By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | December 2, 2025
From the Gaza genocide to the assassination of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, Israel has carried out unprecedented destruction across the region. Yet, despite everything that has happened since October 7, 2023, has Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu truly delivered the “total victory” he promised over his regime’s adversaries?
The current state of play across West Asia has left many in despair. Undoubtedly, the genocide in the Gaza Strip has inflicted a generational psychological wound, not only on the people of the region, but concerned citizens throughout the world.
When the genocide began in October of 2023, many assumptions were made regarding who or what was going to come to the aid of the Palestinian people.
Some trusted in international institutions, others believed that the Arab masses would mobilize or assumed that the rulers of Muslim Majority countries would utilize their trade leverage, resources, and even militaries to rescue the people of Gaza. Then there were those who depended upon the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance.
On the question of the international institutions, the Israelis were brought before the UN’s top judicial organ, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which found Tel Aviv plausibly guilty of committing genocide. However, when it issued its provisional measures, the court was simply ignored.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) even passed resolution 2728 on March 25, 2024, which called for a ceasefire until the end of the Muslim Holy Month of Ramadan, which was supposed to be binding and was again ignored by Israel.
Then came along the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. Tel Aviv and Washington decided to go after the court and its prosecutor, undermining its authority.
The Arab Nations, with the exception of Yemen’s Ansarallah government in Sana’a, refused to lift a finger, as did the rulers of most Muslim Majority nations. The populations of Jordan and Egypt that were expected to act, didn’t even live up to the popular actions taken by European populations. The people in the major cities of the West Bank and in occupied Jerusalem didn’t even stage notable protests.
The only ones who acted were the Axis of Resistance. Lebanese Hezbollah and Yemen’s Ansarallah waged support fronts in solidarity with Gaza, while some Iraqi factions occasionally sent suicide drones and rocket fire from Syria would occur periodically.
Yet the way that the Axis of Resistance dealt with the genocide appeared to be the execution of a strategy to ultimately de-escalate hostilities and bring the assault on Gaza’s people to an end. The Israelis, however, were not interested in a cessation of hostilities and were instead hell bent on destroying the entire Iranian-led Axis once and for all.
Israel broke every tenet of international law and violated all diplomatic norms. They would go on to carry out countless assassinations eventually stretching across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, with a failed attempt on the lives of Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar. The consular segment of Iran’s embassy in Syria was even bombed.
Israel carried out the pager terrorist attacks across Lebanon, which wounded thousands and killed dozens, including countless women and children. This not only shook Lebanese society to the core, but also proved a major security and communications blow to Hezbollah itself. The infiltration of Hezbollah allowed Israel to murder the majority of the organization’s senior leadership. Perhaps the biggest psychological blow was the assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah.
Shortly after thousands had been murdered by Israel’s onslaught on Lebanon between September and late November, the next major blow to the Axis of Resistance came in the form of regime change in Syria. Suddenly, a US-backed government had been ushered into power and instantly opened up lines of communication with Israel.
What occurred in Syria was significant for a number of reasons, the most important of which was the collapse of the Syrian military and occupation of vast portions of territory in southern Syria, including the strategic high-ground of Jabal Al-Sheikh (Mount Hermon). It also meant that weapons transfers to Lebanon, to supply Hezbollah and the Palestinian armed factions, were instantly made much more difficult.
The resistance in the West Bank that had been growing in the north of the occupied territory since 2021 was significantly cut down through aggressive Israeli and Palestinian Authority military campaigns. In the Gaza Strip, the resistance forces were also degraded and had no supply lines. Meanwhile, the only consistent front that never buckled and only accelerated their attacks was the Yemeni Armed Forces, but due to their geographical constraints were limited in what impact they could have.
For all of the above-noted reasons, the Israelis have appeared to have gained the upper hand, and this has left many fearing what they have in store next. It is assumed that further attacks on Lebanon and Iran will be aimed at achieving regime change in Tehran, which, if successful, would indeed declare Israel the undisputed ruler of the region.
A Reality Check
Despite the gains that the Israelis have made, they have also suffered enormous blows themselves, which are often left out of many analyses offered on the current situation the region finds itself in. Before delving into this, to avoid accusations of “cope”, it is important to make note of a few different points.
Many refutations offered to the pessimistic view commonly adopted of the region engage in exaggeration, speculation, and refuse to even acknowledge the obvious losses their side has suffered. This is often the practice of those who remain die-hard supporters of resistance against the Israelis and their regional project.
When such positive and romanticized depictions are used to describe the current situation and are heard by those who are convinced that their side has already lost, they often experience a visceral opposition to that sense of optimism. Supporters of the resistance to Israel’s tyranny attempt to rescue morale through slogans and dogmatic rhetoric, which falls on deaf ears, as such explanations lack logical consistency.
This all being said, things are not exactly as doom-and-gloom as the popularized pessimism that prevails across the region suggests.
At this current moment, Israel has not won on any front; the caveat is obviously that the Axis of Resistance has not won either. Every front is a de facto stalemate. This being said, the Israelis have undoubtedly inflicted much greater damage on their adversaries in the short run.
Yes, the Palestinian factions in Gaza have been weakened, and the human cost of the war has been enormous, beyond anyone’s imagination, but they have not been defeated. Instead, they have waged a guerrilla war against the occupying army that has targeted the civilian population as a means of attempting to defeat them by proxy. Are they capable of defeating the Israeli military? No, not by themselves, but this has always been the case.
In Lebanon, the Israelis certainly dealt a massive blow to Hezbollah; there can be no doubt about it. Although they were incapable of collapsing the group and it is clear that they still retained an abundance of arms, something demonstrated throughout the course of the war in late 2024. Today, Hezbollah is rapidly rebuilding its capabilities and preparing for the inevitability of the next round.
One key takeaway from the Israel-Lebanon war was that, beyond assassinations and intelligence operations, the Israelis proved incapable on the ground and were even deterred from conquering villages like Khiam along with the Lebanese border area. Their greatest tactical achievements came at the beginning of the war, while the remainder of the battle proved that Israel’s only edge came through its air force.
The reason why the Lebanon war was a loss for Hezbollah was down to the collapse of Hezbollah’s image. Previously, the propaganda of the organization and the trust commanded by its leader, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, had convinced the world that the group was powerful enough to destroy Israel by itself. In his last speech, before he was murdered alongside 300 civilians, Nasrallah had publicly admitted that there is, in fact, no parity between Hezbollah and Israel militarily.
In 2006, just as occurred in 2024, the result of the war was a stalemate. No side decisively beat the other. Instead, it was the combined fact that Hezbollah’s performance was militarily stunning, from a planning and execution point of view, in addition to the fact that nobody expected the group to even survive, let alone force the Israelis to abandon their war plans. If you look at the difference in Lebanese to Israeli casualties in 2006, there is no comparison; in fact, it was even a major achievement for Hezbollah to have hit Haifa with rockets back then.
