Robert Barnes: Israel’s Become a Political Pariah, Republicans Take Note
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 12, 2026
Col Douglas Macgregor: Ukraine Russia War, Trump is Toothless
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 11, 2026
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – August 13, 2026
The Caspian Sea — for thirty years a backwater of great-power politics — has quietly become a battlespace, and most of the world is still treating it as a footnote.
In late July, Iranian officials confirmed that a US strike had damaged the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Seyyed al-Shuhada naval facility in Zibakenar, in Iran’s Caspian province of Gilan — the first time in the current war that Washington has reached into Iran’s Caspian coastline. Days earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Kyiv’s drones had struck several vessels in the Caspian more than 1,000 kilometers from Ukrainian-held territory, including a ship reportedly ferrying military cargo from Iran toward Russia. Iran, however, said one of the vessels hit was carrying iron ore from Astrakhan to the Iranian port of Anzali and summoned Ukraine’s chargé d’affaires in protest.
Neither strike, on its own, would rewrite anyone’s map. Together, they are a signal. For the first time, the US and US-backed Ukraine have demonstrated that they have the will and the reach to hit targets on a sea that geography, more than strategy, had long kept insulated from direct confrontation. The Caspian’s basin states — Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan — built an entire diplomatic architecture, including a 2018 legal convention on the sea’s status, around the premise that outside militaries would stay out. That premise no longer holds.
What is emerging is not a contest for territory in the traditional sense. It is a contest over connectivity: over the ports, rail lines, pipelines, and shipping lanes that allow Russia, Iran, and, at one remove, China to function as an integrated economic and strategic space rather than three isolated, sanctioned, or otherwise constrained powers. Call it America’s New Eurasian Containment: a strategy that treats infrastructure, not territory, as the terrain worth contesting.

Severing the Connective Tissue
The clearest evidence of this shift sits not on the Caspian’s water but on its shores, in two projects Washington has spent the past year reshaping.
The first is the International North-South Transport Corridor, a roughly 7,200-kilometer multimodal freight route agreed upon by Russia, Iran, and India in 2000 that links the Indian Ocean, through Iran, across the Caspian, to Russian rail networks and on to Europe. Long stalled by under-investment, the corridor has become a priority for Moscow since 2022, precisely because it offers a way around Western sanctions. Its central artery is the Caspian crossing between the Iranian port of Bandar-e Anzali and the Russian port of Astrakhan. More importantly, it is the same stretch of water where Ukrainian drones struck in July and where Israeli forces had already hit Iranian naval and port assets at Anzali back in March, according to regional shipping trackers. A degraded, contested Caspian corridor is a direct blow to the one overland route that lets Moscow and Tehran trade around US and European sanctions. These attacks are, therefore, not about the US war on Iran; they are about reshaping the very geography of trade passing through the Eurasian landscape.
The second is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP — the transit corridor Washington brokered in August 2025 between Armenia and Azerbaijan, granting a US-led consortium a 99-year lease to build and manage rail, energy, and fiber-optic links through Armenia’s Syunik province. The deal ended a decades-old territorial dispute, but its geopolitical function is narrower and sharper. It places Iran’s only land border with Armenia under American-supervised transit control, cutting off Tehran’s most direct overland access into the South Caucasus and, by extension, into a region Russia has treated as its own backyard since the Soviet collapse. Whatever the deal’s stated humanitarian purpose, it functions as a wedge driven into Eurasian connective tissue.
Neither project was designed with the other in mind. But together with the Caspian strikes, they describe a single logic: deny Russia and Iran the infrastructure that lets their January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership — a 20-year treaty covering defense, energy, finance, and counterterrorism cooperation — translate into real economic integration rather than a document signed in Moscow. China, meanwhile, watches from the margins. Beijing has no naval presence on the Caspian and is not a party to any of these strikes or corridors, but its own westward trade ambitions run through the same chokepoints, i.e., the Middle Corridor via the South Caucasus, and Iranian ports as a Belt and Road terminus. A Washington-controlled TRIPP and a contested Caspian complicate China’s overland options as a side effect, even if Beijing was never the intended target.
