President Donald Trump had a difficult week. No, this isn’t about Elon Musk or Harvard University. On Wednesday, his call to Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t go well. It turned into a ‘conversation’, as Trump wrote on Truth Social, lasting only an hour and 15 minutes, which means, setting aside the time for interpretation, it left no room for substantive discussions.
The call took place against the backdrop of the attack on Russia’s nuclear force on June 1. Trump acknowledged in his Truth Socialpost later that Putin spoke “strongly” about Russia’s response to come. The post was notable for its subdued tone.
We wouldn’t know whether Putin brought up Western involvement. The Kremlin merely noted that “Donald Trump reiterated that the Americans had not been informed about this [attack] in advance.”
Zelensky’s version is that the attack was in the pipeline for the past 18-month period. Yet, we are to believe, neither the CIA nor MI6 whose operatives run the show in Kiev got an inkling of it. Trump’s Truth Social post simply omitted this crucial part of the conversation with Putin, which is highly significant — and consequential.
Especially, as Kremlin-funded RT had already carried one report citing the assessment of an ex-French intelligence officer that the Ukrainian targeting couldn’t have been possible without US satellite inputs.
Earlier, Tass also had carried a similar report citing a former US naval officer who estimated that the 18 month-period was when the Biden administration was virtually on auto-pilot (due to the president’s dementia). An interesting thought in itself?
Tass quoted the American source who actually said on a War Room podcast: “So, who was it on the American side that either gave the greenlight to this or provided the initial intelligence targeting? Hey, where is William Burns and Jack Sullivan, the neocon whizkids in Biden’s team?
Again, on the same day as Trump spoke to Putin, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned at a news conference in Moscow, “The fact that certain circles in the United States have been and are still hatching plans to move towards eradicating Russia as a state is also undeniable… We should not underestimate the consequences of such a mindset… Russian society should remain in a state of high readiness for any intrigues.”
Interestingly, Ryabkov called on Washington and London specifically to speak up on the attack on Russian airfields. As he put it, “We demand that both London and Washington respond in a manner that stops this recent round of escalation of tensions.”
When asked about the Ukrainian attack on Wednesday in Brussels, NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte came up with an ingenious argument: “Let’s not forget that the capabilities they hit were the capabilities the Russians were using to attack innocent people going about their daily lives in Ukrainian cities and communities. So I think we should take note of that.” Clearly, the poor chap was in the loop! Rutte refused to speak further.
Equally, the social media is awash with the assessments by some prominent American experts, especially ex-CIA analysts, pointing a finger directly at the agency’s involvement. Of course, Russia has the experience and technical expertise to dig deep.
There are comparable situations. What comes to mind is the famous U-2 spy plane incident on May 1, 1961. Perhaps, Trump is finding himself in the same embarrassing situation as President Dwight Eisenhower.
Do we give the benefit of the doubt to Trump that he too was unaware of the strike on Russia’s nuclear force on June 1? To my mind, the analogy of the U-2 incident holds good — a rare cold-war era confrontation over the US’ blatant violation of Russian sovereignty and territory at a critical juncture just when the White House was navigting an improvement of relations with Russia.
Eisenhower was kept in the dark about the full details of the U-2 although countdown had begun for his planned summit meeting with Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, in Paris to discuss a Soviet-American detente (just what Trump is attempting with Putin.) The following excerpts from the archives of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial, Eisenhower National Historic Site are most insightful:
“[U-2 spy plane pilot Gary] Powers did have a contingency in the form of a concealed needle with the poison Saxitoxin. If injected, this would have killed him and prevented his capture. Powers did not utilize this and was surrounded by Soviet citizens very soon after he touched down. Soviet citizens soon found his United States issued firearm, and other items bearing the flag of the U.S., turning him over to Soviet officials. Powers, and what was left of his spy plane, were shipped to Moscow be researched and documented. In a matter of hours, Khrushchev was informed of the captured pilot and the wrecked U-2.
“When Powers was overdue to land at Norway [U-2 had taken off from its base in Peshawar], the CIA started to consider what might have happened. As a result, their contingency plan went into action. To prevent the public and the Soviets from learning the true nature of the U-2 aircraft, a misinformation campaign began. A NASA press release stated one of their high-altitude weather research U-2 aircraft had gone missing over Turkey, and that it may have drifted into Soviet airspace because of an unconscious pilot. A U-2 was shown off in NASA colors as well to help sell the story. Khruschev learned of this story from the Americans and decided to lay a trap for the United States and for Eisenhower.
“The Soviets released information that a spy plane was shot down but did not include any other information on the status of the aircraft or Powers. The U.S. believed it could shape the narrative further and kept releasing “reports” of oxygen difficulties in the aircraft and that the auto pilot may have sent the plane into Soviet territory. Once the deception from the United States grew large enough, on May 7th, Khruschev sprung his trap by stating the pilot was alive, and that the Soviets had captured the remains of the aircraft, which contained a camera and film of Soviet Military Installations. This destroyed the cover story and was a public embarrassment for the United States and for President Eisenhower. The President learned of this at the office of his Gettysburg residence, where he got a phone call informing him the Soviets had captured Powers. This shattered the peace and tranquility of his stay in Gettysburg, and he knew that he would be held responsible in the eyes of the Soviet Union. In a remark to an aide, Eisenhower reportedly said, “I would like to resign.”
While Eisenhower did not resign, the U-2 incident and the acute embarrassment so close to the end of his second term defined his Cold War legacy.Khrushchev cancelled the Paris summit and Soviet-American detente had to wait until Henry Kissinger consolidated his grip over US foreign policy strategies. Nonetheless, the Deep State, which loathed detente, booby-trapped Richard Nixon’s presidency!
Eisenhower’s sense of betrayal is reflected in his farewell address when he bitterly called out the Deep State and prophesied that it will someday wreck America’s democracy.
History is repeating. Look at the cascading turbulence already around Trump presidency. Eighty two out of 100 members of the Senate are co-sponsoring a bill by Senator Lindsey Graham (whose affiliation to the Deep State is legion), forcing Trump’s hands to impose “bone-breaking” sanctions against Russia, whose sole objective is to stall any improvement of US-Russia relations. Meanwhile, a call for impeachment of Trump is already in the air.
The EU wants Ukraine in the European Union, and they are willing to use underhanded methods in violation of the founding treaty, including cutting Hungary out of the process and ignoring the country’s veto.
