Prof John Mearsheimer: Drones Can’t Deliver Ukraine Victory
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 6, 2026
US Overestimates Capacity to Wage War on Iran While Supporting Ukraine
Sputnik – 06.08.2026
Ukraine believed it could outsmart Russia by placing its most advanced drone facilities under the protection of Patriot air defenses around the capital, military historian Yury Knutov tells Sputnik, adding that the calculation proved wrong — American interceptor missiles ran dry.
“Germany, Norway, the Baltic states, and the Gulf monarchies that purchased Patriot systems are now confronted with the fact that the American shield has holes in it – and can no longer be fully relied upon,” says the pundit.
Reports say the Trump administration discovered its interceptor stockpiles had been drastically depleted, forcing it to scale back plans for large-scale strikes on Iran and deny Ukraine’s request for additional Patriot missiles. The Iran war was identified as a key driver of the shortages.
“For the next 3-5 years, the US will be forced to operate under strict constraints, unable to simultaneously protect all of its assets in the Middle East and continue supporting Ukraine,” Knutov says, commenting on reports that US missile stockpiles may not recover until 2029-2031.
The US may also scale back protection of its allies, the pundit suggests:
- Ukraine is only the first warning sign – other allies could be next to face reduced US air-defense support
- Many Iranian missiles aimed at the Gulf now go unchallenged as US troops conserves scarce interceptors for defending their own bases in the region
- A number of US units not directly involved in air operations or air defense have been withdrawn from the Middle East
The Imbalance in the Iran War is Critical
“Even if the US multiplies production several times over, it will never match Iran in terms of cost or production speed,” Knutov says. “Iran can manufacture missiles and drones at a fraction of the cost, while its facilities are dispersed and protected.”
A war of attrition against Iran would be a losing strategy for the US from the outset, the expert concludes.
60-DAY HORMUZ ARRANGEMENT CONFIRMED BY TEHRAN & OMAN — w/ Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi
Mario Nawfal | August 5, 2026
Bulgaria’s Bezmer Base and the Logic of American Power Projection
By Adrian Korczyński – New Eastern Outlook – August 3, 2026
On July 22, 2026, the Bulgarian parliament voted to authorize the deployment of up to eight U.S. Air Force KC-135 tanker aircraft and 250 U.S. military personnel at Bezmer Air Base.
The vote was 136 in favor, 13 against, with two abstentions. The deployment is scheduled from July 24 to October 1, 2026. On paper, the government insists this is merely “logistical support.”
A Diplomatic Warning from Tehran
Before the vote, Iran’s Foreign Ministry warned that allowing the deployment would make Bulgaria “an accomplice of aggressors.” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei explicitly stated that any action facilitating U.S. military operations against Iran would make Sofia complicit in “aggression and war crimes.”
The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry responded that it was not “undertaking any hostile actions against Iran” and that “it is out of the question for any military operations in the Middle East to be conducted from Bulgarian territory.” The contrast between the official explanation and the operational role of the deployment is difficult to ignore.
Bezmer in the US Logistics Network
Bezmer Air Base, located in southeastern Bulgaria near the town of Yambol, is one of several joint-use facilities established under the 2006 U.S.-Bulgaria Defense Cooperation Agreement. The agreement allows U.S. forces to use three Bulgarian bases — Bezmer, Graf Ignatievo, and Novo Selo — for training and logistical purposes. Bezmer’s appeal is straightforward: it is close to the Black Sea, has a runway capable of handling large aircraft, and is situated in a country that is a full NATO member.
What makes Bezmer particularly useful is its position within the broader American logistics network. U.S. tanker aircraft operating from Bezmer can refuel fighter jets and bombers over the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Red Sea without returning to bases in Germany, Italy, or Greece. This reduces transit time and allows for sustained operations over a longer period. Bezmer functions as a forward refueling node in a system that stretches from Ramstein in Germany to Souda Bay in Crete to Kogălniceanu in Romania.
