Trump to Give “Important Update on Iran” Wednesday in Prime-Time Speech
By Larry C. Johnson – SONAR – April 1, 2026
What is Donald Trump going to say about Iran on Wednesday night? Before I layout three possible outcomes, let’s examine what Trump is actually doing in terms of some key military assets (all of this is from open source reporting).
A-10 Squadron (Confirmed New Deployment)
Since Friday, March 27, 2026, the most prominently reported new US air asset movement to the Middle East (CENTCOM area of responsibility) has been a squadron-sized deployment of A-10C Thunderbolt II attack aircraft (Warthogs). Six A-10s from the Idaho Air National Guard’s 190th Fighter Squadron arrived at Pease Air National Guard Base (New Hampshire) as part of staging. On March 30, twelve A-10s from the Michigan Air National Guard’s 107th Fighter Squadron (Selfridge ANGB) departed Pease for RAF Lakenheath, UK (a common transit stop), in two flights of six. Another six followed on March 31. These ~12–18 aircraft are en route to the Middle East to reinforce or nearly double the existing A-10 presence there.
A-10s are already operating in theater (e.g., from the 75th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron) for close air support, anti-boat strikes in the Strait of Hormuz, drone interdiction, and coastal targeting. The surge supports intensified low-altitude operations against Iranian “mosquito fleet” vessels, mines, and remnants amid the broader campaign.
Apache Helicopters (AH-64) Squadron
US Central Command publicly confirmed the operational use of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters in late March (updates around March 16–18 and a specific confirmation on March 26). The 6-17th Air Cavalry Squadron (part of the 4th Infantry Division Combat Aviation Brigade, operating AH-64D/E variants) is the unit involved. It had been forward-deployed earlier (under prior rotations like Operation Inherent Resolve) but was newly integrated into Epic Fury strikes against Iranian boats, drones, and coastal targets in the southern flank/Hormuz area.
Several viral Facebook posts and YouTube videos (from accounts like “MovieFans.Lich,” “Live WWIIIRE,” and similar sensationalist pages) claim a “massive C-17 fleet” is deploying Apache helicopter squadrons alongside troops, armored vehicles, and equipment. These describe “dozens” or “over 112 C-17s” streaming into the region, with Apaches highlighted for their anti-armor, close air support, and anti-boat roles in rugged coastal terrain. Some videos include generic footage of folded Apaches inside C-17 cargo bays or all-female flight crews turning around quickly.
Posts from OSINT-focused X accounts (e.g., @TheIntelFrog, @Faytuks, @JewishWarrior13) detail dozens of C-17 flights since mid-March (e.g., ~35–50 flights tracked from March 12–24, with more ongoing) originating from bases like Fort Bragg/Pope AAF, Fort Campbell, Hunter AAF, and McChord AFB. Destinations include Ovda (Israel), Jordanian bases (King Faisal, King Hussein), and other CENTCOM hubs. These are linked to troop surges (including elements of the 82nd Airborne) and special operations forces, with some users speculating or claiming that attack helicopters like Apaches are part of the heavy equipment being airlifted. One analysis noted origins tied to units with aviation assets, such as the 160th SOAR (which operates helicopters, though primarily MH-6/ MH-60 rather than AH-64).
The new deployment of these assets are consistent with a military option that involves close-air support and/or attacks on Iranian fast boats and water drones.
So what is Trump going to announce?
Option 1 — Declare that negotiations with Iran via intermediaries (e.g., Pakistan) are progressing and that the United States is going to cease combat operations against Iran in order to support the negotiations and achieve a peaceful resolution.
Option 2 — Declare that victory has been achieved and that US forces will begin withdrawing from the region, leaving the status of the Strait of Hormuz in limbo.
Option 3 — Announce a massive air and ground operation to secure the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
The deployment of the A-10s and the Apaches can only mean one of two things:
- It is a show of force intended to pressure Iran to return to the negotiating table.
- The US is going to launch a massive attack against Iranian assets in the Persian Gulf, especially those located in and around the Strait of Hormuz.
Since Monday, March 30, 2026, President Donald Trump has made several public comments on the ongoing US-led Operation Epic Fury against Iran, primarily via Truth Social posts, interviews (including with the New York Post ), and remarks to reporters. His statements emphasize US military successes, threats of further escalation if demands are unmet, criticism of allies, and a potential near-term wind-down of direct US involvement.
On Monday, Trump described Iran as effectively “decimated” or “obliterated,” with its air force, navy, and many ships sunk or destroyed. He portrayed the campaign as highly successful and “way ahead of schedule” in prior context, but continued highlighting strikes on “long-sought-after targets.” He shared video footage on Truth Social of a massive explosion and secondary blasts in Isfahan (linked to strikes on uranium-related or military sites), without additional caption in one instance.
Trump also posted that the US was in “serious discussions with a new, and more reasonable, regime” to end operations. He warned that if the Strait of Hormuz is not “immediately ‘Open for Business’” and a deal is not reached shortly, the US would “completely obliterate” Iran’s electric generating plants, oil wells, Kharg Island, and possibly desalination plants. He framed this as concluding the US “lovely ‘stay’ in Iran.” In follow-up comments, he suggested the US could respond to Iranian actions “twenty times harder” with “Death, Fire, and Fury.”
Overall, Trump’s messaging since March 30 combines triumphalism about US achievements, escalatory warnings tied to the Strait of Hormuz and energy targets, frustration with allies, and signals of de-escalation with a short timeline for reduced US involvement. These comments have influenced market reactions (e.g., oil prices and equities) and drawn responses from Iranian officials and international observers.
Trump’s remarks since Monday have boosted the confidence of the folks on Wall Street and contributed to a significant surge in the stock market, with the Dow up 1,125 points. The price for BRENT oil dropped from 118 to 103 during Tuesday trading. This means the financial folks believe the war is going to end.
I think Trump is counting on Iran offering up some concessions in the face of the US buildup of additional air combat assets. Netanyahu reportedly just said Iran no longer poses a threat to Israel’s existence… A dramatic pivot if true. However, over the last few hours, Israel and the US carried out a large wave of attacks across Iran. They struck targets across several parts of Tehran, as well as in the cities of Karaj, Shahriar, Ahvaz, Shiraz, Abadeh, Isfahan, and Bandar Abbas. Iran will retaliate in force to these latest attacks.
