Talk of US-Iran war is all a load of baloney
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | March 26, 2025
The air is thick with the prognosis that a military confrontation between the US and Iran is now just a matter of time. Going by the pattern of such scare mongering in the past decades, Israeli media management skills are self-evident. There is a sense of de javu. Of course, therein lies the danger of miscalculations by the protagonists but that is unlikely to happen.
There are no takers among the regional states for a military conflagration in the Gulf region. The old US-led anti-Iran front has unravelled following the shift in the Iranian and Saudi policies towards reconciliation and amity and the display of strategic autonomy by even those countries who still remain close allies of the US (in particular, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar.)
In a recent interview with the famous American podcaster Tucker Carlson, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani drew an apocalyptic scenario that his country and the Persian Gulf Arab states will run out of water within three days if Iran’s nuclear facilities are targeted by the US or Israel! Does that occur to anyone?
The big question is, what are the intentions of the Trump administration. An underlying assumption here is that President Donald Trump is under obligation to the Jewish-Israeli lobby who funded his election campaign to be supportive of Netanyahu all the way through thick and thin. This assumption is untested yet and may never be, perhaps, given Trump’s complex personality as a deal maker.
According to a recent poll from YouGov, 52% of Americans think Trump will have a shot at a third term; former White House strategist Steve Bannon is convinced that Trump will run and win in 2028. Indeed, Trump himself has not ruled out a 2028 White House bid. This is an X factor, given the historical legacy that the Iran question ultimately proved to be the nemesis of Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Trump, a connoisseur of past American presidencies, cannot be unaware that he ought to tread with great circumspection.
In an interview with Tucker Carlson last week, Trump’s Middle East special envoy Steve Witkoff underscored that regional stabilisation in West Asia demands addressing Iran. In his words, “I would say the goal begins with how do we deal with Iran? That’s the biggie. So the first is nuclear… If they were to have a bomb that would create North Korea in the GCC, we cannot have that… we can never allow someone to have a nuclear weapon and have outsized influence. That doesn’t work. So if we can solve for that, which I’m hopeful that we can.
“The next thing we need to deal with Iran is they’re being a benefactor of these proxy armies because we’ve proven that … they’re not really an existential risk… But if we can get these terrorist organisations eliminated as risks. Not existential, but still risks. They’re destabilising risks. Then we’ll normalise everywhere. I think Lebanon could normalise with Israel, literally normalise, meaning a peace treaty with the two countries. That’s really possible.
“Syria, too, the indications are that Jelani is a different person than he once was. And people do change. You at 55 are completely different than how you were at 35, that’s for sure… So maybe Jelani in Syria is a different guy. They’ve driven Iran out.
“Imagine if Lebanon normalises, Syria normalises, and the Saudis sign a normalisation treaty with Israel because there’s a peace in Gaza. They must have that as a — without question — as a prerequisite. That’s a condition precedent to Saudi normalising. But now you’d begin to have a GCC that all work together. I mean, that would be, it would be epic.”
Does this ‘big picture’ envisage the destruction of Iran as a prerequisite? Not even remotely. And if anyone should know what he is talking about, it is Witkoff.
Later, towards the end of the interview, Carlson drew out Witkoff specifically with regard to Trump’s recent communication addressed to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Excerpts of Witkoff’s remarks are reproduced below:
“Look, he [Trump] sent a letter to the Iranians. Usually it would be the Iranians sending a letter to him…They’re open to attack today. Yeah, they’re a small country compared to ours… If we used overwhelming force, it would be very, very bad for them…
“So under those circumstances, it would be natural for the Iranians to reach out to the President to say, I want to diplomatically solve this. Instead, it’s him doing that. Now, I can tell you that he’s not reaching out because he’s weak, because he is not a weak man. He is a strong man… Maybe the strongest man I’ve ever met in my life…
“So with that all said, he wrote that letter. And why did he write that letter? It roughly said, ‘I’m a president of peace. That’s what I want. There’s no reason for us to do this militarily. We should talk. We should clear up the misconceptions. We should create a verification program so that nobody worries about weaponisation of your nuclear material. And I’d like to get us to that place because the alternative is not a very good alternative.’ That’s a rough encapsulation of what was said…
“The Iranians have reached back out, and I’m not at liberty to talk about specifics, but clearly, through back channels, through multiple countries and multiple conduits, they’ve reached back out.
“I think that it has a real possibility of being solved diplomatically, not because I’ve talked to anybody in Iran, but just because I think logically it makes sense that it ought to be solved diplomatically. It should be.
“I think the President has acknowledged that he’s open to an opportunity to clean it all up with Iran, where they come back to the world and be a great nation once again and not have to be sanctioned and being able to grow their economy. Their economy—I mean, these are very smart people. Their economy was once a wonderful economy. They’re being strangled and suffocated today. There’s no need for that to happen.
“They can join the League of Nations and we can have a better relationship and grow that relationship… That’s the alternative he’s presenting… he wants to deal with Iran with respect. He wants to build trust with them if it’s possible. And that’s his directive to his administration. And hopefully, that will be met positively by the Iranians.
“And I’m certainly hopeful for it. I think anything can be solved with dialogue by clearing up misconception and miscommunication and disconnects between people… And the president is a president who doesn’t want to go to war, and he’ll use military action to stop a war … In this particular case, hopefully it won’t be necessary. Hopefully, we can do it at the negotiating table…”
Again, do such remarks sound like war mongering? Curiously, in the interview, Witkoff openly welcomed an opportunity to serve as Trump’s special envoy to Iran to navigate the dialogue and peaceful resolution of issues.
