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Israeli troops executed Palestinian aid workers at ‘point blank range’: Report

The Cradle | February 23, 2026

Israeli soldiers massacred 15 Palestinian aid workers, targeting them with nearly a thousand bullets, including at least eight at point-blank range, in Tal al-Sultan in southern Gaza on 23 March 2025, a joint investigation by the independent research groups Earshot and Forensic Architecture has shown.

The report, based on eyewitness testimony and audio and visual analysis, shows that Israeli troops executed many of the aid workers, including shooting one from as close as a meter away.

The victims included eight aid workers with the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), six from the Palestinian Civil Defense, and a UN relief agency staffer.

After ambushing the aid workers, the Israeli troops crushed the ambulances and buried them along with the bodies in a mass grave.

The report by Earshot and Forensic Architecture reconstructed the details of the massacre using video and audio recordings taken by the aid workers before their deaths, open-source images and videos, satellite imagery, social media posts, and other materials, as well as in-depth interviews with two survivors.

On 23 March 2025 at 3:52 am, the PRCS dispatched two ambulances from two different areas to the scene of an Israeli airstrike in Al-Hashashin near Rafah on the Egyptian border.

Israeli soldiers ambushed the Palestinian aid workers, firing at them 910 times in a near continuous assault lasting over two hours.

At least 93 percent of the gunshots were fired directly towards the emergency vehicles and aid workers by a group of at least 30 soldiers.

Israeli soldiers began firing on the aid workers from an elevated position on a sandbank. They then began walking toward the defenseless aid workers while continuing to shoot.

Once they reached them, they walked between the ambulances, carrying out execution-style killings at point-blank range.

“The soldiers could clearly see the aid workers, shot at them continuously and deliberately from this position and then approached to execute them one by one at close range,” Samaneh Moafi, assistant director of research at Forensic Architecture, told Drop Site News.

“Locating the massacre within the evolution of Israel’s campaign in Gaza shows that it was not an isolated incident but part of the genocide,” Moafi added.

The 15 aid workers killed were: Mustafa Khafaja, Ezz el-Din Shaat, Saleh Muammar, Refaat Radwan, Muhammad Bahloul, Ashraf Abu Libda, Muhammad al-Hila, and Raed al-Sharif with the PRCS; Zuhair Abdul Hamid al-Farra, Samir Yahya al-Bahapsa, Ibrahim Nabil al-Maghari, Fouad Ibrahim al-Jamal, Youssef Rassem Khalifa, and Anwar al-Attar with the Civil Defense; and Kamal Mohammed Shahtout with UNRWA.

After the mass grave was discovered and news of the massacre emerged, Israeli authorities attempted to cover it up.

“Following our discovery of the mass grave, the narrative from Israeli forces shifted multiple times; we were fed several versions of a blatant lie,” stated Jonathan Whittall, a senior UN official in Palestine between 2022 and 2025.

“The men we retrieved on Eid last year were medics. We found them in their uniforms, ready to save lives, only to be killed by Israeli forces, fully aware of their protected status.”

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes | , , , , | Comments Off on Israeli troops executed Palestinian aid workers at ‘point blank range’: Report

Iran war What if today’s Iran is resigned to a long, hellish war with the US?

By Sajjad Safaei | Responsible Statecraft | February 23, 2026

Trump’s decision in June 2025 to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities in the final days of Israel’s war on Iran removed any lingering doubts about his administration’s willingness to cross the longstanding U.S. red line of directly attacking Iran’s nuclear program.

As a result, every subsequent American military threat, against Iran as well as the rest of the world, was imbued with a credibility that only the precedent of naked aggression can impose. The U.S. military’s abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January only reinforced that credibility.

But the U.S. strike on Iran, or Operation Midnight Hammer, has also set in motion two consequences that run directly counter to his vision of coercing Iran into submission.

First, the brief U.S.-Iran dustup following Operation Midnight Hammer communicated to Iran that while Washington was now more likely to pull the trigger, it was by no means eager to enter a costly and open-ended firefight. Indeed, it did not escape the attention of the Iranians that while the Trump administration warned Tehran that any Iranian response to Operation Midnight Hammer would trigger a devastating U.S. response, Iran’s ballistic missile retaliation against U.S. bases in Qatar elicited not Trump’s wrath but his framing of the episode as an opportunity to move toward “peace and harmony.” This was then promptly followed by his brokering of a ceasefire between Iran and Israel.

Second, the joint U.S.-Israeli war on Iran in June liberated Iran from its own fear of total war. In the months and years leading up to the 12-Day War, Tehran’s intoxicating belief that war could and should be avoided — at every turn and at any cost — had infused the Iranian decision-making apparatus with a paralyzing caution that, on the one hand, deterred Iran from retaliating decisively against Israeli attacks while at the same time emboldened Israel to repeatedly push the limits of escalation with impunity.

But that edifice of fear would collapse under the weight of Israel’s war on Iran in June 2025, and the United States’ direct participation in that war. In its place emerged a sober recognition that Iran was no longer standing on the brink of a war it could prevent but was already fully immersed in a recurring cycle of limited Israeli and American wars inside Iranian territory.

Iran’s generals understood that the only reliable way to conclusively break that cycle was to drive the confrontation beyond Washington’s comfortable terrain of swift, manageable military interventions and into a realm where the costs of continued escalation would become unbearable for the United States and Israel alike. In the recent warning of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, “If they start a war this time,” he cautioned, “it will be a regional war.”

For Washington, this shift in Iranian consciousness could not have occurred at a worse moment in time. Iran has been thrust into a state of full-mobilization for a regional war at the very moment when it has become unmistakably clear that Washington’s appetite for military adventures does not extend beyond spectacular, swift, and high-impact demonstrations of military dominance.

The suggestion here is by no means that the Iranian armed forces are somehow on par with, let alone superior to, those of the U.S. military. Rather, an acute asymmetry has emerged in the two sides’ resolve and pain tolerance, an asymmetry in which, paradoxically, the militarily weaker party is structurally less constrained in its willingness to both endure and impose costs, resulting in a strategic posture far less favorable to the U.S. than the raw balance of military power would suggest.

More paradoxical, still, is that this sharp imbalance in resolve has crystallized at precisely the moment when Iran’s overall regional position is far more precarious than at any point in recent decades, a precarity made possible by the collapse of Assad’s rule in Syria and the significant weakening of Hezbollah’s operational depth in Southern Lebanon.

This asymmetry in resolve has found political expression in the recent resumption of talks between Iran and the United States over the nuclear program, assuming, of course, that the current negotiations reflect a sincere U.S. effort to reach an agreement and not, as was the case during last year’s negotiations, an attempt merely to lull the Iranians into complacency ahead of war.

The talks are not, as is often claimed, evidence of U.S. success in coercing Iran to come to the negotiating table. Instead, the talks reflect a growing realization within the Trump administration that Washington’s options are limited: either climb to the next and final rung of the escalation ladder, which is a full-scale war with Iran, whose duration and intensity would likely escape U.S. control, or return to a negotiated settlement of the nuclear dispute.

Should current talks result in a resolution of the nuclear file, they will stand as yet another outward expression of the realization in Washington that a total war with Iran is a monstrous black box the United States has no desire to open. For if Trump truly believed the U.S. could win militarily against Iran in the time-frame, shape, and intensity of his choosing, he would already have started this war, just as he did in the operation to abduct Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

What has prevented him from doing so, more than anything else, is Iran’s very real and sizable capacity to drag the United States and the entire region into a grinding, drawn-out war of attrition that would further accelerate the decline of U.S. global hegemony in ways previously thought unimaginable.

