The United States and Greenland, Part I: Episodes in Nuclear History 1947-1968
Greenland “Green Light”: Danish PM’s Secret Acquiescence Encouraged U.S. Nuclear Deployments
Pentagon Approved Nuclear-Armed B-52 Flights Over Greenland
National Security Archive | June 3, 2025
The Trump administration’s intention to acquire Greenland, including possibly by force, has put a focus on the history of its strategic interest to U.S. policymakers. Today, the National Security Archive publishes the first of a two-part declassified document collection on the U.S. role in Greenland during the middle years of the Cold War, covering the decisions that led to the secret deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Danish territory in 1958 to the 1968 crash of a nuclear-armed B-52 bomber near Thule Air Base that left plutonium-laced debris scattered across miles of Arctic sea ice.[1]
The radioactive mess caused by the accident required a major clean-up and caused a serious controversy in U.S.-Denmark relations. The U.S. had never officially told Denmark that it was flying nuclear weapons over Greenland, although Danish officials suspected it; nor had the U.S. informed the Danes that it had once stored nuclear weapons in Greenland, although in 1957 they had received a tacit “green light” to do so from the Danish prime minister, according to documents included in today’s posting. But both the nuclear-armed overflights of Greenland and the storage of nuclear weapons there were in strong contradiction to Denmark’s declared non-nuclear policy. When the bomber crash exposed the overflights, Denmark tried to resolve the conflict by seeking a U.S. pledge that Greenland would be nuclear free.
This new publication revisits the nuclear and strategic history of the United States and Greenland as it emerged during the late 1940s through the crash in 1968, highlighting key declassified documents from the archival record, FOIA releases, the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), and other sources. The analysis draws on the work of U.S. and Danish scholars who have written about the B-52 crash and the history of the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland during the Cold War, including revelations in the 1990s that prompted Danish experts to revisit the historical record.[2]
Part I, below, looks at U.S. strategic interests in Greenland in the early Cold War period, including Danish government acquiescence to the storage of nuclear weapons there, U.S. nuclear-armed airborne alert flights over Greenland, and the 1968 B-52 crash. Part II will document the aftermath of the accident, including the clean-up of contaminated ice, the U.S.-Denmark government nuclear policy settlement, and the failed search for lost nuclear weapons parts deep in the waters of North Star Bay.
Background
Greenland has been seen as an important strategic interest to United States defense officials and policymakers since World War II. After the fall of France in June 1940, the Nazis seized Denmark, and the Roosevelt administration feared that Germany would occupy Greenland, threatening Canada and the United States. In response, the U.S. insisted that Greenland was part of the Western Hemisphere and thus a territory that had to be “assimilated to the general hemispheric system of continental defense.” The U.S. began talks with Danish Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann, who was acting on his own authority as “leader of the Free Danes” and in defiance of the German occupiers. On 9 April 1941, Kauffmann signed an extraordinary agreement with Washington giving the United States almost unlimited access to build military facilities in Greenland and would remain valid as long as there were “dangers to the American continent,” after which the two parties could modify or terminate it. By the end of World War II, the U.S. had 17 military facilities in Greenland. After the liberation of Denmark from German rule, the Danish Parliament ratified the Kauffmann-U.S. agreement on 23 May 1945, but it assumed its early termination, with Denmark taking over Greenland’s defense.[3]
In 1946, the Truman administration gave brief consideration to buying Greenland because it continued to see it as important for U.S. security.[4] During 1947, with the U.S. beginning to define the Soviet Union as an adversary, defense officials saw Greenland as an important “primary base,” especially because they were unsure about long-term access to Iceland and the Azores.[5] Thus, maintaining U.S. access was an important concern, as exemplified in an early National Security Council report that U.S. bases in Greenland, along with Iceland and the Azores, were of “extreme importance” for any war “in the next 15 or 20 years.” For their part, Danish authorities had no interest in selling Greenland but sought to restore their nation’s sovereignty there; having joined NATO, they dropped their traditional neutrality approach and were more willing to accept a limited U.S. presence. In late 1949, the U.S. and Denmark opened what became drawn out negotiations over Greenland; during 1950, the U.S. even returned some facilities to Denmark, including Sandrestrom air base. But in late 1950, with Cold War tensions deepening, the Pentagon gave the negotiations greater priority, seeking an agreement that would let the U.S. develop a base at Thule as part of an air strategy designed to reach Soviet targets across the Arctic.[6]
In April 1951, the two countries reached an agreement on the “defense of Greenland” that superseded the 1941 treaty, confirmed Danish sovereignty, and delineated three “defense areas” for use by the United States, with additional areas subject to future negotiations. Under the agreement, each signatory would “take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry out expeditiously their respective and joint responsibilities in Greenland, in accordance with NATO plans.” Consistent with that broad guidance, the U.S. would be free to operate its bases as it saw fit, including the movement of “supplies,” and with no restrictions on its access to airspace over Greenland. With this agreement, Washington had achieved its overriding security goals in Greenland. To move the agreement through Parliament, the Danish government emphasized its defensive character, although the negotiators and top officials understood that U.S. objectives went beyond that.[7]
In 1955, a few years after the 1951 agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to revive interest in purchasing Greenland to ensure U.S. control over the strategically important territory and without having to rely on an agreement with another government. But the JCS proposal never found traction in high levels of the Eisenhower administration. The State Department saw no point to it, since the United States was already “permitted to do almost anything, literally, that we want to in Greenland.” The 1951 agreement stayed in place for decades. Denmark and the United States finally modified it in 2004, limiting the “defense area” to Thule Air Base and taking “Greenland Home Rule” more fully into account.