The 2006 war proved that Hezbollah was a force to be reckoned with, that it would inflict serious blows on Israel if it sought to re-invade and re-occupy southern Lebanon, so Tel Aviv made the calculation that it was best to leave it alone. This is why there were 17 years of deterrence, where Israel would not dare bomb Lebanon.
Fast forward to 2023, Hezbollah was a group capable of striking any target across occupied Palestine, and in 2024 hit Tel Aviv for the very first time. Compared to a force of an estimated 14,000 men in 2006, Hezbollah’s current armed forces consist of over 100,000 men, making them a larger armed group than many of the militaries of various countries.
The difference is that Hezbollah is fighting Israel, which is equipped with an endless supply of the world’s most technologically advanced weapons and equipment that enables it to pinpoint target leaders.
It suffices to say, the two sides are not equal, but by no means is Hezbollah finished or weak; it is simply that the group must suffer immense sacrifices in order to prove victorious in any confrontation with Israel. This is because the equation has changed since October 7, 2023; it is no longer the case that the Israelis can be deterred. It is a long war that will lead to the total defeat of one side or the other. What happens from here is largely down to leadership and the willingness to commit to total war.
Syria is itself a totally different issue. First, we must keep in mind that the government of Bashar al-Assad was not actively engaged in the war against Israel; instead, it allowed for the Axis of Resistance to operate inside its territory and establish a defensive front in southern Syria.
Again, being realistic, the new government in Syria has weakened the entire State and divided it even more than was already the case. Ahmed al-Shara’a is joined at the hip with his US allies and pursues policies that explicitly favor his backers in Western governments. All of the denialism in the world does not change this fact, nor does it change Damascus’s establishing direct communications and even coordination with the Israelis.
To avoid going through what is already well known and beating a dead horse, there are a number of key considerations to make when looking at the situation in Syria, which could lead in various different directions.
I will preface everything below by saying that it is plausible that for the foreseeable future, the Israelis are going to succeed at every turn in Syria, as they have done since the pro-US government took power.
Unfortunately, the Syrian conflict is the top cause of sectarian division in the region. These divisions work on two pillars: tribalism and propaganda. Round-the-clock propaganda is churned out to cause fitnah and you will still hear baseless claims, including totally fabricated statistics, spread to achieve this division. Some would blame these conflicts on religion, yet it is more about blood feuds, corruption, and tribalistic tendencies.
Putting this aside, the Syrian front is now open and various possibilities exist. There is a competition between Turkiye and Israel inside the country, meaning that a proxy conflict is not off the table. It is also very possible that Ahmed al-Shara’a, who has managed to create problems with even his once staunch allies, will be assassinated or ousted from power, creating a bloody power struggle that could pour into the streets of Damascus.
For now, the weapons flow into Lebanon to supply Hezbollah is ongoing and there are also indications that during the final days of the former regime, many advanced weapons fell into various hands. The US is now working alongside the government in Damascus to ensure that these weapons transfers are stopped or at least rendered much more difficult. In addition to this, in the event of a war between Hezbollah and Israel, it is safe to assume that weapons transfers will be put to a halt.
As Israel advances further into southern Syrian territory, more villages will likely choose to resist them, as occurred in Beit Jinn recently; this will happen independent of the government in Damascus. As Ahmed al-Shara’a does not enjoy full control over his country, this also provides opportunities for armed groups to pop up and begin resisting the occupying force, something that the Syrian President will not be able to control, especially if Israel makes mistakes and gets itself embroiled in a crisis.
This story is not over and Syria is a hostile environment for Israeli forces due to the rejection of the people there. Ultimately, just as occurred in southern Lebanon, when the government abandons its duties, the people end up taking matters into their own hands to resist occupation. Does this mean we can expect a robust fighting force there soon? Probably not for now, but various possibilities exist in the foreseeable future.
Then we look to Iran and Yemen, whose capabilities remain and only grow; neither has been defeated. Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi have not been mobilized until now, and it is unclear what role they could play in a broader regional war, but it is of note that they exist.
What has happened is that Israel has proven time and time again that it is willing to be daring with the one tactic that they can actually excel in, assassinations and intelligence operations. However, these operations do not win wars; they are undoubtedly blows, but they do not inflict a knockout punch.
When two sides engage in such a war, it is expected that losses will occur on both sides. The Israelis have suffered a battered economy, a divided society, their settlements in the north are still in ruins, they haven’t repaired the damage inflicted on their infrastructure, and they have lost public support across the world, including in the United States. They are a global pariah sustained only by their Western backers, incapable of defeating what was viewed as the weakest link of the Axis of Resistance in Gaza.
In their favor, they have eliminated most of Iran’s influence in Syria, committed one of the worst crimes in modern history against Gaza and weakened the armed resistance there as a result of it. They also took out Hezbollah’s senior leadership, while degrading it and its political standing. In addition to this, many leaders and generals in the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC)’s chain of command were killed.
In Iran’s case, the so-called 12 Day War, back in June, had resulted in failure for the Israelis. Instead of achieving regime change and/or the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program, it is clear now that it has only succeeded in driving out international monitors and even united the population in a way previously unimaginable. Tehran has leaned into the growing trend of Iranian nationalism among its people and is preparing for another round. That battle also ended with Iran landing the last real blows.
The Israeli military must be viewed for what it is; it has the military edge in the air, possesses the most advanced weapons in the world [outside of Russia], enjoys full US support and is backed by one of the best intelligence agencies in the world. It also has something else on its side, which is that it does not care for morality or international law at all; it will break any rule to achieve an objective.
At the same time, its ground force is largely incapable, and it is also massively fatigued. The Israeli army was only really prepared to fight very brief battles and is an occupation force, which is why it now struggles to mobilize the soldiers necessary to carry out various offensive actions. It also needs to pay some of its soldiers’ danger money salaries. It has also recruited the private sector and civilians, paid as much as 800 dollars per day, to carry out their demolition missions in Gaza.
There is a reason why, on October 7, 2023, a few thousand Palestinian fighters armed with light weapons managed to collapse the Israeli southern command in a matter of hours and temporarily took control of the Israeli settlements surrounding Gaza. In other words, they are far from invincible.
Is this all to say that “Israel has lost”? No, clearly no side has won yet. There are various conspiracies in the works. In the Gaza Strip, the US is working alongside its allies to find a way to defeat the armed resistance groups. The Israelis clearly have their sights set on new wars against Lebanon and Iran; they will also likely strike Yemen hard again. However, they now find themselves in a much more vulnerable situation and could easily overextend themselves on one front, leading to significant losses.
So, can we say that Benjamin Netanyahu is closer to his “total victory”? The answer to this question is no. Is it possible that the “Greater Israel Project” will be implemented and that Iran will be toppled? This always has to be considered as a threat, because this is clearly Israel’s goal, but it is also just as likely that Tel Aviv will suffer a strategic defeat. It is especially the case because they are fighting an opposition that is more likely to commit to an all-out war, given what they have suffered up until this point.
