RSF military group defects, joins Sudanese army: State media
MEMO | September 26, 2026
A military group affiliated with Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on Friday defected and joined the Sudanese Armed Forces, state news agency SUNA reported.
The force was led by Al-Tayeb Mohammed Ahmed, also known as Al-Tayeb Al-Wahido.
Senior officials from the Sudanese army and the General Intelligence Service received the defecting force.
Al-Wahido said in a press statement he had broken away from the RSF and joined the Sudanese army after witnessing “tragedies” within the paramilitary group’s ranks.
He called on RSF members to join the army, “return to the homeland” and reconsider their positions, saying “there is no cause that justified the continuation of the fighting.”
There was no immediate comment from the RSF on the announcement.
The latest defection follows a series of similar moves from the RSF in recent weeks. On Aug. 31, about 200 RSF fighters, including prominent field commanders, defected and joined the Sudanese army in Omdurman, bringing military equipment with them.
Earlier, on Aug. 19, the army said 318 RSF personnel, including four commanders, defected with as many as 50 combat vehicles.
On Aug. 13, Sudanese authorities announced that 21 commanders and 270 fighters had joined the army with 37 combat vehicles.
Sudan has been engulfed in war between the army and the RSF since April 2023. The conflict has killed tens of thousands of people and displaced millions of others.
Ireland goalkeeper refuses to play ‘Israel’ as squad weighs boycott
Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026
Ireland’s preparations for Sunday’s Nations League match against “Israel” have been thrown into uncertainty after goalkeeper Gavin Bazunu reportedly told teammates that he did not want to participate in the fixture, prompting further discussions within the squad.
The players missed their scheduled training session and press conference in Debrecen, Hungary, as they held lengthy meetings over whether individual players should proceed with the match.
The Ireland squad was due to train at the Nagyerdei Stadium in Debrecen and hold a press conference ahead of Sunday’s Nations League encounter.
Instead, the players remained at their hotel for discussions with head coach Heimir Hallgrímsson and his coaching staff. They had earlier met with Football Association of Ireland (FAI) CEO David Courell.
The scheduled press conference was postponed with only 19 minutes’ notice. Irish and Israeli media had already assembled at the stadium when Irish journalists were informed that the event could be delayed by up to two hours.
The UEFA match delegate was also informed of the delay but was reportedly not given a reason. The team ultimately did not arrive for the scheduled training session.
The disruption followed an initial squad meeting on Friday intended to establish the players’ position on the “Israel” fixture and discuss whether they would stage a protest.
According to reports, a collective boycott was not initially the purpose of the meeting. During the discussions, however, Bazunu indicated that he did not want to participate in the match, with other players subsequently considering whether to join him.
The extent of opposition within the squad remains unclear, and no final collective decision had been announced at the time of reporting.
The developments mark a significant escalation in the controversy surrounding Ireland’s Nations League meetings with “Israel”.
Earlier this week, Ireland captain Dara O’Shea said the squad intended to fulfill the two fixtures, while any decision over a separate protest was to be discussed following Ireland’s opening Nations League match against Kosovo.
The position has since become less certain following the latest internal discussions.
Hallgrímsson had previously acknowledged that Ireland’s players did not share identical views or the same intensity of feeling regarding the “Israel” fixtures. He also said that he would respect a player’s decision if an individual did not want to take part.
Ireland’s match against “Israel” is scheduled for Sunday, September 27, at the Nagyerdei Stadium in Debrecen.
FAI faces pressure over ‘Israel’ games
The latest dispute follows months of controversy over the FAI’s decision to proceed with the fixtures.
In July, an FAI motion endorsing the fulfillment of the Nations League matches against “Israel” passed by 68% to 32%. The association had argued that failing to fulfill the fixtures could expose Irish football to sporting and financial consequences.
The FAI has also acknowledged the strength of public opposition to the fixtures. In September, CEO David Courell said the organization was in a “really difficult position,” arguing that UEFA’s failure to take action over “Israel’s” participation had left the FAI with limited options.
The controversy has extended beyond the football establishment. More than 160 Irish athletes have signed an open letter urging the national team to refuse to participate in the “Israel” fixtures, while protests have been held outside the team’s hotel.
China pushes back against US on Cuba, Iran
Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026
China called on Saturday for an immediate end to the blockade on Cuba, in a speech to the UN General Assembly that stopped short of naming the United States.
Vice President Han Zheng urged the “relevant country” to “immediately stop using the threat of force against Cuba” and to “immediately and completely lift the blockade and sanctions.”
He also pushed back against the US on Iran, saying “China holds that the sovereignty and security of countries in the Middle East, including the Gulf, should be respected,” though he did not mention the US at any point in his remarks.
The comments come as a US pressure campaign has largely cut off oil supplies to Cuba. The US oil blockade began in January and has deepened blackouts, with the island’s electrical grid suffering a total collapse earlier this month that left millions without power.
