Leaked: Britain’s Sham Conviction Of Hashim Thaci
By Kit Klarenberg | Al Mayadeen | September 20, 2026
On September 16th, The Hague’s Kosovo Specialist Chambers found former Kosovo Liberation Army chief Hashim Thaci guilty of cruel treatment, arbitrary detention, torture and the murder of 96 people during the 1998/9 Kosovo War. The verdict stunned his supporters and detractors alike, but neither believe he will ultimately be convicted, with good reason. Thaci is but a sacrificial lamb, defendant in a purely symbolic show trial secretly orchestrated by British intelligence – who once considered the KLA leader their bosom ally.
Given this background, that Thaci ended up in The Hague at all seemed nothing short of miraculous. After being indicted in April 2020, he resigned as Kosovo’s President. A longstanding KLA high-ranker, Thaci was at the forefront of the group’s outreach to Western governments and intelligence agencies throughout the 1990s, as it waged ever-escalating guerrilla war on Yugoslav security forces. When NATO’s 78-day-long bombing of Belgrade erupted in March 1999 in support of the KLA, Thaci proclaimed himself prime minister of Kosovo’s “provisional government”.
Categorised as a “terrorist” entity by the US State Department, the KLA was known by Western governments to be an organised crime faction, funded by the drugs trade and states such as Saudi Arabia, with ties to extremist factions including Al Qaeda. This was no impediment to the CIA and MI6 providing the KLA with substantial financial and material support for years. Once NATO’s bombing was complete and Kosovo fell under alliance occupation, Thaci was instrumental in consolidating the group’s total takeover of the statelet.
As his criminal and political rivals were systematically executed, the KLA conducted a concomitant province-wide purge of non-Albanians, reducing Kosovo’s population by hundreds of thousands. As a Western diplomat told the Washington Post in June 1999, “Thaci’s ruthless tactics are legendary in the region.” Despite high-level cognisance of such tendencies, Thaci and his fellow KLA warlords were actively assisted in their reign of terror by occupying NATO KFOR and UNMIK forces. A Kosovo Albanian lamented in 2001:
“Instead of cracking down on the warlords, KFOR and UNMIK allowed them to divide Kosovo into different zones where these warlords generate enormous wealth.”
In July that year, the Washington Post reported how Kosovo’s UN-constructed courts were proving incapable of prosecuting KLA officials for atrocities committed in the wake of NATO’s occupation, let alone before the alliance’s arrival. A Swedish jurist serving as Kosovo’s “first Western judge” detailed “several cases in which UN and KFOR senior officials opposed or blocked prosecution” of KLA leaders. NATO and UN officials allegedly feared they “would put their lives at risk” by pursuing prosecutions of certain figures – including Thaci, presumably.
‘Essentially Untouchable’
A leaked March 2019 British intelligence appraisal of “rule of law issues” in Kosovo is absolutely scathing, specifically naming the KLA’s enduring influence locally as a key problem castrating the would-be country’s laughable legal system. “In common with much of the rest of the Balkans, Kosovo has high levels of state capture; limited reconciliation between ethnic communities; and the system carries a heavy legacy of unresolved war crimes issues,” the study reported. Of particular concern to London:
“Close links between senior politicians and Albanian organised crime, born out of wartime connections that both funded and staffed [the KLA]… Kosovo’s rule of law institutions at both the national and local level are weak; lack expertise and strategic direction; and are politicised. The inability of local law and order institutions to combat high-level political corruption seriously undermines the state’s integrity. These negative influences appear to be increasing… Those in power, and their associates, are essentially untouchable.”
Moreover, “state capture furthers the economic interests of elite groups but increasingly is focused on preventing challenge through subverting rule of law.” Resultantly, “rule of law processes are not strengthened, but are subverted and circumscribed.” In other words, the effectively lawless mafia-dominated system constructed in ‘independent’ Kosovo with NATO and UN help post-NATO bombing endured untrammelled two decades later. The British highlighted “particular issues in the prosecutorial process – both the management of investigations and the creation of indictments.”
The execution of civil and criminal judgments in Kosovo was also cited as a “specific problem,” while sentencing was found to be “inconsistent” – “in particular in relation to corruption and serious crimes, sentencing can be very light.” It was extremely common for cases to be initiated against known criminals, then remain unresolved for years. Questions abounded over the “competence of judges and prosecutors” – “it is generally acknowledged that the quality of legal training at university is poor and… the Bar Exam sets a very low hurdle.”
