Col Douglas Macgregor: War to the Last Missile in Iran
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive
By Jose Nino | Occidental Review | July 7, 2026
The hawks who pushed the United States into its most expensive military operation in decades are already planning the next one. Ben Shapiro and Mark Levin, two of the most listened-to Jewish voices in conservative media, have made clear in the immediate aftermath of the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding that they view the current peace not as a resolution but as an intermission, one they intend to use to rebuild the political and military conditions for a return to war.
Ben Shapiro published a Daily Wire piece titled “Why Trump Signed The Agreement With Iran,” explaining the MOU while making clear his deep reservations. In the same Fox News appearance hours after the text was released, he simultaneously called the war “the signal act of political bravery, perhaps, of my lifetime” and labeled the Memorandum of Understanding “a disaster that does not achieve any of the actual signal goals that were set by the administration at the beginning.” Shapiro laid out five specific objectives he said the administration had named —ending all nuclear enrichment, dismantling ballistic missiles, ending support for so-called terrorist proxies, permanently reopening the Strait of Hormuz toll-free, and conditioning sanctions relief on Iranian compliance—and argued the MOU met none of them. Despite his public condemnation of the deal, he nonetheless stopped short of urging Trump to reject it, thus revealing something more significant than mere disagreement. It exposed a proposed recalibration among hawkish commentators who now appear to be laying the groundwork for a resumption of hostilities after the November midterm elections.
While commentators debated the terms of the deal, the war itself had already delivered its verdict in blood. The war they championed exacted a staggering price. Operation Epic Fury, which began on February 28, 2026, killed between 7,144 and 9,676 people across multiple countries while wounding approximately 46,965 more. Iran’s Foundation of Martyrs confirmed 3,468 Iranian deaths while independent monitors documented higher figures. Among the dead were 240 women and 212 children. One American strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab, Hormozgan province on February 28 killed approximately 175 to 180 people—the majority of them schoolchildren—a strike investigated by the New York Times, BBC Verify, Reuters, NPR, and CBC all of which concluded the United States was likely responsible. Over 4,000 people were killed in Lebanon according to its Health Ministry.
The economic devastation proved equally severe. The Pentagon reported spending $29 billion by May 12, though this figure excluded damage to American military bases from Iranian retaliation and the costs of munitions expended. By June, the Pentagon sought an additional $87.6 billion supplemental from Congress to cover the full costs of the campaign. Harvard economist Linda Bilmes projected that total costs could reach $1 trillion when accounting for long-term ripple effects including veteran care, replenishment of depleted weapons stockpiles, and regional economic disruption. Iran estimated its losses at $270 billion and demanded compensation as a condition of broader peace negotiations. CSIS independently assessed the total U.S. military campaign cost at approximately $34 to $42 billion—a figure that excluded base damage, munitions replacement costs, and long-term obligations.
This catastrophic toll apparently failed to satisfy those who pushed hardest for the conflict. Mark Levin emerged as the most explicit voice calling for a strategic pause followed by renewed military action. On June 18, the same day CNN reported that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was actively using pro-Israel media figures to influence the deal, Levin posted on X/Twitter his prescription for the path forward. “Time for a change in strategy. We should consider slow walking the enemy, building up our munitions, our oil reserves, get the price of gasoline down, get through the midterms, then knock them out. Instead of rushing to a deal, building up their oil industry, transferring billions to them, etc.”
Levin had advocated for military action against Iran long before the war began. He reportedly lobbied Trump directly at a private White House lunch in early June, falsely warning that Iran was “days away from a nuclear weapon”—a claim the U.S. intelligence community did not support. On his show in May he had argued that “The mass-murdering death cult that is the Iranian regime is not going to commit suicide” and that “they cannot” abide by any deal “because as a matter of religious and political ideology and doctrine, they will not in the end bend to the demands of the great Satan.”
Shapiro adopted a position less explicit but functionally identical. After the MOU was signed at Versailles on June 18, he declared the agreement a disaster and hoped that Trump would return to bombing Iran after November’s midterms. He had previously called the war “the single bravest foreign policy move of my lifetime,” telling Lara Trump on Fox News that what Trump was doing in Iran “has the potential to be a true game changer for America’s role in the world,
The broader hawk faction echoed the same framework for restarting the conflict. Hugh Hewitt called the MOU “halftime” and predicted a return to war after the election. Fox and Friends co-host Brian Kilmeade added that “After the midterms, the gloves come off.” Media Matters described this as the hawks’ new “cope” strategy—a way to avoid criticizing Trump directly while keeping the door open for future military escalation.
