Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – May 30, 2026
Prof. Glenn Diesen on Neutrality Studies – May 30, 2026
NATO’s proxy war in Ukraine is morphing into a direct EU-Russia war. And the war hawks in Brussels are further escalating by attacking civilians in the Donbas and Russia proper. The doves in the Kremlin are running out of options to keep their own hawks under wraps. As things stand now, an all-out EU-Russia war is not only a possible, but by now a likely scenario. But to what end?
By Jose Nino | Occidental Observer | May 30, 2026
For decades, prominent Jewish voices have wrestled privately with an uncomfortable question. Does aggressive Israeli government conduct expose diaspora Jewish communities to backlash they did not invite? In early March, Ezra Klein brought that question back into public view. Speaking with former Obama senior adviser Ben Rhodes on a podcast episode titled “The Great Lie of War”, the New York Times columnist warned that Israel’s central role in the joint U.S. assault on Iran could fuel a new wave of antisemitism.
The two men spent most of the interview discussing the strategic recklessness of the Iran operation where the United States and Israel launched an assault that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and much of his senior command. They examined the lack of congressional authorization, the absence of an endgame, the risk of a massive refugee crisis, and what they described as Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-sought goal of drawing the United States into direct military confrontation with Iran.
The antisemitism remark came near the end of that segment, specifically as a follow-on to a discussion about Saudi ambivalence toward the war and the question of what Israel actually wants from the conflict. Klein’s exact words in the transcript were, “I’m not saying this is the biggest issue at this moment, but the centrality of Israel in the operation has raised some concerns for me about what this is going to mean for anti-Semitism. You see the amount of talk on the MAGA right, but elsewhere as well that, you know, Israel’s leverage over Donald Trump or that, you know, this is all just some kind of Israeli plot.”
Klein then noted that Netanyahu appeared to be gambling with Israel’s long term political standing in America and in the world at a time of “very, very sharply rising anti-Semitism,” expressing uncertainty about how it would all pan out. The New York Times columnist’s concern, stated plainly, was that Israel’s highly visible, central role in what many perceived as an unjustified war of aggression would fuel conspiracy theories rather than defuse them. His worry was that Netanyahu’s short-term tactical success, finally getting a U.S. president to strike Iran, risked long-term consequences for Jews, especially in the United States.
This dilemma is not new. Jewish billionaire George Soros articulated a similar concern over two decades ago. Soros has largely steered clear of public association with Jewish communal life and seldom appears at exclusively Jewish functions. That changed in 2003, when he took the stage at a New York City meeting hosted by the Jewish Funders Network. Questioned about the spread of antisemitism across Europe, Soros offered an unexpected diagnosis, laying blame at the feet of U.S. and Israeli policy. “There is a resurgence of anti-Semitism in Europe. The policies of the Bush administration and the Sharon administration contribute to that,” he stated. “If we change that direction, then anti-Semitism also will diminish. I can’t see how one could confront it directly.”
At the time, the reaction from Jewish leadership was furious. Elan Steinberg, who served as senior adviser to the World Jewish Congress after a stint as its executive director, fired back. “Let’s understand things clearly: Anti-Semitism is not caused by Jews; it’s caused by anti-Semites.” Abraham Foxman dismissed Soros’s words as “absolutely obscene.” The head of the ADL elaborated. “He buys into the stereotype. It’s a simplistic, counterproductive, biased and bigoted perception of what’s out there. It’s blaming the victim for all of Israel’s and the Jewish people’s ills.”
The Foxman and Steinberg responses reflected an orthodox position within Jewish communal leadership. Antisemitism, in this view, is a pathology of antisemites, and any attempt to link it to Israeli behavior constitutes victim blaming. Yet this position has always co-existed uneasily with a practical awareness that Israeli actions, particularly those perceived as disproportionate or aggressive, create public relations challenges for diaspora Jewish communities.
Klein’s 2026 remarks fall squarely within this tension. He was warning that Netanyahu’s gamble, making Israel so visibly central to an unpopular war, would hand ammunition to those who already believed such theories. Polling data suggests that Klein’s concerns about Israel’s political standing are well-founded. Gallup’s 2025 Annual World Affairs Survey documented a broader collapse in American sentiment toward Israel. Only 46% of Americans sympathized with Israelis, the lowest figure in 25 years of Gallup tracking. Among Democrats, 59% sympathized more with Palestinians—with only 21% sympathizing with Israelis—creating a nearly 3-to-1 ratio, the first time Palestinians had held such a commanding lead among members of a major U.S. party. A majority of Americans, and a record-high 76% of Democrats, supported an independent Palestinian state.
These trends predate the Iran strike and reflect cumulative damage from Israel’s conduct in Gaza. The joint United States and Israel operation against Iran, with Israel’s role so prominently featured, is unlikely to reverse this trajectory and will more than likely heighten Western populations’ hostility toward Israel. The polling numbers bear this out.
The Jewish People Policy Institute found that only 28% of strong liberal Jews support the war while 62% oppose it. Support climbs to 100% among strong conservative Jews. The partisan split is even more dramatic. Trump voters among American Jews back the war at 99%, while Harris voters divide 47% to 42%.