Equality among states
Han said major countries carry special responsibility for international peace and security and should lead by complying with the rules, upholding the rule of law, and “doing what’s right.”
He also cast China as a reliable partner and a steadfast defender of developing nations, saying all countries, “big or small, are equal members of the international community” and that world affairs should be handled through consultation.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke at the UN shortly after and made a similar appeal, urging Washington to end its siege of Cuba and ease trade restrictions on the island.
He also said the US should remove Cuba from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Trump-Xi summit
US President Donald Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping at the White House earlier this week, welcoming him with military flyovers and a lavish state dinner, according to Reuters.
During the talks, Trump told Xi that China should refrain from providing support to Iran in the US war on Iran. The US ambassador to China claimed on Friday that Trump received assurances from Xi that Beijing would not do so.
This followed reports that China had supplied Iran with shoulder-fired air-defense missile launchers and that Tehran had found ways to evade sanctions on its oil sales with Chinese help.
Beijing has repeatedly rejected the US sanctions campaign against Iran. In August, the Foreign Ministry said that sanctions and pressure “will not help resolve the issue” and that China opposes “illegal unilateral sanctions” lacking a basis in international law.
Chinese support for Cuba
Cuba was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China, and 2025 marked 65 years of relations.
China’s practical support has centered on energy. Reuters reported that Beijing financed 55 solar projects in Cuba in 2025, including a 21-megawatt plant near Jatibonico, with 37 more planned by 2028. Cuban media reported that a shipment of 5,000 solar panels arrived in September, the third of its kind in recent months.
Beijing has also committed 90,000 tonnes of rice to Cuba in 2026, of which 30,000 tonnes have been delivered and 60,000 tonnes pledged.
Ukrainian Soldiers, Potential Mercenaries: Have Gun, Will Travel!
By Jeffrey Silverman – New Eastern Outlook – September 26, 2026
Ukraine is already providing an early glimpse of what may become a much larger post-war phenomenon: highly trained combat personnel, particularly special-forces and other specialists, carrying their battlefield skills beyond the borders of the countries, in which they acquired them, with many of them NATO trained.
History offers plenty of warnings. Africa has spent decades wrestling with the problem of demobilized combatants, soldiers and guerrillas, whose military skills suddenly have little obvious place in civilian economies.
South Africa and Georgia both provide instructive case studies. After apartheid, using the South African example, the labor force had to absorb, integrate or demobilize personnel from competing military and paramilitary structures. Thousands of former combatants faced unemployment and uncertain futures, while the new South African National Defence Force itself eventually had to undergo substantial downsizing, and not only among white troops.
So what happens when the largest European land war in generations finally winds down? What will the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian servicemen do when the battlefield no longer needs them, and the economy cannot reintegrate them?
Many will also have significant trauma, both mental and physical, the former being far harder to identify, it is an unfortunate fact that many former combatants will have developed a taste for killing.
And that is where the story becomes considerably more uncomfortable.
In 2024, UNODC and international organized-crime specialists were already examining the possibility that Ukraine’s enormous post-war veteran population could become a source of organized-crime risk—not because veterans were inherently criminal, but because demobilization, weapons proliferation, inadequate reintegration and the availability of trained manpower could create conditions attractive to criminal networks.
Have Gun, Will Travel is an old American expression, but it may acquire a new geopolitical meaning in the aftermath of the Ukraine war. The world already has a market for soldiers, military trainers, private security personnel and combat veterans. Africa, the Middle East and other conflict zones have repeatedly demonstrated the demand for experienced men with battlefield skills.
Will wealthy states, such as the Gulf monarchies, Western governments, private military companies and international security organizations see this enormous reservoir of experience as a manpower pool to be exploited? Almost certainly in fact, it is already happening in Africa, where Ukrainian “specialists” are aiding terrorist groups, particularly in the Sahel, aiming to overthrow governments that have been causing the French problems.
It is doubtful that so many of these veterans be recruited for legitimate security and peacekeeping missions but rather for the less visible wars conducted through proxies, contractors and allied forces as US Flag Draped in Dover Delaware is not politically expedient.
The next major Ukrainian export may not be agricultural products, weapons, or drones. But battlefield tested military experience.
There is a particularly interesting precedent in Africa. War on the Rocks warned several years ago that the eventual end of the Ukraine war could produce an influx of experienced personnel into African conflicts. And we can now see the reverse phenomenon too: Russia has recruited tens of thousands of foreign nationals into its war, including substantial numbers from Africa.
The fact that Ukrainian personnel or Ukrainian-trained capabilities are already appearing in African theaters would suggest that the post-war question isn’t simply what happens to Ukrainian veterans inside Ukraine? It is also who will recruit their expertise internationally?
The broader literature is already warning about exactly this transition: the Global Initiative has specifically examined organized-crime risks surrounding Ukraine’s eventual veteran population.
Demand for armed warm bodies
That does not require those governments to deliberately create a “mercenary army.” Governments already have incentives to use contractors, partner forces, local auxiliaries and allied personnel when they don’t want to commit their own regular forces.
