On April 22, 2025, militants carried out a brutal attack on tourists at a hill resort in Indian-administered Kashmir, leaving 26 people dead. Indian authorities swiftly blamed Pakistan, responding by downgrading diplomatic ties and initiating a series of escalatory measures.
Among these measures, one that took many observers by surprise was India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) – a landmark water-sharing agreement signed in Karachi in September 1960.
Despite decades of hostilities and multiple wars, the treaty had long endured as a rare symbol of cooperation between the two estranged neighbors.
As tensions surged, India launched a military operation on the morning of May 7, firing a barrage of missiles deep inside Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, reportedly killing dozens.
In retaliation, Pakistan struck several Indian cities, including key military installations, three days later.
A ceasefire was brokered just hours after Pakistan’s attack, halting the escalation between the two nuclear-armed nations. However, underlying tensions remain high.
A key point of contention is the continued suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, in remarks on Monday, warned that the fragile ceasefire could unravel if the treaty is not reinstated.
Indus Waters Treaty: Status, India’s stance and Pakistan’s response
India’s cabinet committee on security announced the Indus Waters Treaty – long seen as a symbol of “water for peace” – would be held “in abeyance” until Pakistan ends its support for cross-border terrorism.
India’s Foreign Secretary confirmed the suspension, stating it would remain in place until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably abjures” terror support.
On the ground, India backed up its announcement with action. It briefly restricted flows on the Chenab River, and then released large volumes of water from the Baglihar and Salal dams as levels rose.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed that “India’s water will flow only in India,” emphasizing that water previously shared with Pakistan would now be conserved for domestic use.
Echoing this, Jal Shakti Minister C.R. Patil said, “We will ensure that not even a drop of water from the Indus River goes to Pakistan.”
In Islamabad, the reaction was defiant and dramatic. Pakistani leaders condemned India’s suspension of the treaty as “an act of war”.
Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and military officials publicly warned that blocking Pakistan’s water share would trigger a full response. Pakistan also announced it would pursue international legal action.
The government is reportedly preparing cases before the World Bank (the treaty’s broker), the Hague’s arbitration tribunals and even the International Court of Justice.
This escalation is particularly notable given the treaty’s durability. The Indus Waters Treaty remained intact through the wars of 1965, 1971, and 1999.
What is clear is that water has moved to the center of the current standoff. India’s handling of dam flows appears to serve more as a signal of power than a direct retaliation; a message to Pakistan that New Delhi can, at will, alter the course of shared rivers.
The Indus basin dams underpin Pakistan’s food and energy security. A recent report showed that over 80% of Pakistan’s irrigation and nearly 50% of its GDP depend on the Indus water.
But there is another player that needs to be factored into the equation.
China’s role and upstream developments
Adding complexity to the dispute is the growing role of China. In January 2023, satellite imagery revealed extensive dam construction by China on the Indus headwaters in Tibet and on the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Zangbo).
Images also show China building a dam on the Mabja Zangbo (which is a tributary flowing toward Nepal and India) and planning a mega-dam on the lower Brahmaputra.
The Brahmaputra provides about 30% of India’s freshwater and 44% of its hydropower potential, giving Beijing strategic leverage.
Some analysts warn that India’s current use of the IWT as a geopolitical tool could set a precedent, encouraging China to do the same against India downstream.
China’s involvement also has a strategic aspect. Under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Beijing has poured billions into Pakistan’s hydropower sector, co-developing large dams like Diamer-Bhasha, Dasu, and Mohmand. These projects are central to Pakistan’s water and energy plans, and China’s investment makes it a key stakeholder.
As a result, any dramatic shift in Indus water flows or treaty dynamics is unlikely to remain a bilateral issue. China could respond directly, especially on the Brahmaputra, or through its partnership with Pakistan, by accelerating joint hydropower projects.
A fragile equilibrium
India’s moves risk triggering a “double-edged sword.” By choking Indus flows, it could prompt Beijing to tighten its grip on Himalayan rivers flowing into India.
In effect, the water dispute now entangles three powers: India, Pakistan, and China, each competing for control over critical transboundary rivers.
However, not all leverage is equal. While China’s upstream position on the Brahmaputra is significant, its practical impact is more limited. The Brahmaputra’s flow through India is largely driven by monsoons, with only 7–10% originating in Tibet.
Even a theoretical full diversion (which remains unlikely due to technical and geopolitical constraints) would reduce India’s national freshwater by 10–15%, impacting less than 1% of GDP. India’s more diversified economy and lower dependence on agriculture (13.5% of GDP) offer some buffer.
Still, China’s dam-building project signals its intent to assert hydro-hegemony in the region.
And as tensions mount, rivers are no longer just a source of sustenance; they are emerging as instruments of strategy and power.
Future scenarios for water diplomacy and conflict
The coming months will reveal whether the current crisis can be resolved through diplomacy or whether tensions will spiral further.
Pakistan appears determined to internationalize the dispute. It has signaled intentions to pursue legal action through the World Bank – the designated facilitator of the Indus Waters Treaty – as well as the Permanent Court of Arbitration and potentially the International Court of Justice.
However, the World Bank has already sought to distance itself. President Ajay Banga stated that the institution has “no role to play beyond a facilitator,” casting doubt on its capacity to mediate a meaningful resolution.
