The growing debate in Iran over withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) reflects a fundamental question: What purpose does membership serve if the treaty offers no meaningful protection for a country’s peaceful nuclear facilities, even as it obliges that country to uphold its commitments?
The issue goes beyond Iran’s legitimate security concerns, striking at the credibility of the international nuclear order itself.
When an NPT signatory’s nuclear infrastructure can be subjected to unprovoked and illegal military aggression without any accountability for those responsible, the treaty’s underlying premise of reciprocal obligations and protections is called into question.
The Assembly of Experts’ latest call for a review of Iran’s defence doctrine, including consideration of withdrawal from the NPT, signals a significant shift in the country’s strategic debate that has been gaining momentum since the 40-day imposed war.
What was once largely confined to discussions among lawmakers and security officials is now increasingly being articulated as a broader national security concern, especially in the wake of continued sabre rattling by the enemy.
While Iran is expected to uphold its international obligations as an NPT signatory, its adversaries face absolutely no accountability for openly violating the most fundamental principles of international law.
The repeated attacks on Iranian nuclear installations, assassinations of nuclear scientists and failure of international institutions to respond decisively have intensified questions about the effectiveness, fairness and credibility of the existing non-proliferation framework.
This is no longer a debate about the future of Iran’s nuclear program, which is entirely peaceful. It has evolved into a much broader question of national sovereignty, strategic deterrence, the credibility of international law and, ultimately, a state’s inherent right to defend itself against external aggression.
From nuclear safeguards to strategic vulnerability
Iran’s grievances did not emerge overnight. For years, its peaceful, energy-focused nuclear programme has been subjected to sabotage, cyberattacks, assassinations of scientists and, ultimately, direct military strikes against facilities under international monitoring.
This pattern long predates the two recent wars of aggression against Iran. In 2010, nuclear scientist Masoud Ali Mohammadi was assassinated in Tehran. Later that year, Majid Shahriari was killed in a bombing, while Fereydoun Abbasi survived an assassination attempt. Abbasi was subsequently martyred on the first day of the 12-day war in June 2025.
Dariush Rezainejad was assassinated in 2011, followed by Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan in January 2012. In November 2020, prominent nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated on the outskirts of Tehran. Israeli spying agency Mossad was involved in these attacks, with the stamp of approval from CIA.
During the 12-day war of aggression in June 2025, Israel assassinated several more of Iran’s leading nuclear scientists, yet the UN nuclear watchdog refrained from condemning these targeted killings. In fact, it was the politically motivated resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors shortly before the war that was instrumental in paving the way for the aggression at a time when Iran and the US were engaged in indirect nuclear negotiations.
The attacks have not been confined to individuals. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has on numerous occasions been targeted through sophisticated sabotage operations, most notably the Stuxnet cyberattack against the Natanz enrichment facility in 2010.
The escalation reached an entirely different level in June 2025, when Israel, backed by the United States, launched an unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Iran, targeting nuclear installations alongside military and civilian infrastructure. Washington subsequently joined the war directly, bombing the three key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on June 22.
These were neither clandestine installations nor facilities operating outside the international nuclear framework. Iran’s nuclear program has for years been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and verification arrangements.
The attacks thus raised a fundamental and logical question: if nuclear facilities under international monitoring can be bombed with sheer impunity, what practical protection does the safeguards system offer countries that remain committed to the NPT?
The IAEA itself confirmed the damage. Director General Rafael Grossi, who is now vying for the top UN post, reported that the above-ground section of Natanz’s pilot enrichment plant had been destroyed in the initial Israeli strikes. Following the US attacks, the agency confirmed that Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan had been hit, with extensive additional damage reported at the Isfahan complex.
The repercussions extended well beyond physical destruction. The IAEA subsequently suspended its field verification activities, while inspectors were withdrawn from Iran for safety reasons. In effect, military attacks on safeguarded nuclear installations undermined the very monitoring arrangements that the international community repeatedly demands Iran uphold.
This glaring contradiction lies at the heart of intensifying calls in Iran to withdraw from NPT. Iran is expected to honour its nuclear commitments even as the international framework designed to safeguard them offers no protection against external military aggression.
The IAEA’s credibility crisis
Iran’s criticism of the IAEA stems from a glaring double standard in its approach to nuclear security, compliance and accountability.
The agency has repeatedly demanded access and cooperation from Tehran, while its response to military attacks against Iranian nuclear installations has largely remained confined to tokenistic statements expressing concern and warnings about nuclear safety.
Grossi did state that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the circumstances. He also warned that such attacks could have serious consequences for nuclear safety, security and international peace. However, the agency he heads did not produce a meaningful accountability mechanism capable of deterring or penalising those responsible for the unprovoked attacks.
The distinction between expressing concern and ensuring accountability is particularly important. The IAEA applies extensive mechanisms for inspecting nuclear facilities, verifying declared nuclear material and reporting safeguards violations. Yet it lacks the mechanism to hold rogue states accountable for attacks against nuclear facilities.
This exposes a structural weakness in the international nuclear order: compliance is rigorously monitored, but the security of compliant states is not equally guaranteed.
The timing of the June 2025 aggression made this contradiction even more glaring. Just a day before Israel launched its attacks, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution claiming Iran was in “non-compliance” with its safeguards obligations.
The move was politically motivated and reflected Israeli pressure on the agency and Grossi’s attempt to appease Washington with an eye on top UN position. The fact that the attacks followed almost immediately proved that diplomatic and monitoring mechanisms had become instruments of pressure on Iran rather than impartial safeguards.
There is also an important distinction here: the IAEA’s June 2025 finding concerned Iran’s safeguards obligations, not a finding that Iran had decided to build nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the episode reinforced the fact that Iran’s rights and obligations under the treaty were being interpreted selectively.
The credibility problem is further complicated by the nuclear status of the Israeli regime, which is not a signatory to the NPT and which possesses nuclear weapons, while maintaining a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel’s nuclear arsenal remains outside the treaty’s safeguards framework, while Iran, a non-nuclear-weapon state party, faces extensive inspections and international scrutiny for no reason.
Withdrawal from NPT becomes serious policy debate
Against this backdrop, calls for the Iranian leadership to reconsider the country’s NPT membership have gained momentum. Recent countywide polls, including those conducted by the state broadcaster IRIB, show an overwhelming majority of people in favor of the country’s exit from the treaty.
The statement by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member constitutional body tasked with electing and supervising the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, is particularly significant because it elevates the issue beyond individual parliamentary interventions.
The body has called for a decisive review of Iran’s defence doctrine, consideration of withdrawal from the NPT and the establishment of the necessary deterrence capabilities. It has described these measures as an unavoidable necessity and an emerging national demand.
