Iran flights continue despite US aviation sanctions
Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026
International flights from Iran to several destinations remain operational despite the expansion of US sanctions targeting the country’s aviation sector, according to Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport.
The airport said Saturday that flights to Turkey, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were continuing according to their previously announced schedules.
The announcement comes as Washington escalates economic pressure on Iran and seeks to restrict the ability of Iranian airlines to maintain international operations.
Iranian flights continue despite sanctions
Imam Khomeini International Airport said that, aside from flights already canceled, no additional cancellations had been announced.
The canceled services include flights involving the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Oman, and Georgia.
The airport also said it was working to restore suspended air connections as soon as possible.
The continued operation of several international routes comes despite growing restrictions on Iranian aviation following a new round of US sanctions announced on September 8.
The measures have affected Iranian airlines as well as companies and intermediaries involved in providing services to the country’s aviation sector.
Recent reporting indicates that Iranian carriers have continued operating some international services despite the sanctions, including flights to China, Turkey, Thailand, and Afghanistan.
US measures target Iran’s aviation sector
The US Treasury Department announced sanctions on September 8 against 36 targets linked to Iran’s aviation sector, including 27 Iranian airlines. Washington described the measures as an effort to target what it considers Iran’s remaining unsanctioned carriers and the networks supporting them.
The sanctions form part of a broader US campaign to restrict Iran’s access to international financial and commercial networks.
The measures have also placed pressure on foreign companies providing Iranian carriers with fuel, ground handling, aircraft-related services, and other forms of support.
The consequences, however, have varied by country. While some governments and companies have restricted Iranian aviation connections, other countries have continued to facilitate flights.
Iraq restrictions trigger backlash
In Iraq, the suspension of Iranian flights, particularly through Najaf International Airport, has triggered criticism from official, political, factional, and religious quarters.
Several Iraqi parties and figures have called for the decision to be reversed and rejected what they described as US pressure on Baghdad.
The Iraqi government is also moving toward dialogue with Washington in an effort to secure an exemption that would allow air links with Iran to resume.
Ali Akbar Velayati, international affairs advisor to Iran’s Leader, said the restrictions on Iranian flights were part of an effort by Iran’s enemies to compensate for their battlefield defeat by attempting to dismantle the “unity of the fronts” from within.
The Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-Sadegh, further told Iran’s ISNA news agency that a new decision surrounding Iranian flights to Iraq is likely to be announced soon.
He added that Iran is in contact with Iraqi officials and proposals on the matter have been submitted.
Al-e Sadegh noted that roughly 12,000 to 13,000 people travel between Iraq and Iran via Iranian airlines.
China maintains air links with Iran
China has maintained its opposition to unilateral US sanctions and continued to receive Iranian flights.
Flight-tracking data cited in recent reports showed Iranian services continuing to operate to Chinese destinations after the latest US measures took effect.
The continued connections with China also reflect the broader geopolitical divide over Washington’s unilateral sanctions policy, with Beijing maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran despite US pressure.
The day-after at the White House: USA and Xi Jinping
Agreements at no cost
By Lorenzo Maria Pacini – Strategic Culture Foundation – September 26, 2026
Xi Jinping left Washington on Friday, September 25, bid farewell by a 21-gun salute and the administration’s top officials lined up at the airport. A three-day state visit organized with a level of attention to detail that the White House rarely reserves for a systemic rival: the welcome at the foot of the aircraft stairs, a three-hour meeting in the Oval Office, the state dinner, tea with the spouses, and a visit to the National Archives. A Schramsberg was chosen for dinner – the same winery that provided the wine for the 1972 toast between Nixon and Zhou Enlai. At the table sat half of the American business community: Musk, Jensen Huang, Zuckerberg, Tim Cook, Bezos, Pichai, Dimon, Fink, as well as three Supreme Court justices, the Federal Reserve chair, and half the Cabinet.
Then there is the real conversation, which must be read between the lines. Beijing immediately released its own account of the talks. On the American side, in the early hours, there was no official statement: only remarks from officials and a president who chose not to answer questions on the substance of the matter. This asymmetry in documentation alone reveals who wanted to set the terms of the meeting in writing.
