No route around Hormuz: Why West Asia’s pipeline alternatives fall short
The rush to bypass Hormuz leads back to the same problem: Every alternative route remains hostage to war, rival chokepoints, or political disputes.
By Hussein Askary | The Cradle | July 23, 2026
“The only alternative to the Strait of Hormuz is the Strait of Hormuz.”
This blunt assessment, offered by an Iraqi expert in a recent interview, captures the central weakness in the rush to revive old pipeline schemes and promote new ones across West Asia. Since Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz after Israel and the US launched their second war against it in February 2026, the region has been flooded with proposals for alternative oil-export routes.
Washington has encouraged these plans, while several governments have presented dormant or unfinished pipelines as strategic solutions. Yet the closer one looks at geography, markets, costs, capacity, and security, the clearer it becomes that most of these projects cannot substitute for Hormuz.
Even if oil bypasses the strait, it still faces the rival chokepoint of Bab al-Mandab, where the Ansarallah-aligned armed forces have declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and attacked Saudi tankers.
These expensive detours will remain exposed unless security in the Persian Gulf itself improves. Until the war on Iran ends and an inclusive regional security architecture is established, Iranian and Yemeni missiles and drones can reach the pipelines and loading terminals built to evade them.
Asia still runs through Hormuz
The first reason is straightforward. The Strait of Hormuz is the natural outlet of the Gulf energy system. In 2024, oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels per day (bpd), roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes it as one of the world’s most important oil transit chokepoints.
Most of this oil is not heading west. About 80 percent of the oil moving through Hormuz is destined for Asia, with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian economies as the principal buyers. The pattern is even clearer for liquefied natural gas (LNG).
The US Energy Information Administration estimated that 83 percent of LNG moving through Hormuz in 2024 went from Persian Gulf exporters to Asian markets, especially China, India, and South Korea.
This market reality matters because many proposed alternatives send oil away from its main customers. Pipelines to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Levant may appear useful on a map, but they often move Gulf crude farther from Asia rather than closer to it.
Commercially, building multibillion-dollar infrastructure to move oil westward, only to redirect it by sea toward Asian markets, is inefficient. If Hormuz is open, the direct route remains cheaper and faster. If it is closed by war, the underlying problem is not a lack of pipelines but the collapse of regional security.
Old routes, unresolved disputes
The older pipeline options illustrate the point. The Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline once carried Iraqi oil across Syria to the Mediterranean. Built in the early 1950s, it had genuine strategic value in its time but has been largely inactive since it was damaged during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Washington is now backing efforts to revive the route, with US companies expected to play a role. Yet the project still requires extensive reconstruction and years of work before it can provide meaningful export capacity.
Estimates for a full restoration and expansion to around 700,000 bpd run as high as $8 billion. It cannot answer an immediate crisis in Hormuz, and if regional peace is restored before completion, the commercial case for reviving it weakens sharply.
The Iraq–Turkiye pipeline faces a different but equally serious problem: politics. The route through the Kurdistan region to Turkiye’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan was repeatedly interrupted by disputes among Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Ankara, and international oil companies.
A 2023 arbitration ruling against Turkiye over unauthorized Kurdish exports led to a two-and-a-half-year shutdown. Flows resumed in September 2025, and exports have continued, but the route still depends on fragile agreements over contracts, payments, federal authority, and revenue sharing.
Its limited throughput and political vulnerability prevent it from becoming a structural replacement for a maritime passage that normally carries a vast share of the world’s seaborne oil.
The Iraqi pipeline in Saudi Arabia, known as IPSA, is another example of strategic nostalgia. Built in the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq war, it was designed to move Iraqi crude from the Basra region to the Red Sea.
It stopped operating after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia expropriated it in 2001. Reopening the line would therefore require a Saudi–Iraqi political settlement over ownership and control, as well as a major technical assessment after decades of disuse. In other words, IPSA is not an available alternative; it is a diplomatic and engineering problem dressed up as a solution.
The proposed Basra–Aqaba pipeline is even more controversial. Its advertised purpose is to move Iraqi oil from southern Iraq to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba, bypassing Hormuz. Yet it has faced intense objections inside Iraq because of its projected cost, uncertain financing, and questionable strategic value.
