances, maneuvers, and communications. A Baltic agreement modeled on that agreement, along with a direct line of communication between regional military commands and an identification system for military flights, would cost little and reduce tensions significantly. In February, Washington and Moscow agreed to reestablish military dialogue. Europeans, who live along the front lines, have even stronger reasons to demand their own channel, and the communications network of the Center for Conflict Prevention could provide the infrastructure without having to create anything new.
The second level concerns the transparency and clarity of red lines. The non-paper on Kaliningrad, regardless of its tone, makes clear where Moscow draws its line. Responding with equal clarity is not a concession. Thomas Schelling demonstrated this precisely: clear commitments stabilize, while ambiguity regarding limited actions destabilizes, because it invites testing the limits. Europe can explicitly state that it does not intend to isolate the enclave, reaffirm the transit guarantees already tested during the 2022 Lithuanian crisis, and revive – even on a voluntary and reciprocal basis – the notifications of major exercises provided for in the Vienna Document. The Forum for Security Cooperation is the natural venue for doing so.
The third level is arms control, where the vacuum is most dangerous. The end of the INF Treaty has reopened the issue of ground-based intermediate-range missiles: on the one hand, the announced deployment of U.S. long-range systems in Germany; on the other, Russian delivery systems in Belarus. These are weapons with flight times of just a few minutes, which compress the time available for political decision-making to the point of virtually eliminating it. A mutual and verifiable moratorium on their deployment on the continent would be the step offering the best cost-benefit ratio. Moscow had put forward such a proposal in 2019, but it was rejected due to the lack of verification guarantees. The challenge, then, is to establish a verification mechanism, and the resumption of the Structured Dialogue within the OSCE would allow this to be done in a format where Europeans are participants – not mere spectators – in Russian-American negotiations.
The fourth level is the political framework, and the crux of the matter remains Ukraine. There can be no de-escalation between Europe and Russia without a ceasefire in Ukraine, nor a stable ceasefire without a guarantee mechanism that Moscow does not interpret as a NATO advance. Three recommendations follow from this. Europe must secure a seat at the table, through a contact group or a small-group format with a clear mandate. It must prepare a package for the gradual easing of sanctions linked to verifiable steps, because sanctions are also a bargaining chip, and a chip that is never spent eventually loses its value. Above all, it must propose, as a guarantee mechanism, an OSCE-led monitoring mission authorized by the United Nations Security Council and substantially funded by European states. This would be the most concrete way to translate the financial burden that Europe already bears into political influence.
Fears, hopes, risks
A deliberate attack by Russia against an Alliance country – or vice versa – remains unlikely in the short term. More likely is the possibility that an incident in the Baltic – a drone straying off course, a ship-to-ship collision, a severed cable – could escalate into a crisis due to a lack of mechanisms capable of containing it. That is where the greatest risk lies, and that is where diplomacy can act immediately: an agreement on incident response, a direct hotline, declared red lines, and mutual notifications. The rest – the missile moratorium, a seat at the table, a guarantee mission under the auspices of the UN and the OSCE – requires time and political courage.
In 2025, the Helsinki Final Act marked its fiftieth anniversary, in a climate that made the occasion almost embarrassing. Yet that document was signed by adversaries who did not trust one another, and it was precisely for this reason that they established rules.
Europe – probably, perhaps, maybe, who knows – does not need to invent a new security order; it needs to go back to using the one it already has, and to do so before an incident renders that choice unnecessary.
Desperate For A Renewed Iran War, Israel Dusts Off The WMD Deception.
Just As It Did In Iraq And Syria , Israel Has Launched A New WMD Deception.
By Justin K.P. | The Dissident | November 4, 2026
Israel, increasingly desperate to have the U.S. launch a new war on Iran, has dusted off the WMD deception sharing clearly manipulated “intelligence” with the U.S. claiming that Iran is planning on using chemical weapons.
Even the New York Times acknowledged that “Some American officials see the Israeli intelligence as part of a pressure campaign by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to persuade the Trump administration to return to major combat operations against Iran” and that several Gulf State countries that Israel shared the “intelligence” with “doubted that Iran was developing plans to use chemical weapons and believe Israel is trying to push the United States and its partners to return to a more intense phase of the war.”
“For some American officials, the talk of chemical weapons threats from Iran has evoked the flawed U.S. intelligence in 2002 about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction”, the paper added.
In fact, it was Israel, that played a large role in collaboration with its neo-conservative allies in the Bush administration to cook up that WMD deception used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Journalist Bob Dreyfuss in 2003 reported that, “feeding information to the Office of Special Plans (OSP)”, the special unit created in the Pentagon to launder the deception “was a secret, rump unit established last year in the office of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel. This unit … which has not previously been reported–prepared intelligence reports on Iraq in English (not Hebrew) and forwarded them to the Office of Special Plans” adding, “This secretive unit,… may well have been the source of the forged documents purporting to show that Iraq tried to purchase yellowcake uranium for weapons from Niger in West Africa, according to the former official”.
The Guardian reported at the time that the OSP “forged close ties to a parallel, ad hoc intelligence operation inside Ariel Sharon’s office in Israel, specifically to bypass Mossad and provide the Bush administration with more alarmist reports on Saddam’s Iraq than Mossad was prepared to authorize,” adding, “The Israeli influence was revealed most clearly by a story floated by unnamed senior US officials in the American press, suggesting the reason that no banned weapons had been found in Iraq was that they had been smuggled into Syria. Intelligence sources say that the story came from the office of the Israeli prime minister”.
The LA Times in 2005 reported that “A former senior Israeli military intelligence official asserted Thursday that the nation’s spy agencies were a ‘full partner’ to the United States and Britain in producing flawed prewar assessments of Iraq’s ability to mount attacks with weapons of mass destruction”.