On the Iran issue, administration sources presented an alignment on three points as “significant progress”: Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons; the Strait of Hormuz must remain open; and there must be no tolls in the strait. Taken one by one, these three points coincide with positions that Beijing had been advocating even before boarding the plane. China holds a permanent seat on the Security Council and is a signatory to the 2015 JCPOA: Iranian nonproliferation has been its official policy for over a decade. An open Strait of Hormuz is in China’s interest even more than it is in America’s, because East Asia consumes the largest share of the crude oil passing through the strait, and China pays more than anyone else for Brent crude that remains above $100 per barrel. As for tolls, a transit fee imposed by Tehran would hit oil tankers bound for Chinese ports first and foremost.
Washington has thus secured Xi’s signature on three statements that Beijing would have endorsed in any forum. The actual gain is more limited, but it exists. China’s distancing itself from Iran’s demand for tolls weakens a card that Tehran is playing in the New York negotiations, where discussions center on a phased exit from the crisis (reopening of the strait, simultaneous lifting of the U.S. naval blockade, followed by the unfreezing of frozen assets), and where the Iranian delegation is reportedly aiming to transfer the issue of transit rights to a separate annex.
Independent accounts fill in what the American version leaves out. Xi asked Trump for an immediate return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and the resumption of negotiations “as soon as possible,” leading to a comprehensive agreement that includes the nuclear issue. Trump did not say yes. Rather than being resolved at the summit, the Iranian issue was kept off the summit agenda.
Tehran and Taiwan
Regarding Chinese support for Iran, the officials themselves admit that the picture is incomplete: “There has been indirect support, we believe, but no direct evidence.” The United States says it is “very concerned” but is unable to prove it. Trump reportedly told Xi in person, however, that any aid to Tehran – “whether direct or indirect, in the form of intelligence, components, or military equipment” – is “totally unacceptable.”
A warning is only as strong as the tool that backs it up, and here the tool is nowhere to be seen. During the same period, flight tracking data recorded a Mahan Air flight landing as scheduled in Guangzhou, and no measures were taken against Chinese airports or operators: the no-fly zone around Iran has failed precisely where it matters most. The term “indirect,” moreover, remains deliberately vague. If it included the purchase of Iranian crude oil, it would strike at the heart of Sino-Iranian trade; if it does not include it, it is reduced to military supplies that Washington, by its own admission, cannot substantiate. The ambiguity serves both sides: the Americans to keep the threat hanging in the air, and the Chinese to continue operating in the gray zone. My assessment is that action by the Treasury against Chinese entities linked to Iran is unlikely before the trade agreement is finalized, with a moderate degree of confidence.
Washington insists that pressure on Iran is a separate issue, unrelated to arms supplies to Taiwan or any other negotiations. This separation has its own domestic logic. With less than six weeks until the November 3 midterm elections, the administration cannot risk being accused of trading Taipei for Chinese cooperation in the Gulf.
The point is that this separation is unilateral. In the Chinese account, Xi described Beijing’s position on reunification and territorial integrity as clear-cut; he called on the United States to oppose Taiwan’s independence and to handle the issue with caution, noting that doing so would lay a solid foundation for strategic cooperation between the two countries. Taiwan is not just another issue among many; it is the condition underpinning them all, including Iran. Beijing will be watching to see how Washington translates its statements into concrete actions, and that response will remain the primary indicator of American seriousness. The result is a clear asymmetry: the United States is giving up using Taiwan as leverage, while China retains it as a precondition.
What about the option of a trade truce?
On the economic front, the summit resulted in the extension of the trade truce until January 10 – which averts an immediate return to much higher tariffs – and the announcement of a managed trade agreement, the details of which are expected on Monday following weeks of negotiations. No breakthrough on tariffs, rare earths, or technology controls. The very term echoes the “Phase One” model from January 2020: quantified purchase commitments – that is, managing the symptoms of a rivalry whose structural causes remain unchanged.
On artificial intelligence, the positions remained distinct. Xi proposed dialogue on risks, human oversight of technologies, and cooperation against abuses, inviting both sides to build on their respective strengths rather than monitor one another. Trump acknowledged that AI concerns the future of humanity, but made it clear that he prefers the current status quo to remain largely unchanged. No common rules, no mechanisms. The two capitals limited themselves to confirming mutual support for the APEC summit and the G20 summit they will host this year, thereby setting the schedule for upcoming meetings.
Taken together, the U.S. outcome consists of a declarative convergence on three already-shared principles, a verbal warning, and a trade agreement yet to be reviewed. Beijing takes home more: a truce until January, no new technological restrictions, Taiwan reaffirmed as the foundation of the relationship, and, above all, the U.S. adoption of the Chinese formula for a “constructive relationship of strategic stability,” agreed upon in May and now revived. Robert Lawrence Kuhn provided the most honest summary: the summit’s main outcome is a longer planning horizon. For a power convinced that time is on its side, that longer horizon is the reward.
