NATO’s credibility eroding amid organized crime corruption scandals and internal fractures
By Uriel Araujo | June 20, 2025
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), heralded as the bulwark of Western security, faces a credibility crisis that mirrors the decline of the West. Corruption scandals, internal divisions, and an insatiable appetite for expansion despite unmet commitments have eroded its legitimacy, with the Ukraine crisis as a stark backdrop. As a matter of fact, NATO’s troubles reflect a faltering Western order struggling to maintain global dominance.
Since last month, a sprawling investigation into the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) has revealed that officials sold confidential information to defense contractors, rigging multimillion-dollar arms contracts, including drones critical to Ukraine’s military efforts. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) exposed a sophisticated network of insiders leaking sensitive data for personal gain, undermining NATO’s procurement integrity. Arrests in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain, with investigations in Luxembourg, Italy, and the United States, highlight the probe’s scope, which is expected to widen the more the EU agencies look at NATO’s contracts. This organized crime angle, involving illicit financial flows, remains underreported, which makes one wonder just how deep the rot goes.
The Ukraine crisis certainly amplifies these scandals’ impact. NATO’s support for Kyiv, including massive arms shipments, is tainted by corrupt practices that may have inflated costs or misdirected resources. One may recall that Ukrainian Brigadier General Volodymyr Karpenko admitted in 2022 that nearly 50% of received weaponry was lost, potentially smuggled. Europol’s Catherine De Bolle warned that same year of arms flooding Europe’s black markets. In 2024, Washington admitted failing to track $1 billion in small arms, but claimed it was due to inadequate inventories. This could be just the tip of the iceberg, as the Atlantic organization is increasingly looking like a racketeering ring.
The fact that this scandal remains underreported speaks volumes. That the CIA admittedly infiltrated media outlets, funded journalists and so on to shape narratives during the Cold War is no secret, Operation Mockingbird being just the most famous case. The late Udo Ulfkotte claimed in his 2014 book “Gekaufte Journalisten” that Western intelligence, including the CIA, would often pay journalists to push pro-NATO narratives. Suffice it to say that there’s no reason to assume such practices ceased, especially as narrative wars have intensified – not to mention that in the post-Soviet world NATO just kept on expanding. In any case, The National Endowment for Democracy and, until recently, the USAID are also known to support media globally, typically with a pro-NATO spin. Corruption and propaganda often go hand in hand. But here I digress.
Historically speaking, NATO has been no stranger to organized crime ties. Up until the nineties, Operation Gladio, a NATO clandestine program, collaborated with the Sicilian Mafia and neo-fascist terrorist groups in Europe, as confirmed by parliamentary inquiries. In post-Maidan Ukraine, NATO’s support for groups like the Azov regiment, with neo-Nazi ties, echoes this pattern. Plus, one may recall that Vladimir Zelensky has claimed that Western officials misappropriated $88.5 billion of aid sent to Kyiv. When it comes to the Western alliance, corruption schemes often go hand in hand with far-right paramilitary groups and organized crime.
Corruption is not NATO’s only problem. Many member states fail to meet the 2% GDP defense spending target; in 2024, only 23 of 32 complied, revealing a chronic lack of commitment. In fact, Trump’s rhetoric pertaining to the Alliance largely stems from this fact alone. Internal divisions further weaken the Alliance. The Greek-Turkish rivalry in the Aegean, for one thing, with territorial disputes, threatens NATO’s southeastern flank. These fissures reveal an alliance struggling to maintain unity amid divergent agendas.
NATO’s relentless expansion, despite these challenges, is its most provocative misstep. Its post-Cold War push eastward, absorbing former Soviet states, fueled tensions with Russia, culminating in the Ukraine crisis. Thus, NATO has become a destabilizing force, which provokes rather than deterrs conflict. Fueling conflicts might be good for the defence industry but it certainly does not do much for trans-Atlantic security. Moreover, the 2022 accession of Finland and Sweden, while touted as a triumph, has stretched NATO’s resources and exposed its inability to integrate new members seamlessly (not to mention the way Turkey leveraged it). It has made Europe a less safe place, for one thing.
These scandals and structural issues are emblematic of the West’s decline. The narrative of Western moral superiority is untenable when NATO, its premier security institution, is plagued by shady deals and disunity. NATO’s failure to adapt to a multipolar world, where players such as China, Russia, and even Turkey assert autonomy, further alienates the Global South. The West’s decline is not merely military or economic but a matter of legitimacy, as its institutions falter under their contradictions.
In conclusion, NATO’s corruption scandals are symptoms of a deeper malaise. They expose an alliance that, despite its grandiose ambitions, is fractured by internal divisions, weakened by unmet commitments, and compromised by systemic failures. Turkey’s ambivalence, the Greek-Turkish rivalry, and the Ukraine crisis highlight NATO’s inability to cohere, while its expansionist zeal deepens global tensions. To put it simply, NATO’s troubles reflect the West’s waning influence in a world no longer willing to accept its dominance.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Spanish Prime Minister Rejects NATO Call to Raise Defense Spending to 5% of GDP
Sputnik – 19.06.2025
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez told NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte that Madrid would not support the proposal to increase the alliance’s defense spending to 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2032, according to a letter published by El Pais newspaper on Thursday.
“For Spain, committing to a 5% target would not only be unreasonable, but also counterproductive; it would move Spain away from optimal spending and would hinder the EU’s efforts to strengthen its security and defense ecosystem,” the letter read.
Sources at the Spanish government told the newspaper that while they do not rule out Europe reaching 5% defense spending, they believe it is too early to set that target.
Earlier in June, Rutte called on NATO member states to increase their defense spending from the current 2% to 3.5% of their respective GDPs, and spend another 1.5% on infrastructure development, military industry and other security-related investments. US President Donald Trump previously demanded that NATO allies spend 5% of GDP on defense.
Italy and Germany on the War Front
By Manlio Dinucci | Global Research | June 16, 2025
Italy and Germany are at war not only against Russia in support of Ukraine, but also against Iran in support of Israel. This is demonstrated by documented facts. These facts are ignored by the political-media mainstream.
