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EU trying to boycott ties between Niger and Algeria

By Lucas Leiroz | November 12, 2026

European interventionism in Africa is increasingly being denounced by local authorities. Tired of foreign interference and the complicity of European states with terrorism across the African continent, local states are seeking alternative international partnerships, gradually breaking their ties with Western powers. In response, Europe has become even more aggressive in Africa, fueling coups d’état, the proliferation of terrorism, and civil wars.

One such recent instance of aggressive European interventionism in Africa has taken place in Niger. The country recently faced a serious crisis, in which criminal forces, backed by foreign actors, attempted to overthrow the legitimate government through an armed uprising. The coup attempt was promptly neutralized thanks to the joint efforts of local forces, alongside Algerian and Russian military personnel. Since then, allegations have emerged regarding the potential involvement of European powers in the attempted coup.

Furthermore, the Europeans have begun to interfere in the ties between Niger and Algeria. Currently, Algerian troops are being deployed to Nigerien territory, at the request of the local government, to assist in the country’s domestic stabilization and pacification. To the EU, it appears “dangerous” that two African nations engage in cooperation against crime and terrorism. Brussels has strongly condemned these Nigerien-Algerian ties, repeatedly questioning the local government about the true purpose of such cooperation.

In a recent statement on the matter, officials from Niger’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned the European attempt to interfere in the country’s ties with Algeria. On November 9, EU Chargé d’Affaires Olai Voionmaa attended a meeting with Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine after being summoned. During the meeting, government representatives presented the EU official with a statement emphasizing the country’s sovereignty and condemning any foreign attempts to intervene in Niger’s domestic affairs.

“Niger does not receive injunctions from any country or institution (…) [Our country] does not need permission from Brussels” to exercise its sovereignty,” the statement reads.

In fact, Algerian troops arrived in Niger in October. The local government requested this support, fearing that new threats of a coup could emerge. The measure was approved by both Nigerien and Algerian lawmakers, fulfilling all legal requirements for a joint military operation in accordance with the laws of both countries. This marked the first case of Algerian participation in a military operation abroad since the early 1970s. The Algerian government stated that the measure is vital for protecting energy infrastructure and other economic investments on Nigerien soil.

Economic ties between Niger and Algeria have strengthened substantially in recent years. Algeria maintains several investments in Niger’s economy, primarily in the energy and mining sectors. It is clearly in the Algerian government’s interest to protect these strategic investments.

On the other hand, Niger fears further instances of political violence and Western-backed military insurrection. Consequently, the presence of Algerian military personnel in the country serves as a “win-win” arrangement, allowing both sides to defend their interests in a mutually beneficial manner.

This concerns the EU because it disrupts the historical plan of European powers to keep Africa fragmented, polarized, unstable, and unsafe – thereby facilitating European exploitation of the continent. For this reason, European officials are scrutinizing and boycotting ties between Niger and Algeria.

Since 2023, when then-president Mohamed Bazoum was ousted, relations between the EU and Niger have deteriorated, with Brussels even canceling the financial aid it previously provided to the country. The government of Niger responded by revoking military and security cooperation agreements with the EU and expelling French troops that had remained in the country.

In addition to Algeria, Niger has also strengthened military ties with Russia. Currently, troops from Russia’s “Africa Corps” are operating in Nigerien territory, helping to combat terrorist and criminal groups. Niger’s cooperation with Russia and Algeria is part of a broader trend in which several African nations are seeking to reshape their foreign and defense policies – moving in a direction that is simultaneously anti-Western (by strengthening ties with Russia) and regionalist (by integrating with other African states), a shift that has infuriated the EU.

Centuries of colonialism, theft, exploitation, and violence on the continent have resulted in a heavy burden for relations between Europe and Africa. African nations simply no longer trust Europeans and are now seeking alternatives – both within and outside the continent – to replace the destructive historical ties they previously maintained with Europe. Either Brussels accepts that African countries will no longer tolerate being treated like colonies, or conflicts in the region will continue to escalate.


Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert.

You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.

November 12, 2026 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , , | Comments Off on EU trying to boycott ties between Niger and Algeria

Europe, US face higher heating bills amid Iran war fallout

Al Mayadeen| November 11, 2026

Europe is paying a heavy price for the US war on Iran. Natural gas prices have risen almost 200% since February and topped €100 per megawatt-hour at the end of October, the highest level in four years.

The European Commission estimates the continent’s energy import bill has grown by more than €127 billion since the war began, and gas storage is running well below normal ahead of winter, with Germany’s stocks possibly running empty by March.

Bloomberg reported that diesel prices have hit a record, kerosene has nearly doubled, and German power prices already exceed even the 2022 average for the start of winter. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed how dependent the continent remains on global energy markets, leaving governments, industries, and households in their second major energy crisis in under five years.

Storage falls short before winter

Gas storage stands at about 15 percentage points below its recent average and far from the EU’s 90% target.

Under a scenario developed by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas, a cold winter combined with tight global LNG supplies would leave stocks barely 10% full by the end of winter. Even then, Europe would need to cut energy demand by 15%.

Weather models point to a mostly mild winter, helped by a potentially record El Niño, but the British forecaster MetDesk warned that a disrupted polar vortex could bring a colder spell to northern Europe in December. Cold in Asia would also intensify competition for LNG cargoes and push prices higher.

The pressure would not end with winter. The International Energy Agency cautioned that refilling record-low reserves next summer could keep markets tight well into next year, and contracts for summer 2027 already trade above those for the following winter.

Russian LNG ban, a shifting dependency

A full EU ban on Russian LNG takes effect on January 1 and will remove around 15% of the bloc’s supplies, roughly one cargo every two days according to Bloomberg’s calculations. Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen insisted the ban stands, leaving member states to buy replacement cargoes on international markets at a premium.

Much of that replacement comes from the United States, and Swedish Energy Minister Ebba Busch said Europe is “just switching our dependency.”

US President Donald Trump threatened earlier this year to ban diesel exports, which would have endangered half of Europe’s imports, and any deal to reopen Hormuz would take up to six months to feed through to European diesel prices.

Governments struggle to cushion the blow

EU governments have more than tripled their emergency spending since June to nearly €35 billion, according to the Bruegel think tank, with Spain accounting for a third. Bruegel said much of the support is poorly targeted and even encourages fossil fuel consumption.

France, after spending an estimated €70 billion after the 2022 shock, is now limiting aid to those in greatest need, a shift Budget Minister David Amiel described as cutting spending instead of raising it.

Italy, which imports about three-quarters of its energy, saw inflation reach 5.6% in October. Truckers blocked roads around Naples and the Messina port for five days until Rome allocated over €100 million in diesel tax credits and about €70 million for agriculture and fisheries.

Rome is also negotiating with the Commission to cap the gas price used in power generation, and it clashed with Berlin over Germany’s slow storage filling, which it said drove panic buying.

Poland, where a fifth of this year’s budget goes to defense, has little room to respond. State Secretary for Energy Wojciech Wrochna said Europe is not doing enough and warned the situation leaves “space for populists to win the elections.”

The Commission has pushed responsibility back to national capitals, unlike in 2022 when Brussels rushed through emergency legislation.

Politics, industry feel the strain

Protests over living costs have spread from Berlin to Milan and Paris. More than half of Europeans are set to vote within the next year.

In France, where presidential elections come in April, National Rally leader Marine Le Pen leads first-round polls and proposes cutting VAT on fuel and energy at a cost her party puts near €11 billion. Far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon calls for price caps and limits on refiners’ margins.

The chemical industry warns of lasting damage. Norwegian chemical company Yara International expects its energy costs to rise by $450 million year on year between October and December if gas prices stay high, and Greece’s Metlen Energy & Metals said further closures are hard to rule out without looser state aid rules.

Kahla Porzellan, a Thuringian porcelain maker that survived both world wars, will shut down by the end of the year and lay off 100 workers. Monthly gas bills reached as much as €180,000, or 70% of operating costs.

US households also face higher bills

American households face the strain too, with home heating costs projected to rise more than 7% on average this winter, The New York Times reported, citing the National Energy Assistance Directors Association.

Households that heat with oil, almost five million nationwide and mostly in the Northeast and Alaska, could pay up to 70% more than last winter, or about $2,977 for the season. Electric heating is set to climb about 6% to $1,215, and propane about 5% to $1,350.

The association’s executive director, Mark Wolfe, said uncertainty over global oil supplies makes prices hard to predict and urged states to prepare for them to stay high. Heating oil is close to diesel, whose supplies have tightened after refinery shutdowns in West Asia.

Data from the Energy Information Administration in April showed that as many as one in six US households had fallen behind on gas and electricity bills.

November 11, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Russophobia, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Europe, US face higher heating bills amid Iran war fallout

Armenian opposition politician dies in custody

RT | November 10, 2026

Armenian opposition politician Arsen Gevorgyan has died in custody less than three weeks after being arrested. His party has accused the pro-EU authorities of political persecution and blamed them for the death.

Gevorgyan, 46, headed the opposition Strong Armenia party’s list in the October 25 election in Stepanavan, northern Armenia. He was arrested on vote-buying charges four days before polls opened.

His condition deteriorated at Nubarashen prison on Tuesday morning. Officials at the facility stated that an on-duty medical officer had provided first aid before an ambulance arrived. Gevorgyan was pronounced dead at around 8:30 AM.

Armenian Justice Minister Srbuhi Galyan said the politician had suffered a cardiac arrest but did not disclose the underlying cause or any other details. She also claimed that Gevorgyan had not raised any health concerns during his detention.

Strong Armenia demanded accountability, accusing the authorities of pursuing him on fabricated charges. “The person who orders the baseless smearing and detention of hundreds of people bears responsibility for the death of yet another opposition figure in prison,” the party said.

Opposition figures have also questioned whether Gevorgyan’s medical concerns may have been ignored by prison authorities. Opposition MP Christine Vardanyan argued that medical evidence is often dismissed and defendants mocked when they seek to avoid detention on health grounds.

While state authorities have accused Gevorgyan and other party representatives of distributing money in exchange for votes, his lawyers have rejected the allegations, pointing out that footage released by investigators showed campaign funds being transferred only between party representatives, not as bribes to voters.

His death follows the arrest last week of Strong Armenia founder Samvel Karapetyan, who stands accused of financial crimes linked to his electricity business. The party, Armenia’s largest parliamentary opposition force, favors closer ties with Russia and has accused Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of targeting political rivals.

