Poland’s New Prez Nawrocki: Not Your Typical Pro-Ukraine Hero
By Svetlana Ekimenko – Sputnik – 02.06.2025
Opposition candidate Karol Nawrocki has been elected as the president of Poland, according to data published on the official website of the election commission. Nawrocki received 50.9% of the votes, just ahead of Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski (49.1%), Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s ally.
Poland’s stance on the Ukrainian crisis may change after the presidential election, as the country’s politicians and ordinary people alike seem increasingly reluctant to support Zelensky’s regime.
Here is a closer look at where Karol Nawrocki stands on Ukraine and other major issues.
No Free Pass for Ukraine
Nawrocki does not see it in either the European Union or NATO until bilateral issues like the 1943 Volyn massacre committed by Ukrainian nationalists during WWII are addressed.
- While promising support, he blasted Volodymyr Zelensky for “ingratitude”.
- Accused “European elites” (plus their “butler” Tusk) of fueling the war.
- Unequivocally will not deploy Polish troops to Ukraine.
- Accused Ukrainian refugees of taking advantage of Polish generosity, vowed to shield Polish farmers and truckers from unfair Ukrainian competition.
- Opposes any Ukraine-EU trade liberalization.
On Russia
Karol Nawrocki swerved from telling Radio ZET that maintaining diplomatic ties with Russia was “not good for Poland,” to claiming he was ready to sit down at the negotiating table with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
As former head of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), he oversaw demolition of Soviet war monuments—earning himself a spot on the Russian Interior Ministry’s “wanted” list of Polish nationals in 2024.
Skepticism Towards EU
- Karol Nawrocki called the EU weak and chaotic, citing its exclusion from Ukraine peace talks.
- He pledged to not allow the liberalization of trade between the EU and Ukraine.
- Nawrocki vowed to keep Poland on the zloty, not the euro.
‘Brussels hijacked our future’ – Orban
RT | June 1, 2025
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has unveiled a proposal to increase the power of EU members and limit the authority of its bureaucracy. Calling it a “patriotic plan” for the bloc, he said in a series of weekend social media posts that it will revive the “European dream.”
The EU elites in Brussels have exploited every crisis to amass more power, Orban claimed in a post on X. This course has so far only translated into less sovereignty for member states and “failed policies,” according to the prime minister. “Brussels hijacked our future” by disrupting public safety through migration and eroding prosperity with “green dogmas,” he stated in another post.
“Europe can’t afford this any longer, it’s time to take back control,” he said.
The PM’s plan is based on what he calls four pillars: a path toward peace on the continent and defusing tensions with Russia, removing Brussels’ “centralized control” over finances, “bringing back free speech” and strengthening Europe’s Christian identity, and tightening control over immigration.
“We want peace, we don’t need a new Eastern front,” Orban said, commenting on his plan and stating that the bloc should not accept Ukraine as a member. “We don’t want our money poured into someone else’s war,” he added.
A military buildup and defense increase actively promoted by some EU nations could easily lock the bloc in an “arms race” with Russia, Orban warned. Such a development would “devour… taxpayers’ money,” he said. Instead of pouring more resources into the military, the bloc needs to contribute to the peace process between Moscow and Kiev, the prime minister maintained, praising US President Donald Trump’s efforts in this regard.
The EU needs to start “arms limitation talks with the Russians as soon as possible. Otherwise, all our money will be swallowed by the arms industry instead of being spent on peaceful… goals,” Orban argued.
European nations once united to create the “safest and the most advanced continent” in the world but this dream was “stolen,” the prime minister charged, calling on EU nations not to allow Brussels to use the Ukraine conflict “as an excuse to take more of our money.”
Europe punching above weight for nothing
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – June 1, 2025
Recent European (UK plus EU) sanctions on Russia amid ongoing US-backed efforts to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine aim to assert Europe’s perceived ability to “correct” the course of events.
However, the continued reliance on sanctions also underscores the limits of what Europe can—and cannot—achieve in ultimately shaping geopolitical outcomes.
Sanctions amid Talks
In geopolitics, timing is often more telling than the event itself. Such is the case with the European Union’s and the UK’s recent decision to impose fresh sanctions on Russia—announced just a day after former President Donald Trump held a two-hour “serious” conversation with Vladimir Putin. This is not the first time European states have sanctioned Russia, nor will it be the last. But this round is different, not in content but in context. The timing sends a clear message: Europe is uneasy, not just about Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but also about the growing strategic vacuum left by an increasingly disengaged United States.
Despite the recent round of dialogue between Ukrainian and Russian officials—and other rounds expected to follow—European leaders remain skeptical of where this path may lead. Their fear? That a negotiated settlement—particularly one brokered without robust Western unity—could leave Russia in a stronger position than before the conflict began.
That anxiety is compounded by waning American commitment to NATO under the Trump administration. In the absence of a coherent transatlantic front, European powers are trying to assert their own leverage. This latest sanctions package, targeting Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” of oil tankers and the financial networks enabling sanctions evasion, is as much a political statement as it is an economic measure.
