US is an ‘out-and-out eavesdropping empire,’ says Beijing, as Washington lists Chinese companies as security threat
RT | March 15, 2021
The Chinese Foreign Ministry has taken aim at Washington, labeling it ‘hypocritical’ and claiming it spies on its own allies, after the US designated five Chinese companies as posing a threat to national security under a 2019 law.
“The US government has generalized the concept of national security, abused national power and unscrupulously suppressed Chinese high-tech enterprises,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian told reporters on Monday.
These US practices are a complete contradiction of the market economy principles that America has always advertised, Zhao added, blasting Washington for its “groundless” and “hypocritical” move against Chinese firms.
The spokesman said other nations should not be wary of China, but the US, which is guilty of spying on everyone, including its own partners. “The United States has used its technological advantages and installed backdoors to carry out large-scale indiscriminate eavesdropping on other countries in the world, including its allies.”
“The United States is an out-and-out eavesdropping empire… The actions of the US have seriously harmed and threatened the security of other countries.”
On Friday, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) designated five Chinese companies, Huawei Technologies Co., ZTE Corp., Hytera Communications Corp., Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co. and Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co. as posing a threat to national security under a 2019 law aimed at protecting the US’s communications networks.
Acting FCC Chair Jessica Rosenworcel said in a statement: “This list provides meaningful guidance that will ensure that as next-generation networks are built across the country, they do not repeat the mistakes of the past or use equipment or services that will pose a threat to US national security or the security and safety of Americans.”
Last week, Beijing criticized Washington after it was reported that President Joe Biden’s administration had tightened rules on dealing with Chinese tech giant Huawei, restricting US companies from supplying Huawei with products that can be used in 5G devices.
Russia triples gas supplies to China via Power of Siberia pipeline
RT | March 1, 2021
Russia’s energy major Gazprom said on Monday that it had pumped more gas to China in February via the Power of Siberia pipeline than it had initially planned, more than tripling supplies compared to the same month last year.
“The export of gas to China through the Power of Siberia gas pipeline continues to grow. Supplies regularly exceed our daily contractual obligations. The actual monthly volume of supplies in February is 3.2 times more than in February 2020,” Gazprom said in a statement.
The 3,000km (1,864 mile) cross-border pipeline started official deliveries of Russian natural gas to China in 2019. The so-called eastern route’s capacity is 61 billion cubic meters of gas per year, including 38 billion cubic meters for export. Last year, Gazprom supplied 4.1 billion cubic meters of gas to China via the Power of Siberia. It plans to boost exports by an additional six billion cubic meters.
The agreement on gas supplies via the Power of Siberia pipeline was reached in 2014, with Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) inking a 30-year contract. It is Gazprom’s biggest-ever agreement and the first natural gas pipeline between Russia and China.
Russia is set to further increase supplies of piped gas to China, including via the Power of Siberia 2 project. This second pipeline entered the design stage last year, and will be capable of delivering as much as 50 billion cubic meters of gas once it’s finished. Gazprom intends to become China’s biggest natural gas supplier, accounting for more than 25 percent of Chinese imports by 2035.
France increases hostilities against China in the South China Sea
By Paul Antonopoulos | February 25, 2021
The French Navy days ago announced that the Tonnerre amphibious assault ship and the Surcouf frigate departed from the port of Toulon on February 18 and would travel to the Pacific for a three-month mission. According to Naval News, the French warships will pass through the South China Sea twice and in May participate in joint military exercises with the U.S., Australia, India and Japan. China has strongly criticized this French move.
The fact that the French Navy sent the Surcouf and the multi-purpose landing craft Tonnere to patrol the South China Sea, which is over 10,000 kilometers away from France, proves that the disputed sea region is one of the most important geopolitical hotspots in the world. The French claim that attention is focused on ensuring navigational security as the South China Sea is a particularly important bridge between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and has influence on geopolitics and geoeconomics, not only within Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific region, but for the entire world.