The Italian B350ER aircraft – a new-generation aircraft for espionage, target recognition and communication operations – operates in the Black Sea together with similar US aircraft to spy on Russian territory and assist Ukrainian forces to strike Russian targets with unmanned drones and explosive vessels. Italy is thus not only supplying weapons to Kiyv but is actively participating in this and other ways in the NATO war against Russia. Even more direct is Germany’s participation in the war: it has permanently stationed a 5,000-strong Bundeswehr brigade in Lithuania, equipped with 2,000 tanks and other military vehicles.
“With this combat-ready brigade,” states German Defence Minister Pistorius, “we are taking on a leadership responsibility within the Alliance here on NATO’s Eastern Flank”.
Thus, NATO has deployed its forces on the borders with Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast and Russia’s ally Belarus. At the same time, two other NATO countries — the United Kingdom and Canada — are deploying their ++forces in Estonia and Latvia, which also border Russia. These forces are like a candle lit in a powder keg. According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, if NATO forces suffer losses in a clash with Russian forces on the border, all other NATO countries would have to intervene on their side against Russia. The Trump Administration’s role is becoming increasingly equivocal, as it states that it wants to agree with Russia on a diplomatic solution to end the war. Yet, it is helping Ukraine to continue the war against Russia, either directly through military operations such as those in the Black Sea, or indirectly through NATO, which, under US command, is bringing its military forces ever closer to Russia.
As part of the same strategy, Germany and Italy play a significant role in supporting Israel in the Middle East. After the USA, Germany is the second-largest supplier of weapons to Israel. So far, Israel has received six Dolphin-class submarines from Germany, manufactured by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. These submarines have been modified to launch nuclear attack missiles. According to an agreement in 2022, Germany will supply Israel with three more Drakon-class submarines, which are larger than the previous models and can launch even more powerful nuclear missiles. Israel is the only country in the Middle East that possesses nuclear weapons, and, as it has not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is not subject to any control. Iran, having joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has civil nuclear facilities that are subject to UN Atomic Energy Agency controls.
US silent on Russia’s missile moratorium proposal – Lavrov
RT | June 9, 2025
The US has so far ignored Moscow’s call to impose limits on its deployment of intermediate-range missiles, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said.
Speaking at the Future Forum 2050 on Monday, Lavrov stated that Washington had not responded to an offer Putin had made to establish reciprocal moratoriums after the collapse of the Cold War-era Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
“It’s already clear they will not react to our call, in the absence of the treaty, to establish two parallel, non-interlinked moratoriums,” he said.
The INF Treaty, signed in 1987 by the US and the Soviet Union, banned land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Washington withdrew from the deal in 2019, citing alleged violations by Moscow.
Russia has denied the claims, accusing the US of developing the banned missiles, but pledged not to deploy such systems unless the US did so first.
Last year, the US announced that it would field the multipurpose Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile, and a hypersonic weapon that is still in development in “episodic deployments” in Germany starting in 2026. The two systems would have been banned by the INF Treaty, assuming they were deployed on land.
Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov signaled that Russia would not be constrained by any limitations if it ends its self-imposed moratorium. “One way or another, Russia will have to respond to NATO’s expansionist and aggressive actions,” he explained.
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov also noted that Moscow would soon be forced to walk back its current policy. “Russia’s restraint in the post-INF period was not appreciated by the US and its allies and was not met with reciprocity,” he said. “We have openly and directly stated that the unilateral moratorium is approaching its logical end.”
He also rebuked the US for an apparent reluctance to alter its course. “We do not see any fundamental change, let alone reversal, in US plans to forward-deploy ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles in various regions,” he said. “On the contrary, practical steps taken by the US military have convinced us that such activity will only intensify.”
Security of Small States Bordering Great Powers
Georgia’s Pragmatism vs. Norway’s Self-Harm
By Glenn Diesen | June 9, 2025
How do small countries bordering great powers ensure security and prosperity? States rarely constrain themselves, and the smaller states near great powers such as the US and Russia have historically had their sovereignty violated. If the smaller state invites a rival great power onto its territory for security, it can trigger an intense security competition. This is evident from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the war in Ukraine. What is the solution for smaller countries such as Georgia?
Norway and Georgia share this security dilemma as both are small states bordering Russia. The security dilemma suggests that states can either refrain from arming themselves and become vulnerable to foreign aggression, or they can arm themselves but then provoke a response from the opponent. States can similarly join military alliances for security, although they can be seen as a frontline in a great power rivalry.
During the Cold War, Norway aimed to mitigate the security dilemma by balancing deterrence with reassurance. It was a member of NATO but did not accept foreign troops stationed on its soil and limited military activity near the Russian border in the high north. Sweden and Finland were neutral and thus also enjoyed decades of peace, stability, and prosperity.
The Unipolar Era
However, the balance of power ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was replaced by a unipolar—or hegemonic—world. This was problematic, as states do not constrain themselves, and a new security system was established based on dominance. The balance between deterrence and reassurance subsequently disappeared, as there was no longer a perceived need to accept constraints to reassure a weakened Russia. Norway agreed to host US military bases and accommodate more NATO activity in the Arctic, while more recently, Sweden and Finland joined NATO. The hegemonic security architecture was accompanied by a liberal ideology suggesting that NATO was a liberal democratic “force for good.” The security dilemma itself is dismissed as the ideology demands that NATO is referred to as a “defensive alliance”, even as it attacks other countries. Any calls for considering Russian security concerns threaten the ideology of a benign hegemon.
Georgia adjusted to the unipolar world by recognising that there was only one game in town. As NATO expanded, it became the only security institution in Europe, and the option was either to be on the inside or the outside. The return to bloc politics revived the zero-sum logic of the Cold War, and the most vulnerable states were those placed on the new dividing lines of Europe – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Russia became increasingly insecure and defensive. When a great power begins to fear for its security and existence, its neighbours will likely suffer. Georgia’s pursuit of NATO partnership was a contributing factor in the war in the summer of 2008, which resulted in the loss of 20% of its territory.
