Peace Negotiations & the End of NATO
Prof. Jeffrey Sachs with Prof. Glenn Diesen
Glenn Diesen | March 18, 2025
The US and Russia negotiate an end to the proxy war in Ukraine: What is realistic to expect, how can Europe’s bellicose reactions be explained, and is this the end of NATO?
Europe’s Provocation: Interview with Russia’s Deputy FM Alexander Grushko on Potential Escalation in Ukraine
“The conflict has reached a stage where the West suffers a strategic defeat”
Izvestia | March 17, 2025
Kirill Fenin’s interview with Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Alexander Grushko on security guarantees from NATO, prospects for dialogue with the EU, and the future of the OSCE:
Q: In December 2021, Russia put forward a proposal to the US and NATO on security guarantees. Is it relevant for us to receive these guarantees now? Is the return of NATO infrastructure to the 1997 borders being discussed in the current negotiations with Washington?
Grushko: In 2021, the Russian Federation put forward two initiatives. One was addressed to the United States, the other to NATO countries. But they were not supported. We realized that our so-called partners were not ready to engage in a dialogue on the merits. It became clear that the nature of the alliance’s military construction and the US military preparations were aimed at achieving superiority over the Russian Federation. Moreover, Ukraine was chosen as the main battlefield, the theatre of military operations against Russia.
If we talk about a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, then, of course, it will have an external outline. We will demand that cast-iron security guarantees become part of this agreement. Since only through their formation will it be possible to achieve lasting peace in Ukraine and, in general, strengthen regional security. Part of these guarantees should be the neutral status of Ukraine, the refusal of NATO countries to accept it as a member of the alliance. In fact, this is precisely the provision that was recorded in the drafts of the aforementioned agreements. As for discussions, of course, they are not being conducted today, since there are no negotiations.
Q: There are reports in the media that the Donald Trump administration is considering the possibility of reducing its military presence in the Baltics. Is this issue currently being discussed with the US?
Grushko: Diplomats and military personnel do not feed on rumors. We soberly assess the situation. If we look at the strategic concepts approved by NATO and developed in the European Union, as well as the nature of NATO deployments along our borders, we will see that we are talking about long-term plans that the West is not trying to adapt in any way to a future peace agreement. And we will proceed from this in terms of our policy and in the sphere of military development.
If we compare the current situation with 2019, the number of NATO military contingents on the eastern flank, primarily in Poland, the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania, has increased by 2.5 times. The amount of heavy equipment has increased by about the same amount. The so-called military Schengen (free movement zone for military personnel – Ed.) is being implemented. The airfield and port networks are being strengthened and expanded. NATO is creating new rapid response units and increasing maneuverability. We are seeing how the density and scale of exercises are increasing. They are becoming more aggressive, aimed at military operations against a comparable adversary. By this we mean the Russian Federation. This is the reality that we have to reckon with. And until there are real changes in the policies and military development of NATO countries, we will proceed from the existence of significant threats to Russia from the West.
Q: As is known, the dialogue on security guarantees was conducted not only between Russia and the United States but also along the Russia-NATO line. The last time a meeting in this format took place was in January 2022. Against the backdrop of the intensification of dialogue with Washington, are negotiations between Russia and NATO possible?
Grushko: I don’t see any prospects at the moment. Of course, you can’t say never, but what can we talk about if NATO countries refused to consider Russia as a partner even in those areas where our interests objectively coincided, for example, in the fight against terrorism. Today they have designated Russia as a direct and immediate threat to NATO countries, and they are conducting their military policy and the process of military development in such a way as to achieve superiority over us in all theaters of military operations, in all, as they say, operational environments: in space, in the air, on land, at sea, in cyberspace.
We see that they are turning the previously most peaceful region of Europe in military terms – the Baltic – into a zone of military confrontation. I will only say that 32 military facilities have been allocated for the deployment of American military forces in Sweden and Finland. All this is a new reality that contradicts everything that was laid down in the Russia-NATO Founding Act and other documents that were intended to unite efforts to counter common threats and at the same time deal with the consequences of the Cold War. The Western countries made a different choice. Our representation in NATO was closed, since NATO made its further functioning impossible. And now there is only a hotline with NATO headquarters, which is provided on our part by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Belgium. It has not yet been activated, but we have officially notified the leadership of the alliance about it. They know where to call if necessary.
Q: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Moscow is categorically against the presence of NATO or EU peacekeepers on Ukrainian territory. Does Russia allow the option of deploying peacekeepers under the auspices of the UN? What conditions must be met for this?
Grushko: Peacekeeping and NATO are incompatible things. They brag a lot that it is a defensive alliance, but the real history of the alliance consists of military operations, a series of aggressions without any reason, just to once again emphasize its hegemony in world and regional affairs. Therefore, all this talk is absolutely inappropriate and absurd. And I think that even the average Westerner understands the real price of such penetrations. Secondly — President Vladimir Putin and Minister Sergey Lavrov talked about this — we absolutely do not care under what label NATO contingents can be deployed on the territory of Ukraine: be it the European Union, NATO, or in their national capacity. In any case, if they appear there, it means that they are deployed in a conflict zone with all the consequences for these contingents as parties to the conflict.
Moreover, the very talk of peacekeeping is an attempt to put the cart before the horse. The question of some kind of international support for the agreement can only be approached when this agreement is worked out. And if the parties come to the understanding that the “peace package” needs international support, then the subject of discussion appears. This could include unarmed observers, a civilian mission that would monitor the implementation of individual aspects of this agreement, or guarantee mechanisms. But for now, it’s just hot air.
Q: What is Russia’s attitude to the possible deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine under the auspices of the OSCE?
Grushko: There are two points that need to be kept in mind. Firstly, the OSCE does not have armed potential, it does not have an “armed hand”, unlike the UN. In particular, it does not have the competence, the staff committee, the structures that could manage such contingents. Secondly, even the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, which was deployed there, failed to cope with its tasks. In fact, it was used by NATO to gain unilateral advantages for the Kyiv regime. Now it has become known that some employees of this mission, who were supposed to be neutral and ensure strict implementation of the mandate, in fact worked in the interests of Kyiv. And it is no secret that many residents of Donbass said: “OSCE observers drove by – expect shelling”. Therefore, we have an extremely skeptical attitude towards the involvement of the OSCE, even theoretically.