By Tamjid Kobaissy | The Cradle | December 2, 2025
In West Asia, where sectarian politics and external meddling collide with local power struggles, few rivalries have been as entrenched or as symbolically loaded as that between Hezbollah and Saudi Arabia.
For decades, it embodied the broader confrontation between Iran and the Persian Gulf kingdoms – a proxy war defined by ideology, oil, and shifting battlefronts. But today, under the weight of new regional calculations, rising Israeli belligerence, and the cracks in American hegemony, that once-intractable hostility is giving way to a more ambiguous and tactical coexistence.
What is developing is neither an alliance nor even reconciliation. But for the first time, Hezbollah and Riyadh are probing the edges of a relationship long defined by zero-sum enmity. A pragmatic detente is emerging, shaped less by goodwill than by the shared urgency to contain spiraling instability across the region.
Tehran, Riyadh, and the long shadow of history
The long arc of the Hezbollah–Saudi confrontation is impossible to separate from Iran’s post-revolutionary clash with Riyadh. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini toppled the Shah in 1979 and declared the House of Saud a reactionary tool of western imperialism, the rupture was both ideological and strategic.
The Saudis responded by bankrolling Saddam Hussein’s devastating war against Tehran, and in 1987, relations cratered after Saudi security forces massacred Iranian pilgrims in Mecca. Khomeini’s message was scathing:
“Let the Saudi government be certain that America has branded it with an eternal stain of shame that will not be erased or cleansed until the Day of Judgment, not even with the waters of Zamzam or the River of Paradise.”
Decades later, the so-called Arab Spring of 2011 reopened the wound. While Tehran stood by its state allies in Damascus and Baghdad, Riyadh threw its weight behind opposition movements and fanned the flames of sectarian conflict.
In Yemen, the kingdom launched a military campaign against the Ansarallah movement and allied forces, which Tehran backed politically and diplomatically. After Saudi Arabia executed outspoken Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in 2016, Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran, prompting Riyadh to sever diplomatic ties. The two regional powers would only resume relations as part of Chinese-backed mediation in 2023.
From Hariri’s abduction to assassination plots
Within this regional maelstrom, Hezbollah became a prime Saudi target. When the Lebanese resistance captured two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006, to secure the release of prisoners, Riyadh dismissed it as “uncalculated adventures” and held Hezbollah responsible for the fallout.
In Syria, Hezbollah’s deployment alongside former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s army placed it in direct opposition to Saudi-backed militants. In Yemen, the movement’s vocal support for the Ansarallah–led government in Sanaa triggered Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sanctions and terrorist designations.
Matters escalated in 2017 when Saudi Arabia detained then-Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri and coerced him into announcing his resignation on television from Riyadh. Late Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah slammed the move as an act of war against Lebanon. The situation de-escalated only after French mediation.
In a 2022 TV interview, Nasrallah revealed that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) was ready to authorize an Israeli plot to assassinate him, pending US approval.
Quiet channels, Iranian cover
The Beijing-brokered rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh changed the regional tone but did not yield immediate dividends for Hezbollah. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia intensified its efforts to roll back Hezbollah’s influence in Beirut, especially following Israel’s October assault on Gaza and southern Lebanon.
Riyadh pressured Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to implement the so-called “Barrack Paper,” aimed at politically sidelining Hezbollah and stripping its arms. Speaking to The Cradle, a well-informed political source reveals that the kingdom informed the former Lebanese army commander – now the country’s president – Joseph Aoun, that it would proceed with its plans even if they triggered civil war or fractured the military. The source describes this as emblematic of Riyadh’s short-term crisis management, mirroring Washington’s reactive regional strategy.
Despite this, signs of a tactical shift began to emerge. In September, Nasrallah’s successor, Sheikh Naim Qassem, publicly called for opening a “new chapter” in ties with Riyadh – an unprecedented gesture from the movement’s leadership. According to the same source, this was not a spontaneous statement.
During a visit to Beirut, Iranian national security official Ali Larijani reportedly recieved a message from Hezbollah to Riyadh expressing its openness to reconciliation. In a subsequent trip to the kingdom, Larijani presented the message to MbS.
While initially dismissed, it was later revisited, leading to discreet backchannel coordination directly overseen by Larijani himself.
Tehran talks and guarded understandings
The Cradle’s source adds that since then, three indirect rounds of Hezbollah–Saudi talks have reportedly taken place in Tehran, each under Iranian facilitation. The first focused on political de-escalation, while the latter two addressed sensitive security files, signaling a mutual willingness to test limited cooperation.
One provisional understanding emerged: Saudi Arabia would ease pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon and drop immediate demands to disarm the movement. In exchange, Riyadh asked Hezbollah to keep its weapons out of Syria – echoing a broader Gulf consensus – and assist Lebanese authorities in curbing drug smuggling networks.
In private, Riyadh reportedly acknowledges Hezbollah’s military resilience as a strategic buffer against Israel’s regional belligerence. The Persian Gulf states no longer trust Washington to shield them from Tel Aviv’s increasingly unilateral provocations – as was seen in the Israeli strikes on Doha in September. But Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon remains a challenge to Riyadh’s political influence.
Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, and the Iranian umbrella
The Hezbollah–Saudi contacts are just one strand in a broader strategic dance between Riyadh and Tehran. According to The Cradle’s source, Saudi Arabia has assured Iran it will not join any Israeli or US-led war, nor allow its airspace to be used in such a scenario. In return, Tehran pledged not to target Saudi territory. These commitments are fragile, but significant.
The source also reveals that US President Donald Trump had authorized MbS to explore a direct channel with Iran, tasking him with brokering understandings on Yemen and beyond. Larijani conveyed Iran’s openness to dialogue, though not to nuclear concessions. MbS reportedly stressed to Trump that a working accord with Tehran was essential to regional stability.
In parallel, Lebanese MP Ali Hassan Khalil, a close advisor to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, is expected to visit Saudi Arabia soon following meetings in Tehran. This suggests continued shuttle diplomacy across resistance, Iranian, and Saudi nodes.
Strategic divergence, tactical convergence
Still, no one should confuse these developments with a realignment. Rather than a reset, this is merely a tactical repositioning. For Riyadh, the old boycott model – applied to Lebanon between 2019 and 2021 – failed to dislodge Hezbollah or bolster pro-Saudi factions. Now, the kingdom is shifting to flexible engagement, partly to enable economic investments in Lebanon that require minimal cooperation with the dominant political force.
The pivot also serves Saudi Arabia’s desire to project itself as a capable mediator rather than a crude enforcer. The 7 October 2023 Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has tilted regional equations, while Israeli expansionism has become a destabilizing liability. A Hezbollah–Israel war would not stay confined to the Blue Line. Gulf cities, energy infrastructure, and fragile normalization deals would all be at risk.