According to German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, the sanctions are a response to Russia’s refusal to agree to an “immediate ceasefire without preconditions.” But here’s the strategic problem: Europe acted alone. Washington, notably silent, announced no corresponding measures. In fact, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that threatening sanctions now could derail ongoing talks rather than advance them. “The president … believes that right now, you start threatening sanctions, the Russians will stop talking,” Rubio told lawmakers in the US.
This divergence reveals a deeper strategic disconnect between Europe and the US. Despite intense lobbying from European capitals, the Trump administration remains hesitant to jeopardize fragile diplomatic progress. In the eyes of many analysts, this marks a foreign policy failure for Europe, unable to rally its closest ally at a critical juncture. Still, the broader implication is troubling: these sanctions are unlikely to shift Moscow’s calculus or alter the trajectory of ceasefire negotiations. Instead, they may highlight Europe’s limited influence in the absence of American backing—and underscore a growing realization that, in the new era of great power politics, Europe may have to fend more for itself. If the goal is to contain Russian power and shape the post-war regional order, sanctions without transatlantic unity are unlikely to suffice. Without Washington on board, Europe’s message is loud—but not necessarily strong.
Anatomy of Sanctions
As the conflict in Ukraine drags into its fourth year, Europe finds itself in a strategic bind. While its leaders continue to voice solidarity with Kyiv, the reality beneath the rhetoric is unmistakable: Europe’s message is not strong enough. But the more pressing question is—why is this message so weak?
The answer lies not in a lack of compassion or political will, but in the cold calculus of power, capability, and consequence. After years of bloodshed, destruction, and stalemate, European leaders increasingly grasp the sobering truth: hard military power has its limits. In this war, force has not produced victory and may never do so. But sanctions, Europe’s go-to instrument in lieu of military engagement, have proven even weaker. Despite wave after wave of economic penalties imposed on Russia—freezing assets, targeting oligarchs, cutting trade—Moscow has adapted.
Faced with this double bind—military impotence on one hand, economic ineffectiveness on the other—some European policymakers have flirted with the idea of escalating their involvement. The suggestion of deploying troops or enforcing a no-fly zone in Ukraine has crept into public discourse. Yet such options bring their own dangers, dangers that many in Europe are not prepared to face. The reality is stark: without the United States, neither NATO nor any coalition of European powers has the muscle to militarily confront Russia directly.
Moreover, sending European troops into Ukraine or deploying aircraft over Ukrainian skies risks a direct confrontation with a nuclear-armed state. It is a step that would almost certainly invite retaliation on European soil. The conflict, in other words, would no longer be something happening “over there”—it would be an immediate, domestic reality. And this, more than anything else, is the psychological wall European leaders are reluctant to breach.
This is the heart of Europe’s dilemma: a conflict it cannot win, a peace it cannot broker, and a strategic imperative it cannot fulfill without paying a heavy cost. Until Europe reconciles its ambitions with its capabilities, its message will remain what it is today—resolute in tone, but tragically weak in substance.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Behind Closed Doors – The US-Russia Diplomatic Games
Glenn Diesen | May 31, 2025
Fyodor Lukyanov is Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, a Research Professor at the Higher School of Economics, Editor in Chief of the Russia in Global Affairs Journal, and the Research Director at the Valdai Discussion Club. Prof. Lukyanov outlines how the US and Russian frameworks for ending the war are coming together. Ukraine is incrementally dragged into the format, and the Europeans are ignored as they are seen to be unrealistic and unreliable.
Follow me:
Substack: https://glenndiesen.substack.com/
Support the channel:
PayPal: https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/glenn…
Buy me a Coffee: buymeacoffee.com/gdieseng
Go Fund Me: https://gofund.me/09ea012f https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles…
EC launches European fact-checking funding network to advance “Democracy Shield” and expand censorship
A €5 million fact-checking project becomes the velvet glove on the iron fist of EU content governance
By Cindy Harper | Reclaim The Net | May 30, 2025
The European Commission has launched a €5 million initiative presented as a fact-checking support program; but beneath the surface, it reads as yet another calculated step toward institutionalizing censorship across the European Union.
This call for proposals is marketed as a tool to “protect democracy” and combat “disinformation,” but the structure, goals, and affiliations of the program point clearly to the opposite: a top-down, publicly funded apparatus for narrative enforcement.
Slated to run until September 2, 2025, the project is open not only to EU Member States but also to candidate countries like Ukraine and Moldova; jurisdictions framed as highly vulnerable to “foreign interference,” especially pro-Kremlin disinformation.
This strategic framing serves a dual purpose: justifying increased surveillance of content and securing narrative dominance in geopolitically sensitive areas.
The program’s core deliverables; protecting fact-checkers from so-called “harassment,” creating a centralized repository of “fact-checks,” and building emergency “response capacity;” sound benign to some. But stripped of the euphemism, this is a blueprint for constructing a continent-wide content control grid.
The “protection scheme” offers legal and cyber assistance to fact-checkers, but more crucially it reinforces the narrative that opposition to these groups constitutes abuse rather than legitimate disagreement.