It is impossible not to see that the purpose of these rumors about the deployment of Western contingents on Ukrainian territory is to prepare public opinion for the most radical scenarios, part of a campaign to whip up military psychosis and demonize Russia. Let me remind you that just a few months ago, such a prospect was denied by all NATO member states, and the Secretary General repeatedly stated that under no circumstances would the Alliance’s soldiers appear there.
Q: This week, the OSCE Secretary General came to Moscow. How do you assess the results of the talks with him? Are any further contacts possible through this organization?
Grushko: There will be contacts, of course. It is good that the Secretary-General came. For two years, the OSCE leadership has not visited Moscow. The main problem of the OSCE is that the organization, as a result of the West’s actions, has effectively been pushed to the sidelines of political processes. Its main purpose as an instrument of reconciliation between East and West, of mitigating contradictions, has been lost. At that time, this was generally called “détente.”
Almost nothing remains of this legacy.
The OSCE is currently at a crossroads. This summer will mark the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords. It depends only on the member states themselves whether this platform will be in demand for some unifying purposes or whether the current crisis state of the organization will become terminal.
Q: Against the backdrop of the dialogue between Moscow and Washington, is a similar negotiating track with Brussels possible?
Grushko: Such a track is possible. But, firstly, the European Union is isolating itself from Russia. It has broken off all political contacts. It is difficult for me to even say with which international structure there was a closer dialogue. Two meetings a year at the highest level, an annual meeting of the government of the Russian Federation and the European Commission. Also more than 20 permanent partnership councils, including the umbrella foreign policy one. Everything has stopped.
In any case, if there are finally signals that Brussels is ready to enter into some kind of dialogue with us, we will not be against it. But today such a prospect is not in sight – on the contrary, the European Union continues to follow the suicidal path of introducing sanctions. If in 2013 the volume of trade between Russia and the European Union was €417 billion, then in 2024 it was at the level of €60 billion.
As for the EU’s insistent demands to sit down at the negotiating table on the Ukrainian conflict, I don’t even know how to characterize this in diplomatic terms. The EU was at these negotiations and was at the center of events starting with the Maidan, where three EU countries acted as guarantors of the agreement between Viktor Yanukovych and the “opposition.” And what did they do to implement the Minsk agreements? Absolutely nothing, on the contrary, they encouraged Kyiv to sabotage them. And when they (the Minsk agreements – Ed.) collapsed, when it became clear that Kyiv was leading the matter to a military solution, a conflict, which, in fact, became the trigger for the decision to conduct a special military operation, Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande stated that they had no intention of implementing the Minsk agreements. A respite was needed to pump Kyiv with weapons and prepare it for a direct clash with Russia. Against this background, it is not very clear what role the Europeans can play.
Q: Can the EU take a more constructive position towards Russia in the future?
Grushko: If we look at their current positions, they do not in any way suggest any constructive participation in the negotiation process. The statements from the camp of the political elites of the European Union are quite clear. Point 1 — do not let the conflict end quickly, it must continue until 2030, because if it ends quickly, then “Russia will immediately attack the Baltic countries and Poland.” Point 2 — we must achieve the strategic defeat of Russia. And we know what is meant by this. Point 3 — seek guarantees of Ukraine’s security.
In fact, the conflict has reached a stage where the West suffers a strategic defeat. Because in all three components that are counted on – military defeat on the battlefield, economic collapse and, ultimately, as they say, regime change – the result is exactly the opposite. If we look at the economic side, our economy has grown by 4%, in the European Union – approximately 0.1% to 1%, close to the statistical error. And the situation on the battlefield is well known.
One of the most important elements for us is the security interests of Russia. And Europe should understand that if strong international legal guarantees for Russia’s security are created, which will exclude Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the possibility of deploying foreign military contingents on its territory or using it to exert military pressure on Russia, then the security of Ukraine and the entire region in a broader sense will be ensured, since one of the root causes of the conflict will be eliminated.
Q: One of the main initiators of the idea of sending European peacekeepers to Ukraine is French President Emmanuel Macron. In your opinion, what is the reason for the desire to aggravate the situation and lead to a direct clash between Russia and NATO?
Grushko: I think that two factors play a role here. First, France itself is not doing so well in the economic, social and all other spheres. The country is going through a serious crisis, it is being shaken by demonstrations, Emmanuel Macron and the political forces that support him are not in a very strong position. Governments are changing. Therefore, the introduction of such a loud topic as sending a military contingent is intended, among other things, to distract public attention from domestic problems.
Secondly, this is an attempt by France to lead the war party within the EU, thereby emphasizing its leadership in the union. France’s influence has been weakening lately. The link between Germany and France no longer works for many reasons, and Macron has apparently decided to use the military theme to once again bring his country to the epicenter of European politics, abandoning French foreign policy traditions.
In the traditions established by General de Gaulle, France played a balancing role. Its significance and political weight lay precisely in this: France proposed initiatives that united rather than divided. Now France, unfortunately, is becoming more radical than the Russophobic camp consisting of the Baltic countries and Poland.
Q: The head of the European Commission recently came up with an initiative for an €800 billion EU rearmament program. Does Russia see risks in connection with the emergence of this program?
Grushko: We see the risks, they are absolutely obvious. The fact is that the military and political subordination of the European Union to NATO has occurred; this follows not only from the practice of cooperation between NATO and the EU, but also from the documents they adopt. The NATO-EU Joint Declaration quite clearly states the EU’s own aim to become a European support for NATO. The Alliance views Russia as a direct and immediate threat. This postulate has also crept into the EU’s political documents. And we see that the plans to create the so-called autonomous military support for the European Union today are aimed at creating threats primarily to Russia.
Large-scale armament programs have been drawn up: over five years, the growth of arms imports to the EU has increased by 2.5 times, with 64% of military equipment purchased in the United States. At the same time, such systems are being purchased — including, in particular, F-35 aircraft — which are not intended for use in some local crisis situations, but for achieving superiority over a comparable enemy, that is, the Russian Federation. The rearmament program is aimed at preparing Europe for a military clash with Russia. US President Donald Trump is demanding an increase in military spending in the EU countries from 2% to 5%. Many have already stated that they will move in this direction. This is a very significant increase. Today, the amount of military spending by the European Union is several times greater than the military spending of the Russian Federation.
Q: The Dutch parliament has already voted against the country’s participation in the EU rearmament program. Is Europe capable of finding the funds for such a large-scale project?
Grushko: Mario Draghi, former Prime Minister of Italy and President of the European Central Bank, recently published a report on the economic state of the EU. The report is quite frank and tough; its main conclusion is that if the EU wants to become prosperous in the new global architecture, it needs to find €800 billion annually to invest in industry, new technologies, the “green transition” and other projects. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, added €800 billion to this, which are needed to further arm the European Union.