To my mind, Iranians understand the meaning of Trump’s letter. They are now in an engaging mood as back channels are clocking hours. A commentary by Nour News, a mouthpiece of the Iranian security establishment, rather playfully titled as Analysis of Trump’s Letter to Iran from a Game Theory Perspective, speaks for the mood in Tehran. Read it here.
Make no mistake that Iran and the US are seasoned adversaries who have absolute mastery over the guardrails that contain tensions from escalating in their complicated relationship.
Even Realists Overstate the ‘China Threat’
By Joseph Solis-Mullen | The Libertarian Institute | March 26, 2025
Perusing the most recent edition of Foreign Affairs, which was typically dreadful, one piece caught my eye. In “The Taiwan Fixation,” Stephen Wertheim and Jennifer Kavanagh argued that a full-scale U.S. military intervention over Taiwan would be catastrophic, and that Washington should seek to balance building up Taiwan’s defense while insulating its own broader Indo-Pacific strategy from Taipei’s fate.
Their critique of full-blown interventionism is, of course, well-founded, and was a welcome sight, but their core assumptions remain unfortunately rooted in the flawed logic of American primacy. Even as they downplay alarmist rhetoric, they still accept an overstated vision of China’s potential threat and Washington’s supposed stake in Taiwan.
At its core, “The Taiwan Fixation” fails to escape the same errors that underpin most discussions on U.S.-China relations. It assumes that Taiwan is of critical strategic importance to American security, that China’s control of the island would be an unacceptable shift in the regional balance of power, and that some level of U.S. intervention remains necessary. But as I argued in The Fake China Threat, these claims are fundamentally weak. The United States has no compelling strategic interest in Taiwan, Beijing has little incentive to disrupt regional trade routes, and Taipei itself seems far more interested in lobbying Washington for protection than in seriously investing in its own defense.
Wertheim and Kavanagh attempt to position Taiwan as strategically valuable but stop short of the full-blown liberal internationalist and neoconservative argument that its loss would be a geopolitical catastrophe. Instead, they argue that while Beijing’s control over Taiwan wouldn’t transform China into an immediate hegemon, it would complicate U.S. military operations and potentially embolden China in the region.
This claim doesn’t hold up under scrutiny. Taiwan is not a vital interest of the United States. The U.S. does not need Taiwan for trade, military positioning, or economic security. As Wertheim himself concedes, Taiwan’s loss wouldn’t fundamentally alter the balance of power in Asia. The idea that China could use Taiwan as a springboard for wider expansion is speculative at best—especially when Japan, India, and other regional actors already have strong incentives to counterbalance China regardless of what happens in Taipei.
One of the article’s weakest points is its flirtation with the classic “credibility” argument—the notion that if the United States fails to defend Taiwan, allies like Japan or the Philippines will start doubting Washington’s commitments. This argument has been trotted out since the Cold War to justify interventions from Vietnam to Afghanistan, and it remains just as flimsy today.
Japan’s leaders have already signaled that Taiwan is not a make-or-break issue for them. Despite constant American warnings, no Asian country is poised to abandon its alliance with Washington over Taiwan’s fate. India and Japan, the two regional powers most capable of countering Beijing, already have their own deep-seated strategic reasons to oppose Chinese expansionism. Their security policies aren’t contingent on what Washington does in Taiwan.
If anything, it’s the United States that risks undermining its own credibility by committing to a fight over Taiwan. The more Washington signals an absolute commitment to Taipei’s defense, the more pressure it creates for itself to intervene—setting up a scenario where its own rhetoric forces it into an unnecessary war.
Wertheim and Kavanagh advocate for the “porcupine” strategy—arming Taiwan with asymmetric capabilities like sea mines, missile batteries, and drone fleets to make an invasion costly for China. Superficially, this seems like a clever alternative to direct U.S. intervention. In reality, it risks provoking the very war it is meant to prevent.
If Washington floods Taiwan with weapons and escalates military cooperation, Beijing may conclude that peaceful reunification is no longer viable. As Wertheim himself acknowledges, Taiwan arming itself “too well” could force China’s hand, making an invasion more likely rather than deterring it. This isn’t just theoretical. The logic follows from the same security dilemmas that have fueled arms races throughout history: the more one side hardens its defenses, the more the other feels compelled to strike before it loses its window of opportunity.
This isn’t just a U.S.-China issue—it’s also a question of Taipei’s own incentives. Taiwan has consistently underinvested in its own defense, spending only about 2.5% of its GDP on the military, despite claiming existential threats from Beijing. Why? Because it has calculated—correctly—that lobbying Washington is far cheaper than paying for its own defense. As Ben Freeman has pointed out, Taipei has spent tens of millions lobbying Congress and funding think tanks that push for greater U.S. military commitments. Why spend hundreds of billions on weapons when you can spend a fraction of that buying influence in Washington?
Wertheim and Kavanagh criticize Taiwan for failing to reorient its defense spending but still assume that Washington should step in and “encourage” (i.e., coerce) Taipei into adopting a more robust posture. But if Taiwan itself is unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices, why should American taxpayers foot the bill? The answer is simple: they shouldn’t.
Perhaps the most glaring omission in “The Taiwan Fixation”—one that even realists like Wertheim often overlook—is that Taiwan is not a separate state in the conventional sense. It remains, officially and historically, a part of China. The Chinese Civil War never formally ended, and U.S. intervention in the Taiwan issue has always been an act of interference in a domestic Chinese conflict.