These commentators built their case for war over several years. Shapiro praised Trump’s 2020 killing of IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani as “utterly righteous,” calling Soleimani “one of the worst human beings on the planet,” and he consistently argued that Iran required direct confrontation rather than the appeasement he accused the Obama administration of pursuing. When Israel launched preemptive strikes on Iran’s nuclear program in June 2025, Shapiro published a syndicated column declaring that “two lies die: the lie that only negotiations can end the threat of a rogue state seeking nuclear weapons, and the lie that every conflict must necessarily become Iraq.” Levin appeared on Hannity right before the 2026 conflict to argue that “If this Islamic Nazi terrorist mass killing regime gets a nuclear weapon, will they use it? The answer is yes” and that “We don’t need to put up with their crap. It’s time to put it to an end.”
Despite the memorandum of understanding being signed on June 17, the conflict remains far from resolved. The deal lifted the U.S. naval blockade, reopened the Strait of Hormuz, created a 60-day window to negotiate permanent terms, and proposed a $300 billion reconstruction fund. Critics noted that despite the war’s enormous costs, Iran’s government remained intact, its ballistic missile program is still functional, and its support for regional resistance organizations like Hezbollah is still unwavering. The statements from Shapiro and Levin give the game away. They have already begun conditioning their audiences for a second round of bellicosity against the Islamic Republic.
For the likes of Shapiro and Levin, conservatism is merely a skinsuit they don, carefully tailored to win trust and influence within the American Right. But the substance beneath it has nothing to do with American national interests. Every war they cheer, every deal they oppose, every argument they make is calibrated toward using American blood and treasure as a battering ram for the interests of World Jewry. The consequences for the United States, the American people, and the families who bear the cost of their wars are simply not part of their calculation. It is time to stop mistaking their fluency in conservative language for loyalty to this country.
Glenn Diesen | July 7, 2026
Prof. Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Prof. Marandi discusses the continued attacks on Lebanon and Gaza, the US efforts to renegotiate the MoU, the possibility of improved ties between Iran, the Arab States, and Turkey.
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Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – July 6, 2026
Press TV – July 4, 2026
The funeral ceremony for the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, brought together one of the largest gatherings of foreign dignitaries in Iran in recent decades, with representatives from across Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, and major international organizations attending the event in Tehran.
The delegations included presidents, prime ministers, parliamentary speakers, foreign ministers, senior government officials, political leaders, and representatives of religious organizations and resistance movements, underscoring the broad international participation in the ceremony.
Asia
Asia accounted for the largest share of official delegations.
From West Asia, Iraq sent one of the largest delegations, including Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, senior officials, and representatives of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Saudi Arabia was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Al-Khuraiji, while Oman sent the chairman of its State Council and Qatar was represented by Parliament Speaker Hassan bin Abdullah Al Ghanim.
Shia community representatives also attended from Bahrain and several other Persian Gulf countries.
Lebanon dispatched Defense Minister Michel Menassa alongside senior delegations from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.
Yemen was represented by Vice President Mahmoud al-Junaid and an Ansarullah delegation.
Palestinian groups also attended, including senior Hamas leaders and Islamic Jihad Secretary-General Ziyad al-Nakhalah.
From the wider Asian region, Pakistan sent one of the highest-level foreign delegations, headed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir. The delegation also included the Senate speaker, senior government officials, and religious leaders.
Afghanistan was represented by delegations from the Taliban administration and the Afghan resistance.
India sent a special government envoy at the deputy foreign minister level.
China was represented by He Wei, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
Tajik President Emomali Rahmon attended the ceremony in person, while Armenia was represented by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Georgia sent President Mikheil Kavelashvili along with a Muslim delegation.
Türkiye dispatched Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, together with political and party representatives.
Turkmenistan was represented by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, Chairman of the People’s Council and National Leader.
Among other participants were Azerbaijan’s parliament speaker, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister; the parliamentary speakers of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka; Thailand’s deputy prime minister; Malaysia’s agriculture minister; Myanmar’s special envoy; and official delegations from South Korea and North Korea.