The picture among Americans generally looks very different. Pew Research found that 59% of Americans said the United States made the wrong decision in using military force and 61% disapprove of Trump’s handling of the conflict. An AP-NORC poll found that 59% of Americans believe U.S. military action has gone “too far,” while a Quinnipiac survey reported 74% oppose sending U.S. ground troops into Iran. The immediate unpopularity of the Iran war combined with Israel’s sullied image as a result of the Gaza genocide may explain why elements of American Jewry are embracing certain forms of controlled opposition to the Netanyahu regime, while stopping short of criticizing the entire Zionist project and its thoroughly Jewish nature.
It should be said that rational anti-Semitism is never about all Jews. Klein’s worry that “Jewish communities globally could be stained with guilt by association in the eyes of those who conflate the Israeli government with all Jews” should be seen as relying on the idea that anti-Semitism refers to complaints about “all Jews.” Most commonly complaints about Jews rely on understanding where the power of the Jewish community is directed, and in this case it’s obvious that the mainstream Jewish community in the U.S. and its powerful lobbying organizations (here and here) are entirely on board with the war. This is especially true in the Trump administration where the more conservative elements of the Jewish community, including Chabad Lubavitch, have increased their influence greatly.
It is simply that their vision [of conservative Jewish groups] for Jewish flourishing in America is radically at odds with the basic assumptions that have grounded American Jewish politics for much of the last century: chiefly, that Jewish interests are best served by the separation of religion and state; that American Jews are best protected through multiethnic, pluralistic coalitions rather than an alliance with the Christian majority; and that the invisibility of Jewish group interests is preferable to visible Jewish particularity.
Ezra Klein’s warnings about the centrality of Israel in the Iran war are a tacit admission that the Jewish establishment has lost its ability to operate from behind a veil. By leveraging control over U.S. administrations to initiate wars of choice, this power structure has forced a public reckoning that no amount of image-polishing can reverse. History has repeatedly shown that Jewish overreach eventually triggers an immune response from the host population.
We are currently in the midst of that reaction, and the path forward lies in the unapologetic identification and systematic dismantling of the Jewish influence networks that have compromised the highest levels of our government and financial institutions.
Press TV – May 30, 2026
An Iranian ballistic missile attack on a Kuwaiti air base has wounded several American military personnel and caused serious damage to two US MQ-9 Reaper drones, according to a new report.
The American news outlet Bloomberg, citing an informed source, said in a report published on Saturday that the attack on the Ali Al Salem Air Base resulted in minor injuries to approximately five individuals, including US service members and contractors.
It also caused significant damage to two MQ-9 Reaper drones, with one reportedly destroyed and another heavily damaged. Each drone is valued at around $30 million.
According to Bloomberg, Kuwaiti air defences intercepted an Iranian Fateh-110 missile before it reached its intended target. However, debris from the intercepted projectile fell onto the US-operated Ali Al Salem Air Base, causing the injuries and damage.
The latest development comes amid heightened tensions between Washington and Tehran.
On Thursday, US Central Command (CENTCOM) claimed that Iran had launched a missile toward Kuwait, describing the action as a “gross violation of the ceasefire.”
In a statement issued later in the day, Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) said it had deliberately targeted the US base, noting that it had been used to launch an earlier American attack.
The IRGC went on to say that US forces had conducted a strike using aerial projectiles against a location near Bandar Abbas airport earlier that morning, describing its missile attack as a warning to the US.
It also vowed that any future acts of aggression would be met with a stronger response, stressing that responsibility for any escalation would rest with the party initiating hostile actions.
The US and Israel started an aggression against Iran on February 28, some eight months after they carried out unprovoked attacks on the country.
Iran began to swiftly retaliate against the strikes by launching a barrage of missiles and drone attacks on the Israeli-occupied territories as well as on US bases in regional countries.
On April 8, forty days into the war, a Pakistan-brokered temporary ceasefire between Iran and the US took effect.
Negotiations ensued in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, but stopped short of an agreement amid Washington’s maximalist demands and insistence on unreasonable positions.
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – May 29, 2026
By Dr Oroub El-Abed | MEMO | May 29, 2026
The War on Gaza continues and has not stopped. It is even expanding to wider geography of displacement and has been unfolding across the Eastern Mediterranean. The Zionists are empowered to widen their gradual restructuring of the land: depopulating borderlands, fragmenting societies, erasing cultural landscapes, and normalising permanent instability across the whole of Palestine, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria.
This week, the Israeli military ordered the immediate evacuation of the ancient Lebanese city of Tyre. Tyre A city that carries thousands of years of Mediterranean history, Phoenician heritage, trade, memory, and civilization was suddenly reduced to a military target. Residents were ordered to move north of the Zahrani River as Israeli bombardment intensified across southern Lebanon despite the language of a “ceasefire.” Entire communities were once again placed on the road during Eid, carrying children, blankets, medicine, and fragments of home while others elsewhere exchanged sweets and celebratory visits.