Imagine if, at the height of the American Civil War, Britain had not only recognized the Confederacy but armed it and promised to fight the Union on its behalf. That’s essentially the position Washington has taken with Taiwan. The United States has no legitimate role in deciding the island’s future. Every time it sells weapons to Taipei or conducts military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, it is actively inserting itself into a conflict where it has no rightful place.
The logical conclusion of this reality should be clear: Taiwan is China’s problem, not Washington’s. Wertheim does acknowledge that American policy should aim for “competitive coexistence” rather than outright confrontation. But he stops short of drawing the real conclusion, one that follows naturally from his own arguments: the United States should be preparing to disengage from Taiwan entirely, not reinforcing its involvement.
Wertheim and Kavanagh offer a more grounded view of Taiwan policy than the usual Beltway hawks, but their analysis still rests on faulty assumptions. They recognize that Taiwan’s fate doesn’t justify war, yet they continue to insist that some American involvement is necessary. They acknowledge that China wouldn’t become a global hegemon even if it took Taiwan, yet they still assume that its loss would significantly damage U.S. interests. They see the dangers of arming Taiwan too aggressively, yet they continue to endorse the porcupine strategy.
Ultimately, their view of Taiwan remains a product of Washington’s obsession with maintaining primacy rather than accepting a multipolar reality. The United States does not need to “fix” Taiwan policy—it needs to let it go. The alternative is continued entanglement in a conflict that serves no vital American interest and risks dragging Washington into an unwinnable war.
The real China threat isn’t a military one—it’s the threat of policymakers manufacturing crises where none need exist. If the U.S. truly wants to avoid war, it should stop making Taiwan a battlefield of its own choosing.
President Putin: 25 Years of Resisting the US Deep State and European Globalists
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – March 26, 2025
Since winning on March 26, 2000, Putin has fought to protect Russia’s sovereignty—standing up to George Soros, the Rothschilds, and Western elites. Read more to see how he did it.
2025: Putin signaled readiness for dialogue with the US administration on Ukraine, while Donald Trump exposed USAID‘s financial abuses and vowed to target US deep state actors and globalists.
2016: Putin signed a law banning the cultivation and breeding of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in Russia, as well as the import of products containing or produced using GMOs.
2015: Russia declared the National Endowment for Democracy, International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, George Soros’ Open Society Foundations, and other major USAID grant recipients as “undesirable organizations.”
2012: USAID was banned from operating in Russia. Additionally, Russia introduced its “foreign agents” law to regulate foreign-funded NGOs.
2003: Russian oligarch and Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested for embezzlement and tax evasion, ending Western-backed oligarchic influence in Russia. Later, he revealed Lord Jacob Rothschild as his powerful backer and Yukos’ “protector.”
2003: George Soros, who condemned Khodorkovsky’s arrest, shut down his Russia funds. His exit coincided with a surge in color revolutions, but Putin’s Russia resisted the globalist push.
Western support won’t secure victory for Kiev – US intelligence
RT | March 26, 2025
Western military aid to Kiev and sanctions against Russia cannot shift the balance of power in the Ukraine conflict, according to the US Intelligence Community’s 2025 Annual Threat Assessment.
The intelligence community’s official coordinated evaluation of an array of threats lists Russia, China, North Korea and Iran as countries which represent a challenge to US interests.
Moscow holds the advantage on the battlefield, having adapted to outside efforts to assist Ukraine, the report’s authors explain. The “grinding war of attrition” is expected to further weaken Kiev, “regardless of any US or allied attempts to impose new and greater costs on Moscow.”
While the conflict has taken a significant toll in terms of manpower, the assessment notes that it has also afforded Moscow “a wealth of lessons regarding combat against Western weapons and intelligence in a large-scale war.”
This experience probably will challenge future US defense planning, including against other adversaries with whom Moscow is sharing those lessons learned.
Russia has proven to be “adaptable and resilient” during what it views as a Western proxy war, enhancing its military capabilities across several domains, including unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and the integration of cyber operations with conventional military maneuvers, the report explains.
It warns that Western efforts to undermine the Russian economy “have accelerated its investments in alternative partnerships and use of various tools of statecraft to offset US power, with China’s backing and reinforcement.”
Beijing considers the US use of unilateral sanctions illegal under international law and rooted in a “Cold War mentality.” The US assessment states that major non-Western nations are poised to align with Russia in order to pursue policies that challenge American dominance, such as de-dollarization.
The continuation of the Ukraine conflict risks unintentional escalation, the document cautions. Russia is prepared for such scenarios, armed with a substantial strategic arsenal that includes both conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as cyber-warfare and anti-satellite operations capabilities.
“Russia’s air and naval forces remain intact, with the former being more modern and capable” than at the start of direct hostilities, the report states.
The US intelligence community posits that both Moscow and Kiev may have reasons to avoid a hasty resolution on unfavorable terms. Russian President Vladimir Putin perceives that “positive battlefield trends allow for some strategic patience,” while Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky likely fears that a clear defeat could “prompt domestic backlash.”
Russia and US agree to key maritime initiative – Kremlin
RT | March 25, 2025
Russia and the US have committed to advancing the Black Sea Initiative as a step towards settling the Ukraine conflict, according to a statement released by the Kremlin on Tuesday.
The agreement follows the 12-hour talks focused on the Ukraine conflict held on Monday in Saudi Arabia by expert groups from the two countries.
The sides discussed steps to ensure safe navigation in the Black Sea, including a pledge to avoid the use of force and prevent commercial vessels from being used for military purposes, while agreeing on control measures such as ship inspections.