The postwar Ukrainian veteran question is potentially a major international-security story in its own right.
“The postwar disposition of Ukraine’s enormous veteran population could become one of the most important security questions of the post-war period. History shows that when large numbers of highly trained combatants are simultaneously demobilized, economically marginalized and connected to international illicit markets, some will inevitably find employment in private warfare, political militias, transnational security networks and organized crime.”
Africa provides some very strong precedents
This has happened repeatedly in Africa. Research on Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe found that poorly designed demobilization and reintegration programs could themselves create later security problems.
And the phenomenon isn’t limited to Africa. Research on Colombia found that demobilization of armed groups could increase some forms of crime—particularly robbery—where former combatants were not successfully reintegrated.
Ukraine could produce a much larger version of the problem
This is where the argument becomes interesting.
Ukraine is potentially different in scale, technological sophistication and international connectivity. A future Ukrainian demobilization could involve enormous numbers of veterans. One recent analysis by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime estimates that Ukraine could eventually have up to nine million veterans, alongside millions of displaced people and refugees.
Obviously, nine million does not mean nine million armed or unemployed men. Most veterans will simply return to civilian life. But even a tiny percentage becoming involved in illicit activity could constitute a significant population.
The Financial Times reported that Colombian criminals have sought to send people into Ukraine to acquire advanced drone expertise and bring that knowledge back to criminal organizations in Colombia, and it is now becoming apparent the Mexican cartels are following suit.
The post-Soviet precedent is important too
There is another historical analogy that may be even more relevant than Africa: the breakup of the Soviet Union.
When the USSR collapsed, large numbers of trained military personnel suddenly found themselves outside a functioning Soviet military system. Some went into private security and legitimate military contracting; others became involved in mercenary activity. Former Soviet military personnel subsequently appeared in conflicts in Africa and elsewhere.
Ukraine is producing veterans with skills that did not exist at anything like today’s scale in previous wars—particularly FPV/drone warfare, electronic warfare and battlefield intelligence.
But there is another elephant in the room. The combat in Ukraine has been brutal, well beyond anything else seen in recent decades. Combined with the violently racist nationalist indoctrination by the Ukrainian government, this has created a large number of emotionally traumatised young men and women, for whom killing comes natural.
If enough of these individuals are recruited into the worlds conflict zones, either by state actors or the underworld and terrorists, the results will be absolutely horrific in terms of war crimes and brutality, as evidenced by the massacre of civilians during the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk, and now in Africa.
Those hoping to profit from the monster they have created may well find its teeth searching for them.
Jeffrey K. Silverman is a freelance journalist and international development specialist, BSc, MSc, based for 30 years in Georgia and the former Soviet Union
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Burnham’s UN debut… A masterclass in British disinformation
By Finian Cunningham | Strategic Culture Foundation | September 26, 2026
So, “Britain is back” and ready to provide glorious leadership to the rest of the world, to “solve shared problems we face.”
British Prime Minister Andy Burnham made his debut at the United Nations this week, addressing the 81st session of the General Assembly in New York.
“You can count on us,” assured Burnham. “Count on us to stand up for those long-standing British values of fairness and justice – our shared values – and for the UN Charter.”
Please, don’t make me vomit. Burnham was oozing noble values on the podium of the UN while Saudi warplanes were massacring Yemeni civilians in their homes – warplanes that are directed and refuelled by Britain (and the United States).
This week, Yemeni media reported that over 100 people, including women and children, were killed as Saudi F-15 and Typhoon fighter jets intensified air strikes on residential areas in the Red Sea cities of Mocha and Taiz. Al Masirah TV showed bloody images of two children killed by a Saudi airstrike in Mocha
On his way to the UN, Burnham announced that he had ordered the deployment of RAF refuelling planes to enable the Saudi air assault on Yemen. Of course, the British media described the move as “defensive aid”.
Earlier this month, Downing Street also approved the dispatch of British military advisors to Saudi Arabia. American advisors are also stationed there to assist in the war of aggression against its southern neighbor.
Yemen’s armed forces and the Ansar Allah militia are hitting back hard. They have overrun Saudi forces in key Red Sea positions and have shut down the Saudi oil industry and pipelines with drone and missile attacks.
But make no mistake, this is a Saudi war of genocidal aggression fully supported by the United States and Britain. The war has been going on since 2015, together with a blockade on Yemen that has resulted in an estimated 400,000 Yemeni deaths. A lull in fighting from 2022 was broken when the Saudis launched air strikes on the Yemeni capital’s airport in July. The Yemenis have hit back with a vengeance, targeting Saudi oil installations.
The Saudi monarchy has begged Trump to give more military assistance. But Trump is bogged down and out of his depth with his losing seven-month war with Iran.