The statement also warned that any renewed aggression against the country would trigger an immediate and effective Iranian response without geographical limitations, echoing the position articulated by Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei in his meeting with top military commanders recently.
The message is twofold: Iran is reconsidering the assumptions underpinning its existing security arrangements, and it intends to ensure that any future attack carries consequences beyond the immediate battlefield.
The Assembly of Experts’ intervention follows similar remarks from senior officials and lawmakers. Major General Mohsen Rezaee, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, also addressed the growing debate over the country’s nuclear doctrine recently.
On November 1, he acknowledged that public and political demands to reconsider the doctrine have emerged following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities despite extensive IAEA inspections and monitoring. He clarified, however, that no official decision has so far been taken by the Supreme National Security Council to change the doctrine.
Earlier, on September 20, Iranian lawmaker Hossein Ali Hajideligani announced that a three-urgency parliamentary motion calling for withdrawal from the NPT had been submitted to the parliament’s presiding board. He said the proposal was awaiting permission to be introduced in an open parliamentary session.
He maintained that after repeated attacks against the country, including the nuclear sites, continued membership of the treaty was delivering more disadvantages than benefits.
These developments suggest that withdrawal is no longer merely an occasional political threat deployed during diplomatic confrontations. It has become a subject of institutional debate involving lawmakers, senior security officials and now the Assembly of Experts.
What does withdrawal from NPT actually mean
The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, is built around three central pillars: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation and advancing nuclear disarmament.
Under Article IV, member states retain the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided they comply with their treaty obligations. Article III establishes the safeguards framework through which the IAEA verifies that nuclear material is not diverted towards weapons programmes.
Article X, meanwhile, explicitly recognises a member state’s sovereign right to withdraw. It states that a party may withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter have jeopardised its national interests. The withdrawing state must provide three months’ notice to all other parties and the UN Security Council, explaining the extraordinary events behind its decision.
This provision is particularly relevant to Iran’s current position. It could contend that repeated military attacks against its safeguarded nuclear facilities, the assassination of its scientists and the failure of international mechanisms to provide effective protection have fundamentally undermined the security rationale for continued membership.
In such circumstances, withdrawal becomes an exercise of national sovereignty under a provision explicitly written into the treaty.
Why Iran is reconsidering its defence doctrine
The debate over NPT membership is closely connected to a wider reassessment of Iran’s defence doctrine. For decades, it has maintained and demonstrated that its nuclear program is peaceful and that nuclear weapons have no place in the country’s defence strategy. Iranian officials have repeatedly invoked a decree by the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei against acquiring such weapons.
Iran reiterated this position in its submission to the 2026 NPT review process, describing the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the placement of peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as central elements of its commitment to the treaty.
However, the strategic environment has changed dramatically. The February 28, 2026, US-Israeli aggression against Iran, following the earlier attacks in June 2025, has reinforced the argument that the country’s existing deterrence arrangements need fundamental reassessment, especially amid continued threats from the US-Israeli war machine.
The central concern is that conventional military capabilities and international diplomatic commitments have not been sufficient to prevent repeated attacks against Iranian territory and strategic infrastructure. Hence, deterrence must be credible enough to convince adversaries that another military adventure would carry unacceptable costs.
This is the context in which Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei’s warning about an immediate response without geographical limitations should be understood. It communicates that Iran would not necessarily confine its response to the location of an attack or accept geographical restrictions imposed by its adversaries in the event of new aggression.
The Assembly of Experts has effectively connected this deterrence argument with the NPT debate. Its position suggests that Iran cannot continue relying on an international framework that has failed to protect its security while limiting its strategic options.
The question is not simply whether Iran should acquire additional military capabilities. It is whether the country’s defence doctrine should be adjusted to reflect the realities of a regional and international order in which military force has increasingly been used against it despite the existence of diplomatic agreements and international safeguards.
Wider implications for international nuclear order
Iran’s potential withdrawal would have consequences extending well beyond West Asia. The NPT is often described as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its credibility depends not only on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also on maintaining confidence that member states can exercise their peaceful nuclear rights without becoming targets of military aggression.
If a state that has remained within the treaty concludes that membership offers inadequate protection against attacks on its safeguarded facilities, other countries may question the practical value of the existing arrangements. This would create a dangerous precedent.
The international community cannot consistently demand that countries accept intrusive inspections and comply with non-proliferation obligations while treating attacks against their peaceful nuclear infrastructure as an issue that can be addressed through tokenistic expressions of concern alone.
There is also a broader contradiction involving nuclear-armed states and those outside the treaty. Israel’s continued refusal to join the NPT, combined with its widely acknowledged nuclear arsenal, highlights the uneven application of international nuclear rules.
Meanwhile, the five states recognised as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT have not fulfilled the disarmament expectations embedded in Article VI to the satisfaction of many non-nuclear-weapon states.
This imbalance has long undermined confidence in the treaty’s underlying bargain: non-nuclear states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states commit to pursuing disarmament and all parties retain the right to peaceful nuclear technology.
Iran’s current debate brings these unresolved contradictions into sharper focus. A withdrawal would not necessarily mean that Iran would immediately pursue nuclear weapons. Nor should such an outcome be presented as inevitable. But it would represent a serious setback for a non-proliferation framework already facing considerable challenges.
It would also complicate the work of the IAEA, reduce transparency and potentially create new uncertainties about nuclear material, verification and regional security.
For the United States and its European allies, as well as the Zionist regime, the prospect of Iranian withdrawal from the NPT should therefore be a warning about the consequences of relying excessively on sanctions, military threats and coercive diplomacy.
A test for international institutions
Ultimately, Iran’s NPT debate is about more than nuclear policy. It is a test of whether international institutions can uphold the principles they were established to defend.
The NPT cannot remain credible if its obligations are enforced selectively, peaceful nuclear facilities are exposed to dastardly military attacks and the perpetrators face no meaningful consequences.
Nor can the IAEA maintain its standing as an impartial international watchdog if its ability to monitor nuclear activities is accompanied by an inability to meaningfully address threats to the safety and security of safeguarded facilities.
Washington and its European allies must recognise that military aggression against a member state’s safeguarded nuclear facilities fundamentally undermines the very non-proliferation system they claim to defend.
The IAEA, too, must demonstrate that its mandate extends beyond demanding compliance from non-nuclear states to consistently defending nuclear safety and the inviolability of peaceful nuclear installations.
Iran’s growing reconsideration of NPT membership is, in this sense, a consequence of a much deeper crisis of confidence. The international community now faces a fundamental question: Can the global nuclear order survive when compliance offers no credible protection against aggression, and when the institutions responsible for safeguarding it can’t ensure accountability?
