Possible NATO Corps Deployment to Ukraine May Become ‘Suicide Mission for Those Troops’
By Oleg Burunov – Sputnik – 04.02.2024
The UK has urged its NATO allies to consider sending the alliance’s expeditionary force to Ukraine, an informed source told Sputnik. According to the source, the alleged move came “in connection with the unfavorable developments in the Ukrainian theater of military operations for Kiev”.
The insider added that Britain also called on NATO to consider imposing a no-fly zone over the territory controlled by the Zelensky regime and to increase military aid to Ukraine.
”The UK’s reported plans about deploying NATO’s expeditionary corps to Ukraine is “a fantastical delusion on the part of the Brits and has no foundation in reality,” retired CIA intelligence officer and State Department official Larry Johnson told Sputnik.
“But just because the Brits are insane does not mean Russia can ignore them. It is a serious proposal,” he added.
Johnson was partly echoed by Matthew Gordon-Banks, an international relations consultant, former member of Parliament and retired senior research fellow at the UK Defence Academy, who said he didn’t think the rumors of a NATO force in Ukraine should be taken seriously.
“The suggestions I have heard are quite unrealistic at present,” Gordon-Banks stated.
Asked to comment on the “unfavorable development of events” for Kiev on the battlefield, he emphasized that “things are collapsing in Kiev quite quickly”.
“[Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky has not been able to fire his top general, and I think he is now very much a ‘lame duck’ president,” Gordon-Banks argued, referring to the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, Valery Zaluzhny.
The same tone was struck by Earl Rasmussen, a retired US Army lieutenant colonel turned geopolitical and military affairs consultant, who warned that if the information about London’s plans is true, and “if this is somebody’s dream, it could quickly become a nightmare for British and NATO forces.
“But it is not a realistic solution or proposal. Russia has complete air dominance, escalatory dominance, logistical dominance, ammunition dominance. This would be catastrophic for any UK forces and definitely would show a symbol of direct NATO involvement, which could really be dangerous, as far as escalation goes,” Rasmussen emphasized, noting that “the British forces would probably be wiped out, fairly rapidly.”
The US Army veteran suggested that someone in the UK military might be having “some type of delusional experience” for even suggesting such a scenario. “It’s a suicide mission for those troops. And it definitely would pull NATO into a much more dangerous situation and direct confrontation [with Russia],” Rasmussen concluded.
Nuland leaves sense of foreboding in Kiev

BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | INDIAN PUNCHLINE | FEBRUARY 4, 2024
The commencement of political upheavals in world affairs sometimes lies with a seemingly obscure event. This is not to say that the shooting down of a Russian Ilyushin-76 military transport plane carrying dozens of Ukrainian prisoners of war over the territory of Belgorod Region by two missiles fired from the area of Liptsy, in Kharkov Region (Ukraine) on January 24 is anything like the spark that set off World War I when a Serbian patriot shot and killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the city of Sarajevo in 1914 and within a month, the Austrian army invaded Serbia.
That said, the downing of the Russian plane would have far-reaching consequences now that Russian investigators found irrefutable proof that the plane was shot down with a US-made Patriot surface-to-air system. President Vladimir Putin disclosed this himself.
Russia sought an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council in the matter but France as the president disallowed the request, which would have cast the West in bad light. The fact of the matter is that the US and Russia are not at war and the Americans would have no hesitation to call such an outrageous incident as an act of war if a Pentagon plane were to be shot down with a Russian missile in the US airspace.
To be sure, Russia will draw appropriate conclusions and formulate a measured reaction. This is an escalation spiral as Russia’s election approaches.
Indeed, all indications are that the US strategy through this year is to ‘hold, build and strike’ at Russia, as outlined in an article in the War on the Rocks co-authored by Michael Kofman, a leading American military analyst and the director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for a New American Security. Basically, the strategy is predicated on the premise that Russia is still far from its official goal of seizing the entire Donbas and therefore, what happens in 2024 is likely to determine the future trajectory of the war.
Kofman identified three elements as crucial: one, a well- fortified frontline in Ukraine which stalls Russian offensives; two, pressing ahead with reconstituting the battered Ukrainian military; and, three, most important, degrading the Russian advantages and “creating challenges for Russian forces far behind the front lines”, while doubling down on rebuilding capacity to resume offensive operations. In a nutshell, the strategy is to reach a level of capability where Ukraine can absorb Russian offensives while minimising casualties and positioning itself to retake the advantage over time. [Emphasis added.]
Russia is unlikely to remain passive without a counter-strategy. In fact, there is a perceptible acceleration of Russian operations lately. The factors of advantage largely lie with Russia which holds material, industrial, and manpower advantages, and therefore, recreating another opportunity to deal Russia a battlefield defeat is virtually impossible.
Washington should be aware that there is very little realistic chance of the West being able to outlast Russia and force it to accept peace on Ukrainian terms. Time is not on Ukraine’s side, either, militarily or economically. The noted American strategic thinker of the realist school and Harvard academic Prof. Stephen Walt is to the point when he wrote in FT recently, “Both [Biden and Trump] administrations will try to negotiate an end to the war after January 2025, and the resulting deal is likely to be a lot closer to Russia’s stated war aims than Kyiv’s.”