The base is not being used for combat operations, but it is enabling them. There is a difference between pulling the trigger and supplying the fuel, but that difference matters less to the pilots being refueled—or to the Iranians being targeted. The Bulgarian government argues that it is merely fulfilling its treaty obligations to its ally. Prime Minister Rumen Radev, often described as more skeptical of Western military adventurism, insisted the tankers would be used “exclusively for logistical and in-flight refuelling missions outside Bulgarian airspace.” The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry echoed this position, stating that no military operations would be conducted from Bulgarian territory.
Spain vs. Bulgaria
The contrast with Spain is instructive. In March 2026, Spain explicitly refused to allow its bases to be used for the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran. Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares stated that Spanish bases would not be used for operations “inconsistent with the United Nations Charter.” The Spanish government argued that using its territory for offensive operations against Iran would violate its constitutional obligations and its own foreign policy principles. Madrid made a sovereign choice to refuse Washington’s request.
Unlike Spain, Bulgaria ultimately chose to facilitate the deployment, reflecting its broader security dependence on NATO structures. It did not publicly question the legality of the operation, nor did it challenge the broader strategic rationale behind the request. The Bulgarian authorities chose to accommodate the request rather than contest it.
Several factors may explain this difference. Spain has traditionally pursued a more cautious approach towards military involvement in the Middle East, while Bulgaria places greater emphasis on demonstrating reliability within NATO. Different strategic cultures and security priorities appear to have shaped their respective decisions. Bulgaria, by contrast, is a smaller country more dependent on NATO guarantees for its security. It is also a country that has long sought to demonstrate its value as an ally, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. For Bulgaria, saying no to Washington is not a luxury it believes it can afford.
There is also a domestic political dimension. The decision was approved by a parliament where the government holds a comfortable majority. Local opposition was minimal. Some Bulgarian officials have argued that refusing the request would have damaged Bulgaria’s standing in NATO. A Bulgarian official’s comment encapsulates the logic of alliance dependency: “We cannot want to be in NATO and then refuse to give anything in return.”
Local Concerns
The decision was not universally welcomed. Burnt-out trees from a fire at the Bulgarian military training ground in Koren were still smouldering during the parliamentary debate. Bezmer’s mayor voiced concerns about the region becoming a potential target. Local communities near Bezmer are not convinced by the official narrative.
The concerns are not entirely theoretical. Iran has already shown its willingness to retaliate against countries it perceives as hostile. In the past, Iranian-backed groups have targeted American bases in Iraq and Syria, and Iranian cyber operations have hit European infrastructure. Bulgarians living near Bezmer now have reason to wonder whether their town might become a target in a future escalation.
Alliance Politics in Practice
The Bulgarian parliament’s decision illustrates a broader reality of the transatlantic relationship. European countries are not always eager participants, but they are deeply integrated into the logistics of U.S. military power. These are not signs of European unity—they are signs of fragmentation within a structure that still depends on the United States for security.
The deeper question is whether this arrangement is sustainable. Bulgaria has made a strategic choice to deepen its military integration with the United States. That choice has immediate operational consequences—a tanker base that enables strikes on Iran—and long-term implications for Bulgarian sovereignty. It may also have security consequences if Iran chooses to respond. The Bulgarian parliament’s decision follows a pattern: Europe increasingly functions as a platform for U.S. power projection.
The deployment at Bezmer therefore reflects a broader reality of contemporary alliance politics: even when European governments avoid direct participation in military operations, they increasingly provide the logistical infrastructure that makes those operations possible. As military logistics become increasingly central to modern warfare, the distinction between participation and support may prove more political than operational.
Adrian Korczyński, Independent Analyst & Observer on Central Europe and global policy research
The paradox of Brazilian defense: a comparative study with Iran
By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | August 3, 2026
For decades, the debate over national defense in Brazil has been treated as a secondary issue. In a country with no significant border disputes and far removed from the world’s principal conflict zones, the prevailing perception has been that substantial military investments are unnecessary. The result of this mindset is an increasingly evident paradox: Brazil ranks among the countries with the largest military budgets in the world in absolute terms, yet it continues to display significant limitations in operational capabilities, strategic production, and deterrence.