Similarly, Israel played a key role in cooking up the “red line” comment used to justify the covert dirty war on Syria.
When Obama said that his “red line” for intervention in Syria would be the use of chemical weapons on rebels from the former Assad government, the journalist Charles Glass reported that a former US ambassador to the Middle East told him that this was seen as an “open invitation to a false-flag operation”.
The “red line” comment “started with Israeli officials, who used the phrase in private discussions with their American counterparts”, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal at the time.
In 2013, when the red line was crossed in Ghouta, Syria, where rockets containing Sarin were launched, killing hundreds – likely from rebel-controlled territory – it was Israel that “shared” the dubious intelligence reports blaming Assad’s forces for the attack.
Journalist Seymour Hersh reported at the time that “A former senior intelligence official told me that the Obama administration had altered the available information – in terms of its timing and sequence – to enable the president and his advisers to make intelligence retrieved days after the attack look as if it had been picked up and analysed in real time, as the attack was happening,” adding, “One high-level intelligence officer, in an email to a colleague, called the administration’s assurances of Assad’s responsibility a ‘ruse’. The attack ‘was not the result of the current regime’, he wrote.”
This was backed up by Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic, who reported that, “Director of National Intelligence James Clapper interrupted the president’s daily briefing to tell him that the intelligence on Syria’s use of sarin gas was ‘not a slam dunk’” adding that this was a “carefully chosen term” referring to when “CIA Director George Tenet infamously told President George W. Bush that intelligence leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq was a ‘slam dunk.’”
According to the Guardian at the time, “The bulk of evidence proving the Assad regime’s deployment of chemical weapons – which would provide legal grounds essential to justify any western military action – has been provided by Israeli military intelligence”.
Hacked emails later showed that at the time, Samantha Power, then US ambassador to the United Nations, thanked the ambassador of Israel to the UN, Ron Prosor, for sharing “technical information … of significant value in dealing with the Syrian chemical arsenal.”
“‘For my non-technical brain, this is extremely helpful,’ she wrote. ‘I know that these options are being worked aggressively,’ she continued — a reference to her ongoing crusade to enforce Obama’s ‘Red Line’ policy by bombing Syria and assisting the Al Qaeda-led armed opposition”, journalist Wyatt Reed reported.
Desperate for Trump to carry out regime change in Iran, Israel yet again is dusting off the same deceptive playbook in order to have the U.S. carry out the final war on the “clean break” hit list.
US Elections Offer Choice Between ‘Bad and Worse’ as Both Parties Serve War Lobby – ex-UN Expert
Sputnik – 04.11.2026
Both parties are “beholden to the military-industrial complex and to the AIPAC lobby,” and “the problem with the American two-party system is that most of the time it is a choice between bad and worse,” Alfred de Zayas, a retired independent UN expert and prolific commentator, told Sputnik, commenting on the results of Tuesday’s midterms.
“Both Republican and Democratic candidates advocate war over diplomacy, support Wall Street over Main Street, and promote Israel over Palestine. Very few address the needs of the American people, the key issues of education, public health, taxation, infrastructure and job-creation,” the observer stressed.
While de Zayas has little hope that the new Democrat-controlled Senate, led by Senator Chuck Schumer, will bring positive changes, he nevertheless welcomes Republicans’ loss of Congress. He believes the result will limit Trump’s ability to pursue his agenda following his “disappointing” failure to resolve the Ukraine crisis, which he traces to Democratic policies, and the decision to launch a new war against Iran.
De Zayas fears a range of potential “Apocalyptic scenarios” for Iran moving forward, including the potential use of nuclear weapons and the conflict’s escalation into a global crisis, unless the US and Israel agree to a diplomatic climbdown. “In such desperate situations, either one takes the offensive and unleashes World War III, or one accepts reality, cuts one’s losses and resigns.”
While the UN has “been ineffective” on Iran, Gaza and other crises, it’s nevertheless needed now “more than ever” to prevent them from spiraling.
“We need an international peace conference,” de Zayas urges. “This is the moment for the Global Majority, for BRICS, the SCO, the OIC, the Non-Aligned Movement to appeal to all parties to exercise restraint.”
Ghalibaf warns US government not to betray voters who rejected war
Al Mayadeen| November 4, 2026
Americans rejected war at the ballot box, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said on Wednesday, warning Washington that any attempt to defy that verdict would meet a forceful Iranian response.
Writing on X after Democrats won the Senate in Tuesday’s midterm elections, Ghalibaf said voters moved by “conscience or the cost of living” had said “NO TO WAR,” a message he stressed Iran endorses. Should the US government betray its own public’s will to serve “international paymasters and blackmailers,” he cautioned, it would discover that Iran’s refusal “comes with a Nightmare.”
Trump, for his part, acknowledged that the war on Iran had weighed on Republicans. “Iran was a piece of it,” he told The Wall Street Journal on Tuesday night when asked whether the war had shaped the outcome.
He nonetheless stood by his decision to launch the aggression. “I did the right thing. I would have done it again,” he said. He argued that soaring fuel prices, a consequence of the war, had hurt his party more than the war itself and rejected the idea that the losses were a verdict on his presidency. “The biggest issue is that I wasn’t on the ballot,” he insisted.
Democrats take Congress
The Associated Press called the Senate for Democrats late Tuesday. They gained seven seats, many in states Trump carried comfortably in 2024.
James Talarico defeated Trump-backed Ken Paxton in Texas, giving the party its first Senate win there since 1988, and Adam Hamilton became the first Democrat elected to the Senate from Kansas since 1932. Democrats also flipped seats in North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Iowa and Maine, where Troy Jackson unseated Susan Collins.
Democrats later secured the House as well. AP’s latest count puts them at 220 seats to Republicans’ 128, past the 218 needed for a majority, with 25 seats gained so far.
Counting continues in several races.
