An Israeli drone strike on the city of Nabatieh wounded two civilians, the Emergency Operations Center of Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health announced.
The strike was carried out in two successive rounds, with the second targeting an ambulance team from the Islamic Health Authority, Islamic Message Scouts Association, and other medical personnel that had arrived at the scene to evacuate the wounded. The strike damaged an ambulance.
The Ministry renewed its condemnation of the continued Israeli targeting of ambulance crews, describing it as an unacceptable violation of international humanitarian law and all international norms.
Lebanese health authorities have reported multiple “double-tap” and “triple-tap” Israeli airstrikes targeting emergency medical and civil defense crews in southern Lebanon. The secondary and tertiary strikes reportedly hit rescuers as they arrived at the scene to evacuate and treat people wounded in earlier attacks.
Israeli strikes targeted Nabatieh, other areas in southern Lebanon
Earlier today, Al Mayadeen’s correspondent in southern Lebanon reported that Israeli occupation forces carried out a powerful mass demolition in the town of Majdal Zoun, southern Lebanon.
The IOF also dropped explosive materials on the al-Dabsha area in the Nabatieh district, causing raging fires.
Meanwhile, an Israeli drone reportedly dropped explosive and incendiary materials near the University District on the outskirts of Kfar Rumman.
The town of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah was also subjected to intermittent artillery fire, alongside machine-gun fire from invading Israeli units toward residential areas. At dawn, Israeli artillery shelled Wadi al-Hujeir and the Ali al-Taher Heights.
This comes amid continued Israeli attacks across southern Lebanon, including the demolition and destruction of homes, the leveling of cemeteries, the burning of wooded areas, as well as artillery shelling and drone strikes.
The Israeli aggression has persisted despite a framework agreement and direct negotiations between the Israeli occupation and Lebanese governments.
Iran believes it has fundamentally altered the balance of power with the United States and now has a narrow opportunity to convert its position into lasting strategic and economic gains, Johns Hopkins University Professor Vali Nasr argued in an interview on Switzerland with Tom Switzer.
Speaking alongside University of Chicago political scientist John Mearsheimer, Nasr said Washington has struggled to accept how dramatically its position has changed following the prolonged war on Iran, particularly as Tehran retains leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. The interview was conducted by host Tom Switzer, who introduced Nasr as a leading Iran expert and Mearsheimer as a political scientist.
“There’s a consensus that they have defeated the superpower, at least put it on its heels,” Nasr said of the view inside Iran, arguing that Tehran sees little reason to moderate its position while it holds the advantage.
Iran sees narrow window to press advantage
Nasr rejected arguments circulating in Washington that Tehran is “overplaying its hand,” saying such assessments reflected disbelief at the extent to which the balance had shifted.
“In reality, Iran is not overplaying its hands. It’s just playing its hand,” he said.
According to Nasr, Iranian policymakers believe they have a limited period in which to secure the maximum possible strategic advantage.
“They think they have a narrow window to get the maximum amount of strategic advantage from having turned the table on the US,” he said, adding that Iranian leaders would consider it a major mistake not to press their advantage while Washington remains on the defensive.
That calculation extends to sanctions relief, frozen Iranian assets, compensation, and Iran’s position in the Strait of Hormuz. Nasr described Tehran’s approach as accepting immediate economic hardship in exchange for potentially much greater long-term gains.
Mearsheimer: US has ‘no choice’
Mearsheimer offered an even sharper assessment, arguing that Washington no longer possesses an effective means of forcing Tehran to abandon its position over the Strait.
Asked why US President Donald Trump would accept an arrangement under which Iran exercises substantial control over passage through Hormuz, Mearsheimer replied, “It’s very simple, Tom. He has no choice. He lost the war. This is a devastating defeat for the United States.”
He added that Trump “has no cards here,” arguing that Washington’s principal threat — further military escalation — had become increasingly difficult to carry out.
According to Mearsheimer, the United States faces both depleted munitions stocks and resistance from Gulf allies fearful that another escalation would trigger Iranian attacks on oil infrastructure, desalination facilities, and other critical installations.
Weapons shortages expose limits of US campaign
Nasr similarly argued that Washington’s weapons shortages had sharply reduced its ability to continue the campaign.
“It’s clear that the US doesn’t have the munitions, either offensive munitions or defensive munitions to keep bombing Iran,” he said, arguing that another month of fighting ultimately left Iran stronger and Washington weaker.
Mearsheimer said US military leaders had warned Trump before the war about limited stocks and the dangers of a prolonged confrontation. He argued that a major factor behind the end of the 40-day air campaign was that Washington was “running out of munitions.”
Nasr said the implications reach beyond West Asia, arguing that China and Russia would draw conclusions from the United States’ difficulty rapidly replacing sophisticated weapons during a prolonged war.
He cited Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement in 2018, attacks launched while negotiations were underway, and what Tehran viewed as Washington’s failure to uphold subsequent understandings.
Trump has created “such distrust about himself with Iranians” that even accepting Tehran’s terms might no longer be enough without guarantees that Washington would implement an agreement, Nasr said.
That distrust, he argued, explains why Iran wants concessions delivered upfront rather than postponed to future negotiations.
The earlier June 17 memorandum had envisaged reopening the Strait, lifting oil sanctions, and establishing a ceasefire that also covered Lebanon, while wider sanctions, reparations, and frozen assets would be addressed later.
Nasr said Tehran concluded that Washington subsequently undermined that arrangement, including its provisions related to Lebanon, reinforcing the view that Iran should secure tangible benefits before relinquishing leverage.
Mearsheimer described the result as a “humiliating defeat” for Washington before adding, “I believe it’s an even bigger defeat for Israel.”
He argued that Israeli officials were reluctant to acknowledge “the extent to which Iran has defeated not just the United States, but Israel,” predicting that both “Israel” and its supporters in Washington would seek to undo any agreement favorable to Tehran in the future.