Recently, I had access to a study prepared by Brazilian Navy Commander Robinson Farinazzo, based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which highlights a striking reality. Between 2015 and 2024, Brazil accumulated approximately US$214 billion in military expenditures, while Iran spent roughly US$134 billion during the same period. In other words, Brazil invested about 60 percent more resources in defense than Iran over the past decade.
However, a simple comparison of spending figures reveals very little about the actual military capabilities of each country. Brazil allocates the overwhelming majority of its defense budget to maintaining its existing structure. Salaries, pensions, and administrative expenses consume most of the available resources, leaving relatively little room for research and development, procurement, weapons acquisition, and technological modernization. This model preserves a large and professional military force, but significantly limits the pace at which its operational capabilities can be renewed.
Iran, by contrast, has followed a fundamentally different approach. Despite decades of economic sanctions, financial isolation, and severe restrictions on importing military equipment, Tehran invested heavily in building a comprehensive domestic defense industrial base. Unable to rely on foreign suppliers, the country directed its resources toward the development of ballistic missiles, drones, air defense systems, and local weapons production. Ironically, the sanctions intended to undermine Iran’s strategic autonomy ended up encouraging a high degree of self-sufficiency across multiple sectors of its defense industry.
This divergence in priorities has become particularly relevant in today’s international environment. In an era characterized by growing competition among major powers, the ability to manufacture weapons domestically, sustain national industrial supply chains, and rapidly adapt military technologies has become just as important as the nominal size of a country’s defense budget. In this respect, Iran’s experience demonstrates that the efficiency with which resources are allocated can be as decisive as the total amount spent.
The contrast with Brazil is unavoidable. The country possesses a respectable defense industrial base responsible for projects such as the KC-390 military transport aircraft, the ASTROS rocket artillery system, the Guarani armored vehicle, and the PROSUB submarine program. Nevertheless, these achievements coexist with decades of inconsistent investment, recurring budget cuts, and the absence of a long-term state policy aimed at continuously strengthening Brazil’s defense industrial and technological capabilities.
Even more concerning is the fact that Brazil operates in a geopolitical environment that is incomparably less hostile than the one confronting Iran. While Tehran has spent decades under international sanctions, surrounded by regional adversaries and subjected to sustained external pressure, Brasília benefits from regional stability, abundant natural resources, and relatively broad access to international markets. Yet Brazil has failed to transform these favorable conditions into a coherent strategy for strengthening its deterrent capabilities.
The principal lesson from this comparison is not that Brazil should replicate the Iranian model, nor should it overlook the profound political, economic, and strategic differences between the two countries. The conclusion is far simpler: financial resources alone do not guarantee military power. Without long-term planning, sustained investment, a strengthened domestic defense industry, and priority given to research and technological innovation, even substantial defense budgets produce limited strategic results.
The world is entering a period of growing geopolitical instability. In this context, Brazil’s real challenge is not simply determining how much to spend on defense, but defining which capabilities it intends to develop over the coming decades. Otherwise, it will continue spending billions merely to sustain an existing structure that, while important, fails to meet the strategic requirements of a continental-sized nation with increasingly significant interests on the international stage.
Call Off the Iran War. Just Walk Away!
By Ron Paul | August 3, 2026
After several days of increasing threats against Iran, including social media posts like “FINISH THE JOB!” and “Take the oil. No mercy!,” President Trump has over the weekend called off a planned major escalation in the Middle East. For now.
“The U.S.A. is locked and loaded and ready to go against the Islamic Republic of Iran, at levels of Military Terror, Strength, and Power not seen since World War II,” he wrote on his social media account. “Despite this, we have just been asked by Iran, and other Middle Eastern Countries, to hold off any attack in that the perimeters of a deal has been agreed to,” he added.
Iran denies any communication with the US and has threatened retaliation against energy infrastructure in the region if its energy infrastructure is attacked. Such destruction could plunge the world into an economic depression.