The “fact-check repository” enables centralized curation of what counts as “truth,” and the “emergency response” function gives the Commission a pretext to fast-track suppression efforts in politically sensitive moments.
Most telling is the program’s requirement that participating organizations be certified by either the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) or the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN).
Many of their members, such as AFP and Full Fact, already work directly with major social media platforms like Meta under third-party moderation schemes. This effectively means the EC is reinforcing an exclusive gatekeeper class, already aligned with corporate censorship programs, now endowed with taxpayer funds and the backing of the European bureaucracy.
At least 60% of the funding will go to third parties, who must co-finance their participation.
The Commission claims this initiative supports the “European Democracy Shield,” a term that in practice functions as rhetorical armor for suppressing free expression.
Every policy facet of this initiative is tied to managing or mitigating “disinformation,” yet no clear or objective criteria for what constitutes disinformation are provided.
This vagueness enables the flexible application of suppression to a broad range of unwelcome speech.
Trump bracing for a longer Ukraine war
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | May 30, 2025
One of the mysteries of the Ukraine endgame is that President Donald Trump did not issue an executive order on January 20 withdrawing all support for Ukraine. That would have been the easiest way to end the war.
The conditions were propitious — Candidate Trump didn’t mince words that it was a hopeless war that cost the US dearly in treasure; he thought poorly of President Volodymyr Zelensky as a shameless free rider; he saw the war as impeding his foreign-policy priority of the US’ transition to a multipolar world order; and, he felt no compulsion to inherit ‘Biden’s war’.
But instead, Trump plunged himself with gusto into the Ukraine question, although Washington lacked the means to leverage Russia to compromise on its core interests in what Russian people regarded as an existential war.
Quite possibly, some of Trump’s advisors prevailed upon him to undertake the theatrical diplomatic effort on the basis of a flawed reading of the state of play in the war. Trump believed that western sanctions lethally weakened the Russian economy; that Russia’s casualty figures ran into hundreds of thousands and such a high level of attrition was unsustainable; that Zelensky would sign up on the dotted line; that an improvement in Russian-American relationship would be a ‘win-win’ with massive economic benefits accruing to both sides and so on.
But all these premises turned out to be wrong notions. Putin has steered the economy to a state of permanent western sanctions (which was the Soviet experience, too). Russian entrepreneurs have successfully replaced the fleeing western businesses in the wake of sanctions and will now resist any re-entry by the latter.
Russia’s casualty figures are much lower than the self-serving western estimates put it, as the high level of recruitment to the army suggests. Zelensky is bent on prolonging the war with support from European powers per Biden’s script to ‘Trump-proof’ the war. Europeans not only have a Plan B but have collaborators within the US some of whom may even be in Trump’s team.
Suffice to say, Trump has been on a learning curve, as he began sensing that the Kremlin is determined to realise the objectives it had set for itself (as outlined in Putin’s historic speech last June at the foreign ministry). According to a Reuters report two days ago, “Putin wants a ‘written’ pledge by major Western powers not to enlarge the US-led NATO alliance eastwards — shorthand for formally ruling out membership to not only Ukraine and Georgia and Moldova and other former Soviet republics as well.”
“Russia also wants Ukraine to be neutral, some Western sanctions lifted, a resolution of the issue of frozen Russian sovereign assets in the West, and protection for Russian speakers in Ukraine” — per Reuters.
Europeans will scoff at such demands. Therefore, as things stand, a breakthrough at the Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul on June 2 seems unlikely. Unsurprisingly, Russia is pressing ahead with an offensive campaign in all directions, throwing in all its forces with a culmination planned for summer or early autumn.
The least bad option
Trump has three options under the circumstances. One is to simply refuse to own responsibility for the war and walk away for good. But then, can Trump deny his own part in it in his first term? While the Trump administration identified its approach to foreign policy as ‘principled realism’, late Joseph Nye’s characterisation of Trump as an “idiosyncratic realist” was perhaps closer to the truth.
The official administration policy on Ukraine during Trump’s first term was a continuation of the policy pursued by the Obama administration. It recognised Crimea as part of Ukraine, condemned Russia’s occupation and eventual annexation annexation of the peninsula; it underscored Russia’s primary responsibility for the instigation, continuation and conduct of the conflict in eastern Ukraine; it even identified the Russian interference in Ukraine as part of a wider pattern of aggression towards other states and as proof of Moscow’s challenge to the fundamental principles of international order.
For these reasons, the Trump administration maintained that the US should help Ukraine to defend itself and should penalise Russia both through sanctions and diplomatic isolation (eg., membership of the G7). Curiously, shades of this thought process resurface even today occasionally in Trump’s Truth Social outbursts. Trump seems unaware he’s carrying a can of worms as his Ukraine legacy.
So, the second option today is to convey Trump’s dissatisfaction over Russia’s perceived intransigence in dictating terms for settlement and its alleged lack of interest in peace talks. Trump even hinted at Russia’s hidden agenda to conquer Ukraine. Trump is hinting at punishing Russia both through sanctions and supplying weapons to Ukraine. German chancellor Friedrich Merz’s provocative announcement of giving long-range weapons to Zelensky was probably green lighted by some people in Trump’s team. After all, Merz is no stranger to Wall Street.