This is where Burnham has entered the fray, responding to Saudi pleas for help by signing off on military deployment. This could prove to be a disastrous strategic blunder. No doubt Burnham is trying to ingratiate himself with Washington. His decision to send the RAF into battle this week came ahead of his first meeting with Trump on the sidelines of the UN. The American president gave him a symbolic pat on the head, saying, “he’s going to be a great prime minister.”
Trump had often ridiculed Burnham’s predecessor, Keir Starmer, for supposedly not offering more military support to the U.S. war aims in the Middle East. Burnham is showing himself to be more amenable, that is, pliable.
The British Butler is slaughtering his way into favor with Washington. Women and children are sacrificed in Yemen all to satisfy the sick “special relationship” between the U.S. and Britain.
Burnham is a fraud with this working-class Manchester accent and glib talk about the “need to do more to help people with the everyday cost of living.”
If you can bear to listen to his speech at the UN, it is a masterclass in British disinformation. It takes a special kind of person to deliver such arrant nonsense with a pose of sincerity.
The thrust of his whole address was to blame Russia for everything. From poverty and inequality in British society, to seething discontent among Britons towards their ruling class, to the war in Ukraine. It truly was a consummate performance in misdirection, the kind of charade that British politicians excel at.
He announced that Britain was launching a new National Centre for Information Defence, purportedly to combat Russian disinformation, which he claimed was “a poisonous tide” sowing division and instability among Britons.
According to Burnham, all that is broken and dysfunctional in British society is due to Russian infiltration. Nothing was said about bankrupt British capitalism and the warmongering of the British state fuelling a proxy war in Ukraine or aggression in the Middle East at the expense of social conditions in Britain.
Burnham’s “solution” to Britain’s endemic problems is to increase “national security” and state control over public information – all under the guise of “defending” Britons from being manipulated by Russian propaganda.
The Orwellian condition that Britain is sliding into is awesome.
This British prime minister dares to speak about British values and leadership and condemn Russia while he is approving the supply of long-range air strikes against Russia with British cruise missiles and drones.
The proof of Burnham’s fraudulence and moral bankruptcy is his decision to materially support Saudi warplanes in committing atrocities in Yemen. Murderous aggression is labelled “defense”.
Burnham’s dubious asset as a politician is his ability to articulate justification for slaughter and war with empty platitudes.
A particularly odious point in his UN speech was his claim that English workers allied with Abraham Lincoln in the American Civil War against slavery. As if English mill workers were representative of British “values”. What Burnham conveniently omitted was the much more heinous role of the British ruling class in creating the Atlantic slave trade.
Britain’s historic role in global exploitation and waging genocidal wars is something that damns its governments forever. Its ongoing role in enabling the slaughter in Ukraine and in Yemen is but two of the latest episodes of this British systemic criminality.
These are the British “values” that Burnham deftly concealed this week with his performative debut at the UN.
Iran flights continue despite US aviation sanctions
Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026
International flights from Iran to several destinations remain operational despite the expansion of US sanctions targeting the country’s aviation sector, according to Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport.
The airport said Saturday that flights to Turkey, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were continuing according to their previously announced schedules.
The announcement comes as Washington escalates economic pressure on Iran and seeks to restrict the ability of Iranian airlines to maintain international operations.
Iranian flights continue despite sanctions
Imam Khomeini International Airport said that, aside from flights already canceled, no additional cancellations had been announced.
The canceled services include flights involving the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Oman, and Georgia.
The airport also said it was working to restore suspended air connections as soon as possible.
The continued operation of several international routes comes despite growing restrictions on Iranian aviation following a new round of US sanctions announced on September 8.
The measures have affected Iranian airlines as well as companies and intermediaries involved in providing services to the country’s aviation sector.
Recent reporting indicates that Iranian carriers have continued operating some international services despite the sanctions, including flights to China, Turkey, Thailand, and Afghanistan.
US measures target Iran’s aviation sector
The US Treasury Department announced sanctions on September 8 against 36 targets linked to Iran’s aviation sector, including 27 Iranian airlines. Washington described the measures as an effort to target what it considers Iran’s remaining unsanctioned carriers and the networks supporting them.
The sanctions form part of a broader US campaign to restrict Iran’s access to international financial and commercial networks.
The measures have also placed pressure on foreign companies providing Iranian carriers with fuel, ground handling, aircraft-related services, and other forms of support.
The consequences, however, have varied by country. While some governments and companies have restricted Iranian aviation connections, other countries have continued to facilitate flights.
Iraq restrictions trigger backlash
In Iraq, the suspension of Iranian flights, particularly through Najaf International Airport, has triggered criticism from official, political, factional, and religious quarters.
Several Iraqi parties and figures have called for the decision to be reversed and rejected what they described as US pressure on Baghdad.
The Iraqi government is also moving toward dialogue with Washington in an effort to secure an exemption that would allow air links with Iran to resume.
Ali Akbar Velayati, international affairs advisor to Iran’s Leader, said the restrictions on Iranian flights were part of an effort by Iran’s enemies to compensate for their battlefield defeat by attempting to dismantle the “unity of the fronts” from within.
The Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-Sadegh, further told Iran’s ISNA news agency that a new decision surrounding Iranian flights to Iraq is likely to be announced soon.
He added that Iran is in contact with Iraqi officials and proposals on the matter have been submitted.
Al-e Sadegh noted that roughly 12,000 to 13,000 people travel between Iraq and Iran via Iranian airlines.
China maintains air links with Iran
China has maintained its opposition to unilateral US sanctions and continued to receive Iranian flights.
Flight-tracking data cited in recent reports showed Iranian services continuing to operate to Chinese destinations after the latest US measures took effect.
The continued connections with China also reflect the broader geopolitical divide over Washington’s unilateral sanctions policy, with Beijing maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran despite US pressure.
The day-after at the White House: USA and Xi Jinping
Agreements at no cost
By Lorenzo Maria Pacini – Strategic Culture Foundation – September 26, 2026
Xi Jinping left Washington on Friday, September 25, bid farewell by a 21-gun salute and the administration’s top officials lined up at the airport. A three-day state visit organized with a level of attention to detail that the White House rarely reserves for a systemic rival: the welcome at the foot of the aircraft stairs, a three-hour meeting in the Oval Office, the state dinner, tea with the spouses, and a visit to the National Archives. A Schramsberg was chosen for dinner – the same winery that provided the wine for the 1972 toast between Nixon and Zhou Enlai. At the table sat half of the American business community: Musk, Jensen Huang, Zuckerberg, Tim Cook, Bezos, Pichai, Dimon, Fink, as well as three Supreme Court justices, the Federal Reserve chair, and half the Cabinet.
Then there is the real conversation, which must be read between the lines. Beijing immediately released its own account of the talks. On the American side, in the early hours, there was no official statement: only remarks from officials and a president who chose not to answer questions on the substance of the matter. This asymmetry in documentation alone reveals who wanted to set the terms of the meeting in writing.
On the Iran issue, administration sources presented an alignment on three points as “significant progress”: Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons; the Strait of Hormuz must remain open; and there must be no tolls in the strait. Taken one by one, these three points coincide with positions that Beijing had been advocating even before boarding the plane. China holds a permanent seat on the Security Council and is a signatory to the 2015 JCPOA: Iranian nonproliferation has been its official policy for over a decade. An open Strait of Hormuz is in China’s interest even more than it is in America’s, because East Asia consumes the largest share of the crude oil passing through the strait, and China pays more than anyone else for Brent crude that remains above $100 per barrel. As for tolls, a transit fee imposed by Tehran would hit oil tankers bound for Chinese ports first and foremost.
Washington has thus secured Xi’s signature on three statements that Beijing would have endorsed in any forum. The actual gain is more limited, but it exists. China’s distancing itself from Iran’s demand for tolls weakens a card that Tehran is playing in the New York negotiations, where discussions center on a phased exit from the crisis (reopening of the strait, simultaneous lifting of the U.S. naval blockade, followed by the unfreezing of frozen assets), and where the Iranian delegation is reportedly aiming to transfer the issue of transit rights to a separate annex.
Independent accounts fill in what the American version leaves out. Xi asked Trump for an immediate return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and the resumption of negotiations “as soon as possible,” leading to a comprehensive agreement that includes the nuclear issue. Trump did not say yes. Rather than being resolved at the summit, the Iranian issue was kept off the summit agenda.
Tehran and Taiwan
Regarding Chinese support for Iran, the officials themselves admit that the picture is incomplete: “There has been indirect support, we believe, but no direct evidence.” The United States says it is “very concerned” but is unable to prove it. Trump reportedly told Xi in person, however, that any aid to Tehran – “whether direct or indirect, in the form of intelligence, components, or military equipment” – is “totally unacceptable.”
A warning is only as strong as the tool that backs it up, and here the tool is nowhere to be seen. During the same period, flight tracking data recorded a Mahan Air flight landing as scheduled in Guangzhou, and no measures were taken against Chinese airports or operators: the no-fly zone around Iran has failed precisely where it matters most. The term “indirect,” moreover, remains deliberately vague. If it included the purchase of Iranian crude oil, it would strike at the heart of Sino-Iranian trade; if it does not include it, it is reduced to military supplies that Washington, by its own admission, cannot substantiate. The ambiguity serves both sides: the Americans to keep the threat hanging in the air, and the Chinese to continue operating in the gray zone. My assessment is that action by the Treasury against Chinese entities linked to Iran is unlikely before the trade agreement is finalized, with a moderate degree of confidence.
Washington insists that pressure on Iran is a separate issue, unrelated to arms supplies to Taiwan or any other negotiations. This separation has its own domestic logic. With less than six weeks until the November 3 midterm elections, the administration cannot risk being accused of trading Taipei for Chinese cooperation in the Gulf.