But that is the whole point. The new war strategy — which was outlined in a recent article in the Washington Post — takes into account the possibility of Ukraine becoming a dysfunctional state. But so long as Ukraine remains a cauldron boiling with nationalism that lends itself as a base for hostile moves to destabilise Russia and lock it in permanently in a confrontation with the West, the purpose is served —from Washington’s viewpoint.
The final act of the power struggle playing out in Kiev is, therefore, of decisive importance and is being supervised by none other than Biden’s agent in the administration ever since the Maidan coup in Ukraine in 2014 — Victoria Nuland, Undersecretary of State. Nuland’s two-fold mission has been, first, to put in place a calculus of power in Kiev that is firmly under US control and, second, to steer the transition from war to insurgency when the need arises.
The probability being talked about is that President Zelensky who has burnt his bridges with Moscow will remain in power while the army chief Valeri Zaluzhni may be replaced. That said, the outcome of high-stakes power struggles, as the one Kiev is witnessing, is also hard to predict. Gen. Zaluzhni’s nuanced op-ed in the CNN on the day after Nuland left Kiev leaves no one in doubt that the redoubtable general is in a defiant mood.
Chief of Defense Intelligence Kyrylo Budanov’s biggest qualification is that although a man of very limited military experience, his forte is intelligence and covert operations who did brilliantly well to create a network of field operatives within Russia for subversive work — just the man to navigate Ukraine’s transition from attritional war to a full-bodied insurgency against Russia.
The US agenda to weaken Russia in a long-drawn out insurgency is very much in the cards. This agenda enjoys the support of the transatlantic alliance, is “cost-effective” and allows the US to focus on Asia-Pacific, while keeping Russia down for the foreseeable future. No doubt, Russia’s reaction to the downing of the IL-86 military plane by Patriot missiles in Russian air space was anything but an accident.
Moscow’s best option would be to create a buffer that keeps Russian territories out of reach of game-changing western medium and long-range missiles that are capable of degrading Russian logistics and command and control nodes and make large swathes of territories in the east and south of Ukraine, including Crimea, untenable for Russian forces.
But that necessitates a full-fledged Russian offensive to take control of the entire region to the east of Dnieper river. Russia may face the same dilemma that Americans faced in Vietnam stemming from the requirement to expand the theatre of operations into Laos and Cambodia (aside North Vietnam.) For Russia, that involves colossal drain of human and material resources and the erosion of its international standing.
The only feasible alternative will be to end the war — through negotiations or militarily — in 2024. But Biden’s interest in negotiations is zero. That leaves the military option as the only choice. The strategy to degrade the Ukrainian military in the meat grinder was highly successful, but going forward, in reality, the US-led western alliance, especially key functionaries like Nuland (an ex-ambassador to NATO) with a long record of being Russophobic, are showing no signs of attrition.
Now that the US has broken the glass ceiling by enabling a military attack on Russian territory, Moscow should brace for more incidents like the downing of the IL-76 plane. The authorities will be keeping a beady eye. Nuland’s sudden appearance in Kiev as a psychopomp from Greek mythology at this inflection point needs to be factored in.
While in Kiev, Nuland forecast Ukrainian military successes in 2024 and that Moscow “is going to get some nice surprises on the battlefield”. The day before Nuland’s arrival in Kiev, Budanov had said that the Ukrainian military is in “active defence” but somewhere in the spring, Russia’s ongoing offensive “will be exhausted completely… and I think ours will start.” The tone of triumphalism is unmistakable, but how far it is rooted in reality time only can tell.
Good Money After Bad: Where Will EU Funds for Ukraine Come From?
By Ekaterina Blinova – Sputnik – 02.02.2024
European Union (EU) member states have agreed on a €50 billion ($54 billion) support package for Ukraine over four years, overcoming Hungary’s resistance. But where will the EU get that money?
The EU could commandeer interest paid on frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine during its war with Moscow.
Europe’s economy is facing stagnation, with zero economic growth for October-to-December period reported by EU statistics agency Eurostat.
The Eurozone inflation rate has yet to fall below the target two percent threshold, with consumer prices still remaining high.
Against that backdrop EU member states are cutting subsidies, reducing energy consumption and diminishing industrial production. Protests by farmers have rocked the continent since early January.
Nonetheless, Brussels has found €50 billion ($54 billion) to support the embattled Kiev regime for four more years. But where will this money come from?
According to the European Council, the bloc has set up the so-called Ukraine Facility for the period 2024-2027 to “contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernization of the country, foster social cohesion and progressive integration into the Union, with a view to possible future Union membership.”
To that end the EC has allocated €50 billion, of which:
€33 billion ($35.9 billion) comes “in the form of loans guaranteed by extending until 2027 the existing EU budget guarantee, over and above the ceilings, for financial assistance to Ukraine available until the end of 2027,” the document sets out.
€17 billion ($18.5 billion) comes “in the form of non-repayable support, under a new thematic instrument the Ukraine Reserve, set up over and above the ceilings of the MFF 2021-27.” The EC document specifies that revenues “could be generated under the relevant Union legal acts, concerning the use of extraordinary revenues held by private entities stemming directly from the immobilized Central Bank of Russia assets.”