Other opposition candidates were arrested in the run-up to June’s parliamentary election. Strong Armenia and other groups have rejected the results of the summer vote as fraudulent.

Moscow has condemned Yerevan for pressuring the opposition. After Karapetyan’s first detention last year, the authorities took over his electricity company, a move Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said looked “more like politically motivated retaliation” against a domestic rival.

The EU has nevertheless continued backing Pashinyan’s government and fuelled its European integration ambitions. It pledged more than €50 million ($56 million) shortly before June’s election while declining to condemn Karapetyan’s prosecution, calling it a domestic matter.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has stressed that Armenia has the sovereign right to choose its future, but warned that membership in the EU is incompatible with participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. Moving toward Brussels could disrupt Armenia’s longstanding economic ties with Russia, its largest trading partner and supplier of discounted natural gas, he warned.

November 10, 2026 Posted by | Civil Liberties | , | Comments Off on Armenian opposition politician dies in custody

France’s ‘Cold War’: Paris blames Tehran for supermarket fridge hacks

RT | November 10, 2026

The French government has accused Iran of hacking refrigerators in hundreds of supermarkets, claiming that the “cyber campaign” was the work of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The attack, which took place in October, affected fridges and freezers at nearly 700 distribution sites across France. Hackers reportedly targeted the fridges’ internet-connected control units and forced them to overheat, destroying tons of food and forcing several stores to temporarily close. A wave of similar attacks took place in Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, and at least six other EU countries three weeks later.

“This was a cyber campaign of unprecedented scale and aggression,” French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said on Monday. “Today, thanks to the work of government agencies, we know who is responsible: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Iran’s ambassador has been summoned, Barrot said, adding that France will “sanction those responsible and take all measures we deem necessary and proportionate to respond.”

Paris prosecutor Laure Beccuau said that investigators discovered the hackers used Farsi and IP addresses linked to Iran, and that three IRGC members are suspected of carrying out the operation “to serve the interests of a foreign power – in this case, Iran.”

Although Beccuau’s accusation is stronger than that of British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, who stated “we can confirm our belief that we believe Iran” was behind a bungled “terror plot” at an RAF airbase in September, it is still not entirely watertight. WikiLeaks’ 2017 ‘Vault 7’ disclosures confirmed that the CIA had developed sophisticated hacking tools capable of leaving behind false digital ‘fingerprints’ in foreign languages, including Russian, Chinese, and Farsi, to implicate other countries in cyberattacks.

The accusations mark a dramatic turnaround from the climate of mid-October. Then, despite it taking place at a time of daily riots and anti-government demonstrations, almost every commentator speaking to European media outlets accused Russia of committing the attack. “We strongly believe this activity could be attributed to a Russian state-sponsored threat actor,” cybersecurity executive Xavier Bellekens told Politico last week, in an article that portrayed the hack as something straight from the pages of “the Kremlin’s hybrid playbook.”

“When we pull on the thread it does look like it could well be Russia. So, that is basically where we’re at,” Bellekens told Euronews – which, like Politico, is funded by the EU – two days later. Russia is “looking into where the weaknesses in the systems lie,” former Dutch intelligence officer Tim Bosch told NU.nl. “Right now it concerns refrigeration, but next time it might be a hospital.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissed the claims as “baseless,” “absurd,” and “backed up by no reasoning.”

Neither Iran’s Foreign Ministry nor the IRGC has commented on Tuesday’s accusation. However, Iran’s state Mehr News agency has dismissed it as “baseless and unsupported by evidence.”

November 10, 2026 Posted by | Deception, Mainstream Media, Warmongering, Russophobia | , | Comments Off on France’s ‘Cold War’: Paris blames Tehran for supermarket fridge hacks

Coup d’état in Poland

By René Zittlau | Forum Geopolitica | November 5, 2026 

The European elites can no longer find responses to the consequences of their policies that are legitimate under the rule of law. The result is a breach of the law—and even a coup, as recently occurred in Poland.

Introduction

Europe is sinking ever deeper into political, economic, and social processes that, until just a few years ago, were perceived in Western Europe as “normal” aspects of life in countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In recent weeks, for example, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany—and this list is by no means exhaustive—have witnessed acts of arson and looting whose brutality came as a shock to many citizens. Political elites were quick to look everywhere for the causes, but not within their own way of conducting politics, which is completely detached from the will of the people. The blame was placed on everyone else: migrants, clans, random troublemakers, radical leftists, radical rightists, and—not to be forgotten—Russia. …

Of course, this kind of search for causes does not stand up to an honest assessment of the situation. Europe has been in a massive crisis for years, one that has now engulfed all areas of life.

Wrong political decisions led to political crises. These were inevitably followed by an economic collapse unprecedented since 1945. The blame lay—and still lies—with, who would have thought, Putin. It was he who guided Chancellor Scholz’s hand in shutting down Nord Stream. Not to mention other “hybrid” attacks on the peace-loving NATO and EU West.

The Shift from Quantity to a New Quality

The constant denial of well-known causes of crises inevitably exacerbates them. Poland has now reached a new, previously unknown level of crisis. However, the events surrounding the Polish Constitutional Court cannot be viewed in isolation, as Poland plays a central role in the plans of the EU leadership. These events are part of a dramatic escalation of the EU-wide political crisis and have reached a new level in Warsaw.

Occasionally, the Western media refers to a “coup d’état,” as here or here. The quotation marks are intended to underscore the impossibility of such a development rather than to be taken as a direct quote. A critical, objective examination of the events in Poland, however, would at the very least have to compare the events to the definition of a coup d’état—something that is consistently omitted.

“A putsch or coup d’état (often from the French coup d’état [ˌkudeˈta]) is an illegal, usually violent, and surprise action carried out by members of the military or paramilitary organizations and/or a group of politicians with the aim of seizing or retaining power in the state.” – Wikipedia.

Was that the case in Poland? Why would anyone do that? Who would have an interest in it?

Let’s recap. On October 30, 2026, Polish Constitutional Court Justice Anna Korwin-Piętowska ordered Constitutional Court President Bogdan Święczkowski to immediately suspend his official duties for one month. She issued the same order for Vice President Bartłomiej Sochański and declared herself the new head of the court. In other words, the subordinate declared her superiors removed from office.

As far as is known, she did so on the instructions of Prime Minister Donald Tusk.

However, a Polish prime minister has no authority whatsoever to intervene in this manner. Tusk’s actions were therefore unlawful—or, as described in the definition above, “illegal.”

To enforce his directive and support Anna Korwin-Piętowska, Prime Minister Tusk deployed the police against the Constitutional Court. He thus used his power to deploy armed forces against a constitutional body. His actions therefore met another criterion of the definition: “… mostly violent and surprise actions by members of the military or paramilitary organizations…”.

Did Donald Tusk also have the “… goal of seizing power in the state or retaining it for himself”?

All the events described took place during a long-planned trip abroad by Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Senegal. Furthermore, the operation took place on the eve of an important national holiday, All Saints’ Day. Tusk knew that at that time, a great many people—especially those from Warsaw—would be on their way to visit their families. The timing of the operation thus appears to have been well-planned. When Nawrocki was informed of the events in Warsaw during his outbound flight, he immediately returned to Poland. Upon arrival, he went directly to the Constitutional Court, where he forcefully gained access—pushing past police barricades and even confronting Constitutional Court justices loyal to Tusk. What we’re talking about here is an attempt to deny the president of a country access to the very institution that embodies the constitution. These scenes speak volumes about the individuals and their backers who caused this national crisis.

A Look Back

In 2023, parliamentary elections were held in Poland. The current Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, had until then been one of the most prominent and influential EU politicians and, in his actions, an extremely loyal follower of EU President von der Leyen. In 2023, one could not help but get the impression that Tusk had not been sent to Poland by the EU leadership to become Poland’s prime minister, but rather, above all else, to advance the interests of the EU. In his election campaign, he focused on the following priorities: ending the power of the “Law and Justice” (PiS) party, restoring the rule of law, and normalizing relations with the EU in accordance with the EU’s wishes. The latter involved, in particular, rolling back the PiS government’s judicial reforms. This referred, among other things, to the manner in which judges were appointed to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, as well as the replacement of those judges who did not conform to EU expectations. It should be noted that while the judicial reform implemented by the PiS government was not to everyone’s liking, it had been carried out in accordance with Polish law.

The results of the 2023 elections were as follows:

Party/Alliance – Share of the vote Seats – Comparison with the Last Election

  • Law and Justice (PiS) 35,38 % – 194 – Minus 41 Seats
  • Citizens’ Coalition (KO) 30,70 % – 157 – Plus 23 Seats
  • The Third Way (Trzecia Droga) – 14,40 % – 65 – New to Parliament
  • New Left (Lewica) – 8,61 % – 26 – Minus 23 Seats
  • Confederation (Konfederacja) – 7,16 % – 18  – Plus 4 Seats

Voter turnout, at 74.4 percent, was the highest since 1990.

Tusk remains the leader of the “Civic Coalition” to this day and, in 2023, formed a coalition government together with the “Third Way” and the “New Left.” However, all his efforts to reverse the judicial reform were thwarted by then-President Andrzej Duda. Duda either sent the bills—drafted by Tusk for this purpose—back for review or refused to sign them.

The new Prime Minister Tusk thus pinned his hopes on a victory by Rafał Trzaskowski in the 2025 presidential election. However, Trzaskowski, deputy chairman of Tusk’s “Civic Coalition” party, suffered a surprising and very narrow defeat at the hands of the current president, Karol Nawrocki, who is closely aligned with the PiS.

Kandidat – Political Party Support – Share of the vote

  • Karol Nawrocki – Supported by the “Law and Justice” (PiS) party – 50,89 %
  • Rafał Trzaskowski – Supported by the ruling “Citizens’ Coalition” (KO) – 49,11 %

The European Dimension of the Scandal

As previously mentioned, Tusk was a highly influential politician in Brussels until 2023. Given the EU’s aggressive policy toward Russia and the role assigned to Poland in that context, the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the Polish Constitutional Court has a significant European dimension. After all, a court inclined to make its own decisions independently, without EU influence, is certainly capable of producing surprises.

It is therefore entirely conceivable that the script for this Polish drama was not written exclusively in Warsaw. This is because the judicial reforms demanded of Poland by the EU are by no means welcomed everywhere in Poland. The PiS certainly has its own vision for Poland, independent of the EU.