Even then, Kosovo authorities “did not select the highest performing candidates, but often those with links to those in positions of influence.” Small wonder “public expectations of the rule of law sector” were found to be “very low” throughout the would-be country. Citizens not only had “no real experience of rule of law,” but there was “an ingrained lack of trust of rule of law systems” among the wider population. Yet, the British were determined to counter this perception – if only for public relations purposes.
At that time, London had been running a dedicated “rule of law portfolio” in Kosovo for several years. It consisted of “three separate strands.” They spanned “monitoring the judiciary” and Pristina’s “prosecutorial functions – trials, verdicts and the behaviour of judges and prosecutors in corruption and organised crime cases.” Four British-approved “Kosovan legal experts” were furthermore embedded “in key posts” in Pristina’s Ministry of Justice, and London took charge of “recruitment and appointment of judges and prosecutors.”
This covered “improved disciplinary procedures; performance appraisal; and ways of increasing accountability.” Along the way, “young judges and prosecutors” in Kosovo were mentored, enjoying “study visits” to Britain and unadvertised “support on real life cases.” In light of Thaci’s conviction, it’s striking the British embassy in Pristina professes to place a “strong emphasis on achieving results in the investigation and conviction of high profile individuals in corruption cases, and on making a visible impact in such cases”:
“The embassy has made a decision… to target more politically sensitive areas.”
In service of this objective, a dedicated Foreign Office project “to change the culture of the Kosovo justice system to one in which judges, prosecutors and others are willing to fearlessly challenge entrenched interests” was also quietly launched in 2018. Leaked files show the effort was outsourced to notorious British intelligence cutout Adam Smith International. Markedly, it operated until March 2020 – one month before Thaci was indicted by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers.
ASI was explicitly concerned with the “enforceability” of KSC prosecutions. Specifically founded in 2016 to prosecute high-profile war crimes cases against KLA officials, ASI acknowledged the KSC was of no concern to Kosovo Albanians. “Whilst senior politicians may be indicted by the Specialist Chambers… Kosovo’s young population aspires to follow its neighbours in making progress to stronger relations with Europe and prosperity at home, which promises to be a driver of reforms,” the cutout observed.
Nonetheless, ASI was tasked with helping the KSC appear to be serious about fulfilling its purview, due to growing concerns among ‘independent’ Pristina’s Western sponsors “about Kosovan capacity to process case volumes, to protect witness identities, and to handle complex cases,” combined with well-founded suspicions the KLA was insulated from prosecution. ASI consciously designed its legal ‘reform’ program “to fit this context of conflict legacies, competing stakeholders, political tensions and uncertain commitment to international standards”:
“Many former KLA leaders now hold positions of power and influence. Those involved in war crimes and organised crime are often the same people. Corruption often manifests itself through the connections between private companies and the political system, with award of public tenders being affected by political connections… However, the general desire of the Kosovo political leadership for closer ties with the EU offers rule of law projects valuable leverage to be used selectively.”
It was under these highly politicised auspices ASI’s intimate ‘assistance’ to Kosovo’s criminal justice systems was provided, and Thaci’s KSC indictment drawn up. At every stage, the cutout coordinated closely with Foreign Office headquarters in London, producing “bi-weekly updates on notable [legal and judicial] developments” related to Kosovo, quarterly reviews “of trends within the institutional and political environment,” and “longer term ‘look forward’ reports anticipating events in the coming three months.”
ASI boasted how its “international advisers” were deployed to Kosovo “on rotations,” ensuring “continuous team presence” locally, with at least one staffer “always ‘on the ground’ and on call” for the Foreign Office. This would help the cutout “build and maintain relationships with direct Kosovan counterparts and wider stakeholders continuously,” and “monitor political dynamics to ensure that project decisions are politically-informed and conflict sensitive.” With such intensive behind-closed-door bonds between London and Pristina, the chances of serious prosecutions of KLA officials emerging remained scant.
Still, in order for Pristina to make “strides towards closer ties with Europe,” ASI understood the necessity of challenging mainstream conceptions of Kosovo as “a country formed through a conflict that shaped its political parties and legitimised their power, to one where rule of law has primacy and state institutions win public confidence by demonstrating their adherence to international standards for professionalism and transparency.” In this context, simply indicting Thaci became in and of itself substantial, regardless of the outcome, or his trial’s actual legitimacy.
It’s unsurprising Thaci and his supporters firmly believed his acquittal to be inevitable, and still do. The Foreign Office project managed by ASI drew upon a variety of “international subject matter experts”, among them several veteran British judges with experience elsewhere in the Balkans, including Albania and Macedonia. They were led by Jonathan Ratel, formerly head of Kosovo’s EU-funded Special Prosecution Office, and “deputy chief prosecutor”. In this capacity, Ratel personally rubbished widespread, EU-endorsed allegations of KLA involvement in organ trafficking.