Nuclear Issues
When the U.S. negotiated the 1951 agreement, nuclear deployments were not an active consideration in official thinking about a role for U.S. bases for Greenland. Yet by 1957, when U.S. government agencies, including the State Department, became interested in deploying nuclear bombs at Thule, they used the agreement’s open-ended language to justify such actions. According to an August 1957 letter signed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, the Agreement was “sufficiently broad to permit the use of facilities in Greenland for the introduction and storage of [nuclear] weapons.” The problem was to determine whether Danish leaders would see it that way.
While Defense Department officials were willing to go ahead on the deployments without consulting the Danish Government, Murphy thought it best to seek the advice of the U.S. ambassador, former Nebraska Governor Val Peterson. Peterson recommended bringing the question to Danish authorities and, having received the Department’s approval, in mid-November 1957 he asked Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen if he wished to be informed about nuclear deployments. By way of reply, Hansen handed Peterson a “vague and indefinite” paper that U.S. and Danish officials interpreted as a virtual “green light” for the deployments. Hansen raised no objections, asked for no information, and tacitly accepted the U.S. government’s loose interpretation of the 1951 agreement. He insisted, however, that the U.S. treat his response as secret because he recognized how dangerous it was for domestic politics, where anti-nuclear sentiment was strong, and for Denmark’s relations with the Soviet Union, which would have strongly objected.[8]
When Prime Minister Hansen tacitly approved the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland, he was initiating what Danish scholar Thorsten Borring Olesen has characterized as a “double standard” nuclear policy. On the one hand, in a May 1957 address, Hansen had stated that the government would not receive nuclear weapons “under the present conditions.” Thus, Denmark abstained from NATO nuclear storage and sharing plans as they developed in the following years. On the other hand, the Danish leadership treated Greenland differently with respect to nuclear weapons even though, as of 1953, it was no longer a colony but a county represented in Parliament. This double standard was not necessarily a preference for Denmark’s leaders but they felt constrained by the need to accommodate U.S. policy goals in Greenland. Thus, by keeping their Greenland policy secret, Hansen and his successors kept relations with Washington on an even keel while avoiding domestic political crises and pressure from the Soviet Union.[9]
In 1958, the Strategic Air Command deployed nuclear weapons in Greenland, the details of which were disclosed in a declassified SAC history requested by Hans Kristensen, then with the Nautilus Institute. According to Kristensen’s research and the Danish study of “Greenland During the Cold War,” during 1958 the U.S. deployed four nuclear weapons in Greenland—two Mark 6 atomic bombs and two MK 36 thermonuclear bombs as well as 15 non-nuclear components. That SAC kept bombs there for less than a year suggests that it did not have a clear reason to continue storing them in Greenland. Nevertheless, the U.S. kept nuclear air defense weapons at Thule: 48 nuclear weapons were available for Nike-Hercules air missiles through mid-1965. There may also have been a deployment of nuclear weapons for Falcon air-to-air missiles through 1965, but their numbers are unknown.[10]
Airborne Alert and the January 1968 Crash
If it had only been an issue of the U.S. storing nuclear weapons on the ground in Greenland for a few years, the matter might have been kept under wraps for years. But the crash of a U.S. Air Force B-52 on 21 January 1968 near Thule Air Base exposed another nuclear secret and caused serious difficulties in U.S.-Denmark relations. While the bomber crash was quickly overshadowed by North Korea’s seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo the next day and the Tet offensive that began on 30 January, the coincidence of the three events was a major crisis for the overextended U.S.[11]
Beginning in 1961, accident-prone B-52s were routinely flying over Thule because Greenland had become even more salient to U.S. national security policy. To warn the U.S. of incoming bombers, the Air Force had deployed Distant Early Warning Line radar stations across Alaska and northern Canada during the 1950s and extended them to Greenland in 1960-1961. The Air Force also deployed the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), with a site located near Thule Air Base in 1960. With BMEWS, the U.S. would receive 15 minutes of warning of a ballistic missile launch.
The warning time was important for U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) because it provided the opportunity to launch ground alert bomber forces in the event of an attack. But the possibility of an ICBM strike on U.S. airbases also helped inspire the emergence of airborne alert, whereby SAC kept nuclear-armed B-52s in the air 24 hours a day, ready to move on Soviet targets in the event of war. SAC began to test airborne alert in the late 1950s, and the flights soon became routine. By 1961, SAC had initiated “Chrome Dome,” with 12 B-52s flying two major routes, a Northern Route over North America and a Southern Route across the Atlantic. While SAC leaders used strategic arguments to justify airborne alert, they also had a parochial interest because it kept bombers in the air, giving pilots even more training.[12]
Airborne alert converged with Greenland in August 1961, when SAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan for two B-52 sorties a day to fly over the BMEWS site at Thule. Given the major importance of the BMEWS site, if the Soviets knocked it out in a surprise attack, they could disrupt U.S. early warning capabilities. Thus, SAC insisted on visual observation so that the B-52 crew could check whether the site was intact in the event there were failures in the communications links between Thule and the North American Air Defense Command in Colorado. SAC’s BMEWS Monitor was a routine operation for years, even after the B-52 crash in Palomares, Spain, led to decisions to scale back on airborne alert. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wanted to end the program altogether but accepted a JCS compromise proposal for fewer sorties.