Marta Kos, the European Commission’s commissioner for enlargement, spoke to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday, where she made it clear that they want to complete the enlargement process for Ukraine by the end of the next EU term, which is 2029.
“We must and will succeed in the next phase of European unification. We have a realistic chance of bringing one or more candidate countries to the finish line in this cycle,” said Kos.
To speed up the process, Brussels is also working on introducing an “alternative” decision-making mechanism. This is intended to ensure that bilateral disputes – such as Hungarian vetoes – can no longer hold back EU enlargement.
“Together with EU member states, the commission is exploring options to simplify access procedures so that bilateral issues do not hinder enlargement in this very sensitive geopolitical situation,” she said.
Kos also specifically addressed the accession process of Ukraine and Moldova, stating: “Now we absolutely have to take the next step with Ukraine and Moldova. Both countries have done their homework.” She also emphasized that all preparations have been made, so it is now up to the Council of Member States to open the first negotiation cluster.
According to the commissioner, enlargement is not only an economic opportunity, but also a key security guarantee for the European Union. To this end, the EU commission is already starting to open up the internal markets to the countries concerned — in particular in the areas of defense and security, energy and connectivity.
“To complement the accession negotiations, the commission is stepping up its efforts to accelerate the integration of the internal market: now in the areas of defense and security, and then in connectivity, energy and other areas, together with EU member states,” she added.
Kos said: “Ukraine’s access to the EU is a key security guarantee. We must make it happen. We must move forward to maintain the momentum of reforms in Ukraine, to help our member states address their concerns and, ultimately, to respond to the greatest security challenges since the Second World War.”
It is worth remembering that it was Marta Kos who recently admitted that accession negotiations with Ukraine would begin in June, and also spoke of doing everything she could to accelerate Ukraine’s accession.
She even said that a thousand people are already working in the Brussels institutions to accelerate the accession. This is interesting because it was EU Commissioner Marta Kos who showed Alex Soros that Ukraine could not meet a single EU accession condition.
Ukraine is considered the most corrupt country in Europe, a point that many top officials and organizations have acknowledged repeatedly in the past. The EU has already sent tens of billions to the country, but if EU membership occurs, European taxpayers can expect to be on the hook for many tens of billions more. The EU agriculture sector is also expected to experience even more losses if markets are opened up to cheap Ukrainian products, which is not just a concern of Hungary, but of countries across the bloc.
Indian Ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar argues that Trump’s words do not match his actions. It is extremely unlikely that the US was not involved in the attack on Russia’s nuclear forces, and Bhadrakumar argues that the failure by Russia to respond would be profoundly irresponsible. Ambassador Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat for 30 years in the Indian Foreign Service, and is now a columnist for Hindu and Deccan Herald Indian newspapers.
The multi-party delegation led by the BJP Vice-President and spokesman Bijayant Panda which toured four countries in the Gulf region — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Algeria — to rally support for the government’s war on terror against Pakistan has returned. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar “lauded their efforts,” per media reports.
This was the most consequential delegation out of the five delegations that the government mounted to mobilise international opinion. The tidings from the Gulf have great ‘grassroots resonance’ in India’s domestic politics.
A member of Panda’s team said, “We briefed the EAM … that India’s growing economic might and position in the world order, secured by PM Narendra Modi’s diplomatic push during his tenure and visits to several nations, are key when it comes to the world’s decision to stand with us as partners both in international trade as well as on the issue of zero tolerance against terrorism.”
West Asia is India’s ‘extended neighbourhood.’ And India’s West Asian diplomacy does carry the imprimatur of Modi. For that reason, an ex-Foreign Secretary was included in Panda’s team to navigate the tricky mission. What comes to mind is Panda’s challenge was similar to Nikita Khrushchev’s as the Commissar of the Red Army at the Stalingrad Front in World War II.
Khrushchev shouted at the commanders of the 62nd Army and the 64th Army on the Stalingrad Front, ‘Comrades, this is no ordinary city. This is Stalingrad. It carries the name of the Boss.” The generals got the message and went on to crush the crack Nazi Panzer Divisions and turn the tide of the Battle of Stalingrad, which is still remembered as the bloodiest and fiercest battle of the entirety of World War II — and, arguably, in all of human history.
But Panda didn’t have such an option. His delegation received a warm reception. But the profoundly worrisome reality still continues, namely, the Gulf regimes are taking a ‘proforma’ attitude, voicing hackneyed words on terrorism but also echoing the burgeoning world opinion that India and Pakistan ought to find a solution to their issues through dialogue and negotiations.
The Gulf states have neatly sidestepped Pakistan’s alleged role in Pahalgam. They ask for ‘proof’! The top diplomat of a friendly country apparently remarked a few days ago in a private conversation as an aside that the Pahalgam terrorists physically checking out the religion of their victims first is nothing new in the subcontinent, and cited Khushwant Singh’s Train to Pakistan for reference.
What has Panda’s delegationbrought home? Does it make a success story? A member of the delegation later told media in the mother of all quotes, “Every country we visited had already issued statements condemning the Pahalgam terror incident — these were reiterated by them in person to us.” But this is like reinventing the wheel.
Some profoundly troubling question arise here, especially as countdown has begun for the Shashi Tharoor moment in Washington. Tharoor also has a challenging mission. After all those decades in the UN where he handled public relations work, this must be a novel experience — to actually negotiate as a flag carrier.
Not a single senior US official is willing to name Pakistan so far — certainly, not Trump. They will wonder how this flashy neocon liberal from Delhi and an eloquent exponent of globalism in American publications all these years has shrunk and become a pale shadow of himself.
Who’s afraid of terrorism in 21st century? We are in an era where terrorism is becoming the preferred weapon to fight hybrid wars. Trump recently shook hands with the notoriously cruel ex-al Qaeda terrorist leader Ahmad al-Sharaa who committed unspeakable crimes against humanity, underscoring that yesterday’s terrorist can be tomorrow’s key ally.
That al-Qaeda was actually a creation of the Americans is known to everybody but Trump proclaimed himself openly as an admirer of al-Sharaa, telling Gulf sheikhs at a GCC conclave in Riyadh on May 14 after shaking hands with the tall six-footer Syrian that “he’s a “young, attractive guy. Tough guy. Strong past. Very strong past. Fighter.” Trump added, “He’s got a real shot at holding it [Syria]together. He’s a real leader. He led a charge, and he’s pretty amazing.”