As of now, there are no reports of substantive diplomatic progress. This vacuum raises the risk that the ceasefire may falter, potentially reigniting conflict. Looking ahead, several possible scenarios emerge:
Legal/diplomatic resolution: Pakistan could formally invoke treaty mechanisms, filing for arbitration and launching protests under international law. A mediated renegotiation might follow, potentially involving updated water allocations or enhanced confidence-building measures. India has long advocated for revisions to the treaty. Under international pressure, New Delhi might seek new security guarantees, while Islamabad could push for a more robust monitoring framework to ensure compliance.
Escalation: If India persists in withholding water flows or damming key rivers in Kashmir, Pakistan’s response may not remain confined to legal avenues. Officials have warned of potential covert retaliation, including cyberattacks or sabotage targeting Indian water infrastructure. Military confrontation cannot be ruled out either. Pakistani leadership has labeled water denial as an existential threat, with some officials mentioning the possibility of a “last resort response.”
International mediation/coercion: While the World Bank has signaled a limited role, other global actors may step in. The United States, which helped broker the current ceasefire, could take further steps to mediate the water dispute. Other states – including China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia – may offer to facilitate negotiations or introduce incentives for cooperation. Thus far, however, India has resisted most third-party involvement, making an exception only for US-led efforts.
Amin Noorafkahn is a student of regional studies at Allamah Tabatabai University, Tehran. He is interested in political science, literature, and sociology.
Legislators in the US state of Florida have shot down a bid to introduce a law that would have mandated encryption backdoors.
The outcome of the effort – known as SB 868: Social Media Use by Minors – means that the backdoors would have allowed encryption to be weakened in this fundamental way affecting all platforms where minors might choose to open an account.
As the fear-mongering campaign against encryption is being reiterated over and over again, it’s worth repeating – there is no known way of undermining encryption for any one category of users, without leaving the entire internet open and at the mercy of anything from government spies, to plain criminals.
And that affects both people’s communications and transactions.
Not to mention that while framing such radical proposals as needed for a declaratively equally large goal to achieve – the safety of youth online – in reality, by shuttering encryption, young people and everyone else are negatively affected.
If anything, it would make everyone online less secure, and, by nature of the world – young people more so than others.
And so, Florida’s Senate on announced that SB 868 is now “indefinitely postponed and withdrawn from consideration.”
The idea behind the proposal was to allow law enforcement access to communications on a social platform – by forcing a company to build in backdoors any time law enforcement came up either with a warrant – or merely a subpoena.
The focus of the bill was “ephemeral” messages – as in, preventing those defined as minors from using the associated features. At the same time, their parents or guardians would have “full access” to their online activities.
“Dangerous and dumb” – is how the digital rights groups Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) earlier summed up and alliterated the proposal.
The US, and its individual states, are not the only ones attempting to create a chink in the armor of global online security by repeatedly attacking online encryption.
Thus far, cooler heads seem to be prevailing, but the battle is far from over, as this fundamental piece of online security continues to be in the crosshairs of, most of the time, authorities hungry for ever-easier ways to conduct ever more invasive mass surveillance.
After the US unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 Iran nucleal deal in May 2018, subsequent efforts to revive the agreement have largely stalled.
Iran has suggested a joint nuclear enrichment project with US investments and regional Arab nations – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi offered the idea as an alternative to US demand for the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program during the recent talks with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in Oman, the New York Times reports.
Iran would use the venture to enrich uranium to a low grade, beneath the levels needed for nuclear weapons.
Representatives from other countries, including the US, will be on the ground to provide “oversight and involvement.”
As the European Union lays the groundwork for a sweeping overhaul of its audiovisual media regulations, the European Council is doubling down on its campaign to police online speech, draped in the familiar language of “safety” and “harm reduction.”
In a set of draft conclusions ahead of the 2026 review of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), the Council is urging the European Commission to expand regulatory oversight over video-sharing platforms like YouTube and TikTok, demanding stricter measures to counter what it vaguely labels “disinformation” and “societal risks.”
We obtained a copy of the draft conclusions for you here.
Under the surface of these bureaucratic formulations lies an unmistakable effort to entrench centralized control over online speech across the EU. While dressed as a protective measure, especially toward children and young people, the Council’s recommendations represent a coordinated push to tighten the screws on independent voices, alternative narratives, and the chaotic, open nature of internet communication.
Wrapped in vague definitions and bolstered by expanding EU digital legislation, these proposals are paving the way for a more surveilled, less spontaneous digital public sphere.
Particularly troubling is the call for the Commission to “engage regularly with Member States” to assess how very large online platforms (VLOPs) comply with self-regulatory codes meant to eliminate what the EU designates as “harmful content.”
This not only formalizes political pressure on private platforms to suppress speech but does so under a self-justifying cycle where the same institutions define both the problem and the acceptable solution.
The Council also throws its weight behind efforts to classify influencers and independent content creators as formal audiovisual media providers. If adopted, such a move would bring an entire ecosystem of decentralized communication under a regulatory regime designed for legacy broadcasters. This is not about leveling the playing field. It is about reining in anyone who communicates outside the narrow channels of state-sanctioned media.