In short, I believe Donald Trump will announce a major offensive to try to force Iran to release its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz… I believe that offensive will fail and that the war will escalate unless the US and Israel agree to two critical Iranian demands: the end of all sanctions and the removal of US military bases from the Persian Gulf arab countries.
Russia and China are two wild cards that could change the trajectory of the current war. If they engage and apply pressure on the diplomatic front — including ironclad security guarantees to Iran — Donald Trump may take the exit ramp.
What do you think?
Pascal Lottaz and I discussed the current situation in the Persian Gulf:
I did my usual Tuesday chat with Marcello:
A new interview with Rathbone. Interesting fellow… He’s also a comedian:
Collapsing Empire: The Resistance Disarms ‘Israel’
By Kit Klarenberg | Al Mayadeen | March 31, 2026
As the criminal Zionist-American war on Iran enters its second month, the conflict has proven so ruinous for the aggressors that dire alarm is being widely sounded. Embarrassing failure to subdue the Islamic Republic from the air has raised the prospect of a US ground operation of some kind, widely perceived as a suicide mission. Washington has also burned through over 850 Tomahawk missiles and 1,000 air-defense interceptors, at a rate the Pentagon finds “alarming”. In the process, “Israel” is rapidly approaching total disarmament.
On March 24th, elite British state-connected ‘think tank’ RUSI published a withering post mortem of the war’s first 16 days. An in-house “ledger tool” tracking the “intense consumption of advanced munitions” by the US and Zionist entity calculates 11,294 fires over this period, which cost a total of approximately $26 billion to produce. Resultantly, US – and thus Israeli – inventories of long-range interceptions and precision strike weapons “are nearing exhaustion.” And it will perhaps cost double that staggering amount to replenish what has been lost.
The Resistance shows no signs of slowing its onslaught, with every indication Tehran’s munitions production continues apace in wartime. Even the Western media has acknowledged Iran’s drone and missile arsenal costs a fraction to produce of the past and future outlay involved in shooting them down. Per RUSI, the war on Iran has exposed a “critical vulnerability” at the core of the Empire’s warfighting capabilities: a “strategically ruinous cost-exchange ratio that the West’s industrial capacity is not prepared to sustain.”
Over a dozen different munitions were fired by the US and “Israel” over the conflict’s first 16 days, “at a rate that appears to be unsustainable.” Now, Tehran’s relentless barrage “continues to drain the coalition’s most critical assets” – RUSI calculates missile and drone attacks have averaged 33 and 94 strikes daily, on average. By contrast, the organisation’s analysis shows “the magazine abyss” for Washington and Tel Aviv is “coming soon”. Moreover, Rheinmetall’s CEO has cautioned the Empire’s global munitions stockpiles are “empty or nearly empty.”
The Zionist-American war on Iran has thus become “a contest of endurance,” in which “the decisive advantage shifts to the actor that can sustain its defensive economy and replenish its most critical assets.” Based on current battle trends, the Islamic Republic firmly holds that advantage, and will continue to do so. The US could be mere weeks away from running out of ground-attack missiles – including much-vaunted ATACMS – and THAAD interceptors. RUSI similarly forecasts “Israel’s” Arrow interceptors will “likely” be “completely expended” come April.
On top of enormous expense, even at pre-war production levels, it would take years to replace what was spent in just over two weeks against Iran. As this journalist documented on March 24th, Tehran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has thrown the Empire’s already shattered defence industrial base into total disarray. Commodities and components central to constructing and maintaining digital and electronic systems, and precision-guided munitions, which hitherto transited the Strait daily in abundance, are now scarcer and ever-rising in cost.
‘Constant Alert’
Iran has not only overwhelmed and disarmed the Zionist entity and imperial targets throughout West Asia via systematic, staggered blitzes of drones and missiles. Crippling at least 12 US and allied radars and satellite terminals throughout the region has dented interception rates far further, while increasing the number of munitions necessary to shoot down the latest barrage blasted from Tehran – often unsuccessfully. Up to 11 Patriot interceptors can be fired at an Iranian missile, and up to eight at a single drone.
As a March 26th report by highly influential Zionist ‘think tank’ JINSA observes, “Iran’s attacks have imposed mounting costs on every component of the defensive architecture.” The Islamic Republic entered the conflict “with a deliberate plan to degrade US and [allied] capabilities by attacking each element of their air defense architectures.” In the process, “some of the most capable and expensive sensors” in Washington’s global inventory have been destroyed, with little chance of near-term repair.
These sensors in many cases explicitly provide the Zionist entity with an “early warning” system, tearing a gaping and ever-widening hole in Tel Aviv’s detection and warning network. As such, Iranian drone swarms – “frequently drawing on Russian tactical innovations from the Ukraine war” – are routinely proving “far harder to detect and defeat” than missiles, hitting twice the number of targets with pinpoint accuracy. Some US sensor systems simply cannot detect low-altitude Shahed volleys – including those specifically designed to counter drones.
It is not just Shaheds that have wreaked havoc. The entire Resistance is increasingly deploying fiber-optic guided drones “immune to electronic warfare jamming,” and first-person-view drones “for precision strikes against point targets,” JINSA reports. Other Iranian drones are equipped with jet engines, making them significantly faster than Shaheds, and interception even more problematic. As the conflict evolves too, Tehran has increasingly relied on ballistic missiles carrying cluster warheads, which release up to 80 submunitions at high altitude that scatter across areas spanning several miles.
JINSA assesses over half of the total Iranian missiles fired during this conflict to date carried cluster warheads, compared with three known uses during the calamitous 12 Day War. “Even a successful intercept does not guarantee the bomblets are stopped” – if interceptors fail to strike these missiles before they reenter the Earth’s atmosphere, they still disperse submunitions in the air, or release them upon impact. These attacks don’t deliberately target Israeli civilians, but nonetheless make daily life miserable for the settler colony’s population:
“Smaller, more frequent Iranian salvos keep civilian populations under constant alert…[This] shortens the time between attacks while reducing overall lethality, trading mass effect for persistence to wear down daily life. Warheads with cluster munitions amplify these disruptions by increasing the chance that submunitions or debris fall in populated areas…”Israel’s” decision not to fire against all incoming ballistic missiles carrying cluster munitions also suggests a need to ration interceptors.”