Since much of Iraq’s crude is sold to Asian customers, sending it westward to Aqaba would add distance and complexity rather than solve the basic market problem. The pipeline would also move Iraqi exports closer to another zone of instability, including the Israeli military sphere and the wider Red Sea security environment.
A bypass route that merely exchanges one security risk for another is no solution. Iraq’s severe fiscal pressures also leave Baghdad poorly placed to finance such an expensive project, while international investors are unlikely to embrace it without strong political and security guarantees.
Bypasses within missile range
The existing Saudi and Emirati bypasses are more credible but still limited. Saudi Arabia’s East–West Pipeline, or Petroline, moves crude from the eastern oil region to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline carries oil from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.
These systems reduce exposure to Hormuz for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have become important national energy-security assets. But they cannot replace the strait for the region as a whole. They offer little to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, or most Iraqi exports, and they do not solve the LNG problem, especially Qatar’s dependence on Hormuz.
The IEA estimates that only 3.5 to 5.5 million bpd of spare pipeline capacity is available to bypass the strait. Neither Yanbu nor Fujairah are immune from attack; regional conflict has already shown the vulnerability of ports, tankers, and energy infrastructure.
The crisis pipelines cannot solve
This is why the alternative pipeline debate is misleading. It treats the closure of Hormuz as a logistical puzzle when it is primarily a political and security crisis. If the Persian Gulf remains militarized and unstable, no pipeline network can fully protect exports.
Pipelines cross vulnerable territory, depend on political agreements, and terminate at ports that can also be threatened. If Gulf security improves, however, Hormuz will almost certainly reopen because this serves the interests of producers and Asian consumers alike.
Once that happens, the commercial rationale for many alternative pipelines will fade. Why spend tens of billions of dollars duplicating a natural route with unmatched capacity and direct access to the main buyers?
The more honest conclusion is that alternative pipelines may offer limited resilience for individual states, but they are no strategic replacement for Hormuz. They are costly, slow, politically fragile, geographically inefficient, and in some cases obsolete before construction begins.
The answer to the crisis is a security arrangement that keeps the Persian Gulf open, prevents attacks on shipping, and restores normal trade through the strait.
Under such an arrangement, oil and LNG would continue to flow mainly to Asia by the most direct and economical route. Hormuz will remain indispensable, while the grand pipeline alternatives amount to expensive insurance policies against a crisis that only diplomacy and regional peace can resolve.
Preparing for Regional Escalation: Iran Appears to Be Pre-Empting the US’ Attack Strategy
By Robert Inlakesh | Palestine Chronicle | July 15, 2026
The US Trump administration sought to weaponize diplomacy once again against the Islamic Republic of Iran and implement a surprise attack strategy – this time, Tehran appears to have preempted the American-Israeli plot.
The Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) officially died this week, but in reality it was terminated on June 26 with the Lebanon-Israel deal that Washington brokered. The reason why was simple: the United States decided to print on paper a new deal that violated the former by granting Israel de facto permission to maintain a belligerent occupation of southern Lebanese lands.
Throughout the month that the MoU technically held, the US committed various violations of a number of clauses of the agreement, including by direct threats from Donald Trump himself to assassinate the entire Iranian negotiating team. But the Lebanon issue was far more indicative of where things were heading than the limited skirmishes in the Persian Gulf and threats to commit war crimes.
Clause 1 of the MoU concerned the ensuring of the war’s termination on all fronts, with Lebanon being explicitly mentioned. Tehran made it clear that this meant a full withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from southern Lebanon and the protection of Lebanese sovereignty.
Instead of implementing the clause, Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu coordinated a careful approach to the Lebanon war, one that would not result in a withdrawal or end to the war, while simultaneously being careful not to provoke any Iranian retaliatory strikes. Therefore, the US worked with Israel to develop a new conspiracy. This involved the use of the US-proxy regime in Beirut to stir division within Lebanon, an attempt to force the Lebanese army to clash with Hezbollah, combined with an initiative to pressure neighboring Syria to invade the Bekaa Valley region in order to take on Hezbollah.