Danish military personnel and others nearby were aware of the daily B-52 flights. Moreover, every year there were emergency landings by U.S. bombers, with three in 1967 alone. After a nuclear-loaded B-52 crashed in western Maryland in January 1964, Eske Brun, Denmark’s Under Secretary for Greenland, wondered whether the B-52s flying over Thule carried nuclear weapons and asked U.S. Ambassador William McCormick Blair about the possibility of an accident. Blair suggested that such an “unfortunate” occurrence would be the price of defending the “free world” and that the flights were consistent with the 1951 agreement. The Danes held internal discussions about whether there were any restrictions on U.S. flights over Greenland and decided not to pursue the matter.
According to Scott Sagan, the January 1968 crash was a “normal accident waiting to happen.” The heating system failed on a bomber carrying four nuclear weapons over Thule, causing foam rubber cushions placed under the seats to catch fire. The crew could not extinguish the flames and bailed out after determining that an emergency landing was impossible, with all but one of the seven crew members surviving. While the nuclear weapons carried on the plane did not detonate when the B-52 crashed on Wolstenholme Fjord, near North Star Bay, conventional high explosives carried in the bombs did, causing plutonium contaminated aircraft parts and bomb debris to scatter about the ice for miles.[13]
To recover what they could of the bombs and assess the contamination, SAC sent an emergency team to Thule, including officials from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). All of this occurred under incredibly difficult conditions, sub-zero temperatures, and winter arctic darkness. Danish officials joined in the effort, although they would not take part in the bomb-salvaging activity. While SAC’s disaster team discovered most of the bomb parts after the accident, it could not find some of the important pieces, which eventually necessitated an underwater search. An equally significant problem was the possible risk to the local ecology from plutonium contamination, including its impact on Inuit hunters. U.S. officials had to find a way to clean up the icy mess quickly and in a way that was satisfactory to Danish authorities.
Immediately after the accident, JCS Chair Earle Wheeler and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered nuclear-armed airborne alert flights to end. SAC would continue the BMEWS Monitor using KC-135 tanker aircraft, but that ended that April 1968 when the flights were switched to the BMEWS site in Clear, Alaska. BMEWS, including the site at Thule, remained a U.S. strategic asset until 2001, when the Air Force replaced it with the Solid State Phase Array Radar System.
Soon after the accident, the Danish Foreign Ministry issued a statement that included this language: “Danish policy regarding nuclear weapons also applies to Greenland and also to air space over Greenland. There are no nuclear weapons in Greenland.” With this statement, the Government of Denmark was beginning to abandon the “double standard” by moving toward a consistent no nuclear policy. How Danish authorities worked with Washington to confirm this policy goal will be the subject of Part II.
The crash of the B-52 was no secret in Denmark, but the fact that airborne alert flights over Greenland were routine during the 1960s did not reach public attention until the early 1990s. Prompted by the revelations, the Danish Government asked the U.S. government for more information, which led the State Department to disclose to the Danish government in July 1995 that the U.S. had deployed nuclear bombs and air defense weapons in Greenland during 1958-1965. The State Department letter was secret, but its contents began to leak. The preceding month, the Danish government had released information on the Hansen paper, creating a political scandal and prompting calls for an investigation of the historical record.
The Danish Institute of International Affairs sponsored the research and published its report in 1996, Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945–1968 [Greenland During the Cold War: Danish and American Security Policy 1945-1968 ]. The report, which included a full reproduction of the Hansen paper, among other revelations, disclosed much of this once-hidden history.[14] Nevertheless, significant State Department and U.S. Embassy records remain classified and have been the subject of declassification requests by National Security Archive to the U.S. National Archives.
Denmark Sends $1 Billion to Build Up Ukrainian Arms Industry Using Seized Russian Funds
By Kyle Anzalone | The Libertarian Institute | May 12, 2025
Denmark is making a significant investment in Ukraine’s domestic arms industry using interest generated from frozen Russian assets.
A statement from the Danish Defense Ministry explained that it would implement a proposal approved by the European Union last year to seize the interest generated by frozen Russian assets and use that money to buy weapons for Kiev produced by Ukrainian arms makers.
“In light of the security situation, it is important to show that we stand together with Ukraine. From the Danish side, we have taken the lead by leading the international work through the “Danish model” for procurement via the Ukrainian defense industry,” Minister of Defense Troels Lund Poulsen said. “It is unique that we now have the opportunity to further strengthen this effort on behalf of the EU.”
Copenhagen has dubbed the process of investing in Kiev’s arms industry as “the Danish model.” In 2024, Denmark invested about $450 million in Ukraine’s defense companies, with $300 million coming from the interest on frozen Russian assets. Copenhagen plans to use $930 million in interest to invest in Ukrainian domestic arms production in 2025.
EU members hold over $220 billion in seized Russian money, and it is estimated to generate about $4 billion in interest annually. Western governments are attempting to use the interest to pay back a $50 billion in collective loans that is being taken out to buy arms for Kiev.
The money sent by Copenhagen is in addition to the $1.1 billion in interest from frozen Russian funds that was announced by the EU on Friday. “We have just made available 1 billion euros for the Ukrainian defense industry so that Ukraine can better defend itself,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said.
Euroclear, the financial market infrastructure group that holds most of the assets, has also seized some of the frozen funds to repay Western investors who allegedly had their assets seized by Moscow.
Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced the Western attempts to use the frozen Russian funds as theft. “Western countries have now frozen Russian assets and foreign exchange reserves. They are considering the ways to create at least some legal basis in order to finally appropriate them. But despite all the fuss theft will remain theft. It would not go unpunished,” he said.
