Press TV – November 21, 2025
Russia and China have, in the strongest terms, rebuked a recent anti-Iran resolution passed by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), calling for the settlement of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear issue through dialogue and cooperation.
Drafted by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States and approved 19–3 with 12 abstentions on Thursday, the resolution sought to pressure Tehran by demanding it “without delay” account for its enriched uranium stocks and facilities damaged in the June attacks by the United States and Israel.
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced at a press conference in Moscow that Russia continues to firmly emphasize finding political and diplomatic solutions to the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.
Asked about a recent telephone conversation between the Russian and Iranian foreign ministers, during which the issue of Iran’s nuclear program and related talks were discussed, Zakharova was cited by TASS as saying that Moscow is consistently committed to actively seeking political and diplomatic solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue.
The spokeswoman added that Moscow has repeatedly warned about the dangers of “military actions” that threaten the stability and security of West Asia, underlining that any military attack on nuclear facilities, especially those under the monitoring of the IAEA, is “unacceptable.”
Zakharova also said the US aggression against Iran’s nuclear sites undermined the principles the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — a treaty to which Iran has always been fully committed and which the IAEA has confirmed.
The Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman went on to say that despite the efforts on the part of some foreign actors to create chaos and trouble in Iranian society, Tehran still prefers the path of dialogue over war and believes that national interests can be secured based on equal dialogue and by taking into account mutual concerns.
She stressed that in order to resume the talks, Iran needs “serious guarantees” that its nuclear facilities will not be targeted by missile or air attacks again.
Zakharova further underlined that the West must put aside threats of sanctions and military threats and return to diplomacy with Iran.
IAEA urged to create ‘favorable conditions for cooperation’
Li Song, China’s permanent representative to the IAEA, told the Board of Governors on Thursday that pushing through a counterproductive resolution against Iran will “only make things worse,” stressing that the US, Israel, and key European states are fueling the ongoing crisis surrounding Tehran’s nuclear file.
“Countries that have recklessly resorted to the use of force and obsessively pursued confrontation and pressure are responsible for the current situation of the Iranian nuclear issue,” Li said.
The Chinese envoy stressed that Israel and the United States attacked Iranian nuclear facilities safeguarded by the IAEA in June, which led to a “fundamental change in the situation of the Iranian nuclear issue.”
“Such an act should be strongly condemned by the international community and the IAEA,” he said.
On the Cairo agreement reached between Iran and the IAEA in September, Li emphasized that the pact was “a positive development” and “an important opportunity” to fully revive safeguards cooperation.
He said the activation of the snapback mechanism by the UK, France, and Germany had “seriously undermined the good momentum of cooperation” between Tehran and the Agency.
Li added that the Iranian nuclear issue “can only be properly resolved” by respecting Iran’s legitimate NPT rights and ensuring the peaceful nature of its program through political, diplomatic, and safeguards mechanisms.
The envoy called on the BoG to “create favorable conditions for cooperation and dialogue” and to avoid “provoking confrontation.”
The Cradle | November 20, 2025
Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 20 November that it is terminating the cooperation agreement signed in Cairo in retaliation for the UN nuclear watchdog adopting a new resolution demanding expanded access and information on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Iran’s envoy to the agency, Reza Najafi, said the resolution “will not add anything to the current situation” and described it as “counterproductive” shortly after the Board of Governors approved the text.
He warned that it would have “a negative impact on the cooperation that has already started between Iran and the agency.”
According to diplomats who attended the closed session, the 35-member board passed the resolution with 19 votes in favor, three against, and 12 abstentions.
The text requires Iran to report “without delay” on the status of its enriched uranium stock and on its nuclear sites that were bombed by Israel and the US during the 12-day war on Iran in June.
It also urges Iran to “comply fully and without delay” with its obligations under UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and to provide all information and access requested by the agency.
Western members of the board stated that “Iran must resolve its safeguards issues without delay” and called for “practical cooperation through access, answers, restoration of monitoring.”
Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful and had earlier cautioned that the resolution would “adversely affect” ongoing cooperation. Najafi noted that Iran had already granted access to “all undamaged facilities,” while inspectors have not been to sites such as Fordow and Natanz since they were hit in the June war.
The agency says verification of Iran’s uranium stock is “long overdue,” and that it cannot inspect the bombed facilities until Tehran submits updated reports.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the IAEA resolution was “unlawful and politically motivated,” initiated by the US and the European troika, and pushed through despite the 15 members voting against or abstaining.
He said the move ignored Iran’s goodwill, undermined the agency’s credibility and independence, and would disrupt cooperation.
The Foreign Minister had previously said that the Cairo agreement with the IAEA was defunct after Europe triggered snapback sanctions, but added that a negotiated solution remains possible if the opposing side acts in good faith.
Araghchi confirmed that he informed IAEA chief Rafael Grossi in a formal letter that the agreement is now considered terminated.
When Israeli attacks began in June, the IAEA estimated Iran held 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent.
Iran and several allied states argued that issuing another resolution would jeopardize efforts to advance dialogue.
Tehran has declared that the September inspection agreement with the IAEA is void, and Najafi said the new resolution “will have its own consequences,” adding that Iran would announce them later.
Al Mayadeen | November 19, 2025
Efforts and consultations with Iran are ongoing in a bid to restore inspection activities in the country, Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), announced on Wednesday.
Addressing the IAEA Board of Governors, Grossi said, “I believe there has been some progress. We have returned to Iran, and over a dozen inspections have taken place so far.”
“However, there is still more work to be done in line with the relevant provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements,” he added.
He noted that, in coordination with the Iranian foreign minister in Cairo, “significant technical understandings have been reached with Iran to facilitate inspections following the events of June,” emphasizing that “this is the path we need to continue on.”
“I remain convinced that there is no solution other than a diplomatic one to this issue, which requires engagement, understanding, and full compliance by Iran with its obligations,” Grossi added.
He continued, “If this does not happen, we will continue to face one challenge after another and will not reach the position we all aspire to. Nevertheless, our work must continue, and my stance has always been to act decisively and maintain ongoing communication with Iran to return inspection activities in a country with a critical nuclear program to their normal course, in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement—nothing more, nothing less.”
It is worth noting that Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA in June, citing the need to ensure the security of its nuclear facilities following US and Israeli actions against them. Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization criticized the IAEA, saying that attacks on its nuclear sites resulted from the agency’s failure to maintain professionalism and political neutrality.
Clash between Iran and the IAEA
Following the June airstrikes carried out by the Israeli occupation and the United States on numerous Iranian nuclear and military sites, Iran swiftly suspended full cooperation with the IAEA. In response, the Iranian parliament passed legislation barring further access to its nuclear facilities by IAEA inspectors unless specifically approved by the Supreme National Security Council. Tehran accused the agency of failing to condemn the attacks and criticized it for lacking neutrality, arguing that this undermined the security of its nuclear infrastructure.