To be sure, the current impasse offers precious little by way of novelty. On the contrary, almost all of its defining features were either knowable or predictable before Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA. Indeed, President Obama’s pursuit of nuclear diplomacy was driven chiefly by the same military realities that have until today prompted Trump to pursue diplomacy with Iran.

Nine years after Trump first set out to overwrite the legacy of Obama’s deal, the paths available to Washington are clearer than at any point since the 1979 Islamic Revolution: a total regional war whose limits would not be set by Washington, or a nuclear settlement that, while not perfect from Trump’s standpoint, would pull the United States back from the brink of an open-ended and intractable regional war with an Iran.

If Washington’s participation in Israel’s June 2025 war with Iran elevated U.S. military force to a perfectly viable instrument of the United States’ Iran policy, the success of current talks would signal the formal undoing of that logic. But should the failure of talks pave the way for another full-scale war, the United States and Israel will be fighting an Iran vastly different from June. For the Iran of today appears to have made its peace with the grim conclusion that while a decisive slog with Israel and the United States is sure to be agonizing, it is preferable to the recurring attrition of repeated wars and a chronic strategic vulnerability that only emboldens adversaries to target Iran and its regional allies.

This cold calculus is captured with unsettling clarity in an oft-quoted Iranian proverb: marg yek bar, shivan yek bar—“death once, wail once.”

Sajjad Safaei, PhD, is a multidisciplinary researcher, lecturer, and analyst based in Germany. Previously a postdoctoral researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, he has also taught at the Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Zurich. His writings on Middle Eastern geopolitics, Iranian domestic and foreign policy, nuclear diplomacy, regional security dynamics, and arms control have appeared in outlets such as Foreign Policy, Responsible Statecraft, Aljazeera, DAWN, and The National Interest.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Iran war What if today’s Iran is resigned to a long, hellish war with the US?

Why Israel Is Escalating Its War Crimes Against Lebanon

By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | February 23, 2026

Key Analytical Points

  • Israel’s pattern of ceasefire violations suggests a deliberate attempt to reshape deterrence rules in Lebanon rather than isolated tactical operations.
  • Provocations aimed at Hezbollah appear designed to trigger a response that would justify a broader Israeli escalation under new “rules of engagement.”
  • Hezbollah’s restraint signals long-term strategic patience rather than weakness, indicating preparation for a larger confrontation tied to regional dynamics.
  • The northern front is increasingly linked to US–Iran tensions, raising the likelihood that Lebanon could become either a preemptive battlefield or a secondary theater in a wider war.
  • The balance of power on the ground—particularly Hezbollah’s missile capabilities and ground forces—creates significant deterrent risk for Israel, limiting its escalation options despite mounting pressure.

Escalation under the Cover of Ceasefire

Since the beginning of Ramadan, Israel has notably ramped up its campaign of aggression against Lebanon. Although airstrikes committed throughout Lebanese territory have been routine since the implementation of the November 27, 2024, ceasefire agreement, what we are seeing now is a sign of panic amid rising tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran.

Israel has committed the most violations of any ceasefire in recorded human history in Lebanon. At the tail end of November of 2025, UNIFIL – the United Nations peacekeeping forces – confirmed that Israel had committed upwards of 10,000 violations of the ceasefire agreement. This is no accident and confirms that the Zionist regime never had any intention of adhering to a cessation of hostilities with Hezbollah.

Instead, the Israelis sought to impose new equations on the ground, enabling total freedom of action, while also using their US allies to pressure the Lebanese state and its army to pursue a policy of undermining the group within the country.

It was never a realistic prospect that the Lebanese army was going to disarm Hezbollah; therefore, the only possible outcomes were going to be civil war or a campaign of pressure. Both favor Tel Aviv, with a civil war conflict being their preferred outcome.

Several times, the Israelis have attempted to provoke a reaction from Hezbollah, which has adhered to the ceasefire and not fired a single munition at their occupiers, who have now illegally established a military presence, intended to be permanent, in southern Lebanon.

These major provocations have included acts such as the assassination of Haytham Ali Tabatabai in southern Beirut. Tabatabai had taken over the role of Hezbollah’s top military chief following the assassination of Fouad Shukr the year prior. The Israelis have attacked the southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital, Dahiyeh, on a number of occasions, also committing civilian massacres in the south of the country up to the northern Bekaa Valley’s Baalbek.

Each of these waves of aggression was clearly designed to draw responses but failed to make Hezbollah bite. The idea was to set new rules of engagement, red lines, and establish a precedent for what constitutes aggression against Israel that would provoke a major bombardment of Lebanon.

Strategic Patience and Military Recalibration

On Hezbollah’s part, it appears that they understood what Israel was attempting to lure them into and instead refrained from responding, waiting for the opportune time to initiate a major war that would enable them to reclaim their territory and inflict what they see as sufficient acts of revenge on the Israeli enemy.

So, while Israel has been provoking Hezbollah and committing its daily acts of aggression against the civilian population in southern Lebanon in particular, Hezbollah has been working to rebuild and establish new battle plans. It has also become clear that the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria did not end the weapons transfers between Syria and Lebanon, something that both Israeli and US think tanks have themselves admitted.

Since the beginning of Ramadan, this campaign of incitement has only increased. On Friday, Israel launched an assassination strike, using three missiles, on the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh, killing two members of Hamas and injuring a number of civilians. Then, later that same day, Israel bombed three populated buildings in the Bekaa Valley, killing 10, eight of whom were members of Hezbollah, and injuring 50 people.

The Northern Front

Israel and its Trump administration are now poised to enter a new conflict with Iran, as the largest US military buildup in the region since the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003 continues. It has become clear that in the event a regime-change war is waged against the Islamic Republic, Hezbollah will very likely engage in a battle with the Israelis.

Nobody truly understands just how powerful Hezbollah currently is, yet it is clear from the final week of the 2024 Lebanon-Israel war that they possess ballistic missiles capable of successfully striking high-rise buildings in Tel Aviv, along with a large attack drone arsenal. However, their missile and drone power aside, Hezbollah’s biggest asset has proven to be their ground forces, which inflicted the largest number of military casualties during the war.

In other words, Hezbollah will act as Iran’s ground force in any regional war. If they can manage to breach the border into northern occupied Palestine, it will represent a major blow to the Israeli state, yet a battle in the heart of the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon could prove even more costly to the Israeli occupying forces.

It is because of this inevitable escalation in the north that the Israelis are displaying signs of panic and continue to target both Hezbollah members and civilians alike. There has even been a campaign of spraying cancer-causing chemical substances in the south, alongside a campaign of intimidation using their drone power, a similar strategy to what we saw in Gaza for decades.

If anything, the Israelis may even urge the United States to help them go after Hezbollah in Lebanon. There is a chance this could lead to a scenario where Lebanon is attacked prior to Iran, yet the inherent risks to this strategy could be that they then lose any element of surprise in their planned assault on Iran, especially in the event that Tehran comes to the aid of Hezbollah.

– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Illegal Occupation, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Why Israel Is Escalating Its War Crimes Against Lebanon

Iran in the face of the armed diplomacy of imperialism

By Sayid Marcos Tenorio | MEMO | February 23, 2026

The ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran, mediated by Oman and recently held in Geneva, have been presented by Western diplomacy as a technical effort to contain nuclear risks. This version is a carefully constructed farce.