There is one objection that must be taken seriously. Xi’s public distancing from the concessions isolates Tehran just as an internal front is opening up in Iran, with an impeachment motion filed in parliament against Foreign Minister Araghchi, accused of negotiating with the Americans without the green light from the Supreme National Security Council. But this very situation highlights the limitations of that gain. The question in Tehran is no longer just what to offer, but who has the authority to offer it; and on this point, Chinese pressure regarding the tolls changes nothing.
There are few but concrete indicators to watch in the coming weeks. The text of Monday’s agreement will reveal whether the trade deal extends to rare earths or is limited to agricultural and energy purchases. The New York channel will indicate whether the phased exchange – involving shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the lifting of the blockade – becomes operational. The six ballistic missiles launched by Ansarallah toward Yanbu and Taif – targeting the terminal of the only major Saudi route bypassing the strait – demonstrate just how narrow the margin is before the price of crude oil pushes Trump, on the eve of the election, toward military options. Finally, a potential designation of Chinese entities by the Treasury would lend real weight to the warning from the Oval Office.
As long as none of these signals change, we can say that the summit has stabilized Sino-American relations without stabilizing the Gulf – and regarding the Gulf, Beijing has offered words, not leverage.
The Geopolitical Balance in the Red Sea: The UAE Being Displaced by New Players
By Samyar Rostami – New Eastern Outlook – September 26, 2026
The persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
For the past ten years, the Southern Red Sea has been a pivotal factor in the UAE’s foreign policy. Over the past decade, the UAE has built a layered maritime, air, and commercial infrastructure network, including military bases, in the Red Sea or near Yemen, Somaliland, Somalia and Sudan, starting from 2015.
According to some estimates, the value of UAE investments along Africa’s coastal regions and the Arabian Peninsula amounts to $60 billion.
In September 2015, the UAE established its first military base in Africa, in Eritrea. These bases possessed strategic advantages: the ‘protection of interests’ and control over the security and economic architecture of international maritime routes.
With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, cooperation between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi in the Red Sea intensified.
The UAE’s approach—channeled through companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports—is centered on controlling ports, strategic waterways, military bases, and key trade and energy routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in coordination with the United States and its allies. Abu Dhabi’s approach also included engagement with non-state armed actors and separatist movements in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.
Factors Behind the UAE’s Diminishing Role
Over the past decade, the UAE emerged as a party to the conflicts in the southern Red Sea. However, geopolitical developments over the past year signal a gradual decline in the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Several factors are also significant, stemming from US and Israeli military strikes against Iran, the war between Sanaa and Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Emirati rivalry in the region, and disputes among African states.
Sudan’s value lies in its geopolitics. With 853 kilometres of coastline and several key ports, Sudan constitutes a vital link in the Red Sea.
The Sudan war since April 2023 has created conditions for the expansion of the UAE’s role. The UAE faces accusations of providing training and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Human rights and political demands against the UAE has increased.
The UAE also maintains bases inside Sudanese territory. However, the ongoing war in Sudan and the support of allies for the Sudanese government have led to increased pressure on the UAE.
Riyadh regards the Red Sea as part of its strategic interests and its exclusive backyard. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh each view the other as a direct threat to their position and interests in parts of the southern Red Sea. Thus, the reduction of the UAE’s footprint in the southern Red Sea constitutes a strategic gain for Riyadh. Riyadh has effectively sought to weaken Abu Dhabi’s role.
In late 2025, Saudi Arabia’s support for Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) resulted in pressure being brought to bear on UAE-backed forces.
In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks among 14 countries—including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia—which established a multinational maritime defence alliance. The UAE and Ethiopia were excluded from the list.
The formation of a Riyadh-led Red Sea maritime task force—with the participation of Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea—without coordination with the UAE amounts to a further constriction of the UAE’s role in the region.
Despite ongoing Egyptian–Emirati consultations on guaranteeing maritime navigation security in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, Egypt’s foreign policy is not aligned with the UAE’s interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. Additionally, the alignment and coordination among Israel, India, the UAE, and Ethiopia are not particularly consonant with Egypt’s interests in Ethiopia and the Red Sea.