Countries such as Georgia and Norway have the same freedoms as Mexico—they can form political and economic partnerships as they wish, but cannot host the soldiers and weapon systems of a rival great power such as the US.
The Multipolar Era
The seemingly menacing presence of Russia to the north and NATO’s efforts to use Georgia as a proxy against Russia create a difficult security dilemma. Avoiding excessive dependence on a more powerful foreign actor is important to enhance political sovereignty. Multipolarity incentivises small states in Europe to diversify foreign partnerships to mitigate the security dilemma. Georgia can avoid becoming a vassal of either Russia or the West in a divided Europe by diversifying its economic partnerships and also linking itself with other centres of power, such as China.
Realist theory recognises that states must respond to the international distribution of power to increase their sovereignty and security. In the current era, small states must adjust from unipolarity to multipolar. The US has fewer resources relative to other powers, and its priorities will shift from Europe to Asia. This requires small states to restore the balance between deterrence and reassurance.
The Norwegians are not adjusting to the new international distribution of power. Norway has doubled down on their excessive dependence on the US and abandoned reassurance by increasing the provocative posture of the unipolar era, including participation in the proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. As Norway-Russia relations deteriorate and the US shifts its focus elsewhere, Norway may find itself on a path to conflict and destruction unless it changes course.
Georgia, by contrast, has chosen a pragmatic path that recognises the international distribution of power. Georgia is diversifying its economic partnerships to avoid excessive dependence, and has withstood pressure to be used as a second front against Russia. As a connecting point between East and West, and between North and South, the emergence of multipolarity presents Georgia with both challenges and opportunities to its security and prosperity. To make the right choices, rational and realist analysis must prevail over ideology.

Germany planning major bunker expansion
RT | June 8, 2025
Germany is accelerating plans to expand and modernize its civil defense infrastructure amid a wide militarization drive in Western Europe, in preparation for a potential direct confrontation with Russia, according to Ralph Tiesler, head of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK).
Germany currently has only 580 operational shelters with room for about 480,000 people – less than 1% of the population. In a series of interviews with German media last week, Tiesler said that to address this shortfall, the BBK plans to convert underground garages, metro tunnels, and public basements into shelters capable of accommodating one million people, complete with food, toilets and sleeping areas.
“New bunkers with the highest protection standards cost a lot of money and take time. We need faster solutions,” Tiesler told the Suddeutsche Zeitung, noting that a full national shelter plan is expected to be presented later this summer.
“Nearly every basement can become a safe place in the event of an attack,” he said in a separate interview with Zeit, encouraging citizens to reinforce windows, stock essentials, and prepare to shelter for extended periods.
Tiesler called a scenario involving Russian tanks rolling into Berlin unlikely – but warned that as a major NATO logistical hub, Germany would become a target for “selective strikes” in the event of an eastern front conflict.
German hospitals are being assessed for their ability to treat mass casualties, with Tiesler warning that the health system could face up to 1,000 additional patients per day in a wartime setting. Other plans include doubling the number of warning sirens nationwide, upgrading emergency apps to include missile strike instructions, and possibly introducing a national civil service requirement.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced last month that he intends to make the Bundeswehr the “strongest army” on the continent. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius reportedly hopes for a “drastic increase” to the country’s military budget, up to €90 billion ($102 billion) by 2028.
Tiesler has insisted that civil protection must not be neglected, calling for €30 billion over the next decade – including at least €10 billion by 2029, the year German officials have repeatedly cited as the deadline for Berlin to be “ready for war.”
Moscow has repeatedly dismissed claims that it intends to attack NATO or EU countries as “utter nonsense,” accusing the West of using fear to justify soaring defense budgets. Russian officials have also condemned Western Europe’s militarization drive, expressing concern that, rather than supporting US-led peace initiatives for the Ukraine conflict, the EU and UK are instead gearing up for war with Russia.
According to a recent survey, Germany has now replaced the US as the country Russians view as most unfriendly. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently stated that Germany’s military buildup and arms deliveries to Kiev show Berlin’s “direct involvement” in the conflict. He warned that the country is “sliding down the same slippery slope it already followed a couple of times in the last century – toward its own collapse.”
Theodore Postol: Trump’s Golden Dome Missile Defense & Nuclear Escalation
Prof. Theodore Postol and Prof. Glenn Diesen
Glenn Diesen | June 6, 2025
MIT Professor and Pentagon advisor Ted Postol presents the dangers of Trump’s Golden Dome.
Western media complicit in Kiev regime’s terrorism
Strategic Culture Foundation | June 6, 2025
Western news media have given up the pretense of being independent and impartial sources of information. American and European mainstream outlets are nothing but propaganda services for the NATO proxy war against Russia.
That observation is hardly new. Since the NATO-backed coup in Kiev in 2014, the Western media have systematically and relentlessly whitewashed the NeoNazi regime and its strategic purpose as a cat’s paw to embroil Russia in conflict. Russia’s inevitable military response to the decade-long proxy war has been distorted as “unprovoked aggression” against “democratic” Ukraine.
The Western “news media” have now outed themselves for the propaganda functionaries that they are. The veil is shredded.
Last weekend, the NATO-backed Kiev regime deliberately attacked a civilian passenger train in Russia’s Bryansk region. Seven people were killed and over 100 were injured after a bridge was blown up, crashing down on a train passing underneath. The death toll could have been much higher, given the hundreds on board.
Within hours of that heinous act, a second train was derailed when a bridge it was traveling over in Kursk was blown up. Mercifully, there were no deaths in the second attack despite several injuries.
Three more explosions have been reported on Russia’s railways this week: another in Bryansk and two in the Voronezh and Belgorod regions.
These calculated acts to cause maximum civilian casualties by the Ukrainian regime and its NATO enablers are nothing short of state terrorism. They are war crimes of the first magnitude.
Yet the Western media, like the Western governments, have maintained a shameful and damning silence on these crimes. One can imagine the outpouring of condemnation if Russia were to carry out such attacks, deliberately targeting civilians in Ukraine.