Nasr later argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had “overreached in Lebanon and Iran,” describing them as wars “Israel” could not win and saying “Israel” had been “strategically defeated”.
For Nasr, the larger consequence is a regional order increasingly different from the one Washington sought to impose. Iran, he argued, now sees an opportunity not simply to end the current confrontation, but to use the outcome to reduce the US military threat around its borders, ease its economic isolation and consolidate its position as a major regional power.
The Israeli Shin Bet has apparently forcibly disappeared Artyom Kirpichonok, a Russia-based historian with Israeli citizenship who has been critical of Zionism.
According to friends of Kirpichonok, “Kirpichonok arrived in Israel last week on a flight from Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, to attend an event to which he had been invited. After landing, however, he did not contact any of them and has not been heard from since. Reports indicate he arrived at Ben Gurion Airport from Yerevan on Aug. 2.”
Ynet noted that, he , “was born in St. Petersburg and immigrated to Israel in the 1990s. He graduated from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and returned to live in Russia about 15 years after moving to Israel. He later adopted a strongly critical stance toward Israel and frequently wrote against the country and Zionism.”
Apparently, Artyom Kirpichonok’s disappearance was due to an arbitrary arrest and detention by the Israeli Shin Bet.
The former Russian lawmaker Daria Mitina alleged that “Our worst fears have been confirmed… Artem Ivanovich Kirpichenok is in prison, in the hands of the Israeli secret police Shabak”.
One friend and colleague of Artyom Kirpichonok, Nika Dubrovsky, wrote in Counterpunchthat “What we know is that he was arrested by the Shin Bet, Israel’s secret police. There has been no contact with him since. There has been no official reason for his detention.”
According to Dubrovsky, “On August 2nd, Kirpichenko landed in Tel Aviv. A lawyer hired by his friends has since confirmed that he is being held by the Shin Bet — Israel’s internal security service” adding , “it’s so obvious he posed no danger to the authorities whatsoever: he wasn’t a member of any party, he never took any practical action on anything — partly because he was an extremely impractical person.
His only crime was his opinion on various political questions. A thoughtcrime, in other words: ‘the essential crime that contained all others in itself,’ as Orwell wrote.”
She added that many had attacked his blog posts critical of Israel, including “Ukrainian and Russian expats, former Soviet citizens living in Israel, who apparently couldn’t leave his blog alone”.
The researcher Volodymyr Ishchenko raised the possibility that Artyom Kirpichonok was even lured to Tel Aviv by the Shin Bet under the guise of a “fake invitation to an event”.
What is clear is that the Israeli Shin Bet disappeared a historian with Israeli citizenship simply because he was critical of Zionism.
For the first time in years, Washington is discussing Turkey’s return to the F-35 program as a serious possibility.
At the NATO summit in Ankara last month, President Donald Trump said he would lift the CAATSA sanctions that the U.S. imposed on Turkey after Ankara purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems in 2019. Trump added that he was “certainly” considering restoring Turkey’s access to the F-35 program, which was also suspended at the time..
Notably, a separate sale of American engines for Turkey’s domestic KAAN fighter jet has advanced through congressional review. Ankara is also reportedly exploring the transfer of its S-400 batteries to a Gulf state, a step Washington has demanded for years.
But the Russian system is no longer the only source of resistance. Israel argues that Turkish F-35s would, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s words, “destroy the power balance” in the region. The phrase invokes Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” a provision in U.S. law according to which Washington cannot sell weapons to Middle Eastern states if those arms would give them capabilities on par with Israel’s own weaponry.
Yet these rules have never been formally applied to Turkey, which is, after all, a U.S. treaty ally. What is being tested is thus not only an arms sale, but whether Israel’s claim to regional primacy can restrict American policy toward a NATO ally.
How Turkey was pushed out
Turkey’s search for a long-range air defence system predates the crisis by a decade. In 2009, the Obama administration approved a sale of Patriot missile defense munitions to Turkey, but the deal broke down over questions of price, technology transfer and local production. Ankara turned to a Chinese system in 2013, cancelled it in 2015, and signed with Moscow in 2017. A late American offer in 2018 came too late to reverse the Russian deal, and the first S-400 components arrived in July 2019.
But the S-400 decision was never simply the product of a failed arms negotiation. When Turkey downed a Russian jet in November 2015, it became the first NATO member to do so since the 1950s. As pressure from Moscow mounted, Ankara had to face it largely alone. The withdrawal of American and German Patriot batteries that same winter, even though armed groups in Syria still posed a threat, hardened Turkey’s sense of exposure.
The July 2016 coup attempt turned mistrust into a political rupture, particularly given that Fethullah Gülen, who Turkish authorities accused of orchestrating the coup, was living in the United States at the time.
Russia exploited the opening, filling Turkey’s defense gap while widening the rift with its NATO allies. Turkish officials justified the purchase as an urgent requirement.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave it a second meaning. The real issue, he said, was not to the S-400 but to Turkey acting on its own will. Elsewhere he refused to retreat, saying Turkey was “not a slave.” Repeated at rallies, Erdogan’s rallying cry about the missile defense system turned it into an emblem of strategic autonomy, making the purchase as hard to reverse politically as militarily.
This has now become a political liability for Erdogan. In Turkey today, commentators and the main opposition describe the purchase as an act of stubbornness — one that left the S-400 rusting in a hangar and wasted the $1.5 billion Turkey had already paid for the F-35 program.
Turkey remains the only participant expelled after paying in, and the six aircraft it financed were never delivered. Its air force depends on an aging F-16 fleet, with Eurofighter Typhoons serving as a stopgap. The domestic KAAN fighter is the long-term answer, but its first batch is set to fly using American F110 engines under a $700 million sale that drew organized opposition in Congress before clearing review in July.
How Israel built a case against Turkey’s return
Within 72 hours of the Ankara summit, Netanyahu took his objections to three American networks, arguing that Erdoğan was “not a friend” and could not be trusted.