The symbolism of Tyre matters. Cities like Tyre are archives of human civilization. Their ports, neighbourhoods, cemeteries, mosques, churches, markets, and coastal life embody centuries of coexistence and cultural production. When such places are emptied, bombed, or transformed into militarized zones, the damage extends beyond physical destruction. A civilization itself becomes vulnerable to erasure.
The same logic that devastated Gaza is now visibly extending outward. In Gaza, entire archaeological sites were destroyed. Urban landscapes have been flattened under the justification of war. Universities, hospitals, archives, schools, libraries, bakeries, agricultural lands, and refugee camps have been systematically destroyed. The assault has targeted the infrastructure of Palestinian life itself, it has dismantled the social, cultural, and demographic foundations necessary for collective survival.
In the occupied West Bank, Palestinians continue to face settler violence, military raids, land confiscation, and forced displacement. Villages are emptied through intimidation, checkpoints fragment movement, and economic suffocation deepens dependency and precarity. Yet the expansionist vision articulated through biblical and historical claims is now stretching beyond Palestine.
Now southern Lebanon and southern Syria are being pulled into the same spatial planning.
Reports and online campaigns promoting land acquisition in areas near Daraa and southern Syria reveal a deeply alarming trend: the normalization of territorial expansion beyond internationally recognized borders. References to ancient “Davidic routes” or biblical entitlement are increasingly integrated into public discourse, settlement imaginaries, and strategic military narratives. The danger lies in transforming expansion into something culturally acceptable and politically negotiable.
This is occurring at the very moment Syrian refugees are being pressured to return “home” after years of displacement with many Global North countries issuing deportation regulation letters against them. Governments and international actors increasingly speak of refugee return as though Syria has become stable enough for repatriation. But what does “return” mean if homes are destroyed, lands fragmented, economies collapsed, and territories themselves vulnerable to new forms of Zionist militarization and external control? Refugees are told to go back while the geography they once belonged to is simultaneously being reconfigured.
The contradiction
The publicised initiatives presented under the language of “peace” and “reconstruction” now stand exposed as hollow political theater. Donor fatigue deepens. Funding commitments evaporate. Humanitarian systems are collapsing under both political paralysis, Israeli persist with insolence to continue the attacks against Palestinians and deliberate underfunding. Gaza’s Peace Board, created by Trump remains largely unfunded while displacement spreads regionally. The promise of rebuilding has become another mechanism for managing headlines with peace illusions rather than protecting people.
Meanwhile, millions remain displaced across the region. In Lebanon alone, over a million people have reportedly fled their homes since the escalation intensified. Entire southern communities now live between temporary shelters, schools, relatives’ apartments, or overcrowded Beirut neighbourhoods.
Families displaced during Eid navigate trauma while attempting to preserve dignity amid uncertainty. The contrast is painful: festive tables offering ka’ek and chocolate exist alongside families searching for mattresses, medication, and safety.
This widening geography of displacement reveals a deeper transformation underway in the Middle East. Forced migration is becoming a governing logic of regional order. Populations are uprooted, contained, redistributed, or rendered permanently precarious while territorial realities are reshaped through military violence and demographic engineering.
Tyre should alarm the world not only because people were forced to flee, but because an ancient city carrying human civilization is being drawn into a broader architecture of destruction. Southern Syria should alarm the world not only because of geopolitical tensions, but because territorial expansion is increasingly discussed openly while refugees themselves remain disposable. Gaza should alarm the world not only because of death tolls, but because the destruction of an entire society is unfolding in front of global institutions that are unable or unwilling to stop it.
What is happening today exceeds the boundaries of a single conflict. It is the expansion of a political project that treats land as empty once people are displaced from it, culture as expendable, and civilian existence as negotiable. The fear is that this geography of displacement may continue and widen far beyond Gaza, unless confronted with nationalist power and regional unity.
By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | May 27, 2026
The US military aggression and economic strangulation ended in a ceasefire, not because of American goodwill, but because the war objectives failed and the aggression backfired.
This outcome reflects a new strategic reality that emerged during the war itself.
Facing the biggest military assault in its history, with Western and Arab countries complicit in arming and supporting the enemy across multiple fronts, Iran not only avoided strategic collapse but imposed a new balance of power on the battlefield.
Against overwhelming odds and coordinated pressure, Iranian resistance transformed what was meant to be a war of submission into a demonstration of enduring national strength.
What has emerged now is far more than the end of a military aggression against the Islamic Republic. It is the failure of a campaign designed to weaken Iran, isolate it from other nations, drain its economic strength, and ultimately force it into strategic retreat.
Military lessons of the war
In terms of the military, the most telling and self-evident lesson from the war is that the idea of “shaping Iran to crumble quickly” was misguided from the outset. Even after multiple claims by the enemy that Iran’s missile infrastructure, command centers, and launch capabilities had been destroyed, Iran continued its regular military activity, hitting the enemy at will.
Missile and drone operations were carried out multiple times every day during the war. The continuity of launch waves will one day become one of the most compelling pieces of evidence that the backbone of Iran’s strategic missile program has remained completely intact.
This revealed a critical wrong assumption made by both Americans and Zionists: the true extent of Iran’s underground military infrastructure, its depth, dispersion, and survivability.