Iranian retaliation – including against critical water desalination plants – could also depopulate US allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others. Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman personally called President Trump to request he not escalate against Iran.
According to various media articles, the US is running dangerously low on missiles, especially interceptor missiles such as the Patriot system. Our ability to protect our military bases in the Middle East appears to be gone.
Reportedly, President Trump was warned by his top military advisors that a ground operation against Iran would result in a high level of US casualties and would have no guarantee of success. Already the official totals are 18 US service members killed and more than 700 injured in the operation.
Over the weekend the US military completed its evacuation of a major military base in the Kurdish region of Iraq. This follows similar evacuations of virtually every US base in the region, including the home of the US 5th Fleet in Bahrain and “safe” US bases in Jordan.
The entirety of US military power in the region appears to have been relocated to Israel.
The war which was supposed to last a couple of weeks and “pay for itself” is entering into its sixth month and the price tag so far is above $100 billion. A war that was started to thwart an Iranian nuclear threat that according to US Intelligence didn’t exist has become a war to open a waterway – the Hormuz Strait – that was open before the war started.
Things are so bad that, according to the Washington Post, the US general in charge of the US European Command sent a message to senior Pentagon officials “saying that without another Navy destroyer he will be forced to choose defense of the United States ‘homeland’ over that of Israel.” How is defending a foreign country over our own country even a choice?
The US attack on Iran is the most unpopular major US military operation in history and is becoming more unpopular by the day. President Trump’s polling numbers have been dragged down to the low 30s by the conflict. Midterm elections are three months away.
President Trump is rapidly running out of options in his war of choice against Iran. There is no path to victory in the war. It is now only about how to manage defeat. That’s why the Constitution does not allow presidents to start wars on their own.
Get out now. Completely out. The foolish war on Iran must end!
Iran’s Petrochemical Industry Turns Sanctions Into Domestic Manufacturing Boom
Sputnik – 02.08.2026
Over the years, the US and its allies tried extensively to sanction Iran’s petrochemicals sector into submission through corporate blacklisting, broker interdiction and secondary restrictions. These efforts appear to have failed.
“Last year, more than 2k parts required by the petrochemical industry which had previously been imported were localized by Academic Center for Education, Culture & Research (ACECR) technologists,” senior ACECR official Hamid Saberfarzam has revealed.
“The technical drawings and final books for these components have also been completed and delivered to the petrochemical industry, paving the way for their mass production by domestic manufacturers,” Saberfarzam said.
Iran’s petrochemicals breakthrough is just one component of its “Resistance Economy” ideology, which promotes self-sufficiency across key strategic sectors including:
- Defense (missiles, radar, drones, air defenses, etc)
- Industrial producer goods, including core inputs like steel, cement, glass and insulation materials
- Electricity and power infrastructure
- Refined petroleum
- Food (85-90% food security achieved to date)
- Upstream oil and gas equipment
- Pharmaceuticals and medical supplies
- Passenger and heavy vehicles (~60-80% sufficiency – ~60-95% localization)
- An array of consumer goods, from refrigerators and washing machines to household electronics
Besides industry, Iran is also a scientific powerhouse, ranking in the top five globally in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Critical Technology Tracker in fields from smart, advanced, composite and nanoscale materials, to antibiotics and air-independent propulsion.
Iranian precision drones cripple US Patriot shield in Erbil, forcing a hasty American pullout
By Yousef Ramazani | Press TV | August 2, 2026
The US military’s accelerated withdrawal from its base in Erbil, officially described as a scheduled redeployment, comes after Iranian precision strikes destroyed air-defense apparatus, including Patriot air-defense systems stationed there, a development supported by satellite imagery that has received limited attention in much of Western media coverage.
The hasty and unplanned withdrawal of American occupation forces from Iraq’s Kurdistan region has taken place amid a series of Iranian retaliatory strikes that have reshaped the security environment and military calculations in Iraq and across the region.
Media reports indicate that US military convoys have been moving from Erbil toward neighboring countries in recent days, with a significant portion of American troops and heavy equipment already withdrawn from the military compound near Erbil International Airport.