Africa
Several African governments were represented by ministerial- or cabinet-level delegations.
Egypt sent its Senate speaker.
South Africa, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Tanzania, and Tunisia all sent official representatives.
Nigeria and Senegal also dispatched delegations to participate in the funeral ceremonies.
Europe and the Americas
Russia sent Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, as President Vladimir Putin’s special representative.
Belarus was represented by its parliament speaker, while Serbia sent its communications minister. Bulgaria also dispatched parliamentary and political representatives.
Germany was represented by members of the country’s Shia community.
From Latin America, Cuba sent its higher education minister as a special representative, while Nicaragua was represented by Foreign Minister Valdrack Jaentschke.
International organizations
The ceremony also drew senior representatives of several international organizations.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was represented by Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev, while the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) sent Deputy Secretary-General Tariq Ali Bakheet.
The D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) were represented by their respective secretaries-general.
Mario Nawfal | July 3, 2026
Dialogue Works | July 2, 2026
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By Timothy Hopper | MEMO | July 2, 2026
As Iran prepares for the funeral ceremonies of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the former Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, the scale of anticipated public participation indicates that they are set to become one of the most significant mass gatherings in contemporary Iranian history. Reports indicate that vast crowds are expected to arrive from across the country, alongside official delegations from numerous states. This moment offers a clear opportunity to assess the U.S. and Israeli decision to assassinate him in February 2026. The operation rested on a flawed assessment of Khamenei’s real role and standing within Iran’s social and political structure. In this regard, the United States was shaped largely by Israeli media narratives and intelligence assessments—accounts that substantially underestimated Ayatollah Khamenei’s popularity, institutional influence, and capacity for social mobilization. The preparations already underway and the expected scale of the turnout make this analytical failure harder to ignore. They show how far American policymakers relied on an incomplete and one-sided picture of Iranian reality.
To understand this miscalculation, it is necessary to return to the framework that had cast a long shadow over analyses of Iran before the attack. For years, Israeli media outlets and a number of research institutions close to Israel’s political and security establishment portrayed Khamenei as a leader with limited social backing, governing a society marked by deep divisions, economic discontent, and generational distance. These narratives repeatedly suggested that removing him could trigger serious instability, or even a fundamental transformation of Iran’s political system. Such an image aligned with the stated purpose of the joint U.S.-Israeli operation: weakening and destabilizing Iran’s political order. Yet this analysis ignored the more complex realities of Iranian society and politics. In assessing Khamenei’s structural position and the attachment of significant parts of society to ideas such as independence, security, and resistance to external pressure, Washington effectively accepted a narrative that minimized decisive factors. The result was an expectation that his removal would rapidly expose internal fractures. Developments since then—including a relatively orderly leadership transition and the continued functioning of core institutions—have pointed in the opposite direction.
Khamenei’s position in Iran went far beyond that of a conventional head of government. For more than three decades, he stressed national self-reliance, scientific and technological development despite external constraints, and sustained resistance in foreign policy against outside pressure.
These priorities helped produce a measure of institutional resilience and measurable progress in certain sectors. Iran has, of course, faced genuine social discontent, economic pressure, and political divisions. But that did not mean Khamenei’s role had been reduced to personal isolation, nor that his removal would necessarily paralyze the country’s political machinery. Israeli media coverage generally emphasized critical currents and visible signs of dissatisfaction while downplaying evidence of broader attachment to ideas such as independence, national sovereignty, and security. This selective emphasis produced an image of fragility and isolation that did not correspond to the durability of Iranian structures after his assassination. America’s acceptance of that image represented a serious intelligence and analytical failure in understanding the depth of Khamenei’s place within Iran’s political structure.
The February attack was accompanied by public statements from American and Israeli officials describing it as a decisive blow. The initial expectation appears to have rested on the assumption that the vacuum created by eliminating the leader would intensify internal divisions or create opportunities for greater outside leverage.
In practice, Iran preserved the functional continuity of its core institutions and its broad policy direction. This outcome showed that Khamenei’s influence was not merely personal. It had taken root in institutions, political networks, security structures, and the political culture of the Islamic Republic.
