Syria, Lebanon, and the limits of power
By Bassam Abu Abdallah | The Cradle | June 19, 2026
Remarks by US President Donald Trump in an interview with NBC News earlier this month, in which he said he would like to see “a more precise surgical attack on Hezbollah” and suggested that Syria’s Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani) could play a role in reaching an agreement over the conflict in Lebanon, have revived a familiar question across the region.
Trump later escalated his rhetoric, saying that if Israel “can’t do the job without killing everyone else, Syria should do the job.” Describing the war on Lebanon as a secondary front, he suggested that Syria, in coordination with the US, could take on Hezbollah if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not be reined in.
Whenever the region enters a period of major change, the same issue resurfaces. Can Syria once again play a direct security or military role in Lebanon, as it did in 1976?
The comparison is tempting on the surface. It invites parallels between the current leadership in Damascus and the late president Hafez al-Assad, who sent Syrian forces into Lebanon during the civil war. Yet even a brief look at the surrounding conditions suggests that the resemblance is largely superficial.
Trump himself did not clarify what form of assistance he had in mind. The possibilities range from border control and curbing smuggling routes to a broader attempt to pressure Hezbollah.
An old question returns
Similar ideas have surfaced before. In a July 2025 interview with The National, US envoy Tom Barrack warned that Lebanon faced an “existential threat” if it failed to address Hezbollah’s weapons, adding that “if Lebanon doesn’t move, it’s going to be Bilad Al Sham [Greater Syria] again.”
In March, Reuters reported that Washington had encouraged Syria to consider sending forces into eastern Lebanon to help disarm Hezbollah, a claim later denied by Barrack. The episode nevertheless fueled speculation about a possible Syrian role in Lebanon.
The responses from Sharaa’s government, however, have remained cautious and indirect. Sharaa has expressed support for Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s efforts to consolidate arms under state authority, while recent exchanges with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have emphasized coordination between military and security institutions in both countries.
Syria’s self-appointed president and former Al-Qaeda chief Ahmad al-Sharaa dismissed reports that Syrian forces could enter Lebanon as “rumors.”
At the same time, periodic announcements from Syrian authorities about dismantling alleged Hezbollah-linked cells have been interpreted by some observers as signals aimed at Washington, suggesting readiness to engage if political backing is secured. Whether this reflects a concrete agreement or simply an attempt to keep options open remains unclear.
What is clear is that the renewed discussion comes at a moment when broader regional balances are in flux, particularly after the collapse of the previous Syrian order. The question is not whether Syria once intervened in Lebanon, but whether the conditions that made that intervention possible still exist.
1976 and the architecture of intervention
By the time Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976, the civil war had pushed the state to the brink. Importantly, the intervention took shape within a web of regional bargains and international understandings, rather than a unilateral move by Damascus.
The move was carried out at the request of the Lebanese president at the time, Suleiman Frangieh, and was supported by influential Lebanese actors who feared a decisive shift in the internal balance of power. It also aligned with broader concerns shared by regional and international players who were wary of Lebanon descending into total disorder.
Accounts in both western and Arab sources point to quiet understandings between the US, Saudi Arabia, and France that gave Syria space to act as a stabilizing force. The objective was about containing a crisis that risked spilling beyond Lebanon and unsettling the wider region.
The intervention was later formalized through the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF), which provided a measure of regional legitimacy under the umbrella of the Arab League. This layer of political cover mattered as much as the military dimension.
Equally important was the nature of the Syrian state itself at the time. Syria in 1976 was a cohesive political entity with functioning institutions and a professional army that ranked among the largest in the region. Assad’s leadership carried both domestic and international recognition, reinforced by the aftermath of the 1973 war.
From Assad’s perspective, Lebanon was not a distant arena but an extension of its own security environment. The prospect of a hostile force dominating Lebanon was treated as a direct threat to Syrian national security.
Even so, the intervention was not without tension. The Soviet Union, Syria’s principal ally, expressed reservations, reflecting its own alignment with other forces inside Lebanon. Assad nevertheless proceeded, guided by his assessment of Syria’s strategic interests.
The ability to make such a decision rested on a combination of factors: a stable state, a centralized leadership, a disciplined army, regional acceptance, and working relationships with key Arab actors. Together, these elements created a framework that made intervention both possible and, for a time, sustainable.
A different Syria
None of these conditions applies in the same way today. The current leadership in Damascus operates from a transitional position, still seeking to consolidate authority within a country deeply affected by years of conflict.
There is no broad national consensus over the future political order, and the institutional framework remains incomplete. Legislative bodies and representative structures that might anchor political legitimacy are either absent or still in formation. External backing, whether from the US, Turkiye, Qatar, or others, does not substitute for internal acceptance.
Experience suggests that states cannot rely on external recognition alone to secure stability. Durable governance depends on a social contract that reflects a degree of consensus among citizens. In Syria’s case, that process is ongoing and far from settled.
The challenges facing the current authority are primarily internal. Rebuilding state institutions, addressing economic collapse, and managing the social consequences of prolonged conflict all demand sustained attention. Large segments of the population continue to face economic hardship, while public services and infrastructure remain under strain.
The divisions forged during the war have not receded. Political, social, and sectarian fault lines still cut across the country. In this context, the priority remains consolidation at home, not projection abroad.
A leadership still working to establish its authority is unlikely to commit to a regional role that would require resources, cohesion, and legitimacy it has yet to secure.
The question of the military
The structure and character of the military institution further complicate the picture. The Syrian army that entered Lebanon in 1976 was a regular force with a defined command structure and a coherent doctrine.