The US has vowed to “help restore access for Russian agricultural and fertilizer exports to the world market, reduce the cost of insurance for maritime transportation, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions,” according to the Kremlin statement.
The agreement envisions lifting restrictions on Russian Agricultural Bank and other financial institutions involved in international trade of food and fertilizers, including reconnecting them to the SWIFT payment system. It also includes removing sanctions on Russian-flagged vessels, port services, and the supply of agricultural machinery and related goods to Russia.
According to the statement, Moscow and Washington have also agreed to develop measures to enforce the 30-day ban on strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia and Ukraine that was agreed last week. There would be an option to extend the arrangement or abandon it if either side fails to comply.
The two sides also welcomed the involvement of third countries in supporting agreements on energy and maritime matters.
The US and Russia “will continue efforts to achieve a lasting and sustainable peace,” the statement concludes.
Originally brokered in July 2022 by the UN and Türkiye, the Black Sea Grain Initiative aimed to ensure the safe passage of Ukrainian agricultural exports in return for the easing of Western restrictions on Russia’s grain and fertilizer trade. Moscow did not renew the deal in 2023, citing the West’s failure to uphold its commitments.
Why did Jeffrey Goldberg leave the ‘bomb Yemen’ Signal chat?
By Max Blumenthal | The Grayzone | March 25, 2025
Atlantic Magazine editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg has won the admiration of his Beltway peers for the conduct he displayed after being accidentally invited into a smoke-filled “bomb Yemen” Signal chat with Trump’s national security honchos and top advisors. “Props to Jeffrey Goldberg for his high standards as a professional journalist,” declared Ian Bremmer, the trans-Atlanticist foreign policy pundit on his Bank of America-sponsored GZero podcast. “When he realized the conversation was authentic he immediately left, informed the relevant senior official, and made the public aware without disclosing intelligence that could damage the United States.”
But what exactly did Goldberg do to deserve such high praise?
With a once in a lifetime opportunity to view and report on high level discussions on the US launching an illegal war on Yemen, Goldberg chose to avert his gaze and leave the scene as soon as he could, apparently because maintaining such unparalleled access would have compelled him to report on discussions that might have complicated a war being waged on behalf of the Israeli apartheid state to which he emigrated as a young man. Instead of exploiting his front row seat to the Trump admin’s war planning – a vantage point that would have yielded countless scoops and a bestselling book for any adversarial journalist – Goldberg bolted and dutifully informed the White House about the unfortunate situation.
From there, the story became a palace intrigue over an embarrassing failure of “opsec,” or operational security, and not one about the policy itself, which entails a gargantuan empire bombarding a poor, besieged country because it is controlled by a popular movement that is currently the only force on the planet taking up arms to stop Israel’s genocide in Gaza.
In the fourth paragraph of Goldberg’s Atlantic article about the principals’ Signal group, he strongly implied that he supports the war’s objectives, describing Ansar Allah, or the Houthis, as an “Iran-backed terrorist organization” which upholds a belief system that is (what else?) antisemitic. Given Goldberg’s admission that Waltz first reached out to him at least two days prior to mistakenly adding him to the Signal group, it appears the NSC director had been leaking to the Atlantic editor on behalf of the neocon faction in the Trump White House. And it seems clear why Waltz would have sought to cultivate Goldberg.
During the run-up to to the Iraq war, then-Vice President Dick Cheney cited Goldberg’s bunk reporting alleging deep ties between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda during multiple media appearances hyping up the coming invasion. Under Obama, Goldberg served as Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s errand boy, churning out tall tales about Tel Aviv’s imminent plan to attack Iran’s nuclear sites – unless the US did it first. Since the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, the once-failing Atlantic has suddenly turned a profit, as Goldberg unleashed a firehose of propaganda against the keffiyeh-clad enemies of the magazine’s Upper East Side donor base. This month, with momentum for a strike on Iran building within the Trump White House, Goldberg was summoned once again to move the neocon message, and wound up with more access than he bargained for.
When asked in a March 24 interview with CNN’s Kaitlan Collins why he left the Trump principals’ Signal group voluntarily, Goldberg ducked the question. But as Ian Bremmer suggested, he did so out of deference to power and an abiding belief in a US empire hellbent on protecting Israel. And in the culture of Beltway access journalism, that’s considered a laudable trait.
Putin’s Senior Aide Patrushev Shared Some Updates About The Arctic & Baltic Fronts
By Andrew Korybko | March 23, 2025
Putin’s senior aide Nikolai Patrushev, who ran the FSB for nearly a decade (1999-2008) before chairing the Security Council for over 15 years till recently (2008-2024), shared some updates about the Baltic and Arctic fronts of the New Cold War in a recent interview with Russia’s National Defense magazine. He began by blaming the Brits for orchestrating Baltic tensions in order to disrupt the incipient Russian-US normalization process and associated talks on Ukraine.
In connection with that, he also warned that some NATO members (presumably led by the British) are practicing cyberattacks against Russian ships’ navigation equipment and suggested that they might have been responsible for recent claims of sabotage in the Baltic, which prompted a larger naval presence. This same expanded presence poses a threat to Russia’s interests and could manifest itself through terrorist attacks against its underwater pipelines, tankers, and dry cargo ships.
Russia plans to defend against this through unmanned underwater systems and strengthening its Baltic Fleet. As for one of the worst-case conventional threats, that of Finland and Estonia teaming up to blockade Russia inside the Gulf of Finland, Patrushev expressed confidence that his country could overcome that plot and punish the aggressors. This segued the conversation into a discussion about Finland, which Patrushev said has a friendly population, unlike its government.