Much of Iran’s arsenal of rockets, along with the necessary underground launching, storage, and escape facilities, is located in hardened bunker networks built over decades to resist common aerial attacks. Some of the most effective US bunker-penetration munitions are thought to be severely restricted by these heavily fortified facilities.
Operational philosophy: Restraint as strength
Also significant was the implementation of Iran’s operational philosophy during the war. Data has shown that Iran was not as aggressive in its use of its most advanced missiles as is often believed. Several systems discussed for years in military circles were either underutilized or not used at all. This has reinforced assessments that Iran deliberately relied more heavily on older missile stockpiles while carefully managing the timing and intensity of launches.
This has led to reports that Iran deliberately kept some of its strategic missiles in reserve while using older arms with calibrated firing patterns. This approach enabled Tehran to maintain its escalation edge while simultaneously proving sustainability.
Moreover, recent reports and analyses of military forces in the region suggest that systems for launching newer solid-fuel ballistic missiles with dual-stage capsules were not widely deployed, though they could greatly boost launch density in future operations.
Iran mounted extended attacks without fully testing its more sophisticated launch architecture. The size and intensity of future attacks could be far greater than anything seen so far.
The naval dimension: Anti-access and area denial
The naval dimension of the war also revealed a major shift in regional deterrence equations. US carrier groups operated well off Iranian waters on opposite shores, a remarkable caution given the overwhelming power of the American navy.
It has become clear that as Iran has matured its anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) doctrine, derived from the use of anti-ship ballistic missiles, long-range cruise weapons, drones, and multi-tiered coastal defense systems, the country has imposed a new caution on American operational decisions.
The Khalij Fars and Hormuz missiles, along with newer generations of anti-ship missiles, pose a serious threat to large naval assets in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Notably, these systems were not used during the recent war, indicating that Iran kept its deterrent capacity largely unused – yet visible enough to alter enemy behavior. This restraint sends its own message: what remains in the arsenal is far more capable than what was shown.
Strategic failure: The unraveling of the pressure campaign
Strategically, the most significant event of the third imposed war has been the complete failure of the original political goal behind the military pressure campaign. What its planners envisioned was a war that would trigger internal instability within Iran’s borders, fracture its command structure, undermine its regional cooperation, and ultimately isolate Tehran as a matter of strategy. Prolonged military pressure, they believed, would achieve what decades of illegal and crippling sanctions could not.
Not a single one of these goals was realized. The Iranian state machinery was not fractured. Continuity of command was maintained. Regional ally networks remained not only intact but operationally effective. In fact, the war produced the opposite effect on multiple fronts.
The war reinforced Iran’s broader strategic narrative across the region that military pressure alone cannot force Tehran into capitulation.
Diplomatic implications: A unified front that never formed
The results carry significant implications for diplomacy as well. Perhaps the most obvious fact to emerge from the war is that Iran successfully thwarted the establishment of any unified international body arrayed against it.
Despite a heavy Western political and military campaign coordinated with Israeli objectives, large portions of the Global South refused to align with the escalation drive against Tehran.
Several regional governments actively worked to defuse the crisis rather than escalate it. Major powers like China and Russia remained opposed to wider international isolation measures. Even among Western allies, growing concerns emerged regarding the risks of uncontrolled regional escalation, energy disruption, and maritime insecurity.
This deep division inhibited Washington from fashioning the kind of new global pressure architecture against Iran that it has typically pursued during past crises – from nuclear non-proliferation to regional security frameworks. The coalition that was meant to isolate Iran found itself isolated instead.
Economic dimension: Sanctions undermined, energy leverage preserved
The economic goal of the unprovoked war was another expected outcome that was not met. During the war, the economic disruption that many external observers had anticipated became totally muted. Iran continued exporting energy and maintaining its internal markets and logistics throughout the war, despite pressure on infrastructure and the weight of sanctions.
Remarkably, the US-Israeli aggression and Iranian retaliation revealed the fragile nature of the global energy system when it comes to instability involving Iran. The mere threat of escalation at the Strait of Hormuz triggered an immediate reaction from the international community, precisely because of the waterway’s critical importance to global oil supply.
Tehran’s inability to be isolated without sparking international ramifications was reaffirmed by the facts, not least of which are Iran’s deep ties to the region’s energy landscape and its central role in maritime security.
Industrial adaptation: War as a catalyst for expansion
The swift pace of the industrial adaptation process was another crucial factor in the recent war. Based on domestic sources and analyses from military-affiliated institutions, the rate of missile production had already dramatically increased after the 12-day war in June last year, and the recent war only accelerated and extended it even further.
Iran possesses a widespread defense industry, and even if aggressors succeed in targeting its production facilities, these are interdependent in such a way that they can localize supply chains and establish underground production lines.
Far from halting production and launch capabilities, the latest war has spurred strategic investments in survivability, redundancy, and high-volume output.
Political triumph: The narrative that collapsed
Among the more significant political considerations, this war represents a significant triumph for Iran, given the failure of the central narrative that Tel Aviv and Washington had been aggressively pushing for decades.