A Frontier Without a Front Line
The danger in this strategy is precisely that it has no clean edges. Containment during the Cold War had defined lines — the Fulda Gap, the Elbe, the 38th parallel — and a doctrine that most parties understood. Infrastructure containment has none of that. A drone strike on a cargo ship, an airstrike on a naval depot, and a 99-year land lease branded with a president’s name: each is individually deniable, incremental, and justifiable in its own narrow terms, even as the cumulative effect reshapes the strategic map of an entire region. That ambiguity is a feature for Washington, which can advance the strategy without ever declaring it. But it is also a source of volatility because affected countries are left to infer intent from actions rather than respond to a stated policy. And, inferences, in a region this armed and this aggrieved, tend toward worst-case assumptions.
The more durable question is what happens once the corridors themselves become targets, not just prizes. Pipelines, rail lines, and undersea cables may now be legitimate objects of great-power coercion. If so, the Caspian will not be the last “peripheral” space pulled into contested geography. The Arctic shipping lanes, the Malacca chokepoint, and the fibre-optic seabed of the Indian Ocean are all candidates for the same treatment. In this environment, the states that thrive will not be the ones with the largest militaries. They will be the ones that make their infrastructure redundant, diversified, and defensible: multiple routes, multiple partners, no single artery whose loss is fatal. Iran and Russia have bet heavily on a small number of chokepoints. Their partnership may keep deepening going forward. But the deeper it goes, the more attacks it will face and endure.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
Sputnik – 13.08.2026
A US Army-funded artillery plant near Dallas, built to produce 155mm shells for Ukraine, never produced a single usable shell, ProPublica reported.
Workers described robots catching fire, machines smashing into equipment, steel cracking beyond repair and giant presses needing to be beaten with a sledgehammer just to function.
“It was just a bunch of guys taking turns going at the machine with a sledgehammer every night,” one former employee said.
The Army halted work on two of the plant’s three production lines in 2025 after General Dynamics missed multiple deadlines.
The company was still awarded billions in new contracts.
The US keeps pouring money into its proxy war machine — and sometimes the machine cannot even make the shells.
Russia has repeatedly warned that such weapons deliveries only prolong the conflict.
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 12, 2026
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 12, 2026
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – August 11, 2026
By Drago Bosnic | August 12, 2026
NATO member Turkey plans to transfer a massive arsenal of US-made long-range strike systems and artillery munitions to the Neo-Nazi junta forces. This includes at least 70 M39 ATACMS TBMs (tactical ballistic missiles), 12 M270 MLRSs (multiple launch rocket systems), 2,524 M26 227 mm rockets (compatible with both the M270 MLRS and the M142 HIMARS) and 47,000 M509A1 203 mm cluster-munition artillery rounds.
This will be by far the largest single transfer of NATO-sourced weapons and munitions to the Kiev regime outside the United States. It comes at a critical moment for the political West, as the Neo-Nazi junta’s ATACMS stockpiles are virtually gone after years of failures against the Russian military, both in terms of losses caused by Moscow’s world-class long-range precision strike capabilities and its no less stellar SAM/ABM (surface-to-air missile/anti-ballistic missile) systems.
With the US embroiled in its disastrous aggression against Iran, the Pentagon is unable to restock its own arsenal, let alone spare some of its missiles for the Kiev regime. Turkey’s decision to deliver these weapons and munitions comes at a critical moment for the political West, demonstrating its loyalty to NATO and its aggression against the world. Namely, arming the Neo-Nazi junta with so many weapons is a clear message to both Russia and Iran, particularly now that the latter has also been targeted by NATO’s favorite puppet regime. As previously mentioned, it also comes amid US aggression against Iran, demonstrating strategic coordination between Ankara and Washington DC. Turkish motives are certainly multifaceted. Apart from showing loyalty, it’s also gaining massive profits from (re)selling its old stockpile of US-made weapons and earning “points” for a potential return to the troubled F-35 program.