Thaci’s trial didn’t explore the issue, he was acquitted of all crimes against humanity, and a right to appeal his 25-year sentence was clearly codified in the KSC’s judgement. Serbian leaders have condemned the ruling as too lenient. Thaci – dubbed Pristina’s “George Washington” by Joe Biden – remains held at The Hague. Meanwhile, KFOR has at last begun withdrawing from Kosovo, due to “an improved security situation” in the aspiring country – where, thanks to covert British judicial interventions, “those in power, and their associates, are essentially untouchable.”
NATO-backed Kosovo separatist ‘responsible for war crimes’
RT | September 16, 2026
The former leader of the NATO-backed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has been found responsible for war crimes committed by the militant group during its NATO-backed campaign to break away from Serbia in the 1990s.
Hasam Thaci, who served as the first president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, has been found guilty of the murder of 96 political opponents and suspected Serbian collaborators, the verdict said. He was also convicted for the unlawful detention and torture of hundreds of people.
The 58-year-old Thaci and three other former KLA leaders tried in The Hague are widely regarded as heroes in Kosovo. Thaci’s defense argued that senior figures in the KLA could not control rank-and-file separatist fighters and thus could not be held responsible for crimes committed under their leadership. Lawyers described the group as lacking a strict military hierarchy during the 1998-99 conflict.
NATO’s bombing campaign targeting Serbia, which Washington and its European allies framed as a humanitarian intervention, ensured KLA’s victory. Belgrade does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state, having rejected the unilateral declaration passed by the breakaway entity’s parliament in 2008.
The US, the UK, France, Germany, and many other Western and European nations, however, officially recognize Kosovo’s independence. Camp Bondsteel, the headquarters of NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), is the largest American military base in the Balkans.
Among the more gruesome claims related to the Kosovo conflict was that the KLA harvested organs from Serbian prisoners and sold them on the black market, which former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Carla Del Ponte detailed in her 2008 memoir.
The allegations were further substantiated in a 2010 European Council report, which also implicated former Thaci subordinates in the trafficking of humans, drug and arms, as well as protection rackets and other organized crime. His government allegedly ensured impunity for those “mafia-like” networks, the document said.
The Serbian government accused the West of pursuing selective justice in the wake of the Balkan wars, allegedly focusing on Serbian suspects and overlooking crimes attributed to their opponents.
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC), where Thaci was tried, was set up in The Hague in 2016, after earlier cases failed in Kosovo due to alleged political interference and witness intimidation.
Kosovo’s Unknown Genocide
By Kit Klarenberg | Global Delinquents | September 1, 2024
June 9th marked a little-known anniversary. On that day in 1999, Yugoslavia’s army withdrew from Kosovo, following 78 consecutive days of NATO bombing. In return for ceasing its criminal campaign, the US-led military alliance was permitted unimpeded, unchallenged freedom of movement and action throughout the province. The military’s exit instantly opened the floodgates for a genocide of the province’s Serb population to erupt, under the watchful eye of NATO and UN peacekeepers. To this day, the region lives with the cataclysm’s destructive consequences.
NATO’s March – June 1999 aerial assault on Yugoslavia was ostensibly waged to prevent an impending mass slaughter of Albanians in Kosovo. Yet, as a May 2000 British parliamentary committee concluded, all purported abuses of Albanian citizens occurred after the bombing began. Moreover, the alliance’s intervention was found to have actively encouraged Slobodan Milosevic to aggressively neutralise the CIA and MI6-backed, civilian-targeting narcoterrorist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), with which Belgrade was truly at war.
The KLA had for years by this point sought to create an ethnically pure Kosovo via insurrectionary violence, in service of constructing “Greater Albania” – an irredentist, Nazi-inspired entity comprising territory in modern-day Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Yugoslavia’s military departing the province at last provided the Al Qaeda-linked terror group with a grand window of opportunity to achieve that mephitic goal. There was a gap of several days before thousands of NATO and UN “peacekeepers” – known as KFOR – arrived in Kosovo, on June 12th 1999.