Today’s military formations are the product of a long, fragmented war. At their core are factions that once operated as distinct armed groups – among them elements that emerged from or overlapped with networks such as the Nusra Front and other Salafi extremist currents, alongside local militias and foreign fighters folded in over time. Efforts to weld these strands into a single national army remain partial and uneven.
Questions also persist regarding leadership structures, external affiliations, and the presence of foreign fighters within certain units. These factors have drawn scrutiny from international actors and have been reflected in sanctions targeting individuals linked to these formations.
Reports of violations during operations along Syria’s coast and in Suwayda have kept questions of accountability and discipline alive. That record complicates attempts to present these formations as a cohesive national army capable of assuming a wider regional role.
Without a unified command structure and broad public confidence, the military lacks the foundation required for sustained operations beyond Syria’s borders.
Lebanon without an invitation
The Lebanese context has also changed in fundamental ways. In 1976, Syria’s intervention was facilitated by internal Lebanese dynamics, including a formal request from the presidency and support from key political forces.
Today, there is no comparable call for Syrian involvement. Across the political spectrum, Lebanese actors tend to view the period of Syrian tutelage as a chapter they do not wish to revisit, regardless of their differing positions on Hezbollah or regional alignments.
The absence of a domestic Lebanese consensus is matched by a lack of regional endorsement. No major Arab state is advocating for a renewed Syrian military role in Lebanon, and the political environment offers little space for such a move.
Regional risks and the Turkish factor
Another variable that did not exist in 1976 is the extent of Turkish involvement in Syria. Ankara’s presence adds a layer of complexity to any potential Syrian move beyond its borders.
Any Syrian move into Lebanon would run straight into Turkish red lines, Iranian interests, and Hezbollah’s own calculations. What begins as a limited step risks quickly widening, pulling in actors who are already embedded across the same theater.
The prospect of Syrian forces entering Lebanon could also deepen sectarian tensions, extending beyond Lebanon into Syria and Iraq. In an already volatile environment, such a development would be difficult to contain.
If the equation shifts
The equation has already begun to shift. Washington and Tehran have signed an interim memorandum that freezes the conflict and opens the door to wider negotiations. Whether that process produces a lasting settlement or merely a temporary pause remains unclear, but the assumptions that governed the region before the agreement are already being tested.
Such a shift would likely alter priorities across multiple arenas, including Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The emphasis could move from confrontation to managing balances of influence, reducing the relevance of some of the initiatives that emerged during periods of heightened tension.
In that context, the role of actors such as Hezbollah would be recalibrated within a different strategic environment, one where stability takes precedence over escalation.
Limits of power
Comparisons between 1976 and the present miss how far the ground has shifted. That intervention rested on a particular convergence of internal strength, regional acceptance, and international cover.
Syria today sits in a different position. Questions of legitimacy, institutional reconstruction, economic recovery, and social cohesion remain unresolved. The regional environment has also changed, with little appetite for a renewed Syrian role in Lebanon.
The question of intervention is not about intent alone. It turns on power, resources, and the condition of the state itself.
From that perspective, the more pressing question is not whether Damascus can re-enter Lebanon, but whether it has fully reconstituted itself at home.
As the familiar political saying goes, those who have yet to put their own house in order are unlikely to reorganize the neighborhood around them.
The debate, in the end, returns to a simple constraint: power is bounded by geography.
How Multipolarity Forced Trump to Capitulate… For Now
By Eric Striker • Unz Review • June 19, 2026
When describing Donald Trump’s new Memorandum of Understanding with Iran, Foreign Policy magazine summarized the seeming end to the war as a “bigger defeat than Vietnam.”
This negation of American militarism has been felt strongest in Israel, where the Jewish state’s executors in Jerusalem and Washington/New York are throwing a fit. JD Vance, thrown in front of the cameras to own the administration’s retreat before their masters, is now openly telling the furious Jewish-American press “Trump is your [Israel] only ally left in the world.”
Has the White House had enough of Jewish domination of its policies? Is the pause in fighting Iran, which through Persian and Shia tenacity has significantly risen the bar for any continuation of hostilities, permanent?
Not so fast.
Passengers pulling the emergency break on the runaway train should not be seen as a change of guard, but rather a hard check placed on the Jewish domination of Washington DC by the combined forces of several major regional actors the American empire relies on to project power on behalf of Israel.
Forcing America to halt a war it was clearly losing and go to the negotiating table took Turkey (NATO’s second largest army), Pakistan (a nuclear power), the Gulf States (hosts of US CENTCOM with $2 trillion dollars parked in American foreign direct investment) and Egypt to pool their immense lobbying and diplomatic resources together. They offered an ultimatum: America must pause to reconsider its pursuit of Israel’s maximalist objective of conquering Iran and breaking it up into multiple rump states or they will form a new power bloc of their own to deal with this problem. As the American empire declines, multipolarity — which is bringing about the genesis of regional power blocs beyond the familiar Chinese, Iranian and Russian alliance — flexed its bicep.
Even as the administration realized it had no choice but to cave under the pressure exerted by the united front of its growing list of disgruntled associates, Trump audaciously demanded they first sign the Abraham Accords embracing Israel before any Iran negotiations began. The exasperated Muslim states responded with a resounding “No!”
This reaction, equal parts panicked and assertive, is a consequence of Iran’s unorthodox decision to focus its strategy on taxing the collaborationist Gulf regimes. The war has so far cost Gulf Cooperation Council states $200 billion dollars worth of economic damage, prompting public threats from Arab monarchs being pummeled to pull their trillions of dollars currently helping keep American tech, real estate, and bonds afloat.
In other words, the Saudis, Qataris and Emiratis pay the American empire to protect them, in addition to offering their soil for US bases and playing nice with Israel.