Bartłomiej Sochański, the vice president of the Constitutional Tribunal—who is unpopular with the EU—served as the reporting judge in the landmark ruling of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal on October 7, 2021 (Case No. K 3/21). In this ruling, the Court held that certain interpretations of the EU Treaty by the European Court of Justice were incompatible with the Polish Constitution.

In his oral explanation, Sochański essentially argued that the Polish Constitution ranks above the EU Treaties in the national hierarchy of norms. EU law takes precedence over ordinary Polish laws only to the extent that Poland has expressly transferred corresponding powers to the EU. EU institutions may not act outside the scope of the powers transferred, and the European Court of Justice cannot override the Polish Constitution through its case law.

Conclusion

The consequences of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s actions are significant. A country that was already politically divided even before this crisis has been pushed even deeper into crisis. The country’s three most important constitutional institutions—the government, parliament, and the president—view one another with deep mistrust.

The head of government attempted to strip the president of his powers in constitutional matters. As in many other countries, however, the Polish president has a decisive vote on constitutional issues.

In the wake of Tusk’s failed attempt to reshuffle the Constitutional Tribunal, parts of Parliament are calling for the prime minister’s resignation and early elections. A forced resignation by Tusk would come at an inopportune time for EU leadership. After all, a victory by the EU-critical PiS would be anything but impossible. The PiS under Jarosław Kaczyński would likely bring Poland closer to the U.S. than to the EU. But what would the EU’s policy toward Russia look like if Poland were to align itself more closely with the U.S. than with Europe? Implementing an aggressive EU policy toward the East is inconceivable without Poland, neither economically nor militarily. And politically, a Poland led by the PiS would be a disaster for Ukraine. Party leader Kaczyński stated clearly that Ukraine “cannot join the EU with the baggage of Banderaism” and announced that he would “do everything to prevent this” if Ukraine does not stop glorifying the perpetrators of the Volhynia massacre. The PiS has already submitted a corresponding draft parliamentary resolution calling on the government to block Ukraine’s EU integration process.

I repeat the question I posed above:

Did Donald Tusk also have the “… goal of seizing power in the state or retaining it for himself”?

In court, criminal liability is assessed based on the following four questions:

Did the defendant have a motive for the crime? Did he have the opportunity to commit the crime? Did he have the means to do so? And finally: Did he have the intent to commit the crime?

November 7, 2026 Posted by | Civil Liberties | , | Comments Off on Coup d’état in Poland

Sunset on the Quality of Western Propaganda: Arrival of the Dr Strangelove Moment

By Greg Simons | Propaganda In Focus | September 30, 2026

Propaganda has a complicated history and relationship with the West, shaped by ideological presumptions, moral and ethical evaluations, definitions, and assumptions. These frameworks have the effect of producing dilemmas and contradictions within an idealised conception of society. In part, this is due to embedded assumptions about identity and the cultural myths that accompany idealised notions of a morally and socially superior Western society. Such myths function to construct the façade of a value- and ethics-based consensus, reinforcing in-group identity and cohesion as a means of generating political unity. At the same time, they define and contrast this in-group against an oppositional out-group perceived as lacking the ‘desired’ mythical attributes of a ‘good’ society.

One of the enduring myths of Western propaganda, which virtue signals the assumed values and ethical principles of a so-called democracy as an in-group, is that democracies do not engage in propaganda. This myth is based on the assertion that the values and virtues of free human will are cherished, where facts and reality prevail in a rational and informed society. Conversely, non-democracies are presented as the idealised out-group that regularly engages in heavy-handed and overt propaganda to prime and manipulate their ‘unfree’ population. The in-group is often thought to be virtuous and ethical while the out-group is subversive to the free human will and spirit: emotional logic dictates loyalty and empathy for the in-group, suspicion and fear of the named out-group.

This fear, of something bad happening and the personal aspect of it happening to you, is driven by mainstream politics and media. Fear is the first step toward compliance. A false sense of unity is driven by the façade of an external threat to an idealised projection of democracy in Western society and the notion that it is under threat from the propaganda of authoritarian forces seeking destroy the presumed cultural and identity foundations of ‘our’ society. See, for example, recent hyperbole about “anti-democratic propaganda” taking over the world.

However, does this cognitively nice and neat image reflect reality? Far from it. There are those who admit propaganda was an invention of the West, that it is a ‘necessary’ tool for the effective governing of democratic society, and that it is the very foundation of liberal democracy. Adolf Hitler admired the ‘quality’ and effects of British propaganda in the First World War to such an extent he praised its excellence in a chapter of his autobiography Mein Kampf. Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels also admired the quality of Western propaganda, such as Hollywood Westerns. He also infamously quipped that the West accuses its opponent of that which they are guilty of doing.

However, in the wake of the Cold War and the general march into the era of what some term as the New Cold War, there is a distinct decline in the quality and effectiveness of Western propaganda. The New Cold War concerns the growing geopolitical tensions between the in-group ‘democracies’ of the Global North and the out-group ‘autocracies’ of the Global South (especially China, Iran and Russia). The motivation is to justify and legitimise a desperate, reckless, and increasingly militarised foreign policy of the West, one which requires political capital and public consent, or at least no significant resistance. Western mainstream political leaders from the liberal democracies lack public approval and consent and are the most unpopular generation according to opinion polls. The propaganda used by Western leaders to justify and legitimise an increasingly aggressive stance against China, Iran and Russia, as a means to contain and weaken these three pillars of the Global South, is ever more heavy handed and overt.

In its current iteration of desperation and decline of operational standards and effects, Western propaganda now seems akin to the satirical anti-war masterpiece Dr Strangelove. Unfortunately, the stakes are increasingly high for the world as compromised and incompetent political leaders seek to maintain an idealised public image and retain their political office, and the Western geopolitical hegemony desperately seeks to cling to its 500 years of a leading global role. Both of these aspirations have run out of time and talent, but the show must go on!

The propaganda of fear is being cultivated to maximum levels among publics throughout the Western world, and especially in the EU and US. This no longer concerns the positive propaganda of attraction, but the negative propaganda of fear and hatred. Furthermore, following Edward Bernays observation in 1947, there is no coincidence in terms of the timing and nature of this propaganda masquerading as news. The engineering of public consent as a means to prime and mobilise mass public audiences for an act that contradicts their objective interests is well under way.

There is a great deal of Orwellian influence in the language of vague wordings used to construct the Russian ‘threat’ – both in military and ideological terms. There is a “good” practical reason and desired outcome for this approach, which is that the sloppy, vague, and dishonest language actively corrupts the public’s ability to think clearly, which in turn enables political oppression and propaganda to be conducted. There are numerous examples of this, such as Russian “grey zone activities,” or “hybrid warfare,” and the threat of a Russian invasion of the whole of Europe should Ukraine lose the war. Here the propagandists refer to Ukraine as a “shield” for Europe, the same terminology used by Nazi Germany’s “crusade against Bolshevism”.

These propaganda constructions of the Russian ‘threat’ make use of fear, card stacking and bandwagoning – An information environment of selective information that is attempting to create a herd mentality, where emotional and knee-jerk decisions are engineered in the interests of the communicator. These desired emotional reactions are objectively against the audience being primed and mobilised. The basis of fear in the audience is to be operationalised to push the ‘solution’, a reckless and aggressive policy.

That policy is to prepare for war with Russia, even if the West is not in a financial or industrial position to effectively do so. Thus, the propaganda narrative is regularly repeated in the “speak with one voice spirit” by the political and media establishment. This includes a massive rearmament programme in an economy that is deindustrialising and running out of public funds, and where the standard of living is dropping and the cost of living rising. A war with Russia is presented as being imminent and inevitable, which among other things requires the public to be “psychologically ready” or, in other words, in an emotional state of fear and compliant to the state dictates. Even though citizens are not willing to fight and die for the vanity of the political establishment and a hegemon in severe decline, conscription is pushed as being necessary and a collective duty of citizens. Various countries are bringing back conscription amidst this massive propaganda campaign of fear, attempting to psychologically groom their citizens who lack the will to fight and lack trust in the political system. This is exemplified in the outrageous demand by politician Jacob Rees-Mogg that Britons need to do their duty to fight and die for the British government, a regime that has actively worked against the objective interests of its country and its people.

Every propagandistic accusation by the West regarding the alleged imminent and inevitable Russian threat reads more like a confession, as noted by Goebbels many years ago. The Western propaganda is not up to the same standards that it used to be when it was so much admired by Hitler; it has become everything that democracies have accused non-democracies of doing and being in terms of their idealised myths and notions of binary constructions of culture and identity between the in-group (liberal democracy) and the out-group (authoritarian). It comes at a time of Western political and geopolitical decline and, as the war in Ukraine seems to be in the process of decisively moving towards a Russian victory on the battlefield, this means that time is short and desperation is setting in to try and save imagined political reputations and a geopolitical hegemony that is all but lost.

November 5, 2026 Posted by | Mainstream Media, Warmongering, Militarism, Russophobia | , | Comments Off on Sunset on the Quality of Western Propaganda: Arrival of the Dr Strangelove Moment

De-escalating the conflict: What the OSCE, the UN, and Europe are (not) doing to prevent war

By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | November 4, 2026

Three signs of the same crisis

I want to ask all our readers – and you, the one reading this – a question: Do you want war?

Regardless of political, military, national, or ideological preferences, this is a serious question. Who really wants war?

We must all ask ourselves this question – and even more so, it should be asked by the politicians, technocrats, and power brokers in European chancelleries who continue to foment war.

We won’t discuss moral issues right now – we’ll write about those on another occasion. Let’s start with the institutional facts and try to understand whether and how anyone has attempted to bring about de-escalation – or not. Because when we read the Western press, there’s a constant impression that European leaders are the world’s best diplomats, constantly striving to solve global problems and ensure peace. Yet, there is a lack of sources, data, and concrete evidence. And where are all those institutions that were supposedly created to ensure peace for the entire world?

On September 30, 2026, Moscow delivered a non-paper to NATO declaring its readiness to deploy its entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons, should the Alliance attempt to isolate the Kaliningrad region. The document explicitly mentions the possibility of striking the decision-making centers of member countries from the very early stages of a conflict, and a senior European defense official noted that a threat phrased in these terms had not been heard since the end of the Cold War. Two weeks later, in Warsaw, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe responded that a Russian attack would be entirely futile. That same month, Russian border guards detained a German merchant ship in the Gulf of Finland for several hours.

