Iran believes it has fundamentally altered the balance of power with the United States and now has a narrow opportunity to convert its position into lasting strategic and economic gains, Johns Hopkins University Professor Vali Nasr argued in an interview on Switzerland with Tom Switzer.
Speaking alongside University of Chicago political scientist John Mearsheimer, Nasr said Washington has struggled to accept how dramatically its position has changed following the prolonged war on Iran, particularly as Tehran retains leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. The interview was conducted by host Tom Switzer, who introduced Nasr as a leading Iran expert and Mearsheimer as a political scientist.
“There’s a consensus that they have defeated the superpower, at least put it on its heels,” Nasr said of the view inside Iran, arguing that Tehran sees little reason to moderate its position while it holds the advantage.
Iran sees narrow window to press advantage
Nasr rejected arguments circulating in Washington that Tehran is “overplaying its hand,” saying such assessments reflected disbelief at the extent to which the balance had shifted.
“In reality, Iran is not overplaying its hands. It’s just playing its hand,” he said.
According to Nasr, Iranian policymakers believe they have a limited period in which to secure the maximum possible strategic advantage.
“They think they have a narrow window to get the maximum amount of strategic advantage from having turned the table on the US,” he said, adding that Iranian leaders would consider it a major mistake not to press their advantage while Washington remains on the defensive.
That calculation extends to sanctions relief, frozen Iranian assets, compensation, and Iran’s position in the Strait of Hormuz. Nasr described Tehran’s approach as accepting immediate economic hardship in exchange for potentially much greater long-term gains.
Mearsheimer: US has ‘no choice’
Mearsheimer offered an even sharper assessment, arguing that Washington no longer possesses an effective means of forcing Tehran to abandon its position over the Strait.
Asked why US President Donald Trump would accept an arrangement under which Iran exercises substantial control over passage through Hormuz, Mearsheimer replied, “It’s very simple, Tom. He has no choice. He lost the war. This is a devastating defeat for the United States.”
He added that Trump “has no cards here,” arguing that Washington’s principal threat — further military escalation — had become increasingly difficult to carry out.
According to Mearsheimer, the United States faces both depleted munitions stocks and resistance from Gulf allies fearful that another escalation would trigger Iranian attacks on oil infrastructure, desalination facilities, and other critical installations.
Weapons shortages expose limits of US campaign
Nasr similarly argued that Washington’s weapons shortages had sharply reduced its ability to continue the campaign.
“It’s clear that the US doesn’t have the munitions, either offensive munitions or defensive munitions to keep bombing Iran,” he said, arguing that another month of fighting ultimately left Iran stronger and Washington weaker.
Mearsheimer said US military leaders had warned Trump before the war about limited stocks and the dangers of a prolonged confrontation. He argued that a major factor behind the end of the 40-day air campaign was that Washington was “running out of munitions.”
Nasr said the implications reach beyond West Asia, arguing that China and Russia would draw conclusions from the United States’ difficulty rapidly replacing sophisticated weapons during a prolonged war.
He cited Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement in 2018, attacks launched while negotiations were underway, and what Tehran viewed as Washington’s failure to uphold subsequent understandings.
Trump has created “such distrust about himself with Iranians” that even accepting Tehran’s terms might no longer be enough without guarantees that Washington would implement an agreement, Nasr said.
That distrust, he argued, explains why Iran wants concessions delivered upfront rather than postponed to future negotiations.
The earlier June 17 memorandum had envisaged reopening the Strait, lifting oil sanctions, and establishing a ceasefire that also covered Lebanon, while wider sanctions, reparations, and frozen assets would be addressed later.
Nasr said Tehran concluded that Washington subsequently undermined that arrangement, including its provisions related to Lebanon, reinforcing the view that Iran should secure tangible benefits before relinquishing leverage.
Mearsheimer described the result as a “humiliating defeat” for Washington before adding, “I believe it’s an even bigger defeat for Israel.”
He argued that Israeli officials were reluctant to acknowledge “the extent to which Iran has defeated not just the United States, but Israel,” predicting that both “Israel” and its supporters in Washington would seek to undo any agreement favorable to Tehran in the future.
Nasr later argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had “overreached in Lebanon and Iran,” describing them as wars “Israel” could not win and saying “Israel” had been “strategically defeated”.
For Nasr, the larger consequence is a regional order increasingly different from the one Washington sought to impose. Iran, he argued, now sees an opportunity not simply to end the current confrontation, but to use the outcome to reduce the US military threat around its borders, ease its economic isolation and consolidate its position as a major regional power.