War, prices drove the vote
According to the NBC News Exit Poll, about 74% of voters described the US war on Iran as a crucial or major factor in their congressional vote.
In the same poll, 79% said inflation was causing hardship for their families, and 62% held Trump responsible for high prices. His approval rating stood at 38%, the lowest for a sitting president on Election Day since 2008.
Voters felt the war most directly at the pump. Gas averaged $4.16 a gallon on Monday, up from $2.98 before the war began.
Trump has nonetheless left the door open to renewed escalation. Hours before polls closed, he told the Financial Times that the US had no immediate plans to bomb Iran but was “locked and loaded if we need to go.”
His remarks came as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hinted at an attack later this week. Reports also said Washington had told Gulf states to prepare for a short, intense campaign after the vote.
Since the US and “Israel” launched the aggression on February 28, the war has cost the US military at least $47.1 billion, according to a CENTCOM estimate that excludes extensive damage to US bases. The Pentagon has admitted to at least 21 US soldiers killed.
Broke Princes: Saudi Arabia’s Powder Keg
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – November 3, 2026
Albania’s Crisis: Rama, Israeli Investments and the Demand for Accountability
By Olsi Jazexhi | 21st Century Wire | November 3, 2026
The protests confronting Edi Rama’s government have become a test of Albania’s democracy. What began on 30 May 2026 as the Flamingo Revolution against Jared Kushner’s resort project in Zvërnec has broadened into a confrontation over corruption, Israeli investment and increasingly authoritarian government. Here is what the mainstream international media are not showing you: this uprising has a geopolitical element at its core, as protesters are accusing an embattled Rama of “selling Albania to Israel.” His increasingly unpopular government has responded with a wave of police violence, mass arrests and increased restrictions on freedoms.
This is an unprecedented political crisis for the country of Albania. For demonstrators, these grievances are connected: a government accused of protecting powerful business interests has resorted to the use of massive force against citizens demanding accountability.
Edi Rama’s relationship with Israel is central to that confrontation. Throughout Israel’s war on Gaza, he has maintained close ties with the Israeli government. In September 2024, he welcomed President Isaac Herzog to Tirana, and subsequently invited Israelis to settle in Albania. Israeli acquisitions of residency, passports, land and property, have since intensified accusations among the populace that Rama serves Israeli interests ahead of the Albanian electorate.
This untoward relationship has a longer security dimension. In 2016, Albania sheltered some 3,000 Iranian former fighters from the previously proscribed terrorist organization known as the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which subsequently established its camp in town of Manëz. Allegations that the organisation conducted attacks against Iran from their protected compound—in coordination with Israel, form a major part of the controversy surrounding its presence.
In 2018, Benjamin Netanyahu requested that Albania “remove the Iranian presence in the country.” The Rama government then expelled Iranian diplomats that year, before severing diplomatic relations with Iran in 2022, and attributing a massive cyberattack to Tehran—an attribution which lacked evidence, and was challenged by critics of Rama.
Israeli defense tech and cyber infiltration in Albania
In October 2022, after the closure of the Iranian embassy, Rama made a three-day visit to Israel and invited Israeli companies to ‘protect’ Albania’s digital infrastructure. This cooperation was accompanied by a reported €100 million in government spending, with contracts channelled through Albania’s National Agency for Information Society (AKSHI).
The resulting procurement allegations raise serious questions about who benefited from this security partnership. Investigations by the Special Structure against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK) have centred on Rama’s handyman Ergys Agasi, AKSHI director Mirlinda Karçanaj, and businessman Ermal Beqiri. Allegations surrounding the affair include diversion of public funds, involvement by Israeli companies and contracts awarded without the required transparent and competitive tendering process.
Albania’s Kosovo-born intelligence chief, Vlora Hyseni, has also been drawn into the allegations, alongside claims concerning her relationship with Israeli businessman Ron Yeffet. Yeffet is the son of Isaac Yeffet, a former senior figure in Israel’s Shin Bet. These connections have sharpened concerns about the overlap between intelligence institutions, political power and commercial interests, and the real risks of Israeli infiltration into key nodes in Albania’s national infrastructure.
Defence procurement is another source of controversy. The notorious Israeli military and arms manufacturer, Elbit Systems, implicated in the genocide in Gaza, has since managed to secure large contracts connected with Albania’s state-owned KAYO. Questions surrounding KAYO, Yeffet and Timak Defense include claims about control of the companies, more than €30 million in state funding, and a projected €1.2 billion investment in Pashaliman port. SPAK has conducted searches and seized documents involving Yeffet, TIMAK and other state officials.
Increased Israeli money and control across society
The controversies extend beyond defence. A 2024 arrangement with Israel’s Sheba Medical Center has been criticised over alleged exclusive medicine-supply rights and the exclusion of Albanian suppliers. In June 2026, Albania signed agricultural investment agreements with 12 Israeli companies, a month after announcing the sale of 100,000 hectares to foreign companies. Albanian media reported that the land would be used for Israeli settlements, or kibbutzim.
In Vlorë, the $6.5 million Jewish Museum, whose construction began in February 2025, has become another focus of opposition. Residents protesting since 5 September 2026 argue that the project threatens the city’s historic identity, the Labëria Patriotic Club and the Ethnographic Museum they say it will replace.
The controversy intensified after Anna Kohen, an Israeli claimed that Vlorë had once been inhabited by “90% Jews and 10% Albanians.” Some residents interpreted the statement as supporting claims over their city by Israelis. Their objections to the museum have consequently become entangled with broader suspicions about Israeli investment.
The airport dispute has reinforced those concerns. On 13 September 2026, Kosovar businessman Behgjet Pacolli alleged that Rama’s government was seeking to terminate his company’s Vlorë Airport concession so it could be handed to the Israeli “businessmen” Ron Yeffet.