The point is that this separation is unilateral. In the Chinese account, Xi described Beijing’s position on reunification and territorial integrity as clear-cut; he called on the United States to oppose Taiwan’s independence and to handle the issue with caution, noting that doing so would lay a solid foundation for strategic cooperation between the two countries. Taiwan is not just another issue among many; it is the condition underpinning them all, including Iran. Beijing will be watching to see how Washington translates its statements into concrete actions, and that response will remain the primary indicator of American seriousness. The result is a clear asymmetry: the United States is giving up using Taiwan as leverage, while China retains it as a precondition.
What about the option of a trade truce?
On the economic front, the summit resulted in the extension of the trade truce until January 10 – which averts an immediate return to much higher tariffs – and the announcement of a managed trade agreement, the details of which are expected on Monday following weeks of negotiations. No breakthrough on tariffs, rare earths, or technology controls. The very term echoes the “Phase One” model from January 2020: quantified purchase commitments – that is, managing the symptoms of a rivalry whose structural causes remain unchanged.
On artificial intelligence, the positions remained distinct. Xi proposed dialogue on risks, human oversight of technologies, and cooperation against abuses, inviting both sides to build on their respective strengths rather than monitor one another. Trump acknowledged that AI concerns the future of humanity, but made it clear that he prefers the current status quo to remain largely unchanged. No common rules, no mechanisms. The two capitals limited themselves to confirming mutual support for the APEC summit and the G20 summit they will host this year, thereby setting the schedule for upcoming meetings.
Taken together, the U.S. outcome consists of a declarative convergence on three already-shared principles, a verbal warning, and a trade agreement yet to be reviewed. Beijing takes home more: a truce until January, no new technological restrictions, Taiwan reaffirmed as the foundation of the relationship, and, above all, the U.S. adoption of the Chinese formula for a “constructive relationship of strategic stability,” agreed upon in May and now revived. Robert Lawrence Kuhn provided the most honest summary: the summit’s main outcome is a longer planning horizon. For a power convinced that time is on its side, that longer horizon is the reward.
There is one objection that must be taken seriously. Xi’s public distancing from the concessions isolates Tehran just as an internal front is opening up in Iran, with an impeachment motion filed in parliament against Foreign Minister Araghchi, accused of negotiating with the Americans without the green light from the Supreme National Security Council. But this very situation highlights the limitations of that gain. The question in Tehran is no longer just what to offer, but who has the authority to offer it; and on this point, Chinese pressure regarding the tolls changes nothing.
There are few but concrete indicators to watch in the coming weeks. The text of Monday’s agreement will reveal whether the trade deal extends to rare earths or is limited to agricultural and energy purchases. The New York channel will indicate whether the phased exchange – involving shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the lifting of the blockade – becomes operational. The six ballistic missiles launched by Ansarallah toward Yanbu and Taif – targeting the terminal of the only major Saudi route bypassing the strait – demonstrate just how narrow the margin is before the price of crude oil pushes Trump, on the eve of the election, toward military options. Finally, a potential designation of Chinese entities by the Treasury would lend real weight to the warning from the Oval Office.
As long as none of these signals change, we can say that the summit has stabilized Sino-American relations without stabilizing the Gulf – and regarding the Gulf, Beijing has offered words, not leverage.
The Geopolitical Balance in the Red Sea: The UAE Being Displaced by New Players
By Samyar Rostami – New Eastern Outlook – September 26, 2026
The persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
For the past ten years, the Southern Red Sea has been a pivotal factor in the UAE’s foreign policy. Over the past decade, the UAE has built a layered maritime, air, and commercial infrastructure network, including military bases, in the Red Sea or near Yemen, Somaliland, Somalia and Sudan, starting from 2015.
According to some estimates, the value of UAE investments along Africa’s coastal regions and the Arabian Peninsula amounts to $60 billion.
In September 2015, the UAE established its first military base in Africa, in Eritrea. These bases possessed strategic advantages: the ‘protection of interests’ and control over the security and economic architecture of international maritime routes.
With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, cooperation between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi in the Red Sea intensified.
The UAE’s approach—channeled through companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports—is centered on controlling ports, strategic waterways, military bases, and key trade and energy routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in coordination with the United States and its allies. Abu Dhabi’s approach also included engagement with non-state armed actors and separatist movements in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.
Factors Behind the UAE’s Diminishing Role
Over the past decade, the UAE emerged as a party to the conflicts in the southern Red Sea. However, geopolitical developments over the past year signal a gradual decline in the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Several factors are also significant, stemming from US and Israeli military strikes against Iran, the war between Sanaa and Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Emirati rivalry in the region, and disputes among African states.
Sudan’s value lies in its geopolitics. With 853 kilometres of coastline and several key ports, Sudan constitutes a vital link in the Red Sea.
The Sudan war since April 2023 has created conditions for the expansion of the UAE’s role. The UAE faces accusations of providing training and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Human rights and political demands against the UAE has increased.