However, this is a recipe for an extremely dangerous NATO – Russia confrontation. If long range German missiles hit Russia, Russia will retaliate in a way that could potentially cripple NATO’s operational readiness in a hypothetical war. Belarus State Secretary of Security Council Alexander Volfovich has said that the Oreshnik missile system is “planned to be stationed in Belarus by the end of the year. The locations for its deployment have already been determined. Work is under way.” The spectre of World War III may seem a bit of a stretch, but Trump will have to consider the dangers of climbing the escalation ladder, which could destroy his MAGA presidency.
Washington has no means to intimidate the Kremlin. The bottom line is, Trump is actually left with only a third option, the least bad option — viz., walking away from the Ukraine conflict at this point and return when the war has been lost and won, possibly by the end of the year. This will not damage Trump’s reputation.
Trump may already be displaying his credentials as ‘peacemaker president’ if the US-Iran talks, which seem to be making progress, results in a nuclear deal. Besides, US-Russia normalisation needs more time to gain traction. Senator Lindsey Graham’s hard-hitting sanctions bill against Russia with 81 co-sponsors in the senate signals that Russia is a very toxic subject in the US domestic politics.
Also, Russia-Ukraine talks is only one track. The Russians have sensitised Trump’s team that while Moscow engages with Kiev, the root cause of the war — absence of a European security architecture — still remains to be addressed, which is something that only Russia and the US can work out jointly. The US shouldn’t shirk its responsibility, being both the original instigator of NATO expansion and sponsor of the Ukraine war.
The reaction by the US special envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg has been positive when he told ABC News in an interview that the US understands that it is a matter of national security for Russia that NATO may stop accepting new Eastern European countries into its ranks — ie., not only Ukraine but Moldova and Georgia as well.
Kellogg said he considered the Russian side’s concerns to be justified. He did not rule out the possibility of reaching an agreement during negotiations between the US and Russia. This is a big step forward.
Veto ban would spell the end of EU – Fico
RT | May 30, 2025
The EU’s reported plan to scrap member states’ veto power would spell the end of the bloc and could become “the precursor of a huge military conflict,” Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has warned.
Slovakia and its Central European neighbour Hungary have long opposed the EU’s approach to the Ukraine conflict, criticizing military aid to Kiev and sanctions on Russia. Both governments have repeatedly threatened to use their veto powers to block EU actions they view as harmful to national interests.
To bypass the dissent, Brussels is reportedly weighing a shift from unanimous voting, a founding principle of EU foreign policy, to qualified majority voting (QMV), arguing that it would streamline decision-making and prevent individual states from paralyzing joint actions.
Fico, however, condemned the proposal on Thursday during the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Hungary.
“The imposition of a mandatory political opinion, the abolition of the veto, the punishment of the sovereign and the brave, the new Iron Curtain, the preference for war over peace. This is the end of the common European project. This is a departure from democracy. This is the precursor of a huge military conflict,” he said.
EU sanctions on Russia currently require unanimous renewal every six months, with the current term set to expire at the end of July. Brussels is also preparing an 18th package of sanctions aimed at tightening restrictions on Russia’s energy sector and financial institutions.
Earlier this month, during a visit to Moscow for Victory Day commemorations, Fico assured Russian President Vladimir Putin that Slovakia would veto any EU-wide attempt to ban imports of Russian oil or gas.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has taken a similar stance. While Hungary has not formally blocked a sanctions package, it has delayed several rounds to extract concessions.
Orban has also warned that removing the veto would strip smaller nations of their sovereignty.
“We want Brussels to show us, as all other member countries, the same respect, not only symbolically, but also by taking our interests into account,” he said last month.
Both Slovakia and Hungary have resisted increased military support to Kiev, with Budapest blocking several key decisions citing concerns over national interests and the potential for escalation. Fico has emphasized the need for peace negotiations over continued military engagement.
Babiš attacks EU elites and calls for ‘renaissance of principle’ in fiery CPAC speech
Czech opposition leader Andrej Babiš branded Brussels a “technocracy without a soul” and warned that Europe is being dismantled from within
Remix News | May 29, 2025
Former Czech prime minister and current opposition leader Andrej Babiš delivered a blistering speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Hungary on Thursday, accusing the European Union’s ruling class of betraying its founding values and urging European nations to reclaim sovereignty and common sense from what he called a failing liberal global order.
Speaking just months before a general election in which he is widely expected to return to power, Babiš portrayed the EU as a decaying institution ruled by unelected bureaucrats, ideologues, and activist networks who have imposed censorship, economic sabotage, and uncontrolled migration on member states. He warned that the Brussels establishment has replaced cooperation among sovereign nations with a coercive, centralized system that punishes dissent and erodes national identity.
“We are standing at the historic crossroads in a time marked by deep divisions and mounting tensions,” Babiš declared. “The elites who built and profited from this system now look on in disbelief, confusion, and anger as it falls apart. But they have only themselves to blame. They betrayed the citizens who trusted them.”