Their premise was that continued military, economic, and diplomatic pressure would eventually bring Tehran to the end of its rope, forcing it to “sit at the table” to negotiate strategic concessions.
Instead, the war proved to be another confirmation of the reverse: Iran under pressure continues to function, possesses the capacity to retaliate, and maintains domestic and governmental strength and unity. Most importantly, it has survived the encounter with its ability to influence regional affairs completely intact.
This is not to suggest that Iran was unaffected or bore no costs. Wars come with severe costs. But strategic results are not determined solely by the scale of damage. They are determined by the ultimate success or failure of political and military objectives.
The new regional reality
In this respect, there is growing evidence that Iran’s opponents found themselves baffled by the outcome. A campaign designed to diminish Iranian deterrence ended up confirming much of it.
A policy aimed at isolating Iran was met by a pressure strategy that ultimately promoted de-escalation with Tehran and prevented tensions from proliferating across the region.
What emerged instead were increased challenges and the risk of direct confrontation with a long-established regional power armed with deep missile stockpiles, rugged supply chains, and a mature asymmetric warfare doctrine.
The lessons that have become clear on the battlefield, in regional negotiations, and in energy calculations leave Iran poised to enter the post-war era with strategic gains and enhanced leverage.
Press TV – May 27, 2026
The vice secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council has denounced hostile measures by the United States and the Israeli regime as the root cause of insecurity in West Asia.
Ali Bagheri-Kani made the remarks in a Wednesday meeting with head of the International Security Division at Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Luchinger, on the sidelines of the 14th International Meeting of High Representatives Responsible for Security Issues in the Russian capital, Moscow.
Bagheri-Kani said the root cause of insecurity and instability in the region is the Israeli regime’s and the United States’ aggressive measures, emphasizing they will have no role in its future.
For his part, Luchinger expressed his deep condolences over the assassination of former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani in an Israeli airstrike on March 17, stating that Bern is prepared to cooperate with Tehran to resolve regional and international issues.
The two officials further discussed and exchanged viewpoints on regional and international developments, particularly the fallout of the US-Israeli war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Earlier, Bagheri-Kani met and held talks with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al- Araji.
Bagheri-Kani arrived in Moscow on Tuesday to take part in the international security conference. Besides giving a speech at the event, the Iranian official is expected to meet with several Russian political and security leaders.
The International Security Forum is taking place in Moscow from May 26 to 29, aimed at fostering practical collaboration among nations and facilitating a non-political, thorough dialogue on urgent security challenges.
The forum also features the 14th International Meeting of High Representatives Responsible for Security Issues, a variety of thematic sessions (academic conferences, roundtables, briefings, presentations), as well as bilateral and multilateral meetings and exhibits that display specific projects from relevant Russian agencies and organizations.
Al Mayadeen | May 27, 2026
The Iranian state television has unveiled a preliminary and unofficial draft memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, outlining potential arrangements on maritime activity and regional security.
The draft framework, as per the broadcaster, suggests that the United States would commit to lifting a maritime blockade on Iran. In return, Iran would agree to restore commercial shipping through key maritime routes to pre-escalation levels within one month.
The reported arrangement does not apply to military vessels.
The report also said the draft includes provisions placing the management and regulation of maritime transit routes under Iranian oversight, in coordination with the Sultanate of Oman.
Military base troop status remains unresolved
In detail, the unofficial draft stipulated that the United States would agree in principle to withdraw military forces from areas surrounding Iran, including recently deployed regional assets. However, it added that the status of forces already stationed at established military bases would remain subject to further negotiation.
The Iranian state television further revealed that the draft proposes that, if a final agreement is reached within 60 days, it could be submitted for adoption as a binding United Nations Security Council resolution.
The Iranian state broadcaster added that the understanding reportedly reached in Islamabad remains unresolved and non-final, stressing that Iran would not take any steps without verifiable and tangible confirmation of implementation measures.
US-Iran MoU delayed amid disputes over final wording: CNN
CNNreported earlier on Wednesday that a proposed memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran remains uncertain despite earlier signs of broad consensus among negotiators.
According to diplomats familiar with the discussions, officials involved in the talks still do not know when or where the agreement could be formally signed, even after key language in the draft was reportedly finalized over the weekend.
The report said expectations had risen Saturday after US President Donald Trump held calls with Gulf leaders while negotiators considered the text effectively “locked in”. Regional sources cited by CNN said the understanding was viewed as a potential opening toward ending the war, reducing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, and paving the way for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and other disputes.
However, progress appears to have stalled over unresolved wording disputes.
Fragile negotiations
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Tuesday that negotiations still required “a couple of days” to settle “disagreements” over a “word or sentence.”
Speaking during a visit to India, Rubio said talks were continuing in Doha and remained centered on “specific language in the initial document,” while insisting that an agreement could still be reached within days despite renewed military escalation.
“The president’s expressed his desire to make it. He’s either going to make a good deal or no deal,” Rubio said, referring to Trump.
The report noted that delays have increased concerns among regional actors who fear the talks could collapse in a manner similar to previous failed diplomatic efforts between Washington and Tehran.
