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From the War of the Cities to True Promise 3: Iran’s ballistic program and the path to networked deterrence

By Abbas Al-Zein | The Cradle | June 28, 2025

Under a regional sky long dominated by US and Israeli air and intelligence superiority, Iran made a fateful decision decades ago. It would not attempt to match its adversaries tank-for-tank or plane-for-plane, but would instead build an asymmetric deterrent from scratch.

Rather than chase the mirage of classical military parity, Tehran developed an indigenous ballistic missile arsenal that is now the largest and most formidable in West Asia. This was no short-term, tactical gambit. Iran’s missile doctrine was forged in an existential struggle, refined over war and siege, and ultimately transformed into a cornerstone of national defense policy.

The War of the Cities: Birth under siege (1980–1988)

The first phase of Iran’s missile journey began in the crucible of the devastating Iran–Iraq War, specifically during the infamous “War of the Cities.” As the Baathist government in Baghdad launched Soviet-supplied Scud-B missiles deep into Iranian urban centers, it did so under the protective umbrella of western intelligence and funding from Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The intent was clear: to break Iranian civilian morale through systematic terror from the sky.

Caught without a missile deterrent of its own, besieged diplomatically, and encircled by western-aligned forces, Iran turned to whatever resources it could muster. It secured limited quantities of Scud-B missiles from Libya, Syria, and North Korea. These early acquisitions, modest as they were, formed the embryonic core of a deterrent force placed under the direct command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

But these were more than mere missiles. They were weapons of national dignity in a war for survival for the nascent Islamic Republic. Iran’s leadership came to view missile capability not simply as a tactical asset, but as a psychological and political necessity.

Military historian Pierre Razoux notes in The Iran-Iraq War (2014) that it was during this phase that Iran’s leadership came to the unshakable conclusion: without a retaliatory missile force, no psychological or strategic deterrence was possible.

The Iranian response was neither ad hoc nor passive. Alongside importing missiles, Iranian engineers began dismantling, studying, and maintaining the systems. They built smuggling networks, circumvented embargoes, and reverse-engineered technology.

North Korea emerged as a critical partner, acting as a conduit for Soviet missile know-how. A 2010 RAND Corporation report titled Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment noted that Iran had become capable not only of replicating but also of redesigning and expanding missile technology independently. Between 2000 and 2010, Iran pivoted from mass production to innovation, prioritizing accuracy, range, and operational readiness.

The foundations of Iran’s ballistic doctrine were thus laid: sovereignty through technological independence, and defense through deterrence.

From imitation to innovation (1989–2009)

With the Imposed War over, Iran’s military establishment—spearheaded by the IRGC—began restructuring its defense priorities. The goal was no longer just to have missiles but to produce them independently and on a large scale.

At the heart of this transformation was the late martyred Brigadier General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, a strategic thinker and technical mastermind hailed as the ‘father of Iran’s missile program.’ He understood that deterrence was not about launching missiles, but about mastering their lifecycle: production, concealment, deployment, and precision.

Under his leadership, Iran transitioned from a user to a manufacturer. The Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 were enhanced variants of the Scud-B and Scud-C. But the real breakthrough came in 2003 with the Shahab-3, boasting a range exceeding 1,300 kilometers—a capability that placed US bases in the Persian Gulf and occupied Palestine within striking distance. The Shahab lineage would later give way to the Ghadr class, with better range and multiple warhead capabilities.

The most significant leap, however, came with the adoption of solid-fuel propulsion. The Sejjil missile (2,000–2,500 km range), unveiled by the end of the 2000s, was Iran’s first medium-to-long-range system not reliant on Scud technology. It signaled a new era of technological self-sufficiency and rapid-launch capability.

During this phase, Iran undertook sweeping strategic steps: adopting solid-fuel for easier storage and rapid deployment, establishing underground and mobile launch facilities to avoid detection, building decentralized manufacturing to reduce vulnerability to strikes, and integrating missile research into academic institutions to develop a domestic cadre of experts.

A 2010 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) titled Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment noted that by this stage, Iran had moved beyond simply replicating foreign missile systems and had begun designing its own through local R&D and systematic redesign, including the establishment of underground manufacturing. From 2000 to 2010, Iran’s program pivoted decisively from quantity to quality, enhancing range, precision, and operational readiness.