Moscow accuses EU state’s leaders of ‘whipping up war psychosis’

RT | February 7, 2025
The Finnish authorities have been churning up an atmosphere of “war psychosis” and urging people to prepare for a possible war with Russia, according to Moscow’s ambassador to the EU country, Pavel Kuznetsov.
In an interview with RIA Novosti published on Thursday, Kuznetsov said that Finland’s leadership is instilling fear in the population using claims of “Russia’s aggressive plans.”
Helsinki is promoting various initiatives to strengthen military preparedness among civilians, the envoy said.
“There is increased media coverage of bomb shelter renovations, the expansion of shooting club networks, and the extension of the maximum age for reservists,” Kuznetsov observed, adding that such measures are being “widely promoted.”
According to the ambassador, such actions are part of the Finnish government’s attempt to justify the country’s “hasty” NATO accession and increased defense spending.
Finland, which shares an almost 1,300-kilometer-long border with Russia, officially joined the US-led military bloc in April 2023 following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict. The Finnish government has since strengthened its defense policies, including expanding military training and civil preparedness programs.
Multiple outlets have reported a sharp rise in interest among Finns in weapons training. Shooting ranges have seen membership soar, and the government has announced plans to open more than 300 new shooting facilities to encourage the trend.
In November 2024, Finland issued guidance on how to prepare for an armed conflict, emphasizing the importance of readiness in the face of potential threats.
Several other Nordic countries have also published information advising their populations on how to prepare for a possible war or other unexpected crises.
Sweden has sent out millions of updated booklets entitled “In case of crisis or war,” while Norway has issued pamphlets urging people to be prepared to survive on their own for a week in the event of extreme weather, war, or other threats.
Denmark’s emergency management agency has informed the public how much water, food, and medicine individuals need to get through a crisis lasting three days. In December, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen told a local broadcaster that she has been stocking canned food and other essentials in case of a Russian attack.
NATO has long declared Russia to be a direct threat, and Western officials have repeatedly claimed that if Moscow wins the Ukraine conflict, it could attack other European countries.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has dismissed any possibility of a military advance against NATO as “nonsense.”
Putin told US journalist Tucker Carlson last February that the bloc’s leaders are trying to scare their people with an imaginary threat from Moscow, but that “smart people understand perfectly well that this is a fake.”
At the same time, Russia has repeatedly warned against what it describes as NATO’s unprecedented military activity near its western borders in recent years.
Denmark Not Interested in Finding Truth About Nord Stream Explosion – Russian Ambassador
Sputnik – 29.10.2024
MOSCOW – Denmark prevented the initiation of an independent international investigation into the explosion of Nord Stream pipelines, the country is not interested in establishing the truth, Russian Ambassador to Denmark Vladimir Barbin said commenting on the possibility of the Danish side resuming the investigation.
“This would contradict the logic of the Danish side’s behavior. Denmark curtailed its own investigation, rejected any interaction with the Russian side, prevented the initiation of an independent international investigation under the auspices of the UN, concealed the fact of the presence of American warships in the area of the explosions on the eve of this terrorist attack on the gas pipelines,” he said.
The head of the diplomatic mission noted that Copenhagen had no interest in establishing the truth.
“The Danish authorities are obviously concerned that the investigation may reveal inconvenient facts and evidence that will compromise both Euro-Atlantic solidarity and further arms supplies to the Kiev regime,” the ambassador added.
Denmark and Sweden stopped investigating the Nord Stream explosions in February 2024.
The explosions on two Russian export gas pipelines to Europe, Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2, occurred on September 26, 2022. Germany, Denmark and Sweden did not rule out deliberate sabotage. Nord Stream AG, the operator of Nord Stream, said that the destruction of the gas pipelines was unprecedented and that it was impossible to estimate the repair time. The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office has initiated a case on an act of international terrorism. Russia has repeatedly requested data on the explosions on Nord Stream, but has never received it, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.
Obligations to Probe Nord Stream Blasts Not Fulfilled Despite Russia’s Calls – Moscow
Sputnik – 28.09.2024
MOSCOW – Obligations to investigate the terrorist attacks on Nord Streams in accordance with international treaties are not being fulfilled, despite Russia’s constant calls, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told Sputnik.
“The bombing of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines is a flagrant act of international terrorism which falls under a number of international treaties establishing obligations to prevent such acts, suppress them, investigate them, bring those responsible to justice and cooperate with other states to achieve these goals. Unfortunately, we see that these obligations are not being fulfilled, despite constant calls from Russia,” Zakharova said.
Switzerland, where the Nord Stream operator-company is registered, has made no attempt to investigate the incidents, the diplomat said, adding that Germany, which is a final destination of the pipelines, had not presented any positive results of its probe.
“The West is not interested in conducting an effective investigation into the terrorist act, despite the colossal damage caused to the European economy and ecology by blowing up the gas pipelines,” Zakharova said.
Moscow has officially filed pre-trial claims against Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland in connection to the investigation of the Nord Steam blasts, based on a number of conventions on terrorism, Maria Zakharova said, adding that other states, which might have part in these acts, are next in line.
“Russia has officially filed pre-trial claims against Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland on the basis of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism … Next in line are other states that might be involved in the attacks on the Nord Streams,” Zakharova said.
If the issue with the pre-trial claims is not resolved, Moscow will appeal to the UN International Court of Justice in connection with the violation by the countries in question of their conventional obligations, the diplomat added.