From Hezbollah’s side, the outreach reflects both constraint and calculation. The resistance faces growing pressure: an intensified Israeli campaign, a stagnating Lebanese economy, and the need to preserve internal cohesion. A tactical truce with Riyadh offers breathing space, and possibly, a check against Gulf-backed meddling in Syria.
When Sheikh Naim Qassem declared that Hezbollah’s arms are pointed solely at Israel, it was also a signal to the Gulf: we are not your enemy.
The real enemy, for both sides, is the unpredictable nature of Israeli escalation. Riyadh fears being dragged into an Israeli-led regional war that it cannot control. Hezbollah fears encirclement through economic, political, and military pressure. Their interests may never align, but for now, they are no longer mutually exclusive.
Press TV – November 30, 2025
The General Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces has strongly condemned Australia’s “unwise decision” to label the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) as a “state sponsor of terrorism.”
In a statement on Sunday, the Armed Forces said the unwise decision by the “dependent” Australian government against the IRGC is in line with the sinister goals of the arrogant system, led by the terrorist United States.
It added that the move aims to serve the terrorist Israeli regime’s interests in the continuation of oppression and crimes and has no meaning other than “baseless and spiteful” claims under the pressure of the US and Israel.
According to the statement, the move demonstrates a lack of proper understanding of international and global realities.
The Army, however, emphasized that such moves will strengthen the will of the heroic Iranian nation to boost its defense prowess and will result in nothing but greater support of Iranians and the free nations across the world for the Armed Forces, especially the powerful and anti-terrorism IRGC.
The Australian government listed the IRGC as a “state sponsor of terrorism” on Thursday over baseless accusations that the elite force had orchestrated attacks against Australia’s Jewish community.
In a statement released on Thursday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry strongly condemned the decision.
“The political move by the Australian government is a dangerous and criminal precedent, designed under the influence of the Zionist regime to divert public attention from the genocide in Gaza,” the ministry said.
A retrospective analysis of the so-called 12-Day War, and the triumphantly celebrated Operation Midnight Thunder
By William Schryver | imetatronink | November 28, 2025
The GBU-57 is a big fat gravity bomb with fins. To achieve effective precision, a B-2 bomber must drop it on its intended target from no further than about five nautical miles — essentially right on top of the target.
Its penetration depth is claimed to be 200 feet. But that capability has NEVER been tested against a seriously hardened deep-underground target encased in layers of high-performance concrete, and topped with a few dozen meters of solid rock. In that sort of real-world scenario, the GBU-57 would be lucky to drill down 50 feet, if that.
It was always ridiculous silly talk to suggest the GBU-57 was the wonder weapon it was made out to be. There is a good reason the US only produced a couple dozen of them and then stopped: they understood its acute limitations in a non-permissive combat environment.
And, notwithstanding the hyperbolic Israeli propaganda, there was never any credible evidence that Iranian medium- and long-range air defenses against fixed-wing aircraft were attrited to any significant degree. And Iranian short-range air defenses were increasingly effective against long-range Israeli drones with each passing day.
As for the B-2: it is a big fat subsonic aircraft. It flies at airliner speeds. A strike on Fordow would entail flying at least 500 miles in and out of Iran.
It is nonsense that the B-2 is effectively invisible. It can be tracked from long distances, and targeted sufficiently well that missiles with effective terminal guidance (thermal / optical) can kill it.
The Iranians established during the October 26, 2024 Israeli counterstrike that they could paint F-35s with their radars. That is why the Israelis launched nothing but long-range stand-off munitions: aero-ballistic and cruise missiles – of which they have a very limited stockpile.
The same conditions prevailed during the 12-Day War.
And just as the Israelis were unwilling to risk getting fighters shot down over Iran, neither was the USAF willing to risk getting a B-2 shot down over Iran.
Maybe a few B-2s launched some JASSMs from over Iraq or the Caspian Sea. Maybe nothing but sub-launched Tomahawks hit Iranian targets. But it certainly wasn’t GBU-57 “Bunker Buster” bombs dropped by a half-dozen B-2s casually flying in Iranian airspace for an hour.
And whatever was dropped inflicted no meaningful damage. Fordow was scratched at best. A bunch of surface structures at Natanz were blown up.
Trump’s claim that Iran’s nuclear program was destroyed is absurd nonsense. No one with even a modest understanding of these things believes that.
The Israelis certainly don’t believe it, and they have admitted as much.
It is true that, in retaliation, the Iranians precisely targeted and convincingly destroyed a significant communications complex at the American Al Udeid airbase in Qatar.
The fictionalized B-2 “Bunker Buster” strike on Fordow, and the token Iranian ballistic missile strike on Al Udeid were orchestrated events designed to grease the tracks of a ceasefire that was proposed by the Americans and agreed to by the Iranians.
The Americans and Israelis had expended almost their entire inventories of ballistic missile interceptors over the course of a week and a half, and Iranian missiles were raining down with effective impunity the last few days.
The Iranians knew damn well they had already achieved a strategic victory, despite their shaky start.
I’m also convinced the Russians and Chinese encouraged Iran to accept the ceasefire proposal.
It allowed both sides to claim a PR victory, lick their wounds, and prepare for the next round.
Meanwhile, the Iranians have more production capability than do their US/Israeli counterparts. And it also appears the Iranians are much more amenable to Russian and Chinese assistance now than they may have been previously.
When this war resumes, the Iranians will be comparatively stronger than they were before. And the risks for the US/Israel will be significantly heightened.
By Martin Jay | Strategic Culture Foundation | November 27, 2025
It is a long-debated subject. Whether it is the U.S. which controls Israel or the other way around. In the 70s, under President Nixon, many analysts firmly believed, despite the JFK assassination, that it was still the U.S. who called the shots and used Israel as a useful tool in the Middle East to keep a rowdy group of Arab states in check and subservient to America’s interests. But it is in recent years where we have to see if Israel has done that effectively and meticulously in America’s interests, given that most analysts agree that Israel and the U.S. are both preparing for war with Iran.
Given that Israel’s main task was to keep the region in order to serve America’s hegemony and its energy needs, one has to ask isn’t it a failure of both U.S. foreign policy and of Israel that a war with Iran is seen as a solution to America’s failing hegemony? And doesn’t this tail wagging the dog scenario show itself in the clear light once and for all?
Recently two startling revelations about Israel’s attacks on Iran in June – otherwise known as the ‘twelve-day war’ have surfaced which should worry Americans as it shows just how far this abusive relationship has become, with Israel playing the role of the spoilt child waving daddy’s pistol as its master. Former CIA whistleblower John Kiriakou and the formidable U.S. academic John Mearsheimer have both confirmed that it was Israel who basically threatened Trump that if he didn’t send ‘bunker buster’ bombs to Iran in a bid to destroy the country’s underground nuclear facilities that they, Israel, would bomb Iran with nuclear weapons. Trump rolled over of course and complied.
