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Kissinger, Ford outraged by Israel humiliating the US in the eyes of Arabs, British documents reveal

By Amer Sultan | MEMO | February 18, 2025

Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was deeply frustrated by Israel’s behaviour, which he saw as “blowing up” the American foreign policy and “humiliation” of the US, declassified British documents reveal.

The documents, unearthed by MEMO in the British National Archives, also indicate that US President Gerald Ford shared Kissinger’s “outrage” over Israel’s approach to negotiations with Arab states.

Kissinger criticised Israel’s strategy of “giving with one hand and taking away with the other” and condemned Israelis’ total “unrealism” and “lack of understanding the Arabs”.

In January 1974, Kissinger brokered the first Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in just eight days. By May, he had successfully mediated a similar deal between Syria and Israel. In early 1975, he resumed efforts, alongside his deputy, Joseph Sisco, to negotiate a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement as a prelude to broader peace talks. However, negotiations collapsed in late March.

On his way back to the US, Kissinger met with his British counterpart James Callaghan at London airport, where he blamed Israel for the breakdown of the talks. According to meeting records, Kissinger stated that Israelis “had locked themselves into a more inflexible position than they need have done”. He understood that Israel “seemed intended” to be inflexible from the outset of his mission.

Kissinger described Israeli negotiators as “hopelessly confused” about the military and political aspects of their demand for a formal non-belligerency statement from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. He noted that Israel insisted on both military assurances and political concessions, although the main purpose of the negotiations was to reach a deal on non-engagement of forces. He described this confusion as “a Talmudic wrangle”, adding that the Israelis “had shown a total lack of realism”. When the Israelis asked him whether their demands were not unreasonable, he replied they were “disastrous”.

Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomatic strategy aimed at gradually resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict, but he warned that if this process stalled, “things would start going rapidly against Israel”. He expressed frustration over Israel’s “extraordinary lack of understanding” of both Arabs and the wider international scene”.

Before negotiations broke down, Ford attempted to push Israel to change its position. Kissinger informed Callaghan that the US president had sent a message to Israel containing “some very stern language” warning that the Israelis “couldn’t expect the Americans to go on financing a stalemate”.

Following the failure of Kissinger’s mediation, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon blamed Egypt for “hardening of attitude” which he alleged “manifested itself only in the concluding phase”.

In a message to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan, Allon asserted that Egyptians were prepared to concede to Israel “far less than might have been assumed before the talks began” while the Israelis “went substantially beyond that maximum” to which they “had initially considered it possible” for them to go.

He insisted that at every stage of the negotiation the Israelis showed themselves “ready to move closer towards the Egyptian position but without response on their side.”

Kissinger, however, dismissed Allon’s version of events as “weird” and “almost wholly fictitious,” calling Israel’s supposed concessions “an outright lie.”

In late March 1975, Kissinger told British Ambassador in Washington Peter Ramsbotham that there had “never at any times had there been any real movement” on Israel’s side. “What they gave with one hand, they took away with the other,” he said.

During negotiations, Israel presented six key demands, which Kissinger called “conditions”, including an Egyptian pledge of non-belligerency, end to propaganda against Israel in the Egyptian media, allowing Israeli cargos through the Suez Canal using ships of a third country, allowing overflights in Sinai, an end to the economic boycott and an end to actions against Israel in the international forum.

Kissinger revealed that Sadat had not only shown willingness to meet these demands but also offered additional concessions. These included allowing some Israeli crew members on third-party ships passing through the Suez Canal, preventing paramilitary activities, giving Israel private assurances on maritime passage through the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, and establishing a joint Israeli-Egyptian commission under UN supervision to resolve future disputes. Sisco, who accompanied Kissinger in the meeting with the British ambassador, said these concessions “had come as a surprise”.

While Sadat could not agree to a formal non-belligerency statement, he offered a compromise pledging not to use force during the disengagement period. This pledge, Kissinger explained, was not only “to be signed by the Egyptian military and diplomatic personnel” but there would be a provision that the pledge “would remain in force until suspended by some other agreement”. He described these as “substantial concessions” to Israel, and advised the British that it was “totally wrong” for the Israelis to say the Egyptians hadn’t made any real concessions.