In a wide-ranging speech, Babiš accused EU leaders of undermining the very foundations of European civilization. He denounced Brussels for replacing love of country with “hollow globalism,” burying common sense under “endless layers of bureaucracy,” and attempting to substitute the natural population growth with “mass migration.”
He reserved specific criticism for three key EU initiatives: the Digital Services Act, the Green Deal, and the new Migration Pact. He accused the first of ushering in online censorship, the second of sabotaging Europe’s economy under the guise of environmentalism, and the third of forcing nations to accept migrant quotas in violation of their sovereignty.
“Under this law, dissent can become a punishable offense,” Babiš said of the Digital Services Act. “This isn’t about safety. It’s about silencing.”
On the Green Deal, he argued that while China is expanding coal and nuclear power, Europe is deliberately impoverishing itself for symbolic environmental virtue. “This is not sustainability,” he said. “It’s economic self-sabotage dressed up as an environmental virtue.”
Turning to migration, he described the EU’s new asylum system as “coercion,” not solidarity, and said it “undermines cohesion, public safety, and national identity.”
Babiš framed these developments as part of a broader ideological drift in Brussels, where he said freedom is being replaced with surveillance, culture with identity politics, and values with apology. “They no longer defend our heritage, they apologize for it,” he said. “Instead of protecting Europe, they deconstruct it.”
Calling for a “renaissance, not just of policy, but of principle,” Babiš urged the EU to return to its original form: a voluntary community of nations rooted in mutual respect, diversity, and national self-determination.
“Europe is not Brussels. It is Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, Rome, Paris, Madrid,” he declared. “It is the voices of citizens who want to be heard. It is the right of nations to govern themselves.”
“The age of patriots has begun,” Babiš concluded. “Not because we want to divide Europe, but because we want to save it.”
His appearance at CPAC Hungary — an event known for bringing together conservative leaders from across Europe and the United States — further cemented his alignment with other nationalist voices in the region, including Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Germany’s Alice Weidel, and Austrian Freedom Party leader Herbert Kickl.
Sanctions as Self-Harm: The West’s Strategic Blind Spot in Confronting Russia
By Ricardo Martins – New Eastern Outlook – May 28, 2025
This article critically analyzes the latest EU sanctions on Russia, arguing they are strategically flawed and economically self-destructive. Drawing from past failures, it shows how the West’s punitive measures are backfiring, hurting Europe and the U.S. more than isolating Russia.
What is the New Sanctions Package About?
The EU has unveiled a new sanction package targeting Russia, predominantly focusing on the energy sector, specifically oil and diesel exports. This builds upon earlier restrictions intended to cripple Russia’s economic capacity to sustain its military operations in Ukraine. The new sanctions include tighter enforcement mechanisms on the oil price cap, restrictions on ship-to-ship transfers in international waters, and efforts to curtail Russia’s access to Western insurance and logistics networks. But like the previous measures, they raise a fundamental question: Will they work?
The Status of Past Sanctions: Buying While Punishing
Historically, sanctions against Russia have been inconsistent and riddled with loopholes. Despite strong rhetoric, Europe has continued purchasing Russian commodities under various exemptions. The EU still imports significant quantities of Russian diesel, liquefied natural gas (LNG), coal, uranium, and even agricultural products like grain and fertilizer. The result is a paradox: while aiming to isolate Russia, the West remains economically entangled with it. This undermines the moral and strategic coherence of sanctions and allows Russia to adapt and thrive despite Western pressure.
Sanctions Hit Europe More Than Russia
While sanctions are theoretically aimed at weakening Russia’s economy, the practical consequences have disproportionately hit European industries and households. Russian exports are fungible: oil, coal, and fertilizers find alternate markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Meanwhile, Europe has struggled with soaring energy prices, industrial shutdowns, and declining competitiveness. Diesel shortages, energy rationing, and inflation have become the new norm, particularly in Germany, which once depended heavily on Russian inputs for its industrial base.
Russia, by contrast, has localized production, developed new markets, and implemented mercantilist strategies to reduce dependence on Western technology and finance. As one Russian analyst put it, sanctions have become “psychological warfare,” increasingly irrelevant to daily life in Russia.
Oil and Diesel: The Inflation Time Bomb
The crux of the new sanctions is oil and diesel. But can the U.S. and EU afford to forgo Russian, Venezuelan, and Iranian crude without catastrophic inflation? The answer appears to be no.
Russia exports about 7.5 million barrels of oil per day, or nearly 10% of global supply. Taking that offline—especially in conjunction with sanctioned Venezuelan and Iranian oil—would create a massive global shortfall. Western refineries, particularly in the U.S. Gulf Coast, are calibrated to process heavy sour crude like Russia’s Urals blend. Without it, refineries operate suboptimally, and gasoline prices spike.
In the U.S., diesel drives nearly all logistics trucks, trains, and ships. Removing a major global supplier like Russia tightens global supply, causing diesel prices to surge and supply chains to buckle. Already, diesel refills for trucks cost over $2,000, with potential spikes threatening food prices and consumer goods. Inflation will soar again, just as it had started to cool.