Let’s not forget that, according to the most conservative estimates, the losses from the sanctions that the EU imposed on Russia and the losses from the refusal to cooperate with us, including in the energy sector, amount to €1.5 trillion. More than €200 billion went to military and other support for the Kyiv regime. If we add up these figures, we get a financial hole of at least €3 trillion. They need to be found somewhere. This is a colossal amount of money – more than two annual military budgets of all NATO countries. It is clear that the money will be scraped from the pockets of taxpayers, cutting spending on education, medicine, science, and so on.
It is difficult for me to say whether this project will withstand such a financial challenge. If we remember that the total public debt of all EU countries will soon approach 100% of GDP – which means that the EU countries must work for a year and spend nothing – then the prospects for implementing all these plans are rather vague.
Q: What measures can Russia take to counter these threats?
I will note once again: we cannot relax. We have drafted military planning documents that are designed to reliably ensure the security of our country and its defense capability in all areas. As the president emphasized, we will not get involved in an arms race. And it is good that our military capabilities allow us to reliably mitigate threats without spending crazy amounts of money on them and taking them out of the development sphere.
It is obvious that the negative trends that are being imposed today by both NATO and the European Union are very stable, and we must be prepared for a variety of scenarios. The events in Ukraine have shown that NATO and the European Union underestimated our capabilities and our determination and, by betting on inflicting a strategic defeat on us, made a big mistake.
Col. Jacques Baud: The Origin and Solution to the Ukraine War
Col. Jacques Baud with Prof. Glenn Diesen
Glenn Diesen | March 14, 2025
Jacques Baud, retired Colonel in the Swiss Strategic Intelligence Service, has published several books on the origin of the Ukraine War, and he presents the conditions to bring the war to an end. Understanding what happened to the Minsk agreement is important to understand what is required to find a solution. Colonel Baud also laments the dangerous geopolitical immaturity in Europe that no longer addresses reality.
Russia’s Kursk Region Becomes Final Resting Place for NATO’s Top Tech
By Ilya Tsukanov – Sputnik – March 15, 2025
The near-total collapse of Ukraine’s operations in Kursk region has highlighted the folly of Zelensky’s obsession with throwing his best troops and materiel into a hopeless campaign. Here’s a selection of NATO equipment that has “found its peace in Kursk’s ground” over the past month, complete with photo and video evidence.
Russia’s Defense Ministry estimates that Ukraine has lost nearly 400 tanks, almost 2,800 armored vehicles and over 1,000 guns and mortars in fighting in Kursk region to date, and says over 85% of territories once occupied by Ukrainian forces have been freed.
Liberated areas contain scores of wrecked, burned out, damaged or abandoned vehicles, including some of NATO’s most advanced equipment:
M2A2 Bradley: Over 300 of these do-it-all American infantry fighting vehicles have been sent to Ukraine, with nearly half confirmed lost by Oryx. They’ve been spotted among other wrecked NATO equipment in Kursk region.
M1 Abrams: 31 of these custom-made monkey model American main battle tanks have been delivered to Ukraine. 20 lost to date. One recently spotted being towed away intact in Kursk region. Australia plans to send 49 more.
Leopard 1 AVLB Biber: Armored vehicle-launched bridge built on a German Leopard-1 tank chassis. 30+ sent to Ukraine. One recently found abandoned, in mint shape, in a Kursk village.
M777: A third of the 180 US-made 155mm howitzers sent to Ukraine have been lost, damaged, or abandoned to date, with several recently captured almost intact in Kursk region.
Stryker: Over 400 of these Canadian-built armored fighting vehicles have been transferred to Ukraine. At least 55 destroyed, some caught on Russian MoD FPV drone videos moments before meeting their fate.
BMC Kirpi II: 200 of these Turkish MRAPs have been sent to serve in Ukraine’s elite units. Scores destroyed, damaged or captured by Russian forces, including in Kursk.
HMMWV: 5,000 of these ubiquitous US vehicles, better known as Humvees, have been delivered to Ukraine. Scores captured on Russian FPV drone cam footage in Kursk region.
Roshel Senator: Over 1,700 of the Canadian-built armored cars have been delivered to Ukraine. Also spotted in Russian FPV drone videos.
MAXXPRO: About 440 these Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) have been sent to Ukraine by the US, with at least 197 lost to date, including in fighting for Kursk.
M113: 1,000+ of these ancient tracked APCs have been sent to Ukraine by the US and allies, with nearly 300 destroyed to date, including in Kursk region.
BATT UMG: Ukraine has received 116 of these US-made vehicles. Rarely seen, some are known to have met their fate on the battlefields of Kursk.
Bushmaster PMV: About 120 of these Australian-made Protected Mobility Vehicles have gone to Ukraine, some ending up in Kursk region, and at least 25 lost to date.
M240: Besides heavy equipment, an array of NATO small arms has also been destroyed or captured in Kursk as well, among them the FN M240 7.62mm machinegun, delivered to Ukraine by the US and France. In February, a Russian trooper in Kursk captured an M240 after storming a Ukrainian position and bringing the gun back to friendly lines.
The ball is in Russia’s court? Russia is winning a war, not playing tennis
Strategic Culture Foundation | March 14, 2025
The ball is in Russia’s court, according to the Trump administration regarding a proposed 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.
The proposed truce was announced following discussions on Tuesday in Saudi Arabia between the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and representatives of the NATO-backed Ukrainian regime. Rubio said it was now up to Russia to reciprocate with the Ukrainian side’s purported willingness to hold a ceasefire.
In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin tactfully said that Russia was open to a ceasefire but only if it led to a complete and comprehensive peace settlement. Putin repeated that any durable resolution must address the root causes of the conflict and Russia’s fundamental strategic security concerns.
The Russian leader then met with Trump’s special envoy on Thursday. Following the discussions in Jeddah between the U.S. and the Kiev regime, Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff travelled to Moscow where he met with Putin. The details of their conversation were not disclosed. But it was reported that Witkoff delivered “additional information” from Trump to Putin regarding the proposed ceasefire. It was reported that Witkoff returned to Washington with details from Putin. It may be surmised that the Russian position on its terms was reiterated. Trump hailed the discussions as “productive.”
Herein lies the rub. The essential underlying issues are the aggressive expansion of NATO and its weaponizing of a NeoNazi Ukrainian regime. The United States and its NATO partners instigated the conflict in Ukraine over several decades since at least the end of the Cold War in 1991. The past three-year war in Ukraine is but a symptom of a longer and systematic hostility. Trump seems to be cognizant of those issues.
