The US and its allies have shown little interest in launching an international probe into last week’s crash involving a Russian aircraft that was carrying Ukrainian captives, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on Thursday. President Vladimir Putin called for an investigation on Wednesday.
A Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft with 65 Ukrainian POWs on board crashed in Belgorod Region on January 24. All of the Ukrainians, as well as six crew members and three Russian military personnel, died in the crash. Moscow immediately blamed Kiev for the incident.
On Wednesday, Putin said Moscow had asked “for international experts to be deployed [here] to conduct an analysis, assess the existing material evidence” as part of an international probe.
According to Peskov, Western nations have demonstrated no interest in the Russian initiative. “The president stated it publicly and openly yesterday that we are ready for an international investigation,” he said, adding that the US and its allies were demanding official written requests and refusing to consider the issue without such documentation.
The West’s position came as no surprise for Russia, since it is a “direct participant” in the ongoing conflict, Peskov said. “It is clear that not one of them [the US and its allies] would be interested in conducting a probe and stumbling upon themselves as a result,” he added.
Earlier, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky had disputed Moscow’s claims and called for an international probe into the incident as well.
On Thursday, the Russian Investigative Committee confirmed that the aircraft had been shot down by a US-made Patriot air-defense system. Such systems have been provided to Kiev’s troops by the Western backers.
In a blow to Ukraine, the World Court ruled Russia didn’t finance terrorism in Donbass and the court refused to blame Moscow for the downing of Flight MH17.
The World Court ruled on Wednesday that Russia did not finance terrorism in its defense of separatists in Ukraine and the court refused to find Russia guilty of downing Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 as Ukraine had asked.
The case was brought to the ICJ by Ukraine in 2017, three years after the U.S.-backed coup in Kiev overthrew the democratically-elected President Viktor Yanukovych.
When Russian speakers in Donbass rebelled against the unconstitutional change in government that they had voted for, the coup leaders in 2014 launched what it called an “anti-terrorist” military operation to put down the rebellion.
Russia responded by helping ethnic Russians with arms and other military equipment. Ukraine claimed to the court that that was in breach of a treaty barring terrorism financing.
But the ICJ ruled on Wednesday that the treaty only covered cash transfers made to alleged terrorist groups. This “does not include the means used to commit acts of terrorism, including weapons or training camps,” the Court said in its judgement.
“Consequently, the alleged supply of weapons to various armed groups operating in Ukraine… fall outside the material scope” of the anti-terrorism financing convention, the Court ruled. The Court also said it had no evidence to show that any of the armed militias in Donbass fighting against the government could be characterized as terrorist groups.
The ICJ found only that Russia was, “failing to take measures to investigate facts… regarding persons who have allegedly committed an offense.” It added that the court “rejects all other submissions made by the Ukraine.”
The ruling is highly significant in undermining Kiev’s claim to be fighting a war against terrorists in Donbass, an essential part of the Ukraine’s and the West’s narrative in justifying its brutal operation that left more than 10,000 civilians dead.
Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 amid indications that Kiev was beginning a new offensive against Donbass. Ukraine and the West had failed to implement two peace agreements negotiated in Minsk and endorsed by the U.N. Security Council.
Western and Ukrainian officials later admitted they never had any intention of implementing the deal and pretended to to buy time to build up its forces against Russia.
Rejected MH17 Claim
In its complaint to the Court, Ukraine had also claimed that Russia was responsible for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in 2014, killing all 298 civilian passengers and crew on board. Kiev wanted Russia to pay compensation to the victims.
But the court refused to rule whether Russia was responsible and to order compensation. This ruling appears to contradict the results of the official investigation into the incident.
The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) and a Dutch-led joint investigation team (JIT) concluded in 2016 that the plane was shot down by ethnic Russian separatists using a missile supplied by Russia. Moscow has denied involvement in the incident.
The ruling on MH17 came two weeks after the European Court of Justice decided that the Dutch government was not required to release information it has about the incident. The Dutch news outlet RTL Nieuws had brought the case before the ICJ.
It wanted to know what reports the Dutch government had received about Ukrainian airspace before the plane was shot down. The government refused to release that data and the European court ruled it did not have to divulge information regarding aviation safety.
No Discrimination
Ukraine was also denied compensation for what it said was discrimination against ethnic Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea after Russia annexed the peninsula in 2014.
The court only agreed that Russia failed to adequately protect Ukrainian language education in Crimea. This complaint came as Ukraine passed laws discriminating against the Russian language in the country.
US Judge Votes Against Russia
Joan Donoghue, the American judge who is president of the Court, voted to protect Ukraine against several of the measures of the judgement.
For instance, she voted (in a 10-5 vote) against rejecting “all other submissions made by Ukraine with respect to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.” She only voted for the point criticizing Russia for not properly investigating the charge and against rejecting Ukraine’s demands for compensation.
Donoghue also voted (in another 10-5 vote) against rejecting Ukraine’s charge regarding discrimination against Ukrainians and Tartars in Crimea.
Joe Lauria is editor-in-chief of Consortium News and a former U.N. correspondent for The Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, and other newspapers, including The Montreal Gazette, the London Daily Mail and The Star of Johannesburg. He was an investigative reporter for the Sunday Times of London, a financial reporter for Bloomberg News and began his professional work as a 19-year old stringer for The New York Times. He is the author of two books, A Political Odyssey, with Sen. Mike Gravel, foreword by Daniel Ellsberg; and How I Lost By Hillary Clinton, foreword by Julian Assange. He can be reached at joelauria@consortiumnews.com and followed on Twitter @unjoe
The war in Ukraine is a complicated tangle of three wars in one. It is a civil war between Ukraine’s European leaning west and its Russian leaning east. It is a war between Ukraine and Russia. And it is a war between Russia and NATO.
Ben Abelow’s book, How the West Brought War to Ukraine, is a clear and valuable introduction to the decisions and events that led up to the war between Ukraine and Russia. Nicolai Petro’s The Tragedy of Ukraine is a comprehensive and masterful account of the history of the ethnic tension between the monist and pluralist visions of Ukraine that led to civil war and made Ukraine vulnerable to being caught up in the larger war between Russia and NATO.
Richard Sakwa’s new book, The Lost Peace, valuably fills the gap by addressing the larger war between Russia and NATO. It is a tour de force analysis of the wasted opportunity for peace at the end of the Cold War.
