Abelardo De la Espriella’s Victory Renews Pressure on Venezuela

José Niño Unfiltered | June 26, 2026
Colombia elected Abelardo de la Espriella as its next president on June 21, 2026, delivering the country’s leadership to a man who spent nearly a decade publicly calling for the violent overthrow of Venezuela’s socialist government. His victory over leftist Senator Iván Cepeda by fewer than 250,000 votes marks a dramatic rightward shift for a nation that shares a porous 1,400-mile border with Venezuela and hosts millions of Venezuelan refugees.
De la Espriella takes office on August 7, 2026. If Brazil’s November presidential election delivers Flávio Bolsonaro to the Planalto Palace, the two largest nations bordering Venezuela will be governed by leaders who have explicitly endorsed forceful regime change in Caracas. Combined with the apparent willingness of acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez to cooperate with Washington, the conditions may finally exist for completing what the Trump administration attempted and failed to accomplish in 2019.
De la Espriella’s hostility toward Caracas is neither recent nor cautious. He first articulated his position on Venezuela during a 2018 appearance on Peruvian TV personality Jaime Bayly’s Miami television program. According to to his own subsequent writings, he urged Venezuelans to commit tyrannicide against Nicolás Maduro. Days later he published a column titled “Death to the Tyrant” in Barranquilla’s El Heraldo, writing that “the death of Nicolás Maduro becomes necessary to guarantee the survival of the Republic.”
When U.S. forces captured Maduro in January 2026, de la Espriella publicly celebrated, claiming he had predicted it years earlier. He sold the American operation not as an “invasion” but as “the arrest of an international criminal and head of the Cartel de los Soles,” arguing that Washington acted according to the law due to Venezuela’s alleged lack of institutional legitimacy.
His campaign platform explicitly called for a renewed military alliance with Washington. In February, De la Espriella announced that he would immediately begin “bombing the camps of the narco-terrorists and spraying drug crops,” adding that “this cannot be done without a strategic alliance with the United States and the State of Israel.” He marketed this as a 90-day security plan modeled on Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele’s approach, promising to retake national territory through joint task forces, aerial bombardment of criminal camps, fumigation of 330,000 hectares of coca, and the construction of 10 mega-prisons in remote jungle locations. He has also promised to establish American military bases on Colombian territory as part of a comprehensive security restructuring.
Colombia may soon find a partner in this posture across its longest border. Five months after de la Espriella’s inauguration, Brazilians will decide their own presidential election. Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, has made Venezuela the centerpiece of his campaign against incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
When Maduro was kidnapped in January, Flávio immediately seized on the moment. He posted that “Venezuela has become one of the most extreme examples of how an authoritarian regime can destroy a nation,” calling Maduro a “narcoterrorist.” At the time, his brother Eduardo texted him saying “you are elected president, because we know that a lot of things will come out of Maduro,” predicting that Maduro’s capture would expose Lula’s ties to the Venezuelan regime.
At CPAC in March 2026, Flávio displayed a photograph of Lula embracing Maduro to a crowd that booed loudly. He accused Lula of maintaining ties with leftist dictatorships through the São Paulo Forum, which he described as a network linking Lula, Cuban communism, and drug cartels. Brazil’s Supreme Court opened an investigation into Flávio for defamation, which he denounced as political censorship.
Flávio took Lula to task for “publicly criticizing President Trump’s actions on Venezuela, Iran, Cuba, and the fight against drug trafficking.” He pledged that under his presidency, Brazil would serve as a reliable U.S. partner rather than an opponent on these issues. Reuters polling in late October shows Flávio and Lula locked in a statistical tie heading into the October first round.
What these leaders propose is not new. Washington reached for it in 2019. The Trump administration’s first attempt to topple Maduro collapsed in spectacular fashion. National Security Adviser John Bolton appeared at a January 28, 2019 press conference at the White House with a notepad reading “5,000 troops to Colombia,” held visibly in front of cameras while announcing new oil sanctions against Venezuela’s state company PDVSA—signaling Washington’s interest in using Colombian territory as a staging ground for military pressure on Caracas. Colombia’s Foreign Minister Carlos Holmes Trujillo Garcia said his government had no knowledge of what the note meant.