The official explanation, promoted by regional officials and reflected in Western reporting, presents the move as a routine redeployment consistent with Washington’s obligation to remove all US forces from Iraq by the September 30 deadline agreed upon with Baghdad.
However, this account does not address a key factor behind the reported withdrawal: the large-scale destruction of Patriot air-defense systems that had served as a central element of US force protection in the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
Satellite imagery dated July 16 and July 24 provide clinching evidence that Iranian drone and missile strikes targeted and destroyed Patriot launchers at Erbil International Airport. Despite this, the imagery has received limited coverage in mainstream Western media.
The removal of these systems reflects not merely a planned redeployment but an acknowledgment that the air-defense assets had become increasingly vulnerable in the face of Iran’s precision-strike capabilities.
Evidence of Patriot system destruction
Satellite imagery captured on July 16 and analyzed by independent observers shows a US Army Patriot air-defense launcher at Erbil International Airport destroyed following an Iranian drone strike in response to the US military aggression against southern Iran.
The imagery shows significant damage to a Patriot PAC-3 system, with smoke visible at the reported impact site, rendering it completely dysfunctional.
The strike was attributed to Shahed-136 one-way attack drones launched by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force – loitering munitions that have demonstrated the cutting-edge ability to challenge advanced and multi-layered air-defense networks.
A second strike on July 24 followed, with additional satellite imagery indicating the destruction of another component of the same Patriot air-defense battery.
A fire reported at Erbil International Airport was linked to damage involving one or more Patriot launchers. Images from the aftermath have been described by military analysts and OSINT researchers as evidence of a precision strike that damaged one of Washington’s most advanced defensive systems and highlighted the challenges posed by Iranian drone capabilities.
The IRGC Aerospace Force announced the destruction of a Patriot air-defense system at Erbil as part of the 27th wave of Operation Nasr-2, carried out under the code phrase “Ya Aba Saleh al-Mahdi, Adrikni.”
In its statement, the IRGC said the operation involved a “surprise” strike that also destroyed a US surveillance balloon and targeted facilities used to accommodate American military personnel.
Declining effectiveness of American air defenses
The devastating strikes against Patriot systems in Erbil exposed vulnerabilities that have been a growing concern for American military planners throughout the war of aggression against Iran.
The Patriot batteries, which have an operational range of between 100 and 160 kilometers, were originally deployed to protect American occupation forces but had become targets themselves.
While US interceptors succeeded in preventing some attacks on the Erbil compound, other attacks proved sufficient to disable the most advanced air-defense systems in the American inventory.
The near-total destruction of Patriot launchers in Erbil was part of a broader pattern of Iranian military successes against American air-defense infrastructure across the region, which prompted war hawks in Washington to look for alternatives and forced Trump to end the bombing campaign.
A study documented the diminishing resources available to American forces, revealing that 55 percent of the Patriot stockpile had been depleted by April, with a further 10 percent reduction following the collapse of the US-Iranian ceasefire in recent months.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute estimated that the United States produces around 600 Patriot interceptors annually, noting that existing stockpiles had already been strained by transfers to Ukraine prior to the escalation of unprovoked hostilities against Iran.
The Iranian success against Patriot systems reflects the inherent asymmetry in modern drone warfare, where expensive air-defense interceptors are depleted by relatively low-cost loitering munitions.
The Shahed-136 drones used in the Erbil strikes are estimated to be thousands of dollars each, while each Patriot interceptor costs millions, making it extremely costly for the aggressor.
This economic imbalance, combined with the demonstrated vulnerability of high-end air-defense systems to drone saturation tactics, has created a fundamental challenge for American force protection that cannot be resolved through redeployment alone.
Accelerated withdrawal: facts on the ground
The destruction of Patriot systems at Erbil appears to have been the catalyst for the accelerated withdrawal of American forces from Iraqi Kurdistan, according to military sources.
The US military began drawing down its last remaining forces stationed near Erbil International Airport, with the pullout starting in the final week of July and continuing at the time of filing this report.
