Supply chains breaking: The hidden bottlenecks threatening to bring the global economy to a standstill
The oil price is just the tip of the iceberg
RT | April 20, 2026
The surge in oil prices in light of the war on Iran has grabbed most of the headlines. For many observers, the severity of the crisis is measurable in the daily changes in the Brent ticker. Some analysts have also begun pointing to emerging stress in fertilizer markets. But beneath these familiar markers, several less visible – and in some cases more systemic – signals are now flashing red.
RT takes a look at the ominous signs that don’t always show up in the news.
Naphtha
Naphtha, a feedstock for petrochemicals, is a classic behind-the-scenes actor. Rarely in the headlines, naphtha is critical to the production of much modern technology, not to mention a whole host of everyday plastics, car parts, medical supplies, packaging – you name it. Naphtha sits at the base of the petrochemical supply chain, where it can wreak havoc if it’s not in supply.
So what exactly is naphtha? It is a liquid hydrocarbon mixture derived from the distillation of crude oil. It is then “cracked” at extreme temperatures to extract ethylene and propylene, which is upstream from a slew of chemical processes that produce the high-purity chemicals, solvents, and plastics that are used in numerous industries, including as supporting inputs in semiconductor manufacturing. Because naphtha is not a core chip material input itself, its role is often overlooked.
Unsurprisingly, naphtha generally exhibits a strong positive price correlation with Brent crude. It is a refinery product, so crude costs are an important driver of pricing. However, its price can diverge meaningfully because it is primarily used in petrochemicals and not simply as a fuel. Naphtha supply disruptions have already made themselves felt in parts of Asia, even causing shortages of plastic bags in South Korea. Incidentally, South Korea has purchased Russian naphtha for the first time in four years.
Several large petrochemical companies, such as LG Chem and Lotte Chemical, are having to cut production or shut cracking facilities due to feedstock shortages. This has disrupted supplies of plastics and packaging, impacting products from consumer goods to medical supplies.
For industrial heavyweight Japan, for example, the disruption to the flow of naphtha is arguably the most pressing economic fallout from the crisis in the Middle East. Japan gets around 60% of its naphtha from overseas. The Middle East is responsible for over 70% of those imports, according to the Japan Petrochemical Industry Association.
The 40% of Japan’s naphtha that comes from domestic refineries isn’t exactly immune to problems in the Middle East – 90% of the oil these refineries use comes from the same region.
Diesel
Diesel is a middle distillate fuel, meaning that it is heavier than gasoline but lighter than fuel oil. It is called “the fuel of the real economy.” It powers all the heavy stuff: trucks, ships, construction, mining, agriculture.
Of particular concern is the fact that diesel prices rise faster than gasoline in nearly every energy crisis. Because it is a critical heavy-transport fuel it has low demand elasticity – meaning diesel consumers will keep buying even at higher prices. Also, it is much harder to ramp up diesel refining quickly. Refineries generally operate at high utilization and have inflexible configurations, limiting their ability to respond quickly to demand surges.
Because diesel is the fuel for the “real economy,” price spikes can be broadly inflationary. According to BloombergNEF, diesel at $5 per gallon in the US could increase prices to consumers by 35%.
Diesel cost an average of $5.61 a gallon nationwide as of last Thursday, according to the American Automobile Association. That is just over $2 above the average on the same date last year and 63 cents more than a month earlier.
Diesel prices have also surged across Europe. Analysts are now warning of potential shortages of both jet fuel and diesel this summer. These two fuels are often grouped together as middle distillates and can to some extent be substituted or blended.
Aluminum
The Iran war has triggered a major crisis in the global aluminum market that could reverberate across numerous sectors of the economy.
Consultancy Wood Mackenzie estimates that the global market is staring at a supply deficit of up to 4 million metric tons this year, which would be the largest in over 25 years. JPMorgan has warned that the global aluminum market has entered a supply “black hole.”
Prices are forecast to exceed $4,000 per tonne. For comparison, the long-term “normal” range is $1,500-$2,500 per tonne. The majority of aluminum producers in the Gulf, which account for around 9% of global supply, have been unable to make shipments to world markets. Meanwhile, a missile strike last month damaged the Al Taweelah smelter operated by Emirates Global Aluminium. Repairs will reportedly take up to a year.
As smelters run through stocks of raw materials, production shutdowns could be forthcoming. But shutting down an aluminum smelter isn’t the same thing as turning off an appliance and turning it back on with the flip of a switch. Smelters run around-the-clock at extremely high temperatures. If you shut them down, the molten metal solidifies and damages the equipment. Restarting them is extremely costly and technically challenging and sometimes entails a full rebuild.
It is currently Western manufacturers taking the brunt of the crisis and partly by the doing of their own countries’ policies. China and Russia are both among the world’s main sources of aluminum but both have been cut off from Western markets because of tariffs and sanctions.
Crack spreads
The gap between what a refiner pays for crude oil and the price at which it sells the finished product is called the crack spread – the word to describe the refining process of “cracking” large hydrocarbon molecules into smaller ones (gasoline, diesel, naphtha, etc.)
A normal crack spread is between $10 and $20, although it can vary by product and region. What we are seeing now is crack spreads over $50. This means refined fuels are becoming more valuable relative to crude oil. This will show up in naphtha and diesel (already discussed above) and in gasoline prices at the pump. Crack spreads therefore provide a useful indicator of fuel-related cost pressures faced by consumers.
Meanwhile, what we’re seeing is a windfall for refiners. In crises such as the current one, pricing power shifts to the most capacity-constrained stage in the system, where output cannot be easily expanded. In this case – and often in oil markets – it is the refining stage.