The centerpiece of Israel’s case against Turkey was a remark by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Asked on CNN Türk whether Turkey was among Israel’s targets, the foreign minister said Israel had become a problem for the world and that, with these policies and this mindset, “these men have become a burden that humanity can no longer bear.” The reference to “these policies” and “this mindset” pointed to the Netanyahu government, and the same judgment about Israel’s isolation has surfaced in European capitals and at senior levels of the U.S. administration, from Trump to Vice President JD Vance.
But Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recast the remark as dehumanizing Jews and calling for Israel’s erasure, and this framing became the dominant account in Israeli commentary. Netanyahu carried it further on Fox, telling American viewers that Fidan had said the Jewish state must basically be wiped out.
The framing slotted Turkey into an existing category, the state that denies Israel’s right to exist. But that is the language of Iranian state rhetoric, repeated by senior officials and inscribed on missiles. Turkey has never pursued such a policy; in fact, it supports a two-state solution and has recognized Israel diplomatically since 1949. Yet Israeli leaders, eager to drive a wedge into Ankara’s relationship with Washington, appear determined to cast Turkey as the next Iran.
Balance for whom?
The most revealing element of Netanyahu’s argument was his definition of the regional balance. By telling Washington that Turkish F-35s would “destroy the power balance,” he equated regional stability with continued Israeli superiority. Israel operates 48 F-35s and is contracted for 100, while Ankara’s immediate effort centers on the six aircraft it already paid for. Turkey’s return to the program would not erase Israel’s advantage; rather, it would modestly narrow an asymmetric order built around Israeli air power and freedom of action.
Israel’s concerns about Turkey are difficult to reconcile with Tel Aviv’s own increasingly preventive and attack-oriented doctrine. While Israeli officials like Netanyahu frame Turkish F-35s as evidence of “aggressive aspirations,” Israeli aircraft have struck targets in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, Qatar, and Gaza. In Ankara, this is seen as hypocrisy; Netanyahu’s “balance” is, in this reading, less about mutual restraint and more about preserving Israel’s air superiority and freedom to strike.
Nor are the objections unique to Turkey. Since 2008, American law has required arms sales to Middle Eastern states be certified as preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge, a standard Israel has invoked against countries including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Nor is this only the position of Netanyahu. Naftali Bennett, his top rival in the coming election, told CNN that Israel cannot allow its Turkish “enemies” such advanced weaponry.
But applying the qualitative military edge doctrine to Turkey does not make sense for U.S. interests. Ankara is not a Middle Eastern buyer seeking parity with Israel but a NATO member whose air force anchors the alliance’s southeastern defense, and its deterrent capacity is a European security question as much as a Middle Eastern one. Extending an Israeli veto over what Washington sells its own allies would put that doctrine in direct tension with NATO’s requirements.
Israel’s concern extends beyond the military effect of a stronger Turkish air force. Despite his best efforts, Netanyahu is unlikely to easily reverse Trump’s broader opening to Ankara. By appointing his longtime associate Tom Barrack as ambassador there, Trump opened a new phase in Turkish-American relations. As Trump said when asked about Netanyahu’s opposition to giving F-35s to Turkey, “nobody tells me what we should be selling or not.”
Unless Ankara takes a step that directly threatens Israel’s security — an unlikely scenario — Trump has little incentive to abandon a relationship he finds useful. That relationship, more than the aircraft, is what Israel is working to prevent.
Fatih Kocaibis is a Turkey-based journalist and political analyst covering U.S. foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and European security, and their implications for Turkish foreign policy.
Malaysian authorities have intercepted a shipping container at the Port of Tanjung Pelepas in Johor over suspicions that its cargo was intended for export to “Israel” in breach of the country’s trade restrictions, local media reported.
The Malaysian Border Control and Protection Agency (AKPS) carried out the operation on Friday after receiving intelligence concerning the shipment, prompting officers to inspect the container.
According to a statement cited by Berita Harian, initial findings suggested that the shipment may have violated Malaysia’s customs regulations governing exports to “Israel”.
“Based on preliminary checks, the shipment is suspected of not complying with Item No 15, Second Schedule, Customs (Prohibition on Export) Order 2023, which provides for the prohibition of direct or indirect export of goods to ‘Israel’,” AKPS stated.
Authorities are now seeking to determine the exact nature and specifications of the cargo, its intended purpose, and how it should be legally classified.
The investigation will also examine whether the shipment contains strategic goods falling under Malaysia’s Strategic Trade Act, which regulates exports of sensitive and dual-use items.
“Any attempt to export goods directly or indirectly to ‘Israel’ that is against the law and government regulations will be dealt with strictly,” the agency added.
Anwar praises enforcement action
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim welcomed the seizure, saying it reflected Kuala Lumpur’s determination to prevent Malaysian territory and infrastructure from facilitating trade that could benefit “Israel”.
“Congratulations to AKPS for the swift action in seizing a container suspected of carrying strategic trade cargo intended for export to ‘Israel’ at the Port of Tanjung Pelepas,” Anwar wrote on X. “This action demonstrates Malaysia’s firm stance to ensure that our country will never serve as a conduit for trade that could support or contribute to the Israeli regime’s atrocities against the Palestinian people.”
The prime minister said the move was consistent with measures Malaysia introduced in December 2023, as well as with its commitments as a member of The Hague Group.
Malaysia’s earlier measures included barring vessels owned by the Israeli shipping company Zim from docking at its ports, prohibiting Israeli-flagged ships from entering Malaysian waters, and preventing vessels headed for “Israel” from loading cargo at Malaysian ports.
The latest case indicates that enforcement is extending beyond restrictions targeting particular ships or maritime operators to include individual shipments suspected of reaching “Israel” through direct or indirect trade routes.
The Hague Group welcomes seizure
The Hague Group, a coalition of states seeking to prevent transfers of weapons, ammunition, military fuel, military equipment, and dual-use goods to “Israel”, also welcomed the Malaysian authorities’ action.