He mentioned how the authorities there distort history to avoid talking about the goal of “Greater Finland”, which took the form of occupying Northwestern Russia, placing its inhabitants into concentration camps, and exterminating the Slavs there. Just like Finland was used by the Nazis as a springboard for aggression against the USSR, so too did Patrushev warn that plans might be afoot for NATO to use it as a springboard potential aggression against Russia.
He then said a few words about how the Arctic is opening up as a new front of competition, mostly due to its resources, but reaffirmed that Russia wants peace and cooperation there instead of rivalry. The Northern Sea Route (NSR), which commemorates its 500th-year conceptualization this year, can help bring that about. Russia will continue developing regional infrastructure and building ice-class vessels for facilitating transit through these waters year-round. It was on that note that the interview ended.
Reviewing Patrushev’s briefing, the first part about blaming the Brits for tensions in the Baltic aligns with what Russia’s Foreign Spy Service (SVR) recently claimed about how the UK is trying to sabotage Trump’s envisaged “New Détente”. It might therefore very well be that they’re attempting to open up this front for that purpose, first through unconventional acts of aggression like “plausibly deniable” terrorist attacks and then possibly escalating to a joint Finnish-Estonian blockade of the Gulf of Finland.
Exposing these plots and expressing confidence in Russia’s ability to overcome them were meant to respectively ensure that the Trump Administration is aware of what the UK is doing and to deter the UK’s regional proxies from going along with this since the US and even the UK might hang them out to dry. Patrushev’s words about Finland were important too in the sense of reminding everyone that governments don’t always reflect the will of the people on the foreign policy front.
At the same time, however, everyone should also be aware of the Finnish government’s historical distortions and the threat that its reckless foreign policy poses to its own people. Wrapping everything up, Patrushev pointed to the Arctic’s importance in Russia’s future planning, and his reaffirmation of its peaceful intentions could be interpreted as a willingness to partner with the US there like their representatives discussed last month in Riyadh. The NSR can also become a vector for cooperation too.
Putting everything together, the Arctic front of the New Cold War is thawing a lot quicker than the Baltic one since the first is where the US could prospectively cooperate with Russia while the second is where the UK could try to provoke a crisis with Russia, but it remains to be seen whether any of this will unfold. Russian-US cooperation in the Arctic is likely conditional on a ceasefire in Ukraine whereas a Russian-NATO conflict in the Baltic orchestrated by the Brits is conditional on them misleading the US about this.
Putin’s interest in a lasting political solution to the Ukrainian Conflict bodes well for the Arctic scenario just like Trump’s criticism of NATO bodes ill for the Baltic one so both ultimately come down to their will. They’re the two most powerful people on the planet so their ties will greatly determine what comes next on those fronts and every other one too. It’s precisely for this reason why the British want to ruin their relations, but after Patrushev just exposed their Baltic plot, that’s a lot less likely to succeed than before.
Kaja Kallas: The EU’s Struggling Foreign Affairs Chief and the Deepening Divide Over Ukraine
By Ricardo Martins | New Eastern Outlook | March 25, 2025
Kaja Kallas’ hardline stance on Russia and failure to unify EU nations have weakened her position as the EU’s Foreign Affairs chief. With the EU out of the negotiation table over Ukraine, internal divisions, diplomatic missteps, and failed Ukraine aid negotiations, is she still fit to lead Europe’s foreign policy?
Why Has the European Foreign Affairs Chief’s Position Weakened?
The position of the European Union’s Foreign Affairs chief has weakened under Kaja Kallas due to multiple diplomatic missteps, internal EU divisions, and a lack of broad strategic support. The most dramatic setback for EU diplomacy is its exclusion from the negotiating table on ending the war in Ukraine.
Kallas’ tenure has been marked by an anti-Russian stance, an aggressive push for military aid to Ukraine, and a failure to build consensus among EU member states. This has led to her increasing isolation, both within the EU and on the global diplomatic stage. When in Washington, a few days ago, Kallas was left in the waiting room and not received by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
The German prestigious newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has sounded the alarm on the EU top diplomat’s weak performance. One of the main reasons for this decline, according to ZAZ, is Kallas’ inability to secure the backing of key EU nations. Her proposal for a €40 billion aid package for Ukraine was met with resistance, not just from Hungary and Slovakia, but also from France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. These countries, which have contributed less to Ukraine than Denmark alone, opposed increasing their financial commitment, revealing a deep divide within the EU regarding the war. Kallas also alienated many diplomats by dismissing high-ranking officials from Italy and Spain from the European External Action Service (EEAS), further reducing her influence.
Who is Kaja Kallas, and Why Did Her Anti-Russian Stance Lead to the EU’s Sidelining?
Kaja Kallas, the former Prime Minister of Estonia and a known critic of Russia, became the EU’s Foreign Affairs chief in December. Her strong anti-Russian rhetoric aligns with the Baltic States’ hardline stance, but this position has made her a controversial figure. Instead of facilitating diplomatic engagement, she has pushed for maximum pressure on the continuation of the war, alienating key EU partners that at this stage favour negotiation.
Her insistence on an uncompromising stance against Russia has sidelined the EU in international peace talks. By strongly criticizing Washington’s approach—especially U.S. President Donald Trump’s efforts to pressure Ukraine into a settlement—Kallas further isolated the EU. Her comments referring to a potential U.S.-brokered deal as a “dirty deal” led to a diplomatic snub in Washington, where meetings with key American officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, were abruptly cancelled.