Yet at the height of the conflict, Iran and its allies quickly destroyed the expensive and difficult to replace THAAD network integral to the air defenses of both the Gulf and Israel. During the commotion, America’s Middle East protectorates endured blow after blow from Iranian missiles and drones, and Washington’s response was to anger another one of its client states — South Korea — by hastily moving its THAAD defense systems from East Asia to Jordan in order to better protect Israel, an act of brazen Jewish favoritism.
Working with America used to make one untouchable, but today it paints a bullseye on your country. The United Arab Emirates thought it could hedge against potential Iranian retaliation by allowing Russian billionaires to use Dubai to skirt sanctions, only to be taken aback by the revelation that Putin doesn’t care what the oligarchs think, preferring to help the IRGC in acquiring Gulf targets, including hotels in its fragile and decadent cities where US soldiers thought they were hiding.
The US’ catastrophic failure to keep up its end of the bargain is forcing Gulf planners to begin considering concessions to Iran, such as paying Tehran not to spare them. The GCC has hitched itself to the US-Israeli wagon as a realist acknowledgement that neither Israel or America can be militarily or economically defeated. The Iranians, who have limitless ability to sustain damage and are constantly innovating in the realm of warfare, have now demonstrated that this assumption is false, which will inevitably force a change in calculation from cowardly and cynical regional actors down the road.
With now a year and a half worth of Barak Ravid’s fairy tales alleging that Trump has had enough of Israel and Netanyahu indexed at Axios, nobody believes it anymore. For this reason, the administration is now forced to make a public spectacle of condemning Israel. This is geared at making America’s Muslim friends and foes — who currently have all the leverage — think Washington has the whip hand, when the reality is that Israel and the Jewish-American elite do. This was proven for the umpteenth time when Trump’s recent command for Netanyahu to “stop!” was immediately met by Israeli strikes on Iran and Lebanon.
As expected, Iran has already made good on its side of the bargain. The Strait of Hormuz has been reopened and a global economic depression has been averted. On the other hand, the major concessions from America to Iran highlighted by commentators in the MOU have stipulations deferring them pending further negotiations, like a hundred-dollar bill being pulled by a fishing line. One of the MOU’s major promises, that Israel’s war in South Lebanon is to immediately cease, continues to be flagrantly violated even at the expense of enormous IDF casualties in recent days.
As for planned talks in Switzerland to actualize the terms of the agreement, they are already failing.
It is unclear whether Benjamin Netanyahu, whose post October 7th wars have largely failed to achieve any strategic objectives, will survive electorally, but favorites to replace him like former IDF chief Eisenkot are just as bloodthirsty.
As for Trump, Witkoff and Kushner’s latest “time out” on Iran, they have so far been lulls to recalibrate with the intent of continuing. There’s no reason to believe this time is any different.
Switzerland confirms US-Iran talks planned for Friday are cancelled
Al Mayadeen | June 19, 2026
Talks that had been planned for Friday between the United States and Iran at the Burgenstock mountaintop resort in Switzerland will not take place, according to a Swiss foreign ministry statement.
The announcement came after a White House spokesperson said overnight that US Vice President JD Vance had pulled out of a planned trip to meet Iranian negotiators in Switzerland on Friday to begin talks to implement an agreement struck between Tehran and Washington to end the war.
Vance had been expected to travel to Geneva on Friday to begin technical negotiations on implementing the 14-point agreement reached between Tehran and Washington. However, a White House spokesperson said the visit was called off because arrangements for the talks had not been finalized.
A White House statement detailed that Vance and the US delegation were prepared to depart once arrangements had been finalized. “But the logistics of these negotiations have never been simple or predictable,” the statement added.
Iran seeks implementation before new negotiations
The Iranian negotiating delegation had earlier postponed its trip to Switzerland due to the ongoing Israeli aggression on southern Lebanon, an informed source told Al Mayadeen on Thursday.
According to the source, the delegation had already been preparing to depart Iran and launch the first round of negotiations, scheduled to span 60 days, before the decision to suspend the trip was made.
Tehran had previously informed both Washington and the mediators that the Lebanon file remains a central component of the negotiations and will directly influence whether the talks proceed, the source stated, citing Iranian warnings that continued Israeli aggression extending up to 10 kilometers deep inside Lebanese territory constitutes a clear violation of the first clause of the Memorandum of Understanding and the framework agreement.
What does the MoU include?
Iran revealed on Thursday the full text of the Memorandum of Understanding, which declares the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, with a final deal to be concluded within 60 days following continued talks.
The US agreed to remove its naval blockade within 30 days, end all sanctions on an agreed schedule, and issue waivers for Iranian oil exports and associated services.
The US also undertakes to release frozen Iranian funds and work with regional partners on a reconstruction plan worth at least $300 billion for Iran.
Iran reaffirmed it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons, with stockpiled enriched material to be resolved via a mutually agreed mechanism under IAEA supervision, while enrichment and other nuclear issues were expected to be discussed in final negotiations.
Israeli aggression continues against Lebanon despite MoU
Despite the agreement, the Israeli occupation has continued its aggression against southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah resistance fighters continue to engage Israeli forces in the town of Kfar Tibnit.
Today at dawn, Israeli bombing on residential areas in southern Lebanon killed and wounded civilians, with casualties reported across several villages in the Nabatieh district.
According to preliminary reports, Israeli airstrikes targeted inhabited homes in the towns of Harouf, Kfar Sir, and al-Sharqiyeh, resulting in several martyrs, injuries, and several missing persons trapped beneath the rubble.
In a separate attack, two civilians were martyred and two others wounded after an Israeli strike targeted the southern town of Qatrani.