If that question remains unanswered, Iran’s debate may prove to be part of a much wider challenge to the foundations of the international non-proliferation regime.
The prospect of a Democratic takeover of Congress in January 2027 is raising the possibility of a sweeping investigation into the Trump administration’s decision to wage war on Iran, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu potentially facing scrutiny over reports that he pushed US President Donald Trump into the war.
As Republican lawmakers question War Secretary Pete Hegseth’s handling of the war amid rising impeachment calls, Israeli website Zman Yisrael has warned that the political fallout could put “Israel” in the dock, as it faces congressional scrutiny.
Republican divisions deepen
Republican Representative Thomas Massie, who lost his party’s primary election and whose term in Congress is expected to end in January 2027, submitted articles of impeachment to remove Hegseth last Monday.
The impeachment resolution contains eight articles, centered on the Trump administration’s waging of war on Iran without the approval of Congress, as the Constitution requires.
It also notes that the administration continued the war even after the expiry of the sixty days, after which obtaining the approval of both the House of Representatives and the Senate becomes mandatory in order to continue the fighting.
But the proceedings alone are not what threatens Hegseth. The fundamental problem facing him and other senior Trump administration officials lies in the House committees, which will begin investigating the decision-making process during the months that preceded the war on Iran.
US intelligence assessments under scrutiny ahead of public hearings
The Israeli website acknowledged that “the United States and Israel did not achieve their unofficial goal, which was toppling the Iranian regime.” Instead, the battle plunged Washington into a series of crises: a sharp rise in energy prices, a jump in consumer goods prices, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (which had been open until the outbreak of the war), and fatal damage to US infrastructure and bases in the region, in addition to harm to US allies in the Gulf.
It said, “It is true that US President Donald Trump, as well as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have repeated in public statements the claim that they triumphed, defeated, eliminated, and destroyed, but it is likely that, with the exception of Hegseth, no one in the world believed it.”
It warned that the repercussions of the deliberations in Congress could be grave for “Israel”. In the first phase, which is taking place this week against the backdrop of Massie’s proposal, no hearings or committee deliberations will be held, and no investigation of Hegseth is expected. But starting in January, with the majority changing hands in both chambers, “Israel may find itself in the dock,” according to the website.
‘Netanyahu dragged Trump into war’
Although members of the House of Representatives, and possibly senators later on, do not have the authority to compel officials of the Israeli administration to testify, they are expected to question US officials about the intelligence that their Israeli counterparts provided to them.
Democratic Representative Gregory Meeks, who is expected to assume the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee, has already pledged to launch an in-depth investigation into the Trump administration’s decision-making process before going to war.
Where could all of this drag “Israel”? An extensive New York Times investigation revealed what transpired behind closed doors between Netanyahu and Trump during the private meeting held on February 11, 2026, a little more than two weeks before the war began.
The investigation described Netanyahu as the person who dragged Trump into the war, despite several public statements by the president in which he said he had made the decision himself and that no one had pushed him to do so.
Later, the newspaper’s two White House correspondents, Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, published the book “Regime Change,” in which they detailed that US intelligence had been highly skeptical of the presentation Netanyahu delivered at the White House and that CIA Director John Ratcliffe described some of the ideas concerning toppling the Iranian regime as “a farce”.
When the going gets tough, Rubio flips
These issues are expected to be put on the table in public hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Senior Trump administration officials will be asked to answer pointed questions: Why did Washington assess that the Iranian system would collapse? What was the intelligence that led to the war based on? And other questions. Such proceedings are expected to be wholly uncomfortable for the Israeli side.
And if that were not enough, Trump himself has joined, in recent days, the voices saying that the war on Iran inflicted one of the Republican Party’s biggest political defeats.
In addition, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a politician known for his clearly pro-“Israel” positions, addressed the day before yesterday the halting of security aid to “Israel”.
He said, “Israel is a rich enough country, and they can buy weapons from us, but we will not fund that.”
The prospect of a congressional investigation into the Trump administration’s decision to wage war on Iran adds to the growing political pressure on the White House, as divisions within the Republican Party deepen and opposition to renewed military action gains ground.
Against this backdrop, Haaretz has reported that Trump’s room for maneuver has narrowed considerably, leaving Netanyahu increasingly isolated in his push to resume the war.
Trump’s post-election retreat leaves Netanyahu increasingly isolated on Iran
Trump’s options for renewed military action against Iran have narrowed significantly following the Republican Party’s loss of its majorities in both chambers of Congress in the midterm elections, Harretz reported.
The Israeli newspaper said, “While Netanyahu is returning to his vision of launching a new war, the White House appears to have lost interest in the matter.”
It assessed that “the chances now clearly favor ending the war on Iran amid Trump’s continued shifts in position,” noting that he has been wavering on the issue for more than six months, after effectively halting the momentum of the war last April.
Netanyahu pushes for renewed war
Trump said early yesterday that there appeared to be no need to resume the war and that a return to fighting would be “a highly unlikely scenario.”
He added that the war was “effectively over” militarily, making a relatively definitive statement that he had avoided making in recent months.
The Israeli newspaper noted that “three main options have long been under consideration: resuming the offensive, potentially in coordination with “Israel”, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been pushing for; reaching an agreement with Iran that includes restrictions on its nuclear program; or maintaining economic pressure.”
In recent days, the Trump administration announced the launch of “Operation Iron Gate” to shut down Iran’s land trade routes, as a measure complementing the naval blockade.
According to the newspaper, Trump’s latest statements indicate that he has chosen, at this stage, to continue the policy of “economic strangulation” against Iran, hoping to force it into an agreement on terms more favorable to the United States.
Trump’s war options narrow
Haaretz added that this comes despite the absence of any current signs that Iran’s leadership is retreating or yielding to pressure.
These developments come amid ongoing mediation efforts by Qatar and several other Gulf countries, which are seeking to prevent the war from resuming.
“Israel currently appears to be the only country in the region whose leadership — the current leadership, whose continued hold on power has been called into question by the results of the Knesset elections — still supports resuming the war,” Haaretz added.
The newspaper also noted that the Trump administration includes an influential group of senior officials opposed to resuming the war, led by Vice President JD Vance. This group has stepped up its criticism of efforts to continue the war since the Republicans’ defeat in the elections.
Iran recently designated Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, as a “hostile group” and declared the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force “terrorist organizations” in a decisive retaliatory measure against London’s relentless hostile actions against the Islamic Republic.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry announced the measures on November 1, 2026, citing Britain’s participation in the US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran and its decision to place the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) under the country’s so-called “State Threats Act 2026.”
The decisions were made under a resolution of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and in response to Britain’s actions over the past year.
Under the first measure, MI6—formally the Secret Intelligence Service—has been designated a hostile group under Note 2 of Article 1 of Iran’s Law on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist regime and Hostile Countries against National Security and National Interests.