Why Did Kallas Fail to Secure the €40 Billion Ukraine Aid Package?
Kallas failed to secure the €40 billion military aid package for Ukraine due to opposition from several EU countries. While she claimed there was “broad political support,” the reality was different. The resistance came not only from Hungary, which has consistently opposed military aid to Ukraine, but also from France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. These countries refused to make significantly larger contributions, likely due to domestic economic concerns and political calculations.
The aid package’s failure was also linked to Kallas’ poor strategic approach. She unexpectedly reintroduced the proposal after the Munich Security Conference, without adequately preparing the groundwork or securing commitments from key stakeholders. Her failure to engage Southern European countries, many of whom had closer ties with her predecessor Josep Borrell, weakened her position further.
How the North-South and East-West EU Divide Affects Ukraine Support
The EU remains divided on its Ukraine policy, with a noticeable split between Northern/Eastern European nations and Southern European countries. Countries like Estonia, Poland, and the Nordic states have strongly supported Ukraine, advocating for increased military aid and a hardline stance against Russia. Meanwhile, Southern European nations, led by France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, have been reluctant to escalate support further.
This divide makes a unified EU approach to Ukraine difficult. Kallas’ failure to bridge these differences has weakened her effectiveness as Foreign Affairs chief, as her confrontational approach has alienated key players in both the EU and broader international diplomacy.
Kallas’ Controversial Tweet and Calls for European Leadership
On February 28, 2025, Kallas tweeted:
“Today, it became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.”
This tweet generated controversy because it was widely interpreted as a criticism of U.S. leadership, particularly in the context of Trump’s renewed approach to Ukraine. Given the EU’s limited ability to act independently in military and geopolitical affairs, Kallas’ call for Europe to take the lead was seen as unrealistic. Some analysts viewed her remarks as undermining further transatlantic relations at a time when European unity and cooperation with the U.S. were crucial.
Is Kallas Following a Strategy of Financial Attrition in Ukraine?
Kallas appears to be following a strategy based on the idea that the Ukraine war will end when no side can afford to continue. This is consistent with the belief expressed by EU diplomats that the conflict will only cease when economic and military exhaustion forces a resolution.
However, this approach carries significant risks. If EU financial support dwindles or political will weakens, Ukraine could find itself forced into a settlement unfavourable to its long-term security. The lack of a clear long-term EU strategy beyond financial and military aid suggests that Kallas’ approach is reactive rather than proactive.
Is Kallas’ Anti-Russia Stance Compromising Her Diplomatic Role?
Kallas’ intense dislike of Russia has undoubtedly compromised her effectiveness as the EU’s top diplomat. Kaja Kallas frequently expresses her personal views and a strong dislike of Putin and Russia in public, even during official events. On several occasions, she has openly stated that she does not trust Putin, overlooking the fact that, in such settings, she is speaking not for herself but on behalf of 27 EU countries and representing a prestigious institution. Such behaviour is widely seen as diplomatically unprofessional.
Diplomacy requires flexibility, negotiation, and relationship-building—qualities that her hardline approach has undermined. By sidelining herself from peace talks, clashing with key EU nations, and alienating Washington, she has weakened her ability to influence the direction of EU foreign policy.
Is Kallas Still Fit to Lead EU Foreign Policy?
There is growing speculation that Kallas may not be able to continue leading EU foreign policy effectively. Her diplomatic missteps, failure in Washington, her failure to unify EU nations, and inability to secure key policy goals have led to increasing criticism. Some EU officials are reportedly considering the appointment of a special envoy for Ukraine, which would effectively bypass her role in one of the EU’s most pressing foreign policy challenges.
Ultimately, while Kallas’ strong stance against Russia aligns with the policies of EU nations, her inability to build consensus and engage in effective diplomacy has weakened her authority. If she cannot adjust her approach, her tenure as EU Foreign Affairs chief may be short-lived.
Ricardo Martins ‒ PhD in Sociology, specializing in policies, European and world politics and geopolitics
Ian Proud: Britain Will Slowly Adjust to the US Position on Ukraine to Remain Relevant
Glenn Diesen | March 24, 2025
Ian Proud was a member of His Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. Ian was a senior officer at the British Embassy in Moscow from July 2014 to February 2019, at a time when UK-Russia relations were particularly tense. He performed a number of roles in Moscow, including as Head of Chancery, Economic Counsellor – in charge of advising UK Ministers on economic sanctions – Chair of the Crisis Committee, Director of the Diplomatic Academy for Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Vice Chair of the Board at the Anglo-American School.
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China submits five-point Iran nuclear deal proposal to UN conference
Al Mayadeen | March 24, 2025
China has formally presented a new proposal to revive stalled negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, calling for diplomacy, mutual respect, and the preservation of the 2015 nuclear deal. The five-point initiative was first unveiled by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on March 14 during a trilateral meeting in Beijing with his Iranian and Russian counterparts. It was later submitted to the United Nations’ Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where it has been published as Document No. 2448/CD.
According to Chinese diplomats, the document outlines principles intended to defuse mounting tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear activities and offers a framework to restart talks. The Chinese delegation requested its official release as a UN document, underlining Beijing’s push for a greater role in global security discussions.
The first principle calls for a diplomatic solution and warns against military escalation or punitive economic actions. “Stay committed to peaceful settlement of disputes through political and diplomatic means, and oppose the use of force and illegal sanctions,” the proposal states. It urges all sides to create conditions for renewed negotiations and to avoid steps that could worsen the situation.