Meanwhile, Israeli property purchases have become a focus of anger over rising prices. During his Tirana visit on 12 October 2026, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar announced that 100,000 Israeli tourists had visited Albania that year. Israeli investment spans agriculture, tourism, medicine, defence, banking and other sectors, while Rama’s government has granted passports and residencies to many Israelis.
During Rama’s January 2026 visit to Israel, Netanyahu publicly encouraged Israelis to visit Albania:
“I can tell all Israelis that Albania is a beautiful country with beautiful people, so go there, number one.”
Protesters interpret these developments as evidence of a government placing foreign interests above their own. Some accuse Rama of turning Albania into a “second Palestine” and acting as Netanyahu’s agent. Their banners declare that Albania is not for sale.
Rama has answered by describing protesters as antisemites exploited by the “enemies of Israel and Albania.” He has blamed Iran, Russia, Antifa, left-wing groups, imams and mosques, portraying demonstrators as radicalised and ideologically manipulated. Such rhetoric turns disputes over government decisions into questions of national loyalty.
Corruption cases involving senior officials have deepened the crisis. Former deputy prime minister Belinda Balluku faces SPAK accusations concerning tender violations, corruption and money laundering involving construction contracts worth over €200 million. On 12 March, Rama’s parliamentary majority refused to lift her immunity and authorise her arrest by SPAK.
Erion Veliaj, Tirana’s evangelical Christian mayor and former minister, has been in pretrial detention since February 2025 over allegations involving €1.1 million in public funds. Former environment minister Lefter Koka was convicted in an incinerator case involving an alleged €3.7 million bribe. Former deputy prime minister Arben Ahmetaj faced prosecution and left Albania, while former health minister Ilir Beqaj was arrested over suspected misuse of EU funds.
These cases, rising living costs and controversies over Israeli takeover of the country explain demands for Rama’s resignation, arrest and prosecution. Protesters see a governing system that protects Zionist American investors such as Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and other Israeli business interests, while treating opposition as a threat.
Rama has chosen not to follow the path of other European leader like Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić, and has flatly refused to step down, call early elections or face corruption allegations in a court of law. Critics argue that Israeli political support has effectively shielded Rama and his government from international pressure, while he rapidly transforms Albania into a fully-fledged police state, using police violence to silence protesters.
These grievances have driven protests since May 2026. The unrest increasingly resembles urban guerrilla warfare, with young people clashing with police. The message from the crowds couldn’t be any clearer: Albanians want regime change.
Author Dr Olsi Jazexhi is an Albanian historian and political commentator, specialising in the history of Islam, nationalism and modernity, as well as work in area of counter-terrorism.
Hezbollah Categorically Denies Syrian Accusations: We Aim at Confronting Israeli Enemy, Not Undermining Syria’s Stability
Al-Manar | November 3, 2026
Hezbollah’s Media Relations Office issued a statement to comment on the claims made by the Syrian Internal Security Forces, reiterating that the Party has no presence or affiliations in Syria.
What follows is the full text of the statement:
Hezbollah’s Media Relations Office categorically and in detail denies the accusations contained in the statement issued by the Syrian Internal Security Forces concerning the alleged connection of a purported cell to the party. It reiterates that Hezbollah has no presence or affiliations whatsoever on Syrian territory and has no connection to any activity that undermines Syria’s security and stability.
The repeated accusations and the invocation of Hezbollah’s name in such cases do not alter the reality of its firm and clear position, which it has repeatedly declared. Hezbollah’s compass is confronting the “Israeli” enemy, which is intensifying its attacks on Lebanon and Syria and continues to occupy their territories. Accordingly, confronting this enemy and its expansionist schemes remains the highest priority around which efforts and positions should be unified, away from accusations that serve no one but its interests.
Trump claims funding to Israel ending in 2026 as merger of Israeli–US armies looms
The Cradle | November 3, 2026
US President Donald Trump said on 3 November that he and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed that Washington would halt its billions in yearly aid to Tel Aviv after the end of this year.
“Now, as far as paying Israel, Bibi Netanyahu and I have made a deal that we give Israel $4 billion a year, and we made a deal months ago that we’re stopping,” the US president told Fox News.
“We’ve already agreed that by the end of this year we won’t be paying Israel. Now we’ll help Israel if they need it,” he added.
He went on to say that Israel does not “need it.”
“Why should we suffer the slings from lunatics like an El-Sayed when they don’t need it? It’s a bad, it’s a bad talking point,” he said, referring to Abdul el-Sayed – a democratic nominee for Michigan who has been critical of US financial support for Israel.
Israel receives $3.8 billion in US military aid a year. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that provides $3.8 billion in yearly US military aid to Israel does not expire until 2028.
Trump’s comments coincide with the start of the US midterms election, and come weeks before the US 2027 annual defense budget is expected to be approved before government funding expires on 11 December – which could be delayed due to disputes.
Washington is reportedly seeking $1.5 trillion in defense funding from Congress for 2027.
Last month, Netanyahu alluded to a halt in US funds for Israel. “If you think we’re going to continue receiving what I secured twice, and that’s tens of billions of dollars in American aid for the defense budget, prepare yourselves and get used to the fact that it won’t happen because America has changed,” he said.
Months earlier, plans for a US–Israeli military integration were revealed in Section 224 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Section 224 of the NDAA, entitled “United States–Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative,” proposes bilateral defense research and development, co-production of weapons, joint ventures, licensing agreements, and other US–Israeli military-industrial complex cooperation.
Bipartisan efforts by Representatives Thomas Massie and Ro Khanna to block the military integration have been shut down by Congress.