Until last September, the UAE played a significant role in the southern Yemeni islands of the Red Sea and in southwestern Yemen. However, Sanaa’s advance in the eastern Red Sea—the port of Mokha, Mayun Island, and other archipelagos north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait—in September 2026 inflicted negative and fundamental consequences on the UAE’s regional role.
Sanaa’s advance amounts to the nullification of the presence of Emirati actors in Yemen’s future political sphere. Sanaa is seeking to consolidate itself as a strategic “node” within the Iran-led Axis of Resistance.
Despite Cairo’s opposition to Sanaa’s proposal for maritime navigation coordination in the Red Sea, Sanaa—having secured control over the most important islands and cities overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait on the Yemeni side—is calling for the formulation of new rules to ensure security and navigation in the region. Ansar Allah’s control over Bab al-Mandab could put the UAE under pressure. Any expansion of Sanaa’s role in Sudan could likewise prove detrimental to the UAE.
Amid tensions between the United States and Iran, Abu Dhabi finds itself facing a more constrained strategic space.
The UAE’s alignment with the United States is, in a sense, also an intensification of Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Iran in areas such as the Red Sea. Unlike the UAE, Iran is seeking better relations with the Sudanese government. Many in Iran believe that Israel and the UAE are devising an economic and geopolitical plan to control the vital routes of the Red Sea and Yemen’s ports.
With Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, many in the countries of the southern Red Sea have linked it to the UAE.
After years, Eritrea revoked the UAE’s access to its military infrastructure. Eritrean officials have recently made sharp statements about the UAE and Israel—particularly regarding Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland.
Eritrea is providing frontline support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Any deeper alliance between Eritrea and Sudan, Iran, Russia, China, and Sanaa could diminish the UAE’s regional role in the Red Sea. Additionally, some countries and actors near the Red Sea also hold a negative view of the UAE’s regional role.
The Somali government’s decision in January 2026 to sever relations with the UAE is, in a sense, a counter to the UAE’s role in the Somaliland and Puntland regions. Somalia has revoked all agreements with the UAE, including cooperation as well as security and defence arrangements. This move has negative implications for the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Moreover, the southern Red Sea plays a pivotal role in the regional strategy of Russia and Beijing. For example, apart from China’s role in Djibouti, Beijing is Eritrea’s principal creditor and has expanded its influence in Sudan.
The developments of the past year have also contributed to a decline in the standing of the UAE’s allies in the region.
Outlook
The US presence in the Red Sea’s African states is rooted in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.
The European Union’s presence in the region, via Operation ASPIDES, is limited to commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Despite the UAE’s formal withdrawal from some bases, its economic and security influence, as well as its soft-power instruments, remain strong.
A decrease in UAE military deployments in the region could negatively impact its support for allies in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.
The UAE continues to have significant economic potential, secure partnerships, and influence in the southern Red Sea. In a way, this is considered a threat and a risk to certain African nations in the Red Sea region.
Certainly, a more extensive Sanaa presence over Bab al-Mandab, strategic coasts, and islands could confront Abu Dhabi’s maneuver and role in the southern Red Sea with a structural challenge.
The UAE’s approach in ports, logistics, energy, and other strategic infrastructure—along with deeper defense and security coordination with the West in the southern Red Sea—is likely to continue. However, the expansion of the UAE’s role also requires an extensive US presence in the Red Sea.
Moreover, the persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
Samyar Rostami is а political observer and senior researcher in international relations.
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Iraqi resistance group vows to stage airport sit-ins over Iran aerial blockade
Press TV – September 26, 2026
An Iraqi anti-terror resistance group has denounced the Baghdad government’s decision to halt Iranian airline operations following US sanctions on Iran’s aviation sector, vowing to stage sit-ins at Iraqi airports nationwide unless normal air traffic between the two Muslim neighboring countries resumes.
“We will not wait long,” Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba Secretary-General Akram al-Kaabi said in a statement on Friday.
He urged Iraqi political forces to “break free from American dominance.”
The restrictions, Kaabi said, were preventing millions of people from visiting religious sites and harming Iraq’s economy.
On Thursday, the Kata’ib Hezbollah resistance group called upon all walks of Iraqi society to break “the US siege on Iran.”
The faction urged Iraqi citizens to “circumvent the embargo through all available means” in demonstration of solidarity with Iran, including the purchase of Iranian commodities, the facilitation of commercial relations with Iran, and the abstention from any undertakings that would exacerbate Iranians’ hardship.