On February 1, CNN claimed that the EU had taken a step towards seizing billions of dollars in interest payments generated by Russian assets frozen in European accounts. Media reported that roughly €200 billion ($218 billion) remain in the EU, mainly in Euroclear, a Belgium-based financial services company.
The media outlet highlighted that the EU approved the €50 billion Ukraine package as it “came closer to finalizing a plan” of using the profits from the Russian Central Bank’s sequestred assets — indicating that it has yet to gain access to the funds. Euroclear revealed on Thursday that the frozen Russian assets had yielded €5.2 billion ($5.6 billion) in interest on income assets since 2022.
On Monday, EU member states “agreed in principle” that profits from the Russian assets will be set aside and not be paid out as dividends to shareholders until the bloc’s members decide to set up a “financial contribution to the [EU] budget that shall be raised on these net profits to support Ukraine”, according to a draft document quoted by Euroactive.
The document claimed that the levy will be “consistent with applicable contractual obligations, and in accordance with [EU] and international law.” After that the EC would transfer the money to the EU’s accounts and then to Ukraine, the media noted, specifying that the proposal targets future profits and would not be applied retrospectively. It is believed that Russia’s frozen assets in the EU could generate an estimated €15-17 billion over four years, which would be transferred to Ukraine, according to the press.
Speaking to Sputnik last October, Jacques Sapir, director of studies at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS) in Paris, argued that any attempt by the EU to grab Russia’s frozen assets or revenues from them could turn into a legal nightmare for the EU leadership and particular member states where the money is being stored.
“As a matter of fact, if assets belong to the Russian state legally, you will have to prove that this state is a ‘failing state,’ something impossible,” Sapir told Sputnik on October 29, 2023. “If assets belong to private persons, you need a legal conviction against these persons. If you can’t do both and that you take away revenues to divert them to a third party (Ukraine) this is no less than a theft. Then you will be liable to legal action. But, what is even more important, you will probably discourage all foreign investors from investing in the EU.”
Brussels Wants European Farmers to Tighten Belts
While allocating tens of billions of euros for Ukraine, Brussels has yet to solve its farming crisis caused by inflation, a spike in production costs, economic slowdown, politically-motivated decoupling from Russia’s energy market, an influx of cheap agricultural goods from Ukraine and the bloc’s aggressive climate policies.
Farmers’ protests have been gaining pace since early January, engulfing France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania and the Netherlands.
Commenting on the provision of €50 billion to Kiev, French member of the European Parliament Thierry Mariani warned that the package could cost France at least €8 billion ($8.7 billion) in taxpayers’ money since Paris contributes 16 percent of the EU budget.
“Another €50 billion for Ukraine (17 in donations plus 33 in loans… which will never be repaid). Do the French realize that they will have to pay €8 billion since we contribute 16 percent of the EU spending? Eight billion that our farmers would dream of,” Mariani posted on X on Thursday.
By January 31, the number of farmers protesting across France against the Macron government’s agricultural policies had reached 10,000, French Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin admitted. French farmers are protesting against unfair competition from cheaper imports, draconian environmental rules and the government’s push to bring down food inflation by artificially suppressing prices.
In a bid to calm the protests, the French government has proposed €150 million in tax and social support — small change compared to the multi-billion aid for Ukraine paid for by Paris.
Will EU Money be Spent Appropriately or Wasted in Ukraine?
Aid to Ukraine would be provided under certain conditions, the European Council said.
“A precondition for the support for Ukraine under the Facility shall be that Ukraine continues to uphold and respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and to guarantee respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. In implementing the Facility, the Commission and Ukraine shall take all the appropriate measures to protect the financial interests of the Union, in particular regarding the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interests and irregularities,” the document read.
Those rules have already been broken by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who has refused to hold general elections this year under the pretext of the ongoing conflict, despite top US and EU officials repeatedly urging Kiev to go ahead with the vote.
Washington and its European allies have grown concerned by Ukraine’s endemic corruption, as Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh remarked in his latest op-ed on Substack. Washington and Western Europe want Zelensky to carry out financial reforms.
“According to the knowledgeable American official, the first step of the new concept is a long-standing issue: financial reform,” Hersh wrote. “Zelensky must be told: ‘You’ve got to get rid of corruption before we do anything more.’ The second step is something that does not exist today in Ukraine: a serious audit of all government funding. The official said Zelensky should consider the billions he needs ‘as our money, as an investment with all of the rules’ for its disbursement ‘to be laid out and followed’.”
The investigative journalist recalled that last year CIA Director William Burns secretly travelled to Kiev to warn the Ukrainian president that Washington was aware of his and his entourage’s corruption. Hersh noted that Burns reportedly also told Joe Biden that Zelensky’s subordinates were outraged by their leader personally taking too large a cut of the US aid.
In order to get Ukraine’s spending under control, “the Council will play a key role in the governance of the Ukraine Facility,” according to the EC press release.
“In this sense, a Council Implementing Decision shall be adopted by a qualified majority for the adoption and amendments of the Ukraine Plan and for the approval and the suspension of payments based on the relevant assessments and proposals by the Commission. On the basis of the Commission annual report on the implementation of the Ukraine Facility, the European Council will hold a debate each year on the implementation of the Facility with a view to providing guidance. If needed, in two years the European Council will invite the Commission to make a proposal for review in the context of the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).”