By sending modern warships to Asia-Pacific, France proved that they have a new approach to Vietnam, a former French colony. The recent moves by Paris marks the return of the French to Southeast Asia, not as an invader like in the previous century, but as a country willing to challenge and provoke China in its own backyard. This is something that would also appeal to Vietnam as it has centuries long enmity with China that continues to this day and is far deeper compared to the relatively short-lived French colonial era of Indochina. Another point to note is that the French energy company Total is one of the most important partners for Vietnam in the oil and gas sector. The French company is currently cooperating with Vietnam and some other countries in the region to exploit resources.
Since 2018, France has built an Indo-Pacific strategy. France is the first European country to make this move. In addition, in 2015 and 2017, French warships also passed through the South China Sea. It is likely that France will now step up its position against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea by increasing the frequency of its activities in the region, including military exercises.
Four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council send their fleets on irregular or periodic patrols in the South China Sea, proving how important this region is for the global economy and the world’s superpowers. It should be emphasized that having a major power from outside the region deploy its modern weapons in the South China Sea is a major provocation. France, whose closest territory to the South China Sea is New Caledonia over 6,500 kilometers away, has no business in being involved in the region’s problems. But none-the-less, the French are most likely motivated to be interested in South China Sea affairs to support Total’s business plans in the area.
In the words of French Defense Minister Florence Parly, the patrol of French warships in the South China Sea is “evidence of the French navy’s ability to deploy operations in remote areas in the long run with strategic partners,” making reference to the U.S., Japan and Australia. It can be seen that France is ready to strengthen cooperation with QUAD, a coalition consisting of the U.S., India, Japan and Australia whose aim is to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific region.
France is not a member of QUAD; however, the European country can strengthen its ties with the alliance on the basis of bilateral military agreements signed with the U.S. and the other three countries. On the other hand, France is an ally of the U.S. through NATO, in which Japan and Australia are also considered Major non-NATO allies. The dispatch of two important warships to the South China Sea shows that France is ready to stand alongside the U.S., Japan, India and Australia in Indo-Pacific geostrategic, political and military issues with a focus against China.
For the U.S., the introduction of French warships to the South China Sea is an important step towards establishing an anti-China alliance on a global scale, not just at a regional level. Although China has denounced these recent provocations emanating from non-regional powers, it has not yet revealed how they may respond.
Although the French Colonial Empire is long gone, Paris is still attempting to maintain its global influence through its former colonies, not only in Southeast Asia through countries like Vietnam, but also in Africa, the South Pacific, South America and the Caribbean. However, despite France’s antagonizations, Paris does not have the capabilities to be able to challenge China unilaterally in the South China Sea, hence why it is relying on former colonial possessions like Vietnam and partners like the U.S., Australia and India. For now, there is no indication that France will successfully deter China from pursuing its interests in the South China Sea.
Paul Antonopoulos is an independent geopolitical analyst.
China announces MASSIVE oil & gas discovery in Bohai Sea
RT | February 24, 2021
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) revealed this week that its newly discovered oil and gas field in the Bohai Sea contains proven geological reserves of 100 million metric tons of oil and gas equivalent.
That makes Bozhong 13-2 one of the biggest crude oil production bases in the country, according to the company.
The new field is located 140 kilometers off the coast of Tianjin at an average water depth of 23.2 meters, according to Zhou Xinhuai, general manager of the oil exploration department at CNOOC. The Bozhong 13-2-2 well, where the reserve was discovered, was drilled and completed at a depth of 5,223 meters, and encountered oil pay zones with a total thickness of approximately 346 meters.
The well was tested to produce an average of approximately 1,980 barrels of crude oil per day. The company expects daily crude oil and natural gas generation from the well to reach 300 tons and 150,000 cubic meters, Zhou was cited as saying by China Daily.
The Bohai oilfield is likely to start production in 2023 and achieve a peak output of 1.2 million tons of oil equivalent.
According to industry experts, the Bohai Sea natural gas and oil discoveries will boost CNOOC’s annual output to above 80 million tons of oil equivalent by 2025.
The company said in 2019 that its Bohai discoveries contain 100 billion cubic meters of proven geological reserves of natural gas. It expects the increased capacity from the new finds to help meet the surging demand for natural gas in northern and eastern China and reduce the country’s reliance on costly imports.