In its second point, the proposal emphasizes Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while also encouraging Tehran to maintain its pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons. “Stay committed to balancing rights and responsibilities, and take a holistic approach to the goals of nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” it reads. “Iran should continue honoring its commitment to not developing nuclear weapons, and all other parties should fully respect Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”
The third point calls for renewed commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the multilateral agreement signed in 2015 that placed limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. “Stay committed to the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as the basis for new consensus. China hopes that all parties will work toward the same direction and resume dialogue and negotiation as early as possible. The United States should demonstrate political sincerity and return to talks at an early date.”
China’s fourth recommendation cautions against moving the matter to the United Nations Security Council, which could trigger the reimposition of international sanctions through the so-called “snapback” mechanism. “Stay committed to promoting cooperation through dialogue, and oppose pressing for intervention by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Under the current situation, hasty intervention by the UNSC will not help build confidence or bridge differences among the relevant parties. Initiating the snapback mechanism would undo years of diplomatic efforts, and must be handled with caution.”
The final principle calls for gradual, reciprocal steps to build consensus, stressing that no lasting resolution can be achieved through pressure or force. “Stay committed to a step-by-step and reciprocal approach, and seek consensus through consultation. History has proven that acting from a position of strength would not lead to the key to resolving difficult issues. Upholding the principle of mutual respect is the only viable path to finding the greatest common ground that accommodates the legitimate concerns of all parties and reaching a solution that meets the expectation of the international community.”
Beijing framed the proposal as part of its broader strategy to promote dialogue over confrontation. Chinese officials said the country will remain in close contact with all relevant parties and will “actively promote talks for peace, and play a constructive role in realizing early resumption of talks.”
Reiterating its longstanding position, China stressed that negotiations—not threats or sanctions—remain the only viable path forward. “Sanctions, pressure, and threats of force are not viable solutions,” Beijing stated.
Trump and Putin begin addressing cumulated geo-strategic debris… amidst Trump’s ultimatum to Iran
By Alastair Crooke | Strategic Culture Foundation | March 24, 2025
The phone call on 18 March between Presidents Trump and Putin has happened. It was a success, insofar as it allowed both sides to label the result as ‘positive’. And it did not lead to a breakdown (by virtue of the smallest of concessions from Putin – an energy infrastructure truce) – something easily it could have done (i.e. devolve into impasse – with Trump excoriating Putin, as he has done to Zelensky), given the fantastical and unrealistic expectations being woven in the West that this would be the ‘decider meeting’ for a final division of Ukraine.
It may have been a success too, insofar as it has laid the groundwork for the absent homework, now to be handled by two teams of experts on the detailed mechanics of the ceasefire. It was always a puzzle why this had not been earlier tackled by the U.S. team in Riyadh (lack of experience?). It was, after all, because the ceasefire was treated as a self-creating entity, by virtue of an American signature, that western expectations took flight in the belief that details did not matter; All that remained to do – in this (flawed) estimation – was to ‘divvy out the cake’.
Until the mechanics of a ceasefire – which must be comprehensive since ceasefires almost always break down – there was little to discuss on that topic on Tuesday. Predictably, then, discussion (reportedly) seemed to have turned to other issues: mainly economic ones and Iran, underlining again that the negotiation process between the U.S. and Russia does not boil down to just Ukraine.
So, how to move to ceasefire implementation? Simple. Begin to unravel the ‘cats cradle’ of impedimenta blocking normalised relations. Putin, plucking out just one strand to this problem, observed that:
“Sanctions [alone] are neither temporary nor targeted measures. They constitute [rather], a mechanism of systemic, strategic pressure against our nation. Our competitors perpetually seek to constrain Russia and diminish its economic and technological capacities … they churn out these packages incessantly”.
There is thus much cumulated geo-strategic debris to be addressed, and corrected, dating back many years, before a Big Picture normalisation can start in earnest.
What is apparent is that whilst Trump seems to be in a tearing hurry, Putin, by contrast, is not. And he will not be rushed. His own constituency will not countenance a hastily fudged accord with the U.S. that later implodes amidst recriminations of deceit – and of Moscow again having been fooled by the West. Russian blood is invested in this strategic normalisation process. It needs to work.
What is behind Trump’s evident hurry? Is it the need for breakneck speed on the domestic front to push ahead, before the cumulated forces of the opposition in the U.S. (plus their brethren in Europe) have the time to re-group and to torpedo normalisation with Russia?
Or does Trump fear that a long gap before ceasefire implementation will enable opposition forces to push for the recommencement of arms supplies and intelligence sharing – as the Russian military steamroller continues its advance? Is the fear, as Steve Bannon has warned, that by rearming Ukraine, Trump effectively will ‘own’ the war, and shoulder the blame for a massive western and NATO defeat?
Or, perhaps Trump anticipates that Kiev might unexpectedly cascade into a systemic collapse (as occurred to the Karzai government in Afghanistan). Trump is acutely aware of the political disaster that befell Biden from the images of Afghans clinging to the tyres of departing U.S. transport planes (à la Vietnam), as the U.S. evacuated the country.
Yet again, it might be something different. I learned from my time facilitating ceasefires in Palestine/Israel that it is not possible to make a ceasefire in one place (say Bethlehem), whilst Israeli forces were concurrently setting Nablus or Jenin ablaze. The emotional contagion and anger from one conflict cannot be contained to one locality; it would overflow to the other. It was tried. The one contaminated the implied sincere intentions behind the other.