In the months that followed, particularly throughout July and August, the IAEA was unable to conduct its routine inspections in Iran. Iranian officials insisted that any resumption of IAEA activities required a renegotiation of the terms of engagement, emphasizing that previous frameworks had failed to protect Iran’s sovereign rights. This signaled a shift toward a more guarded stance, as Iran sought stronger guarantees before reopening its facilities to international scrutiny.
By September, however, progress was made when IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and Iranian officials met in Cairo. The parties reached a preliminary technical understanding aimed at restoring monitoring mechanisms. As part of the deal, Iran agreed to provide detailed status reports on its affected nuclear sites and to resume IAEA inspections gradually. While this understanding marked a step forward, no firm timeline for full cooperation was established, leaving the situation tentative.
Despite the progress, the relationship between Iran and the IAEA remains fragile. Iran continues to demand that the agency uphold a politically neutral approach. At the same time, the IAEA insists that its role under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement must be respected.
IAEA role called into question
However, the IAEA’s role in the latest attack on the country was called into question as Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization chief, Mohammad Eslami, accused “Israel” of striking key nuclear facilities in Tehran, based on technical details provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The attack, according to Eslami, targeted a fuel production unit at the city’s research reactor, as well as a reactor used to manufacture vital radiopharmaceuticals.
Speaking at the Foreign Ministry’s conference “International Law Under Assault: Aggression and Defense,” Eslami emphasized that Iran has long maintained strict safety protocols to protect its nuclear experts, infrastructure, and the surrounding environment, ensuring no leaks or contamination.
Eslami stressed that the accuracy of the strikes suggests that classified technical details, information Iran had provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were exploited, noting that the only laboratory Iran built in full coordination with the agency was singled out in the attack.
Press TV – November 15, 2025
Iran has strongly dismissed allegations of sabotage operations raised by the head of Canada’s domestic Security Agency against the Islamic Republic, calling the claims baseless and fabricated.
On Thursday, Dan Rogers, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, claimed that the agency this year foiled potentially lethal threats by Iran directed against people whom Tehran sees as enemies.
He claimed that the agency countered actions by Iranian intelligence services and what he called their proxies, who allegedly targeted individuals they perceived as threats to Iran.
Rogers also alleged that his agents had blocked attempts by Russia to illegally acquire Canadian goods and technologies. He also levelled some accusations against China and India for espionage and transnational repression efforts against Canada.
Zahra Ershadi, Iran’s deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, said in a statement on Friday that the allegations were aimed at shifting attention away from Israel’s ongoing actions in West Asia and Canada’s role in supporting them.
“The ridiculous accusations of the Canadian Security Organization against Iran have no purpose other than to divert attention from the ongoing violations and crimes committed by the Zionist regime in the West Asia region and Canada’s support for it,” she said.
Ershadi also criticized the obstruction of consular services for Iranians living in Canada, urging the Canadian government to reverse “irresponsible and unjustified” policies toward Tehran.
During the genocide in Gaza, Canada and several other Western countries continued to supply lethal weapons to the Israeli regime despite the enormous human toll in Palestinian territory.
Press TV – November 14, 2025
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has released a new report on Iran’s nuclear program ahead of the Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, focusing on uranium stockpile estimates while avoiding comment on recent illegal attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Press TV has obtained the unpublished report, dated November 12, which will be presented at the quarterly Board of Governors meeting beginning next week in Vienna.
It will be the first such session since the formal phase-out of the JCPOA, meaning Iran’s nuclear file will now be addressed solely under the NPT Safeguards Agreement rather than the defunct 2015 accord.
The report covers the period since the director general’s last assessment in early September and revisits the fallout from the June aggression on Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel and the United States.
The aggression led Tehran to halt all cooperation with the agency, citing “politically motivated” resolutions and the IAEA’s refusal to condemn terrorist attacks on its nuclear infrastructure and personnel.
Grossi has maintained his earlier stance; on September 8 he declined to denounce the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists during the June attacks, stating, “I believe this is not something that, as director general of the IAEA, falls within my purview.”
The new report similarly avoids comment on the June 13 Israeli aggression or the subsequent US bombing of Iranian nuclear sites—actions Tehran maintains violated the UN Charter, international law, and the NPT.
The director general instead focuses on verification issues that have arisen since Iran lawfully suspended cooperation in late June due to internal legislation and security concerns.
The report includes the agency’s estimate of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile as of June 13, shortly before cooperation was suspended. The IAEA assesses the total to be 9874.9 kg, of which 9040.5 kg is in the form of UF6.
This includes “2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235; 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235; 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235.”
The report notes that the figure represents an estimate based on “information previously provided by Iran, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities.”
Iran says its nuclear materials remain under rubble from recent attacks. “What relates to our nuclear materials is all under the debris caused by attacks on the bombed facilities,” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on September 11.
“Whether these materials are accessible or not, and the status of some of them, is currently being evaluated by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,” he added.
Araghchi said that once this evaluation is complete, the report will be submitted to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, which will decide on any subsequent actions considering Iran’s security concerns.
Despite the disruptions caused by the June attacks, the new IAEA report stresses that safeguard obligations remain unchanged.
It states: “The Director General has made clear to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force, and that its implementation cannot be suspended under any circumstances.”
At the same time, the agency acknowledges that “the military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities have created a situation which requires Iran and the Agency to cooperate constructively to implement safeguards.”
The Cairo agreement, reached on September 9 between Iran’s foreign minister and Grossi, is referenced as the basis for re-establishing some degree of procedural clarity.
According to the report, “the Cairo agreement provides a common understanding of the procedures for Agency inspections, notifications and safeguards implementation in Iran under the prevailing circumstances. While taking into consideration Iran’s concerns, these procedures remain in line with the relevant provisions of the NPT Safeguards Agreement.”
The report notes that Iran “has begun to facilitate” accounting reports and Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) updates for facilities unaffected by the US-Israeli attacks. It also urges reports on affected sites.
Grossi claimed his readiness “to work with Iran without delay in order to achieve non-mutually exclusive objectives: full compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and with the recently adopted Iranian domestic legislation.”
On June 25—the day after Iran’s retaliatory operations halted the 12-day aggression — the country’s parliament unanimously passed legislation suspending all cooperation.
The move was rooted in concerns that IAEA resolutions, particularly the June 12 resolution by the Board of Governors, paved the way for the Israeli aggression.
Talks with the IAEA resumed in September, but Iran warned that the decision by Britain, France, and Germany to trigger the UN “snapback” mechanism after the Cairo agreement would create “new conditions” rendering that framework void.