The latter is essentially an economic and financial boost to the troubled Turkish economy, which has suffered due to years of Western pressure and low-level sanctions in the decade since the failed NATO coup against Erdogan. Despite all this and Moscow’s critical role in thwarting the plot, Ankara seems to be distancing itself from the multipolar world and seeking deeper (re)integration into NATO. And while it doesn’t support the political West’s economic siege of Russia, primarily because of its own business interests, Turkey has once again emerged as one of the leading Russian adversaries within NATO, particularly in terms of weapons and munitions transfers. Not to mention its role in supporting all sorts of Islamic radicals and terrorists all across the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeastern Europe, including those who overthrew the last legitimate Syrian government.
Obviously, this was done in coordination with the political West and certain Persian Gulf monarchies, all of which were after President Bashar al-Assad for decades. Turkey’s role in destabilizing the South Caucasus and Central Asia should also be noted, particularly as it directly undermines Russian, Iranian and Chinese national security interests. This is a major challenge for the multipolar world, as it undermines stability in regions critical to BRICS and SCO. It leaves no other logical conclusion except that Turkey is deliberately coordinating its extremely aggressive foreign policy with that of the US and EU/NATO. This includes the involvement of Turkish intelligence in various insurgencies and coup attempts in Central Asia, most notably the failed color revolution attempt in Kazakhstan in early January 2022, which was prevented by joint Russian and Kazakh forces.
Ankara has also been one of the Neo-Nazi junta’s leading arms suppliers and has also played a major role in tricking Russia into fake diplomacy, such as the false promise it wouldn’t release members of the openly Nazi “Azov” battalion. All this was designed as a ruse to buy time for the political West and its favorite puppet regime. As for the latest weapons deal, perhaps the most dangerous aspect is the transfer of cluster munitions, which remain a major hazard for civilians long after fighting has ended. With the American arsenal depleted, Turkey remains one of the few major suppliers of these munitions. Unfortunately, its concern for civilian deaths is virtually non-existent, as it has a long history of using highly controversial weapons that are particularly dangerous for civilians, including white phosphorus that was regularly used by NATO-backed terrorists in Syria.
However, apart from NATO’s terrorist tendencies (hardly surprising considering its origins), can Turkish weapons, particularly the ATACMS, really change anything on the battlefield? While 70 missiles are certainly nothing to be ignored, it should be noted this is only a fraction of what the US already delivered to the Neo-Nazi junta. Namely, it supplied the HIMARS with thousands of M30/M31 GPS-guided rockets (approximately 70 km range) and at least 500 MGM-140 ATACMS ballistic missiles (range 165-300 km, depending on the variant). The Russian military’s unrivaled electronic warfare (EW) and SAM/ABM systems were instrumental in countering these weapons. Of the 500 missiles sent, at least 450 ATACMS are “missing”, which is around 25% of the entire US military’s stockpile. So far, there have been around 20 (if not even fewer) confirmed ATACMS hits on Russian positions.
If 450 were delivered to the Kiev regime and are now “unaccounted for”, is it really that difficult to calculate their actual battlefield effectiveness against the Russian military? As previously mentioned, the Neo-Nazi junta got at least 500 ATACMS, which is approximately 25% of the US Army stocks and 15% of the entire production run since 1991.
Of these, only 50 remained in the Kiev regime’s service by late 2024, meaning that the vast majority got shot down or destroyed while in storage. Even if we go out on a limb and say there have been 20 successful strikes on Russian positions, this would mean that the actual combat effectiveness of the ATACMS is 4.44%, although military reports suggest it’s even lower. In other words, these arms transfers only serve to prolong the fighting and can in no way offer any real battlefield advantages to the Neo-Nazi junta.
Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst.
Sputnik – 11.08.2026
The United Kingdom is the most active supplier of main units and components for unmanned aerial vehicles used as killer drones against civilians. Germany supplies weapons in large quantities, and Sweden is also involved. Canada plays an active role, Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik told Sputnik.