The latest attacks come as Israeli occupation forces continue targeting civilians, medical crews, and residential areas across southern Lebanon despite the ceasefire agreement and ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at ending hostilities on all fronts.
Resistance confronts Israeli advance toward Kfar Tibnit
For its part, the Lebanese Resistance confronted an attempted advance by Israeli occupation forces toward the town of Kfar Tibnit overnight Thursday.
Resistance fighters targeted Israeli military vehicles attempting to move toward the town using anti-tank guided missiles and previously prepared ambushes. Several Israeli vehicles were struck during the confrontation, with flames seen rising from some of the targeted vehicles on the outskirts of Kfar Tibnit.
The Resistance affirmed that the Kfar Tibnit–Ali al-Taher area would remain impervious to Israeli incursions and vowed to continue defending Lebanon and its people.
Iran Beat Back The Greater Israel Project
By Justin K.P. | The Dissident | June 18, 2026
Donald Trump has officially signed the memorandum of understanding with Iran in the Palace of Versailles in France, and Israel and its American lobbyists are having a meltdown.
This is because the war with Iran, according to Israel and its neoconservative allies in the U.S., was indeed to be the linchpin for the Greater Israel Project, and the final phase of the Clean Break plan drawn up by Israel and the Bush administration.
For context, professor Jeffery Sachs explained :
In 1996, Netanyahu and his American advisors devised a “Clean Break” strategy. They advocated that Israel would not withdraw from the Palestinian lands captured in the 1967 war in exchange for regional peace. Instead, Israel would reshape the Middle East to its liking. Crucially, the strategy envisioned the US as the main force to achieve these aims—waging wars in the region to dismantle governments opposed to Israel’s dominance over Palestine. The US was called upon to fight wars on Israel’s behalf.
The Clean Break strategy was effectively carried out by the US and Israel after 9/11. As NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark revealed, soon after 9/11, the US planned to “attack and destroy the governments in seven countries in five years—starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran.”
The first of the wars, in early 2003, was to topple the Iraqi government. Plans for further wars were delayed as the US became mired in Iraq. Still, the US supported Sudan’s split in 2005, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006, and Ethiopia’s incursion into Somalia that same year. In 2011, the Obama administration launched CIA operation Timber Sycamore against Syria and, with the UK and France, overthrew Libya’s government through a 2011 bombing campaign. Today, these countries lie in ruins, and many are now embroiled in civil wars.
Netanyahu was a cheerleader of these wars of choice–either in public or behind the scenes–together with his neocon allies in the U.S. Government including Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Victoria Nuland, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, and others.
As he explained, war with Iran was intended to be the final phase of this roadmap to Greater Israel. “In September 2023, Netanyahu presented at the UN General Assembly a map of the ‘New Middle East’ completely erasing a Palestinian state. In September 2024, he elaborated on this plan by showing two maps: one part of the Middle East a ‘blessing,’ and the other–including Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran–a curse, as he advocated regime change in the latter countries. Israel’s war on Iran is the final move in a decades-old strategy. We are witnessing the culmination of decades of extremist Zionist manipulation of US foreign policy.”
The Zionists and Neo-Cons believed that by destroying Iran, it would cut off support to resistance groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Ansar Allah, destroy the axis of resistance and create an American/Israeli dominated Middle East, and Israeli expansion into Gaza, the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon.
Daniel Levy, former Israeli negotiator explaining why Benjamin Netanyahu so desperately wanted a U.S. war with Iran, explained, “Israel sees us in an era of what I would call a Pax Greater Israel. This is about how far Israel can extend its dominion, how much of a hard-power, dominant hegemon it can be in the region, seizing parts of Syria or of Lebanon, trying to finish an eradicationist approach to the Palestinians. And crucially, to do that, you have to weaken Iran militarily, to remove some kind of deterrent. You can only do that with the U.S., so you need to pull the U.S. into this war. If that means further accelerating American decline and even accelerating Israel’s loss of support in America, then it’s a price to pay. It’s kind of ‘use it or lose it,’ because those things are happening anyway.”
He added, “that’s what Netanyahu is trying to achieve, to achieve Greater Israel, domination in the region, including the weakening of the Gulf, which is intentional, at the expense of America bleeding further reputational, political, economic assets in this war”.
This was outright admitted by Lindsay Graham, the neoconservative South Carolina senator who was a key architect of the war, who reportedly “spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, coaching him on how to lobby the president for action” in Iran.
The real goal of the Iran war was laid out by Graham at the Zionist Tzedek conference, who said referring to war with Iran, “If we can pull this off, it would be the biggest change in the Mid East in a thousand years: Hamas, Hezbollah gone, the Houthis gone, the Iranian people an ally not an enemy, the Arab world moving towards Israel without fear, Saudi-Israel normalize, no more October the 7th”.
In other words, the Zionists and Neo-cons believed that if Iran was destroyed, it would therefore destroy Hamas, Hezbollah and Ansar Allah (Houthis) and pave the way for Arab states to normalise with Israel, isolating the Palestinians and paving the way for unopposed Israeli expansion.
But contrary to the hopes of Israel and its allies in the U.S. like Lindsay Graham, the U.S. did not “pull this off”, failing to destroy Iran or do regime change, eventually being forced to sign a deal after Iranian victory.
But for Israel and its American lobbyists, this is a nightmare; the lynchpin of their Greater Israel Project has now become a fantasy.
Along with pushing back the Greater Israel Project, Iran has successfully created a rift between Israel and its main patron, the United States.
Responding to reports that Israel was , angry with the Trump administration over signing the deal, Vice President JD Vance said, Trump was, “the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time” adding, “The problem for Israel is not Donald J. Trump and anybody in Israel who thinks their biggest problem is the President of the United States needs to wake up and smell the reality of the situation that the country is in”.