Helium
Helium, a byproduct of natural gas processing, is a small market that punches well above its weight. Helium is essential in the high-tech world. It has important uses in chipmaking for which there is no easy substitute.
Currently, the global supply of helium is significantly disrupted and reports of rationing are already emerging. The war has thrown a wrench in both the production and transportation of helium. Supply chains for high-tech goods are already feeling the effects. If dislocations continue, this could start to noticeably interfere with production of goods such as electronics, automobiles, and even smartphones.
Helium production is highly concentrated in certain countries. Qatar, a large natural gas supplier, produces nearly a third of global supply, according to the US Geological Survey. However, the Ras Laffan Industrial City, the single largest helium production site in the world, sustained damage from a missile in early March. The Qatari government estimates that it will take up to five years to fully repair the site.
While shippers of some goods have diverted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, a much longer but entirely unencumbered route, this is not as viable for helium, which is transported in specialized cryogenic containers. During long trips, the helium inevitably heats up and “boils off.”
Sulfur
The disruptions in fertilizer markets have garnered a lot of attention but less focus has been on the major feedstock components of fertilizer: sulfur. Called the “king of chemicals,” sulfur is a byproduct of oil and gas refining. It’s another of the vastly underappreciated inputs that keep things running and keep food plentiful across the globe.
Once converted into sulfuric acid, it is used in fertilizers and metal processing, as well as in many pharmaceuticals. The Gulf accounts for roughly 45% of global supply, which means the disruption is already having knock-on effects in both agriculture and metals. Compounding the problem is the fact that sulfuric acid isn’t easily replaced or immediately substitutable. Another vulnerability is that it is not stockpiled heavily, so when flows stop trouble can creep up quite quickly. This sends consumers scrambling for expensive spot supply – all of which eventually shows up in food price inflation.
Sulfur prices have moved sharply higher since the war on Iran began, and now countries are taking measures to insulate their own economies. Türkiye has announced a ban on sulfur exports, while India is also reportedly considering export restrictions.
Looking ahead
The global economy is as fragile as it is complex. As analyst Zoltan Pozsar says, “global supply chains work only in peacetime, but not when the world is at war, be it a hot war or an economic war.” Right now there are both. The confluence of multiple failures at key chokepoints could trigger cascades of crises that would inflict significant and enduring pain across the economy. Nobody thinks much about naphtha or sulfur when the world is humming along. But these and many other inputs, fuels and feedstocks are what keep the whole show running and their absence quickly becomes a crisis.
Israel’s Expansion Means An Unraveling of Middle East Stability
By José Niño | The Libertarian Institute | April 20, 2026
The recent ceasefire between Israel and Iran may have paused the most intense phase of direct military confrontation, but it has done nothing to resolve the deeper questions about Middle Eastern stability that have emerged since October 7, 2023. Behind the temporary calm lies a profound transformation in Israeli strategic thinking, one that has moved from containment to active regional reorganization.
Israel is not a normal democracy that abides by the rule of law or legal restraint. It is very much an expansionist state with bold ambitions and a demonstrated willingness to break international law. The events of the past two years have made this reality impossible to ignore.
The “Greater Israel” project, a term that has carried two primary meanings over the decades, has moved from the ideological fringe into the governing coalition of Israeli politics. In its narrower, post-1967 usage, “Greater Israel” referred to Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. In its maximalist, biblicist form, drawn from Genesis 15:18, it invokes the territory stretching “from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates,” a vast area encompassing parts of modern Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and potentially reaching into Iraq.
Once confined to religious nationalists and settler ideologues, this expansionist vision now sits at the cabinet table. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has called for Israel to “expand to Damascus,” displayed a map showing Jordan as part of Israel at a 2023 speech in Paris, and settler leader Daniella Weiss has publicly stated that “the real borders of Greater Israel are the Euphrates and the Nile.”
Netanyahu’s coalition agreement explicitly declares that “Jewish people have an exclusive and indisputable right to all parts of the Land of Israel” and that “the government will promote and develop settlements in all parts of the Land of Israel.” As Al Jazeera reported in February 2026, figures like Smotrich and Ben Gvir, once regarded as outside the mainstream, “are now in government, reflecting a wider radicalisation within Israeli society itself.”
Perhaps most striking is that this rhetoric is no longer confined to the religious right. Opposition leader Yair Lapid, an ostensibly secular figure, stated in February 2026 that he supports “anything that will allow the Jews a large, broad, strong land,” adding that “the borders are the borders of the Bible.” When even centrist politicians invoke biblical mandates to justify territorial expansion, the ideological transformation becomes undeniable.
The conflict with Hezbollah has catalyzed a significant shift in Israeli policy regarding Lebanon’s territorial integrity. The previous doctrine of containing Hezbollah has given way to explicit calls from senior Israeli officials for the permanent occupation and annexation of territory up to the Litani River, approximately thirty kilometers north of the current border.
Smotrich has repeatedly asserted that the military campaign in Lebanon must result in a “change of Israel’s borders.” On March 23, 2026, he told an Israeli radio program that the campaign “needs to end with a different reality entirely, both with the Hezbollah decision but also with the change of Israel’s borders.” He then declared at a Knesset faction meeting that “the Litani must be our new border with the state of Lebanon, just like the Yellow Line in Gaza and like the buffer zone and peak of the Hermon in Syria,” adding, “I say here definitively, in every room and in every discussion, too.” Al Jazeera reported that these were “the most explicit” statements by a senior Israeli official on seizing Lebanese territory since the current military operations began.