The group said the interception represented practical implementation of states’ international legal obligations, pointing to the International Court of Justice’s July 2024 Advisory Opinion and UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/24.
Those measures, according to the group, require states not to provide aid or assistance that contributes to maintaining the unlawful situation arising from the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory.
“The defence of humanity is won at ports, courts, and factories, not from the podium. Law that goes unenforced is no law at all,” said Varsha Gandikota-Nellutla, Executive Secretary of The Hague Group. “By halting this cargo, Malaysia has upheld the obligations that bind every UN member state under international law. We invite all states to join The Hague Group and do the same.”
The contents of the seized container and its ultimate destination have not yet been formally established, with Malaysian authorities saying the investigation remains ongoing.
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu says Israel has rejected US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace 15-point plan and will not withdraw forces from the territory until the Palestinian resistance group Hamas fully disarms.
“Israel rejects the 15-point document,” Netanyahu said at a cabinet meeting on Sunday, referring to a US-backed Gaza peace plan.
The Israeli army “will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is genuinely disarmed and will continue to thwart threats against our forces”, he added.
“And when I say disarm Hamas, that means heavy weapons, less-heavy weapons, all weapons. And we are talking about real disarmament, not a fictitious disarmament,” Netanyahu said.
This comes days after the US-backed board made Israeli withdrawal from the blockaded Palestinian territory conditional on Hamas’s complete disarmament, in a move that runs counter to the terms of last year’s agreement, even as Israel has yet to fulfill its own withdrawal commitments.
In a statement last week, the board said Israeli forces would not withdraw beyond the so-called “Yellow Line” until the Palestinian resistance movement had fully completed the decommissioning of its weapons.
Meanwhile, Hamas on Sunday reaffirmed its commitment to a roadmap agreed upon with mediators and the Board of Peace to complete the second phase of the plan for Gaza.
In a statement, the Palestinian movement said it remains serious about “responsibly engaging” in the implementation of the 15-point plan and establishing a clear timetable for its execution.
“The priority at this stage must be to ensure the implementation of all phases and obligations of the agreement,” Hamas said.
The group added that the process should lead to a complete ceasefire, an end to Israeli attacks, the completion of Israel’s withdrawal, the reopening of crossings, the entry of humanitarian aid and shelter supplies, the start of reconstruction, and the enabling of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza to begin its duties.
Hamas called on the mediators, guarantors and the Board of Peace to “shoulder their responsibilities,” ensure that all parties comply with the agreement, and prevent violations that could obstruct its implementation or undermine the ceasefire.
Under last year’s agreement, the “Yellow Line” was designated as the initial withdrawal boundary for Israeli occupying forces, with further pullbacks to take place alongside the gradual decommissioning of resistance weapons.
Israeli forces, however, did not carry out the planned withdrawals. Instead, they continued their military aggression, moved beyond the “Yellow Line” and established permanent military positions after Washington launched the initiative in October 2025.
Meanwhile, the Hamas resistance movement has announced that it would dissolve the emergency committee administering Gaza but declined to disarm its military wing.
Palestinian resistance groups have made clear that surrender is not an option in the face of the US-led effort to reshape Gaza’s future.
Reconstruction has barely begun across most of Gaza, with only a fraction of the estimated $17 billion in pledged funds actually secured. Wealthy donors have largely refused to finance projects in areas still under Israeli control, viewing such efforts as legitimizing the occupation.
Israel has continued to carry out near-daily deadly attacks across the besieged Palestinian strip since agreeing to a ceasefire with Hamas last October.
The Israeli genocide has already killed more than 73,375 Palestinians, wounded over 171,000, and destroyed around 90 percent of Gaza’s infrastructure, according to Gaza authorities.
Since the so-called ceasefire deal was signed, at least 1,250 Palestinians have been killed and another 4,110 injured in Israeli attacks, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry.
Israeli broadcaster Channel 12 reported on July 4 that Israel could resume a full-scale military offensive in Gaza within two months.
Underlying regional calculations behind the new military alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have been shaped by fear of Israel, not Iran, says an analyst.
Speaking to the Press TV website, Anusar Farooqui, a US-based writer and commentator who is also the founder and CEO of Systematic Portfolios LLC, said the newly signed “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” is aimed at the Israeli regime.
“The alliance politics of the Sunni Arab powers is driven by fear of Israel, not Iran,” he said.
“The Saudis and especially the Turks are very fearful of Israeli plans,” he added, noting that Israeli discussions about confronting Turkey, including talk of a possible surprise attack intended to cripple the Turkish air force, had contributed to Ankara’s concerns.
The agreement was signed on Friday in Mecca by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
The three countries said an armed attack against any one of them would be regarded as an attack against all, while describing the pact as a means of strengthening collective deterrence and regional stability.
The agreement did not specify the practical obligations of its members. A Turkish official said it was not directed against any particular actor, remained open to other regional countries and did not replace existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
Farooqui said the absence of Egypt from the initial agreement was particularly significant.
“The important thing about the announcement is the conspicuous absence of Egypt,” he told the Press TV website, adding that the possibility of a Turkish-Egyptian military pact was central to understanding the regional balance.
“The Egyptian question is paramount: why has it taken a pass,” the analyst asked.
He added that such a pact would represent a much stronger counterweight to Israel and said the United States understood the implications.
“So it seems to have intervened to prevent the nightmare from happening,” he said.
Egypt’s position, however, has not been presented as permanently outside the arrangement. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Saturday Egypt could eventually join the pact after several technical issues were resolved.
He described Egypt as Ankara’s “natural partner” and said other countries had also expressed interest in joining, although the founding members were still discussing how expansion should be handled.
The new military alliance comes amid US-Israeli destabilizing actions in the region. Since October 2023, Israel has waged a genocidal war on Gaza, invaded southern Lebanon and occupied territory in Syria, while also launching two wars of aggression with the United States against Iran that triggered massive retaliatory strikes against US and Israeli assets in the region.