“In an ever-changing media landscape, we need rules that are both robust and adaptable,” stated Hanna Wróblewska, Polish Minister for Culture and National Heritage.
“Today’s conclusions highlight the most pressing challenges facing the EU’s audiovisual media sector and call for an approach that will ensure all our citizens are protected from harmful content for years to come.” The sentiment may sound benign, but in practice, “robust” rules often translate into bureaucratic tools for censorship, and “adaptability” into a blank check for regulators to constantly redraw the boundaries of permissible expression.
The Council’s emphasis on combating “foreign information manipulation and interference” (FIMI) also deserves scrutiny. While it invokes threats from abroad, the solutions offered inevitably point inward, toward greater institutional control over speech flows within Europe. The specter of “foreign influence” has long served as a justification to erode civil liberties, and in this context, it becomes a pretext to further entangle state actors in decisions about what citizens can see, share, and say.
The AVMSD was never intended to be a speech-regulating weapon. It was built to coordinate standards across media markets, not dictate what truths may circulate. Yet the Council’s conclusions betray a shift away from this principle, echoing a broader authoritarian drift in the EU’s digital policymaking. Initiatives like the Digital Services Act and the European Media Freedom Act are increasingly being used to empower unelected bodies to interfere in editorial processes and curate public discourse under the banner of safety.
Calls for “media literacy,” “pluralism,” and “support for journalistic standards” now serve as euphemisms for state-aligned narratives. Rather than equipping citizens to think critically, these measures promote compliance with officially approved information streams while marginalizing dissent, satire, and counter-establishment viewpoints.
The General Court of the European Union on Wednesday annulled the European Commission’s refusal to grant a New York Times journalist access to text messages exchanged between Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla.
According to a communication published on Wednesday, the judgment concluded that the Commission failed to provide a credible explanation for its claim that it no longer holds the requested messages, which were allegedly sent during Covid-19 vaccine procurement negotiations.
The ruling comes in response to a 2022 request by Matina Stevi, a Brussels-based journalist with The New York Times, who sought access to all text messages exchanged between von der Leyen and Bourla between Jan. 1, 2021, and May 11, 2022. The Commission denied the request, stating that it possessed no such documents. Stevi and The New York Times challenged that decision before the EU’s General Court.
On May 11, 2022, Stevi submitted a formal request to the European Commission seeking access to the text messages. The request was registered by the Commission the following day, on May 12. When the Commission failed to respond within the time frame set by EU transparency rules, Stevi’s legal representative filed an initial confirmatory application on June 28, 2022, reiterating the request for access.
On July 20, 2022, the Commission responded to the initial application, stating that it did not possess any documents corresponding to the request. In response, Stevi’s representative submitted a second confirmatory application on Aug. 9, 2022, which was formally registered the same day. Later that month, on Aug. 31, the Commission notified Stevi that the deadline for its response would be extended by 15 working days, setting a new target date of Sept. 21.
On Sept. 21, the Commission informed Stevi that the assessment of her application had been completed but that the draft decision still required approval from its Legal Service. Nearly two months later, on Nov. 16, 2022, the Commission issued its final decision, reiterating that it did not hold any of the requested text messages and therefore could not grant access.
The Court found that the Commission’s justification was insufficient and that Stevi and The New York Times had provided “relevant and consistent evidence” showing that such messages had existed. The Commission, it said, failed to meet its obligations under the Access to Documents Regulation and the principle of good administration as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The judgment scrutinized the Commission’s procedural conduct, noting that it relied on assumptions and imprecise information throughout the request process. It also emphasized that public institutions must document and retain information related to their activities in a “non-arbitrary and predictable manner.”
In its decision, the Court stated that “despite those imprecisions, [the Commission] maintains that it does not possess the requested documents, with the result that it is for the applicants to produce relevant and consistent evidence capable of rebutting the presumption of non-possession of those documents.”
That presumption was indeed rebutted, the Court held, by a New York Times article and transcripts of interviews conducted by Stevi with both von der Leyen and Bourla in April 2021. The article reported that for a month during vaccine talks, von der Leyen and Bourla “had been exchanging texts and telephone calls.” In the interview transcript, Bourla said that “[the Commission President and I] exchanged text messages, if there was something that we needed to discuss,” and that von der Leyen had “sent me her phone [number].” These statements provided sufficient grounds for the Court to determine that the text messages likely existed at some point.
The Commission, by contrast, was found to have offered no credible detail about the searches it had conducted for the messages or about their fate. “It remains impossible to know with certainty,” the Court wrote, “whether the requested text messages still exist or whether they have been deleted and, if so, whether such a deletion took place deliberately or automatically.” The Commission also failed to clarify whether von der Leyen’s mobile phone had been replaced, and if so, what happened to the previous device and its data.
“The Commission did not provide in the contested decision any plausible explanation as to why it had not been able to find the requested documents,” the Court held.
Furthermore, the Court rejected the Commission’s argument that the messages did not constitute official documents because they were allegedly short-lived or lacked policy significance. Even if the messages were not registered in its document system, the Commission was still obligated to retain and account for them under EU transparency rules. “Institutions cannot deprive of all substance the right of access to documents which they hold by failing to register the documentation relating to their activities,” the Court held.