The UAE also maintains bases inside Sudanese territory. However, the ongoing war in Sudan and the support of allies for the Sudanese government have led to increased pressure on the UAE.
Riyadh regards the Red Sea as part of its strategic interests and its exclusive backyard. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh each view the other as a direct threat to their position and interests in parts of the southern Red Sea. Thus, the reduction of the UAE’s footprint in the southern Red Sea constitutes a strategic gain for Riyadh. Riyadh has effectively sought to weaken Abu Dhabi’s role.
In late 2025, Saudi Arabia’s support for Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) resulted in pressure being brought to bear on UAE-backed forces.
In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks among 14 countries—including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia—which established a multinational maritime defence alliance. The UAE and Ethiopia were excluded from the list.
The formation of a Riyadh-led Red Sea maritime task force—with the participation of Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea—without coordination with the UAE amounts to a further constriction of the UAE’s role in the region.
Despite ongoing Egyptian–Emirati consultations on guaranteeing maritime navigation security in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, Egypt’s foreign policy is not aligned with the UAE’s interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. Additionally, the alignment and coordination among Israel, India, the UAE, and Ethiopia are not particularly consonant with Egypt’s interests in Ethiopia and the Red Sea.
Until last September, the UAE played a significant role in the southern Yemeni islands of the Red Sea and in southwestern Yemen. However, Sanaa’s advance in the eastern Red Sea—the port of Mokha, Mayun Island, and other archipelagos north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait—in September 2026 inflicted negative and fundamental consequences on the UAE’s regional role.
Sanaa’s advance amounts to the nullification of the presence of Emirati actors in Yemen’s future political sphere. Sanaa is seeking to consolidate itself as a strategic “node” within the Iran-led Axis of Resistance.
Despite Cairo’s opposition to Sanaa’s proposal for maritime navigation coordination in the Red Sea, Sanaa—having secured control over the most important islands and cities overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait on the Yemeni side—is calling for the formulation of new rules to ensure security and navigation in the region. Ansar Allah’s control over Bab al-Mandab could put the UAE under pressure. Any expansion of Sanaa’s role in Sudan could likewise prove detrimental to the UAE.
Amid tensions between the United States and Iran, Abu Dhabi finds itself facing a more constrained strategic space.
The UAE’s alignment with the United States is, in a sense, also an intensification of Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Iran in areas such as the Red Sea. Unlike the UAE, Iran is seeking better relations with the Sudanese government. Many in Iran believe that Israel and the UAE are devising an economic and geopolitical plan to control the vital routes of the Red Sea and Yemen’s ports.
With Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, many in the countries of the southern Red Sea have linked it to the UAE.
After years, Eritrea revoked the UAE’s access to its military infrastructure. Eritrean officials have recently made sharp statements about the UAE and Israel—particularly regarding Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland.
Eritrea is providing frontline support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Any deeper alliance between Eritrea and Sudan, Iran, Russia, China, and Sanaa could diminish the UAE’s regional role in the Red Sea. Additionally, some countries and actors near the Red Sea also hold a negative view of the UAE’s regional role.
The Somali government’s decision in January 2026 to sever relations with the UAE is, in a sense, a counter to the UAE’s role in the Somaliland and Puntland regions. Somalia has revoked all agreements with the UAE, including cooperation as well as security and defence arrangements. This move has negative implications for the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Moreover, the southern Red Sea plays a pivotal role in the regional strategy of Russia and Beijing. For example, apart from China’s role in Djibouti, Beijing is Eritrea’s principal creditor and has expanded its influence in Sudan.
The developments of the past year have also contributed to a decline in the standing of the UAE’s allies in the region.
Outlook
The US presence in the Red Sea’s African states is rooted in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.
The European Union’s presence in the region, via Operation ASPIDES, is limited to commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Despite the UAE’s formal withdrawal from some bases, its economic and security influence, as well as its soft-power instruments, remain strong.
A decrease in UAE military deployments in the region could negatively impact its support for allies in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.
The UAE continues to have significant economic potential, secure partnerships, and influence in the southern Red Sea. In a way, this is considered a threat and a risk to certain African nations in the Red Sea region.
Certainly, a more extensive Sanaa presence over Bab al-Mandab, strategic coasts, and islands could confront Abu Dhabi’s maneuver and role in the southern Red Sea with a structural challenge.
The UAE’s approach in ports, logistics, energy, and other strategic infrastructure—along with deeper defense and security coordination with the West in the southern Red Sea—is likely to continue. However, the expansion of the UAE’s role also requires an extensive US presence in the Red Sea.
Moreover, the persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
Samyar Rostami is а political observer and senior researcher in international relations.
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Iraqi resistance group vows to stage airport sit-ins over Iran aerial blockade
Press TV – September 26, 2026
An Iraqi anti-terror resistance group has denounced the Baghdad government’s decision to halt Iranian airline operations following US sanctions on Iran’s aviation sector, vowing to stage sit-ins at Iraqi airports nationwide unless normal air traffic between the two Muslim neighboring countries resumes.