“At the very least, these countries, even in their official rhetoric, emphasize as much as possible that they are supplying the Ukrainian regime in Kiev with unmanned aerial vehicles, which have caused civilian deaths in the Russian cities of Nizhnekamsk and Belgorod,” Miroshnik stressed.
“Ukrainian forces have fired more than 7,000 munitions at civilian facilities in Russia in the past week, killing 43 civilians and injuring 376 more, the Russian diplomat said.
He added that Ukrainian troops used large quantities of “weapons with shrapnel and high-explosive fragmentation warheads with the aim of causing maximum harm to civilians.”
The enemy attacked residential areas, infrastructure facilities, industrial and logistics hubs in 16 Russian regions located far from the front lines, according to Miroshnik.
He also said that a Ukrainian drone operator deliberately directed a UAV at a beach with civilians in Arkhipo-Osipovka, Krasnodar Region, which should be classified as a grave war crime under international humanitarian law.
Disregarding the norms and principles of international humanitarian law, the enemy carried out deliberate strikes on medical facilities and medical transport, including those located in the Donetsk People’s Republic, Miroshnik pointed out.
In an era of cheap drones, the new battleship is overly reliant on expensive and highly vulnerable technology
By Dan Grazier | Responsible Statecraft | August 11, 2026
The first proposed Trump-class battleship now has a price tag: $23 billion.
This cost, as assessed by the Congressional Budget Office, will garner a lot of attention. But the primary concern for policymakers and citizens alike should be the complexity of the ship’s design.
The U.S. Navy has a poor shipbuilding record in the 21st century. The Zumwalt-class destroyer, the Littoral Combat Ship, and the Constellation-class frigate have been complete failures. The final verdict of the Ford-class aircraft carrier is not yet in, but when the ship’s crew can’t even rely on the sewage system to work properly, the case isn’t looking too good.
It becomes clear reading through the CBO’s report that Navy officials in Washington have learned nothing over the past 25 years from their shipbuilding mistakes. In typical Washington fashion, the new ship is being touted as “the fastest, the biggest, and by far 100 times more powerful than any battleship ever built,” as President Donald Trump put it. In practical terms, the ship will be armed with “antiair, land-attack, and antiship missiles, hypersonic missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, large lasers, and a rail gun (a weapon that uses electromagnetic energy to fire nonexplosive projectiles at hypersonic speeds),” according to the CBO.
All of these systems will require a tremendous amount of electrical power to operate. To meet this challenge, the new ship will also be nuclear-powered. The addition of a nuclear reactor will dramatically increase both the cost and complexity of the ship’s construction.
The original sin of all the Navy’s 21st century shipbuilding failures is a lack of design discipline. The architects of each program attempted to incorporate every gadget the technologists could imagine, several of which (including cutting-edge rail guns) remain unproven to this day. Excess complexity drives up costs and delays delivery, often by years.
Officials compounded that essential mistake when they began building ships before the underlying technology had been developed. The practice of beginning construction before the development process ends is known as concurrency. When the overlap between manufacturing and development is too great, as it has been with acquisition programs like the Littoral Combat Ship and the USS Gerald R. Ford, costs rise and schedules slip because it becomes more difficult to incorporate the new technology into work that has already been completed.
A glance at America’s shipbuilding capacity suggests that the construction timeline for the battleship program is also unrealistic. Navy leaders plan to buy 15 of the new ships between 2028 and 2056. But naval construction is already years behind schedule.
The next Ford-class aircraft carrier, for example, is already five years late, yet the Pentagon hopes to assemble the new battleships at the same Newport News shipbuilding dock used to build aircraft carriers. The Navy’s current fleet of 289 ships is already far short of the legally required 355 ships. Attempting to build the largest and most complex surface warship in nearly a century hardly seems like the proper course of action to expand the fleet and alleviate the strain on the Navy’s already harried sailors.