Taken together, these incidents reflect the current dynamic: verbal deterrence on both sides, low-intensity incidents, and the absence of any mechanism capable of defusing them before they escalate into a crisis. This article argues that de-escalation between Europe and Russia does not depend primarily on the goodwill of governments. It depends on rebuilding a risk-containment architecture that Europe has allowed to erode over the course of twenty years. That architecture does not need to be invented from scratch: it already exists, in a dormant form, within the mechanisms of the OSCE and the United Nations system. These are the only multilateral forums in which Europe and Russia still sit together as full members, and for this very reason, they are the only ones capable of producing agreements that both sides can consider their own.

Each side interprets the other’s rearmament as offensive preparation. In Moscow, it is claimed that NATO and the European Union are preparing for a confrontation around 2030; in various Western military circles, the 2028–2030 window is specifically identified as the period during which a Russian attack would become possible. These are mirror-image predictions, and mirror-image predictions tend to become self-fulfilling, because every defensive measure confirms the adversary’s suspicion. It’s the security dilemma – elementary, Watson.

Compared to the Cold War, however, one decisive element is missing. Back then, the rivalry was framed by treaties, hotlines, notifications of military exercises, and mutual inspections. That framework has largely disappeared today. The INF Treaty expired in 2019, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe has been abandoned, the Open Skies regime has been gutted, and New START is set to expire in February 2026 without a successor. Two armed powers face off along a line stretching from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, and they do so without a safety net.

Added to this is a more strictly political problem. Europe is the object of the conflict but not a party to the negotiations. Talks on Ukraine are mediated by Washington: on October 11, the U.S. president announced an energy truce that neither Moscow nor Kiev has confirmed; at the end of the month, a local ceasefire went into effect in Oleški, and a new round of negotiations is expected in mid-November. Europe appears in this context as a financier and potential guarantor, but remains far from the table where the terms are being defined. Yet whatever agreement emerges from that table will reshape the continent’s security order. The paradox is clear: Europeans have institutions built precisely for this purpose, yet they have stopped using them.

The absurdity of a conventional war – repetition helps

Before discussing the tools, it is worth stating frankly what rarely appears in official statements: for Europe, a conventional war against Russia would be a strategic absurdity, and Europe is not willing to fight it. We have already written this many times, it is true, but as the ancients used to say, “repetita iuvant” – repetition helps. This statement holds true in three respects.

The first is material. Four and a half years of war in Ukraine have shown that high-intensity conflict in our century is a war of attrition: victory is achieved by producing ammunition, drones, and equipment faster than the adversary can destroy them, and by replacing troops faster than they are lost. Russia has restructured its economy for this purpose. At the 2025 Hague Summit, European allies decided to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035: a ten-year timeframe that amounts to an implicit admission that such capacity does not exist today. Industries remain fragmented into dozens of incompatible weapons systems, stockpiles have been depleted to support Kiev, and the capabilities that make a modern campaign possible – from satellite intelligence to in-flight refueling – depend largely on the United States.

The second aspect is social and political. European societies are neither prepared nor willing to endure losses in the tens of thousands of men. Debates over the reinstatement of conscription in Germany and other countries show just how open and divisive the issue remains. No European government could ask its citizens to make a sacrifice on that scale for any purpose other than the immediate defense of its national territory.

The third implication is the most serious. A conventional war with a nuclear power does not remain conventional for long. The September non-paper states this in no uncertain terms: in a conflict of this kind, there would be no distant front line and no safe rear, because European capitals would be the front line. Preparing to defend oneself is legitimate and necessary. Believing that one can win such a war – or even simply fight it without losing what one intends to defend – is a miscalculation. For this reason, de-escalation is not just one moral choice among many: it is the only rational policy available to Europe. It remains to be determined what tools to use to achieve it.

The institutions Europe seems to have forgotten

The OSCE is the successor to the 1975 Helsinki Conference, the only forum in which, at the height of the bipolar confrontation, rival blocs managed to codify common principles: the inviolability of borders, the non-use of force, economic cooperation, and human rights. The 1990 Charter of Paris and the Charter on European Security adopted in Istanbul in 1999 added the principle of the indivisibility of security, according to which no state may strengthen its own security at the expense of others’. It is a principle that both Moscow and Western capitals invoke today, interpreting it in opposite ways. Precisely for this reason, it serves as a starting point: the parties do not debate whether security is indivisible, but rather what this entails in practice.

Behind these principles lies a technical framework that few outside of experts are familiar with. The Vienna Document governs the prior notification of military activities, the annual exchange of information on military forces, and assessment visits. The Forum for Security Cooperation is the venue where participating States discuss conventional arms control. The Conflict Prevention Center manages the communications network linking the capitals and can activate urgent consultation mechanisms in the event of unusual military activities. In 2016, the OSCE also launched a Structured Dialogue on threat perceptions, doctrines, and force deployments: an exercise that was discontinued but which nevertheless constitutes the closest precedent to what Europe needs today. Finally, it should be noted that the Organization has declared itself a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter: its initiatives can therefore operate within a framework of universal legitimacy.

The most significant operational experience is the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, active from 2014 to 2022 with several hundred unarmed civilian observers. Its limitations were real: restricted access, no coercive power, and reports contested by both sides. Yet for eight years, it was the only impartial, daily source of information on ceasefire violations in the Donbas, and its end – when Russia refused to consent to the renewal of its mandate – coincided with the transition to the full-fledged SMO. The Organization emerged weakened, with budgets approved only with great difficulty and presidencies hampered by cross-vetoes, but it is not dead. Russia neither withdrew nor was expelled, and the Swiss presidency for 2026 has openly stated its intention to prepare the OSCE to monitor a potential ceasefire: monitoring the contact line, verifying violations, and even providing electoral assistance. Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis has acknowledged that the Organization can deploy only a few dozen people on short notice, while the front line stretches for about 1,300 kilometers. What is needed, therefore, is a significant political and financial commitment from the participating states. That commitment is exactly what Europe could and should offer.

Alongside the OSCE is the United Nations system, which Europeans tend to view as paralyzed by the Russian veto. This is an incomplete assessment. The Security Council adopted Resolution 2202 in 2015 in support of the Minsk Agreements and, in February 2025, Resolution 2774 calling for a swift end to the conflict – with Russia voting in favor. In July 2022, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, negotiated by the United Nations together with Turkey, demonstrated that even in the midst of fighting, a functional and limited agreement can hold for an entire year if it is managed by a joint coordination center with verifiable rules. Since September 2022, experts from the IAEA, a UN agency, have maintained a permanent presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – the only stable international presence on a front line. Geneva, the European headquarters of the United Nations, already hosted trilateral talks between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine in 2026.

From this perspective, the veto power takes on a new meaning. An observation mission authorized by the Security Council would require Russian consent, and for this very reason, Moscow could not view it as a hostile measure. The same applies to the consensus rule within the OSCE. What appears to be a limitation is in fact the condition of legitimacy: a safeguard mechanism that the other party helped establish is one that the other party has an interest in not sabotaging. This is the essential difference between a reassurance force composed of European national contingents – which Moscow has already declared unacceptable – and a multilateral presence with a UN mandate and an OSCE operational structure.

Four levels of de-escalation

On this basis, four levels of intervention can be distinguished, ordered from the most urgent to the most ambitious. For each, European multilateral forums already offer a starting point.

The first is incident management. The Baltic Sea is currently the theater most vulnerable to unintended escalation: heavy traffic, the Kaliningrad enclave, the so-called “shadow fleet,” undersea cables, and nearly daily aerial intercepts. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on Incidents at Sea at the height of the bipolar rivalry. It worked because it did not require trust, but only predictability, with rules on distances, maneuvers, and communications. A Baltic agreement modeled on that agreement, along with a direct line of communication between regional military commands and an identification system for military flights, would cost little and reduce tensions significantly. In February, Washington and Moscow agreed to reestablish military dialogue. Europeans, who live along the front lines, have even stronger reasons to demand their own channel, and the communications network of the Center for Conflict Prevention could provide the infrastructure without having to create anything new.

The second level concerns the transparency and clarity of red lines. The non-paper on Kaliningrad, regardless of its tone, makes clear where Moscow draws its line. Responding with equal clarity is not a concession. Thomas Schelling demonstrated this precisely: clear commitments stabilize, while ambiguity regarding limited actions destabilizes, because it invites testing the limits. Europe can explicitly state that it does not intend to isolate the enclave, reaffirm the transit guarantees already tested during the 2022 Lithuanian crisis, and revive – even on a voluntary and reciprocal basis – the notifications of major exercises provided for in the Vienna Document. The Forum for Security Cooperation is the natural venue for doing so.

The third level is arms control, where the vacuum is most dangerous. The end of the INF Treaty has reopened the issue of ground-based intermediate-range missiles: on the one hand, the announced deployment of U.S. long-range systems in Germany; on the other, Russian delivery systems in Belarus. These are weapons with flight times of just a few minutes, which compress the time available for political decision-making to the point of virtually eliminating it. A mutual and verifiable moratorium on their deployment on the continent would be the step offering the best cost-benefit ratio. Moscow had put forward such a proposal in 2019, but it was rejected due to the lack of verification guarantees. The challenge, then, is to establish a verification mechanism, and the resumption of the Structured Dialogue within the OSCE would allow this to be done in a format where Europeans are participants – not mere spectators – in Russian-American negotiations.

The fourth level is the political framework, and the crux of the matter remains Ukraine. There can be no de-escalation between Europe and Russia without a ceasefire in Ukraine, nor a stable ceasefire without a guarantee mechanism that Moscow does not interpret as a NATO advance. Three recommendations follow from this. Europe must secure a seat at the table, through a contact group or a small-group format with a clear mandate. It must prepare a package for the gradual easing of sanctions linked to verifiable steps, because sanctions are also a bargaining chip, and a chip that is never spent eventually loses its value. Above all, it must propose, as a guarantee mechanism, an OSCE-led monitoring mission authorized by the United Nations Security Council and substantially funded by European states. This would be the most concrete way to translate the financial burden that Europe already bears into political influence.

Fears, hopes, risks

A deliberate attack by Russia against an Alliance country – or vice versa – remains unlikely in the short term. More likely is the possibility that an incident in the Baltic – a drone straying off course, a ship-to-ship collision, a severed cable – could escalate into a crisis due to a lack of mechanisms capable of containing it. That is where the greatest risk lies, and that is where diplomacy can act immediately: an agreement on incident response, a direct hotline, declared red lines, and mutual notifications. The rest – the missile moratorium, a seat at the table, a guarantee mission under the auspices of the UN and the OSCE – requires time and political courage.