Meanwhile, as this plot was developing, the Israelis returned to the pre-March 2 status quo more or less in Lebanon – Hezbollah froze its retaliatory operations, while Israel continued to blow up civilian homes, bomb on a lower scale, while maintaining its presence inside south Lebanon.
A US military advisory force is being deployed to Beirut in order to guide the Lebanese army on its newly agreed-upon mission to clash with Hezbollah, the stated goal of which is to disarm the movement. Speculation also has it that the US may even be considering deploying thousands of combat troops into Lebanon in order to help prop up the regime in Beirut if the situation goes sideways, although this assertion is yet to be fully substantiated.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has been documenting the ongoing mobilization and military buildup along the Lebanese-Syria border, as Trump himself has repeatedly stated in public that he seeks to use Syria’s forces to invade Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s sudden silence and lack of operations indicate that it has been taking these threats very seriously. Fighting Israel alone has been a battle that it has proven capable of managing, but preparations to fight US-proxies inside Lebanon, the possible collapse of the Lebanese Army into warring factions, and combating a Syrian invasion all demand new defensive and even perhaps offensive preparations.
Iran, for its part, was clearly also coordinated more heavily with Yemen’s Ansarallah leadership. The Yemen front never fully opened during the war earlier this year. Tehran openly challenged Saudi Arabia’s blockade on Yemen, while Ansarallah was mobilizing its forces and declared that it would fight to break the blockade. When Riyadh took the decision to strike Sana’a International Airport, this reopened the Yemen-Saudi War for the first time since early 2022, collapsing the UN-brokered ceasefire.
Yemen’s role in the renewal of the regional war will add major pressure, especially as it holds the card to shut down the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, imposing a blockade in the Red Sea that will choke the global economy further than it has been under the pressure of the Strait of Hormuz blockade. Ansarallah’s capabilities have also significantly developed since 2022, meaning that they will be able to aid Iran in their war efforts against targets in the Arabian Peninsula.
If the US succeeds in pressuring Damascus to launch an assault on Lebanon, then Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) have already threatened to enter the fight on the ground. The PMU would likely seek to seize areas in eastern Syria, like Deir Ezzor, which would open up new supply lines inside Syrian territory and put enormous pressure on its forces.
A US-Israeli plot to collapse the Lebanese State in order to weaken Hezbollah is a major gamble to say the least, one which will inevitably lead to a rise in regional sectarianism. It is also very likely that Arab Gulf media will also act to portray the conflict as a new Sunni-Shia war, as they begin to take more active roles in support of the US-Israeli war effort.
Ultimately, it appears as if the Iranians are not taking any chances and are being proactive, which has been reflected in the scale of their strikes on US assets in the region, including a surprise attack that took out US ATACMS missiles in Kuwait earlier this week.
A return to full-scale war this time around could trigger a series of conflicts that will spiral out of control and thus make any easy off-ramp impossible. The Global economic repercussions will be horrendous, as the only end to the war is total victory or total defeat. The US will be put in a position where it will be forced to withdraw from the region, while Israel is betting on the idea of Iran being significantly weakened as a result of the conflict’s continuation.
No side appears to be backing down, so unless the US suddenly decides to perform a 180-degree pivot in its approach, West Asia is about to erupt into total chaos.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine. He contributed this article to The Palestine Chronicle.
The monopoly of arms: Why the doctrine is enforced only where resistance exists
By Sondoss Al Asaad | Al Mayadeen | July 15, 2026
For decades, the slogan of “restricting arms to the state” has been presented as a universal principle of sovereignty and state-building. Yet a closer geopolitical examination reveals a striking inconsistency: the doctrine is aggressively promoted in countries like Lebanon and Iraq, while it is largely absent from discussions in surrounding countries such as Syria, Libya, or other fragmented states where multiple armed actors continue to exist.
This selective application raises an uncomfortable question: Is the objective truly the consolidation of state authority, or is the slogan primarily employed where armed movements challenge Israeli military superiority and American hegemony?
Political philosopher Carl Schmitt argues that sovereignty ultimately belongs to whoever decides the exception.
Modern geopolitical practice appears to confirm his observation. The international order invokes legal principles selectively, depending on whether they reinforce or undermine prevailing strategic interests. The debate over arms, therefore, is not merely legal; it is profoundly political.