Time will tell whether the EU’s funds allocated for Ukraine at a time of economic stagnation and looming crisis would be used by the Kiev regime properly — or whether it will result in yet another economic and military failure.
Americans likely part of crew that shot down Ukrainian POWs – TASS
RT | February 1, 2024
American specialists may have been part of the crew that operated the US-made Patriot air defense system that shot down a Russian military aircraft carrying Ukrainian prisoners of war last week, TASS news agency reports.
The plane, a Russian Il-76, crashed over Belgorod Region last Wednesday while carrying 65 captured Ukrainian servicemen who were set to take part in a prisoner swap later that day. All of the POWs, as well as three Russian officers and six crew members, died in the crash.
On Thursday, Russia’s Investigative Committee released a report claiming that the plane was brought down using two MIM-104A surface-to-air missiles launched from a Patriot missile system deployed at a staging area in Kharkov Region, Ukraine near the village of Liptsy, around 10km from the Russian border.
Following the Investigative Committee’s report, a source within Russia’s security services told TASS that it is very likely that the crew operating the Patriot system represented a mix of Ukrainian and American specialists.
The agency’s source explained that Ukrainian officers are likely placed in lower positions while “Western specialists, including Americans, sit at the control and missile guidance stations.” They added that Ukrainian servicemen are often only allowed to be involved with these systems as drivers or operators of transport-loading vehicles.
The TASS report noted that the Russian authorities are still in the process of identifying the exact people who were involved in the attack and were operating the Patriot system.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said the use of a US-made system in the killing of Ukrainian POWs means that US President Joe Biden and his administration have made regular American citizens “complicit in the bloody tragedy.”
West refusing to cooperate with Ukrainian POW plane crash investigation – Kremlin
RT | February 1, 2024
The US and its allies have shown little interest in launching an international probe into last week’s crash involving a Russian aircraft that was carrying Ukrainian captives, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Thursday. President Vladimir Putin called for an investigation on Wednesday.
A Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft with 65 Ukrainian POWs on board crashed in Belgorod Region on January 24. All of the Ukrainians, as well as six crew members and three Russian military personnel, died in the crash. Moscow immediately blamed Kiev for the incident.
On Wednesday, Putin said Moscow had asked “for international experts to be deployed [here] to conduct an analysis, assess the existing material evidence” as part of an international probe.
According to Peskov, Western nations have demonstrated no interest in the Russian initiative. “The president stated it publicly and openly yesterday that we are ready for an international investigation,” he said, adding that the US and its allies were demanding official written requests and refusing to consider the issue without such documentation.
The West’s position came as no surprise for Russia, since it is a “direct participant” in the ongoing conflict, Peskov said. “It is clear that not one of them [the US and its allies] would be interested in conducting a probe and stumbling upon themselves as a result,” he added.
Earlier, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky had disputed Moscow’s claims and called for an international probe into the incident as well.
On Thursday, the Russian Investigative Committee confirmed that the aircraft had been shot down by a US-made Patriot air-defense system. Such systems have been provided to Kiev’s troops by the Western backers.
Richard Sakwa Explains How We Ended Up In A New Cold War
By Ted Snider | The Libertarian Institute | January 31, 2024
The war in Ukraine is a complicated tangle of three wars in one. It is a civil war between Ukraine’s European leaning west and its Russian leaning east. It is a war between Ukraine and Russia. And it is a war between Russia and NATO.
Ben Abelow’s book, How the West Brought War to Ukraine, is a clear and valuable introduction to the decisions and events that led up to the war between Ukraine and Russia. Nicolai Petro’s The Tragedy of Ukraine is a comprehensive and masterful account of the history of the ethnic tension between the monist and pluralist visions of Ukraine that led to civil war and made Ukraine vulnerable to being caught up in the larger war between Russia and NATO.
Richard Sakwa’s new book, The Lost Peace, valuably fills the gap by addressing the larger war between Russia and NATO. It is a tour de force analysis of the wasted opportunity for peace at the end of the Cold War.
When Mikhail Gorbachev declared the end of the Cold War on December 7, 1988, a brief window for peace opened. But by the negligent failure to construct a new security structure in Europe that overcame the flaws of the previous one, the window Gorbachev opened was quickly closed. When Gorbachev received his peace prize in 1990, the Nobel Prize committee declared that “the two mighty power blocs, have managed to abandon their life-threatening confrontation” and confidently expressed the “hope that we are now celebrating the end of the Cold War.” But “The Cold War,” as U.N. Secretary General António Guterres has funereally said, “is back.”
How was that window of opportunity wasted? Why was the road from the Nobel Committee’s hope to the United Nations’ eulogy such a short one?
If the second cold war that we now find ourselves in is to end more hopefully, that failure will have to be deconstructed in order to find the clues for constructing a lasting and inclusive security structure upon which real peace can be built. Richard Sakwa, who has been called the preeminent Russia scholar of our day, provides timely help with his deconstruction of that failure.
There are two strengths that set The Lost Peace apart. The first is the wealth and depth of Sakwa’s knowledge. The second is that the book doesn’t just start with the shattering of the peace in Ukraine in 2014 that broke the dam for the new Cold War. In The Lost Peace, Sakwa analyzes the post Cold War world and identifies the conflicts and decisions that wasted the peace and led, once again, to war.