When Mikhail Gorbachev declared the end of the Cold War on December 7, 1988, a brief window for peace opened. But by the negligent failure to construct a new security structure in Europe that overcame the flaws of the previous one, the window Gorbachev opened was quickly closed. When Gorbachev received his peace prize in 1990, the Nobel Prize committee declared that “the two mighty power blocs, have managed to abandon their life-threatening confrontation” and confidently expressed the “hope that we are now celebrating the end of the Cold War.” But “The Cold War,” as U.N. Secretary General António Guterres has funereally said, “is back.”
How was that window of opportunity wasted? Why was the road from the Nobel Committee’s hope to the United Nations’ eulogy such a short one?
If the second cold war that we now find ourselves in is to end more hopefully, that failure will have to be deconstructed in order to find the clues for constructing a lasting and inclusive security structure upon which real peace can be built. Richard Sakwa, who has been called the preeminent Russia scholar of our day, provides timely help with his deconstruction of that failure.
There are two strengths that set The Lost Peace apart. The first is the wealth and depth of Sakwa’s knowledge. The second is that the book doesn’t just start with the shattering of the peace in Ukraine in 2014 that broke the dam for the new Cold War. In The Lost Peace, Sakwa analyzes the post Cold War world and identifies the conflicts and decisions that wasted the peace and led, once again, to war.
Sakwa argues that with the end of the first Cold War, there was a genuine chance for a very different world than the actual one being painfully played out in Ukraine; there was a genuine chance for a real peace.
But an arrogant America misunderstood Gorbachev’s offering of an international order that now transcended blocs and declared the victory of the American-led bloc and the dawn of a unipolar world. “By the grace of God, America won the cold war,” President George H.W. Bush arrogantly and misleadingly boasted in 1992. The young American hegemon, newly bloated with hubris, led the political West, hand in hand with NATO, on a global expansion that would soon close the cold peace and open the door to a new Cold War.
The U.S. rejected the opportunity it had been offered to build a new security structure. Instead, the U.S. declared not only the victory of the political West’s worldview, but its universality, and set out on a mission of enlargement that expanded to fill the whole world.
That is, the whole world but Russia, who alone was left out of the new security arrangement and ostracized as the new dividing lines in Europe moved ever closer to its borders and red lines until the whole strategy exploded in Ukraine, ending the possibility of peace and cementing the new Cold War.
Sakwa deconstructs the necessary security apparatus that was never constructed and demonstrates how, without that framework, the structure of the possible new peace so quickly collapsed. He identifies three crucial contradictions: sovereign internationalism versus liberal internationalism, international law versus the rules-based order, and freedom to choose versus indivisibility of security.
Russia was committed to sovereign internationalism, which emphasizes state sovereignty and the acceptance that different states develop different cultures and are at different stages of development of different forms of government. All are acceptable until they violate international law or human rights. The United States, however, took the perceived victory of the political West to mean the victory of the cultural West and set out on a mission to spread those values across the globe. They favored liberal hegemony over sovereign internationalism, asserting the universality of their beliefs. Russia, China, and the Global South resented that “great substitution” of the values of sovereign internationalism with liberal hegemony and the colonial missionary spread of the universal values of the West.
When the American policy of spreading Western values lacked the necessary approval of the Security Council, the U.S. enlarged the great substitution, usurping the authority of the Security Council and acting unilaterally without its approval. International resentment grew at this replacement of international law anchored in the UN with the rules-based order. The essence of international law is that written laws are applied universally. The rules-based order promoted by the West is composed of unwritten laws whose source, consent and legitimacy are unknown. To Russia and other countries not in the political West, they have the appearance of being invoked when they benefit the U.S. and its partners and not being invoked when they don’t. To those not in the political West, it appeared, disturbingly, that the U.S. and NATO had supplanted the U.N. as the arbiter of international law.
This belief was reinforced in Iraq and, especially, in Kosovo and Libya where the United States acted without Security Council approval in precisely the way they insisted that the rest of the world do not. Russia bristled at the double standard.
As long as liberal internationalism confined itself to the UN based international system, there was much about it that was attractive. But when the U.S. and NATO began their missionary project of spreading those universal values in ways that dismissed sovereign internationalism and international law, other nations felt their sovereignty and security being threatened.
And that led to the third contradiction. The U.S. insists on the free and sovereign right of states to choose their own partners and security alignments; Russia insists on the indivisibility of security, which insists that the security of one state cannot be purchased at the cost of the security of another. Both principles are enshrined in international law and in international agreements, and, with imagination and understanding, they could have been made compatible. But the United States, Russia argues, exclusively pursued the first in disregard of the second.
That conflict came to a head in Ukraine. American and NATO insistence, in violation of verbal promises made at the close of the Cold War, on NATO’s open-door policy and, especially, on Ukraine’s right to join NATO and NATO’s right to expand right up to Russia’s border was perceived by Russia as a security threat that crossed its reddest of lines.
The U.S. and NATO restated their promise of eventual NATO membership for Ukraine and increased military support. Russia felt that its security concerns were being ignored and that Ukraine was being built into a platform for threatening its existence. The U.S. overreached, Russia overreacted, and the second Cold War was a certainty.
If there is a weakness to Sakwa’s book, it is not in its argument nor in its evidence. It is in its reach to an audience. The Lost Peace is not an easy book. It is a book by a scholar steeped in the story that assumes at least a little of that knowledge by its audience. The Lost Peace is not a book for beginners. But for those with an interest in international relations, the book is an invaluable addition.
The Lost Peace despairs of the wasted opportunity to build a security structure that would have provided the architecture for a possible peace at the end of the Cold War. But it also ends with the hope that, having analyzed the contradictions, conflicts and failures to recognize the interests of others, we are able to find “new ways of thinking about old problems” and do better in the face of a new Cold War. Sakwa’s book is an invaluable contribution to that hope.
MOSCOW – The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected Kiev’s claim to recognize Russia as an “aggressor state” and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) as “terrorist organizations,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday.
Earlier in the day, the ICJ rejected most of Ukraine’s claims against Russia under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in Crimea, Court President Joan Donoghue said.
“The International Court of Justice did not follow Kiev’s whim and refused to recognize Russia as an ‘aggressor state.’ The court also rejected Ukrainian insinuations that the DPR and LPR are allegedly ‘terrorist organizations,'” the statement said.
Kiev hoped to back up its demands for the transfer of Russian assets frozen in the West and the introduction of international restrictions against Russia with the court claim, the ministry added.
Ukraine filed the lawsuit with the ICJ in 2017, accusing Russia of violating international conventions on anti-terrorism and racial discrimination over actions in Donbass and Crimea.