Trump had better be right in his optimism because his entire gambit of betting on an ex-al Qaeda ally to reshape West Asia is a risky venture funded by Saudi Arabia and Qatar who’d see in all this by the time Trump becomes history a pathway to sow the germane seeds of a third Wahhabi state modelled after them in the cradle of Islamic civilisation.
In Ukraine too, terrorism is the preferred weapon for the Western powers to bleed Russia in their proxy war when in military technology and defence manufacturing industry they cannot match Russia’s, and they are no longer capable of fighting a continental war either. The stark messagecoming out of the attacks on Russian military assets two days ago with technical support from NATO satellites — and possibly Elon Musk’s Starlink — is that terrorism can be a game changer in geopolitics.
Therefore, all this global campaign by our government against Pakistan may have a good optic domestically as our media hypes it up dutifully, but what is the net gain for diplomacy? Even if the whole world were to now bracket Pakistan with the US, UK, Saudi Arabia or Qatar as yet another state sponsoring terrorism, so what? Who cares?
Today’s papers have reported that according to a list of chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the UN that monitor international terrorism, Pakistan holds responsible positions as co-chair of the Taliban Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council for 2025 and the Counter-terrorism Committee. Pakistan will also be the co-chair of the informal working groups on documentation and other procedural questions as well as the general UN Security Council sanctions issues.
How could the alleged epicentre of international terrorism be possibly a watchdog and decision-maker on counter-terrorism and sanctions in a world body? Clearly, international opinion ignores India’s diatribes against Pakistan, which is also currently an elected non-permanent member of the Security Council.
On the other hand, thanks to the Biden administration and Five Eyes, an impression gained ground in recent years that the Indian government is sponsoring assassination of political opponents abroad as a matter of statecraft. Not only have we suffered some ‘reputational damage,’ but the Pakistani claim that it too is a victim of terrorism gained traction. Countries seem to hyphenate India with Pakistan. It has become necessary for Delhi to disown responsibility when a train derails in Baluchistan or an improvised explosive device blows up a Pakistani army convoy or some notorious jihadi fellow meets with unnatural death on the streets of Lahore and Karachi.
This is becoming a vicious cycle which only helps to call attention to the unresolved Kashmir problem as posing threat to regional and international security. Put differently, ‘terrorism’ in the India-Pakistan context has become the objective co-relative of the Kashmir problem and Hindu-Muslim strife. Trump’s caustic remark about the millennial war speaks for itself.
It is high time that the ‘war on terror’ is removed from our diplomatic toolbox. Certainly, our parliamentarians have no role in it. As for the optics domestically, resort to some other means. By all means, meet terrorism with coercion — if that indeed helps. Deploy what Joseph Nye called ‘smart power’. But neither expect external support, nor canvass for it.
Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky has refused to seriously consider Russia’s latest peace proposal, dismissing it as an unacceptable “ultimatum”.
Russian and Ukrainian delegations exchanged their respective roadmaps for peace at their second meeting in a month, in Istanbul on Monday. In its proposal, Moscow proposed that Ukraine recognizes the loss of five of its former regions that joined Russia in public referendums, withdraws its forces from them, commit to neutrality, and limit its own military capabilities.
Russia also floated a “package proposal” for a ceasefire, in which Kiev would halt deploying its troops, suspend mobilisation, stop foreign weapons shipments, and hold a presidential election.
Zelensky rejected the peace memorandum out of hand. “This is an ultimatum, and it will not be taken seriously by the Ukrainian side… This memorandum is a misunderstanding,” he said on Wednesday.
The Ukrainian leader claimed that any territorial concessions to Russia would contravene Ukraine’s constitution.
Russia’s lead negotiator at the Istanbul talks, Vladimir Medinsky, defended the memorandum, describing it as an opportunity to end the conflict. “This is not an ultimatum. It’s a proposal that will truly allow for achieving real peace — or at least a ceasefire — and make a huge step towards achieving long-term peace,” he said.
Zelensky also criticized the diplomatic process itself, saying, “To continue diplomatic meetings in Istanbul at a level that decides nothing — it’s meaningless.”
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, however, suggested that Zelensky dismissed the outcome of the talks because they were focused not on financial aid or weapons supplies, but on people.
Zakharova was referring to Moscow and Kiev’s agreement to carry the largest prisoner exchange to date, which is expected to take place this weekend and involved 1,200 people on each side.
The Trump administration’s intention to acquire Greenland, including possibly by force, has put a focus on the history of its strategic interest to U.S. policymakers. Today, the National Security Archive publishes the first of a two-part declassified document collection on the U.S. role in Greenland during the middle years of the Cold War, covering the decisions that led to the secret deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Danish territory in 1958 to the 1968 crash of a nuclear-armed B-52 bomber near Thule Air Base that left plutonium-laced debris scattered across miles of Arctic sea ice.[1]
The radioactive mess caused by the accident required a major clean-up and caused a serious controversy in U.S.-Denmark relations. The U.S. had never officially told Denmark that it was flying nuclear weapons over Greenland, although Danish officials suspected it; nor had the U.S. informed the Danes that it had once stored nuclear weapons in Greenland, although in 1957 they had received a tacit “green light” to do so from the Danish prime minister, according to documents included in today’s posting. But both the nuclear-armed overflights of Greenland and the storage of nuclear weapons there were in strong contradiction to Denmark’s declared non-nuclear policy. When the bomber crash exposed the overflights, Denmark tried to resolve the conflict by seeking a U.S. pledge that Greenland would be nuclear free.
This new publication revisits the nuclear and strategic history of the United States and Greenland as it emerged during the late 1940s through the crash in 1968, highlighting key declassified documents from the archival record, FOIA releases, the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), and other sources. The analysis draws on the work of U.S. and Danish scholars who have written about the B-52 crash and the history of the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland during the Cold War, including revelations in the 1990s that prompted Danish experts to revisit the historical record.[2]
Part I, below, looks at U.S. strategic interests in Greenland in the early Cold War period, including Danish government acquiescence to the storage of nuclear weapons there, U.S. nuclear-armed airborne alert flights over Greenland, and the 1968 B-52 crash. Part II will document the aftermath of the accident, including the clean-up of contaminated ice, the U.S.-Denmark government nuclear policy settlement, and the failed search for lost nuclear weapons parts deep in the waters of North Star Bay.