The designation took effect upon publication of the ministry’s statement, and the provisions of the law now apply to the British spy agency.
Under the second measure, the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have been brought under Iran’s Law on Countermeasures against the United States’ Designation of the IRGC as a Terrorist Organization.
Both British military branches are consequently designated as terrorist organizations under Iranian legislation.
The Foreign Ministry cited Britain’s provision of military and logistical facilities and bases within territories under its jurisdiction to support the US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran as one of the grounds for the measures.
It also pointed to London’s July 13, 2026 decision to place the IRGC under the State Threats Act 2026, describing the move as part of Britain’s hostile policies against the Islamic Republic.
The ministry condemned Britain’s policies as contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, particularly the principles of respect for national sovereignty and the prohibition of unlawful actions against other countries.
It reaffirmed Iran’s determination to take the necessary measures to protect its national security and interests.
“The measures have evidently been adopted in accordance with the principles of international law and within the framework of the principle of reciprocity,” the statement said, adding that the British government would bear responsibility for their consequences.
A century of British hostility
The November 1 designations are not an isolated response but the culmination of a century of British intervention, espionage and military aggression against Iran. The record is long, documented and central to Iranian national memory.
Britain’s hostile role predates MI6 itself. During the nineteenth century, London competed with Tsarist Russia for influence over Persia in the Great Game, pressuring the Qajar government and intervening in the country’s affairs to control strategic decisions in Tehran.
On August 25, 1941, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran despite its declared neutrality in the Second World War. British forces advanced from Iraq and the Persian Gulf, while British naval forces operated in southern Iranian waters.
The Royal Air Force participated in the campaign, bombing Ahvaz and attacking ports and naval facilities at Bandar Imam Khomeini and Khorramshahr. The invasion forced the Pahlavi monarch to abdicate.
This was not covert interference but open military aggression against a neutral nation—and it remains a foundational reference point in Iranian accounts of British military power.
The 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh became the most enduring symbol of British intelligence hostility.
After Iran nationalized its oil industry, Britain—through MI6, working with the American CIA—participated in the operation that removed Mosaddegh and restored the Shah’s political position. MI6 was one of the coup’s principal organizers, and declassified British and American documents have confirmed MI6’s central role in “Operation Boot.”
The coup is among the clearest cases in which British intelligence involvement is established by substantial historical documentation.
Espionage against Iranian diplomatic missions
In May 1994, then-President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani announced that British intelligence had placed listening devices in the Iranian embassy in London. Embassy staff discovered a microphone, and further investigations revealed additional devices.
Rafsanjani identified MI6 as responsible for the surveillance and noted that British allegations about Iranian links with the Irish Republican Army were intended to divert attention from the eavesdropping operation.
The Foreign Ministry confirmed that the first microphone had been discovered weeks earlier and that the embassy had delayed publicizing the matter while investigating the possibility of additional devices.
The episode was a direct charge, attributed to the Iranian president, that MI6 had conducted technical surveillance against an Iranian diplomatic mission on British territory.
Support for terrorist groups in Khuzestan
A major escalation occurred during the bombings in Khuzestan in 2005 and 2006. In August 2005, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry announced that British intelligence services were involved in the unrest and bombings in the border Iranian province.
Those arrested in connection with the incidents confessed to direct links with separatist groups and foreign intelligence networks, particularly those associated with Britain. The British connection extended beyond political encouragement to operational support.
After bombings in Ahvaz in October 2005 and January 2006, Iranian officials pointed to the presence of British troops in southern Iraq, close to the Iranian border, and established that terrorist groups operating in Khuzestan were receiving assistance from British military personnel and facilities.
Parliamentarian Alaeddin Boroujerdi raised concern about British involvement, citing the presence of British forces near the border and information about their previous involvement in unrest in Khuzestan.
In January 2006, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stated that London had a clear connection with the bombings, that those responsible had links to British officials, and that they enjoyed the cooperation of British army commanders.
He referred to the use of British facilities in Basra. The episode stands as one of the clearest examples of Britain facilitating violence inside Iran through its military presence in Iraq.
Royal Navy and Iranian maritime sovereignty
The Royal Navy became the subject of a direct sovereignty issue in March 2007, when Iranian forces detained 15 British sailors and marines from HMS Cornwall in the northern Persian Gulf.
Iran established that the British personnel had entered Iranian territorial waters illegally while conducting an inspection of a merchant vessel.
The Foreign Ministry condemned the illegal and interventionist entry by British forces, describing the incident as suspicious and contrary to international rules.
The detention lasted 13 days and became a major diplomatic confrontation between the two countries. Iranian officials said the episode was evidence of British disregard for Iran’s maritime sovereignty.
In July 2019, British forces seized the Iranian tanker Grace 1 off Gibraltar, an illegal seizure of an Iranian vessel that Tehran saw as an attempt to restrict its oil exports.
Iranian authorities rejected the legality of the operation and asserted that Britain had no right to prevent Iran from selling oil to its customers.
Later that month, on July 19, the IRGC Navy seized the British-flagged tanker Stena Impero in the Strait of Hormuz after the vessel violated maritime regulations, ignored warnings, followed an incorrect traffic route and switched off its navigation system.
Interference in domestic affairs
Following Iran’s presidential election in June 2009 and the subsequent engineered protests, British institutions worked to support and inflame the unrest and destabilize the Islamic Republic.
The British embassy in Tehran, British diplomats, the BBC’s Persian-language service and intelligence networks operating under diplomatic and journalistic cover were all implicated.
British diplomats were present among those who indulged in violent riots. Embassy-linked contacts helped coordinate political activity. Individuals working under journalistic cover gathered intelligence.
Britain conducted psychological operations through BBC Persian and supported political networks opposed to the Iranian government
These operations reinforced the longstanding reality that British diplomatic and media activity serves intelligence and political objectives—activity that contributed to the deterioration of bilateral relations and culminated in the 2011 protest against the British embassy and the closure of the mission.
Complicity in the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists
From 2010 onward, British intelligence was connected with American and Israeli operations against Iran’s nuclear program.
The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists became a central part of this record. While the killings were carried out by Israeli Mossad, MI6 and the CIA assisted in intelligence collection, operational planning, training and the identification of targets.
In December 2010, then-Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar announced that individuals arrested in connection with attacks on Iranian scientists had confessed to links with Western intelligence services, including MI6, the CIA and Mossad.
The assassination of nuclear scientist Majid Shahriari in 2020 formed part of a coordinated effort by Israeli intelligence and its Western counterparts, including MI6 and the CIA, to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program.