‘Highly Capable’
However, the Resistance is predominantly concerned with fulfilling its “deliberate plan to degrade” US and Israeli defensive capabilities, to drive the former out of West Asia permanently and make the region safe for Palestine’s final liberation. On this score, JINSA notes the “devastating effects” of Iran’s drones and missile barrages on previously invulnerable targets. For example, the Pentagon estimates a single Resistance strike on the US Navy Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain cost approximately $200 million.
It’s one of over a dozen US bases in the Gulf to sustain “significant damage.” Fighter jets have been destroyed, American soldiers injured and killed in sizeable numbers, and survivors sent scurrying to local hotels. Iran has resolved to target these makeshift, remote bases. Local air defense batteries are thoroughly preoccupied with “sufficiently defending” devastated US military installations, “to create the conditions for additional assets and repair teams to flow into theater.”
When they will arrive, how long they will take to restore what has been lost, and whether doing so will be remotely safe, remains to be seen. Meanwhile, “Iranian fire against shipping in the Gulf has proven even harder to stop than attacks on land targets.” Over half of known Resistance projectiles fired at vessels in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz have hit their targets. With Gulf governments having depleted almost their entire interceptor stocks since February 28th, what comes next could be catastrophic:
“Most Gulf bases, ports, and cities sit only a short distance from Iranian launch areas, which reduces the time defenders have to detect, track, and engage incoming threats. Iranian ballistic missiles launched toward Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, or the UAE can reach their targets within three to 10 minutes, a fraction of the already short 12 – 15 minutes that ballistic missiles take to reach Israel.”
To say the least, from the Empire’s perspective, none of this should be happening. The Zionist-American war on Iran was intended to be a one-sided aerial gangbeating lasting only a few days, which would culminate with the Islamic Republic’s collapse, or at least total capitulation. There was seemingly no sense in Washington, Tel Aviv, or other imperial centres of power that Tehran could fight back at all, let alone bring America’s military machine to its knees.
Yet, the inevitable upshot of kickstarting a major conflict with the Resistance was entirely predictable, and indeed widely predicted. None other than JINSA released an assessment in September 2024 warning how Iran had developed a “large and highly capable missile and drone force,” designed to render US bases in West Asia “unuseable” and “overwhelm” air defences. JINSA acknowledged this capacity posed a dire threat to the Zionist entity – but argued “Israel” simply required enhanced missile interceptors to counter the menace.
That appraisal was authored by former CENTCOM commander Frank McKenzie, who oversaw the Empire’s disastrous retreat from Afghanistan. On March 20th, he openly boasted how the war on Iran was unfolding according to a strategy drawn up by CENTCOM over “many years”, and “my fingerprints are on this war plan.” McKenzie’s failure to take known threats seriously, and delusional belief in the ultimate invincibility – and inexhaustibility – of US and Israeli air defences, surely accounts for the conflict rebounding so spectacularly against the aggressors.
JINSA’s latest report is likewise rife with fantastical optimism. It argues Iran can be defeated by the Empire pressuring its vassals to move their US-supplied air defences to the Gulf, forming a coalition with “partners” in Europe and West Asia “to escort shipping through the Strait of Hormuz,” and other hallucinatory plots. In a bitter irony, on March 5th, the report’s author cheered how “Iran’s missile firepower has almost run out.” Will the Zionist entity’s very real disarmament even be noticed by imperial strategists?
Tehran approves new Hormuz plan with major restrictions
Al Mayadeen | March 31, 2026
An Iranian lawmaker confirmed the approval of a draft bill to manage the Strait of Hormuz, signaling a major shift in Tehran’s approach to one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints.
Mojtaba Zarei, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in parliament, said lawmakers had endorsed a “project to manage the Strait of Hormuz,” according to Fars and Tasnim news agencies.
Zarei outlined that the bill includes comprehensive measures covering security arrangements, maritime navigation safety, and environmental considerations. It also introduces financial frameworks, including fee systems, to be conducted in Iranian currency.
The legislation further seeks to prevent American and Israeli-linked vessels from transiting the strait, alongside restricting passage for countries participating in unilateral sanctions against Iran.
Expanded sovereign and military role
The bill reinforces Iran’s sovereign authority over the strait, granting a central role to the country’s armed forces in its implementation.
It also emphasizes coordination with the Sultanate of Oman in shaping the legal framework governing the waterway.
Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref earlier stated that the management system of the Strait of Hormuz “has changed and will not return to what it was”, as Tehran works to convert recent gains into concrete economic and security guarantees that affirm its sovereign interests.
Iran could emerge stronger from the war, more dangerous to US: FT
Financial Times columnist Gideon Rachman argues that Iran is emerging from the US-Israeli war on it in a position of strategic strength, having demonstrated the capacity to close the Strait of Hormuz and impose a reported transit toll on commercial shipping, in a development that has exposed the limits of US military and diplomatic power in the region.
There is no question that the Islamic Republic has absorbed significant blows since the war began. Senior leadership, including the country’s leader, was martyred in the opening hours of the aggression, and missile launchers, ships, and command centres have been reportedly attacked.
Yet Iran has not merely held its ground. By effectively closing the strait and charging vessels a reported $2 million each for passage, Tehran has converted military pressure into economic leverage, and potentially into a permanent revenue stream.
With approximately 140 ships transiting the strait daily under normal conditions, the toll mechanism could generate billions of dollars per month for the Islamic Republic.
Marandi: Yemen joins the war – Red Sea could be blocked next – Saudi regime at risk
Glenn Diesen | March 29, 2026
Seyed Mohammad Marandi discusses the ongoing escalation in the Iran War—and why Yemen’s sudden entry could be a game-changer. Marandi is a professor at Tehran University and a former advisor to Iran’s Nuclear Negotiation Team. (Some of the video is lagging due to the ongoing bombing of Tehran). Recorded 29.03.2026.