In 2025, the Helsinki Final Act marked its fiftieth anniversary, in a climate that made the occasion almost embarrassing. Yet that document was signed by adversaries who did not trust one another, and it was precisely for this reason that they established rules.

Europe – probably, perhaps, maybe, who knows – does not need to invent a new security order; it needs to go back to using the one it already has, and to do so before an incident renders that choice unnecessary.

November 4, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Comments Off on De-escalating the conflict: What the OSCE, the UN, and Europe are (not) doing to prevent war

No Cossacks at the gates, fix Italy instead – opposition leader to Meloni

RT | November 3, 2026

Italy should spend money tackling real domestic problems rather than driving itself deeper into debt to defend against fictional threats like the “Cossacks from the Russian steppes,” right-wing leader and MEP Roberto Vannacci said on Monday.

Vannacci, who leads the right-wing Futuro Nazionale party, made the remarks at a press conference in Milan alongside his party’s mayoral candidate, Carmelo Burgio.

“Any defense system must be commensurate with a real threat… If we were to ask the people of Milan what the real threat is, they certainly wouldn’t point to Cossacks coming from the Russian steppes,” he told the press. “They would likely point to harassers, vandals who smash shop windows, or ‘youth gangs’ roaming the streets with knives.”

The right-wing politician criticized the EU’s €800 billion ReArm plan for its “excessive spending on weapons systems,” arguing that there was no “concrete threat” to justify such spending and borrowing.

Vannacci has previously argued that the EU’s €150 billion rearmament loan instrument under ReArm would drive Italy deeper into debt without addressing its domestic issues.

Italy’s public debt stood at nearly 140% of GDP in mid-2026, the second-highest ratio in the European Union, according to Eurostat.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni came to power in 2022 on a platform promising tax cuts, stronger border controls, support for Italian families, and responsible management of public finances. Her government has nevertheless continued to commit billions of euros to military assistance for Ukraine, while also backing increased defense spending.

Moscow has long accused European nations of using the pretext of an alleged threat from Russia to justify their accelerating militarization. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly dismissed claims that Moscow intends to attack NATO as “nonsense.”

The Russian president has also blamed European governments’ economic and financial policies, including high public debt, for the riots and unrest sweeping EU countries since September. The reasons lie in “their own mistakes… in economics and finance,” he told Vesti last month, stressing that some EU countries have public debt exceeding 100% of GDP.

November 3, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism, Russophobia | , | Comments Off on No Cossacks at the gates, fix Italy instead – opposition leader to Meloni

Russia shows Europe that prolonging the Ukraine war is pointless

By Ahmed Adel | November 2, 2026

Moscow has shown the European Union that continuing the conflict in Ukraine makes little sense, as Norway and Finland suggest the need for a new approach to building relations with Russia, according to Responsible Statecraft. This became clear after the Oslo conference on Ukraine, when the positions of some European leaders visibly softened.

“Finland and Norway’s more moderate language is a crucial first step toward a shared European understanding that continuing the war in its current form is self-defeating,” Responsible Statecraft reported.

The article noted that European efforts to pressure Moscow have failed. Neither Kiev nor its Western allies achieved the desired results, even after attempting to escalate the conflict, the author added.

“Without US intelligence and weapons supplies, Europe lacks the military leverage to continue this effort on its own. There is no viable European war plan, only reactive crisis management and ad hoc solutions about Ukraine, coupled with repeated hyping of Russia’s ‘hybrid war’ threat,” he wrote.

According to the publication, Europe can resolve the situation in Ukraine through diplomacy, but first European leaders must decide whether to support or sabotage US efforts to achieve a diplomatic resolution.

“But first, Europe must decide: will it support or sabotage the US effort to build a diplomatic off-ramp?” Responsible Statecraft added.

On October 20, multilateral negotiations on the Ukrainian agreement were held in Oslo, attended by Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, and US President Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff. The next day, Vladimir Putin and Witkoff met in St. Petersburg. Putin told Witkoff that Moscow was ready to resume trilateral negotiations on Ukraine on November 10. Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said that a new round of trilateral negotiations on the Ukrainian settlement may take place in Abu Dhabi.

During his recent visit to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Stubb reiterated his case for a “value-based realism.” He said European states should uphold their values without settling the conflict by rigidly claiming the moral high ground, and urged the audience to keep “cooler heads,” warning that fostering a “war mentality” would make imagining peace nearly impossible.

Without a geopolitical agreement with Russia, Ukraine faces destruction, a deeper demographic crisis, and an inability to recover economically—creating a serious problem for Europe. Battlefield conditions remain unfavorable for Ukraine as Russian forces continue to advance and Kiev struggles with air-defense shortages.

Russian troops are maintaining pressure along the front and gradually eroding Ukrainian positions, while Ukraine’s manpower shortages have prompted intensified mobilization and further strained society. Inadequate defenses against Russian missiles, glide bombs, and jet-powered drone attacks are already creating a crisis. As winter approaches, cities, infrastructure, and energy facilities are becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack.

Ukraine is expected to face an extremely difficult winter, with shortages of electricity, energy, heat, and water that could trigger a humanitarian emergency. Repeated Russian strikes on the power grid have left large parts of the country exposed to prolonged blackouts, while electricity-dependent heating and water systems risk failing in freezing temperatures. These difficult winter conditions threaten to deepen civilian hardship, accelerate population displacement, and further weaken Ukraine’s capacity to sustain its war effort, but this reality has meant very little to Europe’s insistence on supporting Ukraine “to the very end” and “for as long as it takes.”

Despite mounting domestic problems, much of Europe still backs the futile war effort. Many capitals favor maximalist rhetoric rather than the more pragmatic diplomatic openings Norway and Finland have begun to explore. This stubbornness persists even as European states face economic decline and deindustrialization, lack independent military leverage without US support, and fail to turn sanctions, arms deliveries, and escalation into battlefield gains.

European leaders still frame the conflict in absolute moral terms, while their economies face rising energy costs and mounting debt pressures. Without moving toward the diplomacy opened in Oslo, Europe remains trapped in a cycle that does not shift the battlefield situation in Ukraine’s favor nor enhance European security. The alternative—backing a negotiated settlement that preserves a viable Ukraine while addressing core security concerns—remains open, as Responsible Statecraft stresses, but it requires political will that much of the continent has so far been unwilling to show.

Ukraine still has a chance to avoid the worst outcome by pursuing a peaceful settlement with Russia. Accepting terms would mean ceding part of its territory, but Ukraine would remain a viable state with a real opportunity for economic and political development. The longer the rest of the continent ignores the opening that Norway and Finland have made, the more territory and state capacity Ukraine will lose.


Ahmed Adel is a Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.

November 2, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Russia shows Europe that prolonging the Ukraine war is pointless

There is cautious optimism about ending the Ukraine War – Part 2

Peace comes in driblets in Ukraine

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | November 2, 2026

The famous line of Irish poet WB Yeats from the poem The Lake Isle of Innisfree comes to mind: ‘And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow…” Yeats was expressing his longing for the peace and tranquility of Innisfree, an uninhabited island in Ireland near which he spent his summers as a child while residing in an urban setting. And that is how Ukraine’s search for peace is meandering – not in a sudden, overwhelming wave; rather, in tiny, quiet increments, much like a gentle rain or a slow leak.

The ‘leak’ by Russia’s presidential aide for foreign policy Yuri Ushakov is no doubt an increment of potentially immense consequence when he told Kremlin’s preferred reporter Pavel Zarubin on Sunday that President Vladimir Putin never refused to speak with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky. Replying to a pointed question whether Putin would answer a call from Zelensky, Ushakov foretold, “I think he would answer, of course. Putin has never refused to talk. He [Zelensky] is sending signals through various sources. If he really wants to negotiate, he is free to come [to Moscow].”

The remark comes within a week of the joint phone call on October 27 by Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre to Putin during which, per a subsequent disclosure by Ushakov, the Nordic leaders discreetly broached the subject of direct contact between Putin and Zelensky. Zelensky later appreciated their debriefing. This is the first thing. Apparently, Putin repeated the refrain that Zelensky can always visit Moscow and that the Kremlin would ensure his personal safety and security. Now, an addendum, as it were, has appeared for the first time to Putin’s standing offer. Presumably, it was an orchestrated Q&A. This is the first thing.

Secondly, the Kremlin closely studied the commotion in Europe that the two Nordic leaders’ impudent behavior triggered — as if the wolf entered the hay pen. The two Nordic leaders broke ranks. Denmark and Sweden protested they were not consulted. However, the two EU heavyweights — France, Germany – simply looked away, and the super hawkish European Commission (EC) leadership under Ursula von der Leyen and her fiery foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, were uncharacteristically subdued.

How to explain it? As Guardian newspaper (no friend of Russia or Putin) noted, “The confusion reflects a wider disagreement across Europe over how to approach Putin, even as governments remain broadly united in their support for Ukraine… France has long advocated keeping a channel to Putin open, while Germany and Britain have been more cautious. The Baltic states and Kaja Kallas fear that renewed high-level engagement could ease pressure on Moscow without securing concessions.”

Thirdly, the dissonance is at its loudest when it came to the question of who should lead any European outreach. Von der Leyen insists on nominating someone who will faithfully execute her policy line – in sum, put her in the driving seat. It is excruciatingly painful for Von der Leyen to dismount the high horse she has been riding to demonize Putin and insist Russia can be defeated in the war.

This is the crux of the matter: the EU, with its narrative on the war collapsing, is not able to come up with any peace proposals. Its one-point demand is to have a physical presence at the high table of negotiations. Moscow has said it does not make sense unless the EU has something to bring to the peace table. Trump agrees.

In fact, across the Atlantic no one is paying attention to the acrimony in Europe regarding the seating arrangement at the peace table. The American elites are busy with domestic politics and if at all on the US’ war with Iran. Generally speaking, the Ukraine war has ceased to be a hot button foreign-policy issue among the elites. The ease with which Trump could mothball the Graham Act sanctions on Russia is telling. Zelensky’s support base in the US is also steadily shrinking. In practical terms, it turns out to be the CIA’s war.