The Trump administration has abandoned the false war-propaganda of the Biden administration. It is now acknowledged in Washington that the conflict in Ukraine is a proxy war between the U.S.-led NATO axis and Russia.
As the spectacular military defeat of the NATO proxy forces in Kursk this week demonstrates – as well as the rapid gains Russia is making against the crumbling Kiev regime – the U.S.-led “Ukraine Project” has been vanquished. Russia has all but won the proxy war.
The Americans (factions within) and their NATO surrogates are trying to avoid the admission of defeat by contriving a superficial peace process that only ends up as a “frozen conflict” on Russia’s borders.
The best way to bring the war to an end is for the United States to stop arming the Kiev regime and supplying it with intelligence and logistical support.
This week Trump resumed military and intelligence supplies to the Kiev regime to coincide with the apparent offer of a ceasefire from the Ukrainian regime. That amounts to one step forward, two steps back.
It was rather risible to hear Marco Rubio, the U.S.’ top diplomat, affecting the image of an honest peace broker telling Russia that the ball was in its court to reciprocate for peace as “a compromise” with Ukraine.
The Trump administration has a misplaced view of the conflict if it thinks Russia can be pressured according to U.S. one-sided and pretentious demands.
Russia is winning a momentous war, not playing tennis.
In any case, the ball, so to speak, is and will remain firmly in the United States’ court until it accepts defeat and Russia’s victory terms. It is the U.S. and not its European vassals nor its catspaw Kiev regime that will have to make that call.
Those terms have been repeatedly stipulated by Moscow: a lasting security treaty in Europe consonant with Russia’s just and basic demands for NATO to roll back and desist from its aggressive tendencies; for Ukraine to be a neutral state in perpetuity never being a member of NATO; for the NeoNazi regime to be eradicated and the cultural rights of ethnic Russian people to be guaranteed and respected; and for the historic Russian territories of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, Zaporozhye and of course Crimea to remain intact as part of the Russian Federation.
Moscow reserves the right to change the terms per conditions on the ground if the conflict persists, such as reclaiming its historic territory of Odessa, Kharkiv, Nikolaev, and enforcing a no-fire zone in Ukraine’s Sumy Oblast from where the failed NATO Kursk offensive was launched last August.
On Russia’s successful recapture of Kursk, as Putin points out, there are serious contingencies that need to be dealt with even before a ceasefire is contemplated. The invaders, including NATO mercenaries, committed war crimes against civilians. Are they expected to be let go freely? This is no doubt a reason why the U.S. and Ukraine are suddenly pushing the idea for a ceasefire as a way to salvage failure and rearm.
Trump will have to deal with the reality of Russia’s dominant position: its military victory and its historically righteous cause to confront NATO aggression.
It remains to be seen now how Trump responds. He needs to disabuse arrogant misconceptions that Washington is acting as a peace broker. The U.S. is the main protagonist in a proxy war against Russia. The Kiev regime is but a bit player. Moscow has no need or inclination to engage with a corrupt NeoNazi regime headed up by a puppet president who no longer even has the semblance of legitimacy after cancelling elections last year and ruling by martial law.
If Trump is serious about ending the proxy war in Ukraine, he can do so promptly by ending the weapons flow to that country. His resumption of weapons supplies this week does not bode well.
Trump should also ignore the bleating of the European lackeys, in particular the British, who have nothing positive to offer. London was “intimately” involved in the latest ceasefire proposal from the U.S. and Ukraine, according to the BBC. That should be seen as a warning of a dirty trick.
It is a negative sign that the U.S.-Ukraine joint statement this week in Saudi Arabia peddled vile lies about Russia abducting Ukrainian children. It was also contemptible that the statement called for “future security guarantees for Ukraine” (the aggressor!) while saying nothing about Russia’s security concerns. The absence of the latter indicates the U.S. side has little understanding about “root causes” of the conflict.
Moreover, the U.S.-Ukrainian joint statement called for the involvement of European partners in peace talks. The present crop of European leaders has no intention or capability of negotiating a lasting peace with Russia. They insist on Ukraine becoming a future member of NATO and they want to insinuate themselves into the dialogue to scupper a peace deal by deploying “peacekeeping” troops. The British and French reportedly want the U.S. to provide air cover for what would be their trip-wire troop presence, thereby escalating the war.
Will Trump be duped by the perfidious British, French and other European Russophobes? Perhaps with a false-flag provocation?
American and European political leaders have negligible credibility for offering a ceasefire to Russia, never mind a durable peace. They started this war and surreptitiously want to continue it by other means under the guise of a peace process that does not address the root causes of conflict.
That implies that the only way to deal with the root causes and to establish a lasting peace is for Russia to defeat the NATO enemy with an explicit, unconditional surrender. Can Trump’s ego handle that?
Peace begins when the guns cease, but for true peace to last, the U.S.-led NATO war on Russia must be defeated. Can the U.S. imperial deep state handle that?
Either way, we will soon see.
NATO countries should restore ties with Russia – bloc chief
RT | March 14, 2025
Europe and the United States should gradually normalize relations with Russia once the Ukraine conflict is over, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has said.
The statement comes a day after the head of the US-led military bloc met President Donald Trump at the White House and amid ongoing efforts by Washington to establish a ceasefire between Moscow and Kiev.
Trump has also expressed interest in restoring economic ties with Russia, an idea that was supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Speaking to Bloomberg TV on Friday, Rutte recalled that he had “many dealings” and “many negotiations” with Putin while prime minister of the Netherlands.
“Long-term, Russia is there, Russia will not go away,” he said. “It’s normal if the war would have stopped for Europe somehow, step by step, and also for the US, step by step, to restore normal relations with Russia,” he argued.
Ukraine’s possible membership of the bloc is off the table in the current peace process, Rutte confirmed, a point Moscow has insisted upon.
Most EU leaders, with the notable exceptions of Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, have advocated for continued confrontation with Russia, despite the ongoing peace process.
European NATO countries have been supplying weapons to Kiev since the escalation of the conflict in 2022. Some bloc members, such as France, have floated the idea of deploying troops in Ukraine to monitor a truce. Russia has denounced the idea and insisted that any NATO contingent in Ukraine deployed without a UN mandate will be considered a legitimate target.
Moscow has accused the EU of militarizing against Russia, after the bloc’s leaders backed €800 billion ($860 bn) in debt and tax-breaks for its military industrial complex.