Sakwa argues that with the end of the first Cold War, there was a genuine chance for a very different world than the actual one being painfully played out in Ukraine; there was a genuine chance for a real peace.
But an arrogant America misunderstood Gorbachev’s offering of an international order that now transcended blocs and declared the victory of the American-led bloc and the dawn of a unipolar world. “By the grace of God, America won the cold war,” President George H.W. Bush arrogantly and misleadingly boasted in 1992. The young American hegemon, newly bloated with hubris, led the political West, hand in hand with NATO, on a global expansion that would soon close the cold peace and open the door to a new Cold War.
The U.S. rejected the opportunity it had been offered to build a new security structure. Instead, the U.S. declared not only the victory of the political West’s worldview, but its universality, and set out on a mission of enlargement that expanded to fill the whole world.
That is, the whole world but Russia, who alone was left out of the new security arrangement and ostracized as the new dividing lines in Europe moved ever closer to its borders and red lines until the whole strategy exploded in Ukraine, ending the possibility of peace and cementing the new Cold War.
Sakwa deconstructs the necessary security apparatus that was never constructed and demonstrates how, without that framework, the structure of the possible new peace so quickly collapsed. He identifies three crucial contradictions: sovereign internationalism versus liberal internationalism, international law versus the rules-based order, and freedom to choose versus indivisibility of security.
Russia was committed to sovereign internationalism, which emphasizes state sovereignty and the acceptance that different states develop different cultures and are at different stages of development of different forms of government. All are acceptable until they violate international law or human rights. The United States, however, took the perceived victory of the political West to mean the victory of the cultural West and set out on a mission to spread those values across the globe. They favored liberal hegemony over sovereign internationalism, asserting the universality of their beliefs. Russia, China, and the Global South resented that “great substitution” of the values of sovereign internationalism with liberal hegemony and the colonial missionary spread of the universal values of the West.
When the American policy of spreading Western values lacked the necessary approval of the Security Council, the U.S. enlarged the great substitution, usurping the authority of the Security Council and acting unilaterally without its approval. International resentment grew at this replacement of international law anchored in the UN with the rules-based order. The essence of international law is that written laws are applied universally. The rules-based order promoted by the West is composed of unwritten laws whose source, consent and legitimacy are unknown. To Russia and other countries not in the political West, they have the appearance of being invoked when they benefit the U.S. and its partners and not being invoked when they don’t. To those not in the political West, it appeared, disturbingly, that the U.S. and NATO had supplanted the U.N. as the arbiter of international law.
This belief was reinforced in Iraq and, especially, in Kosovo and Libya where the United States acted without Security Council approval in precisely the way they insisted that the rest of the world do not. Russia bristled at the double standard.
As long as liberal internationalism confined itself to the UN based international system, there was much about it that was attractive. But when the U.S. and NATO began their missionary project of spreading those universal values in ways that dismissed sovereign internationalism and international law, other nations felt their sovereignty and security being threatened.
And that led to the third contradiction. The U.S. insists on the free and sovereign right of states to choose their own partners and security alignments; Russia insists on the indivisibility of security, which insists that the security of one state cannot be purchased at the cost of the security of another. Both principles are enshrined in international law and in international agreements, and, with imagination and understanding, they could have been made compatible. But the United States, Russia argues, exclusively pursued the first in disregard of the second.
That conflict came to a head in Ukraine. American and NATO insistence, in violation of verbal promises made at the close of the Cold War, on NATO’s open-door policy and, especially, on Ukraine’s right to join NATO and NATO’s right to expand right up to Russia’s border was perceived by Russia as a security threat that crossed its reddest of lines.
The U.S. and NATO restated their promise of eventual NATO membership for Ukraine and increased military support. Russia felt that its security concerns were being ignored and that Ukraine was being built into a platform for threatening its existence. The U.S. overreached, Russia overreacted, and the second Cold War was a certainty.
If there is a weakness to Sakwa’s book, it is not in its argument nor in its evidence. It is in its reach to an audience. The Lost Peace is not an easy book. It is a book by a scholar steeped in the story that assumes at least a little of that knowledge by its audience. The Lost Peace is not a book for beginners. But for those with an interest in international relations, the book is an invaluable addition.
The Lost Peace despairs of the wasted opportunity to build a security structure that would have provided the architecture for a possible peace at the end of the Cold War. But it also ends with the hope that, having analyzed the contradictions, conflicts and failures to recognize the interests of others, we are able to find “new ways of thinking about old problems” and do better in the face of a new Cold War. Sakwa’s book is an invaluable contribution to that hope.
ICJ Rejects Ukraine’s Claim to Recognize Russia as Aggressor State – Russian Foreign Ministry
Sputnik – 01.02.2024
MOSCOW – The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected Kiev’s claim to recognize Russia as an “aggressor state” and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) as “terrorist organizations,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday.
Earlier in the day, the ICJ rejected most of Ukraine’s claims against Russia under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in Crimea, Court President Joan Donoghue said.
“The International Court of Justice did not follow Kiev’s whim and refused to recognize Russia as an ‘aggressor state.’ The court also rejected Ukrainian insinuations that the DPR and LPR are allegedly ‘terrorist organizations,'” the statement said.
Kiev hoped to back up its demands for the transfer of Russian assets frozen in the West and the introduction of international restrictions against Russia with the court claim, the ministry added.