Meanwhile, the regime’s bellicose agenda has raised concerns about the so-called “Greater Israel” scheme that regards Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories as well as parts of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon as part of the Zionist entity.
Israeli regime prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in October 2025 that he feels a deep connection to “this vision”, describing it as “a historical and spiritual mission.”
On the other hand, some analysts have linked the growing Turkish-Israeli rivalry to a broader contest over regional influence. Turkey and Israel have maintained diplomatic relations since 1949 and their strategic and commercial ties have survived tense rhetoric.
Yet tensions seem to have intensified recently over Gaza, Syria, energy routes, maritime issues and Ankara’s expanding regional role.
Pakistan’s position has added another dimension to the emerging security alignment.
Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said on Saturday, following the signing of the agreement, that Israel was “a threat to the entire Muslim world” and called for “a united military front” against it, while noting that the regime poses a direct threat to countries across the region.
The broader security environment has also been affected by changes in the US military posture. Washington has reportedly withdrawn warplanes and other military equipment from countries including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates following Iranian retaliatory strikes.
Asked whether the new alliance could eventually contribute to a region without US military presence and with Israel more contained, Farooqui said the current arrangement is insufficient.
“Not without Egypt,” he told the Press TV website. “The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistan pact is mostly for show. By itself, it is not an effective balancing coalition against Israel.”
Throughout history, almost every national liberation struggle has been labelled “terrorism” by the powers exercising colonial rule or foreign occupation. This strategy is nothing new.
The British Empire branded IRA fighters in Ireland and EOKA guerrillas in Cyprus as terrorists. France portrayed Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN) as a criminal organisation. The same happened to the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, and even Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC).
History, however, vindicated these movements and condemned the colonial regimes that sought to perpetuate their domination.
This pattern reveals a constant: those who occupy a territory seek to strip the occupied people of any legitimacy to resist.
The dehumanisation of resistance is a colonial strategy. By labelling every resistance fighter a “terrorist”, attention is shifted away from illegal occupation, apartheid and the denial of self-determination, and redirected towards the reaction of the occupied people.
This narrative, however, encounters clear limits within international law itself.
From the United Nations Charter to Resolution 1514 (XV) on decolonisation and Resolution 2625 (XXV), which reaffirms the principle of peoples’ self-determination, the understanding has been consolidated that peoples subjected to colonial domination, foreign occupation or racist regimes have the right to struggle for their liberation.
Several subsequent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly recognised the legitimacy of national liberation movements and acknowledged that such resistance may take the form of armed struggle, provided that it remains subject to the rules of international humanitarian law.
This is precisely why the international community has never automatically equated national liberation movements with terrorist organisations.
International humanitarian law regulates the manner in which armed conflicts must be conducted and imposes obligations on all belligerents, including resistance movements.
However, it does not eliminate the political and legal right of a people to resist occupation. Confusing these two dimensions serves only the interests of occupying powers, because it transforms a conflict of a political and legal nature into a mere policing matter.
The history of the so-called “State of Israel” itself exposes this contradiction.
Before 1948, Irgun and Lehi were regarded as terrorist organisations by the British government because of attacks such as the bombing of the King David Hotel and the assassination of UN mediator Folke Bernadotte.
Years later, their leaders reached the highest levels of government, and Menachem Begin received the Nobel Peace Prize. This demonstrates that the label “terrorist” often reflects political circumstances more than any permanent legal definition.
In the contemporary context, this debate remains highly relevant. Palestine continues to be recognised by the United Nations as a territory under occupation, while Western Sahara remains on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, awaiting the fulfilment of its people’s right to self-determination.
In this context, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which emerged during the First Intifada, and the Polisario Front, recognised by the United Nations as the representative of the Sahrawi people in the Western Sahara peace process, belong to the historical tradition of national liberation movements.
As with South Africa’s ANC, Algeria’s FLN, Namibia’s SWAPO, Mozambique’s FRELIMO and many other movements, both base their struggle on their peoples’ claim to the right of self-determination in the face of occupation or foreign domination.
This does not mean that every military action carried out by resistance organisations is automatically legitimate under international law.
The rules of international humanitarian law apply to all parties to a conflict and prohibit deliberate attacks against civilians, regardless of the cause being defended.
However, possible violations of these rules do not, in themselves, invalidate the legal legitimacy of the struggle for self-determination, nor do they automatically transform a national liberation movement into a terrorist organisation under international law. These are distinct questions, frequently conflated for political convenience.
There is no colonialism without resistance. There never has been.
The French Resistance against Nazi occupation, Vietnamese guerrillas, Algerian fighters, South Africans who confronted apartheid, African liberation movements, the Polisario Front and the Palestinian resistance all demonstrate that no people will indefinitely accept the loss of their land, sovereignty and dignity.
The real question, therefore, is not why resistance exists.
The question the world should be asking is why military occupations, colonial processes and regimes that deny entire peoples the right to determine their own destiny continue to exist.
As long as there is colonisation, apartheid, illegal annexation and denial of self-determination, there will be armed resistance movements.
And international law, despite political pressure and attempts to criminalise liberation movements, continues to uphold the fundamental principle that the freedom of peoples is not an act of terrorism, but a fundamental right of humanity.
US Senators Jeanne Shaheen and James Lankford introduced legislation late on Thursday authorizing $1.2 billion in security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces over five years, with the funding structured around a condition that the Lebanese state actively disarms Hezbollah and enforces a state monopoly on weapons.
The bill sets an annual allocation of $240 million, including $200 million through Foreign Military Financing. Up to half of that amount would be withheld until the US Secretary of State certifies that Lebanon has met the disarmament and weapons monopoly conditions, though LAF special operations units and associated enabling forces are exempted from the freeze.
The legislation also authorizes sanctions, including asset blocks, financial restrictions and visa bans, against foreign persons who support Iran’s financing of Hezbollah or who obstruct the Lebanese state’s disarmament efforts.