The Lebanese case illustrates this contradiction with exceptional clarity.
Following the November 2024 ceasefire, “Hezbollah withdrew from the north of the Litani River and ‘accepted’ that decisions regarding war and peace would rest exclusively with the Lebanese state and its armed forces”. The expectation promoted by Western capitals was that this would allegedly strengthen Lebanese sovereignty and reduce tensions.
The reality unfolded differently; the Israeli enemy, unable to establish a lasting foothold inside southern Lebanese villages during sixty-six days of warfare, achieved after the ceasefire what military operations had failed to accomplish. It maintained positions inside Lebanese territory, continued near-daily airstrikes across Lebanon, and expanded targeted assassinations while facing little meaningful deterrence.
The sequence of events inevitably fuelled a renewed domestic debate. If sovereignty means that only the state possesses weapons, what happens when the state itself lacks the capacity to prevent violations of its own borders?
This dilemma reflects what Thomas Hobbes identified centuries ago as the fundamental purpose of political authority: providing security.
The legitimacy of the state rests not merely on possessing legal authority but on its ability to protect those living under its jurisdiction. When that capacity weakens, alternative security arrangements inevitably emerge.
The issue extends beyond Lebanon; In Iraq, international pressure consistently emphasizes integrating or dismantling armed resistance groups under the banner of state monopoly over force. Yet comparable urgency is rarely directed toward states where numerous militias continue to operate without challenging Israeli strategic dominance.
Syria offers another revealing comparison. Multiple foreign militaries, including American, Turkish, and Israeli forces, remain active on Syrian territory alongside various local armed factions.
Libya remains fragmented among competing military authorities and militias. Yet the international discourse seldom revolves around an immediate imperative to monopolize arms before broader political settlements are achieved.
Such inconsistencies have led many observers to conclude that the slogan itself is not universally applied but strategically deployed.
French philosopher Michel Foucault argued that power operates through discourse by defining what becomes accepted as common sense.
The phrase “arms outside the state” has increasingly become one such discourse. It transforms a complex security equation into a simplified legal formula while avoiding a more difficult question: Can sovereignty exist when a state cannot defend its territory?
Million-strong crowds fill Najaf streets for Khamenei funeral as Iraq declares public holiday
MEMO | July 8, 2026
Million-strong crowds filled the streets of Iraq’s holy city of Najaf on Wednesday as funeral ceremonies for Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, began. His coffin will be taken to Karbala before returning to Iran for burial in Mashhad, bringing to an end a week-long farewell.
Iranian leaders sought to reflect Khamenei’s status during the ceremonies. He led the Islamic Republic for nearly four decades before being killed in US-Israeli strikes on his residence in Tehran on 28 February, attacks that marked the start of the Middle East war.
Khamenei’s funeral in Iraq coincided with renewed tensions between Iran and the United States over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, which was a major flashpoint during the regional conflict.
The US military said it had carried out strikes on more than 80 Iranian targets in response to attacks on three ships in the Strait of Hormuz that Washington blamed on Tehran. In response, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it had targeted dozens of US military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait.
Khamenei’s coffin arrived at Najaf International Airport late on Tuesday, where it was received by Iraqi officials, including Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi and other political and military figures.
Iraq declared Wednesday a public holiday to allow citizens to take part in the funeral ceremonies before the coffin returns to Iran for the final burial in Mashhad.
Explainer: Which foreign delegations attended the funeral of martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution?
Press TV – July 4, 2026
The funeral ceremony for the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, brought together one of the largest gatherings of foreign dignitaries in Iran in recent decades, with representatives from across Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, and major international organizations attending the event in Tehran.
The delegations included presidents, prime ministers, parliamentary speakers, foreign ministers, senior government officials, political leaders, and representatives of religious organizations and resistance movements, underscoring the broad international participation in the ceremony.
Asia
Asia accounted for the largest share of official delegations.
From West Asia, Iraq sent one of the largest delegations, including Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, senior officials, and representatives of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Saudi Arabia was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Al-Khuraiji, while Oman sent the chairman of its State Council and Qatar was represented by Parliament Speaker Hassan bin Abdullah Al Ghanim.