The Commission’s handling of the request, the Court concluded, “breached the principle of good administration laid down in Article 41 of the Charter.”
As a result, it annulled the Commission’s decision and ordered the institution to pay the applicants’ legal costs.
The judgment has led to calls for greater transparency within EU institutions and among the bloc’s leaders.
Rob Roos, a former Dutch MEP who was vice-president of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament during the now-dubbed “Pfizergate scandal,” wrote how his legal challenge against the Commission was dismissed at the time.
“My case as an MEP was ruled inadmissible, while a foreign newspaper was accepted. Transparency isn’t optional. Democracy demands it. Back to court,” he wrote on X.
Hungarian MEP András László slammed the corruption scandals at the highest level in Brussels, which he claimed keep piling up. “Europeans want change in Brussels. We deserve better leadership! Qatargate, Pfizergate, Hololei, Reynders and money laundering, Green Deal and Timmermans, fake NGOs… The interests of Europeans are being sold out. Enough is enough!”
Several other European lawmakers demanded that the text messages now finally be released to see what agreements were reached over Covid-19 vaccines between von der Leyen and Bourla.
“She should have made her text messages in the Pfizergate affair public,” said Dutch MEP Marieke Ehlers. “This proves the need for the parliamentary commission of inquiry into transparency proposed by the Patriots for Europe [parliamentary group].”
Anna Bryłka, Polish MEP for the right-wing Confederation, and Spanish MEP Hermann Tertsch of Vox, went further, calling on von der Leyen to resign following the judgment.
The European Commission is yet to formally respond to the judgment.
As we gear up for the first direct talks between Russia and Ukraine since the failed Istanbul talks of March 2022, a complex game of brinkmanship is underway.
Not surprisingly, in my view, President Putin ignored the coalition of the willing’s ultimatum to Russia to embark on an unconditional ceasefire for thirty days or face massive new sanctions. Instead he proposed what the Americans have been pushing for since Trump assumed office, direct bilateral talks with Ukraine in Istanbul on Thursday 15 May.
I have long argued that the only route out of the war in Ukraine is through talks. Compromise was offered by both sides in the first round of Istanbul talks in March 2022. Any new negotiations will require compromise from both sides, but the difference today is that the cards are more heavily stacked in Russia’s favour than they were in 2022.
Against this backdrop, President Zelensky has called on President Putin to meet him personally in Istanbul on Thursday. From my perspective, this appears an attempt to call off talks if Putin doesn’t show up.
Usually, when Heads of State meet, officials will have hammered out the negotiation for some time before hand. The leaders can then arrive and either sign on the dotted line or tackle the most difficult issues one on one. It’s now Tuesday 13 May. There is simply no way that Russian and Ukrainian officials will have lined up the framework for a deal for both leaders to sign in Istanbul on Thursday.
Even if Putin showed up on Thursday, Zelensky isn’t going to announce unilaterally that Ukraine is giving up its NATO ambition before the full negotiations have even started. Whether you agree or not, this is self-evidently Russia’s core ‘root cause’ of the war. The new German Foreign Minister, Johann Wadephul recently repeated the line that Ukraine’s path to NATO is irreversible, even though the Trump administration disagrees.
A form of words on Ukraine’s NATO aspiration that is agreeable to both sides in the war will take time to draft. And there’s a huge list of other detailed points that have to be addressed, including the line of control, the role of military forces from other states, the return of Ukrainian children, the protection of minority languages and so on.
Every statement that Zelensky has made since the war started has emphasised the need for the west to pile more pressure on Russia to ensure ultimate victory. He would meet Putin in Istanbul without the back slapping adulation that he receives in western capitals and with no pressure cards in his back pocket.
That doesn’t mean I think a meeting shouldn’t happen, because I do. The image of both war times leaders meeting in Istanbul, however awkward and uncomfortable, could be deeply symbolic in announcing the commencement of long overdue peace talks between officials. They could agree, face to face, to maintain a ceasefire for as long as those peace talks continued.
But no leader likes to turn up to any international meeting without the preparatory ground work in place. There is deep enmity between Putin and Zelensky for obvious reasons. Given Zelensky’s penchant for publicity stunts, the Russian side would want to be absolutely sure that the choreography of any meeting and the deliverables – what they would announce, however limited – had been agreed.
Putin will know that if he does not now turn up to Istanbul that Zelensky will hit the international airwaves calling for massive sanctions. But that if he meets Zelensky and a comprehensive deal isn’t agreed there and then – a frankly impossible feat it seems to me – then the same calls for massive sanctions against Russia will be made.
Of course, Putin will also know that Europe can’t muster new sanctions massive enough to make a difference at this late stage in the process, having exhausted most avenues since 2014. On Victory Day, Britain unilaterally announced the ‘biggest ever sanctions package’ against Russia’s so-called shadow fleet of oil tankers. The idea that unseaworthy hulks are carrying illicit Russian oil into Britain is obviously fanciful. But in any case, with the global oil price now close to the G7 oil price cap on Russian oil, the idea of a shadow fleet, delivering oil at its market rate, has fallen away. Britain’s February sanctions package against 107 persons and entities was labelled the largest sanctions package since 2022. Let’s be clear, the biggest sanctions package against Russia was imposed in February 2022, and everything since that time has offered diminishing marginal returns.