The agency has issued no criticism of the E3 decision, even as it continues to insist that Iran uphold its safeguards obligations under all circumstances.
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | November 12, 2025
Since the conclusion of the Iranian-Israeli war this June, pro-war think tanks responsible for influencing US government policy have been signalling the need for a second round of attacks against Iran and its nuclear program. Now they are picking up the heat.
Despite the boisterous and triumphant remarks coming from officials within the Trump administration, confidently claiming the complete destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities, behind the scenes Washington’s key think tanks appear to uphold a consensus view that the job is not done.
Think tank panels, analysis, and policy recommendations for the US government’s next steps towards Iran have centred around the understanding that, short of an agreement which spells Iran’s declaration of regional defeat, another round of direct warfare will eventually be necessary. Yet, they often caveat this with the disclaimer that the next round must close the conflict for a long time and not drag things out until another round occurs.
In the interim period between wars, the role of these think tanks is crucial to shaping Washington’s understanding of the tasks at hand. Although by nature, what they are saying is always going to be propagandistic and pursuing a specific agenda; segments of their analyses and certain statements from conference panelists are far more useful than most stories published about Iran in the corporate media. If you pay attention to these think tanks, reading between the lines, it makes the logic behind US and Israeli policy make more sense.
On November 5, Kenneth M. Pollack and Reuel Marc Gerecht recently spoke at a panel hosted by the Washington-based pro-“Israel” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) think tank, where they addressed the issue of linking US lessons from Iraq, in the post-Gulf War setting, to Iran after the 12-day war.
A few takeaways here were that while regime change should be a target, they also commented on the differences in confronting Iran, drawing key distinctions between Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei and former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Gerecht, a resident FDD scholar, makes it clear that Khamenei’s strategic thinking is much more complex, intelligent, and hence difficult to deal with.
Instead of advocating a repeat of the invasion of Iraq, they focus on strategies to weaken and isolate the Islamic Republic, including the aggressive pursuit of disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon and getting heavily involved in Iraq through the upcoming election cycle.
A policy brief published by the FDD on November 7 specifically looks at the potential opportunities for the United States inside Iraq, framing the election as an influence battle between Tehran and Washington. It is clear that the ultimate goal is to pursue the disarmament of the Hashd al-Shaabi.
Interestingly, despite the propaganda often produced for think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, depicting the Islamic Republic as being at the brink of collapse and that the Iranian public will play a key role in this, the FDD’s Gerecht paints a starkly different picture. It appears as if his calculation is built on the assumption that the anti-government Iranian diaspora are not to be relied upon to achieve regime change.
Gerecht also labels the son of the deposed Iranian dictator, Shah Reza Pahlavi, “Baby Shah”, as neither of the panelists appear to put great faith in the pro-regime change Iranian opposition, expressing the frustrations that often come along with working with them.
Meanwhile, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) has argued that Iran must be confronted over its growing confidence following the June war with “Israel”. The policy analysis entitled “Iran’s Self-Confidence Returns?” lays out the argument that Tehran’s ballistic missile program appears to be the backbone of its defense strategy over that of using its allies.
This article centres around the public statements of Khamenei and the post-war assessments offered by senior Iranian officials, in addition to factoring in the strength and rebuilding process of Tehran’s ballistic missile program.
Without openly stating it, the WINEP piece appears to be getting at the idea that Iran must again be militarily punished due to its growing confidence and that a political deal, which Donald Trump voices interest in, is not a possibility. Overall, the piece makes a number of mistakes in its framing of Iranian confidence over the months, but also is a sober enough analysis to admit that Iran managed to land significant and damaging blows against the Israelis.
It is clear that the Israelis are currently in a difficult spot when it comes to carrying out a new series of attacks against Iran, and this comes down to the number of potential cards that Tehran has to play. This is especially the case in the event that the conflict expands and becomes regional.
Therefore, at least outwardly, the Israelis themselves appeared poised to target Lebanon next, an attempt to weaken the Lebanese Resistance significantly and thus isolate Iran in the event of a future prolonged confrontation.
Meanwhile, think tanks based in Washington are busy forging arguments as to why the United States must get involved in any future Israeli-Iranian war, understanding that this is necessary for “Tel Aviv” to achieve any kind of victory against an enemy that is too powerful for it to deal with alone.
Press TV – November 10, 2025
Iran’s top security official says the West is using the country’s missile capabilities as a means of pressure, stressing it is in no position to comment on the issue.
“The current debate on Iran’s missiles is not out of genuine security concerns but rather serves as a tool to exert pressure and restrict the country’s defensive power,” Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani said on Monday.
He added that it is irrelevant for the West to comment on the range of Iran’s missiles, questioning their involvement in the matter.
“What does it have to do with the West that it comments on the range of Iran’s missiles?” he asked.
Larijani, who was a former nuclear negotiator, emphasized that Western countries also use the nuclear issue as a pretext to harbor animosity towards the Iranian nation, saying the US and Europe are raising issues about the range of Iran’s missiles with the aim of imposing control and dominance.
“No country is entitled to interfere in the Iranian nation’s defensive power,” which is a matter of independence, Larijani pointed out.
The United States and its European allies have repeatedly called for any future agreement on Iran’s nuclear activities to include its ballistic missile program as well.
Tehran has consistently rejected that demand, saying its military capabilities are non-negotiable.
Iran held five rounds of talks on a replacement for the 2015 nuclear deal prior to the US-Israeli airstrikes on the country and its nuclear facilities in mid-June.
In his remarks, Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither seeking control [over other nations] nor is submissive to the dominance of any power.”
Larijani further pointed to Iran-West relations and the Islamic Revolution’s stance on the country’s political, cultural, and economic independence, adding, “Iran is neither imperialistic nor submissive to the dominance of any power.”
Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran has increased its trade relations with the East, Muslim countries, and the neighbors, although for years the West was Iran’s primary trading partner, the SNSC secretary noted.
He slammed the West’s arrogant policies with respect to political and security issues, saying the policy resulted in a crisis in its cooperation with Iran.
Larijani stressed the importance of maintaining Iran’s independence “because freedom, culture, and economy will not remain stable in the absence of independence.”
The West, under the guise of advocating human rights and peace, has been the main obstacle to the independence of nations for centuries, he asserted.
Iran’s top security official described national unity as the “greatest asset” of the country, warning of plots to weaken the will of the Iranian people.
He said the Iranian nation has proved over the past four decades, particularly during the US-Israeli war in mid-June, that it will never compromise over its independence.
“Iran will not retreat from its path of independence and dignity, even if it means facing full-scale confrontation,” he emphasized.
He reaffirmed the Iranian nation’s will to stand strong and rational in the face of “modern brutality.”