For the first time in years, Washington is discussing Turkey’s return to the F-35 program as a serious possibility.
At the NATO summit in Ankara last month, President Donald Trump said he would lift the CAATSA sanctions that the U.S. imposed on Turkey after Ankara purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems in 2019. Trump added that he was “certainly” considering restoring Turkey’s access to the F-35 program, which was also suspended at the time..
Notably, a separate sale of American engines for Turkey’s domestic KAAN fighter jet has advanced through congressional review. Ankara is also reportedly exploring the transfer of its S-400 batteries to a Gulf state, a step Washington has demanded for years.
But the Russian system is no longer the only source of resistance. Israel argues that Turkish F-35s would, in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s words, “destroy the power balance” in the region. The phrase invokes Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” a provision in U.S. law according to which Washington cannot sell weapons to Middle Eastern states if those arms would give them capabilities on par with Israel’s own weaponry.
Yet these rules have never been formally applied to Turkey, which is, after all, a U.S. treaty ally. What is being tested is thus not only an arms sale, but whether Israel’s claim to regional primacy can restrict American policy toward a NATO ally.
How Turkey was pushed out
Turkey’s search for a long-range air defence system predates the crisis by a decade. In 2009, the Obama administration approved a sale of Patriot missile defense munitions to Turkey, but the deal broke down over questions of price, technology transfer and local production. Ankara turned to a Chinese system in 2013, cancelled it in 2015, and signed with Moscow in 2017. A late American offer in 2018 came too late to reverse the Russian deal, and the first S-400 components arrived in July 2019.
But the S-400 decision was never simply the product of a failed arms negotiation. When Turkey downed a Russian jet in November 2015, it became the first NATO member to do so since the 1950s. As pressure from Moscow mounted, Ankara had to face it largely alone. The withdrawal of American and German Patriot batteries that same winter, even though armed groups in Syria still posed a threat, hardened Turkey’s sense of exposure.
The July 2016 coup attempt turned mistrust into a political rupture, particularly given that Fethullah Gülen, who Turkish authorities accused of orchestrating the coup, was living in the United States at the time.
Russia exploited the opening, filling Turkey’s defense gap while widening the rift with its NATO allies. Turkish officials justified the purchase as an urgent requirement.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave it a second meaning. The real issue, he said, was not to the S-400 but to Turkey acting on its own will. Elsewhere he refused to retreat, saying Turkey was “not a slave.” Repeated at rallies, Erdogan’s rallying cry about the missile defense system turned it into an emblem of strategic autonomy, making the purchase as hard to reverse politically as militarily.
This has now become a political liability for Erdogan. In Turkey today, commentators and the main opposition describe the purchase as an act of stubbornness — one that left the S-400 rusting in a hangar and wasted the $1.5 billion Turkey had already paid for the F-35 program.
Turkey remains the only participant expelled after paying in, and the six aircraft it financed were never delivered. Its air force depends on an aging F-16 fleet, with Eurofighter Typhoons serving as a stopgap. The domestic KAAN fighter is the long-term answer, but its first batch is set to fly using American F110 engines under a $700 million sale that drew organized opposition in Congress before clearing review in July.
How Israel built a case against Turkey’s return
Within 72 hours of the Ankara summit, Netanyahu took his objections to three American networks, arguing that Erdoğan was “not a friend” and could not be trusted.
The centerpiece of Israel’s case against Turkey was a remark by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Asked on CNN Türk whether Turkey was among Israel’s targets, the foreign minister said Israel had become a problem for the world and that, with these policies and this mindset, “these men have become a burden that humanity can no longer bear.” The reference to “these policies” and “this mindset” pointed to the Netanyahu government, and the same judgment about Israel’s isolation has surfaced in European capitals and at senior levels of the U.S. administration, from Trump to Vice President JD Vance.
But Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recast the remark as dehumanizing Jews and calling for Israel’s erasure, and this framing became the dominant account in Israeli commentary. Netanyahu carried it further on Fox, telling American viewers that Fidan had said the Jewish state must basically be wiped out.
The framing slotted Turkey into an existing category, the state that denies Israel’s right to exist. But that is the language of Iranian state rhetoric, repeated by senior officials and inscribed on missiles. Turkey has never pursued such a policy; in fact, it supports a two-state solution and has recognized Israel diplomatically since 1949. Yet Israeli leaders, eager to drive a wedge into Ankara’s relationship with Washington, appear determined to cast Turkey as the next Iran.