The group also asked Shia religious authorities to issue a decree (fatwa) on whether it is religiously permissible “to help the enemy, in any form, besiege and starve the Iranian people.”
Commercial aviation services between Iraq and Iran were suspended after ground-handling companies stopped providing services on these routes over concerns about potential US sanctions.
The move prompted airlines to suspend their flights.
Najaf International Airport, the last Iraqi airport still operating flights to Iran, suspended the services at 2 a.m. local time on Friday until further notice, according to an official directive.
Erbil International Airport and Sulaymaniyah’s International Airport took similar measures. Kirkuk International Airport also said it had no flights to Iran.
The disruption followed US measures targeting Iran’s aviation sector. On September 8, the US Treasury sanctioned 27 Iranian airlines and claimed that airports, fuel suppliers, ground-handling firms and other service providers dealing with sanctioned carriers could face secondary sanctions.
Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Sayyed Mojtaba Khamenei, on Friday warned against recent regional measures that had disrupted Iranian passenger flights, saying: “Flights in the region are either free for everyone, or for no one.”
He added that cooperation with the US in implementing hostile policies would remain in the memory of the Iranian people, stressing that if Iran cannot fly or receive airport services, “no country in the region will have this possibility either.”
DEATH SPIKES & RISING CANCER IN OUR YOUTH EXPLAINED
The HighWire with Del Bigtree | September 24, 2026
Fresh off testifying at Canada’s Allison Inquiry, physicist Denis Rancourt joins Del to examine mortality and cancer data among 5- to 24-year-olds—and what could be behind their striking, lockstep rise.
Iran offers Trump deal before US election
Tehran says it could reopen the Strait of Hormuz within days if Washington lifts its blockade and returns to a ceasefire framework
RT | September 25, 2026
Iran has offered the US a new deal aimed at ending the months-long conflict before the midterm election in November, directly challenging President Donald Trump’s claim that Tehran is deliberately waiting until after the election to reach an agreement.
Trump claimed in a speech at the UN on Tuesday that Iran is deliberately stalling the talks to see how Republicans perform in the November 3 midterm election, and predicted that Tehran would make a deal “right after” the vote. He also threatened to “annihilate” the Islamic Republic if negotiations fail.
“We don’t want it to get to the midterm elections,” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told reporters on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on Thursday. “We wish Americans to return to the MOU before the midterms,” he said, referring to the memorandum of understanding reached by the US and Iran in June.
“We did reach an agreement with your president… The problem is that America, instead of conducting dialogue, descended into the arena by bombing us first, by blocking every pathway,” Pezeshkian said in an interview with Fox News. “We will stand resolutely to defend ourselves. We never sought war… It’s America that must choose whether it wants to end this or not.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran has submitted a proposal in which the Strait of Hormuz could be reopened within around a week and negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program rapidly resumed. The proposal was sent through mediators during talks in New York this week.
Under the plan, Tehran would restore navigation through the crucial oil shipping route in exchange for Washington lifting its economic blockade, easing restrictions on Iranian oil exports, and releasing some frozen Iranian assets. Iran is also seeking an end to hostilities on other fronts, including Israel’s combat operations in Lebanon.
US and Iranian negotiators are discussing a phased arrangement in which the blockade and restrictions on Hormuz would be addressed first, Reuters reported, citing Iranian, regional, and Western diplomatic sources.
Tehran has not abandoned its claim to regulate Hormuz, with Iranian officials continuing to insist that the waterway should be managed by Iran and Oman and that fees should be charged for services provided to passing vessels.
Araghchi said the proposal largely follows the terms of the June memorandum rather than introducing new demands, adding that Iran is waiting for a response.
Araghchi has also held a series of meetings with foreign counterparts in New York, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Moscow has said there is “no alternative” to a diplomatic settlement of the crisis provoked by the “illegal actions” of the US and Israel.
The renewed diplomatic push comes amid mounting pressure on both sides. The US blockade has sharply restricted Iran’s oil exports, while Tehran’s controls over Hormuz have disrupted one of the world’s most important energy corridors and helped push oil prices above $100 a barrel and US diesel prices to historic highs.
Pezeshkian, who is the first foreign head of state to speak at the UN while his country is at war with the US, told the chamber on Wednesday that Tehran is prepared for “dialogue and diplomacy” but will not negotiate under threats of force and “will never bow our head or bend at the knee.”