The size of the fleet matters because it directly impacts the quality of life and service of the nation’s sailors. The U.S. Navy has played an integral role in maintaining freedom of navigation around the globe since the end of World War II. Having fewer ships in the fleet means that the existing ships and their crews must work longer and harder to meet the Navy’s operational demand. Since leaders in Washington show few signs of reducing the number of missions the Navy must perform, adopting a shipbuilding plan that will see the fleet continue to shrink for the foreseeable future makes little sense.
The fact that the battleship program is projected out over the next 30 years also deserves scrutiny. Instituting a warship program of this size to span three decades at a time when uncrewed vessels and anti-ship missiles are proliferating means that officials today believe a large surface warfare ship will remain viable throughout that timespan. That is a bold assumption to make. It is doubtful many people in 1996 would have anticipated the Ukrainians effectively denying the Russian fleet the use of the Black Sea with uncrewed vessels and shore-based missiles. A $23 billion American battleship will be an inviting target for submarines, anti-ship missiles, and hypersonic weapons.
The current National Security Strategy released in November 2025 calls for the United States to concentrate on defending the Western Hemisphere. Building the largest surface combatant ship since World War II, armed with conventional, hypersonic, and nuclear-tipped missiles, is hardly necessary to defend the seas close to home. Such a ship is designed specifically to project military power around the globe. The battleship plan provides more evidence that the national security establishment will do precisely what it wants to do, no matter what defense strategy the government adopts.
Dan Grazier is a senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center. He is a former Marine Corps captain who served tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. His assignments in uniform included tours with 2nd Tank Battalion in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and 1st Tank Battalion in Twentynine Palms, California.
By Stavroula Pabst | Responsible Statecraft | August 10, 2026
Almost every day, the military tests various emerging technologies across the U.S., including drone and counter-drone systems and GPS jamming.
To a certain extent, this testing is inevitable. But, as experts told RS, the government has in many cases not ensured that the proper safeguards and necessary interagency coordination are in place to make sure such tests can be conducted safely. These testing issues strain civilian airspaces — increasingly disrupting aircraft and even sometimes leading to accidents.
Drone and counter-drone mayhem
In particular, the military’s domestic testing and use of drone- and counter-drone technologies have precipitated several recent high-profile mishaps.
Last March, the Navy and Secret Service tested counter-drone technologies at a military base near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). As a result, several flight crews received faulty alerts warning of possible collisions with nearby aircraft.
In 2020, an MQ-9 reaper drone crashed during testing at the Hancock Field Air National Guard Base, which shares its flight line with Syracuse Hancock International Airport. Military officials did not tell the public about the incident, which caused over $6 million in damages, until more than a year later.
Interagency disagreements and coordination issues over the tech’s use in U.S. airspaces have only caused more problems.
Back in February, the military lent a counter-drone laser to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP subsequently used it, without coordinating with other agencies, to target what it thought were Mexican cartel drones. Instead, it hit party balloons.
The incident prompted the FAA — which had concerns about the laser’s possible effects on civilian aircraft — to temporarily close the surrounding airspace. The agency did so without notifying other agencies in advance, causing confusion amid fears that the U.S. could intervene militarily in Mexico.
Later in February, the military shot down a CBP drone with a laser-based anti-drone system after mistaking it for a cartel drone — again prompting the FAA to close airspace around El Paso.
The FAA and Pentagon formally agreed in April that the laser system’s safety controls work and “do not pose undue risk to passenger aircraft.”
But broader tensions over the testing and use of these technologies in civilian airspace persist.
The FAA’s departing deputy administrator, Chris Rocheleau, said at a drone leadership conference late last month the agency is being “nudged” to accept “more risk” regarding uncrewed drones. FAA officials told Politico last week that the Pentagon’s decisions about aviation often prevail over the FAA’s safety concerns in practice.
Following the repeated airspace closures in Texas, Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.) called for an investigation into “potential serious and alarming problems and deficiencies” with interagency coordination and oversight over counter-drone systems.