Iran Weathering The Storm, But Saudi Arabia Is Sinking
By Brian McGlinchey | Stark Realities | November 2, 2026
While the disastrous US-Israeli attempt to impose regime change on Iran has commanded the world’s attention, most people are oblivious to the rising probability that regime change is instead coming to a major US and Israeli partner: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Owing to financial strains, demographics, military failures, and simmering domestic discontent, it may only be a question of magnitude. That is, will Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) be removed by fellow members of the House of Saud, or will the 94-year-old kingdom collapse altogether? Most likely, we’ll see both things happen in fairly rapid succession.
To understand why Saudi Arabia is in danger of falling apart, it’s important to first understand what’s been holding it together since Ibn Saud united a land of many tribes into a huge new state in 1932:
- Power-sharing across the branches of the Saudi royal family. Traditionally, authorities were shared among many senior princes, with their ministries providing each with a base of power and a well of patronage to tap. Major decisions were made by consensus, consistent with the Islamic principle of shura, which is expressly encouraged by the Quran.
- The integration of the Wahhabi religious establishment into Saudi government. Wahhabism is an austere and puritanical variant of Sunni Islam that arose in central Arabia in the 18th century and came to dominate it. In exchange for the Wahhabists’ bestowing of religious legitimacy on the monarchy, the Wahhabi religious authorities — or ulema — were given authority to guide schools, run charitable entities and enforce social norms.
- Tribal loyalty given in exchange for patronage and influence. The Arabian peninsula is home to dozens of tribes, with histories stretching back several hundred years or more. Their acquiescence to rule by the House of Saud has been secured via ongoing consultations and by government jobs, subsidies and contracts. Tribes have helped maintain internal peace by recognizing the monarchy’s authority, and by acting as mediators of disputes, and negotiators of access to tribal land and resources.
Everything changed when MBS became crown prince in 2017, as he radically concentrated power and decision-making in his own hands and those of a tight circle of trusted allies, to the detriment of the tribes and other members of the royal family. More than just a political maneuver, this was a bona fide revolution against the arrangement that had hitherto ensured the House of Saud’s survival.
In one of his first moves, MBS rounded up hundreds of Saudi royals and top business leaders and imprisoned them in the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton hotel. Most of them were reportedly abused, both psychologically and physically. Seventeen were hospitalized, and a major general died in custody. Faced with corruption accusations, detainees secured their freedom by forking over $107 billion, according to the claims of Saudi officials.
MBS also provoked the Wahhabi ulema, as he undertook an agenda of liberalization and Westernization aimed at improving Saudi Arabia’s image and keeping the country’s youth content. These moves included allowing women to drive cars, ending the requirement for traveling women to have male guardians, relaxing women’s dress codes, re-opening cinemas after a decades-long ban, and allowing rock concerts and art festivals. He also stripped the Saudi religious police of their investigation and arrest powers, shifting the overseers to an advisory role.
“He has offended virtually every constituency of the royal family,” Chas Freeman, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said on Judging Freedom. “He’s also offended the reactionary religious establishment, so he’s made a hell of a lot of enemies.”
MBS’s concentration of power isn’t entirely self-serving. His power grab was driven in part by a sense of urgency as Saudi Arabia stares down a looming financial disaster, which is rooted in the nature of the Saudi state, and exacerbated by its demographics.
Like many other states in the region, Saudi Arabia is an example of a rentier state — a state that derives the great majority of its revenue from sale of resources to other countries, rather than from the taxation of domestic economic and entrepreneurial activity.
In rentier states, the relationship of the people and the government is far different from the norm. Instead of relying on the citizenry as a source of funding, rentier states use their resources to distribute money to the citizenry. “The state doesn’t need its citizens to work hard and pay taxes. It needs them to stay content,” explained The Marrow in a video report on Saudi Arabia’s challenges.
Rentier states are put in danger when revenue becomes insufficient to sustain the flow of money to the people. For Saudi Arabia, two variables have been moving in dangerous directions: the population has grown by leaps and bounds since the 1970s, and oil revenues haven’t kept up.
Saudi Arabia now has an extraordinarily young population: Nearly two-thirds of Saudi citizens are under age 30. In a typical state fueled by economic activity, a large, youthful population can be a great asset. In a rentier state, it’s a liability — one that strains the government’s ability to keep them financially secure, with the failure to do so carrying the risk of dangerous discontent.
A primary means by which the Saudi government has distributed wealth — and prevented idleness that facilitates mischief — is government employment. As of 2016, an extraordinary two-thirds of employed Saudis held government jobs, and their salaries consumed 40% of the kingdom’s budget.
Government jobs’ domination of a market becomes a self-sustaining phenomenon. Private industry struggles to hire workers who’d prefer the lower demands, higher pay and greater job security of a government job. That, in turn, inhibits the growth of a private sector that could reduce the need for a large and costly public sector.
Recognizing the need to completely re-engineer the Saudi economy and relieve its reliance on oil money, MBS in 2016 unveiled “Vision 2030,” with a goal of spurring private-sector investment and employment, and improving the quality of life for Saudi citizens.
Many of MBS’s visions were the stuff of science fiction. A huge ski resort in the desert. A gigantic cube-shaped skyscraper in Riyadh as voluminous as 20 Empire State Buildings. A city for nine million people called “The Line,” comprising two parallel buildings 1,640 feet tall, 660 feet wide and stretching a staggering 110 miles.
One by one, Vision 2030 projects meant to dazzle the world have gone dim as the 2030 due date grows closer. The ski resort, which was supposed to host the 2028 Asian Winter games, has been put on ice. The Line has been suspended, leaving only a few kilometers of construction and a 70-mile-long trench. The colossal cubic skyscraper has been halted after initial excavation and installation of foundation pilings.
The curtailing of those ambitions reflects an irony embedded in the kingdom’s predicament: Its quest to end its dependence on oil revenue itself depends on oil revenue. Since the announcement of Vision 2030, oil prices haven’t cooperated.
As MBS’s grand visions evaporate, they’re increasingly regarded as wasteful vanity projects that have only worsened Saudi Arabia’s situation. Questions about his judgment aren’t confined to economic matters — his military decisions have been even worse.