CNN also cited tensions during earlier contacts involving US Vice President JD Vance in Pakistan last month, when Iranian negotiators reportedly accused Washington of altering agreed terms after discussions had advanced.
Mounting pressure
The ceasefire framework underpinning the negotiations has meanwhile entered its eighth week amid mounting regional strain, including renewed instability in the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian warnings of retaliation following recent US attacks, and escalating Israeli aggression against Lebanon.
The latest tensions come after US Central Command confirmed that American forces carried out strikes in southern Iran on Tuesday, claiming the attacks were conducted “in self-defense” during the ongoing ceasefire period.
At the same time, tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have continued to intensify after Iran moved to restrict traffic through the strategic waterway in response to US-Israeli aggression.
The report added that international and regional pressure to secure the agreement and prevent further escalation continues to intensify as energy markets and shipping routes remain exposed to the risk of wider conflict.
“A few words or sentence even on a ‘locked in’ MOU is unlikely to give him everything he wants,” CNN wrote, referring to Trump’s efforts to present the agreement as a diplomatic breakthrough.
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – May 27, 2026
The I2U2 — that much-heralded “West Asian Quad” of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States — is gathering dust. Launched with fanfare in July 2022 and billed as a transformative framework for regional integration, it has produced little of consequence since its inaugural summit.
Progress stalled through 2024, and its April 2025 revival dialogue in New Delhi was notably described as the first convening of the group in almost two years. Without sustained American engagement, the scaffolding has simply collapsed. What remains, however, is something more durable and more troubling: an informal troika of Israel, the UAE, and India, joined not by shared ambition but by a shared phobia.
Three States, One Obsession
Strip away the diplomatic pleasantries, and the organic glue binding Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and New Delhi is strikingly similar: each government perceives political Islam — in its domestic and regional expressions — as a foundational threat to its survival. For the UAE, the enemy has a name: the Muslim Brotherhood. Abu Dhabi under Mohammed bin Zayed has treated Brotherhood-affiliated movements as an existential menace to dynastic stability. The Emirati government’s sweeping crackdown on al-Islah, the Brotherhood’s local affiliate, was driven by the calculation that political Islam of any kind is fundamentally threatening to government security. The UAE formally designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation in 2014, backed the military coup in Egypt, led the 2017 blockade of Qatar, and as recently as January 2025, blacklisted eleven individuals and eight UK-based organisations linked to Brotherhood networks. This is not counterterrorism policy in any conventional sense; it is a preemptive war on political pluralism dressed in security language.
India’s version of the same anxiety plays out along the Hindu-Muslim fault line. Anti-Muslim sentiment has intensified systematically since 2014. India’s 200 million Muslims — the world’s third-largest Muslim population — have faced demolitions of homes, discriminatory citizenship legislation, and a political atmosphere. The BJP government has systematically reframed domestic Muslim political life as a security threat, deploying counterterrorism law against peaceful dissent. If the UAE fears a Brotherhood-style capture of the state, India fears the democratic agency of its own largest minority.
Israel’s specter is Palestine. More precisely, it is the impossibility of indefinitely suppressing Palestinian political self-determination without a cost to legitimacy. For all three governments, the language of “counterterrorism” functions as a tranquilizer: it sedates domestic dissent, silences international criticism, and transforms political opponents into security threats. This shared grammar of repression is the true foundation of the troika.
While tackling these internal and regional threats remains a key imperative, the most recent push to revive the alliance, even without Washington being a formal member, is Iran and the still ongoing Iran war.
From Phobia to Alliance: Iran as the Accelerant
If political Islam is the ideological glue, Iran is what has now hardened this informal troika into something resembling a war coalition. Following the US-Israeli strikes on Iran that began on February 28, 2026, the theoretical alignments of the Abraham Accords era became operational reality. Iran retaliated by targeting Gulf infrastructure, firing some 550 ballistic and cruise missiles and more than 2,200 drones at the UAE, making it the most targeted country in the region, including Israel. In response, Israel did something unprecedented: it deployed an Iron Dome battery, Israeli troops to operate it, and reportedly also its cutting-edge Iron Beam laser defence system and Spectro surveillance technology to Emirati soil. The Financial Times reported that Israeli military personnel on the ground in Gulf states were “a not insignificant number”. Emirati officials, reflecting on who came to their defence, reportedly said: “It was a real eye-opening moment. To see who our real friends are.”
The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, were partly motivated by a shared perception of the Iranian threat. What the 2026 conflict has done is strip away all residual ambiguity about what that means in practice. The UAE allowed its territory and airspace to be used by Israeli and American forces for strikes on Iran, according to Iranian officials. The Israeli Air Force carried out strikes in southern Iran during the war to neutralize short-range missiles threatening Gulf states. Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem are no longer strategic partners in aspiration; they are military partners in fact. The dream project of dismantling Iran as a regional power, long whispered in the corridors of both capitals, is now an open agenda.