On February 23, 2019, a U.S.-backed humanitarian aid plot from Cúcuta ended in violence when Venezuelan security forces blocked the convoy with tear gas and rubber bullets. According to a USAID Office of Inspector General report, only 8 of 368 metric tons of aid actually reached Venezuela—the rest was distributed inside Colombia or shipped to Somalia.
The failure at Cúcuta had a quieter companion in Brazil. The Brazilian military establishment proved decisive in blocking regional intervention. Vice President Hamilton Mourão, a retired general, stated flatly that “under no circumstances” would Brazil allow the U.S. to use its territory for military action against Venezuela. He emphasized that “nobody is betting on a military solution.”
Brazil’s Vice President Hamilton Mourão stated firmly that the United States could not use Brazilian territory to invade Venezuela. Senior Brazilian military figures similarly warned against being drawn into a conflict that could make their forces a buffer between American and Venezuelan troops. The military’s resistance held even as President Jair Bolsonaro gave ambiguous public signals, while gesturing toward all options, he acknowledged that the possibility of intervention was “near-zero.”
That said, what failed in 2019 may succeed in 2027 because Venezuela’s current leadership appears willing to cooperate with Washington in ways Maduro never would. A CIA authored classified assessment, reported by the Wall Street Journal, identified Delcy Rodríguez as the best suited candidate to lead a transitional government. Days after Maduro’s capture, Rodríguez was sworn in as acting president on January 5, 2026. On January 15, CIA Director John Ratcliffe traveled to Caracas for a two-hour meeting with Rodríguez—the highest-ranking Trump administration official to visit Venezuela since Maduro’s removal—to deliver the message that “the United States looks forward to an improved working relationship.” The meeting came at the personal urging of President Donald Trump, who had spoken with Rodríguez by phone the previous day and called her “a terrific person,” writing on Truth Social that “we are making tremendous progress, as we help Venezuela stabilize and recover.”
The optics devastated hardline Chavistas. Mario Silva, host of the flagship pro-government propaganda program La Hojilla on state television VTV, accused Rodríguez of treason. In a May 2026 broadcast, he accused her inner circle of negotiating Venezuela’s future with Washington “behind the movement’s back.” He reportedly went further in a YouTube video, suggesting that Rodríguez was the only figure in the Venezuela government in touch with the CIA prior to January 3.
If such allegations prove to be true, smart money suggests Rodríguez would fold under sustained pressure from a multinational coalition. Trump has already removed her from DEA and OFAC sanctions lists despite the DEA having classified her as a “priority target” for drug trafficking as recently as 2022. She oversaw the deportation of diplomat Alex Saab directly to the United States after the Maduro government had fought for years to free him.
The Latin American Right has been ascendant for half a decade. Javier Milei in Argentina. Daniel Noboa in Ecuardo. José Antonio Kast in Chile. Now Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia. If Flávio Bolsonaro wins Brazil’s November election, the two largest economies bordering Venezuela will both be governed by leaders who have explicitly endorsed American pressure campaigns against Caracas.
De la Espriella’s campaign pledged to restore the cooperative relationship with Washington that existed before Gustavo Petro. Flávio Bolsonaro has promised to align Brazil with U.S. pressure campaigns. With Rodríguez already meeting CIA directors in Caracas and following Washington’s orders on matters like Saab’s deportation, the path toward a final resolution of Venezuela’s political crisis may be shorter than anyone anticipated.
What Brazil’s generals blocked in 2019 may prove irrelevant in 2027 if Flávio Bolsonaro controls the presidency and appoints loyalists to military commands. What Colombia’s Ivan Duque hesitated to support may become explicit policy under de la Espriella. And what Maduro would never accept, Rodríguez appears willing to negotiate.
The question is no longer whether a multinational coalition will pressure Venezuela toward elections. The question is whether Rodríguez will call those elections voluntarily or wait until Colombian and Brazilian forces mass on her borders with American backing.
One thing is clear: the political crisis in Venezuela is far from over.