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How Indonesia’s tilt toward the US left it stranded in the Strait of Hormuz

People line up for gasoline at a Pertamina’s gas station in Sukoharjo, Central Java, Indonesia, on March 26, 2026. [Agoes Rudianto – Anadolu Agency]
By Bhima Yudhistira and Dr. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat | MEMO | March 29, 2026
In today’s fractured geopolitical landscape, energy flows are no longer governed by markets alone. They are shaped—often decisively—by politics. Nowhere is this clearer than in the unfolding crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, where Indonesia finds itself on the wrong side of a strategic divide.
As tensions escalate in the Middle East, Iran has adopted a selective approach to maritime access through the strait, one of the world’s most vital energy chokepoints. Rather than a blanket closure, Tehran has opted for a calibrated policy: friendly nations may pass; others must wait.
The consequences for Indonesia are immediate and stark. While countries like Malaysia, Thailand, China, India and Russia have secured safe passage for their tankers, two Indonesian vessels remain stranded. This is not a logistical hiccup. It is a geopolitical signal.
Iran’s own officials have made the logic explicit. Access is granted based on diplomatic alignment and strategic trust. Nations perceived as cooperative—or at least non-hostile—are accommodated. Others are left navigating uncertainty.
Indonesia, it appears, has misread the moment.
For decades, Jakarta prided itself on a doctrine of “free and active” foreign policy—non-aligned, pragmatic and flexible. That posture allowed Indonesia to engage multiple power centers without becoming entangled in their rivalries. But recent policy choices suggest a drift away from that equilibrium.
By signing the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) with the United States and joining the Board of Peace (BoP), Indonesia has moved beyond nominal non-alignment into visible proximity to the US orbit.
The ART is not merely a trade deal; it reshapes tariffs, supply chains and regulatory frameworks in ways that bind Indonesia more closely to U.S.-led economic and security systems. Meanwhile, the decision to join the BoP—widely criticized at home as a strategic misstep—signals alignment with Washington’s Middle East posture, particularly in the context of Gaza.
In Tehran’s eyes, these moves blur the line between cooperation and alignment. In a conflict environment defined by binary loyalties, even economic agreements and diplomatic platforms are read as strategic signals. In that context, perception is policy.
The cost of that perception is now measurable.
First, energy security. The Strait of Hormuz handles a significant share of global oil shipments, and disruptions there ripple across supply chains worldwide. If Indonesian tankers cannot pass freely, the country must source crude and liquefied petroleum gas from alternative routes—longer, riskier and far more expensive.
Shipping costs rise. Insurance premiums spike. Subsidy burdens swell. In a country where energy prices are politically sensitive, the fiscal implications are profound. What begins as a diplomatic miscalculation quickly becomes a budgetary strain.
Second, competitiveness. Malaysia and Thailand, having secured passage, are better positioned to maintain stable energy inputs and export flows. Their manufacturing sectors—already integrated into global supply chains—gain an advantage over Indonesia’s.
This is not just about oil. It is about the broader architecture of trade. Delays in energy supply affect production timelines. Disruptions in shipping lanes threaten exports of automotive components, industrial goods and commodities. In a tightly coupled global economy, reliability is currency—and Indonesia risks devaluation.
Third, macroeconomic stability. Higher import costs feed directly into inflation. A widening subsidy bill pressures public finances. And as external balances deteriorate, the rupiah faces renewed volatility. These are not abstract risks; they are the building blocks of economic stress.
All of this stems from a single, uncomfortable reality: geopolitics has overtaken economics.
Iran’s policy in the Strait of Hormuz underscores a broader shift in global order. Strategic chokepoints are no longer neutral spaces. They are instruments of leverage. Access is conditional. Neutrality, if not actively maintained, is easily questioned.
Indonesia’s response so far—continued negotiation and diplomatic outreach—may yet yield results. But negotiation from a position of ambiguity is inherently difficult. Other countries have secured passage not merely through dialogue, but through clear, consistent alignment in the eyes of Tehran.
Jakarta must therefore confront a difficult question: can it afford its current trajectory?
Recalibrating foreign policy does not mean abandoning partnerships or retreating into isolation. It means restoring balance. Indonesia’s strength has always been its ability to engage across divides—to be trusted by competing blocs precisely because it was not seen as belonging to any of them.
That credibility now needs rebuilding.
The immediate priority is practical: secure the release and passage of Indonesian vessels, stabilize energy supply and prevent further economic fallout. But the longer-term task is strategic. Indonesia must reassess its positioning in a world where neutrality is no longer assumed, but demonstrated.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis is a warning. It reveals how quickly global alignments can translate into tangible costs—and how vulnerable even large economies can be when geopolitical signals are misread.
For Indonesia, the lesson is clear. In an era of weaponized interdependence, foreign policy is no longer a distant abstraction. It is an economic imperative.
And getting it wrong is no longer affordable.
US has no choice but to retreat from Iranian borders: Top commander
Press TV – March 29, 2026
A senior Iranian military commander says the armed forces’ crushing strikes against US military assets will leave Washington with no choice but to withdraw its forces from Iran’s borders.
Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force, Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mousavi, said in a post on X that Iranian forces will continue to paralyze US radar networks and logistics while inflicting casualties on their personnel across the region.
“Iran’s intelligence superiority and precision strikes will leave the US with no alternative but to retreat from Iranian borders,” Mousavi said.
The commander noted that “the wreckage of AWACS, aerial refuelers, and demolished hangars speaks for itself.”
Mousavi also vowed that the country’s armed forces will soon add “more high-value targets to this list.”
US President Donald Trump is reportedly considering “limited ground operations” on Iranian soil. Iranian officials have warned that such a move will only lead to further casualties among American troops.
Iranian armed forces have launched 86 waves of retaliatory strikes against Israeli and US assets across the region, causing casualties and billions of dollars in damages.
Notably, a US Air Force E-3 Sentry AWACS command and control plane was struck and damaged during a March 27 missile and drone attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.
According to Air & Space Forces Magazine, this specific attack also injured more than 10 service members and damaged several aerial refueling tankers.