Ukraine filed the lawsuit with the ICJ in 2017, accusing Russia of violating international conventions on anti-terrorism and racial discrimination over actions in Donbass and Crimea.
The ICJ found that Russia had breached the anti-discrimination treaty by “the way in which it has implemented its educational system in Crimea after 2014 with regard to school education in the Ukrainian language,” and rejected all other claims.
The Hague-based court also found that Russia had faithfully fulfilled its obligations to cooperate in the fight against terrorism financing, including the obligation to identify and block funds used to finance terrorism.
The ICJ declined to rule on Kiev’s accusations of Russia’s alleged responsibility for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014.
Breakthrough on All Fronts Ahead of Schedule
By John Helmer | Dances with Bears | January 31, 2024
When the General Staff have been discussing with President Vladimir Putin the timing of the Russian offensive to force the Kiev regime into capitulation, it has been agreed, understood, and repeated that the strategic reserves of the Ukrainian forces should be destroyed first, together with the supply lines for the weapons and ammunition crossing the border from the US and the NATO allies.
This process, they also agreed, should take as long as required with least casualties on the Russian side, as determined by military intelligence. Also agreed and pre-conditional, there should be no repeat of the political intelligence failures of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) which precipitated the failed special forces operation known as the Battle of Antonov (Hostomel) Airport from February 24 to April 2, 2022.
Taking account of the mistakes made then by the SVR director, Sergei Naryshkin, and the subsequent mistakes of military officers around Yevgeny Prigozhin, the General Staff has also accepted that their tactical operations must run least risk of Russian casualties through March 17, the final day of the presidential election.
Reinforcing these preconditions for the timing of the Russian offensive, General Winter and General Patience have joined the Stavka meetings.
This week military sources believe there has been a turning point – on the Ukrainian battlefield, and on the Russian clock.
The daily Defense Ministry briefing and bulletin from Moscow reported last Thursday, before the Friday weekly summary, that the Ukrainian KIA (killed in action) for the previous twenty-four hours totaled 795, with the ratio of offensive tactics to defence, 3 to 3. On Monday, the KIA total was 680, the ratio 4 to 3. On Tuesday, KIA came to 885, the ratio 5 to 1. The casualty rate is unusually high; the shift to offence is recognizably new, if not announced.
The “Stavka Project”, a military briefing which is broadcast by Vladimir Soloviev, confirms the positional breakthroughs this week on several of the fronts or “directions”, as the Defense Ministry calls them, along the Donbass line; click to watch (in Russian).
In Boris Rozhin’s summary of the Defense Ministry briefing materials, published before dawn on Wednesday morning, the leading Russian military blogger (Colonel Cassad ) identifies “small advances”, “slight movements”, some positional “successes”, other positional “counter-fighting”, and “no significant progress yet”. The adverb is military talk for timing.
According to a military source outside Russia, “the Russian breakthrough is beginning to happen now. It’s being coordinated with strikes and raids along the northern border. The commitment of the ‘crack’ Ukrainian brigades at the expense of other sectors shows how desperate [General Valery] Zaluzhny is to plug the holes. He knows that the target is the isolation of Kharkov, the establishment of a demilitarized ‘buffer zone’, as well as the development of a situation whereby all Ukrainian forces east of the Dnieper are threatened with being cut off… and he’s quickly running out of ammunition, not to mention cannon fodder.”
“By the end of the winter,” the source has added overnight, “the Ukrainians will barely be able to move along the roads they use to feed the front due to the Russian drone, missile, conventional air, and artillery strikes. Once they can no longer plug the gaps with mechanized units acting as fire-fighting brigades, it’s just a matter of time before the big breakthroughs and encirclements begin. At the current burn rate of Ukrainian forces, I imagine we’ll start seeing Russian tanks with fuel tanks fitted for extended range appearing and Russian airborne troops making air assaults in the Ukrainian rear within weeks.”
In yesterday’s edition of the Moscow security analysis platform Vzglyad, Yevgeny Krutikov, a leading Russian military analyst with GRU service himself and GRU sources for his reporting since, published a report entitled “What does the offensive of Russian troops in the Kharkov region mean?” “Russia is creating a new strategic situation in the Kharkov region,” Krutikov concluded, “threatening to dismember the Ukrainian defence up to the Donetsk agglomeration.” A verbatim English translation of this piece follows.
January 29, 2024 – 19:10.
What does the offensive of Russian troops in the Kharkov region mean?
By Yevgeny Krutikov“The settlement of Tabayevka in the Kharkov region has been liberated,” the Russian Defense Ministry says. We are not just facing the capture of a village: Russian troops are now hacking into the contact lines, which have not budged for a year. Russia is creating a new strategic situation in the Kharkov region, threatening to dismember the Ukrainian defence up to the Donetsk agglomeration.
First, Krakhmalnoye, then Tabayevka – Russian troops have advanced in the Svatovo direction (Kharkov region), pushing the enemy to a new line of defence (to the village of Peschanoye). Slightly to the north, already close to Kupyansk, the enemy’s positions are also gradually moving to the west and southwest.