Background
Greenland has been seen as an important strategic interest to United States defense officials and policymakers since World War II. After the fall of France in June 1940, the Nazis seized Denmark, and the Roosevelt administration feared that Germany would occupy Greenland, threatening Canada and the United States. In response, the U.S. insisted that Greenland was part of the Western Hemisphere and thus a territory that had to be “assimilated to the general hemispheric system of continental defense.” The U.S. began talks with Danish Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann, who was acting on his own authority as “leader of the Free Danes” and in defiance of the German occupiers. On 9 April 1941, Kauffmann signed an extraordinary agreement with Washington giving the United States almost unlimited access to build military facilities in Greenland and would remain valid as long as there were “dangers to the American continent,” after which the two parties could modify or terminate it. By the end of World War II, the U.S. had 17 military facilities in Greenland. After the liberation of Denmark from German rule, the Danish Parliament ratified the Kauffmann-U.S. agreement on 23 May 1945, but it assumed its early termination, with Denmark taking over Greenland’s defense.[3]
In 1946, the Truman administration gave brief consideration to buying Greenland because it continued to see it as important for U.S. security.[4] During 1947, with the U.S. beginning to define the Soviet Union as an adversary, defense officials saw Greenland as an important “primary base,” especially because they were unsure about long-term access to Iceland and the Azores.[5] Thus, maintaining U.S. access was an important concern, as exemplified in an early National Security Council report that U.S. bases in Greenland, along with Iceland and the Azores, were of “extreme importance” for any war “in the next 15 or 20 years.” For their part, Danish authorities had no interest in selling Greenland but sought to restore their nation’s sovereignty there; having joined NATO, they dropped their traditional neutrality approach and were more willing to accept a limited U.S. presence. In late 1949, the U.S. and Denmark opened what became drawn out negotiations over Greenland; during 1950, the U.S. even returned some facilities to Denmark, including Sandrestrom air base. But in late 1950, with Cold War tensions deepening, the Pentagon gave the negotiations greater priority, seeking an agreement that would let the U.S. develop a base at Thule as part of an air strategy designed to reach Soviet targets across the Arctic.[6]
In April 1951, the two countries reached an agreement on the “defense of Greenland” that superseded the 1941 treaty, confirmed Danish sovereignty, and delineated three “defense areas” for use by the United States, with additional areas subject to future negotiations. Under the agreement, each signatory would “take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry out expeditiously their respective and joint responsibilities in Greenland, in accordance with NATO plans.” Consistent with that broad guidance, the U.S. would be free to operate its bases as it saw fit, including the movement of “supplies,” and with no restrictions on its access to airspace over Greenland. With this agreement, Washington had achieved its overriding security goals in Greenland. To move the agreement through Parliament, the Danish government emphasized its defensive character, although the negotiators and top officials understood that U.S. objectives went beyond that.[7]
In 1955, a few years after the 1951 agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to revive interest in purchasing Greenland to ensure U.S. control over the strategically important territory and without having to rely on an agreement with another government. But the JCS proposal never found traction in high levels of the Eisenhower administration. The State Department saw no point to it, since the United States was already “permitted to do almost anything, literally, that we want to in Greenland.” The 1951 agreement stayed in place for decades. Denmark and the United States finally modified it in 2004, limiting the “defense area” to Thule Air Base and taking “Greenland Home Rule” more fully into account.
Nuclear Issues
When the U.S. negotiated the 1951 agreement, nuclear deployments were not an active consideration in official thinking about a role for U.S. bases for Greenland. Yet by 1957, when U.S. government agencies, including the State Department, became interested in deploying nuclear bombs at Thule, they used the agreement’s open-ended language to justify such actions. According to an August 1957 letter signed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, the Agreement was “sufficiently broad to permit the use of facilities in Greenland for the introduction and storage of [nuclear] weapons.” The problem was to determine whether Danish leaders would see it that way.
While Defense Department officials were willing to go ahead on the deployments without consulting the Danish Government, Murphy thought it best to seek the advice of the U.S. ambassador, former Nebraska Governor Val Peterson. Peterson recommended bringing the question to Danish authorities and, having received the Department’s approval, in mid-November 1957 he asked Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen if he wished to be informed about nuclear deployments. By way of reply, Hansen handed Peterson a “vague and indefinite” paper that U.S. and Danish officials interpreted as a virtual “green light” for the deployments. Hansen raised no objections, asked for no information, and tacitly accepted the U.S. government’s loose interpretation of the 1951 agreement. He insisted, however, that the U.S. treat his response as secret because he recognized how dangerous it was for domestic politics, where anti-nuclear sentiment was strong, and for Denmark’s relations with the Soviet Union, which would have strongly objected.[8]
When Prime Minister Hansen tacitly approved the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland, he was initiating what Danish scholar Thorsten Borring Olesen has characterized as a “double standard” nuclear policy. On the one hand, in a May 1957 address, Hansen had stated that the government would not receive nuclear weapons “under the present conditions.” Thus, Denmark abstained from NATO nuclear storage and sharing plans as they developed in the following years. On the other hand, the Danish leadership treated Greenland differently with respect to nuclear weapons even though, as of 1953, it was no longer a colony but a county represented in Parliament. This double standard was not necessarily a preference for Denmark’s leaders but they felt constrained by the need to accommodate U.S. policy goals in Greenland. Thus, by keeping their Greenland policy secret, Hansen and his successors kept relations with Washington on an even keel while avoiding domestic political crises and pressure from the Soviet Union.[9]
In 1958, the Strategic Air Command deployed nuclear weapons in Greenland, the details of which were disclosed in a declassified SAC history requested by Hans Kristensen, then with the Nautilus Institute. According to Kristensen’s research and the Danish study of “Greenland During the Cold War,” during 1958 the U.S. deployed four nuclear weapons in Greenland—two Mark 6 atomic bombs and two MK 36 thermonuclear bombs as well as 15 non-nuclear components. That SAC kept bombs there for less than a year suggests that it did not have a clear reason to continue storing them in Greenland. Nevertheless, the U.S. kept nuclear air defense weapons at Thule: 48 nuclear weapons were available for Nike-Hercules air missiles through mid-1965. There may also have been a deployment of nuclear weapons for Falcon air-to-air missiles through 1965, but their numbers are unknown.[10]
Airborne Alert and the January 1968 Crash
If it had only been an issue of the U.S. storing nuclear weapons on the ground in Greenland for a few years, the matter might have been kept under wraps for years. But the crash of a U.S. Air Force B-52 on 21 January 1968 near Thule Air Base exposed another nuclear secret and caused serious difficulties in U.S.-Denmark relations. While the bomber crash was quickly overshadowed by North Korea’s seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo the next day and the Tet offensive that began on 30 January, the coincidence of the three events was a major crisis for the overextended U.S.[11]
Beginning in 1961, accident-prone B-52s were routinely flying over Thule because Greenland had become even more salient to U.S. national security policy. To warn the U.S. of incoming bombers, the Air Force had deployed Distant Early Warning Line radar stations across Alaska and northern Canada during the 1950s and extended them to Greenland in 1960-1961. The Air Force also deployed the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), with a site located near Thule Air Base in 1960. With BMEWS, the U.S. would receive 15 minutes of warning of a ballistic missile launch.