Shia community representatives also attended from Bahrain and several other Persian Gulf countries.
Lebanon dispatched Defense Minister Michel Menassa alongside senior delegations from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.
Yemen was represented by Vice President Mahmoud al-Junaid and an Ansarullah delegation.
Palestinian groups also attended, including senior Hamas leaders and Islamic Jihad Secretary-General Ziyad al-Nakhalah.
From the wider Asian region, Pakistan sent one of the highest-level foreign delegations, headed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir. The delegation also included the Senate speaker, senior government officials, and religious leaders.
Afghanistan was represented by delegations from the Taliban administration and the Afghan resistance.
India sent a special government envoy at the deputy foreign minister level.
China was represented by He Wei, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
Tajik President Emomali Rahmon attended the ceremony in person, while Armenia was represented by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Georgia sent President Mikheil Kavelashvili along with a Muslim delegation.
Türkiye dispatched Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, together with political and party representatives.
Turkmenistan was represented by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, Chairman of the People’s Council and National Leader.
Among other participants were Azerbaijan’s parliament speaker, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister; the parliamentary speakers of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka; Thailand’s deputy prime minister; Malaysia’s agriculture minister; Myanmar’s special envoy; and official delegations from South Korea and North Korea.
Africa
Several African governments were represented by ministerial- or cabinet-level delegations.
Egypt sent its Senate speaker.
South Africa, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Tanzania, and Tunisia all sent official representatives.
Nigeria and Senegal also dispatched delegations to participate in the funeral ceremonies.
Europe and the Americas
Russia sent Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, as President Vladimir Putin’s special representative.
Belarus was represented by its parliament speaker, while Serbia sent its communications minister. Bulgaria also dispatched parliamentary and political representatives.
Germany was represented by members of the country’s Shia community.
From Latin America, Cuba sent its higher education minister as a special representative, while Nicaragua was represented by Foreign Minister Valdrack Jaentschke.
International organizations
The ceremony also drew senior representatives of several international organizations.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was represented by Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev, while the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) sent Deputy Secretary-General Tariq Ali Bakheet.
The D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) were represented by their respective secretaries-general.
Iraq sets Sept. 30 deadline for resistance groups to hand over arms amid US pressure
Press TV – June 29, 2026
Iraq has set a late-September deadline for resistance groups to hand over their weapons to the state, as Washington pressures Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi to expedite the disarmament of anti-American factions.
“The end of next September will be the ultimate date for the surrender of weapons,” stated government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi during a press conference on Monday.
He added, “Simultaneously, the [US-led] international coalition will withdraw.”
Under Zaidi’s leadership, the Iraqi government has initiated a renewed effort to disarm armed groups and limit weapon possession to state control. The initiative receives substantial support from Washington, which has long advocated for the disarmament of such groups, many of which are part of the anti-American Resistance in Iraq coalition.
Zaidi, who has received robust backing from the US since assuming office in May, is scheduled to visit Washington in mid-July.
Earlier in June, he met with US envoy to Iraq Tom Barrack, where both emphasized the necessity of ensuring “the complete disarmament and disbandment” of non-state armed groups.
The disarmament process is also expected to coincides with the withdrawal of the US-led coalition purportedly formed to fight against the Daesh Takfiri terrorist group from Iraq, as per an agreement between Washington and Baghdad.
Since the establishment of Iraq’s new cabinet, several resistance factions have expressed their willingness to surrender their weapons and integrate into the state security apparatus.
The Iraqi government’s deadline comes at the same time as a significant anti-corruption purge initiated by Zaidi, resulting in the arrest of at least 67 high-ranking officials and lawmakers. Among those arrested was Muthanna al-Samarrai, a prominent Sunni politician and leader of the Azm Alliance.
“This anti-corruption narrative is distinct from its predecessors, and safeguarding public funds is a duty that remains unaffected by individuals or circumstances,” Aboudi emphasized, asserting that the anti-corruption campaign “will not cease.”
Why Iran’s Retaliation for Israel’s Attack on Beirut is a Regional Game Changer
By Robert Inlakesh | The Palestine Chronicle | June 10, 2026
Iran’s ballistic missile response to Israel’s attack on Beirut is a game-changer for the power dynamics of West Asian politics. The ‘Unity of Squares’ concept has officially led to a NATO-style defense pact developing between the members of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance.