Washington’s error was to imagine that the base of support around him was narrower and more brittle than events ultimately showed it to be. The upcoming funeral ceremonies, scheduled to unfold over several days and across major cities, are set to draw exceptionally large crowds and will provide further tangible evidence against those earlier assumptions. The anticipated presence of mourners and foreign delegations will demonstrate a degree of recognition, respect, and social connection that earlier reporting and assessments had treated as marginal.
From a broader policy perspective, this episode reveals the dangers of excessive reliance on particular intelligence and media sources. In Iran’s case, cultural, religious, and historical forces shape political loyalties and behavior in ways that demand a more precise understanding of the country’s internal realities—not broad, externally produced narratives. Analyses that overlook these factors are vulnerable to strategic error. What was supposed to weaken Iran’s political structure instead reinforced commitment to established principles, heightened sensitivity to foreign intervention, and underscored the perceived necessity of institutional continuity. The forthcoming ceremonies, with their extensive organization, will serve as a visible corrective to assessments shaped by one-sided reporting.
By relying on Israeli media narratives and intelligence assessments of Khamenei’s position and the level of support surrounding him, American decision-makers arrived at a conclusion that developments since the assassination have not borne out.
In conclusion, the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei and the domestic and international response to it expose the limits of policymaking built on incomplete information and politically shaped interpretations. The forthcoming funeral ceremonies and the anticipated exceptional public turnout will offer a vivid illustration of social cohesion in Iran—one that stands in clear contrast to earlier predictions of rapid collapse or internal rupture. This expected turnout suggests that America’s assessment of Iran’s Supreme Leader and the degree of public support he commanded was significantly influenced by Israeli media and intelligence narratives, and ultimately proved mistaken. Rather than producing the disruption that had been anticipated, the process has highlighted Iran’s institutional continuity and social resilience.
John Kennedy forgets to mention Iran’s ballistic missiles can’t reach London or Paris
By Kurt Nimmo | Another Day in the Empire | July 2, 2026
Senator John Kennedy, the Democrat turned Republican from Louisiana, came up with a whopper during an interview with a comedian slash podcaster. It is a take on Netanyahu’s perennial claim Iran is five minutes away from having nuclear weapons that maniacal mullahs will use to bomb New York, London, Berlin, Brussels, in addition to all Arabs and Muslims in West Asia.
Kennedy told Theodor Capitani von Kurnatowski III, aka Theo Von, US intelligence informed him Iran is “stacking ballistic missiles and killer drones like never before” and will rain them down on London, Paris, and Germany. The culprit here is Iran’s Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers, said to be derived from the North Korean Musudan (BM-25) missile. London is over 5,000 kilometers from Iran, while Paris is over 4,000 kilometers, and Berlin 3,000 kilometers.
Trump to the rescue, according to Kennedy. The president faced a “nightmare decision: Let them arm up until they could rain fire on our allies and threaten the homeland… or strike first and save the world? He chose to bomb their nuclear sites and stop the madness.”
I thought the illegal sneak attack on Iran, including the assassination the Supreme Leader of Iran, the 86-year old Ali Khamenei, eliminated Iran’s supposed nuclear threat, or that’s what Trump told us, ad nauseam. Iran has never possessed nuclear weapons and remains a non-nuclear-weapon state under international treaties, specifically the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). US intelligence agencies have assessed that Iran is not currently building a nuclear weapon.
Trump’s former (now persona non grata) Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Tulsi Gabbard, told a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in March Operation Midnight Hammer had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear enrichment capability. No mention on the obliteration of the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School in Minab, Iran, murdering 156 civilians, 120 of them school girls. That collateral damage is 1,200 kilometers from the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant.
Anyway, anything Mr. Kennedy says should be taken with a boulder of salt and a fistful of antacid. He has benefited from $113,680 donated by the Israel lobby. He co-sponsored the Taylor Force Act (legislation prohibits American funds from being given to Palestinian entities), the Israel Anti-Boycott Act (making “economic speech” illegal), the Combating BDS Act of 2017 (making Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions illegal), and the United States-Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act (providing and additional $3.3 billion to Israel for “self-defense,” that is to say abducting, torturing, raping, and murdering thousands of Palestinians).
By Kyle Anzalone | The Libertarian Institute | July 1, 2026
The Iranian Foreign Minister warned Israel of an immediate response if officials continue to call for the death of the Supreme Leader.