Trump similarly lashed out at Israel before signing the deal, saying, “If it weren’t for the United States of America, with me… Israel would not exist right now. Israel would have been blown off the face of the earth, one hundred percent — and every smart person in Israel knows that.”
Iran has forced the Trump administration to acknowledge that Israel’s plans are delusional, that it is despised by the world and that the only entity in the world propping it up is the Trump administration.
By forcing the U.S. to agree to the MOU, Iran not only defeated the plan to destroy Iran for Greater Israel, but for the first time, created an actual rift between a Trump administration desperate to end the losing war, and Israel, desperate to have their Greater Israel Project plan completed.
Israel’s censor silenced 5,700 reports in 2025

Israeli forces detain a photojournalist in Hebron, West Bank on October 3, 2024. [Wisam Hashlamoun – Anadolu Agency]
MEMO | June 18, 2026
Israel’s military censor blocked or altered more than 5,700 news reports in 2025, an average of 15 items per day, making it the second-highest year for media censorship in Israel since records began 15 years ago, according to new data published by +972 Magazine.
The figures, obtained through a freedom of information request submitted by +972 and the Movement for Freedom of Information, show that the censor demanded redactions in 4,974 news items in 2025, while completely barring 753 further items from publication. Both totals remain far above the previous annual average of around 2,300 redactions and 320 full bans recorded between 2011 and 2023. The year 2024, the height of Israel’s genocide on Gaza, still holds the record for the highest number of interventions.
The censor, a unit embedded within Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate, received 17,176 article submissions from media outlets in 2025, compared to a pre-2024 annual average of just under 12,000. Israeli law requires media organisations to submit material touching on “security” issues for censor approval before publication, under emergency regulations enacted at the time of Israel’s founding that remain in force today.
According to +972, censorship was most intensive during Israel’s war with Iran. Police, municipal inspectors, and at times civilians enforced severe restrictions on reporting the locations of Iranian missile strikes on Israeli cities, with Arab and foreign journalists disproportionately subjected to obstruction in the field. Television studios regularly hosted a representative of the censorship authority to monitor live broadcasts in real time.
Media outlets are legally barred from informing their audiences that the censor interfered in a published article. The censor is also authorised to intervene retroactively, ordering the removal of articles published without prior approval as it did last year when it demanded the deletion of a column in Haaretz that disclosed the locations of Iranian missile strikes in Tel Aviv.
The censor holds sweeping powers of enforcement, including the authority to indict journalists and to fine, suspend, shut down, or file criminal charges against media organisations that fail to comply with its orders.
The data raises questions about the political direction of the censorship apparatus. The two men who led the censor over the past two years — Kobi Mandelblit, who served as chief censor until April 2025, and Netanel Kula, who replaced him — are both relatives of senior legal figures from Israel’s religious-Zionist movement.
Three months after Kula assumed the role, reports emerged that he had suppressed coverage of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s son purchasing an undisclosed property abroad. The story eventually reached the public through other channels.
The data also points to a striking double standard in enforcement. The far-right Channel 14, a broadcaster aligned with Israel’s ultranationalist camp, repeatedly published sensitive combat plans and military intelligence tools that security officials determined had caused “actual harm” to national security. Despite this, the channel was not penalised on any occasion.
“It is particularly important during times of emergency to receive reliable information about changes regarding the censor’s activities,” said Or Sadan, an attorney from the Movement for Freedom of Information. “Although there has been a slight decrease from last year, it is hard not to notice the alarming rise in the number of news reports being hidden from the public. Democracy is based on the transfer of information from the government to the public, and any infringement upon this is a direct infringement upon democracy.”
+972 notes that military censorship, while severe, is not the most acute form of press freedom violation committed by the Israeli military. Since 7 October 2023, more than 250 journalists have been killed across Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iran — some of them in strikes that investigators have concluded were direct and deliberate, including so-called “double-tap” attacks targeting rescue workers who arrived at the scene of a first strike.
When the Iran War is over: Why the West Bank may be Netanyahu’s next front
By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | June 17, 2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing perhaps the most precarious moment of his political career. He knows it. His allies know it. And his rivals—both within his coalition and across Israel’s political spectrum—are preparing to capitalize on his growing weakness.
Former Israeli Justice Minister Haim Ramon, who also served as deputy prime minister between 2007 and 2009, is among the latest Israeli political figures to join a growing chorus of criticism directed at Netanyahu.
“In the final result,” Ramon said in an interview with Radio Galey, cited by the Israeli outlet Srugim, “we did not win.” He then broke down that failure in blunt terms: “We did not win in Lebanon, we did not win in Iran, and we did not win against Hamas.”
Another prominent critic is former Israeli army chief Gadi Eisenkot, who joined Netanyahu’s emergency war government following the events of October 7, 2023, before resigning with Benny Gantz in June 2024.
Beyond accusing Netanyahu of failing to protect Israel on October 7, Eisenkot argues that the prime minister has effectively surrendered Israel’s political decision-making to US President Donald Trump, thereby strategically weakening Israel.
Ironically, Netanyahu’s coalition partners have often been even more opportunistic than the opposition.
Since the formation of the current coalition government on December 29, 2022—widely regarded as the most right-wing government in Israel’s history—figures such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich have repeatedly used Netanyahu’s political vulnerability to expand their own influence. Whenever Netanyahu needed political support to remain in power, they demanded concessions in return.
For Israel’s far-right extremists, Netanyahu’s inability to secure decisive strategic victories has often translated into opportunities to advance their own agendas. Every setback on the battlefield became an opening for greater settlement expansion, harsher measures against Palestinians, and deeper entrenchment of extremist policies.