Is the reason for the Trump haste mainly that he suspects his unconstrained support for Israel eventually will lead him to embrace major war in the Middle East? The world of today (thanks to the internet) is much smaller than before: Is it possible to be a ‘peacemaker’ and a ‘warmaker’ simultaneously – and have the first taken seriously?
Trump and those U.S. politicians ‘owned’ by the pro-Israeli lobby, know that Netanyahu et al. want the U.S. to help eliminate Israel’s regional rival – Iran. Trump cannot both retrench the U.S. as a western hemisphere ‘Sphere of Influence’, yet continue to throw the U.S.’ weight around as world Hegemon, causing the U.S. government to go broke. Can Trump successfully retrench the U.S. to Fortress America, or will foreign entanglements – i.e. an unstable Israel – lead to war and derail Trump’s administration, as all is intertwined?
What is Trump’s vision for the Middle East? Certainly, he has one – it is one that is rooted in his unstinting allegiance to the Israeli interest. The plan is either to destroy Iran financially, or to decapitate it and empower a Greater Israel. Trump’s letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included a two-month deadline for reaching a new nuclear deal.
A day after his missive, Trump said the U.S. is “down to the final moments” with Iran:
“We can’t let them have a nuclear weapon. Something is going to happen very soon. I would rather have a peace deal than the other option, but the other option will solve the problem”.
U.S. journalist Ken Klippenstein has noted that on 28 February, two B-52 bombers flying from Qatar dropped bombs on an “undisclosed location” – Iraq. These nuclear-capable bombers were carrying a message whose recipient “was clear as day; The Islamic Republic of Iran”. Why B-52s and not F-35s which also can carry bombs? (Because ‘bunker-buster’ bombs are too heavy for F-35s? Israel has F-35s, but does not have B-52 heavy bombers).
Then on 9 March, Klippenstein writes, a second demonstration was made: A B-52s flew alongside Israeli fighter jets on long-range missions, practicing aerial refuelling operations. The Israeli press correctly reported the real purpose of the operation – “readying the Israeli military for a potential joint strike with the U.S. on Iran”.
Then, last Sunday, National Security Adviser Mike Waltz boasted that multiple Anglo-U.S. airstrikes “took out” top Houthi officials, making it very clear that this is all about Iran:
“This was an overwhelming response that actually targeted multiple Houthi leaders and took them out. And the difference here is, one, going after the Houthi leadership, and two, holding Iran responsible”.
Marco Rubio elaborated on CBS: “We’re doing the entire world a favour by getting rid of these guys”.
Trump then followed up with the same theme:
“Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN, and IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences, and those consequences will be dire!”
In a further piece, Klippenstein writes:
“Trump’s menu of options for dealing with Tehran now includes one he didn’t have in his first term: full-scale war – with “nuclear weapons on the table” (the Trident II low-yield option) Pentagon and company contracting documents I’ve obtained describe “a unique joint staff planning” effort underway in Washington and in the Middle East to refine the next generation of “a major regional conflict” with Iran. The plans are the result of a reassessment of Iran’s military capabilities, as well as a fundamental shift in how America conducts war”.
What is new is that the “multilateral” component includes Israel working in unison with Arab Gulf partners for the first time, either indirectly or directly. The plan also includes many different contingencies and levels of war, according to the documents cited by Klippenstein, from “crisis action” (meaning response to events and attacks), to “deliberate” planning (which refers to set scenarios that flow from crises that escalate out of control). One document warns of the “distinct possibility” of the war “escalating outside of the United States Government’s intention” and impacting the rest of the region, demanding a multifaceted approach.
War preparations for Iran are so closely restricted, that even contracting companies involved in war planning are prohibited from even mentioning unclassified portions, notes Klippenstein:
“While a range of military options are often provided to presidents in an attempt on the part of the Pentagon to steer the President to the one favoured by the Pentagon, Trump already has shown his proclivity to select the most provocative option”.
“Equally, Trump’s green light for the Israeli air-strikes on Gaza, killing hundreds, [last] Monday, but ostensibly targetted on the Hamas leadership can be seen as consonant with the pattern of taking the belligerent option”.
Following his successful assassination of Iran’s top general Qassim Suleimani in 2020, Trump seems to have taken the lesson that aggressive action is relatively cost-free, Klippenstein notes.
As Waltz noted in his press interview:
“The difference is these [Yemen attacks] were not pinpricks, back and forth, what ultimately proved to be feckless attacks. This was an overwhelming response that actually targeted multiple Houthi leaders and took them out”.
Klippenstein cautions that, “2024 may be behind us but its lessons aren’t. Israel’s assassination of top Hezbollah officials in Lebanon was largely perceived by Washington to be a resounding success with few downsides. Trump likely took back the same message, leading to his strike on [the] Houthi leadership this week”.
If western observers are seeing all of what’s going on as some repeat of Biden’s tit-for-tat or limited attacks by Israel on Iran’s early warning and air defences, they may be misunderstanding what’s going on behind the scenes. What Trump might now do, which is right out of the Israeli playbook, would be to attack Iran’s command and control, including Iran’s leadership.
This – very certainly – would have a profound effect on Trump’s relations with Russia – and China. It would eviscerate any sense in Moscow and Beijing that Trump is agreement capable. What price then his ‘peacemaker’ ‘Big Picture’ reset were he, in the wake of wars in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, to start a war with Iran? Does Trump see Iran through some disturbed optic – that in destroying Iran, he is bringing about peace through strength?