The warning time was important for U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) because it provided the opportunity to launch ground alert bomber forces in the event of an attack. But the possibility of an ICBM strike on U.S. airbases also helped inspire the emergence of airborne alert, whereby SAC kept nuclear-armed B-52s in the air 24 hours a day, ready to move on Soviet targets in the event of war. SAC began to test airborne alert in the late 1950s, and the flights soon became routine. By 1961, SAC had initiated “Chrome Dome,” with 12 B-52s flying two major routes, a Northern Route over North America and a Southern Route across the Atlantic. While SAC leaders used strategic arguments to justify airborne alert, they also had a parochial interest because it kept bombers in the air, giving pilots even more training.[12]
Airborne alert converged with Greenland in August 1961, when SAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a plan for two B-52 sorties a day to fly over the BMEWS site at Thule. Given the major importance of the BMEWS site, if the Soviets knocked it out in a surprise attack, they could disrupt U.S. early warning capabilities. Thus, SAC insisted on visual observation so that the B-52 crew could check whether the site was intact in the event there were failures in the communications links between Thule and the North American Air Defense Command in Colorado. SAC’s BMEWS Monitor was a routine operation for years, even after the B-52 crash in Palomares, Spain, led to decisions to scale back on airborne alert. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wanted to end the program altogether but accepted a JCS compromise proposal for fewer sorties.
Danish military personnel and others nearby were aware of the daily B-52 flights. Moreover, every year there were emergency landings by U.S. bombers, with three in 1967 alone. After a nuclear-loaded B-52 crashed in western Maryland in January 1964, Eske Brun, Denmark’s Under Secretary for Greenland, wondered whether the B-52s flying over Thule carried nuclear weapons and asked U.S. Ambassador William McCormick Blair about the possibility of an accident. Blair suggested that such an “unfortunate” occurrence would be the price of defending the “free world” and that the flights were consistent with the 1951 agreement. The Danes held internal discussions about whether there were any restrictions on U.S. flights over Greenland and decided not to pursue the matter.
According to Scott Sagan, the January 1968 crash was a “normal accident waiting to happen.” The heating system failed on a bomber carrying four nuclear weapons over Thule, causing foam rubber cushions placed under the seats to catch fire. The crew could not extinguish the flames and bailed out after determining that an emergency landing was impossible, with all but one of the seven crew members surviving. While the nuclear weapons carried on the plane did not detonate when the B-52 crashed on Wolstenholme Fjord, near North Star Bay, conventional high explosives carried in the bombs did, causing plutonium contaminated aircraft parts and bomb debris to scatter about the ice for miles.[13]
To recover what they could of the bombs and assess the contamination, SAC sent an emergency team to Thule, including officials from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). All of this occurred under incredibly difficult conditions, sub-zero temperatures, and winter arctic darkness. Danish officials joined in the effort, although they would not take part in the bomb-salvaging activity. While SAC’s disaster team discovered most of the bomb parts after the accident, it could not find some of the important pieces, which eventually necessitated an underwater search. An equally significant problem was the possible risk to the local ecology from plutonium contamination, including its impact on Inuit hunters. U.S. officials had to find a way to clean up the icy mess quickly and in a way that was satisfactory to Danish authorities.
Immediately after the accident, JCS Chair Earle Wheeler and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered nuclear-armed airborne alert flights to end. SAC would continue the BMEWS Monitor using KC-135 tanker aircraft, but that ended that April 1968 when the flights were switched to the BMEWS site in Clear, Alaska. BMEWS, including the site at Thule, remained a U.S. strategic asset until 2001, when the Air Force replaced it with the Solid State Phase Array Radar System.
Soon after the accident, the Danish Foreign Ministry issued a statement that included this language: “Danish policy regarding nuclear weapons also applies to Greenland and also to air space over Greenland. There are no nuclear weapons in Greenland.” With this statement, the Government of Denmark was beginning to abandon the “double standard” by moving toward a consistent no nuclear policy. How Danish authorities worked with Washington to confirm this policy goal will be the subject of Part II.
The crash of the B-52 was no secret in Denmark, but the fact that airborne alert flights over Greenland were routine during the 1960s did not reach public attention until the early 1990s. Prompted by the revelations, the Danish Government asked the U.S. government for more information, which led the State Department to disclose to the Danish government in July 1995 that the U.S. had deployed nuclear bombs and air defense weapons in Greenland during 1958-1965. The State Department letter was secret, but its contents began to leak. The preceding month, the Danish government had released information on the Hansen paper, creating a political scandal and prompting calls for an investigation of the historical record.
The Danish Institute of International Affairs sponsored the research and published its report in 1996, Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945–1968 [Greenland During the Cold War:Danish and American Security Policy 1945-1968 ]. The report, which included a full reproduction of the Hansen paper, among other revelations, disclosed much of this once-hidden history.[14] Nevertheless, significant State Department and U.S. Embassy records remain classified and have been the subject of declassification requests by National Security Archive to the U.S. National Archives.
The UK is continuing to escalate its military measures, taking all sorts of irrational actions under the guise of “preparing the country for war”. London’s Russophobic madness is reaching truly worrying levels as local authorities appear willing to face the ultimate consequences of an all-out escalation with Russia – even though there is no chance of victory for the UK in such a scenario.