Unable to deliver ‘victory’, Netanyahu turned perpetual war into a political strategy in its own right. The result has been a genocidal war in Gaza, widespread devastation in Lebanon, and a dangerous confrontation with Iran that has repeatedly brought the region to the brink of a wider catastrophe.
For a time, this formula proved politically sustainable. Netanyahu successfully enlisted unwavering US support to keep the fires of war burning.
At the same time, the failure of Europe and much of the international community to hold a wanted war criminal accountable provided him with the political space necessary to continue his bloody calculations.
Yet that formula may be nearing its limits. While this possibility may appear encouraging, it comes with a serious warning. If Netanyahu can no longer sustain the wars that have prolonged his political life for nearly three years, he may escalate where resistance is weakest: the occupied West Bank.
Regarding Iran, there is growing recognition that the current confrontation is unsustainable indefinitely and that some form of arrangement will eventually emerge. Likewise, regardless of whether Lebanon is formally included in any future agreement, Israel’s ambition of permanently occupying parts of Lebanese territory remains untenable.
Historically, when Israel fails to secure a strategic breakthrough on one front, it seeks compensation on another—typically where Palestinians are most vulnerable and where international scrutiny is weakest.
As Israeli elections approach, it is therefore reasonable to fear a further escalation of the genocide in Gaza, pushing both the death toll and the level of destruction to new heights. According to Gaza health authorities, nearly 1,000 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire agreement was announced in October, bringing the overall death toll of Israel’s genocide in Gaza to 73,000 Palestinians.
Though Israel’s war has already failed to break Palestinian steadfastness, the broader objective remains unchanged: the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza and the transformation of the Strip into a space that can no longer sustain Palestinian life.
The West Bank, however, presents a different challenge.
There, Israel faces a fragmented political landscape and a Palestinian Authority that refuses to develop an effective strategy for confronting accelerating Israeli violence, ethnic cleansing, home demolitions, land confiscation, and the relentless expansion of illegal settlements.
This vulnerability has enabled Israel to move from discussing annexation to implementing it in practice. The strategy rests on two interconnected pillars: extreme violence and displacement on the one hand, and rapid settlement expansion on the other.
According to an Oxfam International study published on June 12, Israel has killed 1,244 Palestinians, including 268 children, in the occupied West Bank since 2023—more than the total number killed during the previous seventeen years combined.
This bloodshed has been accompanied by large-scale displacement that has already uprooted nearly 46,000 Palestinians, many of them from refugee camps and vulnerable communities across the northern West Bank.
An Amnesty International report published on June 10 documented the full or partial displacement of at least 117 Palestinian Bedouin and herding communities between January 2023 and April 2026.
Expectedly, the violence, displacement, settlement expansion, and land seizures are not isolated developments but components of a coherent political project. In September 2025, Smotrich openly proposed the annexation of 82 percent of the occupied West Bank. What was once presented as a political vision is now steadily being translated into facts on the ground.
The era of Netanyahu may be nearing its end, but before this bloody political chapter closes, countless more Palestinians may be forced to bear the cost.
Arab and Muslim countries, along with their allies in the international community, must not wait for Israel to launch a much larger assault on the West Bank before responding.
The matter demands urgent attention and immediate action.
Israeli forces launch fresh ground incursions into Syria’s Quneitra, interrogate locals
Press TV – June 18, 2026
While Israeli military incursions and activities in southern Syria, along with harassment of local citizens under the inaction of the ruling Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) regime, have become recurrent over the past year, Syrian sources have detailed a recent ground incursion.
The sources stated that Israeli forces, onboard nine military vehicles, raided the village of al-Asbah on the outskirts of Syria’s southwestern province of Quneitra near the occupied strategic Golan Heights early on Thursday.
Israeli forces on Wednesday carried out a series of raids on residential homes in the southern countryside of Quneitra, including the interrogation of a local journalist.
Local sources said the incursion targeted ten homes in the town of Saida in southern Quneitra countryside.
Among the properties searched was the home of Sanad al-Hindawi, a journalist and employee of the Quneitra Media Directorate. Sources said Israeli soldiers questioned Hindawi inside his residence during the raid.
No arrests were reported during the incursion.
The raids came two days after Israeli forces broke into the village of Saida al-Golan in southern Quneitra countryside, and established a temporary checkpoint at the village junction, where pedestrians and passing vehicles were subjected to inspections.
Following the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government in early December 2024, the Israeli military has been conducting airstrikes targeting military installations, facilities, and arsenals previously operated by the Syrian army.
Israel has faced widespread criticism for ending the 1974 ceasefire agreement with Syria and taking advantage of the chaos in the war-torn nation to seize territory.
The UN, along with several Arab nations, condemned Israel’s actions as breaches of international law and violations of Syria’s sovereignty.
Despite the HTS’s pledges of cooperation with Tel Aviv, Israel has remained unwilling to withdraw from Syria.
The two sides have been engaged in on-and-off talks to reach a “security agreement”, but no deal or concrete progress has been announced.
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has ordered his forces to push deeper into Syrian territory beyond the 1967-occupied Golan Heights and seize several strategic locations.
The bulk of the Israeli attacks have been concentrated in the southern Syrian governorates of Quneitra, Dara’a, and Damascus, which account for nearly 80 percent of all recorded Israeli attacks.
Syria ‘unwilling, unprepared’ to attack Lebanon despite US pressure: Report
Damascus is reportedly prepared to reconsider its position if Tel Aviv were to withdraw its occupation troops from Syria
The Cradle | June 17, 2026
Syrian President and former Al-Qaeda chief Ahmad al-Sharaa is “unprepared and unwilling” to launch a military offensive against Lebanon despite growing US pressure, Israel’s Broadcasting Corporation (KAN) reported on 16 June.