Instead, the Western “news” outlets gave prominent coverage of the drone attacks on Russia’s airfields. Certainly, the targeting of five airbases where Russian nuclear-capable bomber aircraft are stationed was big news.
However, Western media reports let their colors show by being ecstatic in tone about an “audacious” operation, amplifying unverified Ukrainian claims that 40 aircraft were destroyed. Britain’s Daily Telegraph and other Western outlets shared video of one plane exploding, headlining with glee that “Putin’s bombers” were knocked out.
For its part, the Russian military said that most of the drones were intercepted and only a few aircraft were damaged.
None of the Western outlets reported on the obvious role that NATO intelligence must have played in such a recklessly provocative attack on Russia’s strategic defenses. As such, the Western media is covering up for what could be deemed an act of war on Russia.
The gloating propagandist reporting on the airfield raids was in stark contrast to the relative silence over the terrorist attack on the passenger train.
U.S.-based ABC headlined with “Ukraine targets Russian airfields in major drone attack” and relayed dramatic details of the operation. It was only much further down in the report that ABC mentioned the deadly train explosion, as if it were a minor incident.
It reported: “Elsewhere, at least seven people were killed and 66 injured when a railway bridge collapsed and a train derailed in Russia’s western Bryansk region overnight.”
Note how ABC makes out that a bridge collapsed as if by gravity without explosive sabotage. It goes on to distort the terror attack by quoting a Ukrainian regime propagandist who insinuates that the wreckage was somehow carried out by Russia. The warped logic dignified by ABC was that the Russians carried out a fiendish false-flag ploy to scuttle negotiations that were due to take place the following day in Istanbul between Russian and Ukrainian delegates.
The British BBC deployed the same reprehensible disinformation. Its headline was: “At least seven dead after two Russian bridges collapse.”
Again, according to the BBC, bridges just collapse on passenger trains. Like ABC, the BBC buries important Russian information implicating Ukrainian responsibility for detonating explosives in the mass murder of civilians.
Significantly, the BBC also quotes the same Ukrainian regime propaganda source, Andriy Kovalenko, aired by ABC, who is described as “head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council’s Centre for Countering Disinformation.” He is also permitted by the British outlet to accuse Russia of self-inflicted terrorism, allegedly “laying the groundwork to derail the negotiations” in Istanbul.
With blatant distortion, Western media are minimizing what are outrageous acts of terrorism by the NATO-weaponized regime. Sickeningly, deliberate acts of murdering civilians by the NATO-backed regime are twisted upside down as Russian dirty tricks.
Of course, Western media are obliged to tell lies to cover up crimes by their governments and their proxies. In that case, they have lost their pious and pretentious claims of being “independent media”. They are abject propaganda tools, dressed up with self-ordained virtue. And still they have the arrogance to accuse other nations’ media of being state-run propaganda. This charade by Western media has been running for a long time, decades and indeed centuries. It has always been a charade. It’s now flagrantly obvious. No wonder so many Western citizens have contempt for their mainstream media.
The peace talks in Istanbul – the second round was held earlier this week – to try to find an end to the proxy war in Ukraine have largely come about because of Moscow’s initiative. American President Donald Trump’s declared wish to end the conflict has brought the Kiev regime to the table. It is not clear if the talks will succeed.
In the meantime, it is abundantly clear that the NATO axis on both sides of the Atlantic wants the proxy war to continue.
Carrying out provocations and terrorist crimes against civilians is aimed at sabotaging any diplomatic effort.
Russia responded in recent days to the terror assaults last weekend with massive bombardments on Ukraine’s military sites.
Russian President Vladimir Putin warned Trump in a phone call mid-week that retaliation was imminent.
Western media reported Russia’s air strikes by giving prominence to the deaths of five civilians, according to Ukrainian officials. Russia claims it is not deliberately targeting civilian centers. That is an important distinction compared with the NATO-backed regime.
As usual, the latest Russian strikes were reported without a single mention of the terrorist murders of civilians in Russia. It is an all-too-familiar and deplorable pattern of bias. Russian lives are worthless, evidently from the Western perspective.
The one-sided Western media dereliction of journalism is seen over and over again throughout the proxy war in Ukraine. In another notorious distortion this week, the nuclear power plant in Zaporozhye – the biggest in Europe – came under drone attack from the Kiev regime. There were no reports in the Western media of this nuclear terrorism to contaminate Europe. When Western media reported on previous attacks on the ZNPP (by the Kiev forces), it absurdly claimed that Russia is doing the sabotage on a power plant under its control. Just like supposedly blowing up its own trains and citizens.
Western media silence and distortion are not merely disgraceful false propaganda. It is complicity in war crimes by giving cover and license for more.
Ukraine’s most reckless attack: Was NATO behind it?
RT | June 6, 2025
While Western headlines celebrated Operation Spider’s Web as a daring feat of Ukrainian ingenuity, a closer look reveals something far more calculated – and far less Ukrainian. This wasn’t just a strike on Russian airfields. It was a test – one that blended high-tech sabotage, covert infiltration, and satellite-guided timing with the kind of precision that only the world’s most advanced intelligence networks can deliver. And it begs the question: who was really pulling the strings?
Let’s be honest. Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence didn’t act alone. It couldn’t have.
Even if no Western agency was directly involved in the operation itself, the broader picture is clear: Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, its military, and even its top political leadership rely heavily on Western intelligence feeds. Ukraine is deeply embedded within NATO’s intelligence-sharing architecture. The idea of a self-contained Ukrainian intel ecosystem is largely a thing of the past. These days, Kiev draws primarily on NATO-provided data, supplementing it with its own domestic sources where it can.
That’s the backdrop – a hybrid model that’s become standard over the past two years. Now, let’s look more closely at Operation Spider’s Web itself. We know the planning took roughly 18 months and involved moving drones covertly into Russian territory, hiding them, and then orchestrating coordinated attacks on key airfields. So how likely is it that Western intelligence agencies had a hand in such a complex operation?