“As we saw with the DCA Midair Collision, failures in interagency planning create an unacceptably dangerous situation where it’s no longer a matter of if but rather when the next catastrophic accident occurs that will claim American lives,” Duckworth wrote, referencing a collision between a commercial flight and an Army helicopter near the DCA airport in January of last year.
As Dana Goward, founder and president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, tells RS, it’s “not clear” the U.S. is prepared for drone and counter-drone operations in its airspace.
He questioned whether officials consistently know where and how such systems are used, and whether they have adequate safeguards to manage them safely and efficiently.
“My sense is that while those things are being worked on, they’re not in place right now,” Goward said. That “should be a concern.”
Aircraft ‘couldn’t navigate safely’ near White Sands
The U.S. military has also been testing GPS jamming across the continental U.S., especially in the American Southwest. While it has worked to notify pilots of its efforts, testing often stands to interfere with civilian aviation in practice.
A notable example is a recent accident back in May in New Mexico, where a small medical plane lost its GPS signal due to military jamming testing in the White Sands region. Attempting to land with older navigation methods, the plane became disoriented and crashed into a mountain.
Under investigation, the crash is the first known case where military jamming testing can be directly linked with a civilian plane crash in the U.S. But many other episodes could have come close.In 2021, engineering magazine IEEE Spectrum revealed internal Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records showing that 233 GPS interference incidents took place in the southwestern U.S., where military testing is especially frequent, during 2017 and the early months of 2018.
In those cases, testing repeatedly led commercial, civilian and medical aircraft to lose their navigation capabilities, drift off course, and sometimes enter restricted airspace. Pilots declared emergencies in five of the incidents.
“The GPS jamming at White Sands was effecting [sic] the safety of flight of the aircraft to the point to where they couldn’t navigate safely,” an air traffic controller anonymously wrote to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System in 2021. They added that the military often refuses to stop testing when asked to do so by pilots nearby.
The military issues Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) before it tests electronic warfare technologies like jamming, spoofing, and anti-jamming and – spoofing capabilities, which can all disrupt aircraft navigation systems.
But these NOTAMs often cover regions spanning thousands of square miles and cannot predict exactly where or when interference will occur. Pilots receive large numbers of NOTAMs with little relevance to their flights and can often fly through NOTAM-affected areas without experiencing interference. Such circumstances mean many pilots overlook or otherwise miss important warnings.
In any case, the air traffic controllers assisting the troubled medical plane crew in New Mexico helped three other aircraft without GPS signal on the same evening — despite a NOTAM having warned pilots of possible interference beforehand.
Pilots are required to know how to use older navigation aids in case they lose access to GPS mid-flight. But, as Goward tells RS, GPS has become central to how pilots navigate in practice.
GPS “is something that they’ve grown up with, and trained with, and used for decades,” Goward said. “When that system is no longer available [due to interference], the workload increases, distractions increase, and safety margins decrease.” (In aviation, safety margins refer to the buffers crews maintain to manage unexpected events, including having additional time and fuel, and maintaining greater distances from other aircraft.)
“You end up with a higher likelihood that something bad is going to happen,” Goward said.
As Todd Humphreys, a professor of aerospace engineering at the University of Texas at Austin, tells RS, “there is no question that testing increases aviation risk in the short term.”
“But not doing the testing would increase aviation risk in the long term,” he warned. “We need to test anti-jam and anti-spoof technologies if we hope to put them on planes in the years to come.”
Press TV – August 9, 2026
US Senator Chris Murphy has delivered a scathing assessment of the ongoing war on Iran, declaring that President Donald Trump “has lost this war” and warning that every day the fighting continues, the United States grows weaker while Iran grows stronger.
In an interview on NBC News, the Democratic senator from Connecticut argued that the administration is facing a dire strategic reality, urging an immediate end to the hostilities even if it means accepting highly unfavorable terms.
Murphy highlighted that the cost to reopen the Strait of Hormuz increases daily, noting that a proposed deal currently on the table would effectively pay Iran $100 billion a year to reopen the critical waterway.