By the time they reached Pristina, scores of Serbs had already been murdered or fled Kosovo, their homes and property stolen or destroyed. Despite its official mission being to ensure a “safe and secure environment” in the province, KFOR’s presence did nothing to quell the bloody chaos. Dubbed Operation Joint Guardian, an eponymous account of the effort authored by US military historian Cody R. Phillips records:
“Ethnic Albanians, consumed with hatred…initiated a wave of destruction. Anything Serbian was destroyed or vandalized – even abandoned houses and churches. Much of the violence was clearly organized and deliberate. Each day… American soldiers confronted new expressions of hatred…Radical groups of ethnic Albanians were committed to violence in Kosovo, with the ultimate goal of achieving complete independence from Serbia and bringing along as well bits of territory in Serbia and Macedonia dominated by ethnic Albanians… Chaos dominated as Operation Joint Guardian began in earnest.”
Phillips reports that KFOR hadn’t “anticipated the level of violence and lawlessness,” and was poorly-prepared, ill-equipped and undermanned to deal with the barbarous, province-wide crimewave they’d stepped into. “Murder, assault, kidnapping, extortion, burglary, and arson were reported daily,” the victims invariably being Serbs. These were merely incidents “significant” enough for KFOR to report. Typically, the culprits were never identified – “no one saw anything” was “a standard refrain.” Drive-by shootings were commonplace. Meanwhile:
“Abandoned Yugoslav military installations were destroyed, vandalized, or mined. Even grave sites were booby-trapped. Electricity was intermittent, clean water was almost nonexistent. The absence of order and public services was total.”
On a daily basis, Serbs “were attacked throughout the province…routinely…accosted in public buildings, or on the street, then robbed, beaten, or ‘arrested’ and detained in jails” by rampaging gangs of armed Albanian militants. In one Kosovo community, an estimated 5,000 Roma were expelled from their homes, “which were then looted and burned.” Albanians and Bosniaks who remained in Kosovo during the war, perceived by the KLA as loyal to Yugoslavia, “were harassed… some of them also disappeared.”
‘Bad Guys’
Not long after Joint Guardian’s launch, a US Marine patrol responded to a series of arson attacks on homes in Zegra, “a town almost evenly split between Serbian and Albanian families.” Arriving “too late to stop the violence,” their entry to the area was moreover hindered by a flurry of fire from Albanian militants. “Every Serbian home had been put to the torch,” the local Orthodox church had been destroyed, a nearby cemetery vandalized. Almost 600 Serbs were ultimately forced to leave.
Per Phillips, before Joint Guardian’s first week was over, “dozens of Serbs had been abducted by the KLA.” They were never seen again, their bodies never found. Elsewhere, a Serb school official “who had protected an Albanian home and family” during NATO’s bombing campaign, and his wife, were murdered, their “bodies [left] hanging in the town square.” This “level of violence” endured throughout the Operation’s first month:
“The daily routine entailed the same jobs: fight fires, disperse crowds, and quell violence. Caches of weapons and ammunition usually were found every day. Wounded Serbs were treated regularly by Army medics or evacuated to local US medical facilities. The episodes seemed constant and blended into an endless stream of violence.”
There was also a routine “predictability” to how Serbs were “bullied” into leaving Kosovo – “remote villages were especially sensitive to the unofficial pattern.” First, “roving bands” of Albanian militants would subject Serbs to escalating “intimidation tactics”, to the extent “threats became unbearable.” If these activities “failed to achieve the desired end… thugs would break into selected homes and beat the occupants, and one or two token victims would be killed.” The process was “very effective” in forcing Serbs to abandon the province.
In July, remaining Serb families in the town of Vitina were falsely blamed by Albanian militants for an explosive attack that injured over 30 Serbs, then harassed out of the area. Before leaving, they “gave their houses and remaining property to their Albanian neighbors in gratitude for their friendship and kindness.” Within hours, those houses and their contents were ablaze. According to Phillips, this incident prompted a KFOR commander to lament, “the hatred is so intense and irrational it is unbelievable.”
Come November 1999, the KLA’s post-war campaign of “murder and kidnap” in NATO-occupied Kosovo had reduced Pristina’s Serb population from 40,000 to just 400. Then, “the killings continued throughout 2000.” Serbs of all ages were regularly shot in the street. One Serb preparing to depart for Belgrade “was killed by an Albanian masquerading as a potential buyer” for his home.
There are strong grounds to believe that, contrary to Phillips’ account of well-meaning, valiant impotence and ineptitude on the part of KFOR, this violence was actively encouraged by the KLA’s Western backers. In December 2010, a British “peacekeeper” posted to Kosovo during this time attributed Pristina’s modern day status as “an impoverished, corrupt and ethnically polarised backwater” to NATO’s “unwillingness to control KLA gangsters.” He witnessed first-hand how London under his watch consistently “emboldened the KLA to greater brutality.”