The bulk of US troops and heavy equipment have already been removed from the compound, according to the Al-Monitor website, which claims that all Patriot anti-missile batteries have been redeployed to an undisclosed destination.
However, sources told the Press TV website that the Patriot anti-missile batteries don’t exist anymore at the highly fortified base, which was the main trigger for the hasty military withdrawal.
The Pentagon has declined to confirm or deny the reports of its military’s withdrawal, citing “operational security reasons” for refusing to discuss specific movements.
They also remain tight-lipped about the existing condition of air-defense systems, including Patriot, and how they intend to protect their troops in other regional countries with American bases.
This evasive response has done little to reassure Kurdish authorities, who have been left to interpret the withdrawal without clear guidance from their American allies.
Attack context: sustained Iranian pressure on Iraqi Kurdistan
The withdrawal of American forces from Erbil must be understood within the broader context of Iranian military pressure on the Kurdistan Region throughout July 2026.
Iranian forces maintained sustained retaliatory attacks on US military infrastructure in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the bulk of attacks targeting armed Kurdish militant groups based in the region as well as the US military compound near Erbil International Airport.
The attacks on the Erbil compound specifically targeted the Patriot systems and other military assets, with the IRGC launching multiple waves of Operation Nasr-2 that pounded US-run bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
Local media outlets reported that the Kurdistan Region was subjected to dozens of drone and missile attacks in July, with the city of Erbil facing repeated air-raid warnings and interception attempts.
Iranian and Kurdish sources confirmed renewed strikes against infrastructure associated with coalition forces, with the attacks focused on operational infrastructure rather than saturation bombardment.
The attacks on Erbil International Airport included strikes on a ground support station and maintenance facility belonging to US surveillance aircraft, along with the destruction of the Patriot systems.
This precision targeting reflects the sophistication of Iranian intelligence gathering and the ability to identify and strike high-value American assets with accuracy.
The IRGC’s statement that “almost all” US military infrastructure in Erbil had been destroyed during the conflict, while not independently verified, is consistent with the subsequent American withdrawal.
Regional realignment: from Iraq to the Persian Gulf
The withdrawal from Iraqi Kurdistan is part of a broader American reassessment of its military posture across the region, driven by the recognition that large, permanent military presences have become liabilities rather than strategic assets.
The priority for the US has also shifted toward Persian Gulf states, particularly Kuwait and Jordan.
The United States has been reviewing the extent of its military presence in Kuwait following developments in the war against Iran, with reports indicating that analysts believe “a large, permanent military presence in Kuwait is no longer vital or militarily wise”.
This reassessment has been driven by the reality that US installations and bases have been repeatedly targeted by Iran during the war, with the Patriot systems themselves becoming magnets for Iranian strikes rather than reliable defensive shields.
The destruction of Patriot systems at Erbil ahead of the troop withdrawal has raised further questions about US interceptor stockpiles and how the military seeks to protect troops elsewhere in the region.
The successful Iranian strikes on Patriot systems in Erbil demonstrated that these assets are vulnerable to drone attacks, making their deployment to other locations a matter of risk assessment rather than simple repositioning.
Strategic implications: victory for Iranian deterrence
The American withdrawal from Iraqi Kurdistan, following the destruction of Patriot systems by Iranian precision strikes, represents a significant victory for the Axis of Resistance and a demonstration of the effectiveness of Iranian deterrence strategy, according to defense analysts.
The IRGC’s official statement on the Erbil strikes warned that “should the unlawful and bullying US regime continue its hostile actions, it will face different and stronger responses,” a warning that has been validated by the American decision to withdraw rather than reinforce its position in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Kurdish Regional Government, which has benefited from the American military umbrella while not being the primary target of Iranian attacks, now faces an uncertain future without the protection of US air-defense systems, including Patriot.
The withdrawal also carries significant implications for the broader regional balance of power. The US, which has maintained a military presence in Iraq for over two decades, is now completing a withdrawal that has been accelerated by Iranian military pressure rather than strategic planning.