The ICJ found that Russia had breached the anti-discrimination treaty by “the way in which it has implemented its educational system in Crimea after 2014 with regard to school education in the Ukrainian language,” and rejected all other claims.
The Hague-based court also found that Russia had faithfully fulfilled its obligations to cooperate in the fight against terrorism financing, including the obligation to identify and block funds used to finance terrorism.
The ICJ declined to rule on Kiev’s accusations of Russia’s alleged responsibility for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014.
When the General Staff have been discussing with President Vladimir Putin the timing of the Russian offensive to force the Kiev regime into capitulation, it has been agreed, understood, and repeated that the strategic reserves of the Ukrainian forces should be destroyed first, together with the supply lines for the weapons and ammunition crossing the border from the US and the NATO allies.
This process, they also agreed, should take as long as required with least casualties on the Russian side, as determined by military intelligence. Also agreed and pre-conditional, there should be no repeat of the political intelligence failures of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) which precipitated the failed special forces operation known as the Battle of Antonov (Hostomel) Airport from February 24 to April 2, 2022.
Taking account of the mistakes made then by the SVR director, Sergei Naryshkin, and the subsequent mistakes of military officers around Yevgeny Prigozhin, the General Staff has also accepted that their tactical operations must run least risk of Russian casualties through March 17, the final day of the presidential election.
Reinforcing these preconditions for the timing of the Russian offensive, General Winter and General Patience have joined the Stavka meetings.
This week military sources believe there has been a turning point – on the Ukrainian battlefield, and on the Russian clock.
The daily Defense Ministry briefing and bulletin from Moscow reported last Thursday, before the Friday weekly summary, that the Ukrainian KIA (killed in action) for the previous twenty-four hours totaled 795, with the ratio of offensive tactics to defence, 3 to 3. On Monday, the KIA total was 680, the ratio 4 to 3. On Tuesday, KIA came to 885, the ratio 5 to 1. The casualty rate is unusually high; the shift to offence is recognizably new, if not announced.
The “Stavka Project”, a military briefing which is broadcast by Vladimir Soloviev, confirms the positional breakthroughs this week on several of the fronts or “directions”, as the Defense Ministry calls them, along the Donbass line; click to watch (in Russian).
In Boris Rozhin’s summary of the Defense Ministry briefing materials, published before dawn on Wednesday morning, the leading Russian military blogger (Colonel Cassad ) identifies “small advances”, “slight movements”, some positional “successes”, other positional “counter-fighting”, and “no significant progress yet”. The adverb is military talk for timing.
According to a military source outside Russia, “the Russian breakthrough is beginning to happen now. It’s being coordinated with strikes and raids along the northern border. The commitment of the ‘crack’ Ukrainian brigades at the expense of other sectors shows how desperate [General Valery] Zaluzhny is to plug the holes. He knows that the target is the isolation of Kharkov, the establishment of a demilitarized ‘buffer zone’, as well as the development of a situation whereby all Ukrainian forces east of the Dnieper are threatened with being cut off… and he’s quickly running out of ammunition, not to mention cannon fodder.”
“By the end of the winter,” the source has added overnight, “the Ukrainians will barely be able to move along the roads they use to feed the front due to the Russian drone, missile, conventional air, and artillery strikes. Once they can no longer plug the gaps with mechanized units acting as fire-fighting brigades, it’s just a matter of time before the big breakthroughs and encirclements begin. At the current burn rate of Ukrainian forces, I imagine we’ll start seeing Russian tanks with fuel tanks fitted for extended range appearing and Russian airborne troops making air assaults in the Ukrainian rear within weeks.”
In yesterday’s edition of the Moscow security analysis platform Vzglyad, Yevgeny Krutikov, a leading Russian military analyst with GRU service himself and GRU sources for his reporting since, published a report entitled “What does the offensive of Russian troops in the Kharkov region mean?” “Russia is creating a new strategic situation in the Kharkov region,” Krutikov concluded, “threatening to dismember the Ukrainian defence up to the Donetsk agglomeration.” A verbatim English translation of this piece follows.
January 29, 2024 – 19:10.
What does the offensive of Russian troops in the Kharkov region mean?
By Yevgeny Krutikov
“The settlement of Tabayevka in the Kharkov region has been liberated,” the Russian Defense Ministry says. We are not just facing the capture of a village: Russian troops are now hacking into the contact lines, which have not budged for a year. Russia is creating a new strategic situation in the Kharkov region, threatening to dismember the Ukrainian defence up to the Donetsk agglomeration.
First, Krakhmalnoye, then Tabayevka – Russian troops have advanced in the Svatovo direction (Kharkov region), pushing the enemy to a new line of defence (to the village of Peschanoye). Slightly to the north, already close to Kupyansk, the enemy’s positions are also gradually moving to the west and southwest.
Along the way, forests are being cleared, which the VSU [Ukrainian Armed Forces] is turning into fortified areas, even giving them names (“Alligator” and “Woodpecker”). The enemy is losing the old lines of trenches, the first line of contact has been destroyed. Something similar is happening directly near Kupyansk, but there the advanced fortified lines in Sinkovka are being held still by the VSU, though the positions on the flanks have gradually begun to sink.
At first glance, we are looking at isolated episodes of positional warfare, since the big, iconic and recognizable geographical names do not appear in the information releases. But this is not quite true.
Firstly, even in this scenario as published so far, strategic threats arise for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for example, in the possible drive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the Oskol River which has far-reaching prospects. Notwithstanding, it is still impossible to predict when this will become possible in practice.
Secondly, the enemy has been demonstrating a systemic defence crisis in the Kupyansk direction during the past week. The defence of Kupyansk has been under construction by the Armed Forces of Ukraine since the spring of last year, when the decision was made in Kiev on a ‘counteroffensive’ in the southern direction. New brigades with western armoured vehicles were sent to the southern section of the contact line, and Kupyansk and the area around it were designated for defence with the rest of their forces.
In Kiev, they were convinced that Russian troops were forming an offensive group in the Kupyansk direction, and so the VSU began to wait there for a frontal assault. However, as a result, the Russian Army did not undertake anything of the kind in this area. Instead, the Ukrainian units were gradually ground down by the Russian army in positional battles, while the Kupyansk group of the VSU had to be replenished with whatever troops were left.
Now Ukrainian sources are complaining that as a consequence, a combination of lines has formed in the sinkhole areas (that’s the same Krakhmalnoye and Tabayevka). Into these lines the VSU has herded separate battalions from different units, with the result that unified management and command have been lost, and the performance quality of the troops has left much to be desired.