Military analysts describe the loss of these “flying radars” as a “big deal” that has significantly crippled Washington’s ability to manage the battlespace in the Persian Gulf.
Beyond the AWACS and tankers, Iran’s attacks have damaged or destroyed radar systems, a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system and Reaper drones in attacks on US bases in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait.
Reports have also suggested that the US and its regional allies are “burning through” their supply of Tomahawk and interceptor missiles.
Since the war began on February 28, the Pentagon has already confirmed at least 13 US troops killed and roughly 200 wounded.
Israel’s Iran Strategy Uses US Military & Gulf States as Its Pawns
By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | March 29, 2026
While most honest analysts will conclude that the decision made by the White House came as a result of pressure from the Israelis or that this is a war that is being fought for Tel Aviv’s interests, many fail to see any clear strategy at play.
In order to understand the strategy behind the US-Israeli assault on the Islamic Republic, you must first remove the notion that the United States is in the driving seat to any significant extent.
Almost immediately after the 12-Day War in June of 2025, the Israeli leadership was already preparing for the next round. On July 7, Axios News even reported that officials in Tel Aviv believed that US President Trump would give them another green light to attack.
Meanwhile, the most influential Zionist think tanks in Washington DC, the likes of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), were openly discussing the necessity of a new round of confrontations.
These think tanks facilitated discussions and published pieces in which they made it clear that while the next round was inevitable, it had to be the last round, and that the US’s involvement would be important in deciding outcomes.
Understanding the Israeli Strategy
It is no coincidence that senior Israeli officials, all the way from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to opposition leader Yair Lapid, have all recently publicly endorsed the “Greater Israel Project”.
This is not simply posturing, this is their goal. But how does this fit into the Iran war? Well, it will begin to make sense when the context is all provided.
Firstly, the Greater Israel Project’s strategy is grounded in an academic article published by a former Israeli intelligence officer and journalist, Oded Yinon. The plan did not advocate for the physical expansion of the Israeli State’s borders over every nation between the Euphrates River and the River Nile, but instead opted for an approach that would transform Israel into a regional empire.
In order to achieve this goal of a “Greater Israel”, it would first necessitate the collapse of all the region’s sovereign States, which would instead be broken up into warring sectarian and ethno-regimes.
The purpose of achieving the disintegration of the surrounding nations is a simple concept to understand. If they are all divided, economically weak, and lack the military capabilities to stand up to Israel, it makes it easy for the Israelis to control them.
Take, for example, the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq, or the semi-autonomous zone in southern Syria’s Sweida Province, now carved out by Israeli-backed separatists.
Syria and Iraq are perfect examples of what happens when a nation is torn apart and sectarianism, or ethno-supremacist ideologies, are spread through deliberate propaganda campaigns.
Although Secular Arab Nationalism failed in the region, the chief proponent of it, former Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, was indeed correct in his analysis as to why it was a net positive for the region.
A united Arab World would undoubtedly be far stronger than the simple modern nation-states of the region, whose borders were drawn up by European colonial powers.
For the Israelis, they had always sought to impose this long-term solution upon West Asia, of a “Greater Israel”, but were previously seeking to do it in a slow and methodical way, opposed to a ruthlessly violent one.
Part of this way of thinking was centered around the idea that Israel maintained a “deterrence capacity”, meaning that their military power was capable of deterring any significant strategic threat from rising against it.
On October 7, 2023, the Qassam Brigades of Hamas crippled this strategy and debunked the notion of their “deterrence capacity”. A few thousand Palestinian fighters managed to overcome the most militarily advanced army in the region, bursting through the gates of their concentration camp, despite the world’s most advanced surveillance systems being present in the area.
The Palestinian groups themselves appear to have been genuinely surprised by how easily they were capable of achieving their goals. Not only did they inflict a blow on the Israeli military and seize captives, but they also managed to collapse the entire Israeli southern command, all with light weapons.
To Israel, the message was clear: The Arab populations of Jordan and Egypt had taken to the streets, some even pouring across the Jordanian border. The weakest link in the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance had dealt the Israeli military its most embarrassing defeat. Deterrence was dead, and former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, was proven correct: “Israel is weaker than a spider’s web”.
The decision to commit genocide was therefore ordered. Israel believed it had to show the Arab World what it was truly capable of, as a means of asserting its control. In the cases of the Arab populations in Jordan, Egypt, and even the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem, the fear tactics appeared to have worked. Then they made an irreversible mistake.
In September 2024, they assassinated Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, a move that completely changed the thinking of Iran and its allies. Now, the message had been received loud and clear; preparations for the last war had to be made. Up until then, the Axis of Resistance had been attempting to close the chapter of the Gaza genocide; now, they understood that destroying Gaza wasn’t the end goal of Israel.
Israel had decided it would accelerate its national project of gradual expansion, meaning that the Islamic Republic of Iran had to be deposed. A failure to overthrow the Iranian government would represent an existential threat to this project.
Israel’s Iran War Strategy
As I have been writing in the Palestine Chronicle for the past eight months, the only viable strategy that the Israelis could hope to use, in order to see any gains, is one where Iran’s civilian infrastructure is the primary target.
That means: taking out power stations, desalination plants along with other key water facilities – less than 3% of Iran’s water needs come from desalination – while blowing up oil and gas facilities, bombing factories, destroying agricultural lands, inflicting costly environmental catastrophes, and attempting to cripple the Iranian State’s ability to function. In other words, a policy that replicates the Gaza model on a much wider scale, impacting a nation of 92 million people.
Tel Aviv’s goal here is a long-term regime change operation, one that will happen gradually following the war itself. Israel knows that destroying Iran’s military capabilities was never going to be possible. Yes, they may have some successes, but totally crippling their missile and drone programs through strikes alone won’t work.
Therefore, they seek to try and force Tehran to expend a large portion of its missile arsenal, making it more difficult for them to start a new war in the near future following the conflict’s conclusion.
If you look at Syria, for example, the government of Bashar al-Assad did not collapse during the war. Instead, the Syrian State slowly eroded from the inside, due to its isolation and the US-EU’s maximum pressure sanctions.
In the end, the Syrian State was largely bought out and was so corrupt that there was little left. When Ahmed al-Shara’a marched into Aleppo and then Damascus, he did so without any fight, although there were some exceptions where a few units resisted.