As NATO’s biggest financial contributor, Trump has consistently criticized the bloc’s European members for not meeting the defense expenditure targets.
NATO has maintained a hostile position towards Moscow since Crimea joined the Russian Federation in 2014 and the subsequent escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022. The developments led to the suspension of practical cooperation and a significant military buildup in NATO countries on Russia’s borders.
Trump’s presidential diplomacy is surging
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | March 14, 2025
The US President Donald Trump by far outstrips any of his predecessors in post-cold war diplomatic history in the transparency both in connecting the public opinion with his America First ideology and in his presidential diplomacy.
Trump’s media briefings have become a daily occurrence and are an absolute ‘must’ for any serious analyst / observer of world affairs.
Trump’s press conference at the White House on Thursday during the visit of the NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte, a 48-minute event, stood out for the following signposts in his foreign policy agenda:
One. Whereas the expectation was that this was just the right occasion for Trump to reclaim the leadership of the transatlantic alliance system and “to project American power” (Rutte’s words), he was instead simply uninterested in NATO — although Rutte praised him sky-high for his contribution to making the alliance a “strong” organisation by boosting its budget.
Two. On the contrary, Trump spoke at length on the Ukraine peace process and expressed hope that the war is ending, taking even a swipe at NATO for having squandered its budget wastefully under the Biden presidency by intervening in a war that should not have happened.
By the way, Rutte is known to be a super hawk on Russia (which actually inspired President Biden to handpick him for the present job late last year.) Rutte was a prominent fixture in the family photos of the recent string of EU summits that were pioneered by French President Emmanuel Macron to choreograph the future trajectory of the Ukraine war the downstream of the perceived US retrenchment,
Three. Trump taunted Rutte openly by proposing a potential role for NATO in his major foreign policy venture to make the Greenland and integral part of the US. Trump severely questioned the basis of the claim by Denmark, a NATO member, to Greenland. Rutte tried to change the topic but Trump would have none of it and reminded him of NATO’s “relevance”. To be sure, NATO finds itself like a cat on a hot tin roof if Trump’s strong hint of a likely boost in the US troop presence in Greenland goes ahead. Trump spoke in the presence of Vice-President JD Vance and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth.
Four. Trump point blank rejected the narrative that Russia posed a military threat to Europe. It not only knocks the bottom out of the legitimacy of the NATO and Europe’s intervention in Ukraine but also casts doubts on the raison d’être of the NATO. (Earlier in his remarks, Rutte had spoken forcefully of the imperative need to build up Europe’s defence industry to meet the threat from Russia.)
Five. Trump hinted that he may resume talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, which he began in the first term but got derailed as his presidency came under siege from the deep state and the neocon lobby with the support of the Democratic Party.
Six. Most important, Trump disclosed that behind the scene, much serious discussion has been taking place with Russia on the various aspects of the Ukraine crisis, including the seemingly intractable territorial issues, and the future status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station in southeastern Ukraine, which is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and among the 10 largest in the world, and has been under Russian control since 2022.
Trump flagged that the White House and the Kremlin as interlocutors are rather familiar by now with each other’s respective stances and the parameters of the Ukraine crisis, which has created conditions for serious negotiations going forward.
Specifically, Trump commented that the Russian reaction to the US’ offer this week of a thirty-day ceasefire in the Ukraine conflict is incomplete and he hopes to meet Putin in this connection. This disclosure enables us to read between the lines the various contrarian pronouncements emanating from Moscow and put in proper perspective the tenor of Putin’s statement of March 13.
There is no question that Trump spoke with great deliberation in Rutte’s presence, knowing that European capitals would be keenly listening. Trump left them in no doubt that without US participation, Europeans will chicken out no matter their rhetoric in recent days.
The ‘Trump effect’ is no longer restricted to Hungary and Slovakia. On Tuesday, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced that “We will not send Italian soldiers to Ukraine .” She announced that Italy, a major NATO member country, shall not be taking part in any future European summits held in this connection. Meanwhile, Meloni’s predecessor Giuseppe Conte told Euronews that the European Commission (read Ursula von der Leyen) “is exaggerating the Russian threat” to boost military expenditure and is “throwing money away to allow all the member states to continue increasing military spending in an uncoordinated and disorderly manner.”
The bottom line is that the misadventure spearheaded by the UK and France and the EU bureaucracy in Brussels to create a “coalition of the willing” to carry the war forward in Ukraine is crash landing even before it got under way. Trump has shown no interest in Western troop deployment in Ukraine in any peacekeeping role; nor does he envisage any European participation in the US-Russia dialogue.
Above all, Trump sees this as a deal between Putin and him. He sounded confident that Russia’s concerns can be properly addressed.
Indeed, in his remarks, Trump never once mentioned Zelensky whose continuance in power Russia regards as the single biggest impediment to peace.
The video of Trump’s press conference is below:
Collapse of Kursk: Narratives versus Reality
Prof. Glenn Diesen
Glenn Diesen | March 11, 2025
The Ukrainian army’s invasion of Kursk, backed by NATO, likely had rational and tangible objectives such seizing the Kursk nuclear power plant, creating a buffer zone, diverting Russian troops, and giving Ukraine a bargaining chip in future negotiations. However, it was also a battle for narratives. Exploring why the military operation failed also provides some lessons for why the war to control the narrative failed. … continue reading
New findings on the Nord Stream attacks — a deep dive
By Maike Gosch | Nach Denk Seiten | March 7, 2025
The Nord Stream pipelines are currently back in the headlines. After rumours of a US takeover of the pipelines recently caused a stir, the Bild newspaper reported on March 4th that Germany is currently intensively examining what levers it has at its disposal to prevent a comeback of Nord Stream 2. Just when you think the absurdity can’t get any worse, someone turns the screw a little further. But I guess these are the times we live in.
However, there is also other news, namely the publication of very interesting research findings on the attack on the pipelines, which may shed new light on the modus operandi and the possible perpetrators. As expected, these do not come from the official investigative bodies, but from an independent journalist from France.
Every crime fiction reader knows that one of the most important steps in solving a case is to ask the right questions. One question that has been bothering me for some time in relation to the Nord Stream attacks is why some of the deepest places in the Baltic Sea, which is shallow in many places, were chosen for the attacks.
Why was the so-called Bornholm Basin chosen as the crime scene, which is around 80 to 100 metres deep, and not other areas that have a water depth of only around 20 to 30 metres and would have had the additional advantage that the two twin pipes of Nord Stream 1 and those of Nord Stream 2 run very close to each other, so that it presumably would have been easier to blow up both pipelines or all four strings?