“What a victory for Iran,” Murphy remarked. “At the end of this war, they get paid to reopen the Strait, they get paid to rebuild their military, they get paid to rebuild their support for proxies in the region.”
Acknowledging the unfavorable terms, the senator stated he is willing to accept a flawed agreement simply to stop the bleeding.
“I am prepared to support a bad deal to end this war and reopen the Strait, because the only deal that is available at this point in time is a terrible, bad deal,” he said.
The senator stressed the severe domestic economic consequences of the conflict, pointing out that ordinary Americans are bearing the brunt of the administration’s military adventurism.
“People here in the United States get screwed, as prices go up, and up, and up,” Murphy said. He noted that seven in ten Americans want the war to end, adding that “families are being bankrupted, as we speak.”
Highlighting the immediate impact on daily life, Murphy pointed out that as children return to school, “filling up lunchboxes this year is going to cost them $4,000 more than it did last year. That is mostly because of this war.”
A depleted arsenal and global vulnerability
Beyond the economic fallout, Murphy warned of the severe toll the war has taken on US military readiness. The prolonged engagement has drastically depleted America’s defensive capabilities, leaving the country vulnerable to other global adversaries.
“We have used up almost all of our interceptors, the majority of our Tomahawks,” he revealed. He cautioned that this depletion has “put the United States in a dangerous position,” arguing that the military’s overextension has “allowed Russia and China to imagine things that they couldn’t have imagined early on because of our inability to defend ourselves and our allies.”
While Democrats have repeatedly attempted to curb Trump’s war powers, efforts that have been consistently blocked by Republican majorities in Congress, Murphy drew a strict line on future military funding.
“I am not going to support funding to keep this war going,” he declared, adding that he does not expect his Democratic colleagues to fund “a continuation of a war that is destroying American credibility and destroying American families.”
However, the senator offered a conditional path forward for post-war military recovery.
“If the war comes to an end, if the president ends this war, then, yes, of course, I and my colleagues will be ready to provide the funding to replenish the stores of munitions that have been spent,” Murphy concluded. “But the priority is ending this war.”
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | August 9, 2026
Although Donald Trump insists that the Strait of Hormuz is open, it ain’t. There are no direct talks between Iran and US representatives. In fact, it looks like Pakistan’s attempt at mediation is going nowhere. Iran has been talking with Oman, but those talks — despite claims of progress — appear to have stalled.
Iran updated its demands that the US must accept if it wants the Strait of Hormuz back in full operation:
‘Until America corrects its behavior, the Strait of Hormuz will not be opened.
Correcting behavior means:
- Never threaten Iran with any language nor insult the sanctities of this nation.
- End the war and aggression against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq permanently.
- Lift the naval blockade and withdraw U.S. naval and air forces from the area surrounding Iran.
- Pay the damages for the two aggressive wars imposed against Iran.
- Lift the cruel and illegal sanctions against the Iranian nation.
- Release the frozen and stolen assets of the Iranian people unconditionally.
These are the demands of the Iranian people who have been relentlessly present in the squares and streets for 160 days.
Some in the West are treating these demands like they are something new. They are not. Let me remind you that in early April 2026 (around April 6), Iran delivered a 10-point proposal (sometimes called a peace plan or counter-proposal) to the United States. It was conveyed via Pakistan, which was mediating. This responded to an earlier U.S. 15-point proposal. Iranian state media and subsequent reporting summarized the key elements; no complete official English text of every point was universally published at the time, but consistent accounts of the main demands included the following:
Iran is holding firm to its demands. I remain skeptical that Donald Trump will agree to these terms. In fact, Trump reportedly has decided to launch a new campaign of bombing and missile strikes, despite warnings from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that US missile inventories are running dangerously low. Folks at CENTCOM who thought they would have a long weekend reportedly have been called back to work to finish planning the new round of strikes.