On Monday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei was “marked for death.” At the onset of the current war, the US and Israel assassinated Khamenei’s father, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a strike that killed several other members of his family.
On Wednesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi wrote on X that future threats would receive an “immediate powerful response” from Tehran. He also directed President Donald Trump to rein in the rhetoric coming from Tel Aviv.
“POTUS has committed the U.S. to muzzling its pets in Tel Aviv. If they ignore their master, Iran will school them,” he added.
Last month, the US and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding that provided the framework for negotiations to finalize a peace agreement. However, Israel has violated the MOU and undermined negotiations.
The first point of the MOU calls for a ceasefire in Lebanon. Over the past two weeks, Israel has continued to bomb and occupy Lebanon. Additionally, Israeli officials say they will not end the war in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.
Mehr News | July 1, 2026
Leaked official Israeli documents reveal that Iranian missile attacks on the Bazan refinery in Haifa destroyed critical infrastructure, including a storage tank.
Quds News Network reported on Tuesday that an official draft document published by the Israeli regime’s Interior Ministry reveals significantly broader damage than previously disclosed following the Iranian missile strikes.
The document, which was published as part of procedures to approve reconstruction work at the Bazan refinery complex in Haifa Bay, reportedly details damage to gas turbines, steam boilers, electrical rooms and other auxiliary systems that had not previously been publicly reported.
It also states that an oil derivatives storage tank struck during the March attack is beyond repair and must be replaced with a new tank with a capacity of up to 12,700 cubic meters.
The June strike on the complex severely damaged its power plant, disrupted refinery operations and killed three workers. At the time, Bazan estimated the losses at $150-200 million, while Israeli officials maintained that fuel supplies would not be affected.
According to the Interior Ministry document cited by QNN, the damage extends beyond physical infrastructure and has affected the refinery’s operational capacity.
The document states that the destruction of the storage tank has “directly affected the ability to produce gasoline that meets the specifications required by the market and to supply it to consumers.”
This contradicts previous statements by then-Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen, who said the strikes had not damaged production facilities and would not affect fuel supplies.
The document further reveals that the area approved for reconstruction is almost double that authorized after the June attack, indicating that the scale of the destruction was considerably greater than previously acknowledged.
According to the Interior Ministry document cited by QNN, the complete restoration of the Bazan complex is not expected before 2028, only about three years before the Israeli cabinet’s planned evacuation of the Haifa Bay petrochemical industries in 2031.
The document concludes that the damage affects “essential operational and storage components” within one of the Israeli regime’s most important energy facilities, requiring years of reconstruction while maintaining production and fuel supplies.
By Trita Parsi | July 1, 2026
Will Israel restart the war with Iran before the October elections? This is the consensus view emerging within Iran’s internal national security debate over the past week.
Several factors are driving Tehran to this conclusion. Beyond its deep—and not entirely unwarranted—suspicion of President Donald Trump’s intentions, heightened by Vice President JD Vance’s recent remark that Trump wants to use the MOU to replenish global oil reserves and then “see where the hand is,” two developments stand out: the recent Israeli-Lebanese agreement and its impact on Hezbollah’s military posture over the coming months.
From Tehran’s perspective, the agreement hands Israel a significant advantage in any renewed war with Iran—one it lacked in February. By allowing Israeli forces to remain in parts of southern Lebanon, the deal appears to contravene the MOU while fundamentally reshaping the military balance. Israel’s continued presence in these strategic positions would make it far more difficult for Hezbollah to mount the kind of offensive operations that proved critical during the previous round of fighting.
That matters because, in February and March, the Iranians say they used only about 40 percent of their offensive capabilities against Israel, because Hezbollah carried much of the remaining burden. At the time, pundits in the West were debating why Tehran hit the UAE harder than it did Israel.
Part of it was because of Israel’s much higher pain tolerance compared to the GCC states. Tehran was aiming to reach the most accessible pain threshold to pressure the US to end the war. But part of it was the critical role Hezbollah played in the war, contrary to much of the press coverage at the time. It played a critical role in stretching Israel’s defenses, complicating its targeting decisions, and forcing it to divide resources across multiple fronts.
That role, however, was poorly understood because Israel imposed near-total military censorship during the war—far stricter than the censorship regime in June 2025—which sharply limited public visibility into Hezbollah’s operations and their impact. As a result, the degree to which Hezbollah shaped the course of the war has been significantly underestimated.