As a result, the VSU is considering the possibility of transferring the remnants of those forces which participated in the failed ‘counteroffensive”’ to Kupyansk from the southern direction. Before that, they had been sent in great haste sent to Avdeyevka.
But this is already a systemic problem for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, since there is trouble in the southern sector. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have gradually regained some of the positions which were left during the so-called counteroffensive, and these forces continue to move forward. We are even talking about possible threats to Orekhov, a rearguard city for the VSU, from which all the communications and command of the ‘counteroffensive’ had been carried out.
Behind the defensive fortifications of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, an open field for tens of kilometres opens up on a whole group of sites. Kiev’s military reserves are gradually being squandered, and there is practically no human materiel left to plug the holes. Related to these problems there are the panic campaigns in Kiev about total mobilization.
There is another problem: the attrition of officers. Western military personnel cannot replace this crucial resource — they can only be used to service technically complicated weapons systems such as air defence or long-range artillery. Along the line of contact, foreign officers are more likely to interfere due to their ignorance of the language and misunderstanding of the mentality of the [Ukrainian] subordinates.
There are other factors weakening the Ukrainian defence, but they are not directly related to military operations. For example, the Western sponsors are really concerned about the corruption of the Ukrainian leadership. The inspections and audits which are taking place in Kiev on this issue right now are preventing Ukraine from building new defensive lines swiftly enough.
Another non-military factor: political discord among the various factions of the Ukrainian authorities. The premonition of defeat is triggering a drop in morale, not only in the troops, but also in the elites.
All this in general creates a strategic opportunity for Russia to seriously change the situation on the line of contact.
Partial tactical successes must at some point turn into a major breakthrough in the enemy’s defence. Moreover, we are talking about such a breakthrough that will not stop in just two or three days at the next defensive line, but will lead inevitably, precisely, to the collapse of the front. This is exactly what the efforts of the Russian Armed Forces are now aimed at, probing for the weaknesses in Ukrainian defensive positions.
The liberation of Tabayevka is an example of just such an approach. Sooner or later, the VSU will not have time to create a new defensive line behind a particular settlement. And then we will see how the special operation will break the current positional deadlock.
The Pentagon plans to “field test” a new, ground-launched variant of its deadly Small Diameter Bomb design in real world battlefield conditions in Ukraine. What are these weapons? What dangers will they pose to Russian forces and civilians in frontline areas? How can Russia defeat them? Sputnik explores.
Sources told Politico on Tuesday that Ukraine is preparing to receive a delivery of the US’ new Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDBs) as soon as this week.
The deliveries will give Kiev “a deeper strike capability they haven’t had” and “complement” the Ukrainian military’s “long-range fire arsenal,” a US official familiar with the transfer boasted. The weapons, which even the US military doesn’t have in its arsenal yet, will serve as “an extra arrow in the quiver that’s gonna allow them to do more,” the official said, without elaborating.
What is the Small Diameter Bomb?
Developed in the mid-2000s by US aerospace and defense giant Boeing’s Integrated Defense Systems division, the original GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb was envisioned as an air-dropped glide bomb designed to target an array of stationary ground targets, ranging from bunkers and electronic warfare jamming equipment to airfields, fuel depots, barracks, and troop concentration.
The GBU-39 is equipped with a 285-pound (130 kg) bomb and has a 206-pound (93 kg) penetrating blast fragmentation warhead – enough to punch through up to three feet of steel-reinforced concrete, and can be guided by a combination of active radar homing, laser guidance, GPS, and inertial navigation, depending on configuration and model. The system boasts a circular error probable of about one meter, and has a range of between 75 and 110 km.
The GBU-39 is a glide weapon, which, as the name suggests, means the bomb glides to its target along a pre-designated flight path at low speeds, without the assistance of rocket engines. The system’s comparatively low cost (as little as $40,000 apiece compared to $3.2 million for the Storm Shadows Kiev has been receiving from Britain and using to terror bomb Donbass, for example, combined with its small radar signature and comparatively short flight time makes it difficult to detect and intercept using traditional air defenses.
What is the Ground-Launched Variant of the Small Diameter Bomb?
With Ukraine’s Air Force hard pressed to get its aircraft into the skies due to the constant threat of Russian air defenses and interceptor warplanes, the US and its allies have committed significant resources to converting ordinarily air-launched weapons for launch from ground-based systems (for more information check out the US military-industrial complex’s “FrankenSAM” program for Ukraine).
Besides air defenses, another component of efforts to convert ordinarily air-launched weapons from the ground revolves around rocket artillery. That’s where the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb comes in. Unlike its air-launched cousin, the modified GBU-39 is fitted with an engine from the M26 rocket motor used by the M270 and HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to propel it toward its target.
Developed by Boeing and Swedish defense giant Saab in the mid-2010s, the GLSDB is said to have a range of up to 145 km, and has a reported price tag of about $100,000 apiece.
With the US and its allies having already sent dozens of MLRS artillery platforms to Ukraine over the past two years, the delivery of new ground-launched Small Diameter Bombs is expected to provide Kiev with an instantaneous new long-range strike capability.
How Many GLSDBs Will Ukraine Get?
With US funding for Ukraine running out in December and the Pentagon forced to dip into its own dwindling stockpiles to assist Kiev, it’s not clear how many of the newfangled ground-launched GLSDBs Ukraine will receive. When plans to deliver the weapons were first announced a year ago as part of a $2.17 billion arms package, US media mentioned a figure of two launchers and 24 weapons total.
That would be enough for Kiev to attempt strikes deep behind Russian lines, or to launch terror attacks against cities in Donbass or other Russian border settlements, but not enough to have any serious strategic impact – where quantity of available munitions has proven key.
Where Have Small Diameter Bombs Been Used?
Ukraine’s military will be the GLSDB’s first operator, with the Chinese breakaway island province of Taiwan expected to follow at a later date.
The original SDB was used by the US and its allies in conflicts across the Middle East and Asia, from Iraq and Afghanistan, to Syria and Gaza (where it has been used by Washington’s Israeli ally), and Yemen (deployed by members of the Gulf-led coalition against the Houthis). In each instance, GBU-39s successfully targeted forces fighting US or allied militaries, but in no case has their deployment resulted in or even contributed to a strategic victory for an aggressor power.
How Can Russia Defend Against Ground-Launched GBU-39s?