It is in this context that Prime Minister Modi’s May 15, 2026 visit to Abu Dhabi — his eighth trip to the UAE in twelve years — must be read. The visit produced a raft of agreements: $5 billion in Emirati investment pledges, a long-term LPG supply deal, ADNOC access to India’s strategic petroleum reserves, and — most significantly — a formal Framework for the Strategic Defence Partnership covering defence industrial collaboration, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing, maritime security, and joint military exercises. Modi also chose to publicly condemn the Iranian attacks on the UAE and pledged India’s support in maintaining regional peace — a significant departure from the studied neutrality New Delhi had maintained for years. The visit came one day after India had hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who had openly accused the UAE of being “directly involved” in the US-Israeli war on Iran. The juxtaposition was not accidental; it was a signal about the direction of India’s foreign policy.
Silence Is No Longer a Strategy
For years, India’s position in this triangular relationship was one of studied ambiguity. New Delhi deepened ties with Israel and the UAE while maintaining functional relations with Iran and nominally adhering to the principle of strategic autonomy. That posture is now collapsing under the weight of events.
The contradiction at its heart is Chabahar. In May 2024, India signed a ten-year agreement to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal, committing $120 million with a further $250 million credit line. This was to be New Delhi’s only viable overland and maritime gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi has called it a “golden gate” for India’s connectivity ambitions. Yet the US ended its special sanctions waiver for Chabahar in September 2025, and India has been reduced to exploring a temporary transfer of its stake back to Iran to avoid American penalties. Strategic autonomy, it turns out, survives only on American sufferance. Meanwhile, any Indian military technology that reaches the UAE now enters a security ecosystem that includes Israel — meaning India’s new defence partnership with Abu Dhabi is, in practice, an indirect alignment with Tel Aviv.
India now faces a reckoning that its political class has been deferring for years. As the region moves from cold confrontation to hot war, the space for equidistance evaporates. Every arms deal, every investment pact, every public statement condemning Iranian strikes while maintaining silence on Gaza and the West Bank narrows the gap between partnership and complicity. The troika that fear built has a peculiar logic: states drawn together by what they dread at home — Muslim political power in its various forms — will inevitably be pulled toward a shared agenda abroad. For India, the path ahead is less a clear choice than a delicate negotiation — with its own pluralistic traditions, with its new partners in the Gulf and Israel, and with a neighbourhood that offers no easy answers. What happens next will depend not on grand declarations, but on the quiet, unglamorous work of balancing interests without losing sight of the human cost at home.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | May 27, 2026
Notwithstanding the Al Jazeera report, there are still significant areas of disagreement that make a deal between Iran and the US unlikely. The Pakistan-Qatar mediation channel toward a possible memorandum of understanding remains active. But “active” does not mean “settled.” The unresolved center of gravity remains sequencing. The following is based on information I received from a knowledgeable source with access to the negotiations. It mirrors my analysis.
Washington and Israel want Iranian concessions first, while Tehran wants tangible, front-loaded economic and security relief before it gives ground on anything that matters. That is the heart of the present deadlock.
Iran’s position is not theatrical. It is rooted in a clear strategic doctrine: after decades of sanctions, pressure, assassinations, sabotage, and military threats, Tehran will not trade hard leverage for verbal assurances or a memorandum of understanding.
Promises are not enough. Mechanisms matter. Sequencing matters. Asset movement matters. Enforcement matters. The central judgment is this: Iran is not blinking.
Tehran is not operating from weakness, confusion, or desperation. It is executing a highly disciplined strategic posture: firmness on the fundamentals, flexibility on the margins, and careful use of its available leverage across the nuclear file, the Strait of Hormuz, regional alliances, frozen assets, and the Pakistan-Qatar mediation channel.
This is not the behavior of a state preparing for unconditional surrender. Nor is it the behavior of a state recklessly lurching toward total war. It is the behavior of a state converting pressure into leverage — and leverage into economic and security guarantees.
The Nuclear File: Sovereignty Is the Red Line
According to a knowledgeable source, enrichment is not a negotiable bargaining chip. Tehran views enrichment as three things simultaneously:
No meaningful quantity of enriched uranium will leave Iranian territory under the present framework. That line is firm.
On weaponization, the assessment is more nuanced. Iran is not presently building a bomb. But it is deliberately preserving the capability to move toward one if it concludes that its survival is at stake.
The phrase “all bets are off” should not be read as an announcement of imminent weaponization. It should be read as doctrine: if Iran faces an existential assault, it will not leave any strategic option permanently closed. That is virtual deterrence — and, at least for now, it is working.
Strait of Hormuz: Tehran’s Non-Nuclear Strategic Lever
The Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s most powerful non-nuclear instrument. The logic from Tehran is blunt: the United States cannot freeze Iranian assets, sanction Iranian exports, suffocate Iranian banking channels, and then expect unconditional maritime passage as though nothing has happened.
Iran’s emerging posture appears tiered and deliberate. Friendly states receive passage. Neutral states are handled selectively. Hostile or adversary-linked shipping will face interdiction, delay, or denial. This is not simply military posturing. Tehran is attempting to convert maritime geography into a regional security architecture based on reciprocity: if Iran’s economy is strangled, the economic arteries of others will not remain entirely immune.