A separate reconstruction fund under the bill, administered by the State Department, would rebuild government services, municipal institutions and civilian infrastructure. It explicitly bars funds from reaching the Council for South Lebanon, the state body with the most experience in building and rebuilding infrastructure in the South.
Sovereignty conditioned on US certification
Shaheen, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement that Lebanon has “a real chance to reclaim its sovereignty, disarm Hezbollah and break free from Iran’s malign influence” with US support. Lankford said a “sovereign Lebanon protects Lebanese, Israeli, and American citizens living in the region.”
Despite its alleged aim of restoring Lebanese sovereignty, the bill gives the US Secretary of State, rather than the Lebanese government or LAF command, the authority to assess the Lebanese Armed Forces’ performance. It also leaves the definition of who qualifies as “obstructing” disarmament, and therefore subject to sanctions, to the same US determination.
Both sponsors have received financial support from pro-“Israel” PACs over their careers. OpenSecrets records $574,295 in career contributions to Shaheen and $365,560 to Lankford from PACs and individuals in its broad pro-“Israel” donor category, which spans AIPAC alongside J Street, NORPAC, Pro-Israel America and other groups; a separate tracker counts $284,002 in pro-“Israel” PAC contributions to Shaheen since 2016, more than three-quarters of it from J Street PAC.
Not a marginal movement
The bill, like the broader US disarmament push it builds on, treats Hezbollah as a foreign-directed militia to be dismantled rather than as an outgrowth of Lebanon’s own political and social fabric.
Hezbollah holds seats in parliament and remains one of Lebanon’s largest political and social organizations, with a base that extends well beyond an armed wing.
Its financial institution, Al-Qard Al-Hassan, continued paying out depositors through Lebanon’s 2019 banking collapse, when commercial banks froze accounts and locked account holders out of their own savings. The group also runs hospitals, clinics and schools concentrated in the South and Bekaa, areas that have received limited investment from the Lebanese state for decades.
Hezbollah is a symptom of both an expansionist settler-colonial project on Lebanon’s southern border and a Lebanese state that has never built a national defense strategy capable of securing the South on its own. It emerged directly from “Israel’s” 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the nearly two-decade occupation of the South that followed, and the group has framed its arsenal since as a deterrent against a state that has invaded Lebanon repeatedly and continues to occupy Lebanese territory and attack areas of the South under the current ceasefire.
A fraction of what ‘Israel’ receives
US funding to the LAF has fluctuated between roughly $200 million and $285 million annually in recent years, following a $230 million package approved in late 2025.
The pending FY2027 defense authorization draft in the Senate would cut that to $36 million, tied to a stricter recertification process every 90 days. A separate House bill, the PAGER Act, would cut off all LAF funding entirely pending eight conditions, including the delegitimization of Hezbollah, Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc and Amal as political parties; it remains stalled without a floor vote.
By comparison, the Israeli regime receives $3.8 billion annually in US military financing under its current ten-year agreement, plus $21.7 billion in supplemental funding since October 2023, with none of the equipment restrictions applied to Lebanon.
Egypt and Jordan each receive over $1 billion a year under multi-year agreements that provide budget predictability the LAF has never had.
The gap traces to the Qualitative Military Edge doctrine, codified into US law in 2008, which requires that any US arms sale to a regional state other than “Israel” include a formal determination that the sale will not erode “Israel’s” military superiority over its neighbors.
In practice, the LAF has never received air defense systems, advanced anti-tank weapons, or offensive strike platforms, regardless of the threat Lebanon faces on its southern border. The new bill does not alter that restriction.
No state or security body offers a single, systematic account of how Israeli agents are used, why they are recruited, or what services they ultimately provide. Outside experienced state institutions, universities and research centers rarely undertake such scrutiny. Israeli academia is the notable exception.
Israeli universities form part of the wider intelligence ecosystem through research, graduates, and seminars conducted with the security services and military. They produce personnel, assess institutional performance – as they have done since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood – and examine intelligence work in detail.
The Second Annual Israeli Conference on Intelligence Studies, held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on 28–29 October 2025 under the title “Intelligence Transformations After Failure,” is one open example. No comparable body of work has emerged from Arab and Islamic institutions.
Accounts from current and former security practitioners, alongside cases involving agents both living and dead, reveal an intelligence pyramid: a layered system of recruitment, cultivation, and deployment built around the value of the intelligence sought and the risks demanded of each spy.
Level one: Building the picture
At the base of the pyramid is information gathering, a task common to almost every category of recruited agent, though the value and type of information vary widely. Israeli services generally separate the agent or cell collecting intelligence from the cell carrying out an operation. The roles sometimes overlap, but collection remains the gateway to action.
An agent may gather information during a probationary phase, without knowing what it will be used for or whether others are working alongside him, simultaneously or in sequence, inside or outside the same organization.
Then come the “mosaic collectors,” who move beyond isolated fragments. They, too, may not see the complete picture, but their assignments are more complex. Instead of passing a single detail or photograph, they may track a person’s movements and relationships in depth, or map an entire process, such as an organization’s purchase of motorcycles or communications equipment.
One recent Lebanese case involved a detainee later released by the judiciary despite the sensitivity of his alleged mission. According to security sources familiar with the file, he was instructed to mount specialized equipment on a vehicle and drive through selected areas, harvesting data from internet routers in homes and institutions and attempting to penetrate them.
A second, recurring example comes from Palestine: the penetration of external training chains. Trainees sent to courses in Lebanon, Syria before the government’s fall, and Iran before the war on Gaza were exposed.
At times, the training bodies themselves were compromised and discovered concealed cameras in equipment covers. The breach then operated at three levels – inside the organization, along the training chain, and within the host institution.
Higher up are agents with access to sensitive files or influence inside a faction’s military or security apparatus. Their task may be to construct a picture of a company, battalion, brigade, division, or specialist unit. No single member normally sees an entire arena or organization; that degree of access is usually confined to a political bureau, military, or jihadi council.