As mentioned above, glide bombs’ design characteristics and principle of operation makes them difficult to intercept and destroy, but that doesn’t mean the task is impossible. Russia’s response to GLSDB deployment by Ukraine will likely include:
continuing operations to target HIMARS and M270 fire positions, ammunition, supply, and repair depots using artillery and precision missile strikes.
deploying radio-electronic jamming equipment to degrade the weapons’ accuracy (although this will not affect onboard inertial guidance systems, without GPS the glide bombs are less precise).
shooting the glide bombs down using the dense array of conventional air defenses along frontline areas, from the Tor and Buk missile system to close-in anti-aircraft guns.
More bad news for Ukraine – Japan and the UK fail to carry out preliminary agreements on supplying the struggling army with more artillery, as the silver lining at the end of the tunnel goes dim for the Kiev regime.
Efforts by the UK and Japan to replenish Ukraine’s artillery stocks have fallen through, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) has reported, citing sources privy to the draft.
There are two core aspects to the issue – the technical mismatch of the British and the Japanese military blueprints, and the limited production capacity of the supposed Japanese contractor.
By the initiative, Japan was to produce 155 mm shells under an official license granted by the BAE Systems company, one of the leading global defense contractors.
The shells in question were to be manufactured at local Japanese facilities and then were supposed to be shipped over to the UK. Thus, Japan was essentially getting tacitly involved in supplying the Kiev regime with foreign arms without ever having to openly side with Ukraine in the ongoing conflict.
Last December, The Financial Times reported on a similar plan being considered between Japan and the US. The draft was aimed at replenishing the now depleted Western armory stockpiles, so that Kiev’s sponsors were in a better place to provide even more supplies without having to compromise their own military potential.
However, both plans stalled. According to the WSJ sources, British officials have assessed whether the military could use 155 mm projectiles produced by the Japanese Komatsu manufacturer, and have ultimately decided to scrap the plan altogether.
The main issue reportedly stems from troubles in using weapons and arms systems that come from different manufacturers. Besides, the WSJ also noted Komatsu’s limited manufacturing capacity of the shells.
The US and its allies ramped up their military assistance to Kiev shortly after Russia launched its special military operation in 2022. Moscow has repeatedly warned that NATO countries are “playing with fire” by supplying arms that the Kremlin said adds to prolonging the conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, for his part, underscored that any cargo with weapons for the Zelensky regime would become a legitimate target for Russian forces.
MOSCOW – The West is beginning to understand that the “Ukraine project” is failing but can not stop assisting Kiev because of its economic benefit and fear of losing “prestige,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Tuesday.
“The figures that are hidden in Ukraine, they speak a lot about how important it is for the West to prevent the ‘failure’ of their ‘Ukraine project’. Moreover, they already understand that the failure has already begun. But nevertheless they cannot stop. And not only for reasons of prestige … And also from the point of view of economic benefits,” Lavrov said during a meeting with foreign diplomats in Moscow.
Addressing the UN Security Council meeting on January 22, 2023, Lavrov emphasized that there are no interests – and there never were – in the conflict with Russia in favor of the Ukrainian people. There are only “the interests of the Anglo-Saxons, their henchmen and the criminal, rotten Kiev elite, which is tied to the West by mutual responsibility and which is afraid of being swept away the day after the end of the war.”
The Russian top diplomat pointed out that Moscow has never given up on a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine conflict.
“We never gave up on the peaceful resolution, we are always ready to negotiate — negotiate not about how to keep the leadership of the Kiev regime in place but about overcoming the inheritance of a decade-long destructive looting of the country and violence against the people, removing the reasons for the tragic Ukrainian situation,” Lavrov said. However, the key factor hindering a resolution of the conflict in Ukraine is the continued support of the West, he added.
President Joe Biden is working on a document that would promise military assistance to Ukraine for the next decade. The White House hopes to get Congressional approval and prevent Donald Trump from changing course in Ukraine if elected. With the commitment to Kiev, Biden is seeking President Zelensky to adopt a defensive position and abandon aspirations to retake territory.
The Washington Postreports that the White House is working with the State Department to compile a document that will pledge short and long-term military assistance to Ukraine. The administration will seek Congressional buy-in. A portion of the policy would be included in a $111 billion supplemental defense spending bill that includes $61 billion in military assistance for Ukraine.
“According to US officials, the American document will guarantee support for short-term military operations as well as build a future Ukrainian military force that can deter Russian aggression,” The Post explains, “ It will include specific promises and programs to help protect, reconstitute and expand Ukraine’s industrial and export base, and assist the country with political reforms needed for full integration into Western institutions.”
It continues, “Not incidentally, a US official said, the hope is that the long-term promise will also “future-proof” aid for Ukraine against the possibility that former president Trump wins his reelection bid.”
After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Trump started to criticize Biden for failing to prevent the war. Trump claims that, if elected, he will be able to end the conflict within days of retaking office.
It is unclear how Trump plans to accomplish this. As president, he significantly escalated tensions with Russia in Ukraine by providing Kiev with lethal arms.
While the Biden White House cannot ensure that his predecessor does not alter Ukraine policy, last year, the Wall Street Journal explained that the significant number of pro-Ukraine war hawks in Congress will create roadblocks for policy changes.
Additionally, the White House is pushing Zelensky to forego offensive operations this year. “The Biden administration is putting together a new strategy that will de-emphasize winning back territory and focus instead on helping Ukraine fend off new Russian advances while moving toward a long-term goal of strengthening its fighting force and economy,” the Post explains.
“The emerging plan is a sharp change from last year, when the US and allied militaries rushed training and sophisticated equipment to Kiev in hopes that it could quickly push back Russian forces occupying eastern and southern Ukraine.” The authors add, “That effort foundered, largely on Russia’s heavily fortified minefields and front line trenches.”
In the early months of the war, Kiev’s Western backers pledged to support Ukraine for as long as it takes and pushed Zelensky to abandon a potential agreement with Ukraine. Nearly two years into the war, the White House has depleted its funds to arm Ukraine, and Western arms stockpiles are running low.
In Ukraine, Kyiv’s weapons depots are also depleted, and under-equipped soldiers are struggling to push back advancing Russian forces.
The US assured Kiev that the Russian assets that remain frozen in the West are going to be seized and used to rebuild Ukraine after the conflict, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denis Shmygal has said.
The US, EU, and their allies blocked some $300 billion of Russian central bank assets as part of sanctions in response to Moscow’s military operation in Ukraine. Around $200 billion of that money is held in the EU.
Politico reported on Thursday that it asked Shmygal if he was concerned that US funding for the Kiev government would come to a complete stop if Donald Trump won the presidential election in November and returned to the White House for his second term.