When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to strike the southern suburbs of Beirut last Monday, the immediate threat issued by the leadership in Tehran forced him to take a step back. Ultimately, the US and Israel would delay the implementation of the decision to attack the Lebanese Capital, then suffering an overwhelming response that outperformed expectations.
The first detail to consider here is that the mere threat of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launching strikes on Israeli targets forced Tel Aviv and Washington to take a step back, meaning that both de facto admitted that Tehran maintains deterrence power. Then came the Israeli strike on the southern suburbs this Sunday, which was extremely limited and nothing of the nature of what Netanyahu had originally advertised.
A weak strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs, which had no actual impact on Hezbollah whatsoever, indicates that the US-Israeli alliance acted in order to save face, seeking to test Iran’s resolve, but also to leave space for it to retreat from all-out war.
Following Iran’s missile waves, which struck Ramat David Airbase – according to satellite imagery evidence – the Israelis decided to launch an attack on Iran. Although they did target at least three radar sites and a petrochemical company, amongst other targets, it was clear that the Israeli attack was lackluster; designed primarily to give them the veneer of having risen to confront the IRGC. No Iranians were killed in the Israeli attack, and the majority of the sites hit were previously struck during the 40-day war earlier this year.
It was clear that the IRGC had prepared for the Israeli counter-strike, not only unleashing an attack of its own on Israeli companies and military sites in response but also coordinating its retaliatory action with Yemen’s Ansarallah.
As the Israelis were playing catch-up, the Iranians were implementing a carefully calibrated phase two of their promised retaliation to Israel’s attack on Beirut– that being the inclusion of new fronts. The IRGC had previously warned Tel Aviv that the war would expand to other fronts; the Yemeni Armed Forces achieved precisely this.
Ansarallah has declared that the Bab al-Mandab Strait is now closed to Israeli shipping, returning to the equation imposed in support of Gaza until October of 2025, when the ceasefire was signed. Yemen then went a step further and vowed to totally close Bab al-Mandab, should the war escalate further. This would represent an enormous economic blow to the global economy, considering the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
The concept of the ‘Unity of Squares’ was originally developed by former Secretary General of Lebanese Hezbollah, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, and before him Iran’s former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani. In essence, it was the idea of linking all of the fronts of the Axis of Resistance so that none would stand alone. On October 8, 2023, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah put this into action by immediately intervening on the side of the Palestinian resistance in Gaza. Soon thereafter, Ansarallah would follow, and to a lesser extent, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.
Israel had long bragged that its assassination of Nasrallah had broken this Unity of Squares dynamic, because Hezbollah was forced into accepting a less-than-favorable ceasefire in late 2024. It was because of Nasrallah’s refusal to abandon Gaza “no matter where it takes the region”, that Tel Aviv had decided to kill him. Therefore, it is accurate to say that the former Hezbollah leader quite literally gave his life for Gaza.
Benjamin Netanyahu’s quest to achieve “total victory” in his 7-front war has not proven successful, but one major step towards that was managing to break the idea of the Unity of Squares. Through Iran’s actions this Sunday, that “success” was just undone.
The IRGC has also recently been insisting that Gaza be included in their ceasefire agreement, something that a number of statements released by Hamas also appear to be indicating will be the case. If the Islamic Republic does impose its will on the US-Israeli alliance by setting in stone the equation that an attack on one is an attack on all, the Unity of Squares equation will be imposed fully, as it was originally intended. In the past, it was never fully implemented because of Iran’s absence as a front that could easily open.
The implications of this equation coming to life are that the Iranian-led Axis will undoubtedly be the most powerful alliance in the region. Not because they necessarily possess the most firepower and capabilities, but because they will together be able to cut off key international chokepoints, while battering their adversaries in a way that can achieve strategic deterrence.
It should be noted that this is a direct result of the US-Israeli failure in their war of aggression to achieve any of their goals. Instead of weakening Tehran, their reckless aggression and arrogance may have just undone the tactical victories they previously achieved, pushing Iran into the position that many previously argued it should have assumed sooner after October 7, 2023. Unless Tel Aviv and Washington find a way to reverse this, this will represent a major historic shift in regional power dynamics.