One battalion in northern Gaza was penetrated before the current war, specifically in 2021. The agent held considerable authority and ranked roughly third in its command structure, yet still lacked a complete map of the battalion’s tunnels.
Israeli handlers therefore supplied him with military boots resembling those worn by resistance fighters. A tracking device was hidden inside, and he was told only to walk through the tunnels, allowing Israel to chart the network.
After the breach was discovered – having paralyzed operations in that area during the Sword of Jerusalem battle – the agent fled to Europe. A counterintelligence operation later lured him back to Gaza by making him believe suspicion had passed.
He was arrested, and the source of the breach was exposed. Security sources inform The Cradle that the discovery spared the battalion from destruction in the latest war and helped turn the border area into a persistent problem for Israeli forces until the final stages.
The battalion commander responded through trial and error, creating separate tunnel routes and branches and preventing any one fighter from moving through all of them or taking part in the entire excavation process.
Yet the same agent escaped prison shortly before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. That extraordinary story lies beyond the scope of this investigation, though one detail is telling: another agent facilitated his escape.
At the top of this first level stands the source of “golden information” – intelligence decisive to a major operation, particularly an assassination. It may reveal a figure who has never been photographed, identify a safe house, or confirm a target’s presence during the final moments before a strike.
Some such agents have been killed by mistake; others, sources say, were deliberately abandoned when Israel judged that they had nothing more to offer or could not be extracted.
Technology has made field agents harder to detect and reduced the need for some older practices. At the beginning of the Second Intifada, for example, agents could be ordered to mark a building with a laser before an airstrike.
Such tasks are less necessary today because Israel already possesses extensive maps of public bodies – municipalities, governorates, and ministries – as well as many overt and covert resistance sites.
Israeli military publications openly use the Hebrew term yediat zahav – “golden information” – for decisive, current intelligence extracted from a mass of raw data. In resistance environments, invoking such intelligence can also fuel suspicion that a senior agent exists, even when the information was obtained through technical surveillance.
Where the source is human, investigations repeatedly show that an Israeli service may spend years and large sums cultivating one person for a single disclosure. The assassination of Yahya Ayyash is a prominent example.
The collaborator who enabled the operation was bound to be exposed because he supplied both the identifying information and the instrument of assassination – a booby-trapped mobile phone. With no plausible alternative suspect, an escape or extraction plan had to be prepared in advance.
Level two: Agents in the field
Information gathering already demands work on the ground – photography, surveillance, communications, and impersonation among them. Direct field missions require a different class of agent. Security sources estimate that nearly all must meet their handlers inside Israel or abroad and receive either task-specific instruction or broader operational training.
At the bottom are what security practitioners describe as “cheap missions”: assignments carrying minimal risk, with exposure more likely to result from chance or a basic mistake than from the work itself. These include leaving communications devices, messages, or cash at “dead drops.” Such tasks usually require little training and are assigned gradually.
A dead drop is selected after studying a country’s geography and population patterns. One agent leaves the material; another retrieves it without knowing the first and sometimes for an entirely different operation. Many recruits with reasonable collection skills can perform these tasks. They remain below the risk threshold reserved for more experienced and intensively trained agents.
The next rung involves logistics. This involves obtaining communications equipment, buying or renting homes and vehicles, or securing other tools later used by operational cells.
From there, the work can become far more dangerous. Agents may tamper with resistance weapons or insert tracking chips into them, including RPG and Kornet anti-armor rounds and even missiles or their explosive warheads. Others plant surveillance devices. At this point, the agent generally understands exactly what the mission entails.
In one prominent example, a single agent working in a manufacturing workshop belonging to an Islamic organization in Gaza was responsible for the deaths of at least 30 operatives between 2008 and 2012 by planting tracking devices in the rockets they launched, as well as weakening the explosive material in the warheads.
Having joined from another organization, he cultivated an image of exceptional devotion to deflect suspicion, even carrying wounded comrades on his shoulders while performing tawaf around the Kaaba.
Although eventually exposed, he escaped Gaza and, according to the same sources, still holds an official post in a Muslim-majority country.
At the summit are the hardest assignments: planting explosives or carrying out assassinations directly. Israel embraced this route only more extensively during the past decade. For years, a basic assumption among Palestinian and Lebanese investigators held that Israel killed only by Israeli hands. That premise often led inquiries to discount a local perpetrator from the outset.
The 2010 assassination of Hamas commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai reinforced that belief. The large team seen on Emirati surveillance footage used foreign passports; many were believed to be Jewish. But subsequent cases in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran indicate that Israel has sought to reduce the risks borne by Jewish operatives, Arabic-speaking Israeli agents, and Druze or Bedouin recruits by transferring more of the execution phase to local assets.
The March 2017 assassination of freed prisoner Mazen Fuqaha in Gaza exposed the limits of the old assumption. Fuqaha, a commander in the Qassam Brigades, was responsible for supporting military activity in the occupied West Bank. Investigators faced a missing link. Even after a Palestinian agent confessed, some remained convinced that an Israeli special unit must have entered Gaza to carry out the shooting.
Nearly nine years later, on 5 February 2026, Netanyahu publicly acknowledged Israel’s responsibility for Fuqaha’s assassination. He confirmed that the killing was carried out through recruitment of a Palestinian collaborator, Ashraf Abu Leila, who shot Fuqaha outside his home in the Tel al-Hawa neighborhood in Gaza City.
The disclosure was unlikely to have been casual. Its timing came as Palestinian resistance movements were conducting sweeping reviews of their security and military performance after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
The following day, Al Jazeera broadcast an investigation into armed groups in Gaza accused of serving Israel.
The program included material on local militia members used to track targets and carry out armed tasks. One case involved two men assigned to kill a wanted figure with a suppressed weapon. One was captured despite having received little training and not being a long-serving recruit – another departure from the model that prevailed before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
During Israel’s June 2025 war on Iran, Israeli messaging sought to portray every ground operation as the work of Mossad officers. Field investigations and sources following the cases point to a different picture. Iranian Jews living abroad, migrants, and their descendants accounted for only a small share of those allegedly involved.