In November 2013, the head of MI6, John Sawers, discussed the role of British intelligence in the international pressure campaign against Iran, acknowledging that intelligence activity had contributed to the pressure on Tehran and the sanctions regime.
His remarks confirmed hostile British intelligence activity against the Islamic Republic.
In December 2013, the head of the Kerman Revolutionary Court, Dadkhoda Salari, announced the arrest of an individual accused of spying for MI6.
The suspect had maintained contact with four British intelligence officers and had met them 11 times, both inside and outside Iran.
Salari collected information requested by the British officers and received instructions intended to undermine Iranian national interests. He confessed to the allegations, and judicial proceedings were underway.
Intelligence penetration and the Akbari case
In July 2022, the IRGC Intelligence Organization announced that several foreign diplomats had been detained after collecting soil samples in Iran’s central desert.
Giles Whitaker, then the British deputy ambassador, was specifically identified, and the activity was connected with intelligence gathering.
The area was near a military and missile-related site. The British diplomat was expelled from the area, and the case became part of the established record that British diplomatic personnel collect sensitive information under civilian and scientific cover.
The most prominent recent case involving an MI6 agent was that of Alireza Akbari, a former Iranian deputy defense minister holding Iranian and British citizenship.
In January 2023, Iran announced that Akbari had been executed after being convicted of spying for MI6. Iranian judicial and intelligence authorities established that he had provided MI6 with sensitive information about Iranian officials and strategic institutions over an extended period.
The Intelligence Ministry described him as an infiltrating agent who had obtained access to sensitive centers and transferred information to British intelligence officers.
Akbari met MI6 officers during trips to Europe and was recruited through contacts associated with research and business institutions.
The information he supplied included details about 178 Iranian figures, among them top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was assassinated near Tehran in November 2020.
The case demonstrated the consequences of MI6 penetration of Iran’s state institutions.
Latest turn of events
The November 1, 2026 designations respond to Britain’s most recent hostile acts. The British government initially declined to authorize the use of its bases for American attacks, but subsequently permitted US forces to use RAF Fairford in England and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean for operations against Iranian missile facilities.
Tehran regards the provision of bases, facilities and logistical support as participation in hostile military operations against Iran.
On July 13, 2026, London placed the IRGC under the State Threats Act 2026, a hostile measure against a central institution of the Islamic Republic. The Foreign Ministry’s statement cited both actions as grounds for the designations.
The November 2026 designations mark a formal escalation in Iran’s treatment of Britain’s armed forces.
MI6 has been designated a hostile group—a status reflecting its record of espionage, surveillance, recruitment of Iranian informants, support for armed groups, interference in domestic politics and cooperation in operations against the nuclear program.
The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have been designated terrorist organizations—a status reflecting the Royal Navy’s violations of Iranian maritime sovereignty and Britain’s use of its military bases and facilities for operations against Iran.
The Royal Navy’s record includes the 2007 violation of Iranian territorial waters, the illegal 2019 seizure of the Grace 1, and Britain’s broader military presence in the Persian Gulf.
The RAF’s record includes the 1941 bombing of Ahvaz and, most recently, the provision of British bases for US operations against Iranian missile facilities.
These designations are adopted in accordance with the principles of international law and within the framework of reciprocity. The British government bears responsibility for their consequences.
The message from Tehran is clear: Britain’s century of hostility against Iran—from the 1941 invasion and the 1953 coup to espionage, support for armed groups, interference in domestic affairs, complicity in the assassination of Iranian scientists and the provision of bases for attacks on Iranian territory—will no longer go unanswered.
Iran has acted to protect its national security and interests, and it will continue to do so against any hostile power that violates its sovereignty.
Yousef Ramazani is a military affairs analyst based in Tehran.
Lt. Col. Daniel Davis is a 4x combat veteran, the recipient of the Ridenhour Prize for Truth-Telling, and is the host of the Daniel Davis Deep Dive YouTube channel. Daniel Davis Deep Dive: https://www.youtube.com/@DanielDavisDeepDive/videos
00:00 The West’s “1992” mindset and a changing balance of power
03:59 Unattainable objectives, morality, and the rules-based order
09:38 Operation Iron Gate: Can Iran’s land borders be sealed?
13:12 Why Davis calls the proposed blockade a fantasy
17:26 Show of strength, negotiation, or a path back to war?
21:02 Two possible exits from the Iran conflict
25:28 Why the Strait of Hormuz changes the stakes
28:59 Russia and Ukraine: the same strategic miscalculation
33:40 Closing thoughts on Western policy toward Russia
Iranian-linked vessels have been observed making suspicious movements near undersea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Oman, according to a Financial Times report, following Tehran’s warnings that it could target regional communications infrastructure if the United States and Israel renew aggression against the Islamic Republic.
At least four vessels tracked by the maritime analytics company Windward have been observed taking unusual routes and loitering over subsea cables traversing the Gulf of Oman in the days after Iran warned of disruption to digital infrastructure if the US escalated the conflict, reported theFinancial Timeson Friday.
Three were tankers subject to US sanctions, while the fourth was a small Iranian fishing craft that loitered over the Europe India Gateway and Transworld cables between October 21 and 26, according to Windward data.
According to data from TeleGeography, six cables run through the Strait of Hormuz, while three more — Fiber in Gulf, Sea-Me-We 6 and 2Africa — are under construction. 2Africa is the closest to completion.
Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar are wholly dependent on cables running under the strait for their internet connectivity.
Tehran has been vocal in its threats against cables and data centers running through the Strait of Hormuz over the past month, in response to threats from US President Donald Trump and other senior US figures that they would launch further attacks on Iran.
Earlier in October, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has warned that undersea internet cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz could become targets if the United States launches a new war against the Islamic Republic.
In remarks quoted by Iranian media on October 19, IRGC Spokesman Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi warned that any renewed conflict would bring a harsher response, new weapons and previously unidentified targets.
US President Donald Trump’s second term has exposed a reality starkly at odds with his promises to end crises and “achieve world peace,” as wars continue and economic difficulties deepen, Israeli reserve Major General Yitzhak Brik said.
In an article published by the Israeli newspaper Maariv, Brik noted that the West Asia region remains engulfed in an ongoing war, amid fears that the confrontation could spread to other parts of the world. Meanwhile, the global economy is deteriorating rather than experiencing the prosperity Trump had promised.
Brik argued that the outcome of the US midterm elections, in which Republicans lost control of Congress, reflected the extent of public dissatisfaction with Trump’s policies and declining confidence in his ability to resolve the crises he had pledged to address.
According to Brik, the US president is now facing consequential decisions over the war on Iran, amid sharp divisions within his administration and the absence of a unified strategy for dealing with the evolving confrontation.