KAN cited an informed Syrian source who said that Sharaa is “concerned” that an attack by Damascus against Hezbollah will be seen across the region as “serving” Israel’s interests.
This could negatively impact Damascus’s “legitimacy.”
For now, the self-appointed Syrian president is ruling out an attack against Lebanon and its resistance forces unless Israel decides to pull its forces out of Syria, the report states.
Israel has rejected withdrawal from both Syria and Lebanon.
KAN also said that Turkiye – a longtime backer of Sharaa since his days as Abu Muhammad al-Julani, founder and leader of Al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front – has urged Damascus against such an incursion.
Ankara is reportedly concerned that a Syrian assault on Lebanon would “embolden” Tel Aviv and “strengthen” its position.
“Trump proposed a framework in which the Syrian military would play a central role in a future effort to disarm Hezbollah,” i24 reported on Wednesday.
Lebanese authorities reportedly felt uneasy about the idea during recent US-backed direct talks with Israeli officials, which have taken place despite Lebanon’s legal restrictions.
Additionally, Israeli authorities are reportedly concerned about the effectiveness of a Syrian attack on Hezbollah.
“Some of the arrangements currently under discussion could ultimately strengthen Hezbollah politically and militarily rather than diminish its influence,” i24 reported.
Sharaa said earlier this week that talk of a Syrian incursion into Lebanon was a “rumor.” “Syria’s approach aims to end the war in Lebanon, not to expand it or get involved,” he stressed.
US President Donald Trump has repeatedly called on Syria to attack Hezbollah.
Iraqi resistance groups allied with Hezbollah have cautioned the Syrian government and its forces that they will act if Damascus initiates an attack on Lebanon.
Syria experienced a significant geopolitical change following the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, as Sharaa’s government aligned with Washington and engaged in discussions with Israel.
The US has largely lifted sanctions on Syria and called Damascus a “partner” in the global fight against ISIS — overlooking Sharaa’s past as an Al-Qaeda leader and earlier as deputy to ISIS founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Hezbollah fought in Syria for years with the former government, helping recapture areas from extremist groups like Al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and others considered by the west as the “Syrian opposition.”
The Nusra Front, led by Sharaa, was rebranded into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and ended up toppling Assad’s government in 2024.
HTS and other extremist factions with links to ISIS currently dominate what has become the new Syrian Defense Ministry and military.
Tom Barrack, US special envoy to Syria and Iraq, threatened Lebanon last year with a Syrian incursion, and said Damascus would “actively assist us in confronting and dismantling … Hezbollah.”
He also said Syria viewed Lebanon as its “beach resort” and would carry out an assault against the country unless Hezbollah is disarmed.
Hezbollah thwarts Israeli advances into Kfar Tebnit-Ali al-Taher
Al Mayadeen | June 18, 2026
The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon – Hezbollah released a detailed statement regarding confrontations along the Kfar Tebnit-Ali al-Taher axis in South Lebanon, after four days of failed Israeli attempts to advance toward the area via multiple axes under the cover of aerial surveillance, heavy artillery, and smoke screens.
The Operations Room stated that its fighters have consistently engaged all Israeli advance attempts by targeting troop movements and concentrations with rockets, drones, and FPVs, inflicting significant losses in personnel and equipment among Israeli officers, soldiers, and armored vehicles.
It added that, as a result of these engagements, Israeli occupation forces were compelled to withdraw and conduct nighttime helicopter evacuations under smoke cover and artillery fire to recover casualties.
According to the statement, on Wednesday, June 17, at 8:00 pm, following the detection of an Israeli infantry unit attempting to establish positions on the northeastern outskirts of Kfar Tebnit, Resistance fighters engaged the force using a swarm of drones and Ababil FPV drones, confirming casualties among its members, including killed and wounded. The operation was subsequently followed by rocket salvos and artillery fire directed at the same area.
Several hours later, at approximately 01:50 am on Thursday, June 18, amid enemy attempts to regroup in a crossing area, Hezbollah fighters targeted a Merkava tank with the appropriate weapons, achieving a direct hit and forcing the withdrawal of the Israeli force from the sector.
The Resistance confirmed that Israeli occupation forces remain present on the southern outskirts of Kfar Tebnit toward Arnoun, vowing that the Kfar Tebnit–Ali al-Taher axis will remain inaccessible to enemy advances.
The operations come as Hezbollah defends Lebanese territories from ongoing Israeli violations of the April 17 ceasefire and the memorandum of understanding reached between the United States and Iran, which clearly stipulates “Israel’s” withdrawal and cessation of attacks in Lebanon.
The final war or final deal: Why the MoU?
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | June 18, 2026
The Israeli-US plot to inflict “regime change” upon Iran has been turned into a strategic failure of historic proportions – in the end, Washington and Tel Aviv were forced to confront the reality. The newly signed Memorandum of Understanding is either a gateway to a final deal or simply another strategy to buy time.
Forty days of all-out war, followed by two months of dead-end negotiations, led to two final options: Submit to a deal that works heavily in Iran’s favour or keep on fighting until the end. What ultimately comes of this equation will completely reshape West Asia and perhaps geopolitics globally.
US President Donald Trump had tried every single avenue to pressure the Islamic Republic of Iran into surrender. He suddenly found himself in a new phase where the walls were closing in and decided to make a diplomatic move. The Iranians managed to reunite their allied fronts across the region, taking de facto ownership of the Strait of Hormuz, while proving they can fight the world’s top military superpower to a standstill.