After his appointment as Saudi defense minister in 2015, MBS immediately sought to establish his military credentials by intervening in Yemen’s civil war, which had seen that country’s Saudi-allied government ousted from the capital by Ansar Allah, a Zaidi Shia group widely referred to as “the Houthis.”
It was an enormous failure. Even with refueling, arms and other assistance provided by the United States, the Saudi intervention failed to defeat Ansar Allah. It also inflicted enormous damage on Saudi Arabia’s reputation, as bombings routinely caused mass casualties among Yemeni civilians, and a Saudi blockade created one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters.
Saudi Arabia finally joined a truce in 2022. Despite his earlier humiliation, MBS stirred things back up again in July of this year, violating the truce by bombing an airport in Yemen’s capital to prevent a Yemeni delegation from landing in an Iranian jet, after attending the funeral of Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei.
What followed has been devastating to Saudi Arabia. Ansar Allah retaliated, declaring the imposition of a blockade on Saudi Arabia to counter the Saudi blockade on Yemen. Furthering their ability to make good on that promise, Ansar Allah unleashed an offensive in which they rapidly seized the remainder of Yemen’s west coast, positioning their forces to easily threaten Saudi shipping entering the Red Sea via the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Worse, Ansar Allah has taken the battle into Saudi territory, repeatedly inflicting damage on oil and gas facilities. Iraqi Shia militias joined them in that endeavor, shutting down the east-west pipeline that Saudi Arabia had been using as an alternative to the Iranian-blockaded Strait of Hormuz. Ansar Allah has also struck Saudi airports. In the worst such attack, a Yemeni cruise missile hit a passenger terminal at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport, killing 13 people, wounding more than 300, and causing a weeks-long closure. President Trump has compounded MBS’s ongoing military humiliation by refusing his repeated pleas for US forces to rejoin the war on Ansar Allah.
The destruction resulting from MBS’s renewal of the war in Yemen comes on top of damage caused by Iran, which has deemed any country that hosts US forces as fair targets for retaliation. Some analysts predict it will take seven to 10 years to replace all the specialized oil and gas equipment and fully restore production.
The physical damage from missiles and drones will be hard enough to repair, but the most enduring damage may have been inflicted on Saudi Arabia’s reputation as a safe place to visit and to open businesses — directly undercutting the kingdom’s quest to attract foreign investment and remake its economy.
In a vivid illustration of such damage, Ansar Allah’s attacks recently forced the postponement of Saudi Arabia’s annual Future Investment Initiative, which is hosted by the kingdom’s Public Investment Fund. First held in 2017 and nicknamed “Davos in the Desert,” the highly-anticipated October event was poised to bring major-corporation CEOs — including the leaders of JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Blackrock — to Riyadh. Major sports events, such as F1 races, have also been cancelled or postponed, and the E-Sports World Cup was moved from Riyadh to Paris.
“MBS has staked everything on Vision 2030, the promise that Saudi Arabia will become a global hub for business, tourism, sport and investment,” writes former CIA intelligence analyst Larry Johnson. “Every one of those businesses depends on one thing: the perception that the kingdom is safe. The Houthis are attacking that perception directly.”
As bad as the military situation is for Saudi Arabia and MBS, it may get far worse. As Ansar Allah continues to expand its control of Yemen — where the group already has the capital and territory in which 70 to 80% of Yemenis live — there’s growing wariness the group could retake three provinces from southwest Saudi Arabia that were historically part of Yemen, but were annexed by Saudi Arabia in 1934.
With Saudi Arabia facing increasingly dire circumstances, MBS could be targeted for removal by those who see him as incapable of steering the kingdom out of peril. There are Saudi precedents for that. Faulted for extravagant personal spending and poor management of the kingdom’s finances, King Saud al Saud saw his powers reduced in the late 1950s. Then, in 1964, he was dethroned in a bloodless coup organized by his younger brother, Crown Prince Faisal, who became king.
Eleven years later, King Faisal was himself removed from power — in bloody fashion. In 1975, after returning from a trip to the United States, he was shot to death by his nephew Prince Faisal bin Musaid, who was apparently outraged by the king’s drive to Westernize and liberalize Saudi Arabia. Revenge was also thought to be a factor, as the prince’s brother was killed in 1966 amid a violent protest of the introduction of television to the kingdom.
In October, there were reports that MBS was moving from bomb shelter to bomb shelter beneath heavily-guarded palaces. “[Supposedly] for fear of a Houthi assassination,” Alistair Crooke told Judge Napolitano. “Actually, what he’s frightened of is an assassination by one of his own family or a military officer.”
“There’s a long history in the Arab world of the overthrow of monarchy,” Freeman noted. “It’s facilitated because Islam, in the Holy Quran, is actually very much against monarchy.”
As Saudi Arabia’s condition weakens, its political and economic landscape has become fertile ground for countless seeds of discontent:
- Vision 2030 construction projects have forced thousands from their homes and granted compensation that many say is far too little.
- Government jobs have lost some of their luster; pay raises are harder to come by, and limits on overtime and annual leave have been imposed.
- Citizens who were accustomed to a largely tax-free existence are getting a taste of non-rentier-state life: In 2018, Saudi Arabia adopted a 5% Value Added Tax and later tripled it to 15%.
- Saudi royals — which number between 15,000 and 25,000 — have seen their perks and stipends reduced, forcing many of them to sell homes, yachts and art to raise cash. Princes who were subjected to abuse at the Ritz-Carlton and the confiscation of their assets are likely yearning for revenge.
- Resentments are growing over uneven financial treatment. Crooke offers an illustrative example of two military officers working side by side: one, a highly-placed tribal member who isn’t well-paid, the other a royal of the same rank whose income is padded by a stipend.