China’s natural gas production reached 188.8 billion cubic meters in 2020, up 9.8 percent on a yearly basis, according to data by the National Bureau of Statistics. Natural gas imports rose to 102 million cubic meters, up by 5.3 percent on a yearly basis.
US Navy held three FONOP in the South China Sea since Biden’s inauguration
By Lucas Leiroz | February 24, 2021
Tensions in the South China Sea are intensifying as American interference in the region increases. The so-called “freedom of navigation operations” (FONOP) have been taking place with an increasingly shorter interval between operations, demonstrating a strong interest on the part of Washington to permanently occupy the region, forcing China to retreat its maritime positions on its own zone of influence.
Recently, for the third time since Biden took office as President, a US flag warship conducted an operation in the disputed South China Sea. The ship used this time was the guided missile destroyer Arleigh Burke USS Russell, which skirted the Paracel Islands on February 17. The ship’s intention is simply to promote a FONOP, with no major military objectives publicly specified. In a statement on the case, Lieutenant Joe Keiley, spokesman for the American Navy, stated that “The United States upholds freedom of navigation as a principle. As long as some countries continue to assert maritime claims that are inconsistent with international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and that purport to restrict unlawfully the rights and freedoms guaranteed to all States, the United States will continue to defend those rights and freedoms”.
Beijing had previously said it would take the necessary steps to ensure its security and prevent further American military operations in its maritime zone, but such measures have not been announced yet. There is still a war of narratives, as Beijing claims that American ships that have passed by the Sea this year have been expelled by Chinese security forces (without any American reaction or confrontation, however), which is denied by Americans, who claim to have carried out their operations without any hindrance. Clearly, we can see that both countries desperately try to create a dominant narrative. China wants to show the world that it has its own special interests in the region, and the US says it wants more nations to feel safe to cross the Sea without the Chinese endorsement, showing that “nothing will happen”.
Washington sees Chinese territorial claims in the South Sea as a threat to freedom of navigation and therefore justifies the sending of warships to the region. According to American military thinking, this attitude does not represent a real affront to China, as Americans believe they have the right to monitor international maritime standards, acting as “global maritime police”. This type of thinking had begun to suffer some criticism from Trump, who changed the focus of confronting Chinese growth from a military confrontation path to a commercial and tariff dispute. But, with Biden and his administration, it is highly likely that Washington will not only resume the ideal of global police but will also act in a much more aggressive way in this regard, especially in the seas, where the US has historically had a hegemonic status.
The justifications used by Washington are always full of legalism. Warships are sent to the coast of a foreign power “in the name of international law”. The American armed forces, accustomed to exercising the function of global police, believe to play an important role in complying with international navigation standards. In this way, if a territorial dispute is preventing the movement of people and goods and hampering the flow of trade, Washington can simply conduct a “FONOP”. But this view of international standards is absolutely distorted. International law has its own methods for dealing with violations of international norms and for no country is given the function of a controller of the global order.
The very validity of the “FONOP” concept is absolutely questionable. There is, in fact, the principle of “freedom of navigation” (FON) in international law, but at no time do international documents provide for such a thing as a “freedom of navigation operation”, this being a narrative invented by countries interested in winning space in areas claimed by other countries. Washington is the only country that currently has an official and complex military program focused on promoting such operations in all disputed areas of the world, which is absolutely contrary to international law. Such disputes must be resolved with the means available at the UN, not through unilateral US action.
Therefore, the “legal” justification for maritime interventionism must be ignored and the case must be analyzed from a strictly political point of view. Biden on several occasions, both during the campaign and after the election, affirmed his commitment to deepen US ties with his Asian allies – which are precisely the countries that have disagreements or disputes with China. Sovereignty over the South China Sea is included in this issue, as it is one of the most controversial topics in Asian geopolitics. China has historically claimed sovereignty over the South Sea, but this has been condemned by several neighboring countries. Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam criticize the Chinese sovereignty in the region and claim their space, considering that they also have access to the Sea and therefore should supposedly have the right to occupy it.