How Russia is Rewiring the Global South
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – September 25, 2026
The West may have pushed Russia out of its orbit, but it cannot push Russia out of the world.
Russia’s Diplomatic Blitz
Over the past two weeks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has staged a remarkable diplomatic blitz. Across three major gatherings in Bishkek, Vladivostok and New Delhi, as well as during Vietnamese leader To Lam’s state visit to Moscow, Putin met a succession of heads of state from across Asia and the wider Global South. Among them were the leaders of China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia and Turkey.
The sheer intensity of this diplomacy is difficult to reconcile with the notion—aggressively propagated by Western political elites and the media—that Russia has been internationally isolated. Moscow may be estranged from Washington and most European capitals, but its diplomatic and economic relationships elsewhere have been expanding. More importantly, Russia is increasingly operating at the centre of a network of states that are seeking greater strategic autonomy from the Western-led international order.
That does not make these countries a Russian bloc per se. India continues to maintain close relations with the United States; China has its own global ambitions; Turkey is a NATO member; and the BRICS countries have yet to develop a common framework of global action. But it does demonstrate that Russia’s post-2022 so-called “isolation” exists only in the Western perspective. The reality outside of this perspective is totally different.
Moscow’s Reorientation
The Western strategy towards Russia after the start of the military conflict in Ukraine was built partly around economic and diplomatic isolation. The United States and European Union imposed extensive sanctions, restricted access to Western technology and finance, and dramatically reduced many forms of economic engagement with Moscow. Russia responded by accelerating a pivot that had already begun towards Asia and other non-Western regions.
The transformation is particularly visible in trade. Asia accounted for 73.4 percent of Russia’s trade turnover in 2025. China and India have become particularly important destinations for Russian energy exports, while Moscow has simultaneously expanded commercial and strategic relationships across the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
India is perhaps the clearest illustration of this adjustment. Despite its increasingly close strategic relationship with Washington, New Delhi has sharply expanded its economic engagement with Moscow. Reuters reported this month that India and Russia have developed payment arrangements using the rupee and rouble that facilitate the overwhelming majority of bilateral trade. Bilateral trade reached roughly $70 billion in 2024, with both sides targeting $100 billion by 2030. The significance lies not simply in the volume of trade. It is the development of mechanisms that allow countries to maintain economic relationships despite restrictions imposed by Western financial systems.
This is an important distinction. The Global South is not necessarily seeking to replace the West. Many of its governments remain deeply integrated into Western markets and institutions. What they increasingly seek is the ability to maintain alternative relationships when their interests diverge from those of Washington or Brussels. Russia has not only become one of the principal beneficiaries of that preference, but it’s actively cultivating ties on its own too—something clearly evident from the diplomatic blitz mentioned above.
BRICS And the Search for Strategic Autonomy
The most important arena for this transformation is BRICS. The grouping has expanded substantially from its original membership and now includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Its members represent a substantial share of the world’s population and economic output. Although member countries apparently have different geopolitical and national interests, this diversity is not a weakness but BRICS’s defining characteristic.
The grouping provides a political space in which countries can discuss reforms to international institutions, alternative financial mechanisms, trade arrangements and greater representation for emerging economies without having to accept a common ideological position. This is different from Washington’s demands for conformity from its allies in Europe and North America. But BRICS agenda increasingly overlaps with Russia’s own interests.
At the BRICS summit in New Delhi, member states called for greater influence over international economic governance and raised concerns about unilateral trade and financial measures. India has also promoted mechanisms that could eventually facilitate greater use of alternative payment systems. New Delhi has proposed linking central-bank digital currencies among BRICS countries, although substantial technical and political obstacles remain.
For Moscow, these discussions have obvious significance. Western sanctions have made Russia deeply interested in payment mechanisms, financial arrangements and trading networks that are less vulnerable to Western restrictions. But Russia is not creating these demands by itself. It is benefiting from a broader transformation in the preferences of major non-Western states. The result is an unusual convergence. Russia wants alternatives because it has been subjected to Western restrictions. Other Global South governments want alternatives because they do not want their economic and diplomatic options constrained by decisions taken in Washington or Brussels. Therefore, even though the motivations are different, the direction of change is not.
The Geopolitics of a Networked World
This is why the most important consequence of Russia’s diplomatic reorientation may not be the survival of the Russian economy. It may be the emergence of a different geography of globalisation. Energy provides the clearest example. Russia has redirected large volumes of oil and gas towards Asian markets, while expanding nuclear-energy cooperation with countries beyond the West.