- Military cohesion and operational efficiency has been impaired by the silo-ization of the various service branches — which is meant to reduce the ease with which a coup could be mounted. “[MBS] has divided the military, set them against one another, [and] used the National Guard to keep an eye out for any disaffection within the army,” explained Crooke.
- Though often characterized as a Sunni country, Saudi Arabia has a significant Shiite minority, accounting for about 12% of the population. Critically, they’re concentrated in two important areas: Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Region, which is the center of the kingdom’s oil production, and Saudi Arabia’s southwest corner, adjacent to the Shiite population in northwest Yemen, where Ansar Allah rules.
- The kingdom faces reputational damage and a major financial hit that’s likely to arise in a US civil suit in which victims of the 9/11 attacks are building an overwhelming case that Saudi government officials aided the Al Qaeda plotters.
- MBS’s marginalization of the Wahhabi religious establishment holds great peril. Clerics may no longer tell their followers to ignore the lavish royal lifestyles that violate the core tenets of Wahhabism, setting the stage for a radical Islamic insurrection.
Saudi Arabia isn’t alone among Middle East countries in facing the likelihood of major upheaval. Other Gulf rentier states are similarly exposed, and Kuwait could vanish via conquest by Iraqi Shiite militias. As Crooke recently said on Daniel Davis Deep Dive, “People just do not see the huge geopolitical shifts that are taking place today. The Middle East is going to change. You will not recognize it in two years’ time.”
Sunk Ships Don’t Sail Home: Why Peace Won’t Save the Oil Market and War Will Wreck It
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | November 3, 2026
Yesterday, at the opening of ADIPEC in Abu Dhabi, ADNOC’s CEO Sultan Al Jaber told the world that energy security now comes down to getting the oil to the customer, not just producing it. He wants storage, redundancy and diversified routes to market. He noted that shipping and logistics have climbed from less than 5 percent of the cost of a barrel to more than 30 percent. All true. But he skipped one small detail about routes to market. They require ships.
Karl Miller, who has been annoyingly right about the Gulf all year, supplied that detail in a November 1 assessment of the Persian Gulf tanker fleet. If Al Jaber’s speech was the diagnosis, Miller’s report is the X-ray. It shows why a barrel now costs a third of its value just to move.
The butcher’s bill, maritime edition
Miller counts 79 named tankers in the Gulf damage and casualty record. Thirty-five of them are VLCCs, the 2-million-barrel workhorses of the crude trade. That works out to 70 million barrels of carrying space caught up in the damage, for each loading. Together the 79 ships represent more than 14 million tonnes of rated deadweight. His assessment rates the physical damage and replacement burden as “catastrophic,” which is the sort of word that is hard to soften in a press release.
The worst cases make the point:
- Sunk: the Suezmax KYLO on September 5 and the Aframax RIESCO on September 8, about 267,000 tonnes of deadweight lying on the bottom.
- Permanently disabled: DOWNY and STARK I, one VLCC and one Suezmax, reported by the military on September 5.
- Destroyed or rendered inoperable: DERYA, KAVIZ and CHARMINAR, reported by the military on September 8.
- ADNOC’s own ships: the VLCCs AL BAHYAH and MOMBASA B took significant damage in July. MOMBASA B later went back to shuttle work.
- Jet fuel adrift: METRO VENETIAN suffered an engine-room casualty on August 24 with 704,000 barrels of jet fuel aboard. It later limped into Fujairah.
- Confiscated: KAVOMALEAS caught fire in July, was abandoned and ended up in Iranian custody. It was last seen near Qeshm on October 29.
Then there are the October cases: EVER VICT losing command, PETRO DOLPHIN evacuated and drifting, and GEM NO 2 leaking oil into the Gulf. Nothing says “diversified routes to market” quite like a tanker drifting with nobody aboard.
Arithmetic, the enemy of optimism
A tanker is not a barrel. It is a delivery service that loads, sails, discharges, sails home and does it again. Lose the ship and you lose every cargo it would have carried for the rest of its working life.
Miller cites an October 30 assessment that 18 non-Iranian VLCCs are likely out of operation. That is 36 million barrels of loading space. How much daily delivery that represents depends on how long the full round trip takes:
Full voyage cycle Lost gross service
30 days – 1,200,000 barrels/day
45 days – 800,000 barrels/day
60 days – 600,000 barrels/day
That is for the VLCCs alone. It leaves out the Iranian fleet, the two sunk medium tankers and the product carriers.
Now for diesel and jet fuel, the products that actually keep trucks and airliners moving. Before the war, about 750,000 barrels a day of diesel and gasoil and 400,000 barrels a day of jet and kerosene came through Hormuz. In one of Miller’s sensitivity cases, 10 percent of the ships are lost and the round trip stretches from 30 days to 40. Only 67.5 percent of the old service survives. That is 373,750 barrels a day of diesel and jet fuel that never arrives. Al Jaber said yesterday that diesel stocks in some markets are at their lowest seasonal level in 35 years. Now you know part of the reason.
The ships that survive have problems too. A hull that sits idle in warm Gulf water for six months grows things. On a 45-day cycle, fouling that cuts speed by 10 percent reduces daily service by about 9 percent, and a 20 percent speed cut costs about 18 percent. The barnacles, at least, have had a very good war.
Supertankers are not sold at the mall
Somewhere in Washington, someone is surely saying that the market will simply build more ships. It will. Eventually. A VLCC is an industrial project: hull, propulsion, cargo systems, commissioning, sea trials and classification approval, all before it carries a single barrel. The owners’ contracts show how long that takes:
- Worldwide, 20 VLCCs are scheduled for delivery in Q4 2026 and Q1 2027 combined.
- Scorpio’s newly ordered VLCCs arrive in September and October 2028.
- Bahri’s three newly contracted VLCCs arrive in 2029–2030.