But that’s not really the point. By trying to force a showdown in Istanbul, Zelensky may want to continue to paint Russia as the aggressor and to press the case for more military aid, having asked for three million new artillery shells during his recent trip to Prague. However, this war really must now end, having blighted over one million lives already.
Boris Johnson was wrong in March 2022 to discourage Zelensky from accepting the first Istanbul peace deal precisely because he could not back up the promise that he made; to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. Even though Britain continues to pump £4.5bn in yearly military aid into Ukraine, that sum pales against the free aid that the U.S. offered under Joe Biden.
Trump is offering nothing more now than to plunder Ukraine’s resources so that it can buy American weapons, and Europe cannot afford to make up the difference, for as long as it takes. Ukraine is still losing on the battlefield and now, apparently, treating its traumatised troops with ketamine to help them deal with the PTSD.
Despite significant risks around inflation and high interest rates caused by the enormous fiscal splurge on its war economy, Russia is still growing at a respectable rate. Europe is not.
For now, President Putin is keeping his powder dry by not responding to Zelensky’s relentless press stunts. It’s clear to me that Russia’s initiative of a second round of Istanbul peace talks from Thursday is essential in edging both sides closer to a cessation of the killing that should have ended over three years ago. Whether or not both leaders meet at the start or at the end of those negotiations, let’s just please get down to the business of talking.
On May 13, 2025, a new bill titled “On the Transparency of Public Life” was submitted to the Hungarian parliament. The proposal comes at a critical time when national sovereignty and democratic self-determination face mounting pressures from global influence networks. This legislation marks a significant step in Hungary’s commitment to shielding its public life from covert foreign interference.
The bill was introduced in response to escalating concerns about foreign-funded organizations and their involvement in shaping Hungary’s political discourse. Investigations and public disclosures in recent years have revealed that millions of dollars, primarily from American and Brussels-based entities, were funneled into Hungarian civil society groups and media outlets with clear ideological agendas. The government argues that these funds have been used not to strengthen democracy, but to distort it, aiming to manipulate voter sentiment and policy outcomes to suit external interests.
At the core of the proposed law is a simple but powerful principle: Democratic decision-making must reflect the will of the Hungarian people, not that of foreign powers or their proxies. The bill asserts that public life, including political activity and discourse, must be free from the influence of foreign financial resources. It expands the definition of foreign-funded influence to cover all legal entities and civil organizations whose activities, backed by external support, target national decision-making processes including elections, legislative debates, and public opinion shaping.
Just as the United States began cleaning house, freezing USAID funding, and initiating a major restructuring after widespread scandals, Hungary is also taking decisive steps to defend its democracy from covert political influence.
The legislation introduces a registry system for entities that engage in such activities. If passed, the Sovereignty Protection Office will identify organizations whose foreign-funded efforts jeopardize Hungary’s constitutional values. These organizations will be listed, required to obtain state approval before receiving any foreign support, and their leaders have to file public asset declarations. Violations, such as accepting funds without approval, can lead to fines of up to 25 times the value of unauthorized support, or even a ban on further public engagement.
Crucially, the bill builds upon overwhelming public support. A recent national consultation revealed that over 98 percent of respondents back stronger measures to defend Hungary’s sovereignty and oppose foreign political influence. These figures highlight a deep societal consensus: that Hungary’s future must be determined by Hungarians alone.
Far from restricting legitimate civic activity, the bill aims to restore transparency and accountability in the political process. Just as political parties are banned from receiving foreign funds under EU rules, non-party actors should be subject to scrutiny when their operations affect public decision-making.
In today’s geopolitical climate, defending sovereignty is no longer a theoretical concern, it is a practical necessity. Hungary’s new legislation sets a precedent in protecting democratic institutions from external manipulation and reaffirms the nation’s right to self-governance.
If passed, this bill will be more than just a legal reform—it will be a declaration that in Hungary, democracy belongs to the people, not to foreign financiers.
France has reached the limit of its military support for Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron has said.
In a televised interview with TF1 on Tuesday, Macron defended his administration’s handling of the Ukraine conflict, saying the French have done “the maximum we could” to help Kiev, given that the country’s military was not set up to conduct a protracted, high-intensity land war.
”We gave away everything we had,” Macron said. “But we can’t give away what we don’t have, and we can’t strip ourselves of what is necessary for our own security.” He noted that France’s approach, coordinated with those of other Western donors, aims to avoid direct confrontation with a nuclear-armed power.
France has committed more than €3.7 billion ($4.1 billion) in military assistance to Ukraine since the escalation of the conflict in February 2022, according to the Kiel Institute’s aid tracker. Macron highlighted efforts to scale up the domestic defense industry to continue supplying arms.
The remarks came as the French government struggles with an economic crisis. The national budget deficit hit 5.8% last year, once again surpassing the 3% threshold recommended for EU members. Public debt has climbed above 110% of GDP, and economic forecasts predict growth of less than 1% in 2025. Macron is also facing increased challenges in pushing legislation through parliament.
The TF1 broadcast opened with a montage of public criticism, including accusations that Macron has mismanaged the economy, treated ordinary citizens with contempt, and focused too heavily on foreign affairs. One citizen described him as “a president who practically wants to send us to war.”