Many of the operatives proved to be residents of Iran, meaning Mossad personnel had not acted alone as Israeli accounts implied. Some people who helped smuggle equipment into the country reportedly did not know it would be used in military or intelligence operations, believing they were moving civilian goods for profit.
Level three: Re-engineering the enemy
At the highest level, the selection, conduct, and mission of an agent change fundamentally. Israel studies a target organization strategically, seeking to dismantle it or redirect its course. The work demands highly placed, carefully cultivated recruits. An assignment may involve reading a leader’s behavior or tracing ideological currents across an entire movement.
One agent admitted during interrogation that his task had been limited to observing a leader’s social life and political language. He was required to remain close to a figure in an Islamic organization in Gaza who was assassinated in 2003, mapping his community relationships, recording what he said away from the media, and assessing whether he belonged to the movement’s “hawk” or “dove” camp. The findings helped determine Israel’s targeting priorities.
Past Israeli statements and signals support the view that assassinations, particularly of political figures, are not always ordered for immediate military reasons. A killing can create a vacancy in a movement’s hierarchy.
Israeli planners then anticipate who will fill it and whether that successor better suits their objectives. In effect, an organization’s political trajectory can be re-engineered while its members believe they are responding to internal circumstances.
The practice is old. It dates at least to the rivalry between Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This was a time when Israeli services sought to exploit disputes within and between Palestinian factions and used agents to deepen them.
During periods of intense military escalation, anyone who appears on the radar may be killed as Israel pursues the largest possible number of assassinations. The campaign unleashed after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood marked the largest exception of all.
The US has played a comparable game, sometimes without recruiting a conventional agent. Former CIA officer John Kiriakou described one such method in a podcast released on 29 January 2026, explaining how the agency helped fragment the Abu Nidal Organization.
Unable to penetrate the group directly, the CIA instead planted suspicion. Through direct and indirect contacts, it suggested that a senior member had been recruited. One cadre then killed another on suspicion of betrayal, setting off further internal bloodletting.
The organization was thus driven to destroy itself without the recruitment of a single agent. Its founder, Sabri Khalil al-Banna, better known as Abu Nidal, died in Baghdad in 2002. The author’s security sources maintain that Saddam Hussein had him killed after years of using his organization in external and internal operations, though the circumstances remain disputed and other accounts describe suicide.
A different strategic path requires elevating an agent into the leadership. That person needs achievements to build credibility, even if Israel must allow an operation to appear successful – or announce casualties in its own ranks – to manufacture the necessary record.
A source in Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades reveals to The Cradle that an operative identified as A.N. rose rapidly after an Israeli jeep was apparently destroyed by an explosive along the boundary and Israel announced one death and several injuries. A later transaction involving night-vision equipment exposed him, and he fled into the territories occupied in 1948.
The subsequent investigation found that the jeep had been remotely driven to the site of a bomb reported in advance. The explosion created a filmed “achievement,” giving the agent credibility, quicker access, and a degree of trust that was difficult to challenge.
Once an agent reaches the intended leadership tier, he may be ordered to identify additional cadres for recruitment. Another recurring task is to cultivate financial and moral corruption. The aim is to convince members that their sacrifices are being exploited for private gain. Such tactics work precisely because corruption already exists, to varying degrees, within the structures of several organizations.
One of the starkest cases uncovered by the Palestinian resistance involved a historic leader identified as M.N. He was reportedly not asked to transmit operational intelligence. Instead, his assignment was to magnify organizational failures and obstruct successful work.
Other agents were instructed to arrange commercial deals and partnerships that implicated people who were not directly recruited, widening the perception – and sometimes the reality – of corruption and exploitation.
The effort to create a negative example belongs to the same strategy. Israeli handlers may target the children of leaders whom they have failed to recruit or assassinate. Security pressures and the prolonged absence of a father who once acted as protector and disciplinarian can make those children more vulnerable. Families of martyrs face the same danger.
Palestinian and Lebanese files contain many such examples. The most politically embarrassing involve the sons of a well-known West Bank leader in an Islamic movement, one of whom publicly converted to Judaism and repeatedly entered Israel.
Whether he settled there permanently remains unclear. Such cases are rare, but Israel amplifies them to discredit the movements concerned, dishonor prominent families, and weaken their standing within Palestinian society.
The most dangerous outcome combines two tracks: assassinations designed to reorder an organization and the promotion of an agent into its senior leadership. Together, they open the way to direct influence over decisions and strategy. The danger is greatest after the killing of historic figures who cannot easily be replaced.
Israel’s intelligence services invest for the long term. They study the remaining leaders, their histories of disagreement, and the character of each relationship, then seek to create friction inside the organization. As sources familiar with these files put it, the intended result is to weaken effectiveness, waste effort, and expose structures.
That investment can consume enormous human resources. Specialists may spend a decade or more building a single subject’s biography – from his waking hour and favorite foods to his relationships and most closely guarded secrets.
In several cases, such intimate knowledge has ended in assassination. The spy’s service to Israel is therefore measured by more than the secret he steals or the device he plants. At its highest level, it lies in helping the occupation reshape an adversary from within, long before the target recognizes that its choices are no longer entirely its own.
By Donald Neff | Washington Report On Middle East Affairs | January 1996
On January 4, 1948, Jewish terrorists drove a truck loaded with explosives into the center of the all Arab city of Jaffa and detonated it, killing 26 and wounding around 100 Palestinian men, women and children.[1] The attack was the work of the Irgun Zvai Leumi – the “National Military Organization,” also known by the Hebrew letters Etzel – the largest Jewish terrorist group in Palestine. The Irgun was headed by Revisionist Zionist Menachem Begin and had been killing and maiming Arabs, Britons and even Jews for the previous ten years in its efforts to establish a Jewish state.
This terror campaign meant that at the core of Revisionist Zionism there existed a philosophical embrace of violence. … continue
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