What is at stake is not the so-called “non-proliferation”, but a direct dispute between national sovereignty and imperial domination, conducted in order to preserve the regional hegemony of “Israel” and to keep the Middle East under the strategic tutelage of the US–Zionist axis.

The United States does not negotiate in the name of peace or international security. It negotiates as the diplomatic and military arm of the Zionist regime, tasked with neutralising any regional power that escapes the colonial control imposed after the Second World War.

Iran is today the principal target of this machinery because it dares to assert political, scientific, and strategic autonomy in a region that Washington and Tel Aviv treat as a protectorate.

The real nature of these “negotiations” becomes evident in the adopted method. While speaking of dialogue, the US reinforces its military presence in the Gulf, deploys aircraft carriers, issues public threats, and makes it clear that the alternative to an agreement is violence.

This is the old gunboat diplomacy, in which the empire demands concessions under blackmail. This is not negotiation between sovereign states; it is political extortion disguised as a diplomatic process.

Washington’s central argument, wrapped in an alleged Iranian nuclear risk, does not withstand any honest analysis. Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, has not announced any intention to produce them, and accepts international verification mechanisms. The real problem is not nuclear; it is geopolitical.

What troubles the US and “Israel” is the existence of a state that refuses to integrate into the West’s colonial security architecture, that maintains its own deterrent capability, and that politically and morally supports the peoples of the region against occupation and aggression.

This is why the demand for “zero enrichment” reappears as a mantra of the Zionist consortium. It is an illegal, discriminatory, and politically obscene imposition. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons explicitly recognises the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Even so, this right applies only to allies of the empire. “Israel”, a clandestine nuclear power outside the NPT, with an atomic arsenal that has never been inspected, remains untouched. Iran, by contrast, is required to submit completely. That is the double standard that sustains the current international system.

Sanctions play a central role in this hybrid war. They are not legal instruments, but weapons of collective punishment, used to strangle the Iranian economy, generate social suffering, and attempt to produce internal fractures.

Washington uses civilian suffering as a bargaining tool, hoping to force political concessions that it would never obtain under normal circumstances. It is a form of economic warfare that openly violates the most elementary principles of international law.

When the US attempts to expand the agenda of the negotiations to include Iran’s missile programme and defensive capability, it reveals its intentions even more clearly. Asking a country to negotiate its own defence is equivalent to demanding prior surrender.

No sovereign power would accept such an imposition. Iran has firmly rejected this manoeuvre, making it clear that its defensive capability is not under negotiation and never will be.

Iranian distrust does not arise from ideological paranoia, but from concrete historical experience. The United States unilaterally withdrew from the previous nuclear agreement, dismantled multilateral commitments, and, in 2025, went so far as to bomb peaceful Iranian nuclear facilities during ongoing negotiations.

This record renders any demand for “trust” on the part of Washington laughable. Imperialism does not inspire trust. It inspires caution and preparation.

Even so, Iran negotiates. And this point is central. It negotiates because it is a responsible state, aware of the gravity of the regional scenario, and willing to seek structured solutions. It accepts verification, accepts technical commitments, accepts dialogue. But it resists, and will continue to resist, because it is sovereign. To negotiate does not mean to kneel.

As repeatedly stated by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatullah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Iran does not build its foreign policy under threat, nor does it accept agreements imposed in the shadow of aircraft carriers.

Iranian diplomacy walks side by side with deterrence because recent history has shown, brutally, that unilateral concessions to imperialism do not produce peace, only new aggressions.

What is unfolding in Geneva, therefore, is not a technical debate about centrifuges or enrichment percentages. It is a chapter in the structural crisis of American imperial power, which can no longer impose its will without resorting to brute force and blackmail.

It is also a desperate attempt to preserve the regional supremacy of “Israel”, now shaken by the resistance of the peoples, and by the military and political failure of the Zionist project.

Ultimately, this is a historical choice: sovereignty or submission. The United States acts as the diplomatic arm of the Zionist regime, attempting to impose on Iran what it never demands of “Israel”: limits, inspections and obedience. Iran negotiates because it is responsible. But it resists because it is sovereign.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Iran in the face of the armed diplomacy of imperialism

The US build-up around Iran constitutes strategic war option, not ‘deterrence’

By Amro Allan | Al Mayadeen | February 23, 2026

The confrontation forming around Iran is increasingly defined not by diplomacy or de-escalatory statecraft, but by infrastructure: aircraft, tankers, ships, interceptors, forward bases, and the logistics that bind them into a usable strike system. What is being assembled around Iran is coercion by force posture—a regional arrangement designed to make the use of violence not only possible, but administratively routine.

The danger is not simply that the United States is “sending a message.” It is those messages, once backed by operational capability and sustained logistics, that develop their own momentum—especially in a region where a single incident, whether staged, misattributed, or opportunistically interpreted, can push escalation beyond the point where political actors can plausibly reverse it. That is how wars become “inevitable”: not because they must happen, but because the architecture is built until restraint begins to look like an admission of weakness.

What is underway is best understood as a transition from episodic pressure to a posture designed to make sustained operations feasible. Deterrence theatre is reversible: it can be intensified, paused, or theatrically concluded. War-enabling posture is different. It organizes the region for a campaign that could last weeks, not hours—requiring refuelling depth, airborne command, electronic warfare, forward munitions, missile defense, and a permissive regional geography. In other words, it is not the language of crisis management; it is the language of readiness for force.

The Israeli role

Any realistic scenario involving major strikes on Iran necessarily includes Israeli capabilities, even if formal command structures remain ambiguous. The Israeli Air Force is not simply a parallel instrument. It is a forward-deployed capacity that can be synchronized with US regional power while allowing Washington to stage-manage deniability until the moment of activation.

“Israel” maintains a large combat fleet with a long-range strike capacity built around multiple platforms: approximately 66 F-15 aircraft (including F-15I variants configured for longer-range strike), roughly 173 F-16 fighters, and about 48 F-35I stealth aircraft in service, with additional units expected over time. The operational implication is a structure suited to repeated waves rather than a single, demonstrative raid: stealth assets prioritized for penetration and suppression, with conventional fighters sustaining the bulk of strike and support roles once corridors are opened.

Defense planning in “Israel” also signals expectation of retaliation on a scale that exceeds symbolic exchange. The layered interception network—Arrow, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and THAAD—is designed to deal with different classes of incoming fire, from rockets and drones to ballistic threats, and it functions as a prerequisite for any prolonged confrontation in which Israeli and US regional assets become primary targets.

This is where the political and military lines converge. Israeli leadership has long framed Iran as the central strategic adversary, and war planning has repeatedly been presented as a means of reshaping regional balances. Whatever language is used—“pre-emption”, “self-defense”, “containment”—the practical effect is to normalize the idea that Iran’s sovereignty can be overridden by an external security narrative. In that framework, escalation is not an accident; it is a policy option that is repeatedly rehearsed as common sense.

What the United States has built

The most revealing element in the US posture is not any single platform, but the way assets are being layered into an integrated strike system.

Open sources indicate that, on the air side, the forward package includes at least 30 F-35A fighters deployed in theatre, 24 F-15E aircraft, and an additional 36 F-16s moving toward the region. Electronic attack support includes 6 EA-18G Growlers, alongside 8–12 A-10 aircraft. Around a dozen additional F-16s are operating from Prince Sultan and possibly Al Dhafra, supported by 3 E-11A communications aircraft. In addition, a deployment of 12 F-22 stealth fighters is underway, with part of the force already forward-positioned and the remainder expected to continue toward regional bases.