Macron advocates for deploying French troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal between Kiev and Moscow, arguing that such a move could help deter Russia.
Moscow has repeatedly warned it would not accept any NATO presence in Ukraine, citing the military bloc’s expansion in Europe as a core reason for the conflict. Russia views the war as a US-led proxy campaign, with local troops serving as “cannon fodder.”
Direct talks between Russia and Ukraine, which Kiev called off in 2022, are expected to resume this week in Türkiye. Kiev has demanded that President Vladimir Putin participate in person and urged its Western backers to impose new sanctions if he refuses. Moscow has yet to confirm its delegation.
Russia has rejected the UN civilian aviation agency’s claims that it was responsible for the 2014 downing of the Malaysia Airlines flight over eastern Ukraine. Moscow insisted that the Dutch-led investigation into the incident was politically motivated and relied on “questionable” evidence submitted by Kiev.
“Moscow’s principal position remains that Russia was not involved in the crash of MH17, and that all statements to the contrary by Australia and the Netherlands are false,” the Foreign Ministry said on its website on Tuesday.
The statement came after the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) voted that Russia failed to uphold its obligation to “refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.”
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) was shot down in eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014, killing all 298 people on board, most of whom were Dutch, Malaysian, and Australian nationals. The incident occurred as Ukrainian troops were attempting to retake the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk, which voted to secede following the Western-backed coup in Kiev. The two entities later voted to become part of Russia in September 2022.
In 2015, the investigation – conducted by the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, and Ukraine – concluded that the plane was shot down by a Soviet-era Buk surface-to-air missile system delivered by Russia to the Donbass militias. Moscow denied providing heavy weapons to local forces and argued that the aircraft was hit by a version of the missile used by Ukrainian, not Russian, troops. It also criticized its exclusion from the investigation.
The Foreign Ministry condemned the ICAO Council’s decision as politically motivated, alleging “multiple procedural violations.” It said the ICAO ignored “ample and convincing factual and legal evidence” submitted by Russia to demonstrate its non-involvement in the shootdown.
“The conclusions of the Dutch investigation were based on the testimonies of anonymous witnesses – whose identities were classified – as well as on questionable information and materials submitted by a biased party: the Security Service of Ukraine,” the statement read.
The Foreign Ministry added that Ukraine should ultimately be blamed for the tragedy because Kiev “launched a military operation in Donbass under the false pretense of combating terrorism.”
Speaking to reporters on Tuesday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that, because Russia was not part of the investigation, it “does not accept biased conclusions.”
Ian Proud was a member of His Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. Ian was a senior officer at the British Embassy in Moscow from July 2014 to February 2019, at a time when UK-Russia relations were particularly tense. He performed a number of roles in Moscow, including as Head of Chancery, Economic Counsellor – in charge of advising UK Ministers on economic sanctions – Chair of the Crisis Committee, Director of the Diplomatic Academy for Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Vice Chair of the Board at the Anglo-American School.
On 11 September 2001, while smoke still rose from the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, two meetings – one in Tel Aviv and the other in Washington – put Iraq in the crosshairs. Then-Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon convened an emergency meeting of his National Security cabinet and resolved to exploit the attacks to push for war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Embedded Israeli agents in the hawkish Bush administration were tasked with advancing this agenda. Meanwhile, former US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, initiated internal discussions on targeting Iraq.
According to then-secretary of state Colin Powell’s testimony to the 9/11 Commission, “Wolfowitz – not Rumsfeld – argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the terrorist problem and should therefore be attacked.” It was he who insisted that Iraq was the root of the terror problem. Inside the Pentagon, “Wolfowitz continued to press the case for dealing with Iraq.”
On 11 September, the very same day of the terror attacks – and despite the fact that Washington immediately identified Afghanistan-based Al-Qaeda leaders as the culprits – CIA director George Tenet authorized the creation of the Iraq Operations Group (IOG), led by covert ops veterans Luis Rueda and John Maguire.
Within 24 hours, the two were drafting a blueprint for the destabilization of Iraq. Codenamed DB/ANABASIS (“DB” being the CIA’s cryptonym for Iraq), the plan was activated long before any formal declaration of war, and well before the American public was groomed to support the spurious allegation of WMDs in Iraq.
Rueda and Maguire brought deep experience in black ops from Latin America and Afghanistan. Both had failed in earlier efforts to topple Saddam – most notably with DB/ACHILLES in 1995. But now, the stage was set, the funding secured, and the political climate ripe.
The key takeaway: While the world focused on Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan, Iraq had already been chosen as the first target.
Operation DB/ANABASIS
Approved by US president George W. Bush in February 2002 and backed by $400 million, DB/ANABASIS was a playbook of sabotage, disinformation, psychological warfare, armed uprisings, and assassinations of Iraqi officials. Though the CIA is barred by law from conducting assassinations, euphemisms like “direct action operations” cloaked the intent.
The first objective was to deepen Saddam Hussein’s paranoia. By sowing chaos through subterfuge, the CIA hoped he would lash out – arresting, torturing, and executing his own personnel in a desperate attempt to root out traitors.