“Russia is firmly determined to identify and strictly hold accountable all perpetrators, organizers and accomplices of the terrorist act,” Zakharova added.
The Nord Stream pipelines, built to deliver gas under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, were hit by explosions on September 26, 2022. Denmark, Germany and Norway have left Russia out of their investigations into the attack, prompting Moscow to launch its own probe on charges of international terrorism.
Russia has repeatedly requested data on the explosions from the European countries, but has never received it, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.
EU nations to give Ukraine more tanks
RT | September 6, 2024
Germany, along with Denmark and the Netherlands, will supply 77 more Cold-War-era Leopard 1A5 tanks to Ukraine, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has announced. In addition, Berlin intends to provide an additional twelve PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers, he said.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz approved the delivery of German-made tanks to Ukraine back in January 2023. Kiev has since lost an unknown number of these tanks. The Russian military has released numerous videos showing the destruction of such hardware.
Speaking during a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group at US Ramstein military base in Germany on Friday, Pistorius met with Vladimir Zelensky, who attended personally in a bid to drum up more defense aid. The German minister assured the Ukrainian leader that Berlin “remains in a continuous delivery process for Ukraine.”
Pistorius estimated that Germany, together with Denmark, had already delivered 58 Leopard 1A5 tanks to Ukraine, with 77 more pieces of this hardware to be supplied in the near future.
“We will deliver twelve modern PzH 2000 howitzers to Ukraine, with six expected to arrive in the country by the end of this year,” Pistorius added.
He went on to say that air defense remains a crucial area for Kiev and that more hardware is needed to better fend off Russian missile strikes. According to the minister, Germany is funding the procurement of twelve IRIS-T air defense systems to be shipped to Ukraine. Moreover, Berlin has pledged more medium- and close-range systems, including more than 60 self-propelled Gepard anti-aircraft guns.
Pistorius also stressed that since November 2022, more than 16,000 Ukrainian service members have been trained on German soil.
In mid-July, the Bavarian daily Munchner Merkur, citing government data, claimed that Germany had secretly delivered a “huge” defense aid package to Ukraine between late June and early July. The package reportedly included ten Leopard 1A5 tanks, among other hardware.
The media outlet also alleged at the time that Berlin planned to send by an unspecified date 85 more tanks of this type to Ukraine as part of a joint project with Denmark.
Moscow has consistently warned that deliveries of Western weapons to Ukraine only serve to prolong the bloodshed, without changing the course of the conflict.
Danish Justice Minister Under Fire for Pushing Encryption Ban While Using It
By Didi Rankovic | Reclaim The Net | August 31, 2024
The unprecedented case of the attack on Telegram via the arrest of Pavel Durov – and the nature of the charges against him – has clearly emboldened not only the lovers of censorship (such as the EU) but also the enemies of encryption (the EU).
Encryption itself has long been in the crosshairs in the bloc, but also in various individual countries in Europe individually, and others around the world. This push to undermine encryption – despite it being the key component of security, and privacy online – is habitually justified as necessary for law enforcement to do its job.
Now EU member Denmark is trying to come for end-to-end encryption, and not only Telegram, but also Signal, WhatsApp, and others. In this particular instance, Justice Minister Peter Hummelgaard’s preferred course of action would be to just block these apps (perhaps as a stopgap measure) rather than taking the much longer path of building encryption backdoors.
Judging by reports in the Danish press, Hummelgaard wants to use this moment to further increase pressure on encrypted services, unsurprisingly giving “fighting crime” as the reason.
And while Hummelgaard considers such services as “safe havens” for criminals (it’s the same as saying states are safe havens for criminals because criminals operate in them), a large number of Danish MPs use encrypted apps – according to an investigative report in frihedsbrevet.dk, at least 70. (The country’s parliament has 179 seats).
To make matters even more absurd, Hummelgaard was (or still is) one of them.
And now those perplexed by his idea to block encrypted messengers are calling for him to “lead by example” and make his own messages publicly available – if that is, private communications are an evil that justifies resorting to blocking apps.
Reports quote Danish Reddit users making this suggestion, with one sarcastically noting that this shouldn’t be a problem – “surely he has nothing to hide, and therefore nothing to fear?”
The push around the world to get encrypted apps to “cooperate” by allowing the authorities to expand mass online surveillance to them as well, is defended by those sympathetic toward such policies as the need for “transparency” and “accountability.”
Germany secretly sent ‘huge arms package’ to Ukraine – media
RT | July 15, 2024
The German government secretly delivered a new aid package to Ukraine between late June and early July, the Bavarian daily Munchner Merkur reported on Monday. The paper called the shipment “huge,” adding that it was done in a clandestine manner and went “largely unnoticed.”
The package included 39 pieces of various heavy armor from the stocks of Germany’s military and of its defense enterprises, Merkur reported, after analyzing government data. Kiev received ten more Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks and 20 more Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), among other extra donations, the outlet said.
According to open data published by Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s cabinet, the total number of Leopard 1A5 tanks and Marder IFVs delivered to Ukraine has grown to 50 and 120 respectively.
Other heavy equipment included in the latest delivery involved various engineering and mine-clearing vehicles, according to the report. The package also included 55,000 155mm artillery rounds, according to the government data.
It also showed that Berlin plans to send, by an unspecified date, 85 more Leopard 1A5 tanks to Ukraine, as part of a joint project with Denmark. The future deliveries are also to include 20 additional Marder IFVs. Merkur reported that Berlin had planned to provide Ukraine with up to 80 Leopards by the end of 2023 but fell behind schedule as the nation’s defense industry struggled to find spare parts for the armor pieces.