Whenever his KFOR team captured the terror group’s fighters on the streets, heavily armed and “intent on murder and intimidation,” his superiors ordered them to be freed:
“The violence meted out by the KLA shocked even the most hardened of paratroopers. The systematic murder of Serbs, who were often shot in front of their families, was commonplace. After nightfall, gangs of KLA thugs wielding AK47s, knuckledusters and knives terrified residents of Serbian apartment blocks. Many Serbs fled and their homes were taken by the KLA. The Blair government’s spin machine wanted moral simplicity….The Serbs were the ‘bad guys’, so that must make Kosovo Albanians the ‘good guys’.”
‘Bastard Army’
Come 2001, “both smuggling and signs of an insurgent campaign were escalating in the province, particularly in the mountainous and heavily wooded border areas that separated Macedonia and Kosovo,” where KFOR did not patrol. Contraband entering Kosovo was “not confined to illicit drugs or tax-free cigarettes” – “all too common were firearms and ordnance. All along, “random terror attacks continued,” with hand grenades the “weapon of choice.” Grenades “were both plentiful and inexpensive,” costing about $7 each – “less than the price of a pound of coffee.”
Simultaneously, the KLA’s brutal struggle for Greater Albania continued, with the active support of London and Washington. KFOR stood idly by while KLA insurgents pushed past a five-kilometre-wide “exclusion zone” into neighbouring Macedonia, armed with mortars, and other lethal weapons. This dark handshake was openly condemned by other Western powers. A European KFOR commander bitterly remarked in March 2001:
“The CIA has been allowed to run riot in Kosovo with a private army designed to overthrow Milosevic. Now he’s gone the US State Department seems incapable of reining in its bastard army.”
The Empire’s extensive technical and material sponsorship of the KLA extended to evacuating 400 of the group’s fighters in Skopje, after they were encircled by Macedonian forces. This backing was pivotal to the terror group occupying and controlling almost a third of the country’s territory, by August 2001. At that point though, due to European pressure, the US rescinded all assistance to the KLA. Local leaders duly inked a peace deal on August 13th 2001.
In return for constitutional and administrative changes ensuring equal rights for Albanians in Macedonia, KLA insurgents stopped fighting and handed in many of their weapons to NATO, while receiving amnesty from prosecution. Mere weeks later, the 9/11 attacks took place. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s cofounder and Osama bin Laden’s deputy has been fingered as “the person who can do the things that happened” on the fateful day. Coincidentally, one KLA unit was led by his brother.
Kosovo Spent IMF Funds on Pensions for Veterans Now Fighting for Daesh
Sputnik – 30.11.2016
Over the past two decades, the Kosovar government has spent over $2 billion on payments to former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) paramilitary organization. Kosovo received the money from the United States and the European Union and since 2009 mostly from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The Kosovo Liberation Army was formed during the mid-1990s by Kosovo Albanians seeking independence from Serbia and the creation of a monoethnic state. Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008.
There have been numerous reports of abuses and war crimes committed by KLA members during the 1998-1999 Kosovo war, including massacres of civilians, prisons camps, allegations of organ theft etc. A special court in The Hague has been established to investigate those crimes. According to different estimates, currently at least 500 KLA veterans are fighting in the ranks of Daesh in Syria.
“Compared to the entire population of Kosovo, this number is the fifth-largest among other European countries. Many of the KLA veterans fighting for Daesh receive payments from the Kosovar budget which [is] regularly funded by the US, the EU and the IMF,” journalist Brankica Ristic wrote for Sputnik Serbia.
Currently, there are 46,000 KLA veterans in Kosovo. A list was made up to identify those who deserve pensions from the budget. The IMF unveiled €106 million ($113 million) for the initiative.
The first payments were made in 2015. Some 12,000 former KLA members, who fought against the Yugoslavian government and law enforcement agencies in the 1990s, received €170 ($181) each.
However, since that time the number of officially registered veterans has increased fourfold. Pristina had to ask the IMF to unveil more funds. The Kosovar budget for 2017 is €2 billion ($2.1 billion), including money to transform the Kosovo security forces into full-fledged armed forces, which will be funded by the IMF. However, the IMF does not want to give money for pensions for 46,000 KLA veterans. The fund asked Pristina to clarify the number of veterans. The government hopes that if the IMF rejects giving the money the US could do [so]. But the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election has put this into question.
“After the 1999 war Kosovo received $3.8 billion of international aid. According to different sources, between 2000 and 2010 the region received up to $40 billion. Part of this money could have been paid to those fighting now in the ranks of Daesh,” the journalist wrote.