I think that US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is a good barometer for what Trump is thinking. On Thursday, August 7 he announced fresh Treasury/OFAC sanctions targeting Iran’s use of digital assets, posting that the regime relies on digital asset exchanges to launder billions of dollars, maintain covert access to international financial systems, and support the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He said:
With its economy in freefall and inflation in the triple digits, the regime is desperate for cash, Treasury will hunt down and dismantle the illicit financial networks that keep the regime afloat” whether in dollars, rials, or crypto.
He cast this as evidence his “Economic Fury” campaign is working. If this is what Bessent is telling Trump then it is likely that Trump is considering a CENTCOM plan for another intensive bombing campaign, despite that Cooper having reportedly advised the White House and Pentagon in late July to halt the bombing campaign around the Strait of Hormuz. His argument was essentially that the campaign had hit a wall of diminishing returns. He told administration officials that most of the military’s designated targets in the Strait of Hormuz region had already been struck, leaving relatively few remaining objectives. Despite that warning, CNN and the Jerusalem Post reported that CENTCOM has developed a plan for one or two weeks of heavy bombardment intended to destroy Iran’s remaining missile capabilities. This sits alongside CENTCOM’s unusual, crowdsourcing-style email asking troops for “new creative and unconventional ways” to pressure Iran — a sign the command is casting about for options.
Lots of mixed signals. I cannot rule out the possibility of Trump ordering a new surprise attack in hopes that it will force Iran to capitulate.
The Cradle | August 8, 2026
Turkiye has begun restricting commercial ship traffic into the Black Sea amid a surge in Russian and Ukrainian attacks on civilian vessels, Bloomberg reported on 8 August.
Turkiye’s Directorate General of Coastal Safety has informed several ships heading to Novorossiysk, an important Russian oil and grain export port, that it is not issuing transit permits at this time and requires more time to review passage applications through the Dardanelles.
The sources told Bloomberg that Turkish authorities had provided no explanation for the move. Some vessels have also reportedly been told that the restriction applies to ships heading to Ukraine.
The report comes after a series of drone attacks targeting Turkish commercial vessels operating in the Black Sea and near Russian ports in recent months.
On Friday, a Turkish-flagged vessel, the MV Gulluk, was struck by a drone off the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Although the drone hit the ship’s living quarters, no crew members were reported injured or killed.
On 3 August, the Ro-Ro cargo vessel Nadezhda was struck by a drone about 20 nautical miles off Novorossiysk while en route from the Russian port to Samsun. Three members of the ship’s crew were injured and in serious condition after the attack.
The same day, two civilian vessels, the Yasar and the Nadezhda, were attacked after leaving Novorossiysk.
In response, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister issued a statement saying it was “deeply concerned about the escalating conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea, which is affecting civilian shipping despite our numerous warnings.”
“Unless preventive measures are taken, the escalation in the Black Sea will have multifaceted negative repercussions, including for food security,” the statement added.
Ukraine’s targeting of ships in the Black Sea, as well as Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure and vessels, have threatened grain exports from both countries, pushing wheat prices to a two-year high in July.
“Russia is the world’s largest wheat exporter, and Ukraine is known as Europe’s breadbasket, while mutual attacks between the two countries are putting pressure on maritime transport in the region during the harvest season,” Anadolu Agency reported.
Global food prices already spiked as a result of soaring energy prices following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf earlier this year.
Iran closed the strait in response to the US-Israel war of aggression, disrupting oil and natural gas exports from the Gulf countries partnering with the US and Israel in the war.
Global fuel prices have also risen in response to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries.
On Saturday, a Ukrainian drone targeted the Ilsky oil refinery in Russia’s southern Krasnodar region, causing it to catch fire.
Ukraine’s general staff said the Ukrainian military also hit the Syzran oil refinery in the Samara region of Russia overnight, causing a fire there as well.
The Ilsky refinery can process over 6 million metric tons of oil per year, while the Syzran refinery has a processing capacity of 8.5 million tons annually.
In May, Reuters estimated that disruptions associated with the wars between the US and Iran and between Russia and Ukraine together had knocked out nearly 9 percent of global refining capacity.