When Moghaddam was killed in a suspicious explosion at the “Defenders of the Sky” base in November 2011, Iran declared it a national loss. While Israel neither confirmed nor denied responsibility, the Yediot Aharonot newspaper reported that “some assessments” indicated that the blast was “the result of a military operation based on intelligence information.”

Nevertheless, his legacy endured. He had not merely built a weapons system; he had established a sustainable missile doctrine rooted in adaptability and local expertise. His death marked the end of one era, but it also catalyzed the birth of Iran’s next missile generation.

Smart missiles and precision strikes (2010–2020)

By the 2010s, Iran’s goal had shifted from mass deterrence to precision deterrence. Engineers focused on guidance systems using inertial navigation paired with domestic GPS and anti-jamming technologies. The result was a suite of short- and medium-range guided missiles with enhanced tactical utility.

This generation included the Zolfaghar (750 km), the highly precise and compact Fateh-313 designed for preemptive strikes, and the Qiam—Iran’s first finless missile, engineered for stealth and maneuverability.

Iran also entered the low-altitude cruise missile domain, developing systems such as the Soumar (with a range of over 2,000 km) and Hoveizeh (with a range of 1,350 km), both capable of evading conventional radar and penetrating advanced air defenses.

These weapons were not theoretical. In June 2017, Iran launched six medium-range missiles from its territory targeting ISIS command centers in Deir Ezzor, Syria—its first operational cross-border use since the 1980s.

In January 2020, in direct retaliation for the US assassination of IRGC Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani, Iran struck the Ain al-Asad base in Iraq with Qiam and Fateh missiles. Satellite imagery showed sub-five-meter accuracy, hitting aircraft hangars and troop shelters. The New York Times described it as one of the most accurate missile strikes on a US facility in modern history.

This decade marked Iran’s shift from “deterrent” missiles to “executive” missiles—systems where political power was expressed through precision. It was no longer about maximum range, but maximum effect. The missile became a scalpel, not a hammer, paving the way for Iran’s most advanced deterrent doctrine yet.

The rise of networked deterrence (2021–2023)

By the 2020s, Iranian missiles were no longer stand-alone assets. They had become the final phase of a broader, integrated offensive system. Missiles now worked in tandem with kamikaze drones, electronic warfare units, cyber surveillance, and decentralized command structures. This was networked deterrence: a synchronized, multi-domain approach designed to penetrate and paralyze advanced air defense systems.

Under this doctrine, Iran developed new missiles tailored for layered operations. The Kheibar Shekan hypersonic missile (1,450 km, 500 kg warhead), most recently deployed in a multi-warhead configuration during Operation True Promise III against the occupation state, exemplifies this evolution.

Other critical systems include the Khorramshahr-4 (over 2,000 km), Raad-500 (solid-fuel, rapid launch), Zolfaghar Basir (optically guided, 1,000+ km), and Haj Qassem (1,400 km, 500 kg warhead)—all integral to Iran’s expanding offensive architecture.

By 2023, Iran fielded around 30 missile systems with ranges spanning 200 to 2,500 km. These systems, guided by jam-resistant platforms and launched from mobile or underground sites, were designed to render preemptive strikes both difficult and strategically ineffective.

From blueprint to battlefield: True Promise 3 (2024–2025)

In June, Iran operationalized its full deterrent in True Promise III, a massive retaliatory strike against the occupation state and its US backers. Triggered by Israeli aggression and building on limited predecessors, the operation was a turning point. It marked the battlefield culmination of four decades of Iranian missile doctrine.

What distinguished True Promise III was not just the firepower but the integration. Iran coordinated ballistic strikes, drone swarms, and electronic attacks into a single operational framework. For the first time, the world witnessed the seamless fusion of Iran’s missile and drone capabilities in a real war scenario.

The outcome upended assumptions in Washington and Tel Aviv. The missiles that struck deep into Israeli territory were not just instruments of reprisal. They were shields for the program itself—offensive deterrents capable of defending Iran’s retaliatory power by disabling enemy assets before they could act. The strike was not just a response; it was a preemption of the enemy’s preemption.

None of this can be divorced from Iran’s nuclear posture. The ballistic and nuclear programs may appear distinct, but they operate on the same doctrinal axis. The nuclear program symbolizes sovereignty; the missile program enforces it. Together, they dismantled the western fantasy that Israel could neutralize Iran’s deterrent capacities in a single blow.

That era is over. Iran’s missile shield is no longer just a threat. It is a reality, already in motion.

June 29, 2025 Posted by aletho | Militarism | Iran, Middle East | Leave a comment