UK Defense Secretary John Healey has announced that the country will invest an extra 2 billion dollars package for the opening of new military factories. The aim is to advance an accelerated rearmament project, meeting the government’s previously set targets for expanding the production of weapons and military equipment.
The plan includes building factories capable of producing at least 7,000 more long-range weapons than the country’s current average output. Healey also said the UK will be meeting the mark of 3% of GDP in defense industry investment.
As expected, Healey justified the UK’s bellicose measures with the situation in Ukraine. According to him, Russian military actions have taught London a lesson, showing that it is necessary to strengthen the army through industrial development. He believes that the future of the British armed forces depends heavily on drastic changes in the current British military-industrial landscape, allegedly requiring the production of more and more weapons.
“The hard-fought lessons from [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine show a military is only as strong as the industry that stands behind it (…) We are strengthening the UK’s industrial base to better deter our adversaries and make the UK secure at home and strong abroad (…) This is a message to Moscow as well. This is Britain standing firm – not only strengthening our Armed Forces, but also reinforcing our industrial base. It’s part of our readiness to fight, if required,” he said.
The defense chief’s bellicose stance is boosted by Prime Minister Keir Starmer himself, who recently said the UK was heading towards a “war situation”. He revealed part of the UK’s strategic planning for the coming years when he presented his cabinet’s Strategic Defense Review. Under the project led by Starmer, the UK must prioritize NATO in all foreign policy issues and remain on combat readiness for any possible escalation in the current tensions.
”We are moving to war-fighting readiness (…) Our defense policy will always be NATO first (…) [The UK will be a] battle-ready, armor-clad nation with the strongest alliances and the most advanced capabilities equipped for the decades to come,” Starmer said.
Like some other European nations, the UK is undergoing a process of restoring its military capabilities after years of absolute reliance on the American defense umbrella. The rise of Donald Trump and the “realistic turn” in American foreign policy have shown to the Europeans that Washington will not necessarily intervene on their behalf in the event of an all-out war resulting from the irresponsible actions of the EU and the UK. For this reason, London and Brussels are encouraging militarization projects that put Europe on “combat readiness,” as they allegedly believe that Moscow will expand the objectives of its operation in Ukraine to other European countries.
Moscow has repeatedly made it clear that it has no strategic or territorial interests in Europe, and that the operation in Ukraine is the result of specific circumstances on Russia’s borders and not an expansionist project. There is no evidence to suggest that Russia would be interested in engaging in hostilities with other European nations, which is why the alleged “need” for combat readiness is nothing more than a fallacy.
There would be no problem in the UK and Europe investing in two defense industries to become more independent from the US. Taking care of national and regional security is a legitimate interest of any state. The problem is that it is not a desire for security that is motivating the current European actions, but precisely the opposite: an irrational, anti-strategic and truly suicidal enthusiasm for total war.
If London and its European allies continue to escalate their military policies, this situation of “imminent war” with Russia will cease to be merely imaginary and will become a real possibility in the face of the threat that is being created against Moscow.
Russia will not tolerate impositions from the Europeans and will use any means necessary to prevent enemy bellicosity from threatening its security. It remains to be seen whether the British and Europeans are truly aware of what could happen to them in a worst-case scenario.
Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert.
George Beebe is director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute. Beebe was the former director of the CIA’s Russia analysis and a staff advisor on Russia matters to Vice President Cheney. Beebe outlines why Trump should not walk away from negotiations, and why the attack on Russia’s nuclear forces (possibly with NATO support) was extremely dangerous.
As the media is reporting, Ukraine just launched a massive drone attack that wreaked major destruction deep inside Russia. Ukrainian officials smuggled the drones in trucks into Russia and launched them from inside the country. U.S. officials and the U.S. mainstream press are praising the attack as a brilliant maneuver. They are hoping that the attack will force Russia to the negotiating table with the aim of bringing an end to the war.
One thing is clear: the attack now escalates the conflict in a major way. Ukraine has now shown that it can attack military installations, towns, and cities deep inside Russia,
An important question that is not being asked is: Did Pentagon or CIA officials serve as secret advisors or directors in the drone operation? Since Congress is effectively owned by the U.S. national-security establishment, it’s a question that unfortunately is not going to be asked by any congressional committee. Given the longtime deference to the national-security establishment by the mainstream media, the question is unlikely to come from them either and even if it did, there is no doubt that the Pentagon and CIA would deny it even if they were involved.
Why is the question important? Well, think about it: The U.S. government furnishes weaponry to the Ukrainian government to use against Russian forces. But let’s assume that it goes one step further than that. Let’s assume that it also assists, advises, and directs Ukrainian officials in the use of such weaponry.
That would mean, as a practical matter, that it was the U.S. government that launched that drone attack and was simply using Ukraine as its agent — in order to preserve “plausible deniability.” It would mean, as a practical matter, that it is the U.S. government that is using its weaponry to kill and injure Russian soldiers and destroy Russian armaments, not only in Ukraine but also deep inside Russia.
Ukraine and U.S. officials are hoping that Ukraine’s drone attack will force Russia to end the war. But what they are ignoring in this calculus is the big elephant in the room — NATO. It was because of NATO’s expansion eastward and its threat to absorb Ukraine that caused Russia to invade Ukraine in the first place.
After considerable sacrifice of men, money, and armaments, how likely is it that Russia would agree to a peace treaty that leaves NATO on Ukraine’s border and ready to absorb Ukraine on a moment’s notice? I say: Not likely at all. Even if a peace treaty promised that NATO would not absorb Ukraine, everyone knows that the U.S. government cannot be trusted to keep its word. After all, let’s not forget that U.S. officials promised that NATO would not move eastward, and it broke that promise.
Thus, with NATO still in existence and still on Ukraine’s border, why would Russia be interested in settling the war, given that that’s what motivated Russia to invade Ukraine in the first place? And yet we all know that U.S. officials would not think of dismantling NATO or even just moving it back to Western Europe as part of a peace treaty.
Given these intractable positions, the war will inevitably continue, notwithstanding the fondest hopes of U.S. and Ukrainian officials. But the problem is that the longer it goes on, the more dangerous it is becoming. What if U.S. officials actually are secretly assisting, advising, and directing Ukrainian attacks on Russia? Wouldn’t this be sufficient importantly that Congress, not the Pentagon and the CIA, should decide it? Isn’t that why the Constitution places the decision to go to war against another nation-state in the hands of Congress rather than the Pentagon and the CIA?