The intelligence and command layer expands this into something far beyond a “show of force”: the movement or deployment of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, an RC-135 signals-intelligence platform, a WC-135 nuclear-detection aircraft, and additional E-3 AWACS aircraft preparing for redeployment to forward bases—strengthening airborne battle management and command capability.

Operational persistence depends on fuel and lift. The posture is underpinned by up to 22 tanker aircraft operating from regional hubs, and sustained transport activity by C-17, C-5M, and C-130 aircraft delivering troops, equipment, and air-defence systems to forward locations.

At sea, the naval component includes the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group moving toward the region while the USS Abraham Lincoln group operates in the Arabian Sea, alongside multiple Arleigh Burke destroyers positioned across key waterways (the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean). The posture is reinforced by the USS Georgia, an Ohio-class guided-missile submarine capable of launching a large volume of cruise missiles.

Individually, each of these deployments can be framed as “routine”. Collectively, they form something more consequential: an operational environment in which launching a campaign becomes logistically straightforward. That is the essence of coercion-by-infrastructure. It does not announce war. It makes war easier to begin.

The aircraft carrier story

Washington foregrounds naval deployments because they are legible, dramatic, and politically manageable. Ships can be repositioned without forcing host governments into public commitments. Carrier strike groups allow Washington to appear decisive while keeping escalation thresholds ambiguous. This is useful domestically and diplomatically: it reassures partners, pressures adversaries, and sustains a narrative of control.

Yet the obsession with carriers often obscures the real center of gravity: land-based access, refuelling depth, persistent surveillance, and the defensive systems that keep regional bases operational. A serious campaign aimed at degrading Iran’s missile forces, air defenses, energy infrastructure, or nuclear-related facilities requires sortie generation and basing access that naval aviation alone cannot supply. The decisive question is not what is sailing; it is what is already positioned on land and in the air.

Iran reads this not as theatre, but as preparation. That reading is rational. When an adversary constructs a system designed for sustained strikes, it is the targeted state—not the deploying one—that is forced to plan for worst-case scenarios.

The geography of war

The enabling infrastructure of any sustained campaign sits in fixed locations. The operational map spans the Gulf and the Levant.

From Al Udeid in Qatar—often described as the operational heart of US Central Command—Washington can coordinate high-tempo operations supported by ISR and refuelling. Al Dhafra in the UAE extends its reach with advanced platforms and command integration. Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia, if politically activated, shortens flight times and increases sortie density. The Harir airbase in Erbil provides forward access for strike and surveillance missions, while Jordanian airfields open western approach corridors. US positions in eastern Syria facilitate drone and reconnaissance activity along Iran’s western flank.

Beyond the Arab theatre, “Israel’s” bases operate in close alignment with US operational planning, forming an integrated environment even if formal command lines remain blurred. To the north, Azerbaijan offers potential basing or surveillance access along Iran’s sensitive frontier. Strategically, long-range bombers operating from the continental United States or Diego Garcia can be integrated through aerial refuelling and forward command nodes—adding strike capacity not captured by carrier-focused narratives.

This geography also clarifies what Washington rarely foregrounds: regional states become the battlefield’s enabling terrain. The bases, depots, radars, command centres, and runways that make sustained operations possible also sit within Iran’s retaliatory envelope. Iran does not need to neutralize a carrier to impose strategic and political costs. It can target the infrastructure that keeps the campaign running: runways, fuel depots, hangars, radar nodes, and the host-nation systems that sustain them.

If escalation occurs, the political question for host governments will not be abstract. It will be immediate: whether they are willing to absorb retaliation for choices made in Washington and Tel Aviv. That is precisely why the build-up is destabilizing. It expands the list of actors exposed to consequences while narrowing the space for de-escalation.

This is where the moral and legal questions sharpen. If host states provide launchpads, they are not passive bystanders; they become parties to the escalation. Yet these governments are rarely treated, in Western coverage, as societies that will absorb the consequences. They are treated as facilities—terrain, not people. Iran, by contrast, is treated as a problem to be managed.

Missile defense

If the escalation logic runs through bases, the defensive requirement runs through interceptors. Missile defense in this doctrine is a central operational requirement rather than a supporting function.

Patriot and THAAD batteries protect major airbases and logistics nodes across the Gulf and the Levant, integrated with early-warning radars, airborne surveillance, and regional command networks. Following the US withdrawal from Ain al-Assad in western Iraq, defensive emphasis shifted toward fewer but more politically sustainable bases: Al Udeid and Al Dhafra remain heavily protected, while positions in Jordan and eastern Syria rely on combinations of Patriot systems, shorter-range counter-drone defenses, and persistent surveillance.

“Israel” constitutes a distinct but integrated pillar in this interception architecture. Its layered air-defense network—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Patriot, and Arrow—is linked to US early-warning and interception planning, forming a shared defensive envelope rather than a purely national shield.

Notably, the defensive geography is widening. Cyprus has deployed Israeli-made air-defense systems, and Greece is moving toward integrating Israeli interception technology into its own architecture—developments that point to the gradual emergence of an Eastern Mediterranean interception depth, built around interoperable sensors and strategic alignment rather than formal collective defence commitments.

At sea, US Aegis-equipped destroyers add a mobile interception layer capable of engaging aircraft, cruise missiles, and limited ballistic threats—again supplementing, not replacing, land-based interception.

This matters because missile defense introduces a vulnerability that carrier narratives often conceal: interceptor stocks are finite, and a sustained high-volume exchange strains them. In a scenario of large-scale missile and drone retaliation, the question becomes not simply “can you intercept?” but “for how long?”—and at what political cost to host governments whose territory becomes the absorbing surface for escalation.

Tehran’s strategic logic

Iran’s deterrence logic has been recalibrated by lived confrontation, namely the “12-day war”. The central conclusion drawn in Tehran is that survivability precedes deterrence. Missiles, air-defense systems, command-and-control, missile production, and retaliatory capabilities must be structured to endure the opening shock of war, not to dominate it.

In the opening phase of that confrontation, Iran’s air defenses suffered rapid degradation: fixed or semi-mobile systems were destroyed early, their locations effectively pre-mapped, and their network dependence exploited through precision strikes, electronic warfare, and intelligence integration. Mobile missile systems—long assumed to be the backbone of survivable retaliation—also proved vulnerable once movement became detectable under persistent surveillance and integrated strike networks. The conclusion Tehran extracts is structural: in a conflict dominated by satellite tracking and real-time targeting, anything that must move, emit, or communicate openly at the onset of war is at elevated risk of rapid attrition.

That assessment drives the turn toward underground infrastructure. Iran’s missile force is being reconfigured around hardened tunnels, concealed storage, underground silos, and pre-positioned launch infrastructure designed to reduce exposure time and reliance on vulnerable command links. In this model, air defense still matters, but its role is framed as damage limitation rather than denial: complicating targeting, absorbing strikes, and preserving enough capability to ensure retaliation after the opening exchange.

Disruptions cascade into command delays and coordination bottlenecks, so Tehran’s preparations increasingly prioritise hardened domestic infrastructure, reduced external dependencies, and decentralized command authority to ensure retaliation does not hinge on uninterrupted connectivity. Parallel to this is the elevation of the domestic front—civil defense, continuity, internal stability—as a core component of deterrence rather than an auxiliary concern.