Start with logistics. It’s been reported that 117 drones were prepped for launch inside Russia. Given that numerous private companies in Russia currently manufacture drones for the war effort, it wouldn’t have been difficult to assemble the necessary devices under that cover. That’s almost certainly what happened. Components were likely purchased domestically under the guise of supplying the “Special Military Operation.” Still, it’s hard to believe Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence could have pulled off this mass procurement and assembly alone. It’s highly likely Western intelligence agencies played a quiet but crucial role – especially in securing specialized components.
Then there’s the explosives. If the operation’s command center was located in the Ural region, as some suggest, it’s plausible that explosives or components were smuggled in via neighboring CIS countries. That kind of border-hopping precision doesn’t happen without outside help. In fact, it mirrors tactics long perfected by intelligence services in both the US and Western Europe.
Because make no mistake: this wasn’t just the CIA’s playground. European services – particularly those in the UK, France, and Germany – possess the same capabilities to execute and conceal such an operation. The NATO intelligence community may have different national flags, but it speaks with one voice in the field.
The real giveaway, however, lies in the timing of the strikes. These weren’t blind attacks on static targets. Russia’s strategic bombers frequently rotate bases. Commercial satellite imagery – updated every few days at best – simply can’t track aircraft on the move. And yet these drones struck with exquisite timing. That points to a steady flow of real-time surveillance, likely derived from signals intelligence, radar tracking, and live satellite feeds – all tools in the Western intelligence toolbox.
Could Ukraine, on its own, have mustered that kind of persistent, multidomain awareness? Not a chance. That level of situational intelligence is the domain of NATO’s most capable agencies – particularly those tasked with monitoring Russian military infrastructure as part of their day job.
For years now, Ukraine has been described in Western media as a plucky underdog using low-cost tactics to take on a larger foe. But beneath the David vs. Goliath narrative lies a more uncomfortable truth: Ukraine’s intelligence ecosystem is now deeply embedded within NATO’s operational architecture. Real-time feeds from US and European satellites, intercepts from British SIGINT stations, operational planning consultations with Western handlers – this is the new normal.
Ukraine still has its own sources, but it’s no longer running a self-contained intelligence operation. That era ended with the first HIMARS launch.
Western officials, of course, deny direct involvement. But Russian investigators are already analyzing mobile traffic around the impact sites. If it turns out that these drones weren’t connected to commercial mobile networks – if, instead, they were guided through encrypted, military-grade links – it will be damning. Not only would that confirm foreign operational input, it would expose the full extent of how Western assets operated inside Russia without detection.
At that point, no amount of plausible deniability will cover the truth. The question will no longer be whether NATO participated – but how deep that participation ran.
Profiles in courage: Trump & Eisenhower
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | June 6, 2025
President Donald Trump had a difficult week. No, this isn’t about Elon Musk or Harvard University. On Wednesday, his call to Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t go well. It turned into a ‘conversation’, as Trump wrote on Truth Social, lasting only an hour and 15 minutes, which means, setting aside the time for interpretation, it left no room for substantive discussions.
The call took place against the backdrop of the attack on Russia’s nuclear force on June 1. Trump acknowledged in his Truth Social post later that Putin spoke “strongly” about Russia’s response to come. The post was notable for its subdued tone.
We wouldn’t know whether Putin brought up Western involvement. The Kremlin merely noted that “Donald Trump reiterated that the Americans had not been informed about this [attack] in advance.”
Zelensky’s version is that the attack was in the pipeline for the past 18-month period. Yet, we are to believe, neither the CIA nor MI6 whose operatives run the show in Kiev got an inkling of it. Trump’s Truth Social post simply omitted this crucial part of the conversation with Putin, which is highly significant — and consequential.
Especially, as Kremlin-funded RT had already carried one report citing the assessment of an ex-French intelligence officer that the Ukrainian targeting couldn’t have been possible without US satellite inputs.
Earlier, Tass also had carried a similar report citing a former US naval officer who estimated that the 18 month-period was when the Biden administration was virtually on auto-pilot (due to the president’s dementia). An interesting thought in itself?
Tass quoted the American source who actually said on a War Room podcast: “So, who was it on the American side that either gave the greenlight to this or provided the initial intelligence targeting? Hey, where is William Burns and Jack Sullivan, the neocon whizkids in Biden’s team?
Again, on the same day as Trump spoke to Putin, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned at a news conference in Moscow, “The fact that certain circles in the United States have been and are still hatching plans to move towards eradicating Russia as a state is also undeniable… We should not underestimate the consequences of such a mindset… Russian society should remain in a state of high readiness for any intrigues.”
Interestingly, Ryabkov called on Washington and London specifically to speak up on the attack on Russian airfields. As he put it, “We demand that both London and Washington respond in a manner that stops this recent round of escalation of tensions.”
When asked about the Ukrainian attack on Wednesday in Brussels, NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte came up with an ingenious argument: “Let’s not forget that the capabilities they hit were the capabilities the Russians were using to attack innocent people going about their daily lives in Ukrainian cities and communities. So I think we should take note of that.” Clearly, the poor chap was in the loop! Rutte refused to speak further.
Equally, the social media is awash with the assessments by some prominent American experts, especially ex-CIA analysts, pointing a finger directly at the agency’s involvement. Of course, Russia has the experience and technical expertise to dig deep.
There are comparable situations. What comes to mind is the famous U-2 spy plane incident on May 1, 1961. Perhaps, Trump is finding himself in the same embarrassing situation as President Dwight Eisenhower.
Do we give the benefit of the doubt to Trump that he too was unaware of the strike on Russia’s nuclear force on June 1? To my mind, the analogy of the U-2 incident holds good — a rare cold-war era confrontation over the US’ blatant violation of Russian sovereignty and territory at a critical juncture just when the White House was navigting an improvement of relations with Russia.