Transport infrastructure is developing alongside these commercial relationships. The International North-South Transport Corridor, linking Russia through Iran towards the Indian Ocean, is one example of efforts to create alternative routes between Eurasia and global markets. Russia’s expanding economic engagement with China, India, Iran and other Asian states is gradually creating overlapping networks of energy, transportation, finance and trade.
Vietnam illustrates the same pattern from another direction. During To Lam’s September visit to Moscow, Russia and Vietnam discussed cooperation in energy, science and technology, infrastructure and other sectors. Hanoi, like many Southeast Asian capitals, has little interest in choosing permanently between China, Russia, the United States, Japan, Europe and other partners. Its preference is diversification. That may ultimately prove to be the defining characteristic of the emerging international system.
Russia’s current diplomatic activism should therefore be understood in this larger context. Moscow is not simply looking for countries willing to circumvent sanctions or purchase its commodities. It is building relationships that can survive the political distance between Russia and the West.
The more the West defines its relationship with Russia through separation, sanctions and exclusion, the greater the incentive for Moscow to invest in a world beyond Western institutions, and the greater the incentive for other countries to make sure that such a world remains available. The irony is that the attempt to isolate Russia may therefore be contributing to something larger than Russia’s own diplomatic resilience: a global system in which isolation itself becomes increasingly difficult to impose.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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Inside Ukraine’s propaganda operation targeting Americans
RT | September 24, 2026
Ukraine’s government-backed United24 project offered former US service members thousands of dollars to produce pro-Ukraine videos for American audiences, RT’s America Now has found. The offers targeted veterans whose military backgrounds could make the message seem more credible to viewers.
Host Ben Swann and investigative journalist Elizabeth Lane examined how the project, launched by Vladimir Zelensky in 2022 to raise support for Ukraine, approached former personnel, including special operations veterans with YouTube channels and other media platforms.
According to veterans who reached out to Lane, United24 offered around $10,000 for each video, plus $40,000 in advertising support. There was no stated limit on the number of videos they could make. The project would also provide scripts and guidance, while the veterans would ultimately deliver praise for Ukraine and Zelensky in their own words.
Some creators who agreed to the deal were reportedly creating up to five or six videos a week, making nearly a quarter of a million dollars a month, Lane found.
The men who spoke with Lane said they themselves had turned down the money, recognizing that they were being asked to present paid propaganda as their own views.
However, for some, the refusal came with consequences beyond lost income. One veteran, who turned down the offer and later criticized Ukraine for wasting US money on his channel, had people contacting his employer, calling him a Russian agent, and trying to get him fired.
The effort ultimately failed, Lane learned, noting that it is still “crazy that some foreign government is allowed to reach out to an employer of a former veteran and tell them that ‘you should fire this guy because he’s a Russian propagandist.’”
United24 has since tried to deny making such offers, despite Lane’s recorded Zoom calls with multiple veterans that testify to the contrary.
The choice of former service members is central to the Ukrainian propaganda operation, Swann noted, pointing out that many Americans are inclined to trust someone who had served in the US military, unless they find out that the veteran had been offered thousands of dollars by a foreign government to deliver the message.
Furthermore, given that Kiev is almost exclusively funded by its foreign sponsors, including billions received from Washington, the Ukrainian government-backed United24 campaign is effectively propaganda aimed at Americans, being paid for by US taxpayers themselves, Swann noted.
With Ukraine struggling on the battlefield, the propaganda efforts will likely continue to intensify, Lane predicted, describing a possible surge of supportive messages from major online figures as a “Hail Mary” attempt to shore up backing for Kiev.
Watch the full episode of the four-part America Now investigation here.
EUROPE FEARS RUSSIA’S NEXT MOVE / Ian Proud
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – September 24, 2026
‘A Big Victory’ – Palestine Chronicle Wins Two-Year Legal Battle
By Romana Rubeo | Palestine Chronicle | September 22, 2026
A US federal court dismissed the lawsuit against the Palestine Chronicle and its editor, Dr. Ramzy Baroud, after the three plaintiffs asked to withdraw it.
Almog Meir Jan filed the case in July 2024. Shlomi Ziv and Andrey Kozlov joined an amended complaint the following year. The suit sought to link the Chronicle to their captivity in Gaza through its publication of reports by Palestinian journalist Abdallah Aljamal.