This is not the posture of a state seeking war. It is the posture of a state that has learnt—through repeated threat and episodic attack—that its adversaries prefer to treat its security as negotiable. Tehran’s strategic lesson is bleak but coherent: if the US and “Israel” reserve an expansive right to strike, then Iran must reserve the ability to respond even after absorbing the first blow. This is not radical; it is the minimal condition of sovereignty.

The escalation problem

A central risk is that escalation is unlikely to remain geographically contained. Even if Washington frames an initial operation as “limited”, allied forces and partner theatres are not mechanically separable. Under conditions of sustained strikes on Iran, groups and allied actors across Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq face their own strategic pressures, with intervention becoming a function of credibility and survival rather than preference.

Meanwhile, regional governments that host US assets occupy an exposed position. They may privately prefer de-escalation, but their bases and airspace can become operational requirements once Washington activates the posture it has assembled. Washington has 35,000–40,000 personnel deployed around Iran, expected to carry out the main attack in the event of war—an estimate that underscores how deeply the region is already militarily interlocked with any potential campaign.

This is where political constraint becomes as dangerous as military capability. When leaders publicly elevate threats, they increase the domestic cost of restraint; when adversaries interpret restraint as weakness, they increase the cost of compromise. In such conditions, accidental escalation—triggered by a strike, a misattributed attack, or a rapid chain of retaliation—can become more plausible than deliberate strategic design. And in an environment saturated with narrative warfare, the line between “accident” and “pretext” is rarely as clear as officials insist.

The build-up manufactures the conditions for war

The build-up is not reducible to theatre. It is a layered strike-and-defense system: forward stealth fighters and conventional strike aircraft; electronic warfare; airborne command and ISR; tanker depth and heavy lift; carrier groups and missile-capable submarines; a regional lattice of bases; and an expanding interception architecture stretching across the Gulf, the Levant, and into the Eastern Mediterranean. The combined effect is to make sustained operations technically feasible, while widening the geography of vulnerability and entanglement.

The strategic irony is that the more “prepared” this posture becomes, the less space remains for political off-ramps. Host governments become exposed. Interceptor sustainability becomes a decisive variable. Tehran’s retaliatory doctrine evolves toward survivability and endurance rather than symbolic signalling. In such an environment, the question is no longer whether war is “intended”. It is whether the operational infrastructure of war is now sufficiently in place that a single trigger—miscalculation, provocation, or opportunism—can transform a posture into a campaign faster than political channels can arrest it.

Iran’s reading of this is neither paranoia nor ideology. It is a basic inference. When a superpower constructs the machinery for a sustained strike and embeds it across neighbouring territories, the targeted state will plan accordingly. The real moral burden, then, lies not on Iran’s preparations for survival, but on the political decision—repeatedly rehearsed in Washington and Tel Aviv—that a regional order can be engineered through coercion and air power, while everyone else is expected to absorb the consequences.

If the international community is serious about preventing war, it should stop treating Iran’s defensive doctrine as the primary problem while granting the US-Israeli posture the presumption of legitimacy. The liability of proof lies with those constructing a regional strike system and calling it “stability”. There is nothing stabilizing about embedding a war option across neighbouring territories, then demanding that the targeted state behave as though this is normal. The region has seen this script before: coercion presented as protection, escalation presented as necessity, and catastrophe presented—after the fact—as an unfortunate surprise.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on The US build-up around Iran constitutes strategic war option, not ‘deterrence’

Iran to US: Sanctions and war failed; try diplomacy and respect

Press TV – February 23, 2026

A top Iranian diplomat says the time is ripe for the United States to abandon its “fruitless” sanctions and failed policy of war against Iran, urging genuine respect for diplomacy as the only viable path forward.

“Iran’s enemies may start a war, but they will not be able to determine the end,” Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi said in an address to the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland, on Monday.

“You have tried sanctions and war in relation to Iran and got nowhere. Now it is time to experience diplomacy and respect,” he said.

He said Iranians do not seek aggression against other countries but will firmly stand against any military or political conspiracy against the Islamic Republic and will defend their homeland.

Gharibabadi said the consequences of war will not be limited only to the parties to the conflict, “but will engulf the region.”

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened military action against Iran since early January, following his public support for foreign-linked riots.

Trump has since ordered a significant military buildup in regional waters near Iran and warned of strikes if Tehran does not accept a deal on US terms.

Iranian officials have reiterated their readiness for a fair agreement on the country’s nuclear program but warned that even a limited attack would trigger a decisive response.

Elsewhere in his address, Gharibabadi said the so-called advocates of human rights supported the United States and the Israeli regime during the 12-day war against Iran in June 2025, which killed more than 1,060 Iranians and injured some 6,000 others.

“They did not even allow the UN Security Council and the Human Rights Council to condemn the aggression.”

Gharibabadi said Iran’s enemies, who suffered a severe defeat in the June war, attempted to set the stage for another military offensive by inciting unrest in the country and turning peaceful economic protests into deadly riots.

The Iranian official condemned the terrorists for committing Daesh-style crimes that resulted in the martyrdom of 2,427 civilians.

Gharibabadi said those who place the least value on human dignity are exploiting human rights as a tool to serve their own interests.

The Iranian deputy foreign minister said the main instigators of the January unrest, notably the United States and Israel, must be held accountable for crimes against humanity.

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Iran to US: Sanctions and war failed; try diplomacy and respect

Your Enslavement Begins in Gaza: The ‘Board of Peace’

Propaganda & Co. | February 22, 2026

Jared Kushner presents the dystopian future being built for us all with his Board of Peace Master Plan for Gaza.

Follow us on X: https://x.com/propandco

February 23, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Video | , , , | Comments Off on Your Enslavement Begins in Gaza: The ‘Board of Peace’

What is Zionism? And what is anti-Zionism?

By David Miller | Tracking Power | January 25, 2026

I am asked to give definitional answers to this question quite often. So, here, for the record are the key extracts from my witness statement written in August 2023 (some weeks before the launch of Al Aqsa Flood by the Palestinian Resistance ion 7 October of that year.

Glancing over the statement at this distance I am struck by how long and detailed it is – 97 pages – and how, even then I was naive about malevolence of Zionism. If you look below you will see that I refer to Zionism as being inherently genocidal. This was not a popular view then, but it has certainly been more than amply borne out by the events since.

I should note that it was on the basis of my statement and my testimony under cross examination that the Tribunal determined that my anti-Zionist views were worthy of respect in a democratic society which is the legal test for philosophical beliefs to be protected under the Equality Act 2010. The definition of Zionism I have used is thus of greater import than just my own views and beliefs it has been accepted by the court as satisfying the five key elements of the so-called ‘Grainger’ test of which being worthy of respect is the fifth.

For a belief to be protected under Section 10 of the Equality Act, it must:

  1. Be genuinely held: It cannot be a fictitious or insincere claim.
  2. Be a belief, not an opinion: It must be more than a viewpoint based on the “present state of information available”.
  3. Relate to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behavior: It must concern significant matters rather than trivial or minor ones.
  4. Attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance: The belief must be intelligible and internally consistent.
  5. Be worthy of respect in a democratic society: This has three components

    a. The belief must not be akin to Nazism or totalitarianism. It does not have to be a popular or mainstream belief; even beliefs that are shocking or offensive to others may still be worthy of respect. The belief must be consistent with the principles of a pluralist society.

    b. Not incompatible with human dignity: It must not dehumanize or degrade others.

    c. Not in conflict with the fundamental rights of others: The belief must not seek to destroy the basic freedoms and rights of other individuals.