Clearly, the trilateral meeting in Abu Dhabi will go ahead without any European participation. Meanwhile, Slovakia says Bratislava will represent itself. The house that Von der Leyen built to centralize all decision-making seems far too fragile as multipolarity gains ground in Europe. This trend can only gather pace as incumbent governments may be replaced in four of the EU’s biggest member states in national elections during 2027 – France, Italy, Poland and Spain. A recent Carnegie paper in mid-September assessed that radical-right parties with Eurosceptic orientation and which are Russia friendly are expected to do well.

The Carnegie paper titled How Europe’s 2027 Elections could Test EU Governance reluctantly admitted that the war in Ukraine “is likely to remain the EU’s most urgent security challenge. Radical-right parties are sharply divided on this issue, but as the cost of the EU’s support for Ukraine rises, resistance in several countries will increase. Locking in the union’s backing for Kyiv through multiannual programs would reduce the risk of a new constellation of political forces putting the union’s commitment to Ukraine in doubt.”

Overall, therefore, the Kremlin’s overture to engage Zelensky in a phone conversation comes not a day too soon. The catch is, Zelensky is a protégé of Britain’s MI6’s but here too, Britain’s ability to sustain the present momentum of the war is increasingly debatable. A BBC report gave a stark warning of “painful and depressing few years ahead” for the British people “after forecasts showed growth in living standards grinding almost to a halt.”

Ushakov’s remark testifies to the suppleness of the Kremlin’s strategy of not being an impediment to peaceful settlement in Ukraine but with no let-up in the frontline. Large scale Russian troop movements, the destruction of bridges over the Dnieper, the focus on Odessa and Kharkov, etc message that in the Kremlin’s estimation, there might be no alternative but to seek a military victory.

In a Substack piece, Gordon Hahn, the US security expert and specialist on Russia, visualised that Moscow may “add to its original demands” by pushing the ante on territorial issues, including the seizure of Kiev (“the mother of all Russian cities”) and Odessa (which Putin calls a Russian city’) – ie., gain control of the territory east of Dnieper (what Russians call the ‘Left Bank’) letting western Ukraine collapse into warlordism.

November 2, 2026 Posted by | Economics | , , , | Comments Off on There is cautious optimism about ending the Ukraine War – Part 2

German Imperialism: An Urgent Explainer

By Kit Klarenberg | Global Delinquents | November 1, 2026

The fate of Central and Eastern Europe after the People’s Democracies’ post-1989 fall cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the EU as an extension of German imperialism. Berlin’s drive to ensure the region remains composed of weak, frequently mutually-resentful microstates has endured for well-over a century. Over time, battlefield conquest and occupation has been supplanted by economic and monetary union, and ever-rising military, security and intelligence “interoperability” and “cooperation”, all conducted under “internationalist” auspices.

Comprehending this process and the consistent needs of German imperialism provides a typically absent, critical lens through which to view events such as Yugoslavia’s destruction, the rise and recent demise of Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and seen and unseen political machinations throughout the Balkans old and new. German imperialism is a potent, dangerous force frequently overlooked due to its nigh-invisible operation. With US global hegemony irreversibly faltering, it is vital to truly understand the phenomenon as it threatens to emerge in its own militarised right again.

Today, German imperialism is little-understood even in countries and regions intimately shaped if not outright created by Berlin’s colonial meddling and concomitant hegemonic expansion. Its historic apotheosis was the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The terms and consequences provide an eerily precise blueprint for the EU’s modern day role as German empire via other means. Despite Brest-Litovsk’s seismic import, mainstream English language accounts are comparatively rare. A highly compelling, informative synthesis is nonetheless provided by Adam Tooze’s much-overlooked 2014 work The Deluge.

Tooze writes of how “Brest gave birth to the precursors to the Baltic states in their modern form,” and an “independent Ukraine” for the very first time in history. Resource-rich territory that over prior centuries comprised much larger dynastic land empires was broken up into easily exploitable chunks. The newly-formed nations, and corresponding nationalisms, spread throughout ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse swaths of Central and Eastern Europe constituted a formidable stronghold. Self-determination facilitated Germany’s untrammelled economic, military, and political penetration.

Commenting on Eurasia’s 21st century map, Tooze observes how since the Soviet Union’s 1991 dissolution, all Brest-Litovsk’s “creations” have “come to be regarded as legitimate members of the family of nations.” Moreover, states such as the Baltics and Poland then as now “look to protectors in the West,” being “keen members of an American-dominated NATO and the European Union, in which Germany is the dominant force.” Via Brest-Litovsk, “all of these polities fell willy-nilly under the ‘protection’ of Imperial Germany.”

Treaties of Brest-Litovsk | Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary | Britannica

Brest-Litovsk delegates negotiate, early 1918

The Treaty was signed between Moscow and Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany and the Ottoman Empire in March 1918, following months of tense negotiations produced the previous December by revolutionary Russia signing an armistice with Berlin. At Brest-Litvosk, both sides had advanced their respective visions of “self-determination” for the Central and Eastern European components of the Tsar’s collapsed empire. Vladimir Lenin hoped newly-independent states in the region would be free to turn Bolshevik. Yet, Imperial Germany had no intention of letting that happen.

Instead, the country’s “more intelligent strategic thinkers” realised “there was no better means to dynamite the Tsarist Empire than for Berlin to espouse the demand for self-determination” at Brest-Litovsk. This “manipulative ruse” would allow Germany to extend her hegemony imperceptibly throughout enormously profitable territories. It was “a vision of negotiated sovereignty in which economic and military independence was pooled by smaller states with larger states.” Tooze reports how German imperialists argued “full, unfettered sovereignty” was “always a chimera” – “the real choice was one between hegemons”:

“Germany would secure power on a continental scale not through annexation, but through the formation of an economic and military bloc of smaller Eastern European states… The autonomous Polish entity carved by Germany and Austria out of Russian territory in the autumn of 1916 was a start. While in economic and military terms the new Poland would be bound tightly and irrevocably to Germany, in the social and cultural sphere it would be given the freedom ‘to express itself nationally’.”

‘Military Protection’

From the Central Powers’ perspective, self-determination’s colonial windfall was immense. In territorial terms, Moscow lost control of today’s Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. This prime former Tsarist real estate accounted for 34% of the fallen empire’s population, 54% of its industrial land, 89% of its coalfields, and 26% of its railways. Berlin well-knew the regional treasure trove would be hotly contested, and could easily “fall into the orbit of another great power” – “if not Germany or Russia, then Britain”.

Hence, Brest-Litovsk’s terms exclusively allowed for ‘independence’ under formal “German military protection.” This transformed millions of people throughout the region into potential proxy warriors arrayed against Russia, or other major powers threatening Berlin’s local hegemony, in the manner of NATO today. Rapidly collapsing into civil war, with Franco-British intervention to reverse the Revolution impending, the incipient Soviet Union acquiesced to the Treaty’s harsh stipulations. Lenin believed the Bolsheviks would eventually recapture the lost territories, by sheer force of radical gravity.

Contemporary map of Central and Eastern European states created by Brest-Litovsk

Brest-Litovsk was torn up by the June 1919 Treaty of Versailles, compelling Berlin to grant independence to assorted German-conquered protectorates that had been established throughout the region. Chaotic, violent struggles unfolded over the next three years between Red Army-assisted local revolutionary elements and ‘independent’ states led by collaborationist puppets. Belarus and Ukraine were successfully absorbed as republics, while the Baltics and Poland remained autonomous. Meanwhile, the seed of German hegemony via self-determination had been decisively sown throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

German colonialism particularly left its mark post-Brest-Litovsk via the emergence of nationalisms and according national creation myths throughout the region, which were innately and rabidly antagonistic toward Moscow. In Poland in 1916, Berlin’s invading forces had successfully portrayed themselves as liberators. In the Baltics, Russians represented a large proportion of the country’s urban, land-owning elite. They were easily framed by German propagandists, and in ultranationalist imaginations, as parasitic overlords of largely illiterate ethnic Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian peasantry, who overwhelmingly resided in rural steppes.

Convincing Ukraine’s multiethnic population to embrace an anti-Russian ‘independence’ was considerably more difficult, given their similar backgrounds, customs and languages, and the substantial influence of each others’ culture in both directions since Kiev’s 1654 union with Moscow. Ukraine’s contemporaneous veneration of genocidal fascists, and indeed the wider ongoing proxy war, are direct upshots of efforts by German imperialists to promote enmity and antagonism between Russians and Ukrainians. This strategy was maintained throughout the Cold War by the CIA and MI6, with Nazi-riddled West Berlin’s assistance.

‘Civilising Mission’

Another enduring legacy of Brest-Litovsk was the transformation of “self-determination” from a liberal German imperialist crusade, to a fundamental principle of Anglo-American-dominated international relations. The cause was eagerly and cynically seized upon first by British Prime Minister Lloyd George, then US President Woodrow Wilson. The right to minority self-determination globally became absolutely central to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The world over, anti-colonial and nationalist movements saw an opportunity to achieve independence from foreign subjugation.

At the Conference, Austro-Hungary brutally fell victim to this self-determination push, with Britain successfully ordering its constituent territories be “liberated” via the empire’s total breakup. This created the independent states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The latter pair were entirely new countries, with Yugoslavia forged from Austro-Hungary’s southern Slavic regions – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia – and the revolutionary kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. In a bitter irony, Austro-Hungary herself had previously encouraged self-determination regionally à la Brest-Litovsk, to entrench her imperial rule.

In June 1878, the little-known Congress of Berlin was convened. Major European powers sought to reorganise the Balkans, in the wake of Russia’s victory over the Ottoman Empire three months earlier. The conflict ended with Moscow asserting hegemony over Constantinople’s remaining holdings in Southeastern Europe, via an allied Greater Bulgaria, and the newly-formed, independent states of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. However, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, rapidly expanding host empire Germany, and Italy, wished for these terms to be revised.

Map of the Balkans to illustrate the Treaty of Berlin 1878.

While the Congress recognised the three new Balkan states’ independence, attendees demanded Bosnia and Herzegovina become an Austro-Hungarian protectorate into the bargain, much to Serbia’s chagrin. Vienna’s resultant takeover of Sarajevo sent tens of thousands of Muslim inhabitants fleeing to Turkey. This exodus intensified in 1881, after the imposition of military conscription. The move was inspired by Serbia and Montenegro supporting local anti-imperial elements. It was just one Austro-Hungarian connivance intended to transform harmoniously multiethnic, multifaith Bosnia and Herzegovina into a fractious powder keg.