Moreover, a highlight that makes the region the subject of major disputes is its commercial importance. The South China Sea is a key route for world maritime trade, where a cargo volume of 5.3 trillion dollars passes annually. With China controlling the region, Beijing gains an extremely advantageous position economically – which provokes interests and criticism on the part of the other countries with access to the Sea. Even more emphatically, the country that is most opposed to the Chinese presence is the Philippines, which is the reason for a historical rivalry. The dispute between Beijing and Manila has reached several peaks of tension in recent years – mainly last year, when the Philippines felt threatened by several Chinese operations in the region and the Philippine government said it would request American military support to face China. In that occasion, Trump remained silent; Biden would certainly do something.
Certainly, no tension between China and the US can be elevated to a status of war, since any confrontation between powers with such nuclear apparatus becomes impossible, but that does not prevent several conflicts from arising. Recently, Biden announced the formation of a Pentagon-led task force to deal with China and its “diverse problems” – which include issues such as the maritime dispute, alleged human rights violations, “unfair” trade rules, among others. Beijing, for its part, denied the American accusations that would justify Biden’s attitude and even made promises of greater economic openness, showing a more peaceful stance. But how long will this posture last? With three FONOPs held in less than a month with the new American government, what can Beijing expect for the near future? How far will American naval interventionism reach in the Chinese coast?
In addition to the American presence in the Sea, regional tensions will certainly increase. Encouraged by American actions, naval forces of the countries that claim the South Sea will carry out more and more operations. With emphasis on the Philippines, which have the greatest interest in the Sea and are willing to increase the confrontation with China, provided they receive international aid.
Expectations are not good and Chinese responses can be varied. If these operations become a real problem for Chinese interests, Beijing can respond severely and even a conflict could occur between the two countries.
Lucas Leiroz is a research fellow in international law at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.
India needs course correction on Myanmar
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | February 7, 2021
The Modi government made a strident call on February 1 that the “rule of law and the democratic process must be upheld” in Myanmar. The statement, following a prodding from Washington, was unabashedly intrusive, and, ironically, completely overlooking that human rights, rule of law, democratic pluralism, etc. are universal values that India also can (and should) be held accountable for. Lapping up the neocon prescriptions from Washington may not serve India’s interests, in general, and they are very specific to Myanmar.
The government failed to fathom the US’ motivations in riding the high horse of democracy so soon after the Capitol Riots in Washington, DC. Human rights issues come handy for Washington to rally allies at a juncture when its leadership of the transatlantic alliance is in drift and major European powers do not see eye to eye with its global strategies on Russia and China and mock at its nostalgia-laden slogan that “America is back.”
Alas, the government failed to consult the ASEAN despite Delhi’s refrain that it attributes “centrality” to that grouping.
The ASEAN Chair’s statement of Feb, 1 recalled the “purposes and the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter” which include respecting the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity.”
The ASEAN Chair’s statement of Feb, 1 recalled the “purposes and the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter.” Simply put, India chose to bandwagon with the US, Japan and Australia while the ASEAN and China took a differentiated stance. Geopolitics crept in. But the US has since realised the folly and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan scrambled to contact the ASEAN ambassadors in Washington.
How come Delhi goofed up? Primarily, it is due to a flawed understanding of the Myanmar situation. The Indian analysts increasingly view world developments through their China prism and began fancying that with the massive victory of Aung San Suu Kyi in the November election provided an opportunity for India to “gear up to implement a major strategy with Myanmar under its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy… to bring Myanmar under the Indo-Pacific construct” so as to align that country “more with ‘like-minded’ countries… to stand firm against China… to make Myanmar a part of the Indo-Pacific policy… (and) steer Myanmar away from the Chinese grip.”
Such views betray a zero sum mindset borne out of blind Sinophobia. Whereas, the ground realities are much more complex. The point is, Beijing brilliantly succeeded over the years in building a close relationship of mutual trust and mutual respect with Suu Kyi, parallel to the nurture of links between the Chinese Communist Party and her party National League for Democracy.
Unlike the western narrative of Aung Suu Kyi as Myanmar’s democracy icon, Beijing regarded her as a pragmatic politician who never uttered remarks to the detriment of China-Myanmar ties, was manifestly eager to maintain good relations and consistently adopted a soft stance on the South China Sea issue.