Here are some key excerpts from my statement including, first of all, a declaration of my anti-racism and then a very short and neutral definition of Zionism, and why I oppose it, which I have italicised. (The statement was in the form of numbered paragraphs which I reproduce here)

_________________________________________________________________

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

7. I believe it self-evident that racism, imperialism and colonialism are offensive to human dignity and that each of those interconnected phenomena should be opposed. Human beings are all equal and are of equal value. The arrogance and supremacism of racism and racist systems and practices – which assert that it is acceptable for one group of people to dominate others on racial or ethnic lines – can in my view never be tolerated.

8. I believe that Zionism, an ideology that asserts that a state for Jewish people ought to be established and maintained in the territory that formerly comprised the British Mandate of Palestine, is inherently racist, imperialist, and colonial. I consider Zionism to be offensive to human dignity on that basis, and I therefore oppose it.

9. These beliefs, and the work (academic and political) which I have done in consequence of them, are at the heart of the case before the Tribunal. It is because I believe the things I do about Zionism, and because I have been prepared to say them out loud and without apology, that I have lost my job. It is therefore important that I explain in some detail why I believe the things that I do about Zionism, and to be more precise as to what Zionism is, and what I believe about it.

…

24. By the late 1990s, my beliefs in relation to Zionism were fully formed. I have at all times since that date believed Zionism to be a settler-colonial and ethno-nationalist movement that seeks to assert Jewish hegemony and political control over the land of historic Palestine.

…

31. I believe Zionism to be a form of racism because it necessarily calls for the displacement and disenfranchisement of non-Jews in favour of Jews, and it is therefore ideologically bound to lead to the practices of apartheid, ethnic cleansing, and genocide in pursuit of territorial control and expansion. This is not just a matter of historic observation: my belief concerns the nature of Zionism itself. Nor is it of only historic interest. Zionism remains, today, a colonial project which necessitates the oppression of the Palestinian population that remain within the territory that formerly comprised the mandate of Palestine (that is, modern-day Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip).

32. Crucially, Zionism requires not only the oppression of Palestinians, but also coercion of non-Palestinians who oppose the racist practices of the State of Israel. Zionism has implications that go beyond the territory of Palestine. A central facet of my research has been the identification of a transnational Zionist movement as a key supporting element of the continued ethnic cleansing in Palestine. This movement, and its allied constellation of organisations, seeks to pressure, censor and suppress critics of Israel, which is evident in my case and many others.

33. For example, Israel’s Law of Return, which was passed by the Knesset in 1950, allows Jews from outside of Israel, who have no material or ancestral ties to historic Palestine, to migrate to the State of Israel, at the expense of indigenous Palestinians who were expelled from their homes in the war of 1948 (or since) who are not permitted to return (and whose return was, in fact, prohibited by law in 1952). All of this flows directly from the logic of Zionism.

…

36. Anti-Zionism stands as the antithesis of the racist Zionist movement, calling for an end to the practises of apartheid, ethnic cleansing, and genocide against the Palestinian people, and calling for the liberation and decolonisation of Palestine. As someone who is fervently opposed to racism and colonialism, it is only natural for me to believe in anti-Zionism. Indeed, it is my strong belief in the repudiation of the racist values that Zionism exists to promote that make anti-Zionism an irrevocable part of my personal worldview, identity, and belief system.

…

39. … Zionism is, as I have described, a belief that a Jewish ethno-state should be established in historic Palestine: a land that has at all times since Zionism’s inception had a very substantial non-Jewish population (indeed, when Israel was created in 1948, the non-Jewish population of Palestine was the overwhelming majority of historic Palestine). Zionism is inherently and necessarily racist for that reason, and it is inherently and necessarily settler-colonial in its nature. The racist and colonial logic that sits at the very heart of Zionism necessitates the racist practices that have had, and continue to have, severe consequences for indigenous Palestinians, beginning with the forced expulsion of the majority of the Palestinian population from their homeland in 1948.

40. The idea of a non-racist Zionism is, however, hypothetical: it is outside the realm of actual history and at odds with existing Zionist ideology. Herzl said openly in The Jewish State that the state he wished to conceive was for European colonists and must be created somewhere that is comfortable for their sensibilities rather than a wild expanse of land. He suggested that were a patch of suitable land to be found, for example, “natives” might be put to work draining swamps and killing snakes on behalf of these European colonists with promises of future employment in a land to which they would later be deported.

41. What is at the heart of my anti-Zionist beliefs is an objection to – at least since the coming into prominence of Theodor Herzl’s views – Zionism as an inherently racist movement because of its ideological and practical commitment to settler-colonialism. This necessitates racist practices that have had, and continue to have, severe consequences for indigenous Palestinians.

…

47. There is nothing racist or “anti-Semitic” about anti-Zionism, and the Israeli-state-directed efforts to vilify anti-Zionism as a form of anti-Jewish hatred should be rejected. It is precisely because Zionism – on its own terms, as expressed through its chief ideologues and leaders – is a racist and settler-colonial movement, that so much effort is invested in defending Zionism and even rebranding it as so-called “Jewish self-determination”.

48. To be an anti-Zionist is, in my view, a moral and political duty as an anti-racist, and it has no relation to the “denial” of anyone’s “rights” or “self-determination”. On the other hand, it is Zionism that denies indigenous Palestinians their right to self-determination, among many other of their human rights.

___________________________________________________________________

I await the judgement in the appeal to my victory at the Employment Tribunal. The University of Bristol appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) and there was a hearing in mid-November last year.

Here is the statement on it from my law firm Rahman Lowe. The judgement is supposed to appear within three months. However, the Judge, Lord Fairley, who is the President of the EAT, said that while he hoped to have the judgement ready within three months, he could not guarantee it. So, we wait.

February 22, 2026 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Full Spectrum Dominance | , , | Comments Off on What is Zionism? And what is anti-Zionism?

Why the US-Israeli alliance will lose against Iran

By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | February 21, 2026

While it is impossible to predict precisely what the war on the Islamic Republic of Iran and its regional allies will result in, the winnability of the regional conflict is clear. The only thing driving this attack is sheer Israeli arrogance, as there is no conceivable situation where all out regional war delivers anything short of uncontrollable chaos.

Why is an all out regional war unwinnable? Although there are various reasons as to why this is the case, it suffices to say that the US and Israelis have no way of controlling its outcomes, in addition to this, they simply do not possess the military industrial capacity to wage such a war for a long period of time.

Now, when this argument is made, it is not done from an idealistic point of view. Therefore, it is important to preface this piece on the fact that there is a clear Israeli-US superiority in terms of technology and the kinds of weapons they possess. Nobody disputes this. There is also clear superiority in the field of their intelligence agencies.

So, let us first assume that the United States and the Zionist entity manage to score all of their desired tactical victories. Working on this assumption will then definitively prove the injudicious nature of the endeavour.

Therefore, under the best case scenario for the Zionist coalition, perhaps they succeed in conducting another decapitation strike on the Iranian military leadership, manage to penetrate and destroy some missile bases, nuclear facilities, while gutting the Islamic Republic’s air defences. These are very likely goals that they will seek to achieve.

Let’s also work under the assumption that they manage to put Tehran on the backfoot for at least a week, due to the intensity of their air campaign, making it difficult for the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) to fire large bursts of ballistic missiles at a single time. Then, after achieving air dominance, strikes on essential infrastructure begin, including cultural sites, government buildings, the media, but also the likes of oil facilities, agricultural areas and water systems.