But this extraordinary act by Israel illustrates just how far this Nabokov-esque relationship between Lolita and her foster dad has got. To the point that world wars involving nukes is now on the table for any U.S. president who thinks he can play hardball with Israel. The twist to this story is that the bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites was not at all a success as it has become evident that the Iranians knew it was coming and moved out a lot of the nukes days beforehand. And even the bombing itself didn’t have anywhere near the impact that was expected. It was symbolic more than anything in that it sent a message to the Iranians that such an act was possible under the Trump administration.
In many ways the attack was a gift to the Iranians as it focused their minds and made them aware where they needed to improve their defensive capabilities. It was a test run and they learnt from it.
But for the Americans it certainly couldn’t be called a success.
If it were a success, even the laziest two-bit hack in Washington could arrive at the obvious question, when hostilities kick off again, why are we at war with Iran if we’ve taken out their nuclear capability?
The U.S. has been busy in recent weeks sending naval ships and preparing for air-to-air refuelling of Israel’s jets – crucial in any conflict with Iran given the distance between the two countries – which merely confirms two poignant points. Firstly, that Iran’s response the first time round had significant impact on Israel’s military arsenal (many military sites in Israel were taken out completely, barely mentioned by U.S. media); and secondly that even the U.S. had had its own stocks depleted – which is why a pause quickly came about after the twelve-days. U.S. and Israel needed to rearm but also prepare themselves for the second phase, while Iran itself has improved its own air defences and reached out to Russia and China for rearming.
And so what Israel is successfully doing is drawing Trump into a war with Iran which will be on a scale which no military could even imagine was possible, given that this time around Iran is so much better prepared and that the surprise of using Azerbaijani airspace cannot be repeated. The Israelis don’t have any hit-n-run surprise tactics to rely on, which might lead some analysts to believe that a bigger, broader attack is in the making with the U.S. as a key partner rather than chief supplier. Worse, will be any scenario where the Israelis or the U.S. can justify using nuclear weapons if the conventional attack doesn’t quite go to plan. And all this under the watch of Donald Trump whose entire support base was about stopping ‘forever wars’ [for Israel] in the Middle East. How will he explain to his broader support base that he has nothing to do with U.S. troops being sent to their deaths in Iran, that it is Israel who controls such decisions?
The Cradle | November 27, 2025
Iran’s UN ambassador on November 27 urged the Security Council to act after Washington publicly confirmed its direct role in June’s joint US-Israeli strikes on Iranian territory, calling the operation an unlawful act of aggression that demands full accountability and reparations.
In a letter addressed to the UN secretary-general and Security Council president, Iranian Ambassador Amir Saeid Iravani said the latest US Air Force admission – acknowledging that US F-35s penetrated Iranian airspace and escorted B-2 bombers to strike Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan – confirms “once again” that the US directly participated with Israel in attacks on Iran’s safeguarded nuclear facilities.
He cited the 24 November US Air Force statement announcing that “In June, the 34th was called upon to escort a strike package, including B-2 Spirit bombers, to strike underground nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan during Operation Midnight Hammer,” and that “On 22 June, a formation of F-35s … was the first aircraft to penetrate Iranian airspace.”
Iravani noted that these disclosures align with US President Donald Trump’s earlier remarks openly asserting Washington’s leading role.
The ambassador described the 12-day campaign as an act that targeted Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, adding that the operation included deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian sites.
He wrote that the US is obligated under established international law to provide full reparation, including restitution and compensation for all material and moral damage.
According to Iravani, Washington’s admission also establishes the individual criminal responsibility of US officials involved in the operation.
He reiterated Tehran’s “full and unequivocal” right to pursue all legal avenues to secure accountability and recover losses resulting from what he called an internationally wrongful act.
Iravani urged the Security Council and the wider UN system not to remain silent, saying they must take measures consistent with their responsibilities to uphold international peace and security, ensure accountability of both the US and Israel, and bring those responsible to justice. He requested that the letter be circulated as an official UN Security Council document.
Tehran’s attempt at diplomatic detente was met with an escalation by the US and the E3
By Fereshteh Sadeghi | The Cradle | November 25, 2025
Just hours before his visit to France to discuss Iran’s nuclear file, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned:
“International relations face unprecedented crises due to militant unilateralism. Repeated violations of international law – including ongoing conflicts in West Asia – reflect the backing of the United States and the tolerance of certain European states.”
This underscores Tehran’s defiant stance as it moves in its nuclear diplomacy. Just three months after Israeli-US airstrikes targeted Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran signed a significant security agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It did not last long.
The so-called Cairo Agreement, signed in September and brokered by Egypt, was meant to defuse tensions. Yet that same month, the western-backed IAEA was warned against “any hostile action against Iran – including the reinstatement of cancelled UN Security Council resolutions” in which case the deal would become “null and void.”
Of note, Iran–IAEA relations had been deteriorating since June during the 12-day US-Israeli war on Iran. The IAEA and its director general, Rafael Grossi, refused to condemn the attacks on Iranian civilians and nuclear facilities, and the targeted assassinations of nuclear scientists and senior military officers.
The IAEA’s refusal to condemn the US-Israeli violations made Iranians furious. They accused Grossi of paving the ground for the strikes and being Israel’s footman. The Islamic Republic formally lodged a protest with the UN Secretary General and the Security Council against Grossi, arguing he breached the IAEA’s neutrality.
Resistance to western coercion
The Iranian parliament – or Majlis – raised the bar by ratifying legislation that suspended cooperation between Tehran and the international nuclear watchdog. The law was passed immediately after the war ended on 25 June.
It declared Grossi and his inspectors “persona non grata” and forbade them from travelling to Iran or visiting Iranian nuclear facilities. The law stipulated that the suspension will continue so long as the security and safety of Iranian nuclear installations and scientists have not been guaranteed.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian-mediated Cairo Agreement appeared to thaw the standoff, if temporarily. It was signed in the presence of Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi and Grossi, and ambiguously framed as a deal on “implementing the Safeguards Agreement.”
Few details were made public then; while the IAEA called it a deal on “practical modalities and implementation of the Safeguards Agreement”, the Iranian side insisted it was “a new regime of cooperation.”
State news agency, IRNA, elaborated, “the agency will not engage in monitoring activities provided Iran has not carried out environmental and nuclear safety measures at its bombed facilities.” IRNA referred to the Supreme National Security Council as the sole body that “could greenlight the IAEA monitoring missions inside Iran, case by case.”
Iran’s diplomatic maneuvering, including the deal with the IAEA, was obviously part of the broader strategy to prevent the UK, France, and Germany from activating the snapback mechanism, in the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany.
The European Troika (E3), who were clearly dissatisfied with the Cairo Agreement, reiterated “Tehran needs to allow inspections of sensitive sites and address its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.”
Snapback triggers collapse
A threat to terminate the Cairo Agreement actually came three days after it was clinched, when Iran’s Foreign Ministry warned that “launching the snapback mechanism would put the ongoing cooperation between Iran and the IAEA at risk.” Nevertheless, the UK, France, and Germany moved ahead with the snapback activation.