– Robert Inlakesh is a journalist, writer, and documentary filmmaker. He focuses on the Middle East, specializing in Palestine.
Iran denies attacking Saudi Arabia, warns of Israeli false-flag
The Cradle | June 8, 2026
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei denied reports alleging that Iran targeted Saudi Arabia on 8 June, cautioning that such claims could be linked to potential “false-flag operations” conducted in Iran’s name.
Baghaei stressed that Tehran publicly takes responsibility for any military action it carries out and noted that no statement had been issued by Iran confirming the reported incident.
He further said Iran has repeatedly warned about the possibility of false-flag operations, claiming that Israel and other actors have previously carried out similar actions, including during the most recent US-Israeli war on the Islamic Republic.
His comments came after missile alert sirens were activated in the Saudi city of Al-Kharj, home to Prince Sultan Air Base, a facility long used by US forces, just hours after Israel launched renewed strikes against Iran on Monday morning.
Since the US-Israeli war on Iran began in late February, Tehran has frequently argued that many of the strikes blamed on its forces were actually “false-flag” operations staged by its enemies, designed to draw Gulf states further into the war.
On 4 June, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dismissed reports that it targeted the terminal at Kuwait International Airport, saying the alleged visual evidence was a “crude fabrication.”
While acknowledging midnight strikes on regional US bases, Iranian officials noted that footage of the airport explosion was recorded in daylight.
In April, the IRGC accused Israel of being behind the strike on a Kuwaiti desalination plant to incite regional tensions further.
This followed a similar denial regarding a 30 March attack on a Kuwaiti power facility, which Tehran also blamed on Israel.
On 4 April, the IRGC further rejected claims that it struck the US Embassy in Riyadh in the opening days of the war, asserting the drone attack was “certainly carried out by Zionists.”
Iran’s Foreign Ministry said on 15 March that the US and Israel were using “Lucas” drones – modeled after the cheap and effective Iranian Shahed – to conduct false-flag operations and attribute them to Tehran.
The IRGC military headquarters, Khatam al-Anbiya, stated that such “deceptions” included attacks in Turkiye and Iraq.
Earlier in March, Iranian military sources described a drone strike on the Ras Tanura refinery in Saudi Arabia as an Israeli false flag designed to distract from strikes inside Iran and draw the Gulf states into further hostilities against the Islamic Republic.
Tucker Carlson also claimed in March that Saudi Arabia and Qatar had detained Israeli agents who were planning bombings in their countries.
Kata’ib Hezbollah warns Jordan over allowing US-Israeli reconnaissance missions against Iraq
Press TV – May 19, 2026
The Kata’ib Hezbollah resistance movement has warned the Amman government against ongoing reconnaissance missions launched by the United States and Israel from Jordanian soil against Iraqi resistance fighters, particularly the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU).
“In the wake of unfolding developments across the region and US-Israeli actions against Iraq’s security and stability, the enemies are aggressively seeking to escalate tensions against the (Iraqi) resistance front and the PMU,” Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, the security chief of the group, said in a statement on Monday evening.
He warned that the patience of heroic resistance fighters in the face of blatant Israeli violations of ceasefire agreements and recurrent acts of aggression against Iraq’s national sovereignty is about to run out.
Assaf noted that the bulk of US and Israeli surveillance missions are being launched from Jordan, warning that this serves as a prelude for attacks against Iraq.
The Jordanian government, therefore, is strongly advised to take lessons from missile and drone operations conducted in retaliation for the US-Israeli war of aggression against Iran, as “patience is starting to run out,” the senior Kata’ib Hezbollah official emphasized.
He further said that the US and Israel, based on received information, are preparing for a fresh round of strikes against commanders of Iraqi resistance groups and the PMU, commonly known by its Arabic name Hashd al-Sha’abi.
Assaf warned Washington and Tel Aviv against any strikes on Iraq, stressing that the response to such a folly would be comprehensive, and the United States would have to shoulder responsibility for all serious repercussions in such a case.
The remarks come as US military aircraft have been scrambling over the past few days to transfer personnel and munitions from one military installation to another across Iraq.