According to Merkur, Kiev is still hoping to get enough German tanks to form a specialized brigade for offensive operations and has been “holding back” its remaining western tanks for months.
The Russian military has previously published numerous videos showing German tanks being destroyed with kamikaze drones or even captured by Russian soldiers after being abandoned by their crews.
The latest batch of weapons also included two ground-based IRIS-T air defense systems and three US-made HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. In May, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius vowed Berlin would pay for the delivery of the US-made systems to Ukraine.
Germany has emerged as the second largest single military donor to Ukraine throughout the conflict, spending some €10.2 billion ($11.14 billion) on providing arms to Kiev between January 2022 and April 2024, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Berlin has said some €28 billion ($30.5 billion) has been made available to support Kiev now and in the coming years.
In June, Chancellor Scholz admitted that many Germans were unhappy with the nation’s military support of Ukraine, but he maintained that there was no alternative to arming Kiev. In July, Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky stated that his country would “never” have enough weapons.
Sweden rules out international Nord Stream probe
RT | May 4, 2024
There is no need for an international investigation into the explosions on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 natural gas pipelines, Sweden’s Foreign Ministry has told RIA Novosti news agency.
Last week, China’s deputy envoy to the UN, Geng Shuang, called for a probe into the September 2022 blasts that ruptured the pipelines, which were built to deliver Russian gas to Germany and the rest of Europe. Countries should work together on an investigation “to bring the perpetrators to justice in order to prevent the reoccurrence of similar incidents,” Geng said.
When asked about Beijing’s proposal by RIA Novosti on Friday, the Swedish Foreign Ministry insisted that “there is no need for an international investigation. It’s going to achieve nothing.”
“An investigation into the incidents was carried out by the Swedish authorities in accordance with the fundamental principles of independence, impartiality and the rule of law. Other national investigations are still ongoing,” the ministry stated.
Sweden conducted its own probe as the explosions on the Nord Stream pipelines occurred in the country’s exclusive economic zone. Germany and Denmark carried out separate inquiries. However, in February, the Swedish and Danish investigations were aborted. Stockholm said it had come to the conclusion that the case did not fall under Swedish jurisdiction, while Copenhagen concluded that “there was deliberate sabotage” of the pipelines, but found insufficient grounds to pursue criminal proceedings.
Russia is carrying out its own investigation into the Nord Stream blasts despite the refusal of Western nations to cooperate. Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov said earlier that Moscow had sent more than a dozen requests for legal assistance to Germany, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden, but only received a single formal reply from Copenhagen.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and other officials suggested previously that the pipelines were targeted by the US or on Washington’s behalf.
Hamas calls on 18 countries signing hostage release initiative to expose Israel’s crimes
MEMO | April 27, 2024
Red Sea rising: Exposing the West’s diminishing naval power
By Ali Halawi | Al Mayadeen | April 12, 2024
The Red Sea has witnessed several developments that brought to light the West’s fading power, as its enemies simultaneously and continuously develop precision weapons and naval capabilities.
Although ongoing escort, air defense, and aerial attack operations in the Red Sea are viewed as uncostly, in terms of human capital, and training routines that will raise the preparedness of NATO forces in the region, they have also unveiled a quite unpleasant reality for Western navies. On the flip side, the aerial attacks of Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) on Israeli-affiliated ships, which were later expanded to include US-UK-affiliated ships in the Red Sea, add to an extended bill that NATO countries pay for securing the Israeli genocide of the Palestinian people.
The weapons used in these operations are similar to Iranian-designed drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles and have been described as “cheap” yet effective weapons by US CENTCOM commanders. These precise guided munitions have been disseminated across factions in the Axis of Resistance, via direct armament or technology sharing. When put to the correct use the weapons have proven challenging for some of the world’s most well-trained and equipped forces.
West Asia casts a shadow over NATO military industrial complexes
Some weapons could have been transferred with the blueprints for the production of their main compartments and assembly at their final destination, bringing costs down and production levels up, further deepening the hole for Western counterparts. In the case of Ansar Allah in Yemen, the YAF owns and announces to locally produce a wide array of anti-ship weapons, as well as missiles, and drones that have been appropriated for attacking seaborne targets; currently being put to use to tighten a naval blockade on “Israel” through the Red Sea.
On the other hand, flailing Western military hegemony over the seas pushed the US and its allies to embark on a poorly planned campaign to protect Israeli shipping routes, forcing them to deal with these relatively low-cost weapons in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, where the YAF has dealt direct hits to multiple non-military vessels and threatened near hits some of the most advanced American military ships. This has been the case in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, where US military bases have suffered from the horrors of cheap low-flying, and ballistic weapons in more than 100 operations on US assets, which dealt precise hits to their targets on multiple occasions.
When countering these attacks, Western forces have utilized some of the most sophisticated anti-air surface-to-air missiles, which are estimated to cost millions of dollars of taxpayer money. In the Red Sea, the US-led Western alliance has relied on NATO-standard interceptors, each of which was developed to counter specific inbound aerial objects.
According to The Responsible Statecraft and news circulating on Western media outlets regarding the mishaps of air defense units, the Western coalition has depended on the use of a layered anti-air model, consisting of RIM-116 (RAM), RIM-66 (SM-2), RIM-174 (SM-6), RIM-162 (ESSM), and RIM-161 (SM-3) interceptors. Each interceptor has been developed to counter specific weaponry, however, they all share in common extremely pricey tags.