US divided over war
Brik further stated that disagreements within the White House revolve around two principal options: escalating military attacks on Iran in an attempt to achieve a decisive outcome through force, or maintaining economic pressure while pursuing an agreement that could bring the war to an end and prevent further escalation.
However, military and political calculations are not the only factors shaping Trump’s decisions, the Israeli general said. He suggested that the US president’s sense of “humiliation” over Iran’s treatment of him could drive him to launch an attack out of a desire for revenge rather than on the basis of strategic assessments.
He warned that a military decision motivated by such considerations could have grave consequences for the entire region, particularly if “Israel” joined any new offensive.
A catastrophe for ‘Israel’
Brik stressed that another aerial assault on Iran, potentially involving “Israel”, could rapidly trigger a full-scale regional war in which “Israel” would find itself at the center.
He acknowledged that the damage “Israel” could sustain in such a confrontation would be “enormous and unbearable,” noting that some of the damage it suffered during previous rounds of fighting had already become irreparable.
Brik called on the “sensible and responsible” figures within the US administration to dissuade Trump from ordering another attack, warning that further escalation could open the door to a confrontation extending far beyond the current war.
He argued that the expectation that airstrikes alone could secure a decisive military victory over Iran rests on unrealistic assumptions. Without a ground intervention, he said, aerial operations cannot topple the Iranian government or prevent Iran from becoming a “nuclear state”.
Citing the outcome of previous attacks, Brik maintained that they had failed to achieve their strategic objectives, producing little more than temporary destruction while strengthening Tehran’s determination to continue developing its capabilities.
What are the costs of war?
In outlining the options available to Washington, Brik argued that addressing Iran’s nuclear program would require one of two principal courses of action, neither of which could produce results without imposing a substantial cost.
The first option would involve a large-scale ground operation inside Iranian territory, directly targeting nuclear facilities with substantial troop deployments, extensive air support, and the use of technological and intelligence capabilities.
Brik believed this option could potentially deliver a decisive military defeat to the Iranian government and neutralize its nuclear facilities. He acknowledged, however, that it would require a massive operation resulting in heavy casualties among US forces.
The second option would involve economically exhausting Iran through stringent sanctions and a prolonged blockade, backed by the full participation of Western countries, with the aim of isolating the Iranian economy from global markets.
He specified that this approach would require preventing Iran from exporting oil, gas, and other products, while restricting the entry of raw materials and weapons through land crossings, thereby subjecting Tehran to sustained economic pressure.
Brik acknowledged that this option had a lower likelihood of success than a ground military campaign and would require prolonged patience, international discipline, and broad Western commitment.
At the same time, Brik rejected reliance on a “middle-ground solution” based on repeating aerial attacks, arguing that such an approach would neither halt Iran’s nuclear program nor achieve a decisive military outcome. Instead, it could drag “Israel” into a regional war in which it would pay a heavy price.
Brik concluded his article by urging decision-makers to abandon their reliance on political promises and displays of air power, warning that military decisions driven by revenge, without adequately assessing their consequences, could aggravate the crisis rather than resolve it.
From Student Day on 13 Aban in Iran, where crowds chanted calls for Donald Trump’s killing and revenge and carried slogans declaring that “nuclear deterrence is our inalienable right,” to Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin meeting with Mohsen Rezaei and the Republican Party’s historic defeat in the US midterm elections, the war’s spillover effects are reshaping three trajectories simultaneously.
These trajectories include the boundaries of Iran’s nuclear policy, the depth of the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership, and the economic calculus of American domestic politics.
Underlying all three is a dynamic that has been repeatedly reinforced, which is the US-Israeli military aggression lending legitimacy to precisely the outcomes it seeks to prevent.
Erosion of the nuclear taboo: From marginal demand to establishment debate
For decades, Iran’s nuclear policy was constrained by a religious edict issued by the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, prohibiting the development and use of nuclear weapons.
Today, however, voices from Friday prayer pulpits to street demonstrations are calling on the leadership to abandon its longstanding commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. Millions of Iranians, alongside lawmakers and political figures, are increasingly demanding a decisive and timely shift in the country’s defense and nuclear doctrine.
At the highest political level, the shift is becoming explicit. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary, Major General Mohsen Rezaei, said in a state television interview that the leadership was debating whether to maintain its pre-war nuclear doctrine.
“No new decision has been made yet,” he said. “But, of course, the debate now is whether we want to keep the same doctrine we had before the war.”
Calls for Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), once confined to the political margins, are also becoming increasingly prominent in national media.
In parliament, prominent figures have joined the debate, arguing that if Iran possessed nuclear weapons, its adversaries would not dare attack the country or target its leaders and ordinary citizens, including schoolchildren.
Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of the parliament’s national security and foreign policy commission, in his recent remarks said that even before the war was imposed on Iran, 70 percent of Iranians supported acquiring nuclear weapons as a means of securing deterrence.
The underlying perception is increasingly clear: without the ultimate deterrent, Iran could remain vulnerable to attacks by the United States and Israel at any moment. Trump himself reinforced this perception when he said at a Republican convention in September that if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, he would be “calling the leader politely.”
The structural consequence is stark. Before the June 2025 strikes, the IAEA estimated Iran possessed 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity, a short step from the 90% needed for weapons-grade, and no other country has enriched to such a level without producing a weapon.
About 42 kg is enough for one weapon if further enriched; Iran’s stockpile is roughly ten times that. Inspectors were withdrawn after the US-Israeli aggression and have had no access to Iran’s four declared enrichment sites since. The IAEA’s September 2026 report says it cannot establish the stockpile’s size or location. Iran stayed short of a bomb and was attacked anyway.
For anti-imperialist constituencies globally, the unprovoked and illegal US-Israeli strikes, particularly those occurring during active nuclear negotiations, constitute a crude negation of the principle that sovereign states have the right to self-defense.
When diplomacy is proven ineffective as bombs fall, nuclear weapons as the “ultimate insurance” acquire renewed legitimacy within anti-imperialist discourse. This is not a simple endorsement of proliferation; it is an acknowledgment of a structural predicament.
In an order where a nuclear power can launch preemptive strikes against a state in the middle of nuclear negotiations, nuclear armament is viewed as a rational survival choice.
Russian-Iranian binding: From strategic partnership to substantive interdependence
The war on Iran has accelerated its eastward shift, with all-weather ally Russia emerging as its primary beneficiary. On November 5, 2026, Rezaei met with Putin at the Kremlin, delivering a message from the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei.
Their discussions focused on the ongoing war, Iran’s seven conditions for beginning negotiations with the United States, a natural gas pipeline from Russia to Iran, and the implementation contract for the Rasht-Astara railway line.