Long-delayed rail deal unlocks final segment of a Eurasian freight artery, bolstering Axis of Resistance and bypassing western sanctions
By Vali Kaleji | The Cradle | November 7, 2025
In a long-anticipated development, Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Farzaneh Sadegh, announced on 26 October that a final contract with Russia for the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway would be signed the following month.
This 164-kilometer line through Gilan province, hugging the southwestern Caspian Sea, marks the last missing segment in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and is poised to radically transform Eurasian trade routes.
Beyond economics, the project also represents an effort to re-establish Iran’s rail connection with the South Caucasus for the first time in 35 years.
During the Soviet era, the Tabriz–Jolfa Railway, which connected to the Jolfa (Nakhichevan)–Meghri–Zangilan–Baku–Moscow line as well as the Jolfa–Nakhichevan–Yerevan route, was considered one of Iran’s main transit routes with the Soviet Union.
But the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s ruptured the web of regional rail lines, isolating Nakhchivan and severing Iran’s decades-old railway link to the Caucasus.
Thirty-five years later, Iran reconnects to the Caucasus
Since the early 2000s, Tehran has explored multiple avenues to re-establish these lost links. A proposed Iran–Armenia route via Marand and Meghri never materialized. Efforts to revive the Soviet-era Jolfa–Nakhchivan–Zangilan line have stalled amid Yerevan and Baku’s ongoing dispute over the Zangezur corridor.
In contrast, the Rasht–Astara line, as part of the larger Qazvin–Rasht–Astara (Iran)–Astara (Azerbaijan) axis, is now the only active rail project linking Iran back to the Caucasus. It also extends further along the Astara–Baku–Dagestan route, reconnecting the Islamic Republic to a key segment of the Eurasian transport grid.
This idea is not new. The Soviet Union had extended its own railway network to Astara, Azerbaijan, in 1941, reaching the Iranian border. But within Iran, the crucial stretch from Astara to Qazvin remained incomplete.
Construction on the Rasht–Qazvin leg only began in 2009 and was completed a decade later, with an official launch in March 2019 attended by then-Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and Azerbaijan’s then-economy minister Shahin Mustafayev.
However, the construction of the Rasht–Astara Railway encountered significant challenges. A 2016 deal with the International Bank of Azerbaijan for a $500-million loan was shelved after US President Donald Trump – during his first term – unilaterally exited the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018. Fearing US secondary sanctions, Baku froze its financial commitments.
Tehran subsequently turned to Moscow. When the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi visited Russia in January 2022, both sides finalized a $5-billion credit line to fund key Iranian infrastructure projects, including the Rasht–Astara Railway. Russia’s own trade needs had grown increasingly urgent under the weight of western sanctions, prompting Moscow to double down on the INSTC as a lifeline to India, Iran, and the Persian Gulf.
Russian Presidential Aide Igor Levitin, accompanied by Iranian railway officials, surveyed the route by helicopter in January 2023. Four months later, on 17 May, the two sides signed a $1.6-billion contract to complete the railway. Raisi presided over the ceremony in Tehran, with Russian President Vladimir Putin joining via video link.
Strategic rail link hinges on Russian capital and Iranian land
Despite the celebratory optics, the Rasht–Astara project faces formidable obstacles. The mountainous, forested, and ecologically fragile terrain in northern Iran presents serious engineering and environmental challenges. Specialized bridges, tunnels, and stabilization systems are required to navigate landslide-prone zones and protect sensitive ecosystems such as the Hyrcanian forests and regional wetlands.
Costs are steep. At an average of $10 million per kilometer, the entire line will cost an estimated $1.6 billion. Masoud Shakibaeifar, a transportation planning expert in Iran, believes that “the gross revenue of the project in this optimistic scenario could increase from $500 million in the first year of operation to $1 billion in subsequent years. In this case, a return on investment would be achievable within a 10-year period.”
But others, like Seyed Hossein Mirshafi, former infrastructure advisor to the Roads Ministry, argue Iranian contractors could complete the railway for under $700 million. It remains to be seen whether a new and different figure will be determined in the new Iran–Russia contract, which is set to be signed next month.
Land acquisition has been another sticking point. Much of the route runs through farmland, requiring time-consuming negotiations with private landowners. Under the current division of labor, Iran shoulders land procurement costs while Russia funds construction.
In this regard, Minister Sadegh stated: “Despite challenging climatic conditions and the constraints imposed by sanctions, approximately 80 kilometers of land along the route have so far been acquired and secured, and more than 30 kilometers have been handed over to the Russian side. We are prepared to transfer half of the route for the commencement of technical operations within the next few weeks.”
In addition, to overcome these challenges and mitigate environmental concerns in Iran, Hadi Haqshenas, the Governor of Gilan Province, announced that, following the emphasis of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, the 160-kilometer Rasht–Astara route will be constructed on an elevated bridge.
These complexities make the Rasht–Astara Railway unlike any other infrastructure project in Iran’s recent history.
The North–South Corridor challenges Atlanticist chokeholds
The strategic weight of the Rasht–Astara line cannot be overstated. For Iran, under relentless sanctions, and for Russia, seeking alternatives to its embargoed European trade routes, the railway represents a crucial artery in the multipolar world order. It also restores Tehran’s long-lost rail link to the South Caucasus and, by extension, to Moscow and St. Petersburg. As such, it represents a major geoeconomic and geopolitical development.
Kamal Ebrahimi Kavori, a senior expert on Iran’s free trade and economic zones, believes that “the Rasht–Astara Railway project is not merely a simple rail line, but a vital artery linking Iran to major trade corridors – a route that connects the country’s northern and southern ports, free trade zones, and neighboring countries into an integrated and competitive transport chain.”
For Azerbaijan, which is not formally involved in the project, the completed rail link offers faster freight access to Pakistan – a key strategic ally – and the Persian Gulf Arab states. Given Baku’s expanding trade with these partners, the benefits are clear even without direct investment.
Currently, the lack of a direct rail connection at Astara means cargo has to be manually transferred between rail and road, clogging border terminals and slowing transit between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Once the Rasht–Astara line is operational, freight can move seamlessly from Russia’s northern cities to Iran’s southern port of Bandar Abbas.
An important point is that the North–South Corridor has three main routes: the eastern route (Central Asia), the central route (Caspian Sea), and the western route (South Caucasus). Although all three routes have gained significant momentum in recent years, particularly after the war in Ukraine and western sanctions on Russia, the main volume of transit and trade occurs along the western segment of the North–South Corridor, connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia.
Consequently, there is heavy truck traffic, especially at the Astara border terminals (Iran–Azerbaijan) and the Samur border terminal (Azerbaijan–Russia). Therefore, the construction and completion of the Rasht–Astara Railway could play a crucial role in reducing road congestion, lowering transportation costs, and accelerating transit and trade along this corridor.