Price list for NATO’s Israeli maritime protection campaign
Below is a list of the cost of a single interceptor, excluding operational and battery costs, as of 2022:
- RIM-116 (RAM): $905,000
- RIM-66 (SM-2): $2,100,000
- RIM-174 (SM-6): $3,901,818
- RIM-162 (ESSM): $2,031,875
- RIM 161 (SM-3) Block IB: $9,698,617
- RIM-161 (SM-3) Block IIA: $27,915,625
The price list is retrieved from the US Department of Defense and military-industrial complexes’ official documents.
Germany’s Navy ridicules itself
Keeping the aforementioned price ranges in mind, an outrageous fluke that came as a result of a failed surface-to-air missile interception attempt by the German Navy’s Hessen frigate exposed the deep-lying issues for the US-led Naval alliance in the Red Sea.
What should have been a strike on a low-cost Yemeni drone turned into a shabby affair in which the German Navy misidentified the drone, launched a dual attack on an allied asset, failed to hit the aircraft, and suffered malfunctions that led to the destruction of two interceptors midflight.
At first glance, the attack underlines several glaring issues including, the under-preparedness of the German air defense crew, inadequate storage or production of interceptors, and poor communication between NATO allied forces at Sea. Some military-concerned outlets have attempted to shift the blame on outdated German comms, however, further investigation of the incident reveals an issue of economic cost that could tip the scale towards NATO’s enemies.
Germany’s embarrassing mishap would cost the country around $4.2 million, as the Hessen launched two SM-2s at a US MQ-9 reaper drone that it failed to identify.
No SM-2 batches produced since 2018
The cost of the failed operation should not be the only consideration here, as the last time Ratheon sold a batch of its SM-2 Block IIIA interceptors was in a deal it signed with Denmark back in 2018. The deal was worth $152 million for 46 SM-2 Block IIIA interceptors and corresponding equipment for a couple of vertical launch systems. Now, the company has stopped producing the system, and the interceptors for lack of international orders and plans to resume production in 2035.
However, conflict in Ukraine, the war on Gaza, and tensions in East Asia may prompt reconsideration, especially as the genocide of Palestinian people drags on while their allies in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq tie their operations to the status of the aggression on Gaza itself.
Large-scale confrontation might see selective engagement
The fact that Raethon has not received any major orders since 2018 brings up the possibility of Western shortages in air defense systems and interceptors, in case of larger-scale engagement erupting in the region. The phenomenon cannot be limited to SM-2 interceptors but could affect a range of staple NATO-developed and produced SAMs, including the infamous Patriot systems, THAAD, Israeil Iron Dome, and other anti-ballistic and cruise missile systems.
Large-scale engagement will most likely see the Colletive West prioritize assets and selectively down often low-cost but deadly targets.
One Yemeni strike was capable of sinking a bulk carrier in the Red Sea, while an attack on a secret US outpost on the Jordanian-Syrian border injured and killed more than a hundred US servicepeople.
In a war of attrition, the Axis of Resistance’s factions will have the economic advantages of pumping out low-cost munitions that target multi-million dollar systems and vehicles, and the morale advantage of deep-rooted ideological motives related to religion and nativity to the lands they defend.
Another blunder: Denmark’s unreported defensive failure gets chief sacked
More recently, Denmark sacked its defense chief Flemming Lentfer after major faults were discovered in air defense systems on a frigate that it sent to the Red Sea earlier. Lentfer was axed on Wednesday night after failing to report to the Danish Defense Minister, Troels Lund Poulsen, that the Iver Huitfeldt vessel had experienced a 30 minutes-long malfunction in one of its missile and radar systems, during a drone attack in the Red Sea. The malfunction led Danish authorities to recall the frigate from its mission, marking the gravity of the faults.
“I have lost trust in the chief of defense,” said Poulsen. Shockingly, he found out about the incident from a specialist military outlet, rather than any of his subordinates.
“We are facing a historic and necessary strengthening of Denmark’s defense forces. This places great demands on our organization and on the military advice at a political level,” he asserted.
Danish news website Olfi was the one to break the news to the Minister of Defense, explaining that the frigate was commanded by Commander Sune Lund, who complained about a problem with the ship’s active radar and C-Flex combat management system.
Unexplained outages to the systems were severe enough to prevent the frigate from launching its ESSM interceptors. The Danish frigate’s 76 mm guns were also reported to be defective on several occasions during deployment to the Red Sea. Other reports revealed other aspects of the commander’s message, in which he stated that the equipment problems reportedly had been known about for “years”, but that little had been done to address them.
Germany’s “Embarrassment” vs Yemen’s Victory
Back to Germany’s flop in the Red Sea, which was described by German media outlet BILD as an “Embarrassment to our (the German) Navy in the Red Sea”, the YAF had just marked another milestone by downing a US-operated MQ-9 Reaper Drone over Hodeidah a few days prior to the blunder.
Although both forces attempted to target different MQ-9-type drones using their own SAMs, the Yemeni Armed Forces were able to destroy the highly prized American drone with a “locally produced” air defense system while the Germans harrowingly failed. The Germans said that they mistakenly targeted a drone on February 28, 2024. However, their failure to down the then-unidentified object was due to unnamed technical malfunctions that led to the detonation of the two SM-2 missiles midflight, rather than active efforts to avert the disaster.