Unlike the MOU, the current Israeli-Lebanese agreement does not require Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory until Hezbollah has been disarmed. Since that outcome is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, Israel is poised to retain its positions inside Lebanon, enabling it to renew the war with Iran without facing the same pressure from its northern front that constrained it during the previous conflict.
Netanyahu’s motivations are clear. Beyond his long-standing desire to use American force to subjugate Iran to Israeli domination and achieve a regional balance favourable to Israel, he now also has stark political and personal reasons to restart the war.
The MOU has come at a steep political cost for Netanyahu. His prospects for reelection in October are weaker than they have been in months. Once seen as the Israeli leader uniquely capable of delivering President Trump, he now confronts the prospect that both the war and the ensuing diplomacy will leave Israel in a strategically weaker position—undermining the very case he has made for his leadership.
And of course, if he loses the elections, he will likely spend the next few years in jail, as he will lose his immunity as Prime Minister and face trial over corruption charges.
Whether the Trump administration is coordinating with Israel on such a strategy remains unclear to Tehran. But suspicions surrounding Secretary of State Marco Rubio run particularly deep, given his role in brokering the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, his support for the war, and his perceived opposition to the MOU.
From Tehran’s perspective, there are three plausible scenarios. The first is that the White House is aware of Israel’s plans and helped broker the Lebanese agreement in part to facilitate them. The second is that Washington is unaware of Netanyahu’s intentions but would nonetheless come to Israel’s defense—and perhaps even join the offensive—once Netanyahu resumes the war. The third is that the administration is caught by surprise, chooses not to restrain Israel, but also refrains from direct military involvement in the conflict.
Tehran does not believe Israel’s advantage in Lebanon will prove decisive. Iranian officials remain confident they can impose severe costs on Israel and deny it its broader strategic objectives. But a renewed war could still achieve Netanyahu’s most immediate aim: killing the MOU. Given his mounting political and legal pressures, Netanyahu may be desperate enough to be willing to challenge Trump directly to ensure precisely that outcome.
The question is, once again, not how Trump will react, but if Trump will prevent Netanyahu from deliberately shaping and limiting Trump’s options. This is the test Trump has repeatedly failed.
Al Mayadeen | July 1, 2026
A cargo vessel ran aground in the Strait of Hormuz on Wednesday while traveling a route not approved by Iran’s naval authorities, Iran’s IRIB reports.
The ship was identified as a foreign container ship, but the report didn’t provide any further details on the matter.
IRIB’s report seems to underscore Iran’s geographical control over the strategic waterway, through which a fifth of all oil and gas passes.
According to HormuzTracker, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted, showing little to no passage through the key waterway.
This confirms a total halt in detected commercial navigation activity, with no crude oil tankers, LNG carriers, bulk carriers, or container ships recorded moving through the Strait.
Transit through the Strait fell sharply following waves of US aggression against Iran and subsequent hostile rhetoric from Washington. Trackers showed that between June 24 and June 28, vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz fell from a high of 74 to 22.
Sputnik – 01.07.2026
Iranian Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has confirmed that oil exports are flowing again following the lifting of sanctions, with Tehran selling crude at prices 20% higher than before.
“Since the day we lifted the blockade, we have exported more than 40 million barrels of oil,” Ghalibaf said in a television interview, dismissing earlier skepticism about the impact of sanctions relief.
The lifting of sanctions was a key component of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding signed in June, which also included the release of frozen assets and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Ghalibaf also pushed back against claims by US President Donald Trump that the released funds could only be used to purchase American agricultural products.
“The Central Bank can purchase any goods it needs, at any price and in any currency worldwide,” Ghalibaf stated, asserting Iran’s full control over the use of its assets.
The Iranian parliament speaker said Tehran intends to “increase the prosperity of the Strait day by day,” with plans to boost maritime traffic and lower insurance fees for vessels transiting the waterway.
“We must show the world that security here is increasing day by day,” he added, suggesting that the strait’s reopening would be accompanied by a broader effort to restore confidence in the key global shipping route.
Overnight into June 18, Iran and the United States remotely signed a memorandum that provides for an end to the military conflict that began on February 28. The document also sets timelines for the US to lift its naval blockade of Iranian ports and for Iran to restore shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.