Defense Minister Israel Katz has adopted a complementary posture. He announced at the end of March that the IDF will maintain “security control over the entire area up to the Litani River” and that “hundreds of thousands of residents of southern Lebanon who evacuated northward will not return south of the Litani River until security for the residents of the north is ensured.”
The shift toward annexation is bolstered by the emergence of Uri Tzafon, a movement founded in late March 2024 that advocates for the establishment of Jewish civilian settlements in southern Lebanon. The group, whose name means “awaken, O North” in Hebrew, has organized conferences focused on what it describes as the “occupation of the territory and settlement” of southern Lebanon. Its leaders have invoked conquest, expulsion, and settlement as the necessary sequence for transforming the region.
Senior rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh wrote in a public letter that “after the conquest and expulsion of the hostile population, a Jewish settlement must be established, thus completing the victory.” Eliyahu Ben Asher, a founding member of Uri Tzafon, told Jewish Currents that “the Israeli-Lebanese border is a ridiculous colonial border,” building on his earlier assertion that “what is called ‘southern Lebanon’ is really and truly simply the northern Galilee.”
In mid-2024, the group used drones and balloons to drop eviction notices on Lebanese border towns, informing residents that “they are in the Land of Israel, which belongs to the Jewish people, and that they are required to evacuate immediately,” according to a post the group made on its Telegram channel. In February 2026, dozens of Uri Tzafon activists crossed the border fence near the Lebanese town of Yaroun and planted trees inside Lebanese territory in what the group called a “moral and historical step.” The IDF detained two individuals and called the crossing “a serious criminal offense.” By April 2026, Jewish Currents reported that Uri Tzafon’s once-marginal ideas had gained “broad governmental and public support,” with the movement’s leaders now setting their sights on territory beyond the Litani, toward the Zaharani River, another dozen miles deeper into Lebanon.
The pursuit of “Greater Israel” and the annexation of buffer zones draw on a lineage of Israeli strategic thought that advocates for the fragmentation of rival Arab states. This lineage includes the 1982 Yinon Plan, an article published in the Hebrew journal Kivunim (“Directions”) and authored by Oded Yinon, who had served as a senior official in the Israeli Foreign Ministry and as a journalist for The Jerusalem Post. Yinon argued that the borders drawn by colonial powers were inherently unstable and that Israel’s security would be best served by what he called the “dissolution of the military capabilities of Arab states east of Israel.” He specifically proposed that Iraq should be divided into separate Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite entities, and that Syria and Lebanon should similarly fragment along sectarian lines.
The deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey represents one of the most significant diplomatic casualties of the post-October 7 era. Israeli leadership has designated Turkey not merely as a problematic partner but as a strategic adversary whose regional ambitions require a coordinated counter-alliance.
Foreign Minister Israel Katz spearheaded this posture with highly personalized and escalatory rhetoric. Following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s July 28, 2024, speech suggesting that his country might intervene in Israel “just as we entered Karabakh, just as we entered Libya,” Katz responded on X that Erdoğan was “following in the footsteps of Saddam Hussein” and that he “should remember what happened there and how it ended,” posting a photograph of Erdoğan alongside the former Iraqi dictator. Katz also instructed Israeli diplomats to “urgently dialogue with all NATO members” to push for Turkey’s condemnation and expulsion from the alliance, calling Turkey “a country which hosts the Hamas headquarters” and describing it as part of “the Iranian axis of evil.”
Beyond rhetoric, Netanyahu has articulated a vision for a regional counter-alliance. On February 23, 2026, ahead of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel, Netanyahu announced a proposed “hexagon of alliances” that would include Israel, India, Greece, and Cyprus, along with unnamed Arab, African, and Asian states. He stated that the initiative was designed to counter “the radical axes, both the radical Shia axis, which we have struck very hard, and the emerging radical Sunni axis.” While Netanyahu did not explicitly name Turkey as leading the Sunni axis, Israeli political discourse and analysts have pointed to Turkey under Erdoğan as the primary concern, with former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett recently describing Turkey as “the new Iran.”
The shifts in Israeli rhetoric and doctrine since October 7 have had profound implications for its international standing. The “Greater Israel” rhetoric and the annexation of southern Lebanon have led to what observers describe as a “dark new phase” in Israel’s relations with the international community. Long-standing partners, including the United Kingdom, have suspended trade negotiations and imposed sanctions on individuals involved in the settler movement, citing the strident rhetoric of Israeli ministers as a primary cause.
The military campaign against Iran in early 2026 and the subsequent Iranian retaliation through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz triggered the world’s biggest oil supply disruption since the 1970s. The reclassification of the Strait as a maximum war-risk zone led to insurance premiums surging by over 1,000% contributing to a global fuel crisis and massive volatility in financial markets. Within Israel, the economic damage from the multi-front war has been estimated at over $11.5 billion.
As Israel moves to dismantle the borders of the twentieth century, the resulting shockwaves are rattling both regional alliances and global energy markets. The Jewish state’s transformation into an expansionist power has turned former partners into strategic adversaries, making the recent ceasefire feel like a brief intermission in a much larger drama. In this new Middle East, the map is being redrawn by force, and the cost of that ink is being felt from the Litani River to the Strait of Hormuz.
Why has Israel’s Security Doctrine begun targeting Turkey?
The logic of prevention
By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | April 20, 2026
To understand why Turkey has gradually come to be viewed as a strategic concern for Israel, we must start with a methodological premise: in the Middle East, security doctrines are not formulated solely in response to immediate threats, but primarily in anticipation of future power dynamics. From this perspective, security does not equate to the mere defense of borders, but rather to the ability to prevent the emergence of regional actors capable of limiting Israel’s freedom of action or altering existing strategic balances.