This question and a possible answer to it are the focus of new research findings by French investigative journalist Freddie Ponton, which appeared last week in the online newspaper 21st Century Wire.
He explores a possible, very simple answer to this question, which can be summarised in one word: submarines.
After rumours of a Russian submarine in the vicinity of the crime scene made the rounds in the very first hours after the attack, a possible commission of the crime with the help of submarines has strangely played a very subordinate to non-existent role in the theories and speculations since then. Seymour Hersh does not mention this possibility either — even though highly experienced German defence expert Thorsten Pörschmann, for example, stated in an interview on October 10, 2022, shortly after the attacks, that he considered the use of submarines equipped for laying ground mines to be the most likely scenario. Here are his comments on this in full (from about minute 14:37):
There are explosive charges that are specially designed for these depths and that can be laid with submarines. That’s the exciting thing. And in terms of weight, they also match the explosive force that was measured. The whole thing is called a bottom mine. They are cylindrical and can be carried in the torpedo tubes of submarines. […] A torpedo tube on a submarine is not only there to fire torpedoes. It can also transport combat swimmers in it and let them out, but these torpedo tubes can also be used as a mine-laying device by sneaking somewhere and laying bottom mines there. Every mine is only supposed to explode when you drive over it or when it’s triggered, but every mine is also an effective explosive, which means you can also use it as an explosive. This is often done with anti-tank mines, that is, if I have nothing else, I use an anti-tank mine as an explosive. That would also work with a bottom mine.
But back to Freddie Ponton’s new findings for 21st CenturyWire: he first points out an important point, namely that these deep places in the Bornholm Basin would be ideal for the use of submarines, both in terms of their manoeuvrability and the possibility of acting undetected.
Another point Ponton highlights is the fact that some of the areas where the attacks took place are even specially designated NATO submarine exercise areas, which are marked as such on nautical charts (as shown in documents from the Danish Energy Agency, which issued the licence for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in October 2019, which he shows in his article). Another important piece of information is that submarine operations in the Baltic Sea are managed and coordinated by the German Navy’s Submarine Operating Authority, or SubOpAuth, in cooperation with NATO and the Baltic states.
So, we have sites that are partly in the middle of areas designated for submarine manoeuvres and whose submarine activities are coordinated by a subdivision of the German Navy. Ponton next sets out to investigate more about NATO’s submarine activities in the period around the attack at the end of September 2022.
In his February 2023 report, the American journalist Seymour Hersh claimed that US Navy divers were involved in the sabotage of Nord Stream and used the NATO naval exercise BALTOPS 22 — one of NATO’s largest maritime manoeuvres, which took place in the Baltic Sea between June 5 and 22, 2022 — to place explosives at various locations along the pipeline. Unlike Freddy Ponton, however, Seymour Hersh did not assume that submarines had been used to commit the offence, but that deep-sea divers had planted the explosives on the pipelines.
Ponton also deals with BALTOPS 22, but focusses on the submarine activities. As he reports, it is naturally difficult to obtain more precise information about the planning, content and command structures of the military exercise. But a stroke of luck helped him: Danish journalists from the TV2 channel were filming a report on the activities of the Danish navy, and the picture showed a screen on which the organisational structure of the BALTOPS 22 exercise was visible. It showed that BALTOPS 22 was led by an American, but that a German military officer was in charge of the submarine exercises which were part of the manoeuvre.
However, around the time of the attacks, there were other exercises in the Baltic Sea in addition to BALTOPS 22, which many are familiar with from Seymour Hersh’s article. Of particular interest for our investigation is the German-led naval exercise Northern Coasts 2022, which began on August 29, 2022 and ended on Wednesday September 28, 2022, two days after the Nord Stream explosions, and which was planned and conducted with the help of NATO’s Allied Naval Command (MARCOM) and other NATO partners. As Freddie Ponton points out in his long and detailed article:
The fact that the Nord Stream explosions occurred under the watch of the German Navy and MARCOM during German-led Northern Coasts 2022 is of great concern. Not only it is unthinkable that Germany wasn’t aware of the air, surface and subsurface activities taking place in the Baltic Sea around that time but, it is even harder to believe, if not inconceivable, that MARCOM was left in the dark.
Ponton’s article thus argues that it is unlikely that anyone outside NATO could have carried out attacks on such a large scale in the “NATO Lake”, as the Baltic Sea is also called, unnoticed during this period, while manoeuvres were taking place in parallel. It also shows the extent to which the naval activities of NATO member states are already coordinated with each other.
Of course, without being an expert in this field, this is difficult to judge. Do these latest investigations and research already provide clear evidence of responsibility by a particular state or actor? No, unfortunately not, but they do provide interesting and relevant context that can help to assess the situation and clarify the probabilities of who the possible perpetrators are most likely to be. These investigations can also provide an answer to the question of who most likely had the means to carry out the attack.
Unfortunately, we are still waiting for final results from the German investigators, so citizen journalism will have to fill this gap. The arrest warrant for a Ukrainian national named Volodymyr Z., who allegedly planted the explosives on the pipelines with other suspects while diving from the sailing yacht “Andromeda”, seems more and more like a red herring, just as the whole yacht story is rather unlikely from the point of view of many experts.
Freddie Ponton’s article is only the first in a series. According to the author, the second part is expected to be published around June 2025. We can look forward to seeing what else will come out of it. In an interview with Patrick Henningsen on X about his findings, the author already mentioned that he will explain, among other things, why there was a 17-hour gap between the various explosions, which is one of the many still unsolved mysteries that this attack — the largest terrorist attack (luckily without human victims) in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany — presents us with.
In his article he furthermore announces:
The idea that a covert operation utilizing an ExMCM Unit [Note by MG: ExMCM stands for Expeditionary Mine Countermeasures. This term is used in military and maritime contexts for special units that specialise in detecting, defusing or removing mines under water] was carried out with the support of an Amphibious Ready Group and a submarine(s) (or mini-subs) during NATO naval exercises may appear unlikely at first glance. However, our investigation into the Nord Stream sabotage now provides compelling evidence for the existence of Seabed Mine Warfare and Underwater Demolition Operations. These activities were conducted during maritime exercises led by NATO member states, thereby aligning squarely with the principles of Maritime Irregular Warfare.