Beijing was greatly impressed that although Suu Kyi wanted Western support, she was adamant about national sovereignty. Arguably, it was in sync with what China would like its neighbours to practice. Chinese President Xi Jinping received Suu Kyi seven times since 2015.
State Counselor Wang Yi visited Myanmar recently on Jan. 12, met Suu Kyi and expressed strong support for her government and conveyed a strong commitment that China wants to work with her during the second term. And they agreed to push ahead with Belt and Road projects and lock in a five-year pact on trade and economic cooperation. Clearly, the prospect for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor under Belt and Road Initiative has become uncertain now, as compared to a month ago.
In fact, the Chinese media reports already sound a word of caution that “Chinese companies operating in Myanmar need to watch out for contractual and default risks amid the current political upheaval… Government default is a major risk, especially for major and strategic projects in sectors including transportation and energy… But Chinese companies can seek international arbitration if they face illegal confiscation of their property.”
It is no secret that the Myanmar army marks a certain distance from China. Suffice to say, Myanmar developments present an extraordinary case study where Beijing silently feels distressed over the sudden eclipse of western style democracy in a neighbouring country. (See the Reuters analysis Myanmar coup does China more harm than good.)
Surely, the coup creates political baggage for China insofar as it cannot (and will not) take a position against the military, but also comes under compulsion to cover or provide protection for the military internationally. On the whole, this situation poses a major political and diplomatic liability for Beijing and cannot bring good news. Therefore, China prioritises that the concerned parties to solve their differences mutually, according to the constitution and within the legal framework, while maintaining peace and stability. Chinese expert opinion is that Suu Kyi’s political career is in jeopardy.
Of course, Suu Kyi made some serious errors, too. She heavily depended on people loyal to her personally, without bothering about their competence or integrity. It not only spawned corruption but also led to government failure to deliver, especially in job creation. Her leadership style was often dictatorial. She resorted to draconian laws to muzzle or jail critics. (See the Singapore-based Channel News Asia video titled Aung San Suu Kyi: A Fading Legacy dated October 22, 2020 on the eve of the November elections.)
Suu Kyi had no control over some major sectors of the national economy through two entities, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited and Myanmar Economic Corporation as well as a network of domestic private business enterprises, known as “crony companies,” which generate revenue for the military and strengthen its autonomy.
Suu Kyi’s biggest mistake was in believing that she could, through her brand of nationalism, dismiss accusations of genocide directed against the Rohingya. In the process, Suu Kyi lost western support. From that point, she has been on borrowed time and the military barely hid its distaste for Suu Kyi.
To be sure, the military anticipated the impact and the reaction from the international community and took into consideration the Biden administration’s preoccupations with domestic issues. Myanmar doesn’t even figure in the top 10 priorities of Biden’s foreign policy. But the US Congress is not going to tolerate a coup in Myanmar and will mount pressure on the Biden administration to punish the military by imposing sanctions, cutting aid or targeting the generals and their companies.
However, a reversal of the military takeover is not to be expected and the probability is that Washington may lose whatever little leverage it would have had in Naypyidaw. Washington is mulling over policy options.
But there may be a Plan B. Indeed, the former US Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson, who is no stranger to Myanmar, voiced the opinion last week that the time has come for the West to look beyond Suu Kyi for new faces among the opposition. One way is to mould a leadership that will be friendly to the US. There are signs that the western agencies are inciting the youth in Myanmar to stage protests, as had happened in Hong Kong and Thailand. The military has clamped down on Facebook and internet. Shades of colour revolution?
This is where Russia’s role merits attention. The struggle for influence in Myanmar has a geopolitical dimension, for obvious reasons. Since 2015, following the signing of a military cooperation agreement, Russian presence has increased, and, importantly, it coincides with the lengthening shadows of Russian presence in the Indian Ocean.
Russia has emerged as a major military partner for Myanmar. Russia operates a servicing centre in Myanmar. The Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin told the media last month that Myanmar plays “a key role in maintaining peace and security in the region.”
It is entirely conceivable that Russia, which has great expertise in countering colour revolutions, shares intelligence with the Myanmar military. Over six hundred military officers from Myanmar are studying in the Russian military academies presently. Myanmar’s military chief Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia six times in the recent years, more than to any other country.