Maguire’s team entered Iraqi Kurdistan in April 2002, securing the cooperation of Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani in exchange for US guarantees. By fall, DB/ANABASIS was in full effect.
Iraq, already weakened by wars, sanctions, and a decade of no-fly zones, was being “softened up” before the invasion. The plan was not meant to replace war but to ensure a fragmented, broken state that could not resist one.
Target shift: From Iraq to Iran
In January 2002, president Bush delivered his infamous “Axis of Evil” speech, lumping Iran and Iraq together. The speech, written by neoconservative David Frum, who, like Oded Yinon – author of the “Yinon Plan” – was a disciple of Ariel Sharon.
It followed the strategic logic of the Israeli-authored “A Clean Break” report prepared in 1996 for Benjamin Netanyahu by Richard Perle, Doug Feith, and David Wurmser, among others. The original plan targeted Iraq, Iran, and Syria. To disguise Israeli fingerprints, North Korea was inserted as a decoy.
The strategy was straightforward: Take down Iraq first, then Iran. Once those fell, Syria and Hezbollah would be easy pickings.
Iraq fell in 2003. Syria has been shattered. Now, Iran remains the last domino. And the tools once used against Iraq are being dusted off and re-targeted. This is the CIA’s revised ANABASIS – but this time, it is for Iran.
Remaking ANABASIS for Iran
The principles of DB/ANABASIS are being applied in Iran today: sanctions to weaken the economy, sabotage and assassinations to create confusion and fear, and psychological operations to fracture public trust.
Iranian opposition groups are central to this new campaign. In 2012, former US president Obama removed the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) from the US State Department’s terrorism list. MEK was relocated to Albania, where it now operates from Camp Ashraf, launching cyber and terror attacks against the Islamic Republic.
The CIA also leverages Kurdish and Baluch separatists in its operations. Mossad, often in collaboration with the CIA, is suspected of orchestrating assassinations of scientists like Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, and terror attacks in Tehran (2017), Ahvaz (2018), Chahbahar (2019), and Shah Cheragh (2022, 2023). The recent Kerman (2024) attack fits the same mold.
Protests after Mahsa Amini’s death were swiftly hijacked by CIA – or Mossad-aligned operatives, armed with Molotov cocktails and firearms – a stark contrast to earlier demonstrations.
Fires in Bandar Abbas, Karaj, and Mashhad also fall within the scope of ANABASIS. These are not accidents – they are acts of economic and psychological sabotage.
The hidden war: Psychological and strategic impact
“Mr Bond, they have a saying in Chicago: ‘Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it’s enemy action’” – Goldfinger (1959).
A respected Iranian analyst described the sabotage in Bandar Abbas, Karaj, and Mashhad as “crude counter-value” strikes. That judgment understates the military and psychological impact: As in Lebanon, these acts damage infrastructure, kill civilians, and provoke panic.
Sabotage works best when it appears random yet coincides with political moments. When former speaker of parliament Ali Larijani appeared on television during the Karaj blackout, the message was clear: Your leaders cannot protect you.
Such operations trigger internal suspicion. Iranian security agencies must investigate colleagues, family members, and even friends. As they chase ghosts, trust breaks down. Counterintelligence will target security staff at affected sites, breeding paranoia. Tehran becomes obsessed with foreign infiltrators and moles.
During the Cold War, the KGB was adept at making the CIA suspect its own staff of betrayal. The resulting “mole hunts,” led by CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton, devastated morale. The same dynamic is now being replicated in Iran.
The endgame: Collapse from within
The CIA’s strategy aims to destroy unity and morale as precursors to outright war. Washington and Tel Aviv hope that Iran, like Iraq before it, collapses from within under pressure from a disillusioned population.
Maguire once said that DB/ANABASIS was about “settling scores” with Saddam. This attitude – reducing foreign policy to vendettas – still dominates US strategic circles. Inside the Pentagon and CIA, figures view Iran through the lens of the 1979 hostage crisis and Tehran’s support for the Iraqi insurgency and Taliban.
American troops, particularly the US occupation army – which absorbed the brunt of IED attacks in Iraq – hold deep animosity toward Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). One especially deadly IED variant, the explosively formed penetrator (EFP), was attributed to Iranian design, with Israeli intelligence helpfully pointing fingers.
This animus, combined with pro-Israel sentiment and a black-and-white worldview, leads many in the Trump administration to align with Netanyahu – such as Mike Waltz, a leading advocate for confrontation with Iran. According to Foreign Policy :
[We are witnessing the] “ideological struggle between proponents of an America First ‘realist’ foreign policy, particularly regarding Iran, and an entrenched neoconservative faction that is pushing for regime change within yet another Middle Eastern country.”
Trump complains about the “Deep State,” but fails to see its true nature – a network not interested in jailing him, but in bypassing the presidency itself to advance long-standing agendas. For the Deep State and Israel alike, Iran has been the ultimate prize for decades.
In a new escalation of its ongoing war on Gaza, the Israeli occupation military committed a massacre at the Gaza European Hospital on Tuesday evening, targeting the facility and its surroundings in Khan Younis, southern Gaza, with a series of intensive airstrikes.