The Chronicle rejected the accusations throughout the proceedings. The plaintiffs moved to withdraw their case in July, and US District Judge Tiffany Cartwright granted the request on September 15. The court record closed the case after more than two years of litigation.
“After a struggle of over 2 years, we have won a big victory. We have beaten back a calculated attempt to chill the free speech of some of the most critical voices of the Palestinian people — The Palestine Chronicle and Ramzy Baroud. I have been so proud and honored to represent these clients and am happy for the outcome,” Attorney Dan Kovalik said.
“Still, we must remain vigilant for the inevitable attacks to come against people whose only ‘crime’ is advocating for the lives and rights of the Palestinian people. We are fully prepared for this ongoing struggle,” Kovalik added.
For his part, Baroud welcomed the outcome but said that the case “should have been thrown out from the start.”
“It was initially dismissed, only to be refiled and treated as though the accusations had any legitimacy, despite there not being a single piece of evidence to prove any wrongdoing on our part,” he said.
A Gaza Journalist at the Center of the Case
The lawsuit grew out of an Israeli massacre in central Gaza in June 2024. Israeli occupation forces freed four captives during the operation, which also killed hundreds of Palestinians.
Among those killed was Abdallah Aljamal, a Palestinian journalist who had contributed reports to the Palestine Chronicle. His wife, father and neighbors were also killed. After the raid, Israeli officials alleged that three of the captives had been held in Aljamal’s home.
The three former captives later sued the Chronicle and Baroud. They alleged that the outlet had aided their captivity by publishing Aljamal’s work and paying him for it. The Chronicle denied paying Aljamal and rejected any suggestion that publishing his reports, which were also widely disseminated in both Arabic and English, connected the outlet to the captives’ detention.
Aljamal had filed many reports during the first six months of the war. Baroud said the value of that work lay in its attention to Palestinians whose experiences rarely reached an international audience.
“When Abdallah was sending articles, what I liked about his work is that he spoke to ordinary people,” Baroud said in an earlier interview with journalist Rachel Blevins.
“(We) did not want political commentary; we already have analysts. We wanted the voices of people you never hear from. That’s all,” he added.
In the same interview, Kovalik challenged the allegation that the Chronicle had financed Aljamal’s activities. “The claim is that the Palestine Chronicle paid a journalist, and somehow that money was used to hold hostages. It’s not true. There’s no evidence,” he said.
For the Chronicle, the case put an ordinary editorial decision—publishing firsthand reports from Gaza—at the center of an accusation of wrongdoing. It also forced a small newsroom to defend its work in court while continuing to cover the genocide facing the people and journalists on whom that work depended.
“The saddest aspect of all this is that the victims once again became the accused,” Baroud said in his latest statement. “Some of us have lost hundreds of family members, relatives, friends, neighbors and colleagues, only to find ourselves having to defend against entirely politically and ideologically motivated accusations.”
Israeli authorities have repeatedly accused Palestinian journalists killed or targeted in Gaza of ties to Hamas. The Committee to Protect Journalists has documented a pattern of labeling journalists as “terrorists” without substantiated evidence, while Reporters Without Borders has reported smear campaigns against Gaza’s journalists. Those allegations should be assessed on evidence, rather than treated as established facts because they come from the army that targeted them.
According to the International Federation of Journalists, at least 240 Palestinian journalists and media workers have been killed in Gaza as of September 2026. The federation described the toll as “the greatest massacre of journalists in the history of modern journalism”.
A Silver Lining
Baroud reflected on the people who helped the Chronicle through the case.
“There is a silver lining. This case made us stronger. Dan Kovalik and his team fought with extraordinary dedication on our behalf, while countless readers and intellectuals stood by us.
“Throughout it all, we refused to let the case slow us down. We expanded our coverage and our network, sharpened our journalism and emerged more resilient and more committed than ever to telling Palestinian stories.”
The Palestine Chronicle dedicated the outcome to its readers, solidarity activists, intellectuals, independent journalists and all those who stood beside it and defended the right of Palestinians to tell their own stories.
– Romana Rubeo is an Italian writer and the managing editor of The Palestine Chronicle.
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The claim that Israel serves as a valuable ally for the United States is made by both pro-Zionists and much of the anti-war and anti-Zionist Left that is influenced by Noam Chomsky. As a result of the Gaza flotilla massacre, which has caused a world-wide uproar against Israel, the value of Israel to the United States is being publicly questioned in more mainstream foreign policy forums. … continue
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