Interestingly, Sanaa had only unveiled two air defense systems capable of achieving such a hit. One of which is seemingly a copy of the Iranian-developed compact air-defense missile, dubbed Saqer-2. The missile can be easily transported and launched to take down close-range targets, flying at relatively slow speeds. The Saqer-2, a copycat of the Iranian so-called 358 surface-to-air missile reportedly functions like a one-way attack drone, reaching the required via a liquid fuel-propelled engine, to later hover near an aerial target, approaching it and detonating its warhead after being manually locked on to it by a ground operator, or by working in an autonomous mode.
However, footage published by the YAF’s Military Media indicated that the air defense system utilized in the incident was similar to traditional supersonic SAMs due to the speed at which it reached its target and the sound produced during its flight in the video.
Notably, the missile impacted the drone in a near direct trajectory and did not pause to hover nearby or for directions by operators. Examining the publicly revealed arsenal of the YAF, this likely indicates that the missile in use was the Bareq-1 or Bareq-2 SAM.
The missiles resemble the Iranian Taer line of missiles, which are used on a multitude of staple air defense systems. Digging deeper into the origin of the technology, it is clear that the Taer or Bareq lines of missiles are actually reverse-engineered models of the Soviet-era 3M9, incorporating certain elements from NATO Standard Missiles.
Presuming that the Bareq-2 was used by the YAF for the operation reveals an even deeper hole dug by Western military complexes for their own armies. Moreover, NATO’s SMs are much more developed than the YAF’s interceptors, as they incorporate a wide range of technological and hardware additions, putting them in a class of their own.
These additions allow for 360° scope for air defense teams allowing Hessen and other vessels to fire at any surrounding target within its range at any time without having to adjust their position while boosters on the SM-6 allow for longer-range targeting.
Still, the single-stage and aimed single launch conducted by the YAF achieved a direct hit to the 20 m-long US drone obliterating it to pieces that were scavenged by fighters on al-Hodeidah’s shore.
Yemen’s support to Palestine uncovers deep crises in NATO’s Naval power
Putting this series of unfolding events into the context of the Yemeni Armed Forces’ support to Palestine, as the Western-backed Israeli regime continues its genocidal war on Gaza, is key to not only regional security but global security as a whole.
The equations drawn by the YAF have been unprecedented in the history of the nation’s struggle against Western imperialism, as for the first time, an Arab nation has taken the responsibility of launching an expansive naval campaign to support a moral and national cause, whose result will alter the course of human history. By setting this historical precedent, Yemen has not only altered regional security to the favor of natives, but it has also exposed essential faults in NATO’s military and naval structure which can and will be taken advantage of by adversaries.
These events have not been limited to uncovering the flaws of Danish and German forces, but they have laid bare essential challenges for the far superior American and British navies.
For the US, issues have concentrated around logistics and the high cost of operating multiple strike groups, in order to maintain feeble objectives. The UK on the other hand has witnessed multiple accidents and complications during the period of its operations.
The Yemeni Armed Forces’ strategic engagements in the Red Sea highlight a significant shift in naval dynamics, exposing vulnerabilities in Western military prowess and logistical strategies. Despite maintaining relatively low-scale engagements, the YAF’s precision attacks on military vessels have yielded valuable experience and expanded their target list, aided by direct repercussions from the US’s involvement in the genocidal war on Gaza. This evolving scenario underscores the importance of the Axis of Resistance’s strategic foresight and adaptive responses in navigating the complexities of Western provocations, in the context of modern naval warfare, signaling a paradigmatic challenge for maintaining Western military hegemony in the region.
Denmark sacks defense chief as Red Sea failures pile up for NATO
The Cradle | April 4, 2024
The Danish government fired Chief of Defense Flemming Lentfer on 3 April after it was revealed that the top military official failed to report flaws in the HDMS Iver Huitfeldt’s air defense and weapons systems that emerged during an attack last month by the Yemeni armed forces in the Red Sea.
“I have lost trust in the chief of defense,” Troels Lund Poulsen, Denmark’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, told reporters on Wednesday night. Poulsen reportedly learned about the failure from the Danish military outlet Olfi.
“We are facing a historic and necessary strengthening of Denmark’s defense forces. This places great demands on our organization and on the military advice at a political level,” the Danish official added.
On 9 March, the Iver Huitfeldt’s air defense systems failed for 30 minutes while engaging Yemeni attacks launched in support of the resistance in Gaza, according to a leaked document written by the ship’s commanding officer and reviewed by Olfi. The document also reported issues with the ship’s ammunition system, which caused half of its rounds to detonate before they hit their target.
“Our clear understanding is that the issue has been known for years without the necessary sense of urgency to resolve the problem,” the frigate’s commanding officer reported.
The Iver Huitfeldt eventually fended off the attack, shooting down four drones over the Red Sea in what – at the time – was presented as a success story.
Lentfer’s firing is the latest in a string of recent public embarrassments from NATO member states, particularly in the Red Sea, where a months-long campaign of US and UK airstrikes inside Yemen has failed to deter attacks against Israeli-linked vessels.
“We favor a diplomatic solution; we know that there is no military solution,” US Special Envoy for Yemen Timothy Lenderking said on Wednesday from Oman, candidly acknowledging the failure of what US military commanders called Washington’s largest naval battle since WWII.
Other recent mishaps for NATO include Germany’s use of obsolete communications systems and unsecured lines to discuss providing Ukraine with cruise missiles and Britain’s failure twice in a row to test its nuclear missiles after having two of its flagship aircraft carriers break down ahead of drills in Norway.