- Product tanker orders from Scorpio and TORM deliver in 2029, with options running into 2030.
- Another 138 VLCCs on the orderbook are scheduled for 2029 and later.
Those 20 near-term ships are not an emergency reserve waiting in a parking lot for the Gulf’s insurance claims. They already have owners and charters. Chartering an existing tanker only moves the problem to someone else’s trade. And a ship that has been hauling crude cannot load jet fuel next week. Its tanks need cleaning, inspection, technical approval, crew, insurance and a route that nobody is shooting at. If you lost a ship in September 2026, expect its replacement sometime during the next presidential term.
I am not going to claim the Gulf has stopped exporting. It hasn’t. Late in October, non-Iranian Middle East crude exports exceeded their historical average of about 16 million barrels a day. The bottleneck was how fast ships could be loaded. Some damaged ships do come back. A traceable subset of attacked tankers averaged about two months to their next cargo. On October 28, Bahri reported two affected ships back in commercial service and two still under repair.
Miller is also careful about his counting. The 79 ships include vessels that have since been repaired. The roughly 20-ship current outage estimate (18 VLCCs plus the two sinkings) is a separate measure, and you cannot add it to the 79. Ships running with their transponders off do not mean a hidden graveyard either. There is no honest multiplier for unreported losses, and Miller declines to invent one. Iran’s roughly 43 million barrels of crude and condensate sitting loaded but trapped inside the blockade area on October 22 is cargo waiting to leave. It is not 43 million barrels lost.
That restraint is what makes the conclusion hard to dismiss. Exports are flowing because the surviving fleet is being worked hard, and because buffers are being drawn down. Al Jaber put that drawdown at nearly a billion barrels worldwide.
Peace will not refill the tanks
Suppose the war ends tomorrow. Trump lifts the blockade, hands back Iran’s frozen assets and declares victory on Truth Social. The ships sunk in September stay sunk. The VLCCs out of service still need repair yards or newbuilds that will not arrive before 2028. And the owners and insurers who have spent eight months watching tankers burn will not rush back into the strait because of a press conference.
Aramco’s CEO, Amin Nasser, has already said as much. Speaking in London on October 5, he put lost supply since the war began at almost 3 billion barrels, with about 1 billion barrels pulled from stocks to cover the gap. Even after Hormuz fully reopens, he warned, “replenishing inventories while meeting demand could take up to two years.” Refilling those stocks would add roughly 2 million barrels a day of demand for 18 months. That demand lands on top of normal consumption and has to be carried by a fleet that is short of ships. Nasser also noted that most of the oil still in storage is not really available, because it is sitting in pipelines or needed as minimum tank volume.
So two years is the optimistic case. It assumes the peace holds, the strait stays open and the shipping capacity Miller documents comes back faster than the shipyard calendars allow. I would not bet the farm on any of those.
Or Trump could make it catastrophic
And if Trump decides instead to launch a new attack on Iran? Miller’s 79-ship damage record shows how easily tankers in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman can be hit. Today’s exports depend on the ships that survived, run flat out, and on inventories that have been drained. A new round of strikes would put those survivors back in the line of fire just as the cushion runs out. Last time, the world had a billion barrels in storage to burn through. Next time it will not. That is how a serious energy crisis becomes a catastrophic one.
Count the cargoes, not the communiqués
So here we are. The Gulf’s producers can pump. Their CEOs can give speeches about resilience. Their communications chiefs can send emails demanding corrections without naming a single error. None of that floats a hull. A fleet that lost two ships to the seabed, had five more reported disabled or destroyed and has about 18 VLCCs sitting out of operation is not rebuilt by press release. It is rebuilt in shipyards in Korea, China and Japan, on a schedule that runs to 2030.
Miller ends his report with a test I would recommend to every energy minister now taking a victory lap. Measure recovery by ships cleared to load, carrying space restored and complete cargo cycles delivered. Everything else is just talk about routes to market.
The only thing moving smoothly through the Gulf right now is the rhetoric.
No Cossacks at the gates, fix Italy instead – opposition leader to Meloni
RT | November 3, 2026
Italy should spend money tackling real domestic problems rather than driving itself deeper into debt to defend against fictional threats like the “Cossacks from the Russian steppes,” right-wing leader and MEP Roberto Vannacci said on Monday.
Vannacci, who leads the right-wing Futuro Nazionale party, made the remarks at a press conference in Milan alongside his party’s mayoral candidate, Carmelo Burgio.
“Any defense system must be commensurate with a real threat… If we were to ask the people of Milan what the real threat is, they certainly wouldn’t point to Cossacks coming from the Russian steppes,” he told the press. “They would likely point to harassers, vandals who smash shop windows, or ‘youth gangs’ roaming the streets with knives.”
The right-wing politician criticized the EU’s €800 billion ReArm plan for its “excessive spending on weapons systems,” arguing that there was no “concrete threat” to justify such spending and borrowing.
Vannacci has previously argued that the EU’s €150 billion rearmament loan instrument under ReArm would drive Italy deeper into debt without addressing its domestic issues.
Italy’s public debt stood at nearly 140% of GDP in mid-2026, the second-highest ratio in the European Union, according to Eurostat.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni came to power in 2022 on a platform promising tax cuts, stronger border controls, support for Italian families, and responsible management of public finances. Her government has nevertheless continued to commit billions of euros to military assistance for Ukraine, while also backing increased defense spending.
Moscow has long accused European nations of using the pretext of an alleged threat from Russia to justify their accelerating militarization. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly dismissed claims that Moscow intends to attack NATO as “nonsense.”
The Russian president has also blamed European governments’ economic and financial policies, including high public debt, for the riots and unrest sweeping EU countries since September. The reasons lie in “their own mistakes… in economics and finance,” he told Vesti last month, stressing that some EU countries have public debt exceeding 100% of GDP.