One of the big problems with war is its unpredictable nature. How long will Russia put up with U.S. armaments being used to kill and maim Russian soldiers and destroy Russian armaments and property without attacking the armaments before they reach Ukraine, especially if Russia concludes that it is actually the Pentagon and the CIA who are waging the war using Ukraine as their agent? If Russia were to attack such armaments before they arrived in Ukraine, say in staging grounds in NATO member Poland, we all know what that would mean — all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia. Even if the U.S were to “win” such a war, the United States would cease to exist as a viable nation.
All this is simply to show that the U.S. national-security establishment, operating through its Cold War dinosaur NATO, is getting the United States ever close to the possibility of the nuclear destruction of our nation. Would “winning” a nuclear war with Russia be worth it? Is NATO worth it? I say no. I say it’s time to throw not only NATO into the dustbin of history but also the U.S. national-security state form of governmental structure that was foisted upon our land in the 1940s to protect us from the supposed international communist conspiracy that, U.S. officials claimed, was based in Moscow.
As Iran prepares for an official state visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the political signal could not be clearer: Iran and Russia are intent on formalizing their deepening partnership amid a global order in flux.
Iranian officials have confirmed that preparations are underway, even if the Kremlin has yet to set the date. For both countries – under siege from western sanctions and entangled in regional flashpoints – this visit is more than a ceremony; it marks an intensifying convergence of strategic purpose.
Putin’s trip follows a string of high-level engagements with his Iranian counterpart, President Masoud Pezeshkian, who took office in July of last year. Since then, the two leaders have met three times: in Ashgabat in October, in Kazan at the BRICS summit, and in January in Moscow to ink a long-term defense agreement. In the post-Ukraine war calculus, few relationships carry the same weight as the Islamic Republic in Russia’s pivot eastward.
Economic convergence through the EAEU
Ties between Tehran and Moscow have never advanced in a straight line. Even in their most frictionless periods, progress required determined effort. Still, three crucial milestones passed over the past year suggest that their bilateral relationship is set to accelerate.
The first milestone came on 25 December 2024, when Iran joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as an observer member state. Initially seen as a post-Soviet mechanism to deepen regional economic ties, the bloc’s broader ambitions – particularly from Moscow’s perspective – quickly became clear. Iran’s accession had been a long-standing Russian objective since at least the mid-2010s.
The path to membership began in 2018 with a provisional agreement, but was drawn out by two key factors. The first was Israel’s negotiations with the bloc over free trade zones – launched despite a 2016 framework deal – which appeared designed to sabotage Iran’s entry. They largely succeeded.
The more substantive obstacle was internal. Under former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, whose administration tilted westward, the EAEU was seen more as leverage in western talks than a genuine priority. By contrast, late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi, a strong advocate of Iran’s ‘Look East’ policy, placed higher strategic value on deepening ties with Russia, propelling Iran’s EAEU bid forward.
By 2023–2024, trade between Iran and EAEU states hovered around $3.5 billion. The new agreement slashed tariffs: Iranian duties on EAEU goods dropped to 4.5 percent, while the bloc’s tariffs on Iranian exports fell from 6.6 to 0.8 percent.
Within five to seven years, trade volume is projected to hit $18–20 billion – a substantial gain for a petro-economy whose $60 billion in exports are more than 80 percent oil and gas. The bloc may also serve as a conduit to third-country markets.
Iran’s membership holds political as well as economic value for Moscow. Chief among these is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer route connecting St. Petersburg to Mumbai via Iranian territory. Completion of the Chabahar–Mumbai leg depends on India-Iran ties; the corridor’s viability also requires modernizing the Caspian Sea route–a project that gained urgency post-2022.
BRICS … and a whopping strategic partnership
Politically, the Kremlin’s need to forge a multipolar alliance structure – not a full-fledged global bloc, but a web of regional coalitions – has grown as confrontation with the west intensifies.
In this context, Iran’s accession to BRICS on 1 January 2025 marked the second major milestone. BRICS remains politically disjointed – a union of unequals – but its economic logic is compelling. It enables preferential access to massive markets and encourages bilateral flexibility between members.
Though it may not directly shape Iran–Russia relations, BRICS allows both states to expand cooperation in media, culture, and tourism – deepening their ties beyond traditional economic or military frameworks.
But the most consequential event of the year was the signing of a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement between Tehran and Moscow. As with Iran’s drawn-out EAEU accession, the talks revealed lingering distrust. Negotiations began after Russia’s February 2022 military intervention in Ukraine.
Russia’s motives were transparent: Boxed in by NATO, Moscow sought to strengthen military alliances with regional powers and reap associated economic benefits.
The model agreement was the “comprehensive strategic partnership” signed with North Korea, which included commitments to scale up trade and a mutual defense clause. If either party is attacked or drawn into war, the other pledges to assist “by all means.”
A similar clause was expected in the Iran–Russia agreement, but never materialized. Instead, the pact reads more like a memorandum of understanding than a military alliance. The gap between its title and substance suggests unresolved disagreements during talks.
Two issues caused the rift. First, Moscow demanded that any military assistance be predicated on Tehran’s position being legally airtight under international law – lest Russia be entangled in a nuclear conflict with Tel Aviv. The definition of “aggression” became a flashpoint: What Tehran labels a provocation, Moscow feared Tel Aviv could call a justified “response.”
Second, the scope of assistance – especially the categorical exclusion of nuclear weapons – sparked further discord.
Though a compromise may have been within reach, unconfirmed reports indicate Moscow proposed the transit of Russian personnel or military preparation on Iranian soil – something the deeply sovereign Tehran outright rejected. This categorical refusal ultimately ensured the deal would remain declaratory.
The weight of history
Historical and ideological factors underpin Iran’s caution. Since the Caucasus wars of the 19th century – especially the 1826–1828 conflict – securing Iran’s northern frontier has been a persistent concern.
That anxiety intensified under the Pahlavi dynasty’s staunch anti-communism, compounded in the 1940s by two events: Soviet occupation of northern Iran until 1946, and the Soviet-backed, Kurdish-secessionist Mahabad Republic, widely viewed as an attempt to partition the country.
Simultaneously, Soviet Azerbaijani territorial demands and communist agitation in Iranian Azerbaijan further soured ties. Though these events belong to a pre-revolutionary era, the Islamic Republic’s early years were no less wary of Moscow – fueled in part by Iranian communists’ strategic missteps. The USSR, much like in Turkiye, was branded the “lesser Satan,” and anti-communism fused with inherited Russophobia.