”We have all the assurances from the US about long-term support for Ukraine – for example, the seizure of Russian assets to fund the Ukrainian recovery,” he claimed.
On Wednesday, a US Senate committee approved the “Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Act,” which should help pave the way for such a move by Washington. If it passes both houses and is signed into law by President Joe Biden, Washington could seize the Russian central bank assets, using such a measure against a country that it’s not directly at war with for the first time in history.
Reuters reported this week, citing a senior official in Brussels, that the EU will be unlikely to join the US in confiscating the Russian funds as there’s no agreement on such a step between the bloc’s member-states.
Earlier in January, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned that Moscow would respond to a possible seizure of its assets by the West, inducing tit-for-tat measures.
Previously, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the confiscation of Russian funds would amount to “outright theft” by the West. He told reporters that it would undermine the trust in the US and EU financial systems around the globe.
Shmygal also stated that Kiev is “working hard with the administration of President Biden and with Congress to have support for 2024.” As for the continuation of the aid in 2025, “we’ll see how conditions develop,” he stressed.
”I believe that any president of the US will support our fight for civilized values, our mutual values,” the Ukrainian PM said.
The US has provided Ukraine with around $111 billion in economic and military support amid the conflict with Russia. But the flow of funds subsided dramatically in recent months as Republican lawmakers continue to resist attempts by the White House to push through another $60 billion in assistance for Kiev.
Washington is developing a new Black Sea strategy envisaging bolstering the US and NATO role in the region, as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Jim O’Brien announced at a German Marshall Fund meeting on January 25.
Assistant Secretary of State O’Brien, who oversees US relations with Europe and Eurasia, visited the German Marshall Fund on Thursday to discuss 2024 US priorities in Europe, including backing Ukraine and “widening European integration.”
During his speech, O’Brien placed special emphasis on the strategic importance of the Black Sea to the US and NATO, stressing that the development of a grand design to ensure security in the region is underway. He pointed out that meetings had been held with Turkiye and other littoral states.
“[The US] want[s] to establish dominance over the Black Sea,” Vasily Dandykin, a captain 1st rank reserve and military expert, told Sputnik. “This is an old idea. One of the goals is to bring Ukraine into NATO. Because they believe that whoever dominates the Black Sea and owns Crimea receives all the bonuses. This is the underbelly of Russia in the south. And that’s why there was such irritation when the Crimean Spring happened in 2014 [Crimean people voted to reunify with Russia in March 2014 – Sputnik ]. As far as I remember the Americans had agreed with Kiev to establish a base for the US fleet in Sevastopol by that time.”
What’s Behind US Plans to Create Strategic Dominance in the Black Sea?
It was not the first time that O’Brien has pushed the idea of beefing up US/NATO presence in the region. On October 25, 2023, the US official testified before the US Senate’s Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation. He claimed that the Ukraine conflict is “a very good bargain” for the US as it gives Washington a unique opportunity to increase NATO’s military presence in the Black Sea, including the region’s lands, airspace, and waters, while “Ukrainians are paying the bulk of the cost” by fighting with Russians.
NATO’s dominance in the region could create conditions for pulling Ukraine and other Black Sea countries away from Russia and integrating them into the Western sphere of influence, O’Brien added. That would also help the West build oil and gas pipelines that lead from Central Asia via Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkiye to Europe thus completely axing Russia’s energy commodities from the Old Continent’s market. In particular, O’Brien hinted that Washington was very interested in the Ukrainian conflict going on to allow the US to accomplish its geopolitical goals in the Black Sea region.
The Biden administration is considering the idea of redrawing the energy map of the Black Sea region altogether, as Edward Hunt, a PhD in American Studies from the College of William & Mary, has written in his op-ed for Foreign Policy in Focus. Hunt noted that the idea of the “Southern Gas Corridor” through the Black Sea was recently touted by State Department official Geoffrey Pyatt, who served as a US ambassador to Ukraine at the time of the 2014 coup d’etat in Kiev and who now leads US energy diplomacy. Per Pyatt, “the redrawing of the energy map around the Black Sea that’s taking place” envisages “new pipeline infrastructure”, in particular, “the Southern Gas Corridor to bring gas from Central Asia to European consumers.”
‘NATO’s Expanding in All Directions’
Meanwhile, Dandykin pointed out that Washington’s expansionist plans are not limited to the Black Sea:
“The fact is that the strengthening of the United States and NATO – first of all, the United States – in all directions has become the general concept,” the military expert stressed, adding that the US has recently expanded its continental shelf (including in the Arctic region) to about one million square kilometers – an area twice the size of California.
“They established their bases in Finland, and the Finns gave the go-ahead, for airfields, etc. In the Baltic, near our borders, maneuvers will now take place for two months, with a total of 90,000 [NATO] military personnel. This is a concept of the expansion in all directions, including in the south. They seek to encircle and bleed the Russian Federation white,” the expert said.
Dandykin emphasized that Washington appears to have benefitted the most from the Ukrainian conflict and sanctions spree. The US forced Europe to decouple from Russia and at least partially filled the latter’s shoes. The American military-industrial complex is now working “at full capacity” to replenish the allies’ depleted weapons stockpiles, as their obsolete weapons have been burned down in Ukraine.
“More and more [Western] countries are placing orders for weapons. There is a military schizophrenia in Germany, they want to rearm. The Americans have always been the beneficiaries in all these messes. Therefore, they will, in particular, try to pour more gasoline on the fire this year to create difficulties for Russia,” Dandykin said.
How Will Russia React to US Black Sea Strategy?
The US and their NATO allies have been trying to enhance their operations in the Black Sea, the military expert noted, referring in particular to Western surveillance drones flying in close proximity to Crimea.
Russia has repeatedly warned the US against meddling in the Ukraine conflict. On the morning of 14 March 2023, a Russian Su-27 fighter jet was scrambled to intercept an American MQ-9 Reaper drone. The latter eventually crashed into the Black Sea after conducting a botched maneuver.
Dandykin pointed out that no matter how brazen the US and its NATO allies may behave, they are fully aware that they are risking nothing short of a nuclear war with Russia.