Al Mayadeen’s correspondent reported that the Israeli airstrikes struck multiple sections of the hospital, including the entrance to the emergency department, the courtyard between the maintenance and anthropology departments, and areas adjacent to two shelter centers: Ehsan al-Agha and Jenin.
The attack caused extensive destruction and resulted in multiple fatalities and injuries, with bodies still trapped under the rubble.
Gaza Civil Defense: At least 28 killed, 70 injured
According to Gaza Civil Defense spokesperson Mahmoud Basal, the bodies of 28 martyrs were recovered from the area around the Gaza European Hospital, which had come under fire belts by the Israeli military. He added that more than 70 people were injured, many of them seriously.
The hospital was reportedly hit with at least six missiles, leading to the collapse of several facilities and severe structural damage. Following the attack, Nasser Medical Complex in Khan Younis, southern Gaza, declared a state of maximum emergency, unable to cope with the influx of casualties or take on the burden of patients transferred from the now-disabled hospital.
Medical teams were forced to evacuate the wounded and patients from the Gaza European Hospital to Nasser Medical Complex, as the infrastructure of the former could no longer support medical operations.
The actual death toll is expected to be higher as rescue operations remain obstructed by continuous air raids.
In the early hours of Tuesday, Israeli occupation forces bombed the burn unit of Nasser Medical Hospital, killing several Palestinians, including renowned journalist Hassan Eslaih, whose powerful and unflinching photography has brought global attention to the harrowing massacres committed since the outset of the Israeli genocide.
Palestinian Resistance denies claims about targeted leader
In response to Israeli media reports suggesting that a Palestinian Resistance leader was present at the hospital site, a senior figure in the Resistance affirmed that such claims were untrue.
“Loser Netanyahu is trying to please the Zionist right by claiming that he is achieving success in Gaza,” the senior figure indicated.
Civil Defense condemns Israeli targeting of rescue teams
Gaza’s Civil Defense confirmed that its teams remain unable to access the site of the massacre due to heavy and continuous Israeli shelling. Attempts to retrieve the remaining bodies scattered around the Gaza European Hospital have been thwarted by the Israeli occupation’s deliberate targeting of rescuers.
In a statement, the Civil Defense condemned the attack on its personnel as they attempted to evacuate civilians from a bombed residential building near the customs checkpoint in eastern Khan Younis. The same building was bombed again by Israeli forces while the rescue operation was underway, injuring two crew members and forcing the team to retreat without being able to save trapped civilians.
Continued Israeli raids on Khan Younis, Gaza City
Simultaneously, Israeli strikes continued across other parts of Khan Younis. Two civilians were killed and others injured in an Israeli airstrike on a tent near the Asdaa Gate, west of the city. Another round of airstrikes hit Aabasan al-Kabira, east of Khan Younis.
Elsewhere, Civil Defense teams reported recovering 10 bodies and 16 injured civilians from the Afghan family home, targeted by Israeli warplanes near the customs checkpoint in eastern Khan Younis.
In Gaza City, Israeli shelling was concentrated on eastern neighborhoods, including al-Shujaiya, al-Zaytun, al-Tuffah, and the area near al-Shawa Square, resulting in additional casualties and widespread destruction.
Gaza death toll surpasses 52,900
The Gaza Ministry of Health announced earlier on Tuesday that the death toll from the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza since October 7, 2023, has now exceeded 52,900 martyrs, with more than 119,700 injured. Since March 18 alone, over 2,700 have been martyred and more than 7,600 wounded.
Hundreds of bodies remain under the rubble and in the streets, unreachable due to relentless Israeli attacks and debris blocking access.
Ambulance and Civil Defense teams face immense challenges in responding, as they themselves are targeted in what officials describe as a systematic effort to paralyze rescue efforts.
Trump claims Iran’s military is routed just as IRGC launched missiles strike American bases
RT | June 10, 2026
The Iranian military has been “completely defeated,” US President Donald Trump has claimed, warning Tehran it will “pay the price” for delaying a deal with Washington.
The warnings came after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced missile and drone strikes on American military facilities in several Arab countries in retaliation for recent US attacks. US Central Command said the operations inside Iran were carried out after an AH-64 Apache helicopter was lost near the Strait of Hormuz, an incident it blamed on Tehran.
Trump posted on Truth Social on Wednesday that Iran “is all talk and no action,” adding that “The Bully of the Middle East is DEAD!!!” … Full article
HEAT exposure could drive a dramatic rise in cardiovascular disease (CVD) burden across the USA over the next 25 years, with researchers warning that climate change and population ageing may combine to reverse decades of progress in heart health.
Heat Exposure Threatens Future Heart Health A new modelling study estimated that heat-attributable CVD burden could more than triple by 2050 under a high greenhouse gas emissions scenario, disproportionately affecting older adults and economically disadvantaged communities. … Full article
… Climate change and land use conversion have the potential to increase the frequency of encounters between snakes and humans. This situation arises due to changes in temperature and rainfall, the loss of natural habitats, and shifts in food sources, which drive snakes to move into areas closer to human activity.
Prof Mirza Dikari Kusrini, a lecturer in the Department of Forest Resource Conservation and Ecotourism, Faculty of Forestry and Environment (Fahutan) at IPB University, explained that climate change affects snakes’ behavior, distribution, and movement patterns. … Full article
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