On top of all of this, assume hybrid warfare tactics will be ongoing. Militant groups, especially those focused along the Iranian periphery, will start major offensive operations, working in conjunction with foreign intelligence agents and operatives on the ground, similar to what we witnessed during the 12-day War in June of 2025.

Note that the much debated potential goal of assassinating Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei is not included above. Although many have speculated that the strategy could very well hindge upon this, it guarantees a war with no predictable end, no escalation ladder and will likely trigger calls for global Jihad.

An inevitable US-Israeli defeat

Giving the Zionist coalition the best possible conditions and achievements as a result of their opening offensive, this strategy will quickly begin to run into major issues.

As we saw last June, decapitation strikes against the Iranian leadership do not work at crippling the government and its military, they are simply replaced by another line of leadership, who implement a whole series of pre-planned counter attack strategies.

The Israelis wrongfully believed that their success during the initial attack on Iran last year was going to yield major results, even attempting to utilise their asset in the United States, the son of the deposed Iranian dictator, to call for a revolt. Not only did no such action take place, as Iranians outside of the diaspora do not support this clear Zionist puppet, but the very opposite occurred as the population rallied behind the flag.

Within 15 hours, the Iranians not only managed to get their air defences back online, but captured the initiative and began launching huge volleys of ballistic missiles into the heart of Tel Aviv. As the conflict evolved, a few important developments occurred: the Israeli air defences began to buckle – with the draining of anti-air munitions – while their agents on the ground carried out most of the attacks, something that is key to note.

While it is clear that the US will bring in greater firepower than the Israelis can muster, an air force is still run by human operators who get tired and operate equipment that needs to be serviced. Iran will very easily be able to launch drones waves constantly at US and Zionist positions, and even if their ability to launch large salvos of missiles is constrained during the first week of the conflict, eventually the opportunity will present itself.

If the Iranian State has not crumbled and civil war has not erupted within this time, then the US and Israelis will then be subjected to wave after wave of counterattacks. Inevitably, this means that airbases will be struck, equipment will be lost, and with fewer assets, this means less ability to keep up the pace of their offensive.

Bear in mind that warhawks employed by Washington and Tel Aviv based pro-war think tanks, who claim that the Iranian State is crumbling at least once a year, are far detached from reality. Take the latest round of foreign backed riots for example, the Western corporate media invented an alternate reality in order to sell the idea that Iran was falling, yet the entire ordeal was more or less over in two days.

It is clear to any learned observer, that without a significant ground element, toppling the Iranian government is impossible. Which then leads to the obvious next question: What if major militant offensives occur inside Iranian territory?

Answering this in depth would take time and a more nimble military mind. Yet, again assuming some level of success on the behalf of separatist militias and al-Qaeda linked Takfiri groups, even if they were to seize territory, Iran is a massive country that allows for mistakes. None of these groups compare and can stand up to the Iranian army and IRGC, nor do they likely possess any considerable advanced capabilities.

What this means is that even if they manage to see some level of initial success, the much larger, well trained, motivated and well equipped Iranian armed forces will eventually crush these insurgents. The only real threat is some kind of mass civilian mobilisation that will deal a blow to the Iranian economy, for which there is no indication this will happen, especially as the nation is suffering through a bloody war of aggression against it.

Then come the attacks on missile bases and nuclear sites. Even if some of these attacks are successful, they won’t destroy all of Iran’s capabilities, and as we saw in June of last year, the US attacks on the nuclear facilities don’t appear to have stopped the nuclear program. If it were that easy to simply take out Iran’s capabilities, it would have been done long ago. The Israelis tried last year and failed. If anything, on the nuclear issue, such a war could end up leading to Tehran actually reversing course on its stance against developing the bomb.

Even with full US-Israeli air superiority, the remaining air defences of Iran will at some point come back online, but even in the event that 100% of their anti-air capabilities are gone, their power is in their offensive, not defensive capabilities.

Once this initial period of assumed US-Israeli offensive dominance is over, Iran can easily block the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, inflict large casualty events on US and Israeli targets, while taking out assets. It is impossible to predict which strikes will be the most effective, however, it is clear that everything will become a target. So expect a big hit on the global oil market, resulting in an economic crisis.

If Iran simply keeps up a pace of fire against the Israelis, the likes of which we saw during the 12-day War, then they only have a matter of weeks before their air defences also become useless.

This is all without factoring in Iran’s various allies, which may enter at any level of intensity at any point in this conflict. There’s Ansar Allah, which has the capability of striking the Israelis, but also assets throughout the Persian Gulf. If Hezbollah manages to wage a considerable ground war, the Israelis have proven in the past to be the weakest in this arena.

The Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU/PMF, Hashd al-Shaabi) are around 250,000 men strong, alongside Saraya Awliya al-Dam, who can use their own capabilities to not only target the US, but the Israelis also. So far, since October 7, 2023, we have not seen a true demonstration of their power. Another factor which is not often discussed, but is also very important, is the role of the Palestinian resistance, who are more likely to wait for the right opportunity, but can also pose a major ground challenge to the Israelis from Gaza.

None of this considers the other elements that could come into play, such as the roles played by regional nations, armed groups we may not have previously heard of, the likes of the Fatemiyoun of Afghanistan and Zainabiyoun of Pakistan, or the general populations throughout the region and what we could see in the event that chaos erupts. Governments could be overthrown, the civilian populations of Jordan and Egypt could become active and out of control. There is also the possibility that some groups in Syria could seize the opportunity to attack the Israelis.

In the event that such a war occurs, the longer it goes on, the more chaotic and unpredictable it becomes. A situation will be totally out of the US’s control, especially as the only means of combating this regional explosion is through the air. As we witnessed with the US campaign against Yemen, airstrikes alone change very little. Even in Gaza, the armed resistance groups fought for over 2 years with no supply chain, and by the admissions of the US and Israelis, their fighting force is still roughly the same size.

If things don’t go their way very quickly, then the Zionist coalition is going to get battered, and not even nuclear weapons will get them out of it. Therefore, [if] the US and Israelis, as long as we again grant them another assumption, that they are somewhat sane, choose to go to war, they will have to try and establish an escalation ladder, devising a real exit strategy.

The question becomes whether the Iranians and their allies allow them to exit the fight. An all out war will be bloody, it will claim an enormous amount of civilian lives, and it will also inflict considerable damage on civilian infrastructure. Truly, the effects of such a war are not desired by anyone in the region, yet the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance have long prepared their capabilities in order to combat what appears to have been inevitable.

Another thing to be mentioned here is that the US government, under the Trump administration, is totally captured by the Zionist entity. For all the reasons noted above, no previous administrations have dared escalate to this extent. If it were easy to launch a regime change operation against Iran, it would have been carried out many years ago.

However, a Zionist stooge is occupying the White House, a narcissistic man whose already low cognitive abilities are clearly declining. He is a President that an FBI report concluded had been compromised by the Mossad, but even if that report isn’t to be taken seriously, his whole campaign was bankrolled by Zionist donors, and his administration is an embarrassing collection of Zionist war hawks. If there was ever any US administration that was foolish enough to launch such a war, it is that of Donald Trump.

February 21, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Militarism, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on Why the US-Israeli alliance will lose against Iran

US envoy Huckabee claims Israel has ‘biblical right’ to conquer all West Asia

The Cradle | February 21, 2026

During a recent interview with Tucker Carlson, US ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee claimed Israel has a biblical right to take over “all” of West Asia.

“It would be fine if they took it all,” Huckabee said when asked whether a passage from the Book of Genesis can be interpreted as granting Israel the right to steal all the land between the Nile River in Egypt and the Euphrates in Syria.