Washington’s Black Sea strategy obviously won’t go unnoticed by the Russian Foreign Ministry, the expert continued, adding that Russia is ready for all potential scenarios. He noted that a lot depends on how Black Sea littoral states, especially Turkiye, will react to Team Biden’s Black Sea initiatives. Ankara has so far demonstrated its firm position by closing off the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to warships from any country, whether or not they border the Black Sea, after the beginning of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine. Besides, a new conflict in the Middle East over Israel’s Gaza war may also influence the balance of power in the region. So, Russia is likely to take a wait-and-see approach and it won’t add fuel to the fire as its American counterparts are presently doing overseas, Dandykin noted.
What’s more, the US security doctrine for the Black Sea could hardly be accomplished as it excludes Russia, a littoral state with considerable strategic strength and influence in the region, Dandykin stressed. “No, it’s obviously impossible” the expert emphasized when asked whether it’s possible to implement this or any other security strategy in the Black Sea region without the participation of the Russian Federation.
Ukraine is losing the drone war. This isn’t a claim made by the Russian Ministry of Defense or by Russian state media, but rather the headline of an article appearing in Foreign Affairs magazine, written by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt who now heads a think tank, the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP), advising the US government regarding artificial intelligence and other emerging technology.
The article titled, “Ukraine is Losing the Drone War – How Kyiv Can Close the Innovation Gap With Russia,” makes a wide range of claims, from repeating unlikely narratives regarding astronomically high Russian losses, to admissions regarding Russia’s many and multiplying advantages over both Ukraine and its Western supporters. Schmidt’s narrative is contradictory, and the article ultimately fails to deliver a coherent explanation as to how Ukraine can actually “close the innovation gap with Russia.”
It is a mystery as to why Schmidt is even writing this article in the first place, not being a journalist or a politician, but rather a leader of the US high-tech industry. But the article demonstrates how even at the highest levels of political and industrial leadership in the US, there lies a fundamental misunderstanding of not only the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, but of the fundamental premise upon which all American foreign policy is built.
Why Ukraine is Losing the Drone War, and will Continue Losing
Schmidt’s article lays out a distorted account of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, following familiar narratives found across the collective West’s media. This includes the notion that Ukraine initially “held the upper hand in drone warfare” and had managed to keep “Russian forces on the back foot.” Such conclusions are drawn by focusing solely on the trading of territory, and in particular, on Ukraine’s Kharkov and Kherson offensives in 2022.
However, because the Ukraine conflict is fundamentally a war of attrition, the true measure of Ukraine’s success or failure is measured in the loss of manpower and equipment versus its ability to regenerate forces, replace equipment, and replenish ammunition stockpiles. In all of these regards, Ukraine has been losing the war from the moment it began – some may even look back in hindsight and conclude the war was lost before it even began.
The collective West for decades developed a large, for-profit military industrial base. It focused on maximizing profits through the production of high-cost systems built in relatively small quantities, while eliminating extra manufacturing capacity for large-scale production that rarely if ever was necessary to sustain the West’s “small wars” following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Russia, on the other hand, inherited the Soviet Union’s massive military industrial base, maintained certain aspects of it, modernized and expanded others, preparing for large-scale, high-intensity, protracted warfare within or along its borders.
From 2008, when US-armed and trained Georgian forces attacked Russian troops in the South Caucasus region, Moscow began preparing for a conflict by proxy with NATO it considered inevitable. From 2014, following the US overthrow of the elected Ukrainian government, it was almost certain that conflict by proxy with NATO would be fought in Ukraine.
From that point onward, Russia began building up the military industrial base required to fight and win a large-scale proxy war against a NATO-armed and trained Ukraine. Because Russia’s military industrial base consists of a large network of state-owned enterprises, a preference for purpose over profits prevailed.
Today, this fundamental reality is reflected in virtually every aspect of the fighting in Ukraine, from Russia’s advantage in quantity regarding low-tech artillery shells, to more advanced systems like main battle tanks, cruise missiles, and warplanes that both outnumber and outperform their NATO counterparts, to – perhaps especially – drones of all kinds.
Schmidt’s article admits that Russia is not only outproducing Ukraine in terms of drones, placing the number of drones produced monthly to around 100,000, but also admits Russia possesses drones Ukraine has no equivalent of. Schmidt singled out the Orlan reconnaissance drone and the Lancet kamikaze drone in particular.
Ukraine, however, has been provided with a large variety of drones produced across the collective West. It began the conflict with a number of much more sophisticated Bayraktar TB-2 drones manufactured by Türkiye. While these drones are formidable weapons, they are inappropriate for the battlefield in Ukraine, where they face Russia’s extensive integrated air defense network and Russia’s extensive array of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
Should drones equivalent to the Orlan and Lancet exist in sufficient numbers to provide to Ukraine, the inability to overcome Russia’s advantages in both air defenses and EW would still impair their use.
Schmidt, in fact, notes Russia’s EW capabilities as “superior,” capable of jamming and spoofing signals between Ukrainian drones and their operators. While Ukraine has been provided with EW capabilities as well, the collective West is admittedly years behind Russia in this field of expertise.
At one point, the article admits:
Most Western-supplied weapons have fared poorly against Russia’s antiaircraft systems and electronic attacks. When missiles and attack drones are aimed at Russian sites, they are often spoofed or shot down. U.S. weapons in particular can often be thwarted via GPS jamming.
While Schmidt spends the rest of the article discussing “winning the drone war,” he never actually articulates a coherent strategy in doing so.
He claims, “Ukraine will need to secure additional Western ammunition supplies,” without acknowledging the fact that such supplies do not exist, and will not any time in the foreseeable future because the production capacity to manufacture them in sufficient quantities does not exist.
Schmidt continues, suggesting, “Ukraine also needs antiaircraft and attack missiles to strike fast-moving airborne targets.” Just as with artillery shells, antiaircraft missiles were in short supply even before the conflict began in Ukraine, and have only dwindled further. If producing low-tech artillery shells in greater quantities will take the West years to do, producing more complex missile interceptors will take even longer.
Schmidt claims that, “Ukrainian startups are working around the clock to develop advanced drones that can resist spoofing and jamming.” Yet, this ignores the fact that many more Russians with far greater resources are working around the clock to develop better means of spoofing and jamming.
Ultimately, Schmidt’s “solution” to Ukraine’s losing drone war (and losing the war in general) is for “Kyiv’s allies” to sustain “financial and technical support.” He never explains how this can be done in a way matching or exceeding Russia’s own efforts to constantly expand its military industrial output in both quantity and quality. Russia began with and continues to maintain a headstart over Ukraine and its Western backers. Simply suggesting Ukraine needs more of everything doesn’t address the shortcomings that created these disadvantages in the first place, nor suggest any way of solving them.