In the first year of operation, the Rasht–Astara Railway is expected to handle up to approximately 10 million tons of cargo. In the long term, the cargo capacity of this route could reach approximately 15 million tons.
Adding momentum, Iran’s Preferential Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), signed in October 2019, became a Free Trade Agreement in May 2025. While Azerbaijan is not part of the EAEU, it remains central to the INSTC’s westward stretch. The Rasht–Astara Railway will thus help streamline trade between Iran and major Russian cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Just days before the return of UN sanctions on Iran, Russia hosted a major nuclear deal with Iran on 24 September, and the two sides signed a $25-billion memorandum of understanding (MoU) to build four small-scale nuclear power plants in Sirik, in the southern Hormozgan Province. This was followed by the announcement of the Rasht–Astara Railway contract.
These moves signal a fundamental shift. Unlike in the 2006–2013 period when Russia backed UN sanctions against Iran, Moscow now stands aligned with Tehran against western coercion. Both reject the legitimacy of the UN snapback mechanism.
Far from being weakened by sanctions, the Iran–Russia partnership is expanding – anchored by energy cooperation, strategic transport corridors, and a shared challenge to western economic warfare.
Press TV – November 9, 2025
Iran has set a new record in its oil exports despite the continued pressure of US and UN sanctions, according to the latest data from a leading energy analytics firm.
The Tankers Trackers said in a post on its X account on Sunday that Iran had exported an average of 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil over the past four weeks.
“These are numbers we haven’t seen since the early half of 2018,” the post said.
Iran’s oil exports came under sweeping US sanctions in May 2018, when Washington withdrew from a landmark international deal on Iran’s nuclear program, known as the JCPOA.
The sanctions affected Iranian oil shipments when they were tightened in May 2019, but they gradually became ineffective as Iran managed to restore and expand its exports, particularly to private buyers in China.
The Tanker Trackers had already reported a seven-year record in Iran’s oil exports in September when shipments reached nearly 2 million bpd.
That report came just before the United Nations re-imposed six sanction resolutions on Iran that had been lifted in 2015 when the country signed the JCPOA with world powers.
The US and allies in Europe, who triggered the so-called snapback of UN sanctions on Iran, had expected that the sanctions could curb the flow of oil from Iran to major customers like China.
However, experts and authorities in Iran have consistently downplayed concerns raised about the country’s oil exports, arguing that UN sanctions wouldn’t affect Iran’s oil trade or its access to international markets.
Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad said in early October that UN sanctions would not add any new pressure on the country’s oil exports as he insisted that the country had overcome some of the harshest American sanctions targeting its oil industry in recent years.
RT | November 6, 2025
NATO member-states must boost military production to be ready for a prolonged standoff with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which are challenging the “global rules,” the bloc’s secretary-general, Mark Rutte, has said.
Speaking to Western defense contractors at the NATO-Industry Forum in Bucharest on Thursday, Rutte told the bloc’s arms makers that “there is more cash on the table and even more will flow” amid NATO’s rearmament push.
Moscow has rejected claims it harbors any aggressive intentions towards the US-led military bloc, saying such allegations are being used by politicians in the US and EU to scare the populations and justify huge increases in military spending. Russia also believes that NATO’s deepening involvement in Ukraine was instrumental in escalating the conflict in 2022.
Rutte labeled the fighting between Moscow and Kiev a “threat” to the bloc and he claimed that “the danger posed by Russia will not end when this war does. For the foreseeable future, Russia will remain a destabilizing force in Europe and the world.”
“And Russia is not alone in its efforts to undermine the global rules. As you know, it is working with China, with North Korea, with Iran, and others. They are increasing their defense industrial collaboration to unprecedented levels. They are preparing for long-term confrontation,” the secretary-general said.
He noted the pledge by NATO members to hike military spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, but claimed that “cash alone cannot provide security. We need the capabilities. We need the equipment, real firepower, and of course… the most advanced tech.” This would require the bloc’s defense industry “increasing production and shortening delivery times,” Rutte stressed.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova reacted to Rutte’s comments by asking him to clarify what “global rules” he was talking about and publish their “full list” on NATO’s website.
Moscow, Beijing, and the rest of “the global majority, have always declared their commitment to international law, while NATO has repeatedly violated this law with its aggressive actions and illegitimate coalitions: the invasion of Iraq under false pretenses, the bombing of Yugoslavia, and so on,” Zakharova wrote on Telegram.
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | November 4, 2025
Israel’s goal is to eliminate its regional opposition entirely. In Lebanon, the US-Israeli alliance has pursued the push to disarm Hezbollah. The Israeli strategy is to outmaneuver the Lebanese group by opening new rounds of war, while imposing immense suffering on the people.
Israel is now threatening to open up another war against Lebanon and is initiating a propaganda campaign to justify its actions. It has, in reality, violated the ceasefire every day since it was imposed and its strategy is to eventually push the State to internal chaos and collapse.
While it may be well known, at this point, that Israel continues full steam ahead on the war path with Lebanon, as it threatens to bombard Beirut and escalate its ongoing bombing campaign, there are two important points that are necessary to understand what is truly going on.
The beginning of any conversation on the issue is to understand that Israel alone is the reason for the conflict and that its propaganda surrounding Hezbollah’s disarmament is disingenuous. From there, we can properly assess what the Israeli strategy is in Lebanon and what it seeks to gain.
Israeli media is currently ripe with analysts and military officials commenting about the rapid re-armament of Hezbollah, even claiming that, in one year, the Lebanese group has managed to rebuild to the extent that internal estimates believed only to have been possible in a 15 to 20-year time frame. In the Hebrew media framing of events, it is clear that the justification for a new military operation in Lebanon is explained through a “security” lens, arguing that war is necessary to weaken their greatest adversary to the north.
Meanwhile, in the Gulf and Western-owned Arabic media, along with English-language corporate media, their coverage depicts a failure of the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah as the primary issue at hand. The framing harbors the point that the problem here pertains to Hezbollah’s weapons, that this is the reason for the conflict, and that, while Israel may not be helping the situation, the guilty party is the so-called “Iranian proxies”. This line of reasoning argues that, given Hezbollah’s disarmament, Lebanon will be transformed and return to some notion of its “glory days” of old.
Immediately, here there are two narratives that are not congruent, despite bearing some similarities and arguing from the same pro-Israeli point of view, which should be a major red flag for anyone who is looking at this issue critically.
Israel’s Claims about Hezbollah’s Weapons
Ever since the ceasefire was supposed to come into effect late last November, Israel has violated the deal over 7,000 times according to UNIFIL figures. Hezbollah, on the other hand, has not violated the agreement.