Along the way, forests are being cleared, which the VSU [Ukrainian Armed Forces] is turning into fortified areas, even giving them names (“Alligator” and “Woodpecker”). The enemy is losing the old lines of trenches, the first line of contact has been destroyed. Something similar is happening directly near Kupyansk, but there the advanced fortified lines in Sinkovka are being held still by the VSU, though the positions on the flanks have gradually begun to sink.
At first glance, we are looking at isolated episodes of positional warfare, since the big, iconic and recognizable geographical names do not appear in the information releases. But this is not quite true.
Firstly, even in this scenario as published so far, strategic threats arise for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for example, in the possible drive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the Oskol River which has far-reaching prospects. Notwithstanding, it is still impossible to predict when this will become possible in practice.
Secondly, the enemy has been demonstrating a systemic defence crisis in the Kupyansk direction during the past week. The defence of Kupyansk has been under construction by the Armed Forces of Ukraine since the spring of last year, when the decision was made in Kiev on a ‘counteroffensive’ in the southern direction. New brigades with western armoured vehicles were sent to the southern section of the contact line, and Kupyansk and the area around it were designated for defence with the rest of their forces.
In Kiev, they were convinced that Russian troops were forming an offensive group in the Kupyansk direction, and so the VSU began to wait there for a frontal assault. However, as a result, the Russian Army did not undertake anything of the kind in this area. Instead, the Ukrainian units were gradually ground down by the Russian army in positional battles, while the Kupyansk group of the VSU had to be replenished with whatever troops were left.
Now Ukrainian sources are complaining that as a consequence, a combination of lines has formed in the sinkhole areas (that’s the same Krakhmalnoye and Tabayevka). Into these lines the VSU has herded separate battalions from different units, with the result that unified management and command have been lost, and the performance quality of the troops has left much to be desired.
As a result, the VSU is considering the possibility of transferring the remnants of those forces which participated in the failed ‘counteroffensive”’ to Kupyansk from the southern direction. Before that, they had been sent in great haste sent to Avdeyevka.
But this is already a systemic problem for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, since there is trouble in the southern sector. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have gradually regained some of the positions which were left during the so-called counteroffensive, and these forces continue to move forward. We are even talking about possible threats to Orekhov, a rearguard city for the VSU, from which all the communications and command of the ‘counteroffensive’ had been carried out.
Behind the defensive fortifications of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, an open field for tens of kilometres opens up on a whole group of sites. Kiev’s military reserves are gradually being squandered, and there is practically no human materiel left to plug the holes. Related to these problems there are the panic campaigns in Kiev about total mobilization.
There is another problem: the attrition of officers. Western military personnel cannot replace this crucial resource — they can only be used to service technically complicated weapons systems such as air defence or long-range artillery. Along the line of contact, foreign officers are more likely to interfere due to their ignorance of the language and misunderstanding of the mentality of the [Ukrainian] subordinates.
There are other factors weakening the Ukrainian defence, but they are not directly related to military operations. For example, the Western sponsors are really concerned about the corruption of the Ukrainian leadership. The inspections and audits which are taking place in Kiev on this issue right now are preventing Ukraine from building new defensive lines swiftly enough.
Another non-military factor: political discord among the various factions of the Ukrainian authorities. The premonition of defeat is triggering a drop in morale, not only in the troops, but also in the elites.
All this in general creates a strategic opportunity for Russia to seriously change the situation on the line of contact.
Partial tactical successes must at some point turn into a major breakthrough in the enemy’s defence. Moreover, we are talking about such a breakthrough that will not stop in just two or three days at the next defensive line, but will lead inevitably, precisely, to the collapse of the front. This is exactly what the efforts of the Russian Armed Forces are now aimed at, probing for the weaknesses in Ukrainian defensive positions.
The liberation of Tabayevka is an example of just such an approach. Sooner or later, the VSU will not have time to create a new defensive line behind a particular settlement. And then we will see how the special operation will break the current positional deadlock.
How Can Russia Stop Ground-Launched Glide Bombs US is Sending to Ukraine?
By Ilya Tsukanov – Sputnik – 31.01.2024
The Pentagon plans to “field test” a new, ground-launched variant of its deadly Small Diameter Bomb design in real world battlefield conditions in Ukraine. What are these weapons? What dangers will they pose to Russian forces and civilians in frontline areas? How can Russia defeat them? Sputnik explores.
Sources told Politico on Tuesday that Ukraine is preparing to receive a delivery of the US’ new Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDBs) as soon as this week.
The deliveries will give Kiev “a deeper strike capability they haven’t had” and “complement” the Ukrainian military’s “long-range fire arsenal,” a US official familiar with the transfer boasted. The weapons, which even the US military doesn’t have in its arsenal yet, will serve as “an extra arrow in the quiver that’s gonna allow them to do more,” the official said, without elaborating.
What is the Small Diameter Bomb?
Developed in the mid-2000s by US aerospace and defense giant Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems division, the original GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb was envisioned as an air-dropped glide bomb designed to target an array of stationary ground targets, ranging from bunkers and electronic warfare jamming equipment to airfields, fuel depots, barracks, and troop concentration.
The GBU-39 is equipped with a 285-pound (130 kg) bomb and has a 206-pound (93 kg) penetrating blast fragmentation warhead – enough to punch through up to three feet of steel-reinforced concrete, and can be guided by a combination of active radar homing, laser guidance, GPS, and inertial navigation, depending on configuration and model. The system boasts a circular error probable of about one meter, and has a range of between 75 and 110 km.