Schmidt’s stated objective in the article is “neutralizing the advantages that Russia has gained.” The only actual way to achieve this would be to build a military industrial base capable of matching or exceeding Russia’s ability to research and develop new technology, and then mass produce and place this technology on the battlefield.
It would require the creation of massive state-owned enterprises able to subordinate profit to purpose, the creation of an education system able to supply a steady stream of the necessary human resources this expanded industry would require, and the ability to source raw materials and components from adjacent, likewise state-owned enterprises.
It would take years for the United States to complete such a transformation – years Ukraine doesn’t have. It would also require the political will to do so in the first place, which simply does not and will never exist because of the systemic composition of American political and industrial power.
America’s Tenuous Grasp on Reality, its Worst Enemy
Eric Schmidt has a close relationship with both the leading edge of high-tech American industry and the US government itself. His think tank, SCSP, says on its official website that its purpose is:
To make recommendations to strengthen America’s long-term competitiveness as artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies are reshaping our national security, economy, and society. We want to ensure that America is positioned and organized to win the techno-economic competition between now and 2030, the critical window for shaping the future.
SCSP sees 2025-2030 as a critical window in which the US must establish a clear lead over its “rivals” Russia and China. SCSP admits that the “margin for error is shrinking.”
Yet, Schmidt’s admission to Russia’s success in Ukraine and the advantages it holds over not only Ukraine but its Western supporters as well, seems to suggest that this critical window may have already closed.
The very premise that the United States can maintain techno-economic primacy over both Russia and China (and the rest of the world) is fundamentally flawed. All else built upon this flawed premise will find itself drifting further and further from the realm of practicality, and is reflected in a growing detachment from reality many Western leaders in politics and industry seem to exhibit, including Schmidt.
China alone has a larger population than the collective West. Its higher education system is larger than the United States’, graduating millions more each year in critical fields related to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. China’s industrial base dwarfs the collective West’s, and continues to expand, while the West continues to overextend itself and contract.
Given these fundamental realities, how exactly would the United States still somehow match or exceed China’s technological development unless one assumes “Americans” are simply “better” than the Chinese, and despite all of China’s fundamental and growing advantages over the United States, it will still somehow fall short?
These same assumptions have been prevalent throughout commentary and analysis focused on the conflict in Ukraine. These assumptions have consistently been proven wrong, with disastrous consequences. Russia’s many fundamental advantages on the battlefield ahead of the vaunted 2023 Ukrainian offensive unequivocally guaranteed the offensive would fail. Yet, “intangible” factors were added into an equation assuming Western supremacy and Russian inferiority, to skew projections of the offensive’s success in Ukraine’s favor.
A similar formula is being applied to US competition with Russia and China, ignoring fundamental realities and applying “intangible” assumptions of Western superiority to sidestep the reality that China will irreversibly surpass not just the US, but the collective West.
This reality demands the US reevaluate its position and role within international relations, and begin a transition from a hegemon, into a constructive, cooperative partner with Russia, China, and the emerging multipolar world. But just as battlefield fundamentals in Ukraine ahead of the 2023 offensive demanded Kiev negotiate an end to the war in Russia’s favor, only to be ignored at catastrophic costs, these increasingly clear geopolitical fundamentals will be ignored by the political and industrial leadership of the West, by those like Schmidt, at catastrophic costs to the collective West.
It will be the multipolar world and the restraint and patience it has exhibited as well as the political maturity it exercises in developing and implementing policies, that will attempt to temper and manage these costs, both for the sake of global peace and stability, but also and most ironically, for the sake of the collective West itself.
Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer.
As the 13th anniversary of the crimes of September, 2001 approaches, the neoconservatives are shrieking from the rooftops – and effectively confessing that they were the real perpetrators of the 9/11-Anthrax false flag operation. (The neocons, you may recall, openly called for a “new Pearl Harbor” in September, 2000 – and got one exactly one year later.)
Every year at this time, the neocons orchestrate and hype a series of public relations stunts designed to magnify fears of “radical Islam” and reinforce their crumbling 9/11-Anthrax cover story. But this year’s propaganda campaign is so extreme that it represents a tacit confession: The neocons know that the truth about the 9/11-Anthrax operation is slowly closing in on them; so they are over-reacting by desperately trying to stoke the dying embers of the so-called War on Terror, in order to maintain the myth that Muslims (rather than neoconservative Zionists) attacked America in the autumn of 2001.
When a hysterical person exhibits guilty demeanor by trying too hard to blame a crime on someone else, that person is almost certainly the real perpetrator. As the neocons try much too hard to blame Islam for 9/11 and “terrorism” in general, their hysteria inadvertently reveals their own culpability. Like Shakespeare’s Lady MacBeth, the neoconservative movement has blood on its hands and “doth protest too much.” … continue
This site is provided as a research and reference tool. Although we make every reasonable effort to ensure that the information and data provided at this site are useful, accurate, and current, we cannot guarantee that the information and data provided here will be error-free. By using this site, you assume all responsibility for and risk arising from your use of and reliance upon the contents of this site.
This site and the information available through it do not, and are not intended to constitute legal advice. Should you require legal advice, you should consult your own attorney.
Nothing within this site or linked to by this site constitutes investment advice or medical advice.
Materials accessible from or added to this site by third parties, such as comments posted, are strictly the responsibility of the third party who added such materials or made them accessible and we neither endorse nor undertake to control, monitor, edit or assume responsibility for any such third-party material.
The posting of stories, commentaries, reports, documents and links (embedded or otherwise) on this site does not in any way, shape or form, implied or otherwise, necessarily express or suggest endorsement or support of any of such posted material or parts therein.
The word “alleged” is deemed to occur before the word “fraud.” Since the rule of law still applies. To peasants, at least.
Fair Use
This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more info go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond ‘fair use’, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
DMCA Contact
This is information for anyone that wishes to challenge our “fair use” of copyrighted material.
If you are a legal copyright holder or a designated agent for such and you believe that content residing on or accessible through our website infringes a copyright and falls outside the boundaries of “Fair Use”, please send a notice of infringement by contacting atheonews@gmail.com.
We will respond and take necessary action immediately.
If notice is given of an alleged copyright violation we will act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material(s) in question.
All 3rd party material posted on this website is copyright the respective owners / authors. Aletho News makes no claim of copyright on such material.
The war in Ukraine is a complicated tangle of three wars in one. It is a civil war between Ukraine’s European leaning west and its Russian leaning east. It is a war between Ukraine and Russia. And it is a war between Russia and NATO.
Aletho News 