During the visit of Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu to Naypyidaw last month, the Russian media quoted Gen. Hlaing as saying, “Just like a loyal friend, Russia has always supported Myanmar in difficult moments, especially in the last four years.” An agreement was signed for supply of a batch of Russian missile and artillery air defense systems Pantsir-S1.
Tass reported that the “command of Myanmar’s armed forces has shown interest in other advanced weapon systems of Russian manufacture.” Shoigu has reportedly expressed interest to establish visits of Russian warships to Myanmar’s ports.
All things taken into consideration, we may expect China and Russia to provide a firewall for Myanmar to ward off western penetration, as is happening in Central Asia. (The UN Security Council statement avoids any reference to the military or a coup as such in Myanmar and lays emphasis on national reconciliation, with pointed reference to Suu Kyi’s release.) Russia shares China’s perception of Quad as a destabilising factor in regional security.
Clearly, India needs to keep the “big picture” in view. It will not be to India’s advantage to create misperceptions that it is bandwagoning with some neocon Anglo-American project for regime change in Myanmar. In regard of Myanmar’s stability, India too is a stakeholder and would have a convergence of interests with Russia and China.
Britain’s ban on China’s global television network is a hostile and misguided move that will lead to retaliation from Beijing
By Tom Fowdy | RT | February 4, 2021
The UK communications regulator Ofcom has revoked the license of China Global Television Network (CGTN), banning it from broadcasting in the country. The channel, which was due to set up its new European headquarters in London, is accused of being editorially controlled by the country’s ruling Communist Party and thus violating broadcasting rules.
The UK has overplayed its hand with this vindictive action that demonstrates it is intent on following America’s anti-China foreign policy. When the strikeback comes, it will be more than just the BBC in Beijing’s crosshairs.
Just minutes after the Ofcom ban came through, China’s Foreign Ministry has asked the BBC to “apologise” for a report concerning Covid-19. This is a sign of things to come. In fact, it mirrors the same pattern of events from a year ago when Mike Pompeo, then US secretary of state, announced restrictions on Chinese media operating in the United States. This resulted in China expelling American journalists after having asked the Wall Street Journal to apologize for its coverage. The move, however, is clearly a political one, and undoubtedly a huge provocation in UK-China ties, and one which is bound to have enormous consequences, especially for the BBC’s content and coverage within China itself. The announcement comes conspicuously just a week after Beijing had declared non-recognition of UK British National Overseas (BNO) passports over controversy surrounding a migration plan for Hong Kongers.
And here’s what Britain doesn’t seem to realize. Whilst it is true that the media environment within China is tightly controlled, reciprocity matters nonetheless. The BBC is still operating and broadcasting in China, even if its reports are subject to some censorship. As a result, it is almost guaranteed that Beijing will take some form of reciprocal action, and given the BBC’s incredibly politicised coverage of China of late, it seems untenable that they wouldn’t.
Pompeo last year launched an assault on Chinese media operating in the United States. He implemented visa restrictions, demanded they reduce their numbers and made them register as diplomatic overseas missions. What even he didn’t do, however, despite his fanatical approach to Beijing, was kick them out completely or deny them a presence in America. He understood at the very least that freedom of speech was a staple of American values and that irrespective of differences between political systems, how a country’s media was treated was a medium of diplomacy. Therefore reciprocity, the idea of “tit for tat,” matters. Pompeo knew if he pushed too hard, American journalism within China, already walking on eggshells, would be finished altogether.
Not surprisingly, China retaliated. However, its diplomatic style was indirect, as opposed to explicit. Not long after Pompeo’s announcement, Beijing took issue with the Wall Street Journal, over a headline describing the country as “the sick man of Asia,” which it deemed to be derogatory, and demanded the publication apologise. The Journal did not, and so Beijing expelled a number of its reporters as punishment.
The timing of this UK-Sino row is not a coincidence. Beijing is already frustrated with the BBC behind the scenes, but because of diplomatic considerations chose to do nothing about it. As the above illustrates, a nation cannot simply expel journalists without justification – even China knows this. To do so is to violate a norm. History is already repeating itself.