In service of this goal, Sarajevo’s Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities actively nurtured a nationhood centred exclusively on Bosniak – Bosnian Muslim – identity. The local Serbo-Croatian dialect was proclaimed a separate Bosnian language, Cyrillic text got suppressed, while Serbian books and newspapers were banned. Vienna’s meddling failed to incite violent, separatist division between Bosnia’s diverse peoples. It nonetheless created a vast army of conscripts for any future regional war, while providing Austro-Hungary with an imperial public relations victory. Per historian Maximilian Georg:

“[Vienna’s] objects were to teach the population their supposed Bosnian, pro-Habsburg identity, legitimise the Austro-Hungarian rulers as the new Romans, and demonstrate to Europe and the world the success of Austro-Hungary’s ‘civilising mission’ in an ‘oriental’ country. This ‘civilising mission’ under military occupation was the strongest indicator of an Austro-Hungarian colonialism.”

‘Yugoslav Nationalist’

Austro-Hungary and Germany alike considered independent Serbia’s mere existence a permanent irritant to their Eastern European supremacy, in need of eventual neutralisation. Tensions constantly mounted after the turn of the century, leading in 1908 to Bosnia’s formal annexation by Vienna. All along, imperialists in Berlin were spectating Austro-Hungary’s colonial machinations with intense interest. In 1888, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck prophetically foresaw “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” upsetting Europe’s delicate balance of power, and precipitating a major global conflict.

Serbia and Montenegro’s October 1912 invasion of Albania, in the wake of her declaration of independence from Ottoman rule, almost proved that “damned foolish thing.” Serb and Montenegrin forces sought to permanently capture territory, but retreated a year later under threat of Austro-Hungarian intervention. In the aftermath, Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Vienna, declaring to colonial officials “war between East and West was in the long run inevitable.” As Slavs “were born not to rule but to obey,” their anti-imperialist tendencies couldn’t be tolerated much longer.

Wilhelm II moreover pledged to “back” Austro-Hungary in any future conflict in Eastern Europe, assuring his Viennese counterparts Berlin was “ready to draw the saber any time your action makes it necessary.” Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip’s June 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo provided an ideal pretext for the Kaiser’s long-desired showdown between Slavs and Teutons. Pressured by Austro-Hungarian authorities to implicate Belgrade directly in his actions while on trial, Princip instead insisted he was ideologically motivated:

“I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria…The plan was to unite all South Slavs. It was understood that Serbia as the free part of the South Slavs had the moral duty to help in the unification, to be to the South Slavs as the Piedmont was to Italy…In my opinion every Serb, Croat and Slovene should be an enemy of Austria.”

In post-World War I Yugoslavia, Princip was elevated to national hero. In early 1930, a plaque was erected on the site of Ferdinand’s assassination, celebrating a foundational event in the new country’s creation. It was the sole trophy claimed by the Nazis following the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, presented to Adolf Hitler at a formal ceremony on his 52nd birthday in April 1941, two days after Belgrade’s surrender. A potent totem of German embarrassment expunged, it was now time to erase Yugoslavia permanently.

Adolf Hitler inspects the plundered plaque commemorating Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination by Gavrilo Princip

Carving up the country relied heavily on constructing genocidal, ethnonationalist puppet entities. Painful memories of these attempts to exert hegemony over the Balkans under the banner of “self-determination” remained visceral for many residents of Yugoslavia in December 1991. Then, newly-reunified Germany unilaterally recognised federation members Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ states, while encouraging other republics comprising the collapsing country to follow the pair’s secessionist lead. It was widely predicted Yugoslavia’s demise would produce bloodshed, on a grand scale.

‘Fundamental Subordination’

Dissolving Yugoslavia began waging war on Croat and Slovene secessionists six months earlier. The latter conflict lasted just 10 days, but the former was still simmering. The European Community and UN futilely struggled all along to achieve peaceful settlements to Yugoslavia’s gravely worsening crisis, while formally committed to preserving the country in some form. Berlin’s recognition summarily sabotaged those efforts, removing any incentive for Yugoslav republics to negotiate their futures with Belgrade, while emboldening nationalists in every republic.

Fears of Berlin’s resurgent imperialism were not confined to Yugoslavia. As TIME contemporaneously observed, “it used to be a given of European political life Germany… would not take a leading or controversial role in world affairs,” which “suited its neighbors very well indeed.” While occupied West Germany operated throughout the Cold War as “an economic giant and a political dwarf,” unified Berlin’s “unexpected show of diplomatic muscle” in recognising Croatia and Slovenia as ‘independent’ countries was now causing “discomfort” throughout Western capitals.

In Britain’s parliament, then-Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd explicitly evoked the World Wars as disquieting precedents for Germany’s modern-day “self-determination” push in the soon-to-be former Yugoslavia. “There is a tradition of the main states of Western Europe splitting in rivalry on these Balkan questions, and this all ending up on the battlefield. I don’t think that tradition is a good one,” Hurd cautioned. Washington, immensely irritated by Berlin belligerently “getting out ahead of the US,” duly assumed management of the Yugoslav crisis, with disastrous consequences.

Fratricidal conflicts that subsequently engulfed Yugoslavia forged a highly invasive beachhead, via which German economic and political hegemony throughout the region surged, without direct military engagement. While Berlin framed her support for Croat and Slovene ‘independence’ in terms of human rights, the rich financial rewards of shattering the federation were plain. As by far the two wealthiest republics, Germany effectively granted herself access to “the best productive assets” in the soon-to-be former country by kickstarting its practical and physical collapse, per a 2008 academic paper.

The authors write of how Berlin’s “hegemonic relationship” with Yugoslav successor nations was thereafter writ considerably larger than even Germany’s imperial infiltration of “smaller states” elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. This is due to the “specific dependence” of Balkan countries on Berlin’s “structural power”. In economic terms, this means vast national trade deficits with Germany across the region, with “Balkan pre-products and raw materials” flowing in vast, constant profusion to Berlin, while German corporations and products dominate many commercial, financial and industrial sectors locally.

Undergirding this extraordinary economic colonisation was adoption by Yugoslavia’s successor states of ‘independent’ currencies, pegged first to the former Deutschmark, now Euro. This proved pivotal to the “fundamental subordination of the political economies of the region to the ideological and operational norms” of the EU – or German empire, via other means. New national and private banking systems of post-Yugoslav countries were structured specifically according to Berlin’s own, with German banks ascendant, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. That’s not all:

“[Deutschmark/Euro pegging] was an essential precondition for the shaping of the macro-economic policies of these (and other transition) states, for their foreign economic relationships, for the further development of their capital markets and the programmes of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation which ensued.”

‘European Continent’

Berlin’s Balkan banking takeover moreover fundamentally “facilitates the penetration of all German enterprises into the commercial life of the Balkan economies.” Berlin has gluttonously feasted on local resources and industry alike ever since, its investment regionally “characterised by takeovers.” For example, throughout Central and Eastern Europe German supermarkets are a near-monopoly, with prices of goods frequently higher than back home, despite meagre local purchasing power. Low wages, vast structural unemployment, and mass brain drain are all interlinked, ruinous inheritances.

The Balkans’ Western “transition” has been far more destructive than even the horrors unleashed upon the former Warsaw Pact in the 1990s. Heavily influenced “by prescriptive programmes emanating from the EU and from the World Bank,” Brussels has since 1999 also been “actively involved” in advising and guiding every country in the region towards bloc membership. After so much imposed impoverishment, it isn’t precisely clear what meaningful benefits Balkan states or populations will reap from their vassalage under German imperialism becoming formalised.

In late 2019, a Balkan liberal who once eagerly supported their country joining the EU wrote a sorrowful ode to “the process of so-called integration” Yugoslav successor states suffered by adopting “measures”, “instruments”, and “reforms” dictated by “Western technocrats”. Freshly ‘independent’ countries “were expected to build a fully developed Western liberal democracy from scratch… upon the ruins of a different yet fully developed system… while dragging behind us the burden of deepening poverty and trauma.” Several were and remain deeply scarred by Berlin and Brussels-encouraged ‘independence’ wars.

However, “this excruciating process of destroying and building anew a whole system… went neither fast enough nor successfully enough” for the new German empire. What’s more, “competition was not fair” – “opening our markets to the developed capitalism of the West and undertaking neoliberal reforms drained our human and economic resources while we kept trying to stay apace.” Socialism’s vestiges were eradicated, state industries sold off, and social spending slashed. The op-ed mysteriously failed to mention how Germany’s contemporary Balkan economic assault has a “strong security dimension”.

06/18/99: KFOR Sectors

Kosovo’s original KFOR occupation map, June 1999

The 2008 paper notes Berlin exerts direct colonial-style control across the region, for example via Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU-chosen Office of the High Representative, which traditionally serves as Germany’s imperial viceroy in Sarajevo. Moreover, Berlin has always been a key contributor to NATO’s Kosovo peacekeeping force KFOR, sustaining a military occupation under which Pristina controversially declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. This summer, Washington’s KFOR contingent began departing Kosovo after 27 years.

Meanwhile, the Americans are openly signalling Bosnia’s abandonment, raising potentially urgent questions about the unified country’s future. In April, Ursula von der Leyen made clear the EU and she personally intend to “[complete] the European continent so it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence,” in explicit reference to the former Yugoslavia. History shows us such declarations by German imperialists frequently result in world-threatening catastrophe. Meanwhile, “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” could evidently today yet again trigger war.

November 1, 2026 Posted by | Timeless or most popular | , , | Comments Off on German Imperialism: An Urgent Explainer

Poland Is the Symptom and Europe Is the Patient

By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | November 1, 2026 

The midnight brawl at Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal is not a Polish problem. It is the local flare-up of a continental disease. Across Europe, when voters pick the wrong candidate, the establishment reaches for a judge, an intelligence service or the EU’s checkbook, and calls the result “defending democracy.” The Journal of Democracy wrote the textbook. Warsaw is the teaching hospital.

The article

In December 2023, two months after Donald Tusk’s coalition pushed Law and Justice (PiS) out of power, Jarosław Kuisz and Karolina Wigura of Kultura Liberalna published a how-to guide in the Journal of Democracy. The title says it all: “How to Dismantle an Illiberal Democracy.”

Consider the provenance. At the time, the Journal was the flagship publication of the National Endowment for Democracy, the outfit that does in daylight what the CIA used to do at night. It split from NED this year after DOGE cut off NED’s funding in 2025, and it is now independent and partnered with Stanford’s CDDRL. In 2023, though, this was the democracy-promotion establishment telling Warsaw how to clean house.