Baltic Sea Escalation: Tankers and Arrests
The geopolitical tension is intensifying. Russian oil tankers, often flagged under third countries, are now escorted by Russian naval vessels in the Baltic Sea. An incident involving an Estonian ship attempting to halt a tanker, which ended up detained in Russian waters, demonstrates the volatility of the situation. This marks a dangerous escalation, with the potential for military clashes over enforcement of maritime sanctions—an area traditionally governed by international law, not unilateral action.
Western Industrial Decline: No Shipyards, No Leverage
Sanctions enforcement is further complicated by Western logistical decline. The U.S., Britain, and France have largely lost their shipbuilding industries. Insurance and shipping markets have globalized, and London no longer dominates maritime underwriting. Russian entities are increasingly self-insuring their fleet, rendering sanctions on Western insurers irrelevant.
Furthermore, without a domestic merchant marine, the U.S. relies on foreign ships even for military logistics—a vulnerability in any prolonged conflict. Meanwhile, China and Russia continue expanding their shipping capabilities and influence over global supply routes.
The Legal Quandary: Sanctions and Sovereignty
From a legal standpoint, unilateral sanctions that attempt to compel third-party countries to comply (so-called secondary sanctions) strain the legitimacy of the “rules-based international order.” It is lawful for the West to impose its own sanctions, but not to mandate their enforcement by sovereign nations like India or Brazil. Such overreach risks global backlash and accelerates moves toward de-dollarization and alternative trade systems, such as the BRICS currency initiative.
Is the EU Addicted to Sanctions?
The EU appears increasingly reliant on sanctions as a primary foreign policy tool. Yet, their efficacy is questionable. Past sanctions have not altered Russian behavior, destabilized its economy, or improved Western leverage. Instead, they’ve fostered economic nationalism in Russia, weakened EU industries, and exposed the strategic shallowness of Brussels and Washington’s policies.
Sanctions are not a strategy; they are a tactic. And overuse risks turning them from a deterrent into a diplomatic crutch—one that Europe may not survive intact if economic pain continues to mount.
Conclusion: A Strategy of Self-Harm
Sanctions as Self-Harm: The West’s Strategic Blind Spot in Confronting Russia
In sum, the latest sanctions package is more of the same: punitive in intent, performative in practice, and counterproductive in outcome. The West, particularly Europe, will likely bear the brunt of energy shortages, inflation, and industrial decline. Meanwhile, Russia’s diversified exports, strategic alliances with China and India, and robust internal adaptation mechanisms render sanctions increasingly futile.
History has shown that attempts to isolate Russia through economic pressure are not only ineffective—they risk reinforcing the very state structures they aim to dismantle. Unless sanctions are part of a broader diplomatic and economic strategy, they will continue to hurt the sanctioning powers more than their target.
Ricardo Martins ‒PhD in Sociology, specializing in policies, European and world politics and geopolitics
EU has isolated itself, not Russia – Luxembourg MEP
RT | May 28, 2025
Luxembourg MEP Fernand Kartheiser has argued that the EU’s confrontational approach to Russia during the Ukraine conflict has led to its own isolation.
The lawmaker made the remarks in an interview with RT released on Tuesday while on a trip to Russia that he was forced to fund personally due to the European Parliament’s restrictions.
“Some people in the European Parliament… have an attitude toward Russia that identifies it as a big threat,” Kartheiser said. “They think that if we put pressure on Russia and isolate it diplomatically, that might help to find solutions in the context of the conflict in Ukraine… it is not the discussion that we should have.”
Kartheiser noted that the entire EU approach toward the Ukraine conflict and Russia has been counterproductive.
“What we have now internationally is that basically everybody talks to Russia. We even have the US coming back and having high-level contacts… the anti-Russia stance is diminishing,” he stated. “So this policy of isolation of Russia basically has failed. The only ones who are isolated in a way are the EU itself.”
The lawmaker’s visit to Moscow at the invitation of the Russian State Duma aimed to discuss bilateral relations and the situation in Ukraine. The visit, however, drew criticism from hawkish EU lawmakers. The European Conservatives and Reformists group threatened to expel Kartheiser, claiming he had “crossed a red line.” The MEP called the threat “a regrettable part of the picture” and lamented that some EU lawmakers remain opposed to re-engaging with Moscow.
“The discussion that we should have is what kind of relationship do we want with Russia in the future? We have to open the dialogue again. That is most important,” he said, adding that there are politicians whose opinions towards Russia are shifting, while many ordinary Europeans would also like to see ties restored.
The MEP emphasized that if the EU “wants to be taken seriously as an actor in international relations,” it must abandon the anti-Russia policy and “have some kind of relationship” with the country again.
“If we, Western Europeans, are expected to take a larger responsibility for our own security, one way to assure this is by negotiating an agreement with Russia, ensuring at the same time our security as Western Europeans and guaranteeing the security of Russia’s western border. So, negotiation and diplomacy before rearmament and arms race,” he concluded.
Ukraine in the EU? 5 reasons why it would crush Hungary (and Europe)
Remix News | May 28, 2025
The political elite in Brussels is increasingly trying to achieve that Ukraine’s planned EU accession takes place as soon as possible, preferably before 2030. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, stated in early May that the accession process must be accelerated.