Huckabee was appointed by President Donald Trump as Ambassador to Israel in 2025. He is a former Arkansas governor and Southern Baptist minister.

Carlson and Huckabee discussed interpretations of Old Testament (Torah) scripture used by Christian Zionists to justify Israel’s killing and expulsion of native Christians and Muslims from the Holy Land.

Carlson asked Huckabee about a biblical verse in which God promises Abraham that his descendants will receive land “from the wadi of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates – the land of the Kenites, Kenizzites, Kadmonites, Hittites, Perizzites, Rephaites, Amorites, Canaanites, Girgashites and Jebusites.”

“Israel is a land that God gave, through Abraham, to a people that he chose. It was a people, a place, and a purpose,” Huckabee claimed.

Carlson responded, saying this would include “like, basically the entire Middle East.”

“The Levant … Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon – it’d also be big parts of Saudi Arabia and Iraq,” Carlson said.

“I’m not sure it would go that far, but it would be a big piece of land,” Huckabee answered.

Since 7 October 2023, Israel has launched wars to occupy land in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, including to establish settlements for Israeli Jews. Israel has also escalated its efforts to steal and annex Palestinian land in the occupied West Bank.

Israel has killed at least 72,000 Palestinians during its effort to conquer Gaza, the majority of whom were women and children. Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands more may die from the indirect effects of Israel’s destruction of the strip.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to justify the eradication of Palestinians in Gaza at the start of the war, calling them “Amalek,” a reference to the Biblical account of a people exterminated by ancient Israelites.

Israeli Finance Minister and settler leader, Bezalel Smotrich, has stated that Israel would expand “little by little” and eventually encompass all Palestinian territories as well as Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

“It is written that the future of Jerusalem is to expand to Damascus,” he said, referencing the “Greater Israel” ideology.

Carlson also pressed Huckabee about Israel’s role in pushing the US to go to war against Iraq in 2003, which led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and thousands of US soldiers.

“How many Americans put their boots on the ground for Israel?” the US ambassador asked.

“Everybody who served in Iraq,” Carlson responded, adding that the intelligence falsely claiming that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction had come from Israel.

As Gary Vogler has detailed, neoconservatives inside the government of George W. Bush worked secretly with the Israeli lobby and government to launch the invasion of Iraq to satisfy Israel’s energy needs.

Since the start of the genocide in Gaza, members of Trump’s so-called “America First” political movement have become increasingly critical of Israel’s dominant influence in the US government, in particular at the expense of US citizens.

President Trump has currently amassed an “armada” of US forces in West Asia to prepare for a possible attack on Iran, long a key priority for Israel and Netanyahu, which would lead to the deaths of additional US citizens for Israel’s sake.

February 21, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on US envoy Huckabee claims Israel has ‘biblical right’ to conquer all West Asia

Testing the Alliance: Netanyahu’s Washington Visit

By Abbas Hashemite – New Eastern Outlook – February 21, 2026

Netanyahu’s recent rush to the United States signals that Israel seeks Washington to expand the agenda of negotiations with Iran. However, the Trump administration seems to recalibrate its policy alignment with Israel.

A Diplomatic Visit or a Geopolitical Stress Test?

Soon after the first round of US-Iran peace negotiations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rushed to Washington. This visit was not part of routine diplomacy, but rather a test of geopolitical endurance. Israel and the United States had always been close allies. This bilateral relationship reached a new high during the tenure of US President Donald Trump. Since Donald Trump’s reelection as the 47th President of the US, both sides have exchanged numerous visits. Yet the recent visit of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu displayed pressing importance and urgency that signaled Israel’s anxiety over the recent US-Iran peace talks. Since the visit, analysts around the world are trying to analyze if the US will once again conduct a military attack on Iran at the behest of the Israeli government or if it will assert strategic independence.

The regional landscape in the Middle East is fraught with stress. Washington has intensified its military posture across the region to reinforce strategic deterrence and stability. The United States is critical of Iran’s nuclear program. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran’s uranium enrichment purity reached up to 60 percent as of mid-2025. This made Tehran’s nuclear enrichment levels the flashpoint for Western concern. Iranian officials insist that their nuclear program is merely for peaceful purposes and reversible. However, Tel Aviv views Iran’s nuclear enrichment levels as an existential threat. Some Arab states are also concerned about Iran’s nuclear program.

Due to these concerns by Israel and some pro-West Arab states, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Tehran. Moreover, it increased its military pressure on Iran by intensifying its military presence in the region. The United States deployed its largest aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln, in the Middle East. Reports suggest that the Pentagon has also ordered the deployment of another aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, in the region. US President Donald Trump has also confirmed the deployment of another aircraft carrier in the region. However, none of these arrangements appears to be enough to appease Israel.

Expanding the Negotiation Framework

Netanyahu visited Washington to seek expansion of the US-Iran negotiation outline. Tel Aviv has long maintained that any negotiations and agreement with Tehran must also include restrictions on Iran’s regional alliances and ballistic missile program. This demand has further increased after the recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel. Israel views the range of Iranian missiles and its regional proxy network as a unified threat to its security and expansionist ambitions.

However, Washington’s posture after the Trump-Netanyahu meeting did not suggest any major breakthrough. After the meeting, President Trump stated that nuclear talks with Iran would continue, without mentioning anything about Iran’s ballistic missile program. This suggests that President Trump made no immediate commitment to the Israeli Prime Minister about including Iran’s ballistic missile program in the agenda of ongoing diplomatic negotiations. The absence of a clear US stance on Israel’s demands has drawn global attention.

Domestic Pressures and Global Constraints on Washington

The United States has been Israel’s closest ally for decades. Israel has received the largest amount of US aid in terms of money and weapons. However, it appears that this time the US wants to draw a boundary. There are numerous reasons behind this shift in Washington’s response to the Israeli demands. On the domestic front, the Trump administration is dealing with scores of challenges. American society is highly polarized over the Israeli aggression. Independent estimates suggest that the Palestinian death toll since October 7, 2023, has surpassed 80,000.

More than 90 percent of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure has been intentionally destroyed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). A recent report revealed that Israel used prohibited US-made thermobaric weapons, capable of generating temperatures above 3500 degrees Celsius, in Gaza, which made thousands of Palestinian people evaporate. The United States also provided diplomatic assistance to Israel at international forums. Such reports sparked sustained protests across the United States against unequivocal military and strategic alignment with Israel. These protests and the American youth’s criticism have altered the domestic environment in the country and diminished the influence of the AIPAC on American politics.

On the international front, the United States is already facing diplomatic and strategic challenges. Due to Trump’s “America First” approach and his increasing sanctions, tariffs, and interventionist attitude, Washington is facing diplomatic isolation. The rapid rise of Russia and China as new global superpowers and the increasing role of middle powers in global politics have made the world multipolar. The American economy is also burdened by federal debt of around $34 trillion. A war with Iran would deepen Washington’s economic strain and complicate its diplomatic standing. Due to all these issues, the Trump administration seems to adopt a cautious approach towards Iran. However, given the Zionist influence in the US establishment, it would be hard for President Trump to reject Netanyahu’s demands. The increasing US military posture in the Middle East suggests that the coming few weeks will be decisive for the region.

Аbbas Hashemite is a political observer and research analyst for regional and global geopolitical issues. He is currently working as an independent researcher and journalist.

February 21, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , , , | Comments Off on Testing the Alliance: Netanyahu’s Washington Visit

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