The significance of this agenda goes far beyond the symbolic language of a “strategic partnership.” The gas pipeline would not only help alleviate Iran’s energy shortages but also position the country as a transit corridor for Russian gas to neighboring states, further intertwining the two countries’ energy interests.
The transport corridor, meanwhile, would integrate Iran into a regional logistics network less exposed to Western sanctions. At a time when the war is further isolating Iran from the international system, these increasingly binding economic ties carry existential urgency.
Economic blowback and electoral reckoning: Vance’s “cutting losses”
The war’s most direct economic transmission mechanism has been oil prices, which were approaching $120 per barrel on the eve of the midterm elections.
Brent crude had reached a late-October high of nearly $118, while futures jumped to $106.61 on November 3, the day before Americans went to the polls, following fresh US strikes on Iran’s Qeshm Island. The OPEC basket price had stood at $115.86 at the end of October.
For American households, fuel costs at these levels kept inflation elevated, squeezed real incomes, and left the Federal Reserve with little room to cut interest rates.
The political consequences of this economic chain became apparent on November 3, 2026. Democrats retook control of both the Senate and the House, securing at least 54 Senate seats and 248 House seats, according to projections.
The result exceeded expectations of a “blue wave,” with some describing it as a “blue tsunami.” Trump himself – as well as his close aides and children – acknowledged that the war against Iran and the resulting rise in gasoline prices had contributed to the defeat.
JD Vance’s response was particularly direct. In a lengthy post on X the morning after the election, he wrote: “The real reason we lost is obvious to almost everyone. The reason we lost is the war.” He added: “If you’d like to argue it was worth it, that losing the Senate for the next 6 years was worth it, then do so.”
Drawing on focus-group research, Vance outlined four priorities for Republicans seeking to win back disaffected voters: ending the war, addressing the cost of living and inflation, putting America first, and changing the country’s relationship with the Israeli regime.
Vance’s call to “cut losses” has been widely interpreted as an effort to position himself for a 2028 presidential run. But the broader significance lies elsewhere: a war in West Asia, transmitted through the everyday economic pressure of higher oil prices, became a factor in reshaping the balance of power in the US Congress.
Republican lawmakers are now looking for scapegoats, with War Secretary Pete Hegseth emerging as a target and Marco Rubio reportedly facing pressure to resign.
Trump, for his part, attributed the defeat to the fact that he “wasn’t on the ballot.” Whatever the competing explanations for the result, the election has exposed the domestic political costs of an overseas military campaign that contributed to rising fuel prices and the cost of living.
Trajectories and the unified logic at work
Taken together, these three trajectories reveal a common underlying logic. US-Israeli military aggression undermined the strategic rationale for Iran’s nuclear restraint, turning a weapons program once treated as taboo into an increasingly discussable policy option.
In global anti-imperialist discourse, the strikes also weakened the moral force of non-proliferation norms, lending new weight to the argument that “sovereign states need nuclear weapons to survive.”
Economically, the war’s costs were transmitted through energy prices to populations around the world, including American voters, contributing to an electoral backlash.
Iran deliberately sought to push the costs of aggression back into the domestic politics of American imperialism. The Republican defeat is not the endpoint of this dynamic, but its clearest demonstration that in a deeply interconnected world, the costs of military aggression can eventually reach the aggressor’s own doorstep, often in unexpected ways.
This is the emerging narrative of Iran’s rise as a power shaped by the ashes and blood of war.
Moscow understands and supports Tehran’s firm position on negotiations with the United States, Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali said on Saturday, stressing that dialogue alone cannot advance diplomacy without the fulfillment of Iran’s strategic conditions.
Speaking about a three-hour meeting between Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Jalali said the discussions addressed strategic cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, as well as Iran’s position on Washington’s failure to honor its commitments.
Jalali explained that Rezaei conveyed to Putin that direct negotiations with Washington would serve no purpose without guarantees, adding that the fundamental condition for any diplomatic initiative is the full and unconditional acceptance of Iran’s seven conditions by the US.
According to Jalali, Rezaei stressed that “negotiations will not be the basis for ending the war, and experience has proven that Washington uses the dialogue process to commit aggression.”
Iran and Russia discuss strategic and military cooperation
Jalali also said Russia supports Tehran’s position that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) treats Iran with “discriminatory and irregular conduct.”
He further confirmed that military cooperation between Iran and Russia remains ongoing, pointing to consultations at the highest levels on deepening military and defense ties between the two countries.
Meanwhile, a senior Iranian political and security source told Al Mayadeen on Thursday that Tehran sees no point in taking any step to advance diplomacy before Iran’s seven conditions are fully and simultaneously implemented.
The source also dismissed reports claiming that Rezaei had presented a new political initiative to Putin, saying they are “pure fabrication.”
Rezaei also revealed that discussions with Putin covered a proposed pipeline project to transport Russian gas to Iran, which he said would meet Tehran’s domestic needs while allowing it to resell part of the supply.
He further said Putin condemned attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, said that the war on Iran is unjust, and pledged to help bring it to an end. “President Putin said that he would do everything possible to help end the war,” Rezaei stated.
An Iranian source told Al Mayadeen that Tehran would not reopen the Strait of Hormuz until its seven conditions were met, adding that the decision was not open to negotiation. The source said the talks between Rezaei and Putin focused on efforts to end the US war on Iran.
Separately, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi highlighted the depth of bilateral ties, saying, “Never in the history of cooperation between Iran and Russia have we been this close.” He also praised his talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Tehran, which covered various areas of cooperation between the two countries.
Never hesitate to state the obvious: Everyone with eyes to see is recognizing that the US midterm elections have been sensational. The Democrats have achieved a stupendous – “historic” according to the Financial Times – triumph; the Republicans have suffered a crushing, Stalingrad-scale rout.
Let’s focus on the rout: This is the moment when, on the same day, a New York Timesfront page main headline promises to explain the GOP’s “historic collapse” while Tucker Carlson starts his show with a wry “well, that was a disaster” (adding that he really means “disaster,” as in the sinking of the Lusitania, not rain at a wedding party).
You may suspect both America’s paper of liberal Centrism and the former Fox host turned MAGA dissident of bias or, at least, Schadenfreude. Yet bias is simply irrelevant in this case, where, for once, the facts really do speak for themselves: The great, enormous, humungous GOP midterm catastrophe is quantifiably worse than the 2006 drubbing the party received for George W. Bush’s Iraq War insanity or the “shellacking” – in his own words – voters administered to Barack Obama and his Democrats in 2010. As the staid Economist has summed up the Republican fiasco, this is “not a normal midterm swing against a sitting president, but the biggest wave-election since the aftermath of Watergate more than 50 years ago.”