Turkey is today viewed by a segment of the Israeli discourse not simply as a complex neighbor, but as a rising regional power with autonomous ambitions. This development is significant because, within the logic of Israeli security, an actor does not necessarily become a threat only when it displays direct hostility; it can also become one when it acquires sufficient military capabilities, geopolitical influence, and strategic depth to constrain Israel’s operational margin.
Israeli security doctrine has historically been associated with a preventive approach, grounded in the need to neutralize threats before they mature into a fully hostile form. This framework, applied over time to various theaters and adversaries, tends to view the growth in power of other actors as a potential long-term risk, even when it does not yet translate into a direct and immediate threat.
In this context, the issue is not merely what an actor does in the present, but what it might do in the future if it further strengthened its capabilities. For Israel, therefore, strategic analysis includes not only an assessment of intentions but also of potential. This is why attention focuses on states or organizations capable of influencing the regional balance of power, supporting alternative alliances, or limiting Israeli military superiority.
Turkey increasingly fits into this framework because it combines three key elements: a decisive geographical position, a sophisticated military apparatus, and an increasingly assertive foreign policy. Its ability to operate simultaneously in the Levant, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus makes it a geopolitical actor that cannot easily be reduced to a single bilateral dimension.
From Iran to Turkey
For years, Iran has represented the primary paradigm of strategic threat to Israel. However, Turkey’s growing centrality in Israeli discourse does not indicate a straightforward replacement, but rather an extension of the same logic of containment toward another regional actor perceived as capable of building systemic autonomy.
The statement attributed to Naftali Bennett—according to which a “new Turkish threat” is emerging and Israel should act simultaneously against Tehran and Ankara—is significant not so much for its rhetorical value as because it signals the inclusion of Turkey in a security lexicon that until recently was reserved for other regional adversaries. Similarly, the interpretation put forward by Israeli analytical and media circles emphasizes the need not to underestimate Turkey’s potential, especially as Ankara strengthens its military capabilities and consolidates alternative regional partnerships.
The most important shift is therefore conceptual: Turkey is no longer viewed merely for its immediate moves, but as a potential structural factor in the transformation of the regional order. In this light, Israeli-Turkish tensions are not a diplomatic incident, but a reflection of a broader competition for regional hegemony.
The eastern Mediterranean and Syria
One of the main theaters of this rivalry is the Eastern Mediterranean. Here, Israel has progressively strengthened its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, contributing to the formation of a security axis that also addresses concerns stemming from Turkish activism in the region. The energy issue, control of maritime routes, and the delimitation of exclusive economic zones have transformed the Eastern Mediterranean into a space of strategic competition with high political stakes.
Syria, however, remains the most sensitive issue. Following the collapse of the Assad government in December 2024, the dynamics of influence within the country rapidly shifted, and the overlap between Turkish and Israeli operations has heightened the risk of miscalculation. On the one hand, Ankara has sought to consolidate its presence and prevent the emergence of hostile entities along its southern border; on the other, Israel has pursued the need to preserve freedom of air action and the ability to strike infrastructure deemed hostile.
In this scenario, the problem is not merely the divergence between two states, but the collision between two incompatible security projects. Turkey aims for a strategic depth that allows it to project stability and influence; Israel, by contrast, tends to prefer a fragmented surrounding environment, devoid of powers capable of consolidating to the point of influencing its operational space.
Turkey’s transformation into an object of Israeli strategic attention also depends on its military evolution. The modernization of the Turkish armed forces, the development of missile systems, the extensive use of drones, and the desire to acquire autonomous regional projection capabilities reinforce the perception of Ankara as a revisionist power or, at the very least, as an actor not aligned with Israeli interests.
In terms of perception, the decisive point is that Turkey is no longer viewed merely as a difficult interlocutor or an ambiguous NATO ally, but as a power that could influence the security architecture of the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean. This explains why Israeli circles speak of a “new Turkish threat” and why political discourse has begun to place Ankara in a category close to the more established one reserved for Iran.
This perception is also fueled by Turkey’s stance on the Palestinian issue and its relations with Islamist or anti-Israeli actors. Strategically, this reinforces the idea that Turkey is not merely a regional mediator but an actor capable of forming alternative coalitions and providing political support to forces hostile to Israel.
Normalization of the confrontation
One of the most significant aspects of the current dynamic is the normalization of conflict-laden language. When a threat is repeatedly invoked by former prime ministers, analysts, the media, and strategic circles, it ceases to be a remote possibility and becomes a mentally viable option in public discourse. This does not mean that conflict is inevitable, but that the discursive and psychological conditions are being established that make a future escalation plausible.
The logic is well-known in the history of international relations: before a clash manifests itself militarily, it takes root in security discourse, in preventive doctrines, and in representations of the adversary. Speaking of a “new threat” or the “need to act simultaneously” on two fronts helps redefine the cognitive framework within which political elites interpret available options.
In this sense, the Turkish case is particularly significant because it signals a shift from diplomatic rivalry to a deeper strategic competition. Turkey is not merely criticized for certain foreign policy decisions; it is increasingly treated as a potential structural obstacle to Israeli security.
The reason why Israeli security doctrine has begun to target Turkey must therefore be sought in a combination of structural factors: Turkish geopolitical autonomy, military buildup, competition in the Eastern Mediterranean, overlapping interests in Syria, and the growing political distance between Ankara and Tel Aviv. The problem, from Israel’s perspective, is not merely what Turkey is today, but what it could become if it succeeds in consolidating a regional sphere of influence consistent with its own interests.