Balance for whom?
The most revealing element of Netanyahu’s argument was his definition of the regional balance. By telling Washington that Turkish F-35s would “destroy the power balance,” he equated regional stability with continued Israeli superiority. Israel operates 48 F-35s and is contracted for 100, while Ankara’s immediate effort centers on the six aircraft it already paid for. Turkey’s return to the program would not erase Israel’s advantage; rather, it would modestly narrow an asymmetric order built around Israeli air power and freedom of action.
Israel’s concerns about Turkey are difficult to reconcile with Tel Aviv’s own increasingly preventive and attack-oriented doctrine. While Israeli officials like Netanyahu frame Turkish F-35s as evidence of “aggressive aspirations,” Israeli aircraft have struck targets in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, Qatar, and Gaza. In Ankara, this is seen as hypocrisy; Netanyahu’s “balance” is, in this reading, less about mutual restraint and more about preserving Israel’s air superiority and freedom to strike.
Nor are the objections unique to Turkey. Since 2008, American law has required arms sales to Middle Eastern states be certified as preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge, a standard Israel has invoked against countries including Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Nor is this only the position of Netanyahu. Naftali Bennett, his top rival in the coming election, told CNN that Israel cannot allow its Turkish “enemies” such advanced weaponry.
But applying the qualitative military edge doctrine to Turkey does not make sense for U.S. interests. Ankara is not a Middle Eastern buyer seeking parity with Israel but a NATO member whose air force anchors the alliance’s southeastern defense, and its deterrent capacity is a European security question as much as a Middle Eastern one. Extending an Israeli veto over what Washington sells its own allies would put that doctrine in direct tension with NATO’s requirements.
Israel’s concern extends beyond the military effect of a stronger Turkish air force. Despite his best efforts, Netanyahu is unlikely to easily reverse Trump’s broader opening to Ankara. By appointing his longtime associate Tom Barrack as ambassador there, Trump opened a new phase in Turkish-American relations. As Trump said when asked about Netanyahu’s opposition to giving F-35s to Turkey, “nobody tells me what we should be selling or not.”
Unless Ankara takes a step that directly threatens Israel’s security — an unlikely scenario — Trump has little incentive to abandon a relationship he finds useful. That relationship, more than the aircraft, is what Israel is working to prevent.
Fatih Kocaibis is a Turkey-based journalist and political analyst covering U.S. foreign policy, transatlantic relations, and European security, and their implications for Turkish foreign policy.
According to a Wall Street Journal report citing US officials, President Trump has been privately weighing the possibility of declaring victory against Iran and ending the war without securing a nuclear deal.
Trump reportedly has floated to senior aides that if the US can keep Iran’s nuclear program in check and traffic resumes through the Strait of Hormuz, he would be willing to extend the ceasefire “indefinitely” and effectively declare the conflict over.
In recent meetings, Trump has expressed confidence that Iran is “likely unable to revive its nuclear work” after Operation Midnight Hammer caused heavy damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in June 2025. He believes US intelligence capabilities would catch any Iranian attempts to rebuild, and that the threat of further American strikes would “serve as an enduring deterrent.”
Trump’s key condition for ending the war is that Iran agrees to fully reopening the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. In exchange, officials expect Trump would lift the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.
According to the Wall Street Journal, a White House official said that the U.S. has “completed all of its military objectives against Iran,” and the president’s focus is now on “securing the flow of the world’s energy through the Strait of Hormuz.” The reporting suggests Trump is patient and expected to ride out the latest diplomatic snarl, especially so long as gas prices remain where they are.
Let’s assume that this WSJ report is accurate (a big assumption). President Trump is still living in a fantasy world. Despite his recent outbursts about bombing Iran’s nuclear sites, he now seems content to revert to his original declaration from June 2025 that Iran’s nuclear program has been obliterated. Count me skeptical. However, if Trump is willing to make that assumption then it removes one item from the negotiation list… Until recently the US, via Pakistani mediators, was pressing Iran to discuss the Iranian nuclear program before addressing the lifting of the blockade and sanctions, and the unfreezing of assets. Iran, for its part, has insisted on the reverse position: i.e., lift the blockade and sanctions, unfreeze the assets and accept Iran’s sovereignty over the Persian Gulf.