What is even clearer than that the Republicans have been devastated is that one man in particular has taken a stunning hit: US President Donald Trump. He may insist that he was not on the ballot as much as he likes. No one is fooled. Of course, he was, if not officially – as no president ever is during midterms – then all the more in reality. This was, the Wall Street Journal has noted correctly, “one of the most decisive repudiations of a president in modern history.”
The causes of this “blue tsunami” will keep commentators and, later, historians busy. Here, let’s just note two things: They go beyond the key issues of “affordability,” a typical US euphemism for mass impoverishment and the “Iran War,” in effect another euphemism, standing for a US defeat much worse than Vietnam, incurred for no real reason other than to please genocidal Israel. In particular, the spike in gasoline prices resulting, most of all, directly from this perfectly avoidable war and defeat has delivered a gut punch to Trump’s party.
But also recall that US voters, as we know from polls, are angry as well about such things as the tariff wars that made their lives more expensive even before the Iran War, the blatant rapacity of the Trump clan and their cronies, and the shooting of US citizens in brutal ICE crackdowns.
Not to speak of bulldozing part of the White House in a quixotic quest for the biggest, blingest ballroom of them all. Most of all, perhaps, there is a deep background noise of resentment at a president who seems to make a point out of displaying how little he cares. About his countrymen and about his own promises of no more wars and putting America first, and not Israel.
And now? That is, of course, the most important and most urgent question of this moment. Rumors are swirling: The (political) heads of Secretary of War (On Behalf of Israel) Pete Hegseth and Trump’s chief of staff and single most important adviser Susie Wiles are said to be on the chopping block, for instance.
In this volatile dog-eats-panicked-dog world, one man seems to have made up his mind rapidly. Vice President J. D. Vance, former vehement Trump critic, then devoted Trump convert, has had another moment of revelation and rebirth. With the battle scarcely over and lost, he has addressed the public via X to, in essence, put as much distance between himself and his losing boss as he possibly can while, perhaps, keeping his job.
In a long post, Vance has outlined his theory of why the GOP was crushed. Unusually rich in detail about polling, turnout, and voter movements from one camp (the GOP) into the other (the Democrats), the gist of the post is one clear if implicit message: It’s Trump who is to blame.
Because that’s what you are saying when you say, as Vance does, that the key issue that lost the election was the war against Iran. If you add, as Vance also does, that voters wanted not only an end to that war but also a “focus on cost of living/inflation,” putting America truly first, and a “change of our relationship to Israel,” the point gets only clearer. The Wall Street Journal is right: This was a “stunning repudiation” of Trump.
For while Trump is by no means the only one to blame for the perverse American dependency on and support of a hyper-aggressive and genocidal midget state (that would be virtually the whole US establishment), he has made himself the single most prominent epitome of this national syndrome. And that makes him the single most convenient fall guy, too.
There’s no reason to pity Trump for being stabbed in the back by his very own Brutus. It was always clear that Vance is, to put it mildly, highly flexible in his positions and values as well as unscrupulous. His burning ambition is, if anything, even more obvious: Hire a Vance, don’t complain when he’ll kick and stab you when you’re down.
The Iranian leadership has made no secret of being highly unimpressed by Vance’s latest self-update. “Losing gambler energy, can’t walk away from the table. Boss is prepping the next war phase while America teeters on an Israel-First cliff. Skip the TED talk. Why not say this to your boss?” That was the response of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of Iran’s parliament.
Tehran has every reason to be harsh as well as skeptical. But for the rest of us, it makes sense not to dismiss Vance’s sally so quickly. His motives are certain to be selfish. The fact that he was launched by one of America’s most devious and power-hungry oligarchs, Antichrist-obsessive Peter Thiel, makes his CV even less appealing. But we still have to ask what he may have in mind with his “break” with Trump.
Clearly, Vance is positioning himself for a potential run for the presidency. But what would be his agenda if he ran and won? Skeptics see a massive psyop: Vance will only pretend to offer MAGA cleansed of Trumpian contaminations, in other words, to really put America and Americans first, and cut Israel loose. In reality, they predict, his aim is to betray his potential voters no less than Trump has. Trust neither Vance nor his friend and MAGA rebel Tucker Carlson, the skeptics warn, because they will, in the end, sell out to Zionism and give you the same old, same old again.
There is no compelling reason to rule out such a scenario. Yet there is no reason to find it inevitable either. It is equally possible that Vance – out of opportunism, not because of the conscience he does not have – could really stand for a great right-wing turn away from Israel. Not because Israel is genocidal and all-purpose criminal, but because being tied to it is becoming far too politically costly.
This possibility should not be dismissed out of hand. For two reasons: First, being Israel’s tool in the Middle East has really produced catastrophe for the US and its establishment. And second, until now – or perhaps recently – supporting Israel come-what-may has been a vile bipartisan consensus. To break it down entirely will require great changes both among Democrats and Republicans.
US politics is exceptionally dark and often outright evil. But the geopolitics and the domestic calculus of the long decades of America’s “Israel First” obsession could shift even in that world of darkness. For Israel’s victims, the Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese, Yemenis, Iranians, and many others, it won’t matter why exactly the US will finally stop propping up their tormenters. A realistic commitment to their liberation must focus first of all on getting the US out of the Middle East. Under what regime at home it will make that retreat may matter. Or not.
Tarik Cyril Amar is a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War, and the politics of memory.
A shadowy neocon strategist spent 30 years maneuvering Washington toward war with Iran
José Niño Unfiltered | November 17, 2026
As American forces clash with Iran in 2026, a decades-long campaign orchestrated from the shadows of Washington has finally reached its climax. Earlier this year, foreign policy strategist David Wurmser openly called for Washington to let Israel start a war of aggression against Tehran, portraying the conflict as a historic reckoning akin to the Soviet collapse. For avid critics of American foreign policy, the current war represents the ultimate triumph of a shadowy Jewish operative who spent over 30 years advancing Israeli strategic priorities inside the highest echelons of the United States government.
Born in Switzerland, David Wurmser earned three degrees from Johns Hopkins University, including a doctorate. He spent 11 years in Navy Reserve intelligence and reached the rank of lieutenant commander. During that service, the Defense Intelligence Agency mobilized him for its Iraq Intelligence Task Force in 1994, 1996 and 1998.
Yet his defining partnership was personal as much as institutional. His Israeli born wife, Meyrav Wurmser, wrote her doctoral dissertation on Revisionist Zionism. In 1998, she cofounded the Middle East Media Research Institute, known as MEMRI, with Yigal Carmon, a former colonel in the Israeli military. Carmon served in Israel Defense Forces intelligence from 1968 to 1988. He later advised prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak Shamir on counterterrorism.
During the mid-1990s, Wurmser moved seamlessly between Washington institutions and Jerusalem policy circles. … continue
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