Eisenhower was kept in the dark about the full details of the U-2 although countdown had begun for his planned summit meeting with Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, in Paris to discuss a Soviet-American detente (just what Trump is attempting with Putin.) The following excerpts from the archives of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial, Eisenhower National Historic Site are most insightful:
“[U-2 spy plane pilot Gary] Powers did have a contingency in the form of a concealed needle with the poison Saxitoxin. If injected, this would have killed him and prevented his capture. Powers did not utilize this and was surrounded by Soviet citizens very soon after he touched down. Soviet citizens soon found his United States issued firearm, and other items bearing the flag of the U.S., turning him over to Soviet officials. Powers, and what was left of his spy plane, were shipped to Moscow be researched and documented. In a matter of hours, Khrushchev was informed of the captured pilot and the wrecked U-2.
“When Powers was overdue to land at Norway [U-2 had taken off from its base in Peshawar], the CIA started to consider what might have happened. As a result, their contingency plan went into action. To prevent the public and the Soviets from learning the true nature of the U-2 aircraft, a misinformation campaign began. A NASA press release stated one of their high-altitude weather research U-2 aircraft had gone missing over Turkey, and that it may have drifted into Soviet airspace because of an unconscious pilot. A U-2 was shown off in NASA colors as well to help sell the story. Khruschev learned of this story from the Americans and decided to lay a trap for the United States and for Eisenhower.
“The Soviets released information that a spy plane was shot down but did not include any other information on the status of the aircraft or Powers. The U.S. believed it could shape the narrative further and kept releasing “reports” of oxygen difficulties in the aircraft and that the auto pilot may have sent the plane into Soviet territory. Once the deception from the United States grew large enough, on May 7th, Khruschev sprung his trap by stating the pilot was alive, and that the Soviets had captured the remains of the aircraft, which contained a camera and film of Soviet Military Installations. This destroyed the cover story and was a public embarrassment for the United States and for President Eisenhower. The President learned of this at the office of his Gettysburg residence, where he got a phone call informing him the Soviets had captured Powers. This shattered the peace and tranquility of his stay in Gettysburg, and he knew that he would be held responsible in the eyes of the Soviet Union. In a remark to an aide, Eisenhower reportedly said, “I would like to resign.”
While Eisenhower did not resign, the U-2 incident and the acute embarrassment so close to the end of his second term defined his Cold War legacy. Khrushchev cancelled the Paris summit and Soviet-American detente had to wait until Henry Kissinger consolidated his grip over US foreign policy strategies. Nonetheless, the Deep State, which loathed detente, booby-trapped Richard Nixon’s presidency!
Eisenhower’s sense of betrayal is reflected in his farewell address when he bitterly called out the Deep State and prophesied that it will someday wreck America’s democracy.
History is repeating. Look at the cascading turbulence already around Trump presidency. Eighty two out of 100 members of the Senate are co-sponsoring a bill by Senator Lindsey Graham (whose affiliation to the Deep State is legion), forcing Trump’s hands to impose “bone-breaking” sanctions against Russia, whose sole objective is to stall any improvement of US-Russia relations. Meanwhile, a call for impeachment of Trump is already in the air.
Amb. M.K Bhadrakumar: Russia Must Respond to the Attack on Its Nuclear Forces
Amb. M.K Bhadrakumar and Glenn Diesen
Glenn Diesen | June 5, 2025
Indian Ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar argues that Trump’s words do not match his actions. It is extremely unlikely that the US was not involved in the attack on Russia’s nuclear forces, and Bhadrakumar argues that the failure by Russia to respond would be profoundly irresponsible. Ambassador Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat for 30 years in the Indian Foreign Service, and is now a columnist for Hindu and Deccan Herald Indian newspapers.
The United States and Greenland, Part I: Episodes in Nuclear History 1947-1968
Greenland “Green Light”: Danish PM’s Secret Acquiescence Encouraged U.S. Nuclear Deployments
Pentagon Approved Nuclear-Armed B-52 Flights Over Greenland
National Security Archive | June 3, 2025
The Trump administration’s intention to acquire Greenland, including possibly by force, has put a focus on the history of its strategic interest to U.S. policymakers. Today, the National Security Archive publishes the first of a two-part declassified document collection on the U.S. role in Greenland during the middle years of the Cold War, covering the decisions that led to the secret deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Danish territory in 1958 to the 1968 crash of a nuclear-armed B-52 bomber near Thule Air Base that left plutonium-laced debris scattered across miles of Arctic sea ice.[1]
The radioactive mess caused by the accident required a major clean-up and caused a serious controversy in U.S.-Denmark relations. The U.S. had never officially told Denmark that it was flying nuclear weapons over Greenland, although Danish officials suspected it; nor had the U.S. informed the Danes that it had once stored nuclear weapons in Greenland, although in 1957 they had received a tacit “green light” to do so from the Danish prime minister, according to documents included in today’s posting. But both the nuclear-armed overflights of Greenland and the storage of nuclear weapons there were in strong contradiction to Denmark’s declared non-nuclear policy. When the bomber crash exposed the overflights, Denmark tried to resolve the conflict by seeking a U.S. pledge that Greenland would be nuclear free.
This new publication revisits the nuclear and strategic history of the United States and Greenland as it emerged during the late 1940s through the crash in 1968, highlighting key declassified documents from the archival record, FOIA releases, the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), and other sources. The analysis draws on the work of U.S. and Danish scholars who have written about the B-52 crash and the history of the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland during the Cold War, including revelations in the 1990s that prompted Danish experts to revisit the historical record.[2]
Part I, below, looks at U.S. strategic interests in Greenland in the early Cold War period, including Danish government acquiescence to the storage of nuclear weapons there, U.S. nuclear-armed airborne alert flights over Greenland, and the 1968 B-52 crash. Part II will document the aftermath of the accident, including the clean-up of contaminated ice, the U.S.-Denmark government nuclear policy settlement, and the failed search for lost nuclear weapons parts deep in the waters of North Star Bay.