If Trump’s decision to declare victory and end the war hinges on Iran, “fully reopening the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping,” then prospects for a deal are slim. Iran will only agree to allowing ships to transit the Strait of Hormuz in accordance with the Persian Gulf Strait Authority guidelines it issued on April 22nd. In early May, the Supreme National Security Council and other Iranian bodies publicly confirmed the PGSA’s formation and role. It began administering a permit-based system requiring vessels to submit a detailed “Vessel Information Declaration” (covering ownership, insurance, crew, cargo, etc.) before receiving clearance. Fees for “specialized services” were part of the planned mechanism. Iran is not going to back down on this point.
The WSJ article hints at the major focus of concern for Trump: the domestic price of gas. I have repeatedly pointed out on several recent podcasts that there is a global shortage of diesel and aviation fuel and that the price effects of this shortage will become more profound with each passing week. Also, as I discussed in a recent article, the damage to the oil and gas infrastructure in the Persian Gulf and the departure of maintenance/repair personnel from the Persian Gulf Arab nations, along with the destruction of warehouses that held replacement parts needed to repair damage to the oil and gas terminals, the shortage of diesel and aviation fuel will persist for several months, if not longer.
Trump’s attention at present appears to be focused more on the November mid-term elections than on pursuing a new missile and bombing campaign on Iran. Although Iran has fired on at least five ships trying to transit the Omani channel in the Strait of Hormuz without submitting to the PGSA protocol, Donald Trump has not ordered any new strikes on Iranian targets despite his previous vow to attack Iran for each such incident.
I think that there is growing concern within the Trump administration about the potential for a global economic crisis if the Persian Gulf remains shuttered, especially if this continues as is into September. And this is likely the main factor pushing Trump to do a repeat of the end of Operation Rough Rider… i.e., Declare victory and leave.
Although Donald Trump insists that the Strait of Hormuz is open, it ain’t. There are no direct talks between Iran and US representatives. In fact, it looks like Pakistan’s attempt at mediation is going nowhere. Iran has been talking with Oman, but those talks — despite claims of progress — appear to have stalled.
Iran updated its demands that the US must accept if it wants the Strait of Hormuz back in full operation:
‘Until America corrects its behavior, the Strait of Hormuz will not be opened.
Correcting behavior means:
Never threaten Iran with any language nor insult the sanctities of this nation.
End the war and aggression against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq permanently.
Lift the naval blockade and withdraw U.S. naval and air forces from the area surrounding Iran.
Pay the damages for the two aggressive wars imposed against Iran.
Lift the cruel and illegal sanctions against the Iranian nation.
Release the frozen and stolen assets of the Iranian people unconditionally.
These are the demands of the Iranian people who have been relentlessly present in the squares and streets for 160 days.
Some in the West are treating these demands like they are something new. They are not. Let me remind you that in early April 2026 (around April 6), Iran delivered a 10-point proposal (sometimes called a peace plan or counter-proposal) to the United States. It was conveyed via Pakistan, which was mediating. This responded to an earlier U.S. 15-point proposal. Iranian state media and subsequent reporting summarized the key elements; no complete official English text of every point was universally published at the time, but consistent accounts of the main demands included the following:
A permanent/non-aggression guarantee that Iran (and related fronts) would not be attacked again.
Continued Iranian coordination/control or a secure transit protocol for the Strait of Hormuz (with some versions mentioning fees or arrangements involving Oman).
Ending hostilities against Iran’s regional allies/“Axis of Resistance” (including in Lebanon).
Full or broad U.S./Western sanctions relief (primary and secondary).
Termination of relevant UN Security Council and IAEA resolutions.
Release of frozen Iranian assets.
Compensation or reconstruction funding for war damage.
Related security and non-interference provisions.
Iran is holding firm to its demands. I remain skeptical that Donald Trump will agree to these terms. In fact, Trump reportedly has decided to launch a new campaign of bombing and missile strikes, despite warnings from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that US missile inventories are running dangerously low. Folks at CENTCOM who thought they would have a long weekend reportedly have been called back to work to finish planning the new round of strikes.
I think that US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is a good barometer for what Trump is thinking. On Thursday, August 7 he announced fresh Treasury/OFAC sanctions targeting Iran’s use of digital assets, posting that the regime relies on digital asset exchanges to launder billions of dollars, maintain covert access to international financial systems, and support the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He said:
With its economy in freefall and inflation in the triple digits, the regime is desperate for cash, Treasury will hunt down and dismantle the illicit financial networks that keep the regime afloat” whether in dollars, rials, or crypto.