However, Beijing is increasingly unhappy with the BBC. The broadcaster has been persistent in driving forwards the narrative on issues such as Xinjiang, including commissioning a report on allegations of forced labour which led to US sanctions against the cotton sector, and then yesterday producing a graphic set of interviews whereby Chinese authorities were accused of systematic sexual abuse of the Uyghur minority. For the sake of its relationship with London, Beijing has to date acted with restraint.
However, because the UK has acted first, China now has a political casus belli to take retaliatory actions targeting journalists who consistently broadcast unfavourable or misrepresentative stories about its internal affairs. The BBC is unquestionably on the top of that list, and Beijing’s demand for an apology from it shows what lies ahead.
Inevitably, the BBC will refuse and insist that its coverage is accurate and impartial, as it always does. Thus, like what happened with the Wall Street Journal a year ago, Beijing will close the doors on them in some way, reciprocating Britain’s action in banning CGTN. This may involve expelling a correspondent or removing the BBC’s right to appear on Chinese television altogether.
It is likely to go a lot wider than tit-for-tat media strikes. This sets UK-China relations on a collision course, affirming a growing view in Beijing that the UK is now a hostile country, intent on following America’s anti-China foreign policy. This will inevitably involve China subjecting Britain to the same harsh treatment it has meted out to Australia and Canada, involving sanctions on goods and the like.
Given that there were other options before banning, the UK has definitely overplayed its hand with this. Even Pompeo, of all people, knew better than to ban CGTN completely.
Tom Fowdy is a British writer and analyst of politics and international relations with a primary focus on East Asia.
Beijing hopes Washington will follow China’s lead and invite WHO to the US in search for origin of Covid-19
RT | February 2, 2021
The Chinese Foreign Ministry has urged Washington to invite the WHO to conduct traceability testing in the US, citing the fact the American authorities found Covid-19 antibodies in blood donations as early as December 2019.
Speaking on Friday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin told reporters that Beijing has always maintained close communication and cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO) on Covid-19 traceability, and he said it was time the US followed suit.
“I hope that the United States will adopt a positive, scientific, and cooperative attitude on traceability issues, as well as maintain transparency, like China, and invite WHO experts to the United States to conduct traceability research and make positive contributions to international anti-epidemic cooperation and scientific traceability.” Wang said.
The spokesman told reporters that traceability testing was a very complex issue, with many clues, reports and studies needing to be taken into account.
“I will give you an example. According to a research report by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, there were antibodies to the new coronavirus in some American blood donations in December 2019. This means that the new coronavirus may have appeared in the United States at that time, earlier than the official US report,” Wang stated, reinforcing Beijing’s call for Washington to invite the WHO to America.
Wang continued to point out that China has conducted multiple rounds of in-depth exchanges and shared a lot of information and research results with international partners, including the WHO.
WHO experts are currently in China investigating the source of Covid-19, and they visited a wet market in Wuhan on Sunday. It has been widely suggested that a Chinese wet market was the environment where Covid-19 first passed to humans.
Scientists are still exploring a number of theories relating to the origins of the virus.
Military coup in Myanmar a blow against the Biden regime
By Lucas Leiroz | February 2, 2021
This week, news of a coup in Myanmar shocked international society. Official statements by the UN and several Western governments condemning the attitude of the Burmese military in overthrowing Aung San Suu Kyi and its allies are sharing space in public opinion with neutral statements that only call for the country’s stabilization, as was the Chinese position. Between having been dangerous to democratic institutions or merely changing the government by armed means, there is a range of different possibilities, making the case worthy of a technical and impartial analysis.
The events of February 1, 2021 can be summarized as follows: Burmese State Adviser Aung San Suu Kyi, who heads the country’s government, and President Win Myint were detained by the Burmese army, under extremely obscure circumstances. Previously, tensions between the government and the military of this Asian country had been growing, generating fears of a coup in some sectors of Burmese society – however, such a quick and incisive attitude on the part of the military was not expected by the population.