According to the ceasefire agreement, the Israeli military should have long withdrawn its forces from the south of the country, yet it has vowed to permanently remain inside what it now considers a security zone; in other words, an illegal occupation of Lebanese lands.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese army has adhered to the deal by dismantling sites used by Hezbollah south of the Litani River, while the group itself agreed to begin disarmament in this zone. Despite this and the work done to remove Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon, the Israelis only expanded the zone of illegal occupation, continued their strikes, murdered more civilians, and seized more Lebanese hostages. Israel has even struck the Lebanese capital a number of times since the ceasefire was imposed, to which there was no response from Hezbollah.
When it comes to the issue of total disarmament, Hezbollah has rejected this notion. Earlier this year, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun had attempted to reach a deal whereby Hezbollah would surrender its weapons to the Lebanese Army and integrate within it, as a national defense strategy was put together. Israel and the United States both rejected such an idea.
The Lebanese public was then polled on this issue and overwhelmingly expressed their opposition to disarmament, in the event that there is no national defense strategy in place, fearing that the Lebanese Army itself could not defend the country against existential threats posed by its southern and eastern borders.
Despite this, under the orders of US envoy Tom Barrack, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam decided to push forward with the agenda to totally disarm Hezbollah by later this year, a task widely viewed as impractical and likely to lead to civil war if attempted violently. Both Washington and Tel Aviv pushed for this, regardless, offering Beirut nothing in return, only threatening to escalate tensions.
Hezbollah itself was born out of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, created to resist the illegal occupation of southern Lebanese territory. Immediately upon its founding, it understood the importance of bearing arms and continuing to resist, until the very last drop of blood. The reason for this is simple: they had the example of what had just happened to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
After Israel murdered around 20,000 people in Lebanon and besieged the PLO’s leadership in Beirut, the group’s Chairman, Yasser Arafat, agreed to “end” the war through disarmament and moving his leadership to Tunisia. Once the Palestinian Resistance was no longer there, the Israelis then occupied southern Lebanon and, along with their fascist militia allies, committed massacres against innocent women and children. These massacres, which targeted primarily Palestinians, but also Lebanese Shia and others, were amongst the worst in the history of the conflict, such as the infamous Sabra and Shatila camp massacre that killed as many as 3,500 civilians alone.
What led up to the 1982 invasion was that the PLO found itself in a very similar scenario to Hezbollah today. The Israelis constantly violated the existing ceasefire agreement, attempting to draw a response that would justify further military operations, to which the PLO did not bite.
The PLO, for its part, was not only adhering to the ceasefire, it was also heading up a diplomatic mission that was paving the way for a “two-State solution” process, in line with the organization’s 10-point plan and Saudi Arabia’s Fez Initiative. The Israelis branded this as the PLO’s “peace offensive”, viewing it as a threat and seeking any excuse to invade Lebanon, which they finally found with an incident that the PLO had nothing to do with.
Hezbollah managed to struggle against Israel for decades, forcing them to abandon their occupation of the south in 2000, and later thwarting an Israeli invasion in 2006. After this, despite Israel still occupying the Sheba’a Farms and Ghajar village, Hezbollah’s weapons managed to cause a deterrence scenario, whereby they achieved nearly 17 years of relative calm. The Israelis would not dare to bomb their territory.
On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, would then change this equation by entering into a support front battle, in order to fight alongside the people of Gaza and ensure their victory. The first operations carried out by Hezbollah targeted military sites illegally occupied by Israel in the Sheba’a Farms, a move not prohibited under international law.
The Israeli response then came against Hezbollah sites and civilians in southern Lebanon, soon including the targeting of journalists, medical workers, women, children, and the elderly. Therefore, Hezbollah began escalating its attacks and responding by hitting military sites, then eventually strategically striking settlements in a tit-for-tat battle. While Israel murdered hundreds of civilians in Lebanon, only a dozen Israeli non-combatants were killed by Hezbollah’s fire, which almost entirely focused on military sites and strategically hit settlements.
Even after Israel’s pager attacks across Lebanon, which murdered and maimed women and children, not just Hezbollah members, killing dozens and injuring thousands, Hezbollah still intended to keep its military operations limited to a support front and not all-out war. Then, the Israelis imposed a war on Lebanon, anyway, killed up to 5,000 people in total, assassinating Hezbollah’s senior leadership, and invaded the country with the intent of reaching the Litani River area.
Hezbollah managed to carefully manage the war, not letting it boil over into an all-out extermination campaign as had happened in Gaza, also succeeding in halting the Israeli military’s ground advances in the south.
Despite the words of Hezbollah’s martyred leader, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, in his last speech, vowing to continue firing until a ceasefire is reached in Gaza, the group eventually decided that it would agree to a ceasefire in order to stop the war from escalating to the next phase: anticipated to bring the all out destruction of Beirut.
What Israel’s Agenda Entails
At this point, after reading the above-mentioned context provided, a reasonable skeptic would argue the point that Israel agreed to the ceasefire and, therefore, they must be interested in peace or, at least, their intentions are not as malicious as is being argued. To which the natural answer has been that the Israelis repeatedly violated every tenet of the deal they had agreed to.
Yet, this explanation is not sufficient to explain away the Israeli counterpoint often made. A more rounded answer to this question not only explains why Israel agreed to the ceasefire at the time, but also what their current strategy is.
While Israeli propaganda has it that Hezbollah had been defeated, that some 90 percent of their weapons were destroyed and its mission was completed, the truth is that the war was reaching a boiling point.
In late September and early October of 2024, the Israelis had pulled off their most significant tactical victories against Hezbollah. Their pager attacks, bombings against major weapons depots, and assassinations of senior officials were all massive blows against Hezbollah.
Yet, by late November of 2024, the Israelis had failed to advance any significant distance in southern Lebanon on the ground; they had also gotten themselves tangled up in a deadly tit-for-tat battle. Although the Israeli strikes did far more damage, Hezbollah was revealing and firing new kinds of munitions, day in and day out, even striking high-rise buildings in Tel Aviv.
It was clear to anyone following the course of the war that Hezbollah had an abundance of weapons that were not about to run out, but that the group had also been greatly shaken up. On the Israeli side, their weapons were never going to run dry, yet they failed to achieve anything too significant after the first few weeks, and their ground forces were taking a beating.
After Hezbollah proved it still possessed ballistic missiles capable of striking high-rise buildings in the heart of Tel Aviv, it was clear from the threats being issued by the Israeli leadership that a new phase of the war was afoot. This clearly was not about defeating Hezbollah and would have resulted in destruction against Israeli-held cities that had not yet been seen.