Now, Damascus is open for Israeli citizens, the leadership in Syria meets with Israeli officials face-to-face, and has even set up a joint normalizing mechanism between both sides. Therefore, using the long game strategy against Iran makes the most sense in Israel’s strategic thinking.
Then there comes the convenient side effect of the strategy, which begins to explain how the US leadership is not in the driver’s seat at all. That being the weakening of the Persian Gulf Arab nations.
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are experiencing untold economic devastation as a result of this war. The reason for this, evidently, is that they all host US bases and have permitted a large presence of American military and intelligence personnel inside their countries.
Oman, and to a lesser extent Qatar, have been the only Gulf nations that appear to be pushing back against the true culprits in this war, the Israelis and US. Muscat in particular has blasted the “security arrangements” in the region and condemned normalising efforts with Tel Aviv, pointing their fingers in the right direction.
Bahrain and especially the UAE have gone in the opposite direction. They are only increasing their pro-Israeli and anti-Iran rhetoric, which comes as little surprise given that both have normalized relations with the Zionists. Riyadh, on the other hand, appears to be on a separate trajectory, with its rhetoric being diplomatic, while its actions suggest it is hostile towards Iran.
The Israelis, despite their efforts to normalize ties with the Gulf States, do not want strong nations to exist anywhere in West Asia under their accelerationist approach to achieving an Israel Empire. This appears to be something that the leadership in Abu Dhabi and Manama have not proven intelligent enough to figure out.
That is why the Israeli leadership had started to announce their next targets, following Iran, were the leaderships in Turkiye and even Pakistan. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not a threat in the way that Iran is, but he does command one of the most powerful military forces in the region and rules over a developing economy, working towards transforming itself into a key global trade hub.
Alone, the idea that Turkiye would begin to build an economic or defence alliance with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Egypt, poses a direct threat to the Greater Israel Project. In Syria, we see a similar thing; although Ankara does not present a clear and present military challenge to the Israelis as a result of its influence in Damascus, it acts as a potential competitor, a nation that may seek to curtail Israeli expansionist plots.
The GCC countries, which are in alliance with one another, maintain immense economic power. As we see today, if the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted, the entire world is impacted. Back in 1973, these Persian Gulf Arab States exercised that power temporarily. One thing to keep in mind with the Israelis is that they never forget history and are infamous for holding grudges.
So, the dismantlement of the Gulf Arab nations’ economies, or at the very least, the weakening of these countries, is viewed as a positive development in Tel Aviv. As for the US, this war is similarly disastrous, but Israel fails to care less.
This war has destroyed US power projection, making it open to its top chosen adversaries – Russia and China – in a number of other arenas. Donald Trump personally has business ties in the Gulf, which don’t benefit from this conflict, so even on a personal level, it isn’t exactly a victory. The entire Western World, allying itself with the US and Israel, is suffering economically, and as a result, this will mean social unrest is possible, even if it takes time to come to fruition.
An embarrassment has already been dealt to the US military, which is being made to look like a paper tiger, as Mao Zedong once called it. Its future in the Gulf region may have just been ruined, along with those billions, or trillions as Trump believes, of investments – from Gulf States – may no longer materialize. The entire White House Security Doctrine, published last year, has been torn up and set on fire.
In terms of soldier casualties, the Trump administration is evidently hiding the true figure, but it goes without saying that this isn’t good news. NATO has been forced to flee Iraq. The US has even lifted sanctions on Moscow and a limited number of sanctions on Iranian oil. There is simply nothing that the US stands to gain from this war, even if it were to somehow pull off a victory; at this point, it would prove pyrrhic.
With all of this being said, what the Israelis are doing is making a massive gamble. A series of risks that appear so far to be backfiring, as Tehran appears to have pre-empted the conspiracies set against it. The final results of the war are not yet in, but the odds appear to be on the side of Iran.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine. He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.
Iran: Trump wanted regime change, now just begging for Hormuz to open
Al Mayadeen | March 29, 2026
Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said on Sunday, marking the 30th day of Iranian national defense against the US-Israeli aggression, that the US president’s objectives have dramatically shifted since the start of the war on Iran.
“The enemy who claimed to have destroyed our air, naval, and missile forces, and had a plan for the collapse of the Islamic Republic, has now set his goal on reopening the Strait of Hormuz,” Ghalibaf said.
“Reopening a strait that was open before the war has become Trump’s operational dream,” he said mockingly.
Ghalibaf stated that the war on Iran, which has come to be known as the Ramadan War, is now at its most critical moment. He noted that Trump is unable to secure the support of European countries, that energy markets are out of control, and that food inflation is approaching.
The war bites the belligerent
The Parliament Speaker detailed the damage inflicted on US military assets throughout the conflict. “The manifestations of American arrogance, from the F-35 to the aircraft carrier and US regional bases, have suffered major blows,” he said. “Strikes on the Israeli regime have been effective, precise, and foundation-shaking.”
Ghalibaf also highlighted the growing strength of the Resistance Axis across the region.
“Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was constantly threatened with disarmament, is today an important and effective part of the Resistance and has trapped the malignant Israeli regime,” he said.
“The Resistance in Iraq is fighting heroically and has astonished the enemy. Ansarallah in Yemen has breathed new life into the Resistance front and is ready to achieve spectacular surprises.”
“This is the honor and greatness of the Resistance front against the world’s arrogant powers,” Ghalibaf stated. “Trump has been accused worldwide of waging a pointless war and has no answer for his public opinion. The evil of initiating the war has returned to its initiator.”
Here is a background section summarizing the current situation with the Strait of Hormuz, based on the Al Mayadeen article:
The battle for the Strait of Hormuz
Since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28, the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas shipments pass, has become a central front in the war on Iran. Iranian authorities have restricted the movement of vessels linked to the US and “Israel” or those supporting, requiring ships to obtain approval before transiting the strategic waterway.
Tehran has made clear that “nonhostile” ships may pass safely if authorized, while the strait remains “closed only to enemies carrying out cowardly aggression against Iran,” as Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi put it. The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps has turned back multiple container ships attempting to transit without authorization.