Von der Leyen previously stated in Kyiv that if the process continues at this pace and quality, accession could occur even earlier than 2030.
The EU often does what it wants now and simply bypasses all the old treaty rules. The EU migration pact, which basically amounts to migrant quotas, was supposed to be the type of law that passes with the unanimous consent of the member states. In other words, countries like Hungary and Poland should have had a veto. Instead, Brussels snuck it through the backdoor and passed this “pact” with a qualified majority of the EU’s interior ministers.
Something similar is bound to happen with Ukraine. They will bypass Hungary’s veto in violation of all treaty rules because they have the power — at least for the foreseeable future.
However, it is worth noting that this will not only harm Hungarians, but all of Europe. Mandiner news outlet compiled five reasons it will hit Hungary hard, but many of these reasons apply to a broad swathe of Europe’s population.
1. The wages of Hungarian workers would decrease
With Ukraine’s accession, at least 30 million Ukrainians would have the opportunity to work in any country in the European Union. This would expand the European labor market by about 7 percent. In Hungary, the average net salary is currently about three times that of Ukraine. It is clear that many people would decide that it is worth moving to neighboring Hungary, as well as other EU nations.
Ukrainian workers arriving with lower wage demands would create a competitive situation in Hungarian sectors already struggling with labor shortages (construction, hospitality, agriculture), and this could result in a real wage decrease of up to 10-20 percent.
It is the classic example of cheap labor flooding the market, which while good for owners of capital and big business, can decimate labor markets and undercut labor power.
This would be most prevalent among lower-skilled workers, but jobs requiring secondary education would not necessarily be secure either. The proportion of Ukrainian guest workers in Hungary reached 5 percent in the agricultural and construction sectors by early 2025. Now, 30-40 percent of commuters [itinerants] working in this sector are Ukrainian citizens. After accession, this number would increase dramatically, turning into permanent commuting and settlement in Hungary and other EU nations, which would further drive down basic wages and long-term unemployment in rural regions, further increasing social tensions.
Hungary is spending a fortune on families and social programs for its population. Suddenly, financing family benefits, child-rearing benefits and the 13th month pension would also face serious difficulties, and the cost of the system would increase by 200–300 billion forints annually with Ukraine’s EU accession. This amount can only be raised in the government budget at the expense of public services, healthcare and education. According to analysts, if wages were to fall by 5-10 percent, consumption would also fall by 3-4 percent, and this could mean an additional loss of 0.5-1 percent of Hungarian GDP growth on an annual basis, the compilation highlights.
2. The rapid accession of Ukrainians could cause a new migration crisis
With Ukraine’s accession to the EU, the immigration crisis that has plagued the European Union since 2015 would reach a new level, and this would put Hungary in a very difficult situation. In its study previously published on Mandiner, the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs cites data from the 2023 research of the Ukrainian Future Institute, according to which 6.5 million people have left Ukraine, which had a population of 41-44 million before the war, in recent years, and there are also 3.5 million internal refugees.
With Ukraine’s accession, at least 30 million Ukrainians would have the opportunity to work in any country in the European Union, and a good number of them would understandably leave the collapsed country in the hope of a better life.
This internal, legal migration would significantly burden the EU – and since Hungary is a neighboring country, this would also affect the Hungarian healthcare system.
In addition, illegal migration could also gain momentum. It is currently unknown where Ukraine’s borders will be after the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian war, but a new, currently unknown and unsettled border section of several hundred – perhaps a thousand – kilometers long will certainly be created.
If the Ukrainians are admitted, this line will separate the European Union and Russia. Controlling it is a task that neither the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) nor the Ukrainian authorities would be able to cope with.
New migration routes could open up from Asia, and the EU would have to deal with new waves of migration coming from the east through Ukrainian soil. More people would try to enter the EU from Central Asia and Afghanistan through the new external borders. Some of the incoming migrants would try to reach the territory of the Western member states via Hungary. If Ukraine were also allowed to join the Schengen area, migrants would be able to travel across Europe at will, easily avoiding controls.
3. It would ruin Hungarian farmers
Ukraine’s accession to the EU would significantly increase the size of the EU’s 157 million hectares of agriculture by 41 million hectares.
Ukraine would become the largest beneficiary of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), pocketing about a third of the total budget, thereby undercutting farmers who comply with strict EU regulations, including Hungarian producers.
A large part of the budget’s agricultural subsidies are currently distributed on a regional basis, and due to money given to Ukraine, farmers in other member states would receive less of this amount. This reallocation of agricultural subsidies would mean Hungarian farmers would also receive orders of magnitude less EU funding than before, according to calculations by the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs.
With Ukraine’s accession, the Hungarian agricultural sector is expected to suffer an annual loss of 672 billion forints (€1.68 billion) due to the loss of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) funds.
A loss of resources of this magnitude, in addition to the aforementioned competitive disadvantage, would likely destroy the entire sector and could certainly bankrupt small and medium-sized family farms, Mandiner emphasizes.