He cast this as evidence his “Economic Fury” campaign is working. If this is what Bessent is telling Trump then it is likely that Trump is considering a CENTCOM plan for another intensive bombing campaign, despite that Cooper having reportedly advised the White House and Pentagon in late July to halt the bombing campaign around the Strait of Hormuz. His argument was essentially that the campaign had hit a wall of diminishing returns. He told administration officials that most of the military’s designated targets in the Strait of Hormuz region had already been struck, leaving relatively few remaining objectives. Despite that warning, CNN and the Jerusalem Post reported that CENTCOM has developed a plan for one or two weeks of heavy bombardment intended to destroy Iran’s remaining missile capabilities. This sits alongside CENTCOM’s unusual, crowdsourcing-style email asking troops for “new creative and unconventional ways” to pressure Iran — a sign the command is casting about for options.
Lots of mixed signals. I cannot rule out the possibility of Trump ordering a new surprise attack in hopes that it will force Iran to capitulate.
Turkiye has begun restricting commercial ship traffic into the Black Sea amid a surge in Russian and Ukrainian attacks on civilian vessels, Bloomberg reported on 8 August.
Turkiye’s Directorate General of Coastal Safety has informed several ships heading to Novorossiysk, an important Russian oil and grain export port, that it is not issuing transit permits at this time and requires more time to review passage applications through the Dardanelles.
The sources told Bloomberg that Turkish authorities had provided no explanation for the move. Some vessels have also reportedly been told that the restriction applies to ships heading to Ukraine.
The report comes after a series of drone attacks targeting Turkish commercial vessels operating in the Black Sea and near Russian ports in recent months.
On Friday, a Turkish-flagged vessel, the MV Gulluk, was struck by a drone off the Russian port of Novorossiysk. Although the drone hit the ship’s living quarters, no crew members were reported injured or killed.
On 3 August, the Ro-Ro cargo vessel Nadezhda was struck by a drone about 20 nautical miles off Novorossiysk while en route from the Russian port to Samsun. Three members of the ship’s crew were injured and in serious condition after the attack.
The same day, two civilian vessels, the Yasar and the Nadezhda, were attacked after leaving Novorossiysk.
In response, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister issued a statement saying it was “deeply concerned about the escalating conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea, which is affecting civilian shipping despite our numerous warnings.”
“Unless preventive measures are taken, the escalation in the Black Sea will have multifaceted negative repercussions, including for food security,” the statement added.
Ukraine’s targeting of ships in the Black Sea, as well as Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure and vessels, have threatened grain exports from both countries, pushing wheat prices to a two-year high in July.
“Russia is the world’s largest wheat exporter, and Ukraine is known as Europe’s breadbasket, while mutual attacks between the two countries are putting pressure on maritime transport in the region during the harvest season,” Anadolu Agencyreported.
Global food prices already spiked as a result of soaring energy prices following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf earlier this year.
Iran closed the strait in response to the US-Israel war of aggression, disrupting oil and natural gas exports from the Gulf countries partnering with the US and Israel in the war.
Global fuel prices have also risen in response to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries.
On Saturday, a Ukrainian drone targeted the Ilsky oil refinery in Russia’s southern Krasnodar region, causing it to catch fire.
Ukraine’s general staff said the Ukrainian military also hit the Syzran oil refinery in the Samara region of Russia overnight, causing a fire there as well.
The Ilsky refinery can process over 6 million metric tons of oil per year, while the Syzran refinery has a processing capacity of 8.5 million tons annually.
In May, Reuters estimated that disruptions associated with the wars between the US and Iran and between Russia and Ukraine together had knocked out nearly 9 percent of global refining capacity.
Former US negotiator Aaron David Miller has acknowledged that the United States is “on the verge of suffering a really significant strategic defeat” if it is forced to accept Iran’s growing leverage and control over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical shipping lanes.
Speaking in an interview with Australia’s ABC network, Miller warned that emerging arrangements could compel Washington to give Iran the ability to control who and what passes through the waterway. Such an outcome, he emphasized, would constitute a major setback not only for the United States but also for its allied Arab states in the Persian Gulf.
Miller made the remarks while discussing reported negotiations between Iran and Oman on mechanisms to guarantee the safe passage of vessels through the Strait. Although he cautioned that it is still too early to declare a final deal, he made clear that any arrangement strengthening Tehran’s hand would represent a profound strategic loss for Washington.
“The (Persian) Gulf states need to decide whether or not they can acquiesce or even support such an accord. And then, once a text is made public, the administration is going to have to weigh in to see whether or not they’re able to accept. But, again, my confidence level here is not entirely as high these days,” he said.