The root of the conflict of interest between the government and the military was, in short, the last electoral process, which the Army classified as fraudulent and illegal. As a result of the crisis, the country’s political leader was arrested, in what was considered a coup by the media and some foreign governments. Some regional ministers were also captured by the military, as well as several other government’s allies. Citizens’ reports attest that military personnel are spread throughout the country’s streets, carrying out patrolling services and avoiding possible riots.
The military’s distrust of the electoral process is due to several factors. The election was held on November 8 and was the second general election since the end of the military government in 2011. Since the fall of the military, a scenario of tension of interests has been established among the civil political elite, interested in the preservation of democratic institutions, and the military elite, interested in conserving their power and continuing their national project. The country’s ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won by an immense advantage, getting 396 seats out of a total of 476. On the other hand, the Union, Solidarity and Development Party, supported by the Army, took the minimum number of seats in Parliament, which further aggravated the rivalry.
The speech of the Burmese military since the elections was unique in stating that there was large-scale electoral fraud. For this reason, the military had been demanding for months that the government postpone the summons to Parliament, which was scheduled for February 1 – which did not occur, resulting in the coup. Before that, representatives of the Burmese Government and Army met to resolve the conflict but were unable to reach an agreement of common interest.
Previously, in the midst of such fears of a possible anti-democratic coup, the country’s military has on several occasions denied the intention to do anything in this sense, categorically claiming that these accusations were unfounded and disseminated by a pro-government media. However, there are reports that the commander of the armed forces, Min Aung Hlaing, said on January 27 that the national constitution could be repealed if the laws were not properly implemented – and this in fact happened.
However, it would be naïve to believe that this event has no sign of external interference. In fact, a polarized political scenario has been outlined in Myanmar for years. Historically, the military has sympathy with China and Democrats sympathize with the West. Last month, Min Aung Hlaing and the head of Chinese diplomacy, Wang Li, met to discuss the Burmese political crisis and the chief of the armed forces alleged electoral fraud in the November process.
Chinese interest in Myanmar is clear. Maintaining an allied government in a border country is extremely strategic for Beijing and avoids a greater degree of Western influence in its continental zone. Bilateral trade between China and Myanmar has always been intense, but it has declined with the rise of the recently overthrown government, whose pro-Western positions have weakened ties with Beijing. Also, due to the latest events of ethnic conflict and persecution of the majority Buddhist military against Islamic minorities, the West has imposed several sanctions on the Burmese military, which have been consented by the civilian government. It does not seem to be by chance that the Chinese reaction to the coup was limited to a request for both sides to resolve their differences, without any condemnation against the military.
If Chinese influence is real, the military coup in Myanmar can be interpreted as a test and a warning against Washington. Losing space on the Chinese border is unpleasant for American interests but, in the midst of a strong internal crisis, will Biden really react strongly or will his response be limited to mere notes of repudiation?
Lucas Leiroz is a research fellow in international law at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.
Russia ramps up natural gas supplies to China via Power of Siberia mega-pipeline
RT | February 1, 2021
Russian energy major Gazprom pumped more gas to China in January via the Power of Siberia pipeline than it had initially planned, boosting daily supplies by as much as 2.5 percent.
“The export of gas to China through the Power of Siberia gas pipeline continues to grow. Supplies regularly exceed Gazprom’s daily contractual obligations,” the company said in a statement, adding that the volume of gas delivery last month “was 2.9 times higher than in January 2020.”
The 3,000km (1864 mile) cross-border pipeline started official deliveries of Russian natural gas to China in 2019. The so-called eastern route’s capacity is 61 billion cubic meters of gas per year, including 38 billion cubic meters for export.
The agreement on gas supplies via the Power of Siberia pipeline was reached in 2014, with Russia’s energy giant Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) inking a 30-year contract. It is Gazprom’s biggest-ever agreement and the first natural gas pipeline between Russia and China.
Gazprom exported some 2.3 billion cubic meters of gas along the route during the first eight months of 2020. It plans to boost exports by an additional six billion cubic meters.
Russia is set to further increase supplies of piped gas to China, including via the Power of Siberia 2 project. The latter pipeline entered the design stage last year, and will be capable of delivering as much as 50 billion cubic meters of gas once finished.
Gazprom intends to become China’s biggest supplier, making up more than 25 percent of gas imports by 2035.