Iran’s Parliament is now advancing legislation to impose formal tolls on vessels passing through the strait, a move lawmakers say is designed to assert Tehran’s “sovereignty, control and oversight” over the passage, much like the model applied by Turkey in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. The toll system would build on temporary fees applied since late February.
US President Donald Trump has threatened an escalation in the aggression against Iran’s power infrastructure if the strait remains closed, while US attempts to organize international naval escorts to bypass Iran’s control over the strait have so far failed.
The new framework signals Tehran’s intent to use its control over its waterway to regulate access systematically, rather than relying on ad hoc measures, while simultaneously sending a message to the US and “Israel” about the country’s ability to control this key energy corridor.
US-Israeli war on Iran drives global fertilizer prices up 40%
Al Mayadeen | March 28, 2026
The ongoing war on Iran is driving a sharp rise in global fertilizer prices, exposing how Western-led escalation is reverberating across critical sectors such as agriculture and food production, the German-based Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) reported on Friday.
According to Philipp Spinne, managing director of the German Raiffeisen Association, mineral fertilizer prices have increased by 30% to 40% since the beginning of the year. He noted that current market conditions are approaching levels seen at the start of the war in Ukraine, indicating mounting pressure on global supply chains. “A situation similar to what happened in February 2022 is recurring,” Spinne said, pointing to the rapid climb in nitrogen fertilizer prices toward previous peaks.
Hormuz disruptions
The surge is closely tied to disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway through which a significant share of global fertilizer trade passes, including roughly one-third of globally traded urea and about 20% of ammonia. Tehran’s response to the US-Israeli aggression has prompted restrictions on maritime flows, tightening supply and pushing energy prices higher, feeding directly into production costs.
Despite this, the immediate impact on European consumers remains limited. Many farmers had already secured their fertilizer supplies before the outbreak of the war. According to German industry estimates, around 80% of the required quantities for the entire spring season are already held in cooperative storage, while roughly 50% are already in the hands of farmers. However, industry representatives warn that a prolonged war will inevitably translate into higher production costs, which are expected to pass through to food prices over time.
A spokesperson for the Bavarian Farmers’ Association noted that while availability is currently manageable, farms that did not secure supplies early are now facing significant cost burdens. At the same time, relatively weak grain prices are compounding the pressure, squeezing margins and weighing on farm liquidity.
Rising fertilizer costs
Energy costs remain the central driver. Gas accounts for between 80% and 90% of the cost of producing ammonia and nitrogen fertilizers, meaning that fluctuations in energy markets, intensified by the war, directly affect agricultural inputs. Industry representatives added that the sharp rise in gas prices in Western Europe during the Ukraine war had already weakened the region’s chemical sector, a trend now deepening.
As prices rise, farmers may reduce fertilizer use, a shift that could lead to lower yields and tighter food supplies globally. The structural importance of fertilizers to global food systems reflects the scale of the risk: nearly half of the world’s population depends on crops grown using mineral fertilizers, while yields today are roughly double those of the early 20th century due to their use. Any sustained disruption, therefore, carries long-term implications for food security.
Although Europe produces a large share of its own fertilizers, covering roughly three-quarters of its nitrogen needs domestically and slightly more in the case of potash, it remains indirectly exposed through rising gas and LNG prices. While Europe has for years imported little fertilizer directly from conflict-affected regions, indirect pressures through energy markets continue to impact production costs.
Europe under pressure
At the policy level, European actors are increasingly turning to protectionist measures, including tariffs on Russian fertilizers, in an effort to shield domestic markets and reduce external dependency. Industry groups have also called for higher tariffs on Russian potash and for strengthening local production capacity. At the same time, Russia has introduced its own export restrictions to protect internal supply, further tightening global availability.
For now, German farmers remain partially insulated, but those forced to purchase at current prices are facing significantly higher costs, reinforcing concerns that the economic strain on agriculture will deepen if the war persists.
Yemen joins fight against US, Israel by firing missiles at occupied territories
Al Mayadeen | March 28, 2026
Yemen’s Armed Forces have carried out their first military operation since announcing readiness for direct military intervention in the ongoing US-Israeli war on the Axis of Resistance, targeting military sites in southern occupied Palestine with a salvo of ballistic missiles.
Yemeni Armed Forces spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Saree confirmed the operation on Saturday, stating that ballistic missiles struck “sensitive military objectives belonging to the Israeli enemy in southern occupied Palestine.”
Saree said the operation coincided with ongoing resistance operations by fighters in Iran and Lebanon, stressing that it “successfully achieved its intended objectives.”
He affirmed that operations would continue “until the declared goals are met and until the aggression ceases across all fronts of the resistance.”
Earlier this morning, Israeli media had reported missiles launched from Yemen toward the southern occupied territories, with sirens sounding in Eilat, the Wadi Araba region, and al-Naqab.
Saree’s warning
The strike follows a Friday warning from Saree that the Yemeni Armed Forces were prepared for direct military intervention should certain red lines be crossed.
He named three specific triggers: the formation of additional alliances alongside the US and “Israel” against Iran or Axis of Resistance states; the use of the Red Sea as a platform for hostile military operations against Iran or any Muslim country; and the continued escalation of the US-Israeli aggression.
Ansar Allah leader Sayyed Abdul Malik al-Houthi had warned Thursday that the US and “Israel” are advancing a “scheme to reshape the Middle East and establish the so-called Greater Israel,” stressing that Yemen is “not neutral” but stands with the Islamic nation.
Sayyed al-Houthi affirmed that any developments requiring a military response would be met with full readiness, as in previous rounds, while reiterating that Yemen’s military activity targets only US and Israeli objectives, not Muslim-majority states or civilian populations.
Seizing the Kharg: Washington’s path to defeat in the Persian Gulf
By Anis Raiss | The Cradle | March 27, 2026
Four weeks of US-Israeli war on Iran – and the stakes have climbed far higher than Washington anticipated. US President Donald Trump threatened on Truth Social to “hit and obliterate” Iran’s power plants if the Strait of Hormuz was not reopened within 48 hours.