Miller further observed that while the Persian Gulf states as a group hold limited influence over Trump, Saudi Arabia and the UAE wield considerable leverage thanks to the extensive business interests of the Trump family in the region.
He pointed out that the Trump administration, members of the president’s family, including son-in-law Jared Kushner, as well as Steve Witkoff and others have already benefited from hundreds of millions of dollars in investments linked to projects in the Persian Gulf, he added.
“Affinity Partners, which is Jared Kushner’s $2 billion hedge fund, was bankrolled by Mohammed bin Salman, the future king of Saudi Arabia,” Miller noted.
Miller warned that any US strike on Iran’s energy infrastructure would provoke a severe Iranian response with far-reaching consequences for global energy markets.
The full extent of the damage Iran could inflict on Persian Gulf oil facilities has not yet been seen, he said, and such an escalation could “drive oil prices well north of anything we’ve seen.”
Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum on collective defense on Friday, according to a joint statement from the countries seen by Sputnik.
According to the Turkiye newspaper, the joint defense agreement provides for cooperation in the field of intelligence sharing and regional security coordination. Turkiye’s accession to the system of strategic defense cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, an agreement on which was signed in 2025, may become an important stage in changing the balance of power in the Middle East.
“Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Shahbaz Sharif and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed an agreement in Mecca on collective defense, showing the countries’ shared commitment to further enhance collective security,” the joint statement said.
The purpose of the agreement is to strengthen collective deterrence of any act of aggression, the statement read.
According to the document, an attack on any of the three countries would be considered as an attack on all of them. It also implies strengthening all aspects of defense cooperation between the three countries, the statement said.
The head of the Mossad dismissed two senior officials from the agency, the head of its Intelligence Directorate and the head of its Iran Division, following the failure of an operational plan designed to facilitate regime change in Iran, Israeli Channel 12 reported.
According to the channel, the Mossad chief’s decision was based on the assessment that the officials who formulated the operational concept and oversaw its development should be held accountable for its failure. The two dismissed officials were reportedly directly involved in the intelligence planning, development, and operationalization of the strategy, which was presented to US President Donald Trump.
The channel added that the plan hinged on establishing cooperation with groups from ethnic minority communities inside Iran to generate conditions for regime change and facilitate the installation of a new Iranian leadership. However, the operation was never translated into action on the ground.
The channel quoted security sources as saying that relations between the Mossad chief and the dismissed officials had been strained from the outset and that their departures were agreed upon.
Nevertheless, the timing of the dismissals was not coincidental, the sources said, given that the two officials had played leading roles in developing the operational plan that ultimately failed, according to the Israeli account.
The US-Israeli aggression on Iran was reportedly built in part around a Mossad assessment that Israeli strikes, assassinations and armed riots would trigger a “popular uprising and ultimately topple the Iranian government.”
However, months into the war, the anticipated regime change has failed to materialize, while US and Israeli intelligence assessments indicate that Iran’s government remains intact.
The plan reportedly faced skepticism from US military commanders and Israeli intelligence officials even before the aggression began. A parallel strategy involving Kurdish armed groups also faltered after opposition from the US, Turkey, Iraq and Kurdish leaders, raising questions over the assumptions underpinning the campaign.
Iranian state media reports that a deal with Oman to regulate traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is nearly completed.
Fars News reported that details of the deal include, “Vessels belonging to the United States, the Zionist regime, and other hostile countries will be prohibited from passing through the Strait of Hormuz.”
“Cargo related to the Zionist regime, both military and civilian, will not be allowed to pass through this area.” The Fars report continues, “Vessels or cargoes that are involved in actions against the Resistance Front will also be subject to the ban.”
It adds that other countries that have taken part in the war against Iran will be banned from using the Strait until reparations are paid.
After the US and Israel started an aggressive war against Iran in February, the IRGC seized control over the Strait of Hormuz. Washington has demanded Tehran return the critical waterway to its prewar status. However, Iranian officials say Tehran will retain control over the Strait after the war is settled.
Iran says the current negotiations with Oman do not include the US. Tehran and Muscat plan to split the revenue from the service fees generated from the Strait.
When the House of Commons was debating how much to increase the time limit for detention without trial the question of torture came up. Officially this was limited to the nice considerations of whether it was all right to send people to places where torture is used and whether Britain can use information collected by the use of torture in other countries. This discussion gave an impression of democratic Britain as the home of civilised behaviour where the very idea of torture is repugnant to our legislators – unlike, say, the US with its secret CIA jails… In reality, the British state has a long history of using and developing a whole range of torture techniques. … continue
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