Therefore, understanding that repeating the Gaza model of destruction in Lebanon was not going to serve either side, both agreed to a ceasefire. The result was a stalemate, yet politically and in terms of public perception, the Israelis clearly had the edge.
Hezbollah could not credibly claim a victory and was clearly desperately in need of repair, after suffering severe blows to everything, from its chain of command to its communication, intelligence wing, political standing, and even its weapons. According to multiple sources inside Lebanon, up to 25 percent of Hezbollah’s weapons were destroyed. Although this is nowhere near the Israeli numbers, it is certainly significant.
Tel Aviv saw that, through their actions, they were capable of seriously shaking Hezbollah and putting them in a terrible political predicament, but eliminating them altogether was a goal that clearly failed.
So, the next step was to pursue this goal through other means. Instead of dissolving and the public support for the group evaporating, the base of the group inside Lebanon had doubled down. To them, what was done specifically to their former leader, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, ignited an everlasting fire, inflicting emotional pain that exists in each household until this day.
Israel then sought to impose an equation whereby they could fire at will in Lebanon, while forcing the pro-American stooges picked to run the government to do their bidding. Naturally, the US and Israel knew that the disarmament of Hezbollah was never going to happen by the end of the year, and, without any roadmap as to how to achieve it, there was not even the slightest chance of success with this strategy.
Nevertheless, the US-Israeli alliance has pursued this push to disarm Hezbollah, the Iraqi PMU, Hamas, along all the Palestinian resistance factions, through political maneuvers and agreements.
While ceasefire agreements hold in both Gaza and Lebanon – translating to Israel reducing its attacks while its enemies actually respect the agreements – they scheme for the next inevitable round of confrontations.
Before proceeding with this line of analysis, it is important to establish Israel’s goal, which is to both conquer or impose its will on more territory and eliminate its regional opposition entirely. A perfect demonstration of what happens in the event of disarmament is the case of Syria, where the Israeli military continues to illegally occupy more territory, arm separatists to fight a government it is dealing directly with and refuses to allow the country to enjoy any sovereignty.
The new Syrian government has collaborated with the Israelis openly in the south of the country, worked on their behalf to stop weapons transfers into Lebanon, kicked out and disbanded all the Palestinian resistance groups in the country and is openly aligned with the US. Despite all of the Syrian regime’s pandering, the Israelis are still arming groups to divide the country into separate sectarian regimes and bomb it, at will, additionally refusing to allow the rebuilding of the Syrian army.
On October 7, 2023, the Israelis suffered a severe blow, yet they also saw an opportunity to go after every one of their opponents and to carve out their “Greater Israel Project”, which its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admits to and frames as a “seven-front war”.
In this regional war, Iran is its strongest opposition. However, they have no actual ground options against the Israelis, meaning that as long as any round of conflict with the Islamic Republic is short, they can survive. Hezbollah, on the other hand, has a ground force consisting of around 100,000 men, which makes up for the lack of parity when it comes to missiles and other capabilities.
Incapable of winning any decisive victory over Hezbollah, the Israeli strategy is to put the Lebanese group on the back foot, to open up new rounds of war that will set them back further, each time damaging them, but not inflicting a total defeat. This strategy means that the wars have to be limited and not all-out.
In the Israeli mindset, the Lebanon question is similar to the Gaza question. Solving it is not only destroying Hamas or Hezbollah, because another group will inevitably rise to assume their position. The issue is to use proxy groups, whether sectarian or extremists of whatever flavor, to divide society and turn their focus on within. It is a process by which the people there must be re-educated, propagandized, forced into internal division and controlled as slaves who adhere to Israel’s regional ambitions. Syria is a great example of Israel’s dream.
When we now turn to Israel’s most recent threats against Lebanon, we are in a phase of political pressure being applied upon the government in Beirut, but also on the public, which is collectively anxious about the perceived inevitability of war. Should that war soon come, the Israelis will seek to achieve their goals quickly, impose immense suffering and then go back to a ceasefire, similar to what we have now.
If Hezbollah fails to inflict a perceived defeat upon the Israelis, it will severely damage their image and even sow doubt amongst their own supporters, who all long for revenge. Not only do they seek revenge for what Israel did last year, but they continue to suffer daily oppression at the hands of the occupying force that remains in the south of their country.
The Israelis believed that symbolically imposing their dominance over the Lebanese people, something clearly on display with the fighter jet flyover of Beirut during the funeral of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, they could beat the people’s spirits down. For now, they have only grown more motivated towards revenge.
Broadly speaking, the public perception, even amongst Hezbollah’s most die-hard supporters, is that Israel is militarily superior and the old perception of the Lebanese group’s power is gone. From an Israeli perspective, this is a good thing, yet it could also serve as the opposite in any future battle.
Hezbollah was perceived as a massive victor in the 2006 war, not because they decisively defeated Israel, but because they were such a massive underdog and still managed to dictate the pace of the conflict in many regards. Mere survival for such an armed group was considered a victory, let alone the master-class pulled off by the group during the war. Back then, Hezbollah did not possess weapons that could hit Tel Aviv, let alone guided ballistic missiles and suicide drones. In many ways, it was comparable to the power of Hamas on October 7, 2023.
Therefore, if Hezbollah plays its cards correctly this time around, it could come off with what is considered a devastating defeat of Israel. The problem with this will be Israel’s reaction to its own failure, as we are no longer in the era of 2006-style battles being permissible, as was the case in Gaza; the Israelis could exit a battle, as occurred in 2014, and be content, but not now. If the Israelis start getting embarrassed in Lebanon, they could feel the need to escalate further.
This is where two major questions arise: Will Iran fight alongside Hezbollah? And how far are Hezbollah willing to go?
Under the scenario that Iran joins in, this could lead to two potential outcomes: A much broader war or an intervention that forces the Israelis to close the war and accept defeat. The Iranians also have their Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) allies, who number above 250,000 and could potentially be used to fight Israel, also.
The reason why Iran could decide to throw its weight behind Hezbollah, this time, is down to the inevitability of another US-Israeli attack on them and the fact that losing Hezbollah could spell strategic defeat.
As for the question of how far Hezbollah is ready to go, if its current Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem’s rhetoric about waging “a Karbalae battle”, that is to say a war to the death, then we should expect their forces to enter the northern Galilee. If this occurs, Israel will interpret it as another October 7-style failure, meaning the number of civilians we can expect them to kill across Lebanon will be unprecedented.
If Hezbollah fighters breach the borders, this will provide a moment of truth for the Palestinian Resistance in Gaza, as well. What the groups in Gaza will do is impossible to predict, but there will certainly be major decisions that will have to be made in such a scenario.