It is a well-established fact that the United States Navy engages in covert, unacknowledged, and unscheduled operations during NATO Mine Countermeasures (MCM) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) maritime exercises in Europe. This assertion is supported by publicly available information, and also further corroborated by off-the-record conversations by our investigative team with both former and active duty NATO officers, and EOD commanders.
It is worth reading Freddie Ponton’s extremely detailed and comprehensive article in full — it contains a great deal of information about developments in the military sector that are unfortunately rarely critically scrutinised by the media, such as the extremely close integration of the German military with NATO structures. There is also very interesting information about the means and methods of the extensive clean-up operation on the bottom of the sea that took place stealthily after the attacks.
However, it is very difficult for me to imagine that German marines were involved in the Nord Stream blast or were even in on it, but let’s wait and see how things develop. In any case, there is still a lot to be discovered beneath the surface.
Translated from German for Thomas Fazi on March 10, 2025.
All the pressure is now on Zelensky after ceasefire offer – don’t believe the British spin
By Ian Proud | Strategic Culture Foundation | March 12, 2025
I assess that Russia will agree with the U.S. on a proposed ceasefire in Ukraine. This would put the ball back in Zelensky’s court to sign a peace deal that could destroy him politically and may give President Putin the security assurances he has sought for over seventeen years.
In a quite remarkable turn of events, the BBC announced that Britain had helped the U.S. and Ukraine agree on the need for a 30-day ceasefire. This is spin of the most disingenuous kind.
The UK has done everything in its power to prevent the possibility of ‘forcing’ Ukraine into negotiations on ending the three-year war. Indeed, just last week, a prominent UK broadsheet reinforced this point in a searing editorial. The British narrative for three years has been that, with sufficient support and strategic patience, Ukraine could impose a defeat on Russia. To use a British military phrase, that plan ‘didn’t survive contact with the enemy’.
Ukraine’s sudden collapse in Kursk, after Russian troops crawled ten kilometres through a gas pipeline that President Zelensky had, with much fanfare, shut down in January, was an astonishing defeat. It was astonishing because it revealed what many western commentators had said since August 2024, that seizing a small patch of land in Russia would turn out to be a strategic blunder for Ukraine. Since the Kursk offensive was launched, Russia has occupied large tracts of land in southern Donetsk, including several important mines and one of Ukraine’s largest power stations. The basic maths show a significant net loss to Zelensky over the past six months. The bigger picture proves that the overall direction of the war has been moving in Russia’s direction since the failed Ukrainian counter-offensive in the summer of 2023.
In Ukraine itself, the vultures are already circling in the sky as the body of Zelensky’s now six-year presidential term approaches its final breath. Arestovich was quick to call for Zelensky to resign after the damaging shoot-out at the Oval Office. Poroshenko has come out to say Ukraine has no choice but to cut a deal. Even Zelensky’s former press spokeswoman has called for peace and implied that the Ukrainian government tries to limit free speech on the subject of a truce. Team Trump is apparently talking to the egregiously corrupt former Prime Minster Yulia Tymoshenko about the future, heaven help us. The domestic political space for Zelensky to keep holding out with meaningless slogans like ‘peace through strength’, and ‘forcing Russia to make peace’ is rapidly closing around him.
That Ukraine has come to the negotiating table at all is a sign that it has been given no choice, since America paused the military and intelligence gravy train. There is nothing in the Jeddah meeting that suggests any change in the U.S. position towards Ukraine.
All that the ceasefire does, if Russia agrees to it, is pauses the fighting. Indeed, it goes further than the unworkable Franco-Ukrainian idea to pause the fighting only in the air and sea, allowing Ukraine to keep fighting on the ground. Ironically, the Jeddah formulation favours Russia, as a partial ceasefire would have provided succour to the Ukrainian army which does not enjoy strategic air superiority, despite its mass drone attack on Moscow and other parts of Russia.
The joint U.S.-Ukraine statement calls for Ukraine and others to ‘immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace that provides for Ukraine’s long-term security’.
If Russia agrees to a ceasefire, the clock will start on 30-days of intensive talks aimed at delivering a durable peace. Russia has said consistently that it will not agree to a ceasefire only; it wants the big questions addressed front and centre. These include Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO, the status of the four oblasts annexed by Russia since the start of the war and the protection of the Russian language in Ukraine.
The latter should be easier to tick off, at least in theory, although it will face resistance from ultranationalists in Ukraine. The second will be harder, as there is no military route for Ukraine to reclaim occupied lands, so may require some diplomatic finesse in allowing for a freezing of the line. By far the most bitter pill for Ukraine and its European sponsors will be the NATO issue.
Just moments after U.S. Defense Secretary Peter Hegseth said at the Munich Security Conference that Ukraine’s NATO aspiration was unrealistic, Keir Starmer told Zelensky that it was irreversible. There is simply no way in which Britain will be able to finesse the point that a core plank of its strategy on Ukraine will be shattered, at U.S. and Russian insistence. Nor is it likely that Russia will agree to any UK proposal for a NATO-lite peacekeeping force in Ukraine, even if it is in Lviv or some place hundreds of kilometres from the line of contact.
Moreover, Russia will expect some movement in any peace talks on the issue of economic sanctions. Before arriving in Jeddah, the Guardian newspaper published an OpEd from Andriy Yermak calling for more sanctions on Russia as part of any peace plan. This is beyond idiotic. What person with an ounce of political savvy thinks that Russia will sign up a peace process that punishes it for ending a war that it is winning on the battlefield?
While I doubt that Russia expects to achieve a complete lifting of all 20,000 sanctions, they will want many to fall away immediately as part of a longer-term plan. This will also force a reckoning with the issue of the $300bn in seized Russian sovereign reserves, most of which are held in Brussels. Ignoring the issue or hoping that western nations can simply give the money to Ukraine, simply won’t work; detailed thinking needed here too, as I have said several times before.
From my perspective, Ukraine’s readiness to go for a ceasefire illustrates how weak its hand of cards has become. Many on the western side are crowing that Russia will be forced to accept a ceasefire on Ukrainian terms, but this is nonsense. I predict President Putin will see this as an opportunity for NATO to provide him with the longer-term security reassurances on NATO enlargement that he has sought for the past seventeen years, without heed.
Trump’s ingenuity vis-à-vis Russia, Iran
By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | Indian Punchline | March 10, 2025
Through the past three year period, Moscow claimed that it faced an existential threat from the US-led proxy war in Ukraine. But in the past six weeks, this threat perception has largely dissipated. The US President Donald Trump has made a heroic attempt to change his country’s image to a portmanteau of ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ with whom Moscow can be friendly despite the backlog of a fundamental dislike or suspicion.