The annihilation of Patriot systems from Erbil, and the subsequent withdrawal of American occupation forces, represents an acknowledgment that these systems were no longer capable of protecting American personnel in the face of Iranian precision strike capabilities.
The official narrative of a scheduled redeployment, analysts opine, cannot mask the reality that the American position in Iraqi Kurdistan became untenable following the Iranian retaliatory strikes in recent weeks, which demonstrated that even the most advanced American air-defense systems cannot withstand sustained Iranian drone warfare.
Claims of Iran agreeing to reopen Hormuz Strait are false: Report
Press TV – August 2, 2026
Media reports claiming that the Islamic Republic of Iran has agreed to a plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz are false, and no change has been made to the country’s policy regarding the strategic waterway, according to a report.
Foreign media outlets, citing Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, have claimed earlier that Iran had accepted a proposal under which ships would enter the Persian Gulf through Iranian territorial waters and leave through Omani territorial waters.
Fars News Agency, citing a source close to Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, rejected those claims, with the source saying, “The Islamic Republic of Iran has reached no agreement on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and the reports published in this regard are false.”
According to Fars, a military source also dismissed the claims, saying they were entirely unfounded.
“As long as the hostile actions and acts of malice by the United States continue, the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed,” the military source was quoted as saying.
“Passage will only be possible through the designated route, in coordination with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Navy and after obtaining permission to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Otherwise, other routes are unsafe, and vessels attempting to use them will certainly encounter incidents.”
The source further emphasized that reports claiming that Iran had agreed to any plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz were “baseless” and that no decision or policy change had been made regarding the strategic waterway.
It came after US President Donald Trump said he had canceled declared attacks on Iran, following warnings from Tehran that any new US or Israeli aggression would face strong retaliation.
In a post on Truth Social on Saturday, Trump claimed that the US was “locked and loaded” and prepared to launch a military assault against Iran, describing the potential aggression as involving levels of military power “not seen since World War II.”
The latest round of war against Iran began on February 28, when US and Israeli forces launched large-scale strikes on Iranian territory.
Iran responded with daily waves of missiles and drones targeting US and Israeli assets across the region, while closing the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran and the US later signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 17 in an effort to end the war across all fronts.
However, renewed US military aggression against Iran in recent weeks has prompted Tehran to resume missile and drone strikes against US assets in the region and close the Strait of Hormuz once again.
Seyed M. Marandi: Morocco Invades Spain?
Glenn Diesen | August 1, 2026
Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Prof. Marandi discusses the 60,000 Moroccans storming into Spain and the possible encouragement from the US and Israel to reward Morocco and punish Spain.
Iran Army hits US base in Kuwait as satellite images show fresh damage
Press TV – July 31, 2026
The Iranian Army says it has targeted key facilities at US-run Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait, as newly analyzed satellite imagery also points to fresh damage at another US-operated base in the Persian Gulf state.
The Army’s Public Relations Office said the strike marked the 27th phase of Operation Sa’eqeh and was carried out in response to recent US military attacks on Iran, including an airstrike on a residential home on Qeshm Island.
According to the statement, loitering drones targeted aircraft shelters, satellite communications systems and equipment storage facilities at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base. It described the installation as a major hub for US air and surveillance operations and a vital center for the logistical support of American forces.
The retaliation comes as the US has been targeting southern Iranian provinces since earlier in July after violating the terms of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.
Tehran has responded with repeated missile and drone attacks targeting US-operated military facilities across the region under Operation Nasr 2 and Operation Sa’eqeh (Lightning).
The Army condemned the US strike on civilian homes in Qeshm, calling it “a clear violation of humanitarian principles and another example of the enemy’s war crimes.”
It added that “crimes, sanctions and threats will only make Iran more united and cohesive in its sacred defense.”
The statement further said the “decisive, extensive and heavy” attacks carried out by the Army and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps have made it “very costly and difficult” for the United States to intercept Iranian drones and missiles despite deploying advanced air defense systems and reinforcing them.
It also noted that Washington has imposed strict censorship to prevent information about damage, casualties and injuries from becoming public.