All of this is, to some extent or another, understood by the Israelis. They know the dangers of pursuing this course of action and what happens if it spirals out of control, yet it appears as if they are willing to take these chances. So far, the Iranians have decided to hold back and so the Israelis have walked away from each round, having achieved some objectives and only suffering minor consequences.
If Israel gets its way, it will seek to continue its phased attacks on Gaza, Lebanon and even Iran, each time attempting to score new victories and to inflict major psychological blows on the populations inside these countries. Israeli victory hedges upon limited confrontations and maximum civilian suffering, to rob the people of their sense of stability, their faith in victory, and to divide them, turning the people on each other as a means of crippling their leadership.
By Peiman Salehi | The Cradle | November 3, 2025
The US has long styled itself as a guarantor of peace and stability in West Asia while systematically undermining both. From the Oslo Accords to the Abraham Accords, Washington’s so-called peace initiatives have masked coercion as consensus.
These efforts consistently reinforce the regional status quo, prioritizing Israeli security over Palestinian sovereignty, and maintaining western hegemony over regional autonomy.
The collapse of another US-backed Gaza ceasefire, violated within days by renewed Israeli aggression, exposes the structural flaws in this diplomatic model. Rather than arbitrating peace, Washington serves as an enabler of conflict.
Its diplomacy rests on selective morality and strategic interest, not universal principles. The American insistence on brokering ceasefires while actively resupplying Tel Aviv’s military machinery makes a mockery of its so-called neutrality.
‘No legal basis under international law’
The recent joint letter by Iran, China, and Russia to the UN Secretary-General rejecting Washington’s attempt to reactivate the expired “snapback” mechanism under Resolution 2231 further lays bare the fissures between western powers and global legitimacy.
The mechanism, part of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal, formally expired on 18 October 2025. Yet, the US and its European partners are now attempting to revive sanctions via a legal instrument widely considered void.
Tehran’s rejection of the move, supported by Moscow and Beijing, signals a collective refusal to let Washington unilaterally interpret international law. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian affirmed in August that “China reaffirms its commitment to the peaceful resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue and opposes the invocation of the UN Security Council’s ‘snapback’ mechanism.”
His words echoed a broader conviction across the Global South that legitimacy can no longer be dictated by Washington’s will. Fifteen years ago, Beijing and Moscow joined western powers in imposing sanctions on Iran; today, they stand beside Tehran in open defiance of that same framework.
The world’s center of gravity is shifting from a unipolar order managed by Washington to a multipolar one defined by resistance to its dominance.
Economic multipolarity and the end of American centrality
Nowhere is the erosion of US dominance more visible than in East and Southeast Asia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), once conceived as a Cold War neutral bloc, has evolved into a robust, self-sustaining economic engine. As reported by the Japan News in March 2024, ASEAN’s combined GDP now rivals that of Japan.
Following Washington’s 2017 withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the region coalesced around the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Even traditional US allies have joined. As Professor Amitav Acharya argues in ‘The End of American World Order,’ what is emerging is not anti-western, but post-western – a world in which regions increasingly manage their own affairs. Trump’s recent visit to East Asia highlighted Washington’s growing irrelevance in a region it once dominated.
Yet Washington continues to operate as though the post–Cold War era never ended. Its diplomats still speak the language of the “rules-based order,” even as its actions violate the very norms they claim to uphold.
The attempt to weaponize international law through the snapback mechanism mirrors its broader conduct in Gaza: mediation that enforces control rather than fosters compromise. When the US calls for restraint but resupplies Israel with weapons as civilian casualties rise, its moral authority collapses under its own contradictions.
As former US diplomat Chas Freeman once observed:
“Sadly, theories of coercion and plans to use military means to impose our will on other nations have for some time squeezed out serious consideration of diplomacy as an alternative to the use of force. Diplomacy is more than saying ‘nice doggie’ till you can find a rock … The weapons of diplomats are words and their power is their persuasiveness.”
This transition from persuasion to pressure has degraded Washington’s credibility. US diplomacy increasingly resembles an extension of Pentagon strategy – a negotiation backed by bombs, not by principle.
And this is not limited to Gaza or Iran. From Venezuela to North Korea, from Syria to China, Washington’s diplomatic strategy hinges on threats, sanctions, and military posturing. The soft power myth has dissolved under the weight of decades of failed interventions.
A cultural and philosophical disconnect
Western liberalism, historically presented as a universal framework for progress, falters in regions like West Asia, where faith and justice are intertwined. As even Francis Fukuyama – the American political scientist best known for declaring the “end of history” at the Cold War’s close – himself conceded, liberalism is not a universal fit. For Iran and much of West Asia, peace cannot be reduced to the absence of war or bought through economic incentives. It must arise from justice, dignity, and recognition.
This is the blind spot of every US-brokered deal: the failure to grasp that sovereignty and moral legitimacy cannot be negotiated away. The more Washington pressures regional actors into conformity, the more resistance solidifies into a collective identity.
Tehran’s approach reflects this new reality. Rather than reacting impulsively to western provocations, Iran has adopted a hybrid posture combining strategic deterrence with selective diplomacy. Its partnership with Moscow and Beijing is not an alliance of convenience but of conviction – a shared rejection of a system where power masquerades as principle.
In the wake of the failed snapback, Tehran has deepened energy and transport cooperation through the North–South Corridor while maintaining calibrated dialogue with regional states seeking stability beyond US patronage.
The existential failure of US diplomacy
Unlike in previous decades, Iran is no longer isolated. It now commands a regional network of partnerships that reflect mutual interests rather than asymmetric dependencies. From Iraq to Central Asia, Tehran’s outreach has become a model for post-western engagement.
Meanwhile, the Gaza ceasefire serves as a grim mirror of Washington’s diplomatic decay. Within 48 hours of its declaration, Israeli airstrikes resumed under the pretext of “pre-emptive defense,” and the White House responded with silence. For the Arab and Muslim world, this silence is deafening and an unmistakable confirmation that American mediation is designed to manage violence, not end it.
The myth of the western peacemaker has endured because it served both sides: it offered Washington moral legitimacy and offered local elites a pretext for inaction. But that myth is now collapsing under the weight of its contradictions.
A world divided between moral resistance and strategic cynicism cannot be reconciled through the language of “balance.” It demands a new moral vocabulary – one that acknowledges power but subordinates it to justice.
The failure of US mediation in West Asia is therefore not tactical but existential. It stems from a worldview that confuses control with order and influence with peace. Until Washington accepts that peace cannot be engineered through dominance, its diplomacy will remain what it has always been: an empire’s negotiation with its own illusions.
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By Lisa Pease | Consortium News | September 16, 2013
More than a half century ago, just after midnight on Sept. 18, 1961, the plane carrying UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and 15 others went down in a plane crash over Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). All 16 died, but the facts of the crash were provocatively mysterious. … continue
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