In this context, Israel appears to be applying to Turkey the same preventive logic it has already employed with other actors: to contain at an early stage what might, in the future, reduce Israel’s freedom of action or challenge its strategic superiority. The issue, therefore, is not merely bilateral but concerns the entire Middle Eastern power architecture.
For this reason, interpreting the Israeli-Turkish rivalry as a simple contingent dispute would be misleading. Instead, it must be understood as an expression of a broader transformation of the regional order, in which states with autonomous ambitions and growing capabilities are viewed as potential systemic threats. It is within this logic that Turkey has entered Israel’s strategic radar.
Col Doug Macgregor: US Strategy in Iran NEVER ADMIT DEFEAT
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – April 19, 2026
IRNA denies 2nd round of negotiations: reports
Al Mayadeen | April 19, 2026
Iran has not yet made a decision on whether it will engage in a new round of negotiations with the United States, local media reported on Sunday. IRNA news agency said that “there is no clear prospect of fruitful negotiations.”
IRNA denied reports that a second round of negotiations had been held in Islamabad, stating that they were “incorrect.” The state news agency reported that Washington’s “maximalism and excessive and unrealistic demands,” along with “frequent changes of positions, constant contradictions, and the continuation of the so-called naval blockade.”
The agency added that under these conditions, “there is no clear prospect of fruitful negotiations.”
It also indicated that the reports being circulated by the United States are nothing more than “media games, part of a pattern of exchanging accusations and exerting pressure on Iran.”
On another note, citing unnamed sources, the Fars and Tasnim news agencies reported that Tehran has not finalized its position on participating in the proposed talks. They also described the current climate as “not very positive,” with Fars quoting a source as saying that lifting a US blockade on Iranian ports would be a prerequisite for any negotiations.
Iran withholds second-round US talks until blockade lifted
Iran has not yet decided whether to send a delegation for negotiations with the United States, Tasnim News Agency reported on Sunday, as tensions remain high following Washington’s continued breach of the ceasefire.
According to the report, Tehran has made clear that talks with the United States will not take place as long as the maritime blockade remains in force, effectively linking any diplomatic engagement to the removal of coercive measures.
Communication between the two sides is ongoing through a Pakistani intermediary, suggesting that backchannel contacts remain active despite the absence of formal negotiations.
Talks collapse
The current deadlock follows an earlier round of talks held in Islamabad in mid-April, which lasted several hours but ended without agreement.
The US delegation was led by Vice President JD Vance, while Iran was represented by a senior delegation headed by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
Tehran rejected “maximalist” US demands, arguing that Washington sought sweeping concessions, particularly on nuclear and regional issues, without offering credible guarantees or meaningful sanctions relief in return.
Ceasefire contradiction
The breakdown was further compounded by Washington’s decision to impose a naval blockade on April 12, even as negotiations were ongoing.
Iran had initially moved to reopen the waterway under a ceasefire understanding before reversing course in response to continued US interference with maritime traffic.
Washington maintained its blockade, announced on April 12, even as it publicly framed the Strait as “reopened,” a contradiction that has fueled tensions.
Iran has argued that engaging in talks under such conditions would amount to negotiating under pressure, insisting that meaningful dialogue requires the lifting of restrictions on its shipping and ports.
Israel attacks three nations for alleged backing of Iran
RT | April 19, 2026
Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations has lashed out at his French, Chinese, and Pakistani counterparts, accusing their countries of effectively backing Iran by allegedly striking deals to secure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
The rebuke appears to stem from media reports which recently indicated that commercial vessels from all three countries were able to transit the Strait of Hormuz during the blockade, in some cases with Iranian authorization, despite broader restrictions on shipping imposed by Tehran.
“I asked the French ambassador: How much money did you pay Iran to move ships safely through the Strait of Hormuz?” Danny Danon said in a post on X shortly after speaking at the UN General Assembly session on the Strait of Hormuz blockade.
“Surprisingly, he had no answer,” he wrote, adding: “The ambassadors of China and Pakistan also had no answer.”
Navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, a key route handling around 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows, has been disrupted since Tehran effectively blocked the waterway in response to the US-Israeli bombing campaign that began on February 28.
On Friday, Iran opened the Strait to all commercial vessels, framing the move as part of ceasefire arrangements linked to the Israel–Lebanon truce, but closed it again the following day. The decision came as US President Donald Trump said the US blockade on Iranian ports and shipping would remain in force until a peace deal is reached. Washington imposed the restrictions after bilateral talks in Pakistan collapsed last weekend.
In March, Iran said that vessels of India, China, Russia, Iraq, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka would be allowed to pass through the crucial waterway. Beijing is ranked as the biggest buyer of Iranian oil and most of its supplies pass through the chokepoint. At the same time, Malaysian authorities thanked Tehran for allowing the passage of the country’s ships.
In April, the Financial Times reported, citing the tracking data, that a container ship owned by a French shipping company had sailed through the Strait of Hormuz along with several other ships.
At the UN, France previously voted in favor of resolutions condemning Iran’s blockade of the strait, China either vetoed the measures or voted against critical wording, while Pakistan abstained.
Ex-intel officer questions Israeli strategy in Lebanon as losses mount
Al Mayadeen | April 19, 2026
A former Israeli Military Intelligence officer has questioned the Israeli occupation’s strategy in southern Lebanon, pointing to mounting losses since the ceasefire took effect.
Retired Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Neriah told i24 News that Hezbollah has emerged stronger from the war despite extensive Israeli bombing and attacks, noting that the group “represents the resistance against Israel, and this is its primary source of strength.”