Araghchi’s first reaction noted that “in regards to the E3’s move, the Cairo agreement has lost its functionality.” Iranians had also vowed to halt cooperation with the IAEA. However, they did not fulfill that threat and collaborated in silence.
The IAEA inspectors visited some Iranian nuclear sites in early November. However, they were not given access to the US-bombed Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan facilities.
Even this tactical compliance failed to shield Tehran from a new IAEA censure. On 20 November, the agency’s Board of Governors passed a US-E3-backed resolution ignoring Iran’s cooperation and demanding immediate access to all affected sites and data.
It was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Iran condemned the move as “illegal, unjustifiable, irresponsible, and a stain on the image of its sponsors.”
Araghchi on his X account posted, “like the diplomacy which was assaulted by Israel and the US in June, the Cairo Agreement has been killed by the US and the E3.”
For the second time, Iran’s top diplomat announced the termination of the Cairo Agreement, “given that the E3 and the US seek escalation, they know full well that the official termination of the Cairo Agreement is the direct outcome of their provocations.”
Iran’s representative to the IAEA, Reza Nadjafi, told reporters that “If the US claims success in destroying Iran’s Natanz and Fordow facilities, then what is left for inspections?” and further warned, “any decision (by the IAEA) has its own consequences.”
Back to confrontation
By applying pressure through the IAEA, the E3 and the US seek to coerce Iran into opening the doors of its bombed nuclear sites to the IAEA inspectors, to hand over the 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which the US believes is still intact, and “to eliminate Iran’s ability to convert that fuel into a nuclear weapon.”
The collapse of the Cairo Agreement marks a return to the kind of standoff that defined US–Iran relations from 2005 to 2013, when Iran’s nuclear file was sent to the UN Security Council, and sanctions were imposed under Chapter VII.
Some skeptics believe US President Donald Trump’s administration would not only take Iran to the Security Council but would also cite the chapter in question, which sanctions the use of military force against any country deemed a threat to global peace.
While Iran signed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in hopes of avoiding that scenario, the US’s unilateral withdrawal under Donald Trump’s first term in 2018 and the E3’s failure to meet their obligations rendered the agreement toothless.
June’s US-Israeli bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear infrastructure confirmed for Tehran that western powers have no intention of engaging in diplomacy in good faith.
Toward a new strategy
According to IRNA, which echoes the official line of the Iranian government, “Iran feels that the goodwill gestures it has shown towards the IAEA and the United States, have drawn further hostility. Therefore, maybe now it is the time to change course and revise its strategy and the rule of engagement with international bodies, including the IAEA.”
Some observers believe Iran’s first step to map out a new strategy is pursuing the policy of “nuclear ambiguity, remaining silent regarding the whereabouts of the stockpile of the highly-enriched uranium and quietly halting the implementation of the [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty, without officially admitting it.”
In the latest development, the chairman of the Parliament’s National Security Committee has vowed that “Iran will sturdily pursue its nuclear achievements.” Ibrahim Azizi has cautioned the US and Europe that “Iran has changed its behavior post June attacks and they’d better not try Iran’s patience.”
That posture is hardening. In September, over 70 Iranian lawmakers urged the Supreme National Security Council to reconsider Iran’s defense doctrine – including its long-standing religious prohibition on nuclear weapons.
They argue that the regional and international order has changed irreversibly since Israel and the US jointly bombed the Iranian nuclear facilities. While citing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2010 fatwa banning nuclear weapons, they assert that in Shia jurisprudence, such rulings may evolve when conditions change – especially when the survival of the Islamic Republic is at stake.
Iran is also working to immunize itself against any escalation at the UN Security Council. Here, it banks on the veto power of Russia and China to neutralize any western effort to reimpose sanctions.
The collapse of the Cairo Agreement marks a turning point in Tehran’s nuclear diplomacy. It is a conclusion drawn from years of unmet commitments and military escalation that western multilateralism has exhausted its credibility.
Sputnik – 25.11.2025
Israel remains the sole obstacle to establishing a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and must be forced to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Abbas Araghchi, Iranian foreign minister and head of the Iranian delegation to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), said on Tuesday.
The 30th session of the OPCW Conference of States Parties is underway in The Hague from November 24 to 28.
“The Israeli regime must be compelled to accede to the convention and to submit to full-scope inspections as a priority for the OPCW,” Araghchi said during the session.
Israel has not joined any disarmament treaties, including the CWC, and remains the “only obstacle” to creating a WMD-free zone in the region, the Iranian foreign minister said.
While WMDs are inherently dangerous and inhumane, their possession by “wanted criminals” responsible for “massacre and genocide over the past two years” poses a grave existential threat to humanity and the planet, he said.
Araghchi said that the CWC is the most successful disarmament treaty to date but warned that its effectiveness depends on full compliance by all states without exception.
John Mearsheimer | November 22, 2025
The Monroe Doctrine is DEAD. Russian warships in Venezuelan waters just shattered 200 years of American hemispheric dominance. Prof. John Mearsheimer breaks down how Washington’s own policies created this historic shift.
John Mearsheimer | November 23, 2025
Russian hypersonic anti-ship missiles are now targeting U.S. Navy warships in the Caribbean. Prof. John Mearsheimer reveals how America’s own sanctions policy created this deadly threat in our own hemisphere.
Al-Manar | November 23, 2025
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei stated on Sunday that Washington’s professed willingness for dialogue lacks credibility, asserting that US claims are fundamentally inconsistent with its actions.
Speaking at a weekly press conference, Baqaei referenced recent remarks by the US president, stating that America has demonstrated in practice that it is not serious about negotiations.
The spokesman suggested that Washington either misunderstands the very concept of negotiation or approaches talks with a mindset that reduces them to dictation. He emphasized that such claims must be measured against the United States’ actual conduct.
Commenting on Tehran’s conditions for any potential talks with the US, Baqaei underscored that safeguarding Iran’s national interests remains the central and guiding principle.
“The other side has shown no genuine belief in negotiations,” he said, adding that as long as dialogue is treated as an imposition, the necessary conditions for genuine talks do not exist.
“What matters is that the US government has destroyed any basis for trust through its actions,” Baqaei stated. He cited the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and subsequent “unfaithful” actions during the Biden administration, despite earlier progress.
He further argued that the US decision to accompany the Zionist regime in its military aggression against Iran this past June provided further proof of Washington’s lack of intent to reach a reasonable and fair solution.
Addressing other diplomatic matters, the spokesman firmly dismissed speculation that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi’s upcoming trip to the Netherlands would involve negotiations with the three European countries (the E3). He clarified that the visit’s sole purpose is participation in a conference for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
Baqaei conceded that consultations with other foreign ministers might occur on the sidelines in The Hague, but he explicitly labeled reports of negotiations with the European troika as untrue.