Last week, Trump turned to the Iran question for what could be a potentially similar leap of faith. There are similarities in the two situations. Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian are quintessential nationalists and modernisers who are open to westernism. Both Russia and Iran face US sanctions. Both seek a rollback of sanctions that may open up opportunities to integrate their economies with the world market.
The Russian and Iranian elites alike can be described as ‘westernists’. Through their history, both Russia and Iran have experienced the West as a source of modernity to ‘upgrade’ their civilisation states. In such a paradigm, Trump is holding a stick in one hand and a carrot on the other, offering reconciliation or retribution depending on their choice. Is that a wise approach? Isn’t a reset without coercion possible at all?
In the Russian perception, the threat from the US has significantly eased lately, as the Trump administration unambiguously signalled a strategy to engage with Russia and normalise the relationship — even holding out the prospects for a mutually beneficial economic cooperation.
So far, Russia has had a roller coaster ride with Trump (who even threatened Russia with more sanctions) whose prescriptions of a ceasefire to bring the conflict in Ukraine to an end creates unease in the Russian mind. However, Trump also slammed the door shut on Ukraine’s NATO membership; rejected altogether any US military deployment in Ukraine; absolved Russia of responsibility for triggering the Ukraine conflict and instead placed the blame squarely on the Biden administration; openly acknowledged Russia’s desire for an end to the conflict; and took note of Moscow’s willingness to enter into negotiations — even conceded that the conflict itself is indeed a proxy war.
At a practical level, Trump signalled readiness to restore the normal functioning of the Russian embassy. If reports are to be believed, the two countries have frozen their offensive intelligence activities in cyber space.
Again, during the recent voting on a UN Security Council resolution on Ukraine, the US and Russia found themselves arrayed against Washington’s European allies who joined hands with Kiev. Presumably, Russian and American diplomats in New York made coordinated moves.
It comes as no surprise that there is panic in the European capitals and Kiev that Washington and Moscow are directly in contact and they are not in the loop. Even as the comfort level in Moscow has perceptively risen, the gloom in the European mind is only thickening, embodying the confusion and foreboding that permeated significant moments of their struggle.
All in all, Trump has conceded the legitimacy of the Russian position even before negotiations have commenced. Is an out-of-the-box thinking conceivable with regard to Iran as well?
In substantive terms, from the Russian perspective, the remaining ‘loose ends’ are: first, a regime change in Kiev that ensures the emergence of a neutral friendly neighbour; second, removal of US sanctions; and, third, talks on arms control and disarmament attuned to present-day conditions for ensuring European and global balance and stability.
As regards Iran, these are early days but a far less demanding situation prevails. True, the two countries have been locked in an adversarial relationship for decades. But it can be attributed entirely to the American interference in Iran’s politics, economy, society and culture; an unremitting mutual hostility was never the lodestar, historically.
A constituency of ‘westernists’ exists within Iran who root for normalisation with the US as the pathway leading to the country’s economic recovery. Of course, like in Russia, super hawks and dogmatists in Iran also have vested interests in the status quo. The military-industrial complex in both countries are an influential voice.
The big difference today is that the external environment in Eurasia thrives on US-Russia tensions whereas, the intra-regional alignments in the Gulf region are conducive to US-Iran detente. The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, a steady and largely mellowing of Iran’s politics of resistance, Saudi Arabia’s abandonment of of jihadi groups as geopolitical tool and its refocus on development and reform as national strategies — all these mould the zeitgeist, which abhors US-Iran confrontation.
This historic transformation renders the old US strategy to isolate and ‘contain’ Iran rather obsolete. Meanwhile, there is a growing realisation within the US itself that American interests in West Asia no longer overlap Israel’s. Trump cannot but be conscious of it.
Equally, Iran’s deterrence capability today is a compelling reality. By attacking Iran, the US can at best score a pyrrhic victory at the cost of Israel’s destruction. Trump will find it impossible to extricate the US from the ensuing quagmire during his presidency, which, in fact, may define his legacy.
The US-Russia negotiations are likely to be protracted. Having come this far, Russia is in no mood to freeze the conflict till it takes full control of Donbass region — and, possibly, the eastern side of Dniepr river (including Odessa, Kharkhov, etc.) But in Iran’s case, time is running out. Something has to give way in another six months when the hourglass empties and the October deadline arrives for the snapback mechanism of the 2015 JCPOA to reimpose UN resolutions to “suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related, and enrichment-related activities” by Tehran.
Trump will be called upon to take a momentous decision on Iran. Make no mistake, if push comes to shove, Tehran may quit the NPT altogether. Trump said Wednesday that he sent a letter to Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, calling for an agreement to replace the JCPOA. He suggested, without specifics, that the issue could quickly lead to conflict with Iran, but also signalled that a nuclear deal with Iran could emerge in the near future.
Later on Friday, Trump told reporters in the Oval Office that the US is “down to the final moments” negotiating with Iran, and he hoped military intervention would prove unnecessary. As he put it, “It’s an interesting time in the history of the world. But we have a situation with Iran that something is going to happen very soon, very, very soon.
“You’ll be talking about that pretty soon, I guess. Hopefully, we can have a peace deal. I’m not speaking out of strength or weakness, I’m just saying I’d rather see a peace deal than the other. But the other will solve the problem. We’re at final moments. We can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.”
Trump aims at generating peace dividends out of any normalisation with Russia and Iran, two energy superpowers, that could give momentum to his MAGA project. But cobwebs must be swept away first. Myths and misconceptions have shaped contemporary Western thinking on Russia and Iran. Trump should not fall for the phobia of Russia’s ‘imperialistic’ ambitions or Iran’s ‘clandestine’ nuclear programme.
If the first one was the narrative of the liberal-globalist neocon camp, the second one is a fabrication by the Israeli lobby. Both are self-serving narratives. In the process, the difference between westernisation and modernisation got lost. Westernisation is the adoption of western culture and society, whereas, modernisation is the development of one’s own culture and society. Westernisation can at best be only a subprocess of modernisation in countries such as Russia and Iran.
Trump’s ingenuity, therefore, lies in ending the US’ proxy wars with Russia and Iran by creating synergy out of the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership. If the US’ proxy wars only has drawn Russia and Iran closer than ever in their turbulent history as quasi-allies lately, their common interest today also lies in Trump’s ingenuity to take help from Putin to normalise the US-Iran ties. If anyone can pull off such an audacious, magical rope trick, it is only Trump who can,