British MPs tout NATO’s ‘Kosovo success story’ as reason to bomb Syria
By Dan Glazebrook | RT | December 31, 2015
Kosovo is often cited by liberal interventionists as NATO’s success story and now a reason for attacking Syria. However, the ongoing lawlessness in the country shows nothing could be further from the truth.
In 1999, NATO bombed Yugoslavia for 78 days, culminating in the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from the Serbian province of Kosovo. Tens of thousands were killed or maimed by the airstrikes, and Kosovo was carved out as a NATO statelet under the control of UNMIK (the United Nations Mission in Kosovo) in alliance with its local quislings the Kosovo Liberation Army (the KLA).
Last month’s parliamentary debate on British airstrikes in Syria witnessed several MPs citing the operation as a great success. Labour MP Ivan Lewis was “proud of the difficult choices that we made” in Kosovo and elsewhere, which he claimed “saved hundreds of thousands of lives”.
Kosovo was particularly held up by those supporting British military action in Syria as an example of how airstrikes alone, without support from ground forces, can be victorious. Mocking those who argued that “coalition action which rests almost wholly on bombing… will have little effect”, Margaret Beckett responded “well, tell that to the Kosovans, and do not forget that if there had not been any bombing in Kosovo perhaps 1 million Albanian Muslim refugees would be seeking refuge in Europe.”
Conservative MP Richard Benyon concurred, adding: “I asked one my constituents––someone who knows a bit about this, General Sir Mike Jackson––whether he could remember any conflict where air power alone made a difference. He thought and said one word: Kosovo.”
The argument is entirely fallacious. One obvious difference between the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999 and the British bombing of Syria today is the contrast in their stated aims. NATO was ostensibly bombing Yugoslavia to achieve a limited goal – the secession of Kosovo. In Syria today, however, the ostensible aim of airstrikes against ISIS is the destruction of ISIS. In other words, while the first aimed to force a concession from the force it was targeting; the other apparently aims at the total elimination of its target. While enough punishment might persuade someone to concede a demand, it will not persuade anyone to agree to their own eradication. There is, thus, no parallel in the logic behind the two campaigns, and anyone trying to draw one is being entirely disingenuous.
Secondly, when the actual historical record is examined it becomes clear that, even on its own terms, NATO did not actually achieve its demands. The Rambouillet ‘agreement’ was NATO’s eleventh hour diktat to Yugoslavia on the eve of bombing, designed to be rejected in order to justify the bombing raids. The key bone of contention for Yugoslavia in this document was that it demanded NATO troops be granted full access to air fields, roads, ports and railroads across the country – that is to say, an effective NATO occupation of the entire federal republic.
Obviously, as Sara Flounders and John Catalinotto of the International Action Centre have written, “no self-respecting government could accept such an ultimatum”. Instead, the Yugoslav government offered to withdraw their troops from Kosovo. This was rejected by NATO, who began bombing within days. After nearly three months of heroic resistance from the Yugoslav people, the bombing ended with Yugoslav troops withdrawing from Kosovo – without any NATO occupation of the rest of the country. That is to say, the war was brought to a close on the terms originally offered by the Yugoslavs, and not on the terms demanded by NATO at the outset: hardly the overwhelming victory claimed by the likes of British General Mike Jackson.
What really gives the lie to the ‘Kosovo success’ narrative, however, is simply the condition of NATO’s statelet today. An in-depth piece by Vedat Xhymshiti in Foreign Policy Journal last month notes that “Kosovo is the poorest and most isolated country in Europe, with millionaire politicians steeped in crime. A third of the workforce is unemployed, and corruption is widespread. Youth unemployment (those aged 25 and under) stands at 2 in 3, and nearly half of the 1.8 million citizens of Kosovo are considered to be in poverty. From December 2014 until February 2015, about 5% of the population was forced to leave the country in an effort to find a better life, studies and more dignified jobs, on their uncertain path towards wealthier countries in the EU.”
The British MPs’ argument that NATO’s takeover of Kosovo was achieved by airstrikes alone, without ground forces, is a lie. NATO’s allies in 1999 were the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), a violent sectarian group who openly sought the establishment of an ethnically supremacist state – much like the forces supported by NATO in Libya, Syria and Ukraine. Once NATO had destroyed the Yugoslav administration in Kosovo, effective power on the ground passed to the KLA, who set about implementing their vision of an ethnically pure Kosovo via a series of pogroms, massacres and persecutions of the province’s Serb, Jewish and Roma populations. They gained effective control of Kosovan politics, and used this power to guarantee themselves impunity both for their historic and ongoing war crimes, and for their massive expansion of organized criminality.