The reported MOU framework involving the Strait appears real: Iranian de-escalation in exchange for sanctions relief, asset movement, and restoration of commercial access. But the sequencing dispute remains unresolved. Iran wants assets released before surrendering maritime leverage. Washington wants compliance in the Strait before releasing assets. As I write this (Tuesday evening eastern time) this issues remains unresolved.
The Drone and Air-Defense War: Contested Skies, Real Costs
The airspace over Iran, the Persian Gulf, and adjacent maritime corridors has become a live drone and air-defense battlespace. Iran’s message is clear: it may not dominate the air domain, but it can make aerial operations expensive, politically visible, and operationally imperfect. Every drone interdicted, every platform forced down, every failed or disrupted operation adds friction. That friction shapes how Washington and Tel Aviv assess the real cost of escalation.
This is deterrence by attrition. Not absolute deterrence. Not total denial. But enough to complicate operational planning and raise the political price of continued pressure.
Frozen Assets: The Economic Core of the Negotiation
The frozen-assets file is not peripheral. It is central. According to a knowledgeable source with access, Iran is demanding immediate movement on approximately $12 billion held through Qatar-linked channels, within a much larger claim that Tehran places at more than $100 billion in frozen overseas assets.
This is the economic heart of the negotiation. Tehran wants asset release as a precondition for meaningful concessions. Washington wants asset relief conditioned on Iranian performance first. Until this is resolved in a concrete, enforceable way — not with vague language or aspirational language — no MOU is likely to hold. Iran is leery of any verbal assurances from the West and does not trust a MOU having been burned previously on this issue after signing the JCPOA.
For Tehran, this is not merely about money. It is about proof of seriousness. If Washington cannot or will not move assets, Tehran will conclude that the negotiation is designed to extract concessions without delivering relief.
Lebanon and Hezbollah: The Detonator Built Into the System
Lebanon remains the most dangerous variable in the entire equation. The diplomatic architecture now being constructed contains a structural flaw, and that flaw runs directly through Beirut. Lebanon is not a side theater. It is the tripwire.
Israel wants continued freedom of operation in southern Lebanon. Iran views Hezbollah as a central pillar of its regional deterrence architecture. From Tehran’s perspective, Hezbollah is not a disposable card. It is non-negotiable. Hezbollah has not agreed to disarm. Israel has not abandoned its operational doctrine. Iran has not agreed to separate the Lebanese file from its broader regional deterrence posture.
The American formula — that if Hezbollah behaves, Israel will behave — is not a guarantee. It is an aspiration dressed up as a diplomatic condition. This means that even a signed MOU between Washington and Tehran could be blown apart by one Israeli operation in Lebanon, or one Hezbollah response, that crosses a threshold neither side can fully control. In fact, Israel has renewed its offensive in Lebanon on Tuesday, but apparently acceded to Donald Trump’s demand to halt bombings of Beirut.
The ground war in southern Lebanon, however, is back on in its full fury, with Israel trying to push beyond the Yellow Line while Hezbollah is scoring major hits on Israeli forces, tanks and vehicles. Netanyahu is facing major pressure from Ben Gvir and Smotrich to expand military operations
Abraham Accords and the Pakistan Variable
Iran’s rejection of the Abraham Accords is categorical. Tehran views the Accords as a U.S.-backed normalization architecture designed to entrench Israeli regional legitimacy while hollowing out the Palestinian cause. Any attempt to fold that architecture into an Iran settlement cuts directly against Tehran’s strategic and ideological position.
The Pakistan dimension is especially sensitive. Islamabad is functioning as a key mediation channel between Washington and Tehran. But pressuring Pakistan to join or support the Abraham Accords while simultaneously relying on Pakistan to carry messages to Tehran creates a structural contradiction. Pakistan understands this. Its public rejection of forced linkage is not diplomatic boilerplate. It is the condition under which Islamabad preserves credibility with Tehran and keeps the mediation channel alive.
Saudi Arabia remains in its established position: no normalization without a credible path to Palestinian statehood. In the current environment, that condition cannot be met.
Three Triggers That Could Blow This Up
The negotiations remain alive because both sides understand the danger of uncontrolled escalation. But there is no strategic trust. The situation remains combustible and highly sequenced. One operational incident could change the trajectory very quickly.
The three most dangerous triggers are:
1. Failure of the frozen-asset transfer mechanism
If Tehran concludes that Washington is blocking relief while extracting concessions, the entire diplomatic framework could collapse.
2. An Israeli operation in Lebanon that crosses Iran’s response threshold
This could force Hezbollah into a major confrontation and pull Iran back into a harder regional posture.
3. Renewed US strikes during the ceasefire or negotiation window
If Iran reads such strikes as negotiation under fire, it is likely to conclude that diplomacy is merely cover for coercion.
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – May 26, 2026
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ICC | December 2005
When the House of Commons was debating how much to increase the time limit for detention without trial the question of torture came up. Officially this was limited to the nice considerations of whether it was all right to send people to places where torture is used and whether Britain can use information collected by the use of torture in other countries. This discussion gave an impression of democratic Britain as the home of civilised behaviour where the very idea of torture is repugnant to our legislators – unlike, say, the US with its secret CIA jails… In reality, the British state has a long history of using and developing a whole range of torture techniques. … continue
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