“If we are sustaining daily losses in Lebanon, how long can we endure this situation?” he asked.
2 killed, dozen injured since ceasefire
The Israeli military command had announced that an Israeli reservist soldier was killed and nine others were wounded in an improvised explosive device incident in southern Lebanon on Saturday. Reports indicate that the incident occurred in the border village of Kfar Kila, opposite of Metulla, which has seen extensive periods of Israeli military occupation and incursions since the 66-day war on Lebanon in 2024.
On Sunday, Israeli media reported that an Israeli soldier was killed and nine others were wounded, including one seriously, after an explosive device detonated in an area it occupies in southern Lebanon. The soldier served in the 769th “Hiram” Regional Brigade’s 7106th Battalion.
According to an initial military probe, the incident occurred during operations in Israeli-occupied territory, where an engineering vehicle was struck by an IED planted in the area. Troops securing the machinery were caught in the blast, resulting in multiple casualties. The wounded were airlifted to hospitals, while the Israeli regime says its forces launched their own attacks near the area following the explosion.
A day earlier, Israeli media reported that another reservist, a warrant officer, was killed and three soldiers were wounded in a similar explosion in the southern Lebanese village of Jebbayn. The troops were reportedly scanning a building for weapons when the device detonated.
Continued attacks, occupation in southern Lebanon
The Israeli military command had announced that its forces would operate in a so-called “advanced defense zone” within southern occupied Lebanon, extending from Ras al-Bayyada on the coast to Shebaa in the east. The zone is seen as a prelude to a prolonged Israeli occupation and an attempt to push settlers within Lebanese territory.
The announcement comes as part of a push by the Israeli regime to impose a new status quo in areas located in a region 8-10 km from Israeli sites in occupied Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian territories.
However, the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon has emphasized that a ceasefire must include a complete halt to Israeli violations, including incursions and destruction of property.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem stated that the Resistance remains prepared to respond to any aggression, stressing that the ceasefire cannot be one-sided and must be respected by both parties. He outlined key priorities for the next phase, including a full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory, the return of displaced residents to their villages, and the launch of reconstruction efforts supported at both the national and international levels.
Sheikh Qassem also stressed the importance of strengthening Lebanese sovereignty, maintaining internal unity, and preventing foreign interference.
Netanyahu’s ‘total victory’ to total flop
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | April 19, 2026
Promising annihilation, dominance, and total victory, the Israeli leadership has found itself in a predicament no closer to victory on any front. Tactical victories sold as strategic ones have been exposed; instead of meticulously planned operations, Tel Aviv engages in aggression without any discernible long-term strategy to achieve its stated aims.
Since October 7, 2023, the Israeli regime of old is no more. Instead of implementing methodical planning, public deception, and fighting the long game, its thinking has been replaced by a ruthlessly violent vengeance scheme that seeks to try and achieve in months what it was previously aiming for over decades.
The beginning of the war on Iran was not February 28, 2026; instead, it was October 7, 2023. This was the moment when everything changed in the strategic thinking of the Israeli leadership. For them, the illusion of absolute control and superiority was crushed under the boots of a few thousand Palestinian fighters, who single-handedly dealt the most severe blow to the Zionist regime in its history.
As an event, the collapse of the Israeli southern command at the hands of a guerrilla force possessing homemade light weapons, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, represented the moment of a great shift. It wasn’t long before the decision was made to launch a genocide against the people of Gaza.
Inflicting the genocide was the whole strategy, not dealing a military defeat to Hamas or any other Palestinian organizations. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu foolishly believed that the genocide would restore the Zionist entity’s prized “deterrence capacity”, while the side effects of the genocide would mean the de facto defeat of the Resistance, destroying Palestinian will to resist that could lead to a mass ethnic cleansing event that would end up inflicting a predicament on Hamas that replicates the PLO’s defeat in 1982.
When it became clear that this strategy was not working inside Gaza itself, the Israeli military continued without any clear goals and launched operation after operation in desperate attempts to achieve their desired outcomes. The majority of the tasks performed inside Gaza by the invading ground forces were simply round-the-clock demolition work; so much that they even recruited private businesses and settler employees to aid in these efforts.
Ultimately, they ran into a major problem; after two years, they had still failed and presented a plan to try to implement a West Bank-style occupation over Gaza City, a task that experts predicted could take them a decade. This is why they accepted a ceasefire, one in which the war was simply frozen and meant they were able to engage in a prisoner exchange.
In Lebanon, they were also put into a difficult predicament. The stance of former Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had been that Lebanon would remain a support front for Gaza until the very end. “Hamas will win,” stated Nasrallah in a 2023 speech, after which he asserted that “no matter where the region is taken,” Hezbollah will stand with Gaza.
The daily operations by Hezbollah were a thorn in its side, which is why the Israelis began planning to escalate in an unprecedented way. Through their terrorist indiscriminate pager attacks, followed by the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and most of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, the Israelis believed they had dealt a death blow to Hezbollah.
Selling this lie to the public, the Israeli leadership claimed a major victory and alleged to have taken out around 80% of Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal.
In March, when Hezbollah began responding to the some 15,400 ceasefire violations committed by the Zionists, suddenly the Israeli public was jolted back by the power and coordination with which Hezbollah managed to attack, especially as these operations were carried out alongside Iran’s missile and drone strikes.
Eventually, failing to score victories in key towns like Bint Jbeil and Khiam, the Israelis begrudgingly accepted a temporary ceasefire, one that they immediately violated.
If it were true that the Israelis were close to, or even believed that a victory over Hezbollah was possible, they would not take any ceasefire agreement of any description. Instead, they were forced to go back to the drawing board.