In December 2010, a Council of Europe report named Kosovan Prime Minister and former KLA leader Hashim Thaci “the head of a “mafia-like” Albanian group responsible for smuggling weapons, drugs and human organs through eastern Europe”, according the Guardian newspaper’s summary. Following NATO’s intervention, Thaci’s Drenica group within the KLA, according to the report, seized control of “most of the illicit criminal enterprises” in which Kosovans were involved in Albania. The report noted that “agencies dedicated to combating drug smuggling in at least five countries have named Hashim Thaçi and other members of his Drenica group as having exerted violent control over the trade in heroin and other narcotics.” The human rights investigator who authored the report, Dick Marty, commented that: “Thaçi and these other Drenica group members are consistently named as ‘key players’ in intelligence reports on Kosovo’s mafia-like structures of organised crime.”
In addition to their leading role in Europe’s heroin smuggling trade, Thaci and his group were also named as having been responsible for a professional organ smuggling operation involving the kidnapping and murder of Serb civilians in order to harvest and sell their kidneys. Currently serving as both Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Thaci’s NATO protection guarantees he has never been brought to justice for any of these crimes.
Indeed, NATO-sponsored impunity has been a consistent theme amongst the new Kosovan elite. A report by Amnesty International published in August 2013 noted that “the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) singularly failed to investigate the abduction and murders of Kosovo Serbs in the aftermath of the 1998-1999 conflict” adding that “UNMIK’s failure to investigate what constituted a widespread, as well as a systematic, attack on a civilian population and, potentially, crimes against humanity, has contributed to the climate of impunity prevailing in Kosovo.” Marty’s report, too, noted the “faltering political will on the part of the international community to effectively prosecute the former leaders of the KLA”, and Carla del Ponte, former chief war crimes prosecutor at the Hague, stated that she was barred from prosecuting KLA leaders.
UNMIK’s responsibilities for police and justice came to an end in December 2008, following Kosovo’s controversial declaration of independence. It was replaced by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which, according to Amnesty International, inherited 1,187 war crimes cases that UNMIK had failed to investigate. All the signs are that the overt impunity that has prevailed up until now will be replaced by lip service to the rule of law, accompanied by the prosecution of a few low level operatives, whilst maintaining the protection for those at the top. Following the Council of Europe’s damning report, EULEX spent three years investigating the claims, eventually publishing a verdict that was a textbook case of damage-limitation whitewash. EULEX concluded that the crimes were indeed real, and were linked to leading KLA members, but refused to corroborate the names of any specific individuals involved, despite copious evidence. Thaci’s protection, it seems, is absolute.
Nevertheless, in August of this year, the Kosovan parliament finally and grudgingly approved (after initially rejecting) the establishment of a special war crimes court to prosecute KLA leaders for crimes committed between 1998 and 2000. In moves highly reminiscent of scenes outside both the Libyan and Ukrainian parliaments when tentative and tokenistic legal moves were made to end the impunity of the sectarian death squads, the parliament has come under repeated attack ever since. Riots and six separate teargas attacks by the opposition have brought the normal functioning of the Kosovan parliament to a standstill. Failed state status surely beckons.
Meanwhile, the credibility of EULEX, whose officials will be overseeing the establishment of the new court, was further thrown into doubt in November 2014 when Andrea Capussela, former head of UNMIK’s economic unit, released the results of an in-depth analysis of the most significant cases in which EULEX had been involved. Seven of these she claimed had only been brought after intense international pressure, whilst in a further eight, no investigation was carried out at all, despite “credible and well-documented evidence strongly suggesting that serious crimes had been committed.”
She noted that “Eulex’s conduct in these 15 cases – the eight ignored ones and the seven opened under pressure – suggests that the mission tended not to prosecute high-level crime, and, when it had to, it sought not to indict or convict prominent figures”. During its six years of operating, she noted, only four convictions had been secured – three of them against only secondary figures, whilst “higher-ranking figures linked to the same crimes were either not investigated or indicted”. A senior Kosovan investigator noted that “There are people killing people and getting away with it because of Unmik and Eulex,” adding that “The political elite and Eulex have fused. They are indivisible. The laws are just for poor people,” Indeed, Eulex seems to be operating increasingly like a mafia themselves, last year, putting “pressure”, according to Amnesty International, on “journalist, Vehbi Kajtazi, who had reported alleged corruption in EULEX”.