Ukraine is one of the world’s largest grain producers and exporters, with vast acreage and excellent resources, but our eastern neighbor has much looser regulations than the European Union, and labor is much cheaper, which is why their production costs are much lower. If they were to enter the EU market, farmers from other European member states would be at a huge competitive disadvantage.
If Ukraine joins the EU, it would account for 15 percent of European wheat production, 49 percent of corn production, and 20 percent of overall grain production. This dumping would result in depressed prices, and Hungarian farmers would be unable to compete with cheap, often inferior-quality Ukrainian products.
4. The European Union would also import war by admitting Ukraine
According to a study by the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine’s accession to the EU would necessitate the introduction of new coordination mechanisms, but it is clear that the European Union is currently unable to guarantee Ukraine’s security. Realistically, Ukraine’s accession to NATO has practically zero chance, so the security guarantees of the Ukrainian state could only be resolved through bilateral agreements.
The European Union’s mutual assistance clause is very similar to NATO’s famous Article 5. If a country is attacked, it can activate it independently, i.e., without the consensus of the European Council, and in this case the other member states must come to its aid.
This means that if Ukraine were an EU member, it could activate the article, which would – at least legally – automatically make all EU member states belligerents.
This is probably what Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán meant when he said, “If the European Union admits Ukraine, it will also be admitting war.” The aforementioned article has no implementing regulations, so it would cause an unprecedented debate on its interpretation, which would lead to divisions among the member states. On the other hand, the adversary could automatically consider the European Union a belligerent party, and if this were to happen, NATO would also have to deal with the issue.
It is unprecedented in the history of the European Union for a country at war to join the community, but even if peace were to be concluded, the aftermath of a legally closed conflict would pose dangers that the Union would be unable to deal with. The Russian-Ukrainian war will almost certainly end with a peace treaty that would change Ukraine’s current internationally recognized borders.
If the European Union were to include Ukraine as a member, it would be adding a conflict zone with a constant threat of war, with the associated tasks and costs. This step would eliminate the buffer zone between the European Union and Russia, which Ukraine has so far represented, with the two directly bordering each other. This would also drastically change the security situation of the European community.
5. We would allow the Ukrainian mafia into the EU
Ukraine is one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, where organized crime was very strong even before the war, but the situation is even worse now. A lot of weapons from the arms shipments that have flowed into the country have ended up on the black market and then in the hands of criminal groups. The Ukrainian mafia will not have HR problems either.
The rehabilitation of demobilized soldiers is currently unresolved, and many of them are likely to be unemployed and traumatized, but there is one area in which they have gained serious expertise in recent years, and this is very useful knowledge if someone wants to join organized crime.
If Ukraine were to join the EU at an accelerated pace, as the European Commission envisions, this problem would also affect Hungarians. With the possibility of free movement in the European Union and the avoidance of border controls, Ukrainian organized crime groups would be able to conduct their business much more easily in the territory of other member states, and due to our geographical proximity, this would definitely be felt in Hungary.
The domestic drug situation is already very serious, and it seems to be getting worse with the spread of synthetic drugs, and the Ukrainians’ “entry into the market” would not help this, just as Hungarian society does not want clashes between expanding criminal gangs back in their everyday lives.
Of course, the state of public security would not be improved by the fact that Ukraine’s accession to the EU would certainly lead to an increase in the intensity of migration and the number of migrants residing in Hungary. This in itself carries a serious public security threat. The examples of England, Germany, Sweden and France all show that integration attempts, which are impossible in the short term anyway, almost always fail, and the number of crimes increases in direct proportion to the increase in the number of immigrants, and in many cases new organized criminal networks are created in migrant communities.
Hungary’s opposition pushes for Ukraine’s EU membership
Charles Michel, the former president of the European Council, and Manfred Weber, the president of the European People’s Party (EPP), which has the largest faction in the European Parliament, both support the EU’s push for Ukrainian membership. The party of Hungarian opposition leader Péter Magyar has also joined the EPP.
It is no coincidence that the German politician, Weber, made it clear to Magyar before the Tisza Party could join his faction that he only works with those who are pro-Ukraine, pro-Europe, and pro-rule of law, and he expects the same from Péter Magyar’s party.
The Tisza Party is apparently trying to comply with this, as in April, in line with the People’s Party line, they voted for a proposal that urges Ukraine to become an EU member, and would even provide a large amount of support (approximately €35 billion) to the war-torn country to facilitate this.
Apparently, the majority of their supporters expect this from Péter Magyar’s party: in the Voice of the Nation poll, the majority of Tisza respondents support Ukraine’s accession to the EU (58.18 percent yes, 41.82 percent no).
Manfred Weber stated in relation to Ukraine’s EU accession that Ukrainians have the same right to belong to the European Union as we Hungarians.
The Hungarian government, on the other hand, takes the position that accelerating Ukraine’s EU accession would have a catastrophic impact on Hungary and the surrounding countries, as in addition to the fact that there is currently a war in the country and the process itself would cost an incredible amount of money, this step would bring serious long-term negative changes in many areas of life, affecting the lives of European people.