“We will not wait long,” Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba Secretary-General Akram al-Kaabi said in a statement on Friday.
He urged Iraqi political forces to “break free from American dominance.”
The restrictions, Kaabi said, were preventing millions of people from visiting religious sites and harming Iraq’s economy.
On Thursday, the Kata’ib Hezbollah resistance group called upon all walks of Iraqi society to break “the US siege on Iran.”
The faction urged Iraqi citizens to “circumvent the embargo through all available means” in demonstration of solidarity with Iran, including the purchase of Iranian commodities, the facilitation of commercial relations with Iran, and the abstention from any undertakings that would exacerbate Iranians’ hardship.
The group also asked Shia religious authorities to issue a decree (fatwa) on whether it is religiously permissible “to help the enemy, in any form, besiege and starve the Iranian people.”
Commercial aviation services between Iraq and Iran were suspended after ground-handling companies stopped providing services on these routes over concerns about potential US sanctions.
The move prompted airlines to suspend their flights.
Najaf International Airport, the last Iraqi airport still operating flights to Iran, suspended the services at 2 a.m. local time on Friday until further notice, according to an official directive.
Erbil International Airport and Sulaymaniyah’s International Airport took similar measures. Kirkuk International Airport also said it had no flights to Iran.
The disruption followed US measures targeting Iran’s aviation sector. On September 8, the US Treasury sanctioned 27 Iranian airlines and claimed that airports, fuel suppliers, ground-handling firms and other service providers dealing with sanctioned carriers could face secondary sanctions.
Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Sayyed Mojtaba Khamenei, on Friday warned against recent regional measures that had disrupted Iranian passenger flights, saying: “Flights in the region are either free for everyone, or for no one.”
He added that cooperation with the US in implementing hostile policies would remain in the memory of the Iranian people, stressing that if Iran cannot fly or receive airport services, “no country in the region will have this possibility either.”
Turkish parliament to review Saudi-Pakistan defense pact next month
Al Mayadeen | September 25, 2026
Turkey’s Parliament is expected to consider the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan next month, Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus told reporters on Friday, as the three countries move to establish mechanisms for implementing the pact.
Kurtulmus said the agreement has not yet been submitted to Parliament for ratification and is expected to be formally presented once lawmakers return from recess next month. He added that international agreements require parliamentary approval to enter into force in Turkey, while meetings currently being held under the agreement remain preparatory.
Turkey prepares to ratify Mecca defense agreement
Kurtulmus made the remarks to reporters in Ankara, confirming that the agreement has yet to reach Parliament despite ongoing coordination among Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was signed on August 7 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Mecca.
The agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries would be regarded as an attack against all three, while providing for expanded defense cooperation and collective deterrence.
The pact is therefore moving from its initial political agreement toward institutional and legal implementation, with parliamentary approval constituting a key step for Turkey.
When asked about the claim that the Mecca agreement was against Iran, Kurtulmus denied the allegation and stated that the main source of the region’s problems was “Israel” and its aggressive policies.
He reminded parliamentarians that “Israel” launched multiple attacks on numerous nations without question as part of its hostile policies, and explained that the balance of power has completely changed following the US-Israeli war on Iran.
“We propose that the countries in the region increase their cooperation to establish and secure their own security,” he said. “We absolutely do not, and should never, view the Mecca Agreement as an agreement against Iran. The Mecca Agreement, and perhaps even its expansion to include Iran and other regional countries, should become an agreement that ensures the security of the regional countries and, more broadly, the Islamic world.”
Kurtulmus added that the agreement was not formed as a threat to any country as it’s an agreement for the promotion of unity, solidarity, and security of the region.
“It is still in its initial stages and is not yet fully formed,” he said. “We hope that with the participation of other regional countries, it will become a much stronger agreement.”
Saudi Arabia calls for military coordination
The development comes as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan prepare for an urgent meeting of their military chiefs, amid Saudi Arabia’s aggression on Yemen.
Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry announced Friday that the chiefs of staff of the three countries would meet to discuss ways to support the Kingdom under the terms of the Mecca agreement.
The announcement followed a meeting in New York between Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The Saudi statement did not specify when the military chiefs would meet or what form potential support could take.
Pact moves toward institutionalization
The three countries have already begun establishing mechanisms to implement the agreement.
At a Strategic Political and Defense Committee meeting in Istanbul on August 31, the three sides agreed to establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for three years.
They also agreed to strengthen military capabilities through joint activities, defense-industry cooperation, technology development, and production.
DEATH SPIKES & RISING CANCER IN OUR YOUTH EXPLAINED
The HighWire with Del Bigtree | September 24, 2026
Fresh off testifying at Canada’s Allison Inquiry, physicist Denis Rancourt joins Del to examine mortality and cancer data among 5- to 24-year-olds—and what could be behind their striking, lockstep rise.