Press TV – November 23, 2025
On Saturday it was announced that Iranian companies will soon begin drilling at the strategically important Farzad B gas field in the middle of the Persian Gulf.
The development marks a rare breakthrough for the country’s energy sector after years of delays, sanctions pressure and missed opportunities.
It signals that Iran has finally gained the technical confidence and institutional capacity to push ahead with one of its most complicated shared fields without relying on hesitant foreign partners.
Farzad B lies near the maritime border with Saudi Arabia, close to Farsi Island, in a geologically difficult zone known for high pressures, high temperatures and fractured formations. Those conditions make it significantly more challenging to develop than South Pars, the country’s flagship offshore field.
Yet for nearly two decades, Farzad B remained stuck in negotiations, mostly with Indian companies that once planned to produce gas there and turn it into LNG for export. Each time political conditions shifted, the project stalled.
India pulled out during the first round of sanctions, returned briefly once sanctions were eased, and again withdrew during the Trump-era restrictions even after Tehran accepted New Delhi’s terms, including dropping its LNG ambitions, to keep the partnership alive.
While Iran waited, Saudi Arabia moved forward. Working with a Canadian-led consortium, it began producing gas from the shared field in 2015 and lifted output to roughly 34 million cubic meters a day the following year.
That imbalance carried economic consequences. Iran holds about 70% of the reservoir, and in shared fields, the country that produces less risks losing pressure in its part of the formation, allowing gas to migrate toward the neighbor extracting more aggressively.
In a period when Iran’s domestic demand has been rising and supply strains have become increasingly visible during winter peaks, the long delay at Farzad B was more than a strategic concern. It risked turning a national asset into a gradually shrinking one.
The administration’s response has been to push a broader strategy that focuses on shared fields as part of strengthening economic resilience. It has already delivered results in South Pars, where Iran eventually overtook Qatar in daily extraction, and in the West Karun region along the Iraqi border.
Bringing Farzad B into full development is now seen as a key part of that policy. With foreign partners unable or unwilling to commit, the government turned inward.
In 2017, the National Iranian Oil Company assigned Petropars to manage the project under a master contract covering subsurface analysis, conceptual design, drilling oversight and preparation for full field development.
The decision was a gamble on domestic capacity at a time when sanctions limited access to global finance, equipment and specialist technology.
But it also reflected a shift in economic planning; rather than wait for sanctions relief and return of foreign investors, authorities pushed national contractors to take the lead on the $1.78 billion project.
Over the past two years, that shift has produced visible results. Most notable is the completion and offshore installation of the 2,650-tonne jacked designed and built inside Iran by local companies.
The operation, led by Petropars and executed by the Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company, required a level of engineering competence that industry analysts once assumed was out of reach for domestic firms working without international support.
The roll-up and installation at sea under demanding conditions demonstrates that Iran can carry out heavy offshore construction at a standard that matches global norms.
The technical hurdles go beyond the platform. The gas composition at Farzad B requires advanced metallurgy and specialized alloys for safe transmission. Laying the offshore pipeline is considered one of the most difficult marine engineering challenges attempted in the country.
Processing the high-pressure, high-temperature gas adds another layer of complexity. Yet Iranian engineers say they have now developed the design, equipment sourcing and operational planning needed to manage those conditions.
For a sector accustomed to relying on international contractors for the most complex offshore work, this represents a meaningful shift.
There is also momentum onshore. Officials have finalized the site of the gas processing plant after a series of environmental, geotechnical and risk assessments that included natural hazards, social and economic impact, access to infrastructure and proximity to offshore installations.
The level of preparatory work reflects a determination to avoid the kind of planning weaknesses that contributed to earlier delays.
The expected economic impact is significant. Once operational, Farzad B is projected to add roughly one billion cubic feet of gas per day to Iran’s supply.
That increase matters for a country that has struggled at times to meet domestic demand, manage seasonal shortages and maintain output in aging fields. It also reduces the risk of further reservoir losses to Saudi Arabia and helps safeguard Iran’s majority share of the field.
The project has become a symbol of the benefits of investing in domestic engineering capacity rather than waiting for foreign partnerships that may be derailed by geopolitics.
Petropars, once a secondary contractor in joint projects, has emerged as the emblem of that approach. Its leadership of Farzad B is evidence that Iranian firms can handle highly complex offshore developments even under sanctions and with restricted access to global suppliers.
The recent progress has pushed Farzad B past the stage of plans and declarations into active development.
For an economy navigating sanctions, rising energy needs and long-term pressure on shared fields, that shift marks a phenomenal achievement.
By Ivan Kesic | Press TV | November 23, 2025
Iran’s drone technology has evolved from a domestic defense initiative into a formidable presence on the global stage, demonstrating a distinctive and effective approach to aerospace development that resonates with a diverse array of international partners.
Over the past decade, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry has undergone a remarkable transformation, progressing from a localized capability to a significant global force.
This rise is not necessarily due to groundbreaking new technologies, but rather a pragmatic and strategic philosophy that defines the country’s aerospace engineering program.
Iran’s astounding success lies in its intelligent integration of existing commercial technologies, combining them into simple, reliable, and cost-effective platforms that are mass-produced to meet the specific demands of modern asymmetric warfare.
This approach has produced three notable UAV systems: the Shahed-136 loitering munition, the Mohajer-6 multi-role combat drone, and the Ababil-3 reconnaissance platform.
Each model reflects a distinct phase of Iran’s technological evolution and operational doctrine, addressing a wide spectrum of military needs.
From the plains of Africa to the skies of South America, these drones serve as instruments of strategic influence, extending Iran’s geopolitical reach and cementing its role as a prominent manufacturer and exporter of military-grade drone technology.
Their widespread adoption underscores a global demand for capable, affordable unmanned systems and highlights the effectiveness of Iran’s tailored development strategy.
Strategic philosophy: Pragmatism as a cornerstone
The foundational strength of Iran’s burgeoning drone program lies in its purposeful and pragmatic design philosophy, which prioritizes functionality, cost-effectiveness, and reliability over cutting-edge complexity.
This strategy reflects a conscious effort to maximize operational output while minimizing technological input, resulting in systems that are both easy to produce and challenging to counter.
At its core, the program optimizes the use of commercially available, dual-use components, engineered into robust platforms tailored for specific battlefield roles.
By focusing on simplicity, Iran facilitates rapid mass production, enabling the deployment of large numbers of drones to achieve strategic effects.
This approach aligns with an asymmetric warfare doctrine, where overwhelming an adversary with numerous, affordable, and capable assets neutralizes the technological advantage of costlier, limited platforms.
This philosophy has allowed Iran to build a sustainable and scalable aerospace industry from the ground up, bypassing restrictions on access to specialized military-grade technology.
The resulting product line precisely meets the operational needs of a diverse client base, providing practical, cost-effective solutions to real-world security challenges without the prohibitive expenses of advanced Western drone systems.