Similarly, they launched the 12-day war on Iran and came out empty-handed. They also used their US allies to launch an air assault on Yemen and failed to achieve any of their goals. Then came the February 28 attack on Iran, where the largest blows were landed during the first 24 hours, yet even with the US on their side, their aspirations for regime change quickly faded into a distant memory.
When Yemen’s Ansar Allah joined the war in support of Iran and Hezbollah, the Israelis didn’t even launch strikes on Yemen, likely due to it being a useless endeavour.
So as it stands, the Lebanon front is again open, the Iran front was fought to a standstill with no goals achieved, Yemen is open whenever there is aggression on their allies, and Gaza is a temporarily frozen arena that they still have no plan for. Even in Syria, the constant aggression is like playing with fire.
Meanwhile, the delusional Zionist leadership is still chasing its aspirations of a “Greater Israel”, threatening even Turkey with retaliation for simply criticizing them. What this behaviour and all of their decision-making since October 7 point to is an irrational inability to close any conflict, lacking any coherent plans to win.
Therefore, the Israelis will use any and all ceasefire agreements in order to go back to the drawing board, in order to conjure up new plans for further aggression. Whether it’s a Lebanon, Gaza, or Iran ceasefire, they are not about to give up on attacking everyone mercilessly.
This means that despite all of its efforts and attacks over the past two and a half years, the predicament they find themselves in has not changed. A ceasefire kicks the can down the road, simply delaying the inevitable resumption of war. Either the Israelis are totally defeated in battle, or they will continue to attack again and again. This will go around in circles until they are eventually defeated.
Hezbollah denies involvement in deadly attack on UNIFIL in south Lebanon
Al-Mayadeen | April 18, 2026
Hezbollah has denied any involvement in an incident targeting United Nations observers in southern Lebanon earlier today.
In a statement, the group said it “calls for caution in issuing judgments and responsibilities regarding the incident,” urging restraint until facts are fully established.
The movement specifically rejected any responsibility for the incident involving UNIFIL forces in the al-Ghandourieh–Bint Jbeil area, stressing that blame should not be assigned before the Lebanese Army completes its investigation and clarifies the circumstances.
Emphasis on coordination and stability
Hezbollah also highlighted the importance of maintaining cooperation between local residents, UNIFIL, and the Lebanese Army. It emphasized the need for coordination between the army and UN peacekeepers, particularly given the current sensitive conditions.
The group further “expressed surprise at the [parties] that rushed to throw accusations arbitrarily, while remaining silent when Israeli forces target UNIFIL personnel.”
Earlier today, UNIFIL said a patrol clearing explosive ordnance along a road in the village of Ghandourieh came under small-arms fire “from non-state actors”, leaving one observer dead and three others wounded, including two in serious condition.
UNIFIL warns IOF movement limits threaten mission logistics flow
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has reported that a routine convoy carrying military and civilian peacekeepers, along with essential contractors, was stopped by Israeli forces a few kilometres from its destination in Naqoura on Tuesday afternoon.
UNIFIL said the incident is not isolated, adding that similar restrictions, whether through physical roadblocks or the reversal of prior clearances, have affected both peacekeepers and essential supporting personnel.
The incidents are part of a broader pattern of Israeli aggression targeting the UNIFIL’s presence on the ground.
Late last month, a UNIFIL patrol was subjected to an Israeli attack on the Bani Hayyan-Tallouseh road, resulting in two peacekeepers killed and two others injured, with a helicopter from the Naqoura area intervening to evacuate the wounded.
The prospect of an expanded and far more violent war
By Kurt Nimmo | Another Day in the Empire | April 18, 2026
… Earlier this month, Israeli minister Bezalel Smotrich declared an official start to the Greater Israel project. He included Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine in the project. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Zionists have strived to weaken neighboring states, dismantle their military capacity, and worked to reshape the balance of power in West Asia. The original plan called for occupying and ethnically cleansing the entirety of Palestine, all of Jordan, south Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, and northern Saudi Arabia.
The Nazis had a similar plan during their occupation of Europe in the Second World War. It was called the “Greater Germanic Reich” (Großgermanisches Reich). In the autumn of 1933, Adolf Hitler made plans to annex territories including Bohemia, parts of western Poland, and Austria to Germany. He also aimed to create satellite or puppet states that would lack independent economies or policies. Nazi racial theories classified the Germanic peoples of Europe as part of a racially superior Nordic subset within the broader Aryan race, which they considered to be the sole true bearers of civilized culture.
In Deuteronomy, the Jewish God chooses Israel to be his holy (kadosh) and treasured (segulah) people. Deuteronomy 14:2 states God has chosen the Jews “to be a people for Himself, a special treasure above all the peoples who are on the face of the earth.” According to the Torah, “Eretz Israel” (“Land of Israel” in Hebrew), now defined as “Greater Israel,” was “given” to the “children of Abraham” and serves as the basis for “a merger of religious fundamentalism and modern political ethno-nationalism, whereby ancient texts are used to justify a modern military expansionist state.” In regard to Lebanon, the Zionists believe Greater Israel extends up to the Sidon and Litani rivers.
According to Amichai Friedman, a rabbi in the Israeli Army, “This land is ours, the whole land, including Gaza, including Lebanon,” while Daniella Weiss, a Jewish ethnonationalist and former mayor of Kedumim, called for the “invasion of Lebanon” immediately after the war in Gaza. Lebanon-born Israeli journalist Edy Cohen posted to social media that areas of Lebanon, including Faraya and Kesrouan, will also suffer the fate of Gaza, that is to say ethnic cleansing, massacres, and wholesale theft of land, homes (those not demolished), and infrastructure. … Full article
Canada’s Carney Revives Online Censorship Bill
The bill that died with Trudeau’s election call is back, and so is the advisory panel that wrote it.