In a final twist to NATO’s ‘success story’, Kosovo has now become the largest per-capita provider of fighters for regime change in Syria. The official figure is 300 but more reliable estimates suggests the true figure is more than 1000 (from a population of 2 million), including one of the top ten ISIS commanders, Lavdrim Muhaxheri. As state education, along with most other social provision, has collapsed since 1999, Saudi-sponsored Madrasas have filled the gap, providing an extreme Wahhabi sectarian education now feeding its first generation of impoverished graduates into NATO’s new Syrian battlefields. No surprise, then, that Kosovan government’s efforts to prevent this have been “superficial and ineffective”, according to David Philips in the Huffington Post.
The ‘lesson’ of Kosovo, then, is not that “airpower works” or any other such nonsense. The real lesson is what it reveals about NATO’s formula for the destruction of independent regional powers – relying on a combination of aerial bombardment alongside the empowerment of local sectarian death squads, who come to dominate the political scene in the aftermath, obliterating the rule of law and guaranteeing a dysfunctional state incapable of providing either dignity or security to its citizens. This was the same formula that was used on Libya in 2011 and currently being attempted in Syria today. Of course, for NATO, all of this is indeed a success: Yugoslavia dismembered; its resources plundered at the expense of its desperate and impoverished people; and Kosovo turned into a provider of shock troops for regime change in Syria, and transit hub for heroin and organ trafficking. If this is what NATO calls a success, we must all pray for failure.
Dan Glazebrook is a freelance political writer who has written for RT, Counterpunch, Z magazine, the Morning Star, the Guardian, the New Statesman, the Independent and Middle East Eye, amongst others. His first book “Divide and Ruin: The West’s Imperial Strategy in an Age of Crisis” was published by Liberation Media in October 2013. It featured a collection of articles written from 2009 onwards examining the links between economic collapse, the rise of the BRICS, war on Libya and Syria and ‘austerity’. He is currently researching a book on US-British use of sectarian death squads against independent states and movements from Northern Ireland and Central America in the 1970s and 80s to the Middle East and Africa today.
Kosovo Liberation Army harvested Serb organs – EU inquiry
RT | July 29, 2014
An inquiry by the EU has found “compelling indications” that ten Serb captives had their body organs harvested for illegal trafficking during the 1998-99 Kosovo war. However, it wasn’t widespread and there will be no trial, the lead investigator said.
The chief prosecutor Clint Williamson, who led the investigation, said there was no evidence of widespread organ harvesting, but that the crime had occurred a number of times.
“There are compelling indications that this practice did occur on a very limited scale and that a small number of individuals were killed for the purpose of extracting and trafficking their organs,” he told journalists. However, he added that there would not be enough evidence at the moment to prosecute the alleged crimes.
The revelation was part of a presentation on a 2 1/2 year investigation into atrocities that also largely confirmed human right reports that there was a campaign of persecution against Serb, Roma and other minorities by some people in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
The investigation was prompted by a 2011 report by Council of Europe member Dick Marty that accused senior KLA commanders of involvement in the smuggling of Serb prisoners into northern Albania and the removal of their organs for sale.
Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, himself a former KLA leader who was named in Marty’s report, has dismissed the accusations as an attempt to tarnish the Kosovo Albanian fight for independence.
“The government of the Republic of Kosovo appreciates the completion of the ambassador Williamson’s work, which is an important step to determine potential individual responsibility and gives an end to the claims of the unfounded charges,” Tachi said.
However, Williamson bitterly complained that the investigation had been made far more difficult because of “a climate of intimidation that seeks to undermine any investigations of individuals associated with the former Kosovo Liberation Army.”
Williamson did say the Special Investigative Task Force would in future be “in a position to file an indictment against certain senior officials of the former Kosovo Liberation Army” for a series of crimes, including killings, disappearances, camp detentions and sexual violence.
Without naming any individuals, Williamson said that “there are compelling indications that this practice did occur.“ He went to lengths to make clear the alleged harvesting was not a wholesale practice, rejecting claims of hundreds of victims. Some 400 people, mostly Kosovo Serbs, disappeared near the end of the war, AP reports.
Just over 2,000 Serbs are believed to have been killed during and immediately after the war.
Serbia has vowed never to recognize the independence of its former province, which many Serbians consider their nation’s heartland, after it declared independence in 2008. It is also not recognized by dozens of country’s worldwide, including Russia.
In Belgrade, Serbia’s war crimes prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic told The Associated Press that Tuesday’s announcement “crowns a big effort on our part and shows that we were right when we said that war crimes had been committed and that organ trafficking took place.”