If you were to listen to the rhetoric coming from the White House, it was like hearing a radio broadcast from a parallel universe. According to Trump, Iran was defeated all the way back in March, its military is destroyed, nobody knows who is running the country, it has no air defenses, no missiles left, no navy, and is on the verge of collapse. But quite frankly, nobody bought his nonsensical ramblings.
Beneath the egotistical exterior is a system that was running out of gas and whose operator was in panic.
In order to accurately assess the situation, we have to factor in precisely why the US leader is managing this war so incredibly poorly. The Trump administration is not composed of competent and experienced individuals; it’s a who’s who of Israeli Lobby shills and hardline ideological fanatics – a tech billionaire’s dream administration. While the Israeli Lobby and other lobby groups have for long had sway over American presidents and foreign policy, it has never been this severe.
Donald Trump exemplifies this through his total incompetence and constant inability to say no to the Israelis when it matters the most. There is, after all, a reason why no other US president agreed to go to war with the Islamic Republic upon the request of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, even when Iran was far less prepared for it militarily.
Finding out the hard way, the US president found himself caught in a quagmire– if he escalated the war, then the entire region would go up in flames, but if he backed out, he would face the wrath of the same billionaire class that put him in power to begin with.
The Zionist regime can’t defeat the Iranians alone, nor does it believe that the US will defeat Tehran conventionally. Yet, the Israeli leadership does not want to give up, for if they fail, then the Iranians will become the dominant regional power and the “Greater Israel Project” will not be able to succeed.
Therefore, they are only really left with two actual options, both involving the United States: The first is a fight to the death that could go so far that nuclear weapons become involved; the second is a large-scale attack on Iranian infrastructure.
The second option is more likely to be favoured by the Israelis than the first, and its goal will be to continue battering Iranian civilian infrastructure until the Israelis can’t take the punishment coming back its way any longer. For the US, this would represent a catastrophe, because the Iranians have long pledged to wipe out the entire region’s oil and gas infrastructure, even going after water desalination and power plants if it comes down to it.
For Washington, this means their Gulf allies will be destroyed. Keep in mind that the Trump administration previously bragged about the alleged Trillion that the Gulf Arab States had pledged to invest in the United States. All of that is gone overnight, and a global economic meltdown would be underway. Trump personally has a lot of investments in the Gulf, which means sacrificing this too.
The Israelis, on the other hand, want the Arab Gulf States weakened. This is for the very same reason they threaten Turkiye constantly – they do not want any potential competitors. Tel Aviv doesn’t even like other regional nations, who are their allies, to get the latest US fighter jets. So, the hypothetical annihilation of rich Gulf States doesn’t likely bother them at all.
As long as the primary goal is achieved, they will be happy. They want a weakened and battered Iran, an Islamic Republic that is susceptible to future color revolutions, one that can no longer impose deterrence equations. But the Americans were facing an economic tidal wave and had no good options in front of them.
If a deal is signed on the terms of the Iranians as a result of the MoU, the Israelis have been strategically defeated. The war that began on October 7, 2023, would have been completely lost for them, and they will only have two options available to them: try to linger on and delay the inevitable implosion of their expansionist project, or sign a deal with the Palestinians in order to allow for a State of Palestine to come into existence. Realistically, the so-called “Two-State solution” is their only hope of long-term survival. All of this assumes they won’t simply blow the deal up before it can come to fruition.
Iran declares victory over US
RT | June 18, 2026
Iranian officials have portrayed the newly signed memorandum of understanding with the US as a diplomatic victory achieved through strength and as evidence that Washington failed to achieve any of its objectives militarily.
The 14-point document was signed remotely by President Donald Trump and his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, late Wednesday and immediately entered force, according to the Pakistani mediators.
The US side has been unusually muted in its public response. The White House has also yet to publish the final text of the memorandum, although an unnamed senior US official read out the 14-point document to journalists after days of criticism over the secrecy surrounding the deal.
Meanwhile, Iran’s parliament speaker and chief negotiator in the talks, Mohammad Ghalibaf, described the memorandum as proof of US surrender.
“The agreement is a record of US failure,” Ghalibaf said in a televised interview on Wednesday. “People will see it and judge.”
Tehran has argued that the document reflects a series of concessions by Washington, including the lifting of the US naval blockade, sanctions waivers for Iranian oil exports, access to frozen Iranian funds, and a US-backed economic reconstruction plan worth at least $300 billion. Washington has also agreed not to impose new sanctions or deploy additional forces in the region while the sides negotiate a final agreement.
In response, Iran “will make arrangements” to restore freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz – something that had not been an issue before the US-Israeli attack. However, Tehran has signaled that the key waterway will not simply return to prewar conditions.
“I emphasize again that the Strait of Hormuz will never return to the previous conditions,” Ghalibaf said. “Iran has the right to sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, and of course, we will receive a fee for services.”
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei added that a framework was being developed to manage the key waterway, with consultations already held with Oman, as outlined in the MOU.
Tehran has also highlighted the memorandum’s language on Lebanon. “If the Israeli regime’s attacks on Lebanon continue, it will be considered a violation of the other party’s commitments under the memorandum of understanding,” Baghaei said.
The memorandum is not a final peace agreement, but launches a 60-day negotiation period during which Washington and Tehran are expected to discuss Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, frozen assets, the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, and a final settlement to be endorsed by the UN Security Council.
The nuclear language in the document states that Iran “reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons” – something Tehran has been stating for years, including during both previous US-Israeli attacks. The MOU adds that the sides will work out a mechanism for the disposition of stockpiled enriched material, with the minimum methodology being down-blending on site under IAEA supervision.
Trump made multiple unrelated posts on Truth Social hours after signing but said nothing about the deal. Earlier in the day, he defended the memorandum, threatening to “bomb the hell out of” Iran if it failed to comply.