The operation followed a deadly US strike on a residential building on Iran’s southern Qeshm Island on Thursday. A local official said three members of a family—a mother, a father and their two-year-old son—were killed in the attack. Two other children were pulled alive from the rubble and taken to hospital after receiving emergency treatment at the scene. The father was identified as a taxi driver, and the neighborhood was a working-class residential area.
Satellite imagery shows damage to US-run base in Kuwait
Meanwhile, satellite imagery has indicated new damage at another US-operated military installation in Kuwait.
Soar Atlas, specializing in maps and satellite imagery, said its assessment of newly released satellite images suggested fresh damage at Ali Al Salem Air Base.
According to the analysis, part of a storage area used by US forces appeared blackened in the latest imagery, indicating that the facility may have sustained damage.
The developments come as The Wall Street Journal reported on Thursday that Washington is reassessing the scale of its military presence in Kuwait.
Citing US officials familiar with the deliberations, the newspaper said the Pentagon had already been considering reducing its troop presence before the war on Iran began and has since scaled back personnel in Kuwait to minimize the risk posed by Iranian attacks on US military bases.
Analysts quoted by the newspaper said US officials increasingly believe that maintaining a large permanent force in Kuwait is no longer militarily necessary.
Was the Drone Attack on US LNG Tanker in Egypt a False Flag?
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | July 31, 2026
Short answer… I think so.
On Wednesday July 29, 2026, at roughly 3:20 pm CET, a drone struck the Energos Winter — a Marshall Islands-flagged floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) owned by US company New Fortress Energy — on its starboard side at Egypt’s Mediterranean port of Damietta, in the northern Nile Delta. The fire spread to a nearby Bermuda-flagged LNG carrier, the Gaslog Salem. Both crews were evacuated, the blaze was brought under control, and no injuries were reported. Both vessels were subsequently moved offshore for assessment; the Energos Winter was pulled off the quayside before the fire was fully out.
Egyptian harbor responders got on scene fast from both the land side and with fire and rescue tugs, which several accounts credit with preventing a much larger disaster — a fire spreading to the terminal infrastructure or fully involving either LNG hull would have been catastrophic. Egypt’s Petroleum Minister Karim Badawi traveled to the port personally to oversee the response.
CNBC and CNN framed this attack as part of a widening campaign on energy infrastructure, implicitly blaming Iran: Iran, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias have all broadened strikes, with Iraqi Iran-aligned militias launching drones at oil infrastructure in Riyadh and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province this same week. The Damietta strike was viewed by many in the West as extending that campaign from Gulf oil into Mediterranean gas.
I think the attack at Damietta was an Israeli false flag that was intended to stir tensions between Cairo and Tehran. Iran inadvertently set the stage for such a narrative. Two days prior to the drone attack Iranian state TV ran a segment headlined about revenge against Ukraine, showing a multi-target map of European-energy-linked infrastructure, which included Damietta, marked with a pin, citing its LNG capacity (5.2M tons/yr) as a “gateway for gas exports to Europe” descriptor. Damietta was not the focus of the broadcast and was merely identified as one of several possible targets. Everything beyond that — i.e., that the map amounts to Iran claiming or committing the strike at Damietta — is inference layered on top. The critical point about the framing: the stated enemy was Ukraine, not the US or Egypt.
Many in the West were quick to point the finger of blame at Iran. Yet Egypt’s Minister of Information, in an interview with Al Arabiya, denied the Wall Street Journal’s claim that the Egyptian government considered Iran responsible for the drone attack on two ships in Damietta port.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Aragchi issued a statement insisting that it wasn’t Iran and that it was an Israeli false flag operation to try to drag Egypt into an anti Iranian coalition. I think Aragchi is correct.
Give credit to Mossad for monitoring Iranian media and taking advantage of the news broadcast to quickly create an incident that would cast the shadow of blame on Iran by virtue of the news broadcast that had listed Damietta as one of many possible targets for retaliation against Ukraine. It is very easy for an organization like Mossad to mount such a drone attack in two days… Guilt by association.
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