However, Israel rejected Sadat’s offer and continued to insist on a formal non-belligerency agreement, prompting Kissinger to “blow up” and tell them “they couldn’t get this”.

Kissinger informed the British of a heated exchange between Sadat and Egyptian Defence Minister, General Abdel Ghani El-Gamasy, on more concessions Sadat was prepared to concede with regard to the control of strategic passes and oilfields in Sinai. The US minister confirmed that the concessions “brought an explosion” from El-Gamassy, who expressed “vehement objections”. But these objections “were brushed aside by Sadat as had his other objections earlier in the negotiations”.

Despite Sadat’s willingness to compromise, negotiations collapsed due to Israeli obstinacy. Upon learning of the breakdown, Ford “immediately” sent a letter “in a very strong language” to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Kissinger, who showed the British ambassador a copy of the letter, noted that he had “never seen President Ford so outraged.” The president felt “personally betrayed” by Israel’s conduct. To emphasise the gravity of the situation, Kissinger arranged for a prominent American Jewish leader to meet Ford. After the meeting, Kissinger remarked that the man had emerged “a shaken man.”

Kissinger also made it clear to the British government that “all along, there was an Arab willingness to negotiate,” but Israel responded only with “intransigence.” He cited King Hussein of Jordan’s stance on the Allon”s plan as an example of Arab flexibility. Contrary to public statements, Hussein had privately told the U.S. that he “was prepared to accept half of the plan” and “half of the West Bank”.

The plan, which was presented by Allon, the then Israeli minister of labour, in July 1967 and was amended over years, aimed at Judaisation of the Palestinian territory especially the West Bank. It would enable Israel to annex most of the Jordan Valley, from the river to the eastern slopes of the West Bank hill ridge, East Jerusalem, and the Etzion bloc of settlements. At the same time, the heavily populated areas of the West Bank, together with a corridor that included Jericho, would be offered to Jordan.

Meanwhile, in a meeting with Kissinger, Saudi King Faisal expressed his belief that Israel “shouldn’t remain in the occupied areas” he expressed his “support” to the US efforts to “reach a solution in the Middle East”.

Kissinger lamented that Israel’s actions had “destroyed this support.”

Although Kissinger stressed that it was not in the US interest to be “publicly critical” of Israel, he believed that the Israelis “had to learn to be flexible and not believe that because of their friendly links with various governments, they could always count on support regardless of their behavior.” When British Ambassador Ramsbotham asked whether the Israeli behaviour could have any backlash inside the US, Kissinger said that “it wouldn’t be difficult for the Administration to generate a wave of indignation in the US against Israel”. But, the Americans “would not do so”, he added

Kissinger also stressed that the Israelis “had to realise that they could not blow up the US foreign policy, humiliate the United States in the Arab eyes”. The Ford Administration “felt more and more outraged” by what happened, in a reference to the Israeli behaviour that led to failure of the negotiations.

After the collapse of negotiations, Callaghan considered visiting the Middle East. Kissinger advised him to caution Israel that it “had tried the US patience too far”. He also advised that “it was very important not to give the impression to the Israelis that the British government were sympathetic with the position they had got themselves”.

Kissinger believed that if Callaghan had any new proposals, it would probably be “a mistake at this time for him to put them forward himself”.  He asked for any suggestions to be “offered to him in private”.

Despite the impasse, negotiations resumed a few months later, leading to the signing of the Sinai II Agreement on 4 September 1975, in Geneva. The accord allowed Egypt to recover parts of Sinai occupied since 1967. While Sadat saw the deal as strengthening ties with the West, it strained Egypt’s relations with the Arab States, particularly with Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

February 20, 2025 Posted by aletho | Illegal Occupation, Timeless or most popular | Egypt, Israel, Middle East, Palestine, United States, Zionism | Leave a comment