Shahed-136: The archetype of asymmetric warfare
The Shahed-136 epitomizes Iran’s strategic approach – a loitering munition designed for long-range, one-way missions where simplicity and affordability are paramount.
Its design is a masterclass in minimalist engineering that achieves devastating strategic impact.
Featuring a delta wing and single fuselage, the drone’s airframe is inherently stable and durable, manufactured from inexpensive composite materials like fiberglass.
Complex landing gear is eliminated, replaced by a simple rocket-assisted launch system that reduces weight, cost, and mechanical complexity.
Powering the Shahed-136 is a commercial MADO MD 550 two-stroke piston engine, widely used in light aviation and prized for its low cost and easy maintenance.
Although its distinctive loud acoustic signature is notable, it is tactically mitigated by doctrines deploying these drones in large, saturating swarms designed to overwhelm enemy air defenses.
The guidance system combines a commercial GPS receiver with a basic inertial navigation system (INS), allowing pre-programmed target coordinates.
Even under GPS jamming, the INS maintains sufficient accuracy to engage large, stationary infrastructure targets.
The Shahed-136’s design effectiveness is underscored by its widespread replication and licensed production in countries such as Russia and Yemen, alongside imitation projects reported in China, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Ukraine, Poland, France, and even the United States—a testament to the enduring influence of Iran’s foundational drone design philosophy.
Mohajer-6: A leap into advanced multi-role combat drones
Representing a more advanced tier of Iran’s drone capabilities, the Mohajer-6 marks the industry’s maturity and successful transition into the realm of multi-role, medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) combat UAVs.
This platform showcases significant technological evolution, moving beyond simple, single-use munitions to a sophisticated system capable of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions as well as precision strikes.
Its airframe features a classic, proven aerodynamic design with straight wings optimized for extended loiter times and an H-tail configuration for enhanced stability, highlighting a balance between reliability and performance.
The Mohajer-6 is believed to be powered by a version of the highly reliable Rotax 912/914 series four-stroke engine, or an Iranian equivalent, reflecting Iran’s continued emphasis on leveraging dependable commercial technology as the foundation for military-grade systems.
The platform’s key technological advancements lie in its secure communications suite and advanced sensor and weapons payload.
Equipped with a secure line-of-sight data link for real-time video transmission and command, some variants reportedly possess satellite communication capabilities, dramatically extending operational range.
Its stabilized electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) gimbal, combined with a laser designator, enables accurate target identification, tracking, and guidance of precision munitions such as the Qaem series bombs and Almas anti-tank missiles.
The Mohajer-6’s operational adoption by countries including Ethiopia, Venezuela, and Iraq, alongside reports of licensed production, underscores its competitive standing as a sought-after platform in the global combat drone market.
Ababil-3: Pillar of reliable battlefield surveillance
Serving as a vital link in Iran’s drone lineage, the Ababil-3 is a dedicated and reliable tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platform.
Though less complex than the Mohajer-6, it significantly surpasses basic reconnaissance drones, demonstrating Iran’s proficiency in producing effective, long-endurance surveillance systems.
Purpose-built for its role, the Ababil-3 features a classic aerodynamic layout with a rear-mounted engine and propeller, providing an unobstructed field of view for its nose-mounted sensor payload, essential for capturing clear, stable imagery.
Its twin-tail design enhances flight stability, a crucial factor for effective surveillance missions.
Like its counterparts, the Ababil-3 employs a simple, reliable piston engine prioritizing flight endurance over high speed, allowing several hours of operation.
The platform’s primary technological focus is its reconnaissance payload, typically an electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) system capable of rotation and zoom to track ground targets.
Live video feeds are transmitted to ground control stations via data links with ranges reported up to 250 kilometers, making it invaluable for frontline monitoring, artillery coordination, and border patrol.
Its versatility extends to armed variants, capable of carrying light bombs and missiles.
The Ababil-3’s proven service with nations such as Syria and Sudan, and licensed production as the Zagil-3 in Sudan, further cement its reputation as a robust and effective tool for persistent battlefield situational awareness.
Global reach and strategic influence
The international reach of Iranian UAV technology stands as a defining pillar of its success, extending well beyond the West Asia region to establish a presence across Africa, South America, and Eastern Europe.
This global dispersal is multifaceted, operating through a variety of channels including direct state-to-state sales, licensed production agreements, and observable technology transfers, reflecting a flexible and adaptive export strategy.
The deployment of these systems in different environments has provided real-world validation of their capabilities, further fueling international interest and demand.
This expansion carries significant geopolitical weight, positioning Iran as an emerging partner for countries seeking to enhance their defense capabilities outside traditional Western or Russian arms markets.
By providing these drones, Tehran fosters new defense partnerships and wields strategic influence, extending its diplomatic reach through technology-driven relationships.
Iranian UAVs offer a compelling value proposition for many countries, delivering capable military assets that are affordable, accessible, and often free from the political strings commonly attached to other suppliers.
This growing network of users and producers fosters a form of technological solidarity, reinforcing Iran’s narrative of self-reliance and strategic independence, and cementing its role as a prominent actor within the global defense technology landscape.
A model of purposeful innovation
Iran’s rise in the global drone market is a compelling example of how a deliberate and pragmatic technological strategy can yield outsized strategic influence.
The Shahed-136, Mohajer-6, and Ababil-3 collectively reflect a sophisticated grasp of modern warfare demands, offering a tiered portfolio of systems ranging from low-cost saturation weapons to advanced intelligence and precision-strike platforms.
Iran’s achievement lies in its consistent ability to identify and integrate mature, accessible technologies into coherent, effective military systems tailored to the specific, often budget-conscious needs of a diverse international clientele.
This development model, which prioritizes reliability, affordability, and operational effectiveness over cutting-edge novelty, has proven highly successful.
It has not only secured Iran’s defensive capabilities but also enabled it to become a significant exporter of military technology, carving out a distinctive niche in a fiercely competitive global market.
The ongoing evolution and widespread adoption of these platforms indicate that Iran’s approach to drone warfare and defense industrialization has established a lasting and influential footprint, one poised to shape conflict dynamics and defense partnerships well into the future.
or go to
Aletho News Archives – Video-Images
By Alan Mosley | The Libertarian Institute | April 22, 2026
Palantir CEO Alex Karp’s book, The Technological Republic, is a clarion call for Silicon Valley to abandon its consumer trinkets and rush headlong into the arms of the military-industrial complex. According to Karp, America’s future depends on wielding hard power through technology—arming soldiers, AI-weaponry, and mass surveillance systems—rather than on the “soft” influence demonstrated by free markets and liberty-first principles. The book claims that “the survival of the American experiment depends on the technological revitalization of the military-industrial complex” and urges the country’s engineering talent to focus on national defense. Karp and his co-author, Nicholas Zamiska, argue that tech bros should “grow up” and start killing America’s enemies before they kill us. … continue
Aletho News If Americans Knew No Tricks Zone
Aletho News 