These sentiments persist and are fueled by pro-west propaganda outlets. Among Iranian elites, accusations that Russia has “stabbed Iran in the back” are a common rhetorical tool for western-aligned factions. In 2023, a diplomatic crisis erupted after the Russian Foreign Ministry’s equivocal stance on sovereignty over contested Persian Gulf islands and muddled comments about the waterway’s name.
This blunder – unfolding as Iran’s EAEU talks progressed – not only inflamed Iranian Russophobia but handed ammunition to domestic pro-west voices, reinforcing the trope of “colonial Russia” as an unreliable partner.
What lies ahead
Even so, the Iran–Russia strategic pact is far from toothless. Though it omits a mutual defense clause, it commits both states to deepen security and defense ties and explicitly pledges cooperation to counter external destabilizing forces in the Caspian, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and West Asia. The emphasis is timely – especially in the wake of Syria’s devastation.
Today, Tehran faces heightened threats. Analysts and officials alike debate whether Israel will launch direct strikes against Iran, whether the US will try – or even be able – to restrain such moves, and whether US forces will intervene if Tel Aviv provokes open conflict. No clear decisions have emerged.
This uncertainty may prompt caution in the short term. But in the long run, only the alliances forged today will determine whether Tehran can deter tomorrow’s wars.
The peace memorandum developed by Russia and presented to the Ukrainian delegation during the talks in Istanbul, Türkiye, on Monday calls on Kiev to withdraw its troops from the former Ukrainian territories that have joined Russia and confirm its neutral and non-nuclear status, according to the text of the document seen by RT.
The proposal consists of three parts, which include the conditions for a comprehensive settlement of the Ukraine conflict, steps toward achieving a ceasefire, and a peace roadmap that includes some unilateral steps by Russia.
The “final settlement” of the conflict would require international recognition of the former Ukrainian territories as parts of Russia. The two Donbass republics, as well as Kherson and Zaporozhye Regions, officially joined Russia following a series of referendums in autumn 2022. Crimea voted to rejoin Russia in 2014 in the wake of the Western-backed Maidan coup in Kiev.
Ukraine would also have to withdraw all its forces and armed groups from those territories, the document said.
Kiev would have to reaffirm its neutral status and introduce a ban on any military activities of third-party states on Ukrainian territory, as well as to withdraw from international treaties incompatible with such a status. It would also have to reaffirm its nuclear-free status and prohibit the acquisition, transit, or deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory.
The memorandum expects Ukraine to set certain limits on the size of its armed forces, as well as military equipment, but does not provide any fixed numbers. All Ukrainian nationalist armed groups within the armed forces and the National Guard would have to be disbanded, according to the document.
Under the peace proposal, Kiev would have to guarantee the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking people in Ukraine and grant Russian the status of an official language, stop the persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, ban Nazi propaganda and any nationalist groups, as well as lift sanctions imposed against Moscow. Both Russia and Ukraine would renounce claims to compensation of damage linked to the conflict.
The document suggests two options for reaching a ceasefire. One of them requires Kiev to start withdrawing its troops from the territories that have joined Russia and pulling them away from the Russian borders to a certain distance. This process would have to be completed within 30 days.
The second option – the “package option” – would include a ban on any Ukrainian troop movements (except for the withdrawal of forces) and the cessation of the Ukrainian mobilization campaign and Western military aid to Kiev, including arms shipment and intelligence sharing. The sides would then establish a bilateral monitoring center and release each other’s citizens held by the other side.
Ukraine would also have to lift martial law and set a date for presidential and parliamentary elections. All the steps listed within this option would also have to be completed within 30 days, according to the document.
According to the proposal, the final peace treaty between Moscow and Kiev would be signed after the elections in Ukraine and endorsed by a legally binding UN Security Council resolution.
Last week, Reuters published what it called the details of Ukraine’s peace proposal where Kiev reportedly rejected Moscow’s demands for the recognition of Ukraine’s former territories as parts of Russia, and also ruled out abandoning its ambition to join NATO. The Ukrainian memorandum also demanded reparations from Russia.
Russian delegation head Vladimir Medinsky, an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, reported the key outcomes of the negotiations with Ukrainian representatives in Istanbul.
Key statements:
Russia handed Ukraine a draft memorandum on settlement, which Kiev took for study
The Russian settlement memorandum is in two parts and is detailed and well-developed
The first part focuses on how to achieve genuine long-term peace
The second part outlines steps for a full ceasefire, allowing for flexibility and multiple paths to that goal
Russia will unilaterally transfer 6,000 bodies of Ukrainian soldiers to Kiev next week, having identified all the deceased
The parties agreed on the largest-yet prisoner exchange
The total exchange will be at least 1,000 prisoners, possibly more
Sick and seriously wounded prisoners will be exchanged on an “all for all” basis
Moscow and Kiev will create a commission to exchange seriously wounded troops without political decisions
The sides will exchange soldiers under the age of 25
Russia offered Ukraine a concrete ceasefire for two to three days in certain frontline sectors
Moscow and Kiev agreed to a ceasefire in specific areas so commanders can retrieve the bodies of their soldiers
The Ukrainian armed forces promised to work out the ceasefire proposal for those areas soon
Kiev turned the issue of ‘child abductions’ into a ‘show for sentimental Europeans’
No children have been kidnapped by Moscow, only rescued by Russian soldiers
Russia received a list of 339 children from Ukraine who are in difficult situations due to the conflict
Moscow returns children to Kiev if their parents or legal guardians are present
Russia is working on reuniting families separated by the Ukraine conflict
The negotiations with Ukraine were conducted in Russian
The Russian delegation was satisfied with the results of the second round of talks with Ukraine, Medinsky said.
By John-Michael Dumais | The Defender | October 2, 2023
A former police detective claimed that around 50% of the 250 sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) cases she investigated over seven years happened within 48 hours after the infant received a vaccine. About 70% happened within one week.
She argued this timing proves vaccines are behind SIDS because the correlation would not be observed if the deaths were occurring randomly.
The detective, who worked in a “major city” of over 300,000 people and identified herself simply as “Jennifer,” shared her story with Steve Kirsch in a video and Substack article published last week. … Full article
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