The GBU-39 is a glide weapon, which, as the name suggests, means the bomb glides to its target along a pre-designated flight path at low speeds, without the assistance of rocket engines. The system’s comparatively low cost (as little as $40,000 apiece compared to $3.2 million for the Storm Shadows Kiev has been receiving from Britain and using to terror bomb Donbass, for example, combined with its small radar signature and comparatively short flight time makes it difficult to detect and intercept using traditional air defenses.
What is the Ground-Launched Variant of the Small Diameter Bomb?
With Ukraine’s Air Force hard pressed to get its aircraft into the skies due to the constant threat of Russian air defenses and interceptor warplanes, the US and its allies have committed significant resources to converting ordinarily air-launched weapons for launch from ground-based systems (for more information check out the US military-industrial complex’s “FrankenSAM” program for Ukraine).
Besides air defenses, another component of efforts to convert ordinarily air-launched weapons from the ground revolves around rocket artillery. That’s where the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb comes in. Unlike its air-launched cousin, the modified GBU-39 is fitted with an engine from the M26 rocket motor used by the M270 and HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to propel it toward its target.
Developed by Boeing and Swedish defense giant Saab in the mid-2010s, the GLSDB is said to have a range of up to 145 km, and has a reported price tag of about $100,000 apiece.
With the US and its allies having already sent dozens of MLRS artillery platforms to Ukraine over the past two years, the delivery of new ground-launched Small Diameter Bombs is expected to provide Kiev with an instantaneous new long-range strike capability.
How Many GLSDBs Will Ukraine Get?
With US funding for Ukraine running out in December and the Pentagon forced to dip into its own dwindling stockpiles to assist Kiev, it’s not clear how many of the newfangled ground-launched GLSDBs Ukraine will receive. When plans to deliver the weapons were first announced a year ago as part of a $2.17 billion arms package, US media mentioned a figure of two launchers and 24 weapons total.
That would be enough for Kiev to attempt strikes deep behind Russian lines, or to launch terror attacks against cities in Donbass or other Russian border settlements, but not enough to have any serious strategic impact – where quantity of available munitions has proven key.
Where Have Small Diameter Bombs Been Used?
Ukraine’s military will be the GLSDB’s first operator, with the Chinese breakaway island province of Taiwan expected to follow at a later date.
The original SDB was used by the US and its allies in conflicts across the Middle East and Asia, from Iraq and Afghanistan, to Syria and Gaza (where it has been used by Washington’s Israeli ally), and Yemen (deployed by members of the Gulf-led coalition against the Houthis). In each instance, GBU-39s successfully targeted forces fighting US or allied militaries, but in no case has their deployment resulted in or even contributed to a strategic victory for an aggressor power.
How Can Russia Defend Against Ground-Launched GBU-39s?
As mentioned above, glide bombs’ design characteristics and principle of operation makes them difficult to intercept and destroy, but that doesn’t mean the task is impossible. Russia’s response to GLSDB deployment by Ukraine will likely include:
- continuing operations to target HIMARS and M270 fire positions, ammunition, supply, and repair depots using artillery and precision missile strikes.
- deploying radio-electronic jamming equipment to degrade the weapons’ accuracy (although this will not affect onboard inertial guidance systems, without GPS the glide bombs are less precise).
- shooting the glide bombs down using the dense array of conventional air defenses along frontline areas, from the Tor and Buk missile system to close-in anti-aircraft guns.
EU to seize profits from Russian assets – council presidency
RT | January 30, 2024
EU member states have reached an agreement that is expected to allow Brussels to transfer the income generated by Russia’s frozen central bank reserves to Kiev, according to the Belgian presidency of the EU Council.
“EU Ambassadors just agreed in principle on a proposal on the use of windfall profits related to immobilised assets to support Ukraine’s reconstruction,” the country’s representatives announced in a post on X (formerly Twitter) on Monday.
The Financial Times, meanwhile, has reported that EU envoys had approved a plan aiming to set aside the billions of euros in profits generated by the frozen assets of Russia’s central bank. Some €191 billion ($206 billion) out of €260 billion ($291 billion) of Russia’s immobilized reserves are currently held by Belgium’s Euroclear, a central security depository, generating billions as securities reach maturity and are reinvested.
According to the draft seen by the FT, profits generated by Euroclear will be booked separately with no dividends to be paid to shareholders until members of the bloc unanimously opt to set up a “financial contribution to the [EU] budget that shall be raised on these net profits to support Ukraine.”
The proposed measures are expected to only target future profits and won’t apply retroactively.
Last week, sources close to the discussions told Bloomberg that EU foreign ministers had backed applying a windfall tax on Russia’s frozen assets. At the same time, Reuters reported that the EU was unlikely to confiscate the funds despite G7 plans to discuss the legality of doing so at a meeting in February.
Moscow has repeatedly warned that any actions related to its assets by the US and its allies would amount to “theft,” stressing that seizure of the funds or any similar move would violate international law and undermine reserve currencies, the global financial system, and the world economy.
In April, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing a mechanism to temporarily take over foreign assets in Russia in the event that other countries seize Russian private or government property in their jurisdictions, or threaten the national, energy, or economic security of the country.