Background
Greenland has been seen as an important strategic interest to United States defense officials and policymakers since World War II. After the fall of France in June 1940, the Nazis seized Denmark, and the Roosevelt administration feared that Germany would occupy Greenland, threatening Canada and the United States. In response, the U.S. insisted that Greenland was part of the Western Hemisphere and thus a territory that had to be “assimilated to the general hemispheric system of continental defense.” The U.S. began talks with Danish Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann, who was acting on his own authority as “leader of the Free Danes” and in defiance of the German occupiers. On 9 April 1941, Kauffmann signed an extraordinary agreement with Washington giving the United States almost unlimited access to build military facilities in Greenland and would remain valid as long as there were “dangers to the American continent,” after which the two parties could modify or terminate it. By the end of World War II, the U.S. had 17 military facilities in Greenland. After the liberation of Denmark from German rule, the Danish Parliament ratified the Kauffmann-U.S. agreement on 23 May 1945, but it assumed its early termination, with Denmark taking over Greenland’s defense.[3]
In 1946, the Truman administration gave brief consideration to buying Greenland because it continued to see it as important for U.S. security.[4] During 1947, with the U.S. beginning to define the Soviet Union as an adversary, defense officials saw Greenland as an important “primary base,” especially because they were unsure about long-term access to Iceland and the Azores.[5] Thus, maintaining U.S. access was an important concern, as exemplified in an early National Security Council report that U.S. bases in Greenland, along with Iceland and the Azores, were of “extreme importance” for any war “in the next 15 or 20 years.” For their part, Danish authorities had no interest in selling Greenland but sought to restore their nation’s sovereignty there; having joined NATO, they dropped their traditional neutrality approach and were more willing to accept a limited U.S. presence. In late 1949, the U.S. and Denmark opened what became drawn out negotiations over Greenland; during 1950, the U.S. even returned some facilities to Denmark, including Sandrestrom air base. But in late 1950, with Cold War tensions deepening, the Pentagon gave the negotiations greater priority, seeking an agreement that would let the U.S. develop a base at Thule as part of an air strategy designed to reach Soviet targets across the Arctic.[6]
In April 1951, the two countries reached an agreement on the “defense of Greenland” that superseded the 1941 treaty, confirmed Danish sovereignty, and delineated three “defense areas” for use by the United States, with additional areas subject to future negotiations. Under the agreement, each signatory would “take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry out expeditiously their respective and joint responsibilities in Greenland, in accordance with NATO plans.” Consistent with that broad guidance, the U.S. would be free to operate its bases as it saw fit, including the movement of “supplies,” and with no restrictions on its access to airspace over Greenland. With this agreement, Washington had achieved its overriding security goals in Greenland. To move the agreement through Parliament, the Danish government emphasized its defensive character, although the negotiators and top officials understood that U.S. objectives went beyond that.[7]
In 1955, a few years after the 1951 agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to revive interest in purchasing Greenland to ensure U.S. control over the strategically important territory and without having to rely on an agreement with another government. But the JCS proposal never found traction in high levels of the Eisenhower administration. The State Department saw no point to it, since the United States was already “permitted to do almost anything, literally, that we want to in Greenland.” The 1951 agreement stayed in place for decades. Denmark and the United States finally modified it in 2004, limiting the “defense area” to Thule Air Base and taking “Greenland Home Rule” more fully into account.
Nuclear Issues
When the U.S. negotiated the 1951 agreement, nuclear deployments were not an active consideration in official thinking about a role for U.S. bases for Greenland. Yet by 1957, when U.S. government agencies, including the State Department, became interested in deploying nuclear bombs at Thule, they used the agreement’s open-ended language to justify such actions. According to an August 1957 letter signed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, the Agreement was “sufficiently broad to permit the use of facilities in Greenland for the introduction and storage of [nuclear] weapons.” The problem was to determine whether Danish leaders would see it that way.
While Defense Department officials were willing to go ahead on the deployments without consulting the Danish Government, Murphy thought it best to seek the advice of the U.S. ambassador, former Nebraska Governor Val Peterson. Peterson recommended bringing the question to Danish authorities and, having received the Department’s approval, in mid-November 1957 he asked Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen if he wished to be informed about nuclear deployments. By way of reply, Hansen handed Peterson a “vague and indefinite” paper that U.S. and Danish officials interpreted as a virtual “green light” for the deployments. Hansen raised no objections, asked for no information, and tacitly accepted the U.S. government’s loose interpretation of the 1951 agreement. He insisted, however, that the U.S. treat his response as secret because he recognized how dangerous it was for domestic politics, where anti-nuclear sentiment was strong, and for Denmark’s relations with the Soviet Union, which would have strongly objected.[8]
When Prime Minister Hansen tacitly approved the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland, he was initiating what Danish scholar Thorsten Borring Olesen has characterized as a “double standard” nuclear policy. On the one hand, in a May 1957 address, Hansen had stated that the government would not receive nuclear weapons “under the present conditions.” Thus, Denmark abstained from NATO nuclear storage and sharing plans as they developed in the following years. On the other hand, the Danish leadership treated Greenland differently with respect to nuclear weapons even though, as of 1953, it was no longer a colony but a county represented in Parliament. This double standard was not necessarily a preference for Denmark’s leaders but they felt constrained by the need to accommodate U.S. policy goals in Greenland. Thus, by keeping their Greenland policy secret, Hansen and his successors kept relations with Washington on an even keel while avoiding domestic political crises and pressure from the Soviet Union.[9]
In 1958, the Strategic Air Command deployed nuclear weapons in Greenland, the details of which were disclosed in a declassified SAC history requested by Hans Kristensen, then with the Nautilus Institute. According to Kristensen’s research and the Danish study of “Greenland During the Cold War,” during 1958 the U.S. deployed four nuclear weapons in Greenland—two Mark 6 atomic bombs and two MK 36 thermonuclear bombs as well as 15 non-nuclear components. That SAC kept bombs there for less than a year suggests that it did not have a clear reason to continue storing them in Greenland. Nevertheless, the U.S. kept nuclear air defense weapons at Thule: 48 nuclear weapons were available for Nike-Hercules air missiles through mid-1965. There may also have been a deployment of nuclear weapons for Falcon air-to-air missiles through 1965, but their numbers are unknown.[10]
Airborne Alert and the January 1968 Crash
If it had only been an issue of the U.S. storing nuclear weapons on the ground in Greenland for a few years, the matter might have been kept under wraps for years. But the crash of a U.S. Air Force B-52 on 21 January 1968 near Thule Air Base exposed another nuclear secret and caused serious difficulties in U.S.-Denmark relations. While the bomber crash was quickly overshadowed by North Korea’s seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo the next day and the Tet offensive that began on 30 January, the coincidence of the three events was a major crisis for the overextended U.S.[11]
Beginning in 1961, accident-prone B-52s were routinely flying over Thule because Greenland had become even more salient to U.S. national security policy. To warn the U.S. of incoming bombers, the Air Force had deployed Distant Early Warning Line radar stations across Alaska and northern Canada during the 1950s and extended them to Greenland in 1960-1961. The Air Force also deployed the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), with a site located near Thule Air Base in 1960. With BMEWS, the U.S. would receive 15 minutes of warning of a ballistic missile launch.