By Christina Maas | Reclaim The Net | April 18, 2026
Canada’s Liberal government is preparing to revive legislation that would hand the state new powers over what Canadians can say online, with Prime Minister Mark Carney’s team signaling that a rebooted “online harms” law is coming.
A report submitted to the Senate social affairs committee confirms the direction.
The Department of Industry told senators that Ottawa is working toward a “future online safety regime” aimed at reducing online “harms,” a category the government itself gets to define. To shape the proposal, officials have brought back the Expert Advisory Group on Online Safety, the same body that helped design the previous censorship attempt.
“To advise on this proposal, the government has recently reconvened the Expert Advisory Group on Online Safety, whose members previously contributed to the development of online harms legislation, to engage on new and emerging issues related to online harms,” the department said.
“Any future legislative proposal would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and details will be made public at the appropriate time.”
One of the members back at the table is Bernie Farber of the Canadian Anti-Hate Network. The advisory group helps shape what the government will treat as hateful, harmful, or dangerous.
That definition, once written into law, determines which posts get deleted, which accounts get silenced, and which Canadians face fines or house arrest for saying the wrong thing online.
Canadian Culture Minister Marc Miller telegraphed the timing this week, suggesting a new law targeting “online harms” is needed and likely coming soon. With the Liberals now holding a majority after three byelection wins and the defection of five MPs from the Conservatives and NDP, the procedural obstacles that killed previous attempts have largely disappeared. A social media ban for children is also on the table.
The last attempt, Bill C-63, known as the Online Harms Act, was introduced under the familiar justification of protecting children from online exploitation.
The bill died when former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau called the 2025 federal election. Its actual reach went well beyond child safety. It targeted lawful internet content that authorities deemed “likely to foment detestation or vilification of an individual or group,” wording broad enough to sweep up political argument, satire, religious commentary, and journalism, depending on who was reading it. Breaking the rule carried fines of up to $70,000 or house arrest.
Before C-63 there was Bill C-36, a 2021 effort to amend the Criminal Code along similar lines. Neither bill made it through. Both kept returning in slightly different forms.
The Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms, Canada’s leading constitutional freedom organization, has launched a national campaign urging the Carney government to abandon the project entirely.
The JCCF warned that the Online Harms Act would “dramatically expand government censorship powers, punish lawful expression online, and authorize preemptive restrictions on individual liberty.”
“In doing so, it would represent a fundamental departure from Canada’s long-standing commitment to freedom of expression and due process,” the organization said.
Preemptive restrictions, the legal mechanism the previous bill contained, mean punishing or silencing someone before they have said anything unlawful. Canadian courts have historically treated prior restraint as the most serious form of speech suppression. The revived framework appears to contemplate it as a feature.
The chilling effect is already setting in. Writers, commentators, and small publishers in Canada began adjusting what they posted during the C-63 debate, well before any law took effect. The threat alone was enough to quiet a portion of online political speech.
A reintroduced bill, backed by a majority government and an advisory panel stacked with people who see the internet as a venue that needs controlling, makes that quieting louder.
The Liberal government has said repeatedly that some version of Bill C-63 is coming back. What it has not said, in any substantive form, is who decides what counts as hate, what counts as harm, and what counts as the kind of speech a democracy is supposed to tolerate even when it finds it ugly. Those definitions will sit with the same government promising the law, and the same advisory group promising to help write it.
Israeli soldiers kill UNICEF truck drivers delivering water to Gaza families

The Cradle | April 18, 2026
Israeli soldiers killed two Palestinian truck drivers hired by UNICEF and injured two others during routine water delivery operations at a filling point in northern Gaza on 17 April.
“UNICEF is outraged by the killing of two drivers of trucks contracted by UNICEF to provide clean water to families in the Gaza Strip,” a statement from the UN agency reads.
UNICEF added the victims were “killed by Israeli fire in an incident that took place early this morning at the Mansoura water filling point in northern Gaza.”
The attack occurred during normal operations, with no changes in the convoy’s movements or procedures that morning.
UNICEF has since told its contractors to stand down at the site until conditions are safe enough to return.
“The Mansoura water filling point is currently the only operational truck filling point for the Mekorot water supply line serving Gaza City,” UNICEF said, highlighting the significance of the disruption.
“UNICEF and humanitarian partners use it multiple times a day to sustain critical water trucking operations for hundreds of thousands of people, including children.”
UNICEF called on Israeli authorities to “investigate this incident, and ensure full accountability,” adding that “Humanitarian workers, essential service providers, and civilian infrastructure, including critical water facilities, must never be targeted.”
In March, Israel slashed already restricted aid flows into Gaza, allowing just 640 trucks to enter out of 6,000 expected under existing arrangements – around 10 percent of the required amount.
Palestinian officials warn that the cuts have intensified shortages and pushed the strip closer to famine, with fuel, food, and basic goods increasingly scarce.
UNICEF said prices for essential items had surged by 200 to 300 percent, placing more than 1.5 million people at risk of severe food insecurity.
At the same time, Israeli attacks on the besieged Strip have continued despite the so-called ceasefire.
Earlier this month, Israeli forces shot and killed nine-year-old Palestinian schoolgirl Ritaj Reihan inside a tent classroom in northern Gaza, around two kilometers from the so-called ‘Yellow Line,’ in front of dozens of her classmates.