The argument, stripped of its footnotes:

  • Poland needs a “second wave” of transitional justice to deal with PiS “violations of the rule of law.”
  • Avoid vague treason charges. Prosecute specific acts: the 2015 Constitutional Tribunal appointments, the 2020 attempt at an all-mail presidential election and the 2023 visa-for-cash scandal.
  • Jarosław Kaczyński bears responsibility but will be hard to convict.
  • Parliamentary investigative committees are the main tool.
  • Expect resistance from the PiS-aligned presidency, Supreme Court and State Tribunal.
  • Stabilize the system without breaking it.

The authors close with a disclaimer worth framing: “There is no clear roadmap… One should therefore not expect miracles.”

The critique

The defenders of democracy have written a manual for dismantling one. They don’t see the irony, and that is the most instructive thing about the essay.

Start with the word “illiberal.” It is not a legal category. It is a label handed out by people with conference budgets to governments they dislike. PiS won the 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections outright. Yet the article treats its officials less like a defeated party and more like the communist nomenklatura of 1989, in need of a “transitional justice” process.

In fairness to Kuisz and Wigura, they are more careful than their cause. They warn against show trials and vague charges, and they admit nobody knows how to do this. But manuals are not read for their caveats. Politicians skip the footnotes and go straight to the chapter on tools.

Here is the core contradiction. PiS stands accused of capturing the courts, ignoring rulings and stacking institutions with loyalists. The cure prescribed is to purge the courts, ignore rulings and install the right loyalists. The sin becomes a sacrament when the right people commit it.

Poland, three years later: the manual in action

This week the manual left the library and went to the streets of Warsaw, escorted by riot police.

Since 2023, Tusk’s government has refused to recognize the Constitutional Tribunal and has ignored its rulings. Starting in March, parliament elected eight new judges. President Karol Nawrocki refused to swear in five of them. They held their own oath ceremony and mailed the oaths to the presidential palace, which is a new one even by Central European standards.

Then came October 30. According to Notes from Poland and ProtoThema :

  • Judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska suspended Chief Justice Bogdan Święczkowski and declared herself acting head of the Tribunal.
  • Justice Minister Waldemar Żurek moved to strip Święczkowski’s immunity.
  • Riot police blocked Święczkowski from entering his own court. His supporters cut through the fence with power tools.
  • Nawrocki turned his plane around on the way to Senegal and, around 1 a.m., pushed his way past judges into the building. Each side accuses the other of physical aggression. Protesters outside called it a coup.

Tusk’s response, per Euronews : “In certain matters there can be no compromise.” He also warned about Russian bots, because no European crisis is complete without them.

Not everyone in the coalition is cheering. Szymon Hołownia said Poland should be ashamed and that forcing a fix only deepens the decline. Hołownia and the PSL are now attending Nawrocki’s talks. When your own partners start taking meetings with the other side, the roadmap has a pothole.

Kuisz and Wigura told us not to expect miracles. This isn’t a miracle. It’s a mirror.

The disease, not the symptom

Poland is just the case where the patient is thrashing hardest. Look at the rest of the ward and the same pathology shows up everywhere: elections treated as advisory, with the final say reserved for institutions nobody voted for.

  • Romania. On December 6, 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled the first round of a presidential election after Călin Georgescu, an outsider polling in single digits, came in first. The grounds were declassified intelligence about “aggressive hybrid Russian attacks” and alleged illegal campaign financing. In March 2025 the electoral commission barred Georgescu from the rerun, while he was “the favourite in all the polls,” and the court unanimously agreed. That is one way to fix an election: hold it again without the winner.
  • France. In March 2025 a Paris court convicted Marine Le Pen of embezzling EU parliamentary funds and banned her from office for five years, effective immediately. The frontrunner for 2027 was gone with one gavel. In July the appeals court upheld the conviction but cut the ban to 45 months, 30 of them suspended, so she can run after all. The judges giveth, and the judges taketh away. Either way, the judges decide.
  • Germany. In May 2025, the BfV, Germany’s domestic intelligence service, branded the AfD a “confirmed right-wing extremist” party. The AfD polls at 24 to 26 percent. In February a Cologne court suspended the label, ruling the conditions for it “are not met.” Lawmakers are still pushing to have the Constitutional Court ban the party outright. Banning the party a quarter of your voters support is certainly one way to win an argument. In my old business, we called a spy agency monitoring the main opposition party something else.
  • Brussels’ checkbook. The European Commission froze about €137 billion for Poland under PiS. On February 29, 2024, eleven weeks after Tusk took office, it released the money. One of its own officials conceded, “That does not mean the rule of law is fully restored and everything is fine,” and the reform plan was “still a draft ambition.” The rule of law, it turns out, is measured by who sits in the prime minister’s office. Hungary got the same treatment. Its new prime minister, Péter Magyar, promised to go to Brussels “to have EU funding released.” Message received in Budapest.

Put the cases side by side and the illness has a clear set of symptoms. Courts annul or narrow the choices on the ballot. Intelligence services rate which parties are fit to compete. Brussels pays for good behavior, defined as the right government. All of it is done in the name of protecting democracy from the people who vote in it.

That is why the Kuisz and Wigura essay matters beyond Poland. It isn’t a Polish policy paper. It is a clinical protocol for treating a voter who votes wrong, written for a continent whose elites have concluded the electorate can’t be trusted with the keys. Tusk is just the first surgeon to try it without anesthesia.

What this means for NATO

An alliance is only as strong as the governments that have to say yes. Right now several of NATO’s key European members are too busy fighting their own voters, courts and presidents to launch any foreign venture. In some cases they couldn’t if they tried.

Start with Poland, the country Washington holds up as NATO’s model member and the frontline state on Belarus and Ukraine. Under Poland’s constitution the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces. Poland’s president and its prime minister are currently accusing each other of a coup. Ask yourself who gives the order to deploy in that situation. Then ask whether a Polish soldier knows whose order to follow. A country with two constitutional courts and a commander-in-chief shoving past judges at 1 a.m. is not preparing to project power. It is trying to hold itself together.

The rest of the ward is no healthier:

  • Germany is debating whether to ban the opposition party that a quarter of its voters support, and that party wants nothing to do with a war against Russia. Any German government that sends troops east hands the AfD its next election.
  • France faces a 2027 presidential race in which Le Pen, whose party has long been skeptical of NATO’s integrated command, is back on the ballot. No French president facing that race will gamble on a foreign adventure.
  • Romania, home of NATO’s base at Mihail Kogălniceanu on the Black Sea, is still governed under the shadow of an election its own court cancelled. Its political class has a legitimacy problem it cannot afford to aggravate with a war.

NATO runs on consensus. Every one of these governments is now weighing a foreign deployment against a domestic electorate it has spent years managing rather than persuading. When the elite’s grip at home depends on courts, intelligence services and Brussels’ money, asking voters to send their sons east is the one request it can’t risk. Sooner or later, the bill for treating the voter as the enemy comes due.

The irony is hard to miss. The project was sold as protecting democracy from the barbarians at the gate. What it has produced is an alliance whose members cannot agree with their own voters, let alone with each other. Moscow didn’t have to lift a finger. Europe’s “defenders of democracy” are doing the job for it.

The Globalists refuse to go away

Strip away the vocabulary of “rule of law” and “transitional justice” and you find a project aimed at Polish nationalism itself. PiS’s real offense was not packing a court. Plenty of governments pack courts. Its offense was putting Polish sovereignty, Catholic identity and the nation-state ahead of Brussels.

The record is consistent. Poland refused the EU’s 2015 migrant relocation quotas, and in April 2020 the European Court of Justice ruled that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had broken EU law by refusing. That July, the Commission denied twinning grants to six Polish towns over their “LGBT ideology-free” resolutions. Then came the €137 billion freeze. The message from Brussels never varied: national identity is welcome as folklore, not as policy.

To the globalist wing of the Western establishment, meaning NED, Brussels and the foundations and think tanks that orbit them, nationalism is a disease to be treated, not a view to be debated. A nation that insists on deciding what it believes, whom it admits and how it runs its own courts is “illiberal” by definition. Kuisz and Wigura simply gave that attitude a legal procedure.

Now look east, because the same people take the same attitude toward Russia, with fewer manners. NED has funded Russian civil-society groups for decades, which is why Moscow made it the first “undesirable organization” under its 2015 law. In June 2022, the U.S. Helsinki Commission held a briefing titled “Decolonizing Russia: A Moral and Strategic Imperative.” The title says the rest. Russian nationalism, like Polish nationalism, is treated not as a fact to be dealt with but as a pathology to be cured, by sanctions, regime change or, if the seminar circuit gets its way, partition.

Here is the irony I find most delicious. Washington and Brussels spent years cheering Polish nationalism when it was pointed at Moscow. Poland’s hostility to Russia was the alliance’s favorite asset. Point the same nationalism at Brussels and it suddenly becomes a threat to democracy requiring riot police. Polish patriotism, it turns out, is a weapon to be aimed, not a conviction to be respected. Poles should notice that the people eager to dismantle Russia’s sense of nationhood are the same people dismantling theirs.

That is my assessment, not the article’s. Kuisz and Wigura frame everything as restoring the rule of law, and insist that the PiS started this. Its 2015 Tribunal appointments were a power grab, and in its 2021 Xero Flor ruling the European Court of Human Rights found that a bench including an improperly appointed judge violated the right to a fair trial.

Nawrocki’s refusal to swear in the new judges is hardball too. Both camps have real legal arguments. That is exactly why riot police at midnight are the wrong way to settle it.

Even if you set motive aside entirely, judge the project by its adverse effects: a country with two rival constitutional courts and a president shoving past judges in the dark.

On NATO, a caveat. Domestic turmoil makes an offensive or expeditionary venture far less likely, but it does not mean these countries would refuse to defend their own territory. Both camps in Warsaw back heavy defense spending, and a direct attack on a member tends to unite even the most divided parliament. My argument is about appetite for adventure, not the willingness to fight at the border.

None of these caveats changes the central point. The fight in Warsaw isn’t really about judges. It is about whether a European nation may still define itself, or whether that right now belongs to Brussels, NED and the people who write manuals on dismantling democracies. Moscow got that answer years ago. Warsaw is getting it now.

November 1, 2026 Posted by | Civil Liberties, Russophobia | , , , , , , | Comments Off on Poland Is the Symptom and Europe Is the Patient