The warning time was important for U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) because it provided the opportunity to launch ground alert bomber forces in the event of an attack. But the possibility of an ICBM strike on U.S. airbases also helped inspire the emergence of airborne alert, whereby SAC kept nuclear-armed B-52s in the air 24 hours a day, ready to move on Soviet targets in the event of war. SAC began to test airborne alert in the late 1950s, and the flights soon became routine. By 1961, SAC had initiated “Chrome Dome,” with 12 B-52s flying two major routes, a Northern Route over North America and a Southern Route across the Atlantic. While SAC leaders used strategic arguments to justify airborne alert, they also had a parochial interest because it kept bombers in the air, giving pilots even more training.[12]
Airborne alert converged with Greenland in August 1961, when SAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan for two B-52 sorties a day to fly over the BMEWS site at Thule. Given the major importance of the BMEWS site, if the Soviets knocked it out in a surprise attack, they could disrupt U.S. early warning capabilities. Thus, SAC insisted on visual observation so that the B-52 crew could check whether the site was intact in the event there were failures in the communications links between Thule and the North American Air Defense Command in Colorado. SAC’s BMEWS Monitor was a routine operation for years, even after the B-52 crash in Palomares, Spain, led to decisions to scale back on airborne alert. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wanted to end the program altogether but accepted a JCS compromise proposal for fewer sorties.
Danish military personnel and others nearby were aware of the daily B-52 flights. Moreover, every year there were emergency landings by U.S. bombers, with three in 1967 alone. After a nuclear-loaded B-52 crashed in western Maryland in January 1964, Eske Brun, Denmark’s Under Secretary for Greenland, wondered whether the B-52s flying over Thule carried nuclear weapons and asked U.S. Ambassador William McCormick Blair about the possibility of an accident. Blair suggested that such an “unfortunate” occurrence would be the price of defending the “free world” and that the flights were consistent with the 1951 agreement. The Danes held internal discussions about whether there were any restrictions on U.S. flights over Greenland and decided not to pursue the matter.
According to Scott Sagan, the January 1968 crash was a “normal accident waiting to happen.” The heating system failed on a bomber carrying four nuclear weapons over Thule, causing foam rubber cushions placed under the seats to catch fire. The crew could not extinguish the flames and bailed out after determining that an emergency landing was impossible, with all but one of the seven crew members surviving. While the nuclear weapons carried on the plane did not detonate when the B-52 crashed on Wolstenholme Fjord, near North Star Bay, conventional high explosives carried in the bombs did, causing plutonium contaminated aircraft parts and bomb debris to scatter about the ice for miles.[13]
To recover what they could of the bombs and assess the contamination, SAC sent an emergency team to Thule, including officials from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). All of this occurred under incredibly difficult conditions, sub-zero temperatures, and winter arctic darkness. Danish officials joined in the effort, although they would not take part in the bomb-salvaging activity. While SAC’s disaster team discovered most of the bomb parts after the accident, it could not find some of the important pieces, which eventually necessitated an underwater search. An equally significant problem was the possible risk to the local ecology from plutonium contamination, including its impact on Inuit hunters. U.S. officials had to find a way to clean up the icy mess quickly and in a way that was satisfactory to Danish authorities.
Immediately after the accident, JCS Chair Earle Wheeler and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered nuclear-armed airborne alert flights to end. SAC would continue the BMEWS Monitor using KC-135 tanker aircraft, but that ended that April 1968 when the flights were switched to the BMEWS site in Clear, Alaska. BMEWS, including the site at Thule, remained a U.S. strategic asset until 2001, when the Air Force replaced it with the Solid State Phase Array Radar System.
Soon after the accident, the Danish Foreign Ministry issued a statement that included this language: “Danish policy regarding nuclear weapons also applies to Greenland and also to air space over Greenland. There are no nuclear weapons in Greenland.” With this statement, the Government of Denmark was beginning to abandon the “double standard” by moving toward a consistent no nuclear policy. How Danish authorities worked with Washington to confirm this policy goal will be the subject of Part II.
The crash of the B-52 was no secret in Denmark, but the fact that airborne alert flights over Greenland were routine during the 1960s did not reach public attention until the early 1990s. Prompted by the revelations, the Danish Government asked the U.S. government for more information, which led the State Department to disclose to the Danish government in July 1995 that the U.S. had deployed nuclear bombs and air defense weapons in Greenland during 1958-1965. The State Department letter was secret, but its contents began to leak. The preceding month, the Danish government had released information on the Hansen paper, creating a political scandal and prompting calls for an investigation of the historical record.
The Danish Institute of International Affairs sponsored the research and published its report in 1996, Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945–1968 [Greenland During the Cold War: Danish and American Security Policy 1945-1968 ]. The report, which included a full reproduction of the Hansen paper, among other revelations, disclosed much of this once-hidden history.[14] Nevertheless, significant State Department and U.S. Embassy records remain classified and have been the subject of declassification requests by National Security Archive to the U.S. National Archives.