The deadline passed. He blinked and, for the second time, postponed his own ultimatum, recasting it as ‘productive conversations.’ Tehran denied any talks and insisted the reversal was driven by “fear of Iran’s response.”
The US-Israeli air campaign was supposed to break Iran. It didn’t. Now the hawks are pushing for boots on the ground. But the ground war being floated does not simply risk American lives on an island 15 miles (around 24 kilometers) off Iran’s coast. It threatens the entire US military architecture in the Persian Gulf – the bases, the alliances, and the energy infrastructure that has underwritten American dominance in West Asia for decades.
In an interview with NBC News, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, in response to a question about a possible ground invasion by the US, delivered words the Pentagon had no answer for: “We are waiting for them,” which became a meme in the process. The bluff has been called. The question now is whether showing Washington’s hand collapses the entire table.
Raising the stakes with an empty hand
The ground invasion discourse is no longer hypothetical. Pentagon officials have submitted detailed preparation requests for deploying ground forces. Three Marine amphibious assault groups are converging on the Persian Gulf: the USS Tripoli carrying the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit from Japan, the USS Boxer with the 11th MEU from California, and roughly 1,500 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg.
By the time all units arrive, between 6,000 and 8,000 US ground troops will be within striking distance of Iran. But the composition of these forces exposes the gap between rhetoric and reality. Military analyst Ruben Stewart noted that what is being deployed is “consistent with discrete, time-limited operations, not a sustained ground campaign.”
At the same time, Israel’s own military is showing signs of strain. Chief of staff Eyal Zamir warned on 25 March that the army is “going to collapse in on itself,” citing an eroding reserve force and a deepening manpower crisis as wars stretch from Gaza to Lebanon and now Iran.
Washington is pushing more chips to the center of the table – but the hand behind them remains weak. The scenarios now circulating form an escalation ladder where each rung risks pulling the US deeper into a fight it is structurally unprepared to sustain.
Pickaxe Mountain and the raid that takes too long
The most politically attractive option is a covert raid on Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile – believed to be around 400 kilograms enriched to roughly 60 percent, possibly stored near Isfahan or deep inside Pickaxe Mountain.
But the problem is one Sun Tzu identified centuries ago: speed is the essence of war – yet this mission demands the opposite. Extracting nuclear material requires troops to remain on-site long enough for Iranian forces to respond.
Former CENTCOM commander General Joseph Votel described such operations as “feasible,” but issued a clear warning: “You’re going to have to take care of them, resupply them, medevac them. And that requires a logistical tail, and at some point that tail has to be protected as well.”
Washington still carries the scar of Operation Eagle Claw – the failed 1980 hostage rescue that collapsed in the Iranian desert and helped end Jimmy Carter’s presidency.
Kharg Island: The trap disguised as a shortcut
If covert raids carry too much risk for too little certainty, the next option on the table is a limited territorial seizure – and Washington’s hawks have converged on a single target: Kharg Island.
An eight-square-mile (around 20.7 square kilometers) coral outcrop in the northern Persian Gulf, Kharg processes roughly 90 percent of Iran’s crude exports. US Senator Lindsey Graham urged Trump to “take Kharg Island,” while retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg described himself as a “big believer in boots on the ground” there.
The logic sounds surgical: seize Iran’s economic lifeline and force Tehran to the table. But it collapses under even basic scrutiny. Kharg sits just 15 miles (around 24 kilometers) off the Iranian mainland – well within range of coastal missile batteries, drones, rockets, and artillery. Any US force stationed there would face “near-constant bombardment.”
Retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery put it bluntly: “If we seize Kharg Island, they’re going to turn off the spigot on the other end. It’s not like we control their oil production.”
Sun Tzu warned that there is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare. Modern analyses reach the same conclusion. Think tank assessments warn that Kharg is a textbook case of mission creep, pulling US forces step by step toward a wider ground war.
The war Iran has prepared for
What Washington’s hawks consistently overlook is that Iran has spent decades preparing for precisely this scenario – not to match US firepower, but to make any ground war prohibitively costly.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is divided into 31 autonomous ground divisions, each capable of operating independently if central command is disrupted.
When strikes killed the Islamic Republic’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei, intelligence minister Esmail Khatib, and Basij chief Gholamreza Soleimani, the military apparatus continued launching missiles, closing the Strait of Hormuz, and fighting. A command structure designed to survive decapitation appears to be doing exactly that.
At sea, Iran’s naval doctrine relies on asymmetric warfare. Its reported arsenal: hundreds of fast attack craft, coastal missile batteries, an estimated 5,000 naval mines, over 1,000 unmanned suicide vessels, and Ghadir-class midget submarines built for the Gulf’s shallow waters. The Persian Gulf is not an open ocean. It is a corridor shaped by geography and fortified by doctrine – designed to swallow conventional naval power.
On land, the scale alone is decisive. Iran is four times the size of Iraq, with a population exceeding 90 million. Estimates suggest that any conventional invasion would require “hundreds of thousands of troops.”
Then there is the Basij paramilitary network, reportedly capable of mobilizing up to a million reservists – and the IRGC’s decades of experience coordinating asymmetric resistance across the region.
The US currently has fewer than 8,000 moving into position. This is not a war Iran needs to win – but one that is designed to make Washington unable to sustain.
Winning Kharg, losing the Gulf
Even if Washington succeeds tactically – seizing Kharg and declaring victory – the strategic consequences are immediate.
Since the war began, Iran has already demonstrated its escalation capacity. Missiles and drones have targeted US-linked infrastructure across Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Energy facilities, airports, and desalination plants have all come under fire.
A seizure of Kharg would likely trigger a far broader response. Iranian officials have explicitly warned of “continuous and relentless attacks” on regional infrastructure if Iranian territory is occupied.
Tehran has also signaled it could expand the conflict to the Bab al-Mandab Strait through allied Ansarallah-aligned forces in Yemen, threatening a second global chokepoint.
Every US position in the Gulf depends on supply lines that run through the very states already under threat. Bahrain hosts the Fifth Fleet. The UAE hosts Al-Dhafra. Kuwait functions as a logistical hub.
As the Stimson Center noted, Gulf states already fear Trump could declare victory and leave them fighting Iran alone.
