Aletho News

Russia Communicates Consistently, But the West Won’t Listen

By Bryan Anthony Reo – New Eastern Outlook – November 15, 2025

Russia consistently states its interests, goals, and security concerns, but the West often ignores these statements, considering them irrelevant and refusing to consult on issues directly affecting Russia. This attitude reflects hubris and folly and risks disastrous consequences, as it is both unjust and historically unsound.

Over the last several decades, Russia has consistently communicated a clear stance to the West, a stance that has largely been ignored or even ridiculed. As I say, “over the last several decades,” it becomes clear I am going to pick a starting point for a divergence or breakdown of East/West communications, and I must necessarily pick some point. I could go back to the Crimean War and show how Britain and France were engaged in imperialist interventions to try to harm Russia as far back as 1854 (and very few British patriots who honor the glory of the Light Brigade ever think to inquire as to why the British Army was in Crimea in the first place), or I could even go back to 1054 with the East-West Schism, but for the sake of simplicity, brevity, and precision, let’s focus around 1989-1991 as the starting point. It is necessary to pick a point, so I choose 1989-1991 for the purpose of this writing.

The Decline of the Soviet Empire and NATO’s Promises

As the Cold War was winding down and Soviet Premier Gorbachev tacitly conceded that Marxism-Leninism had not prevailed in the competition of ideas with the Western nations, agreements were made, understandings were reached, and terms were established for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe and from the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact member territories. Then US Secretary of State James Baker promised guarantees: “NATO jurisdiction or forces will not move eastward” regarding the possibility of NATO eastward expansion. Memorandum of Conversation between James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow available in the National Security Archive.

There was also the follow-up conversation with President Gorbachev (held the same day as the initial conversation with Mr. Shevardnadze), where Baker told Gorbachev, “Not one inch to the east.”

Consequences and Lessons of the Eastern Bloc

It was on this basis that the Soviet Union consented to German reunification under Western auspices favorable to the FRG, by which the DDR was essentially absorbed. The Soviets also withdrew, in peace, throughout the Warsaw Pact nations, and nowhere did they use violence to oppose the popular mass demonstrations occurring throughout 1989-1990 across in the Eastern Bloc; not even in Romania, where the demonstrations were not only not peaceful, but morphed into a bloody revolution. As an aside, Brussels technocrats might do well to ponder what the Romanian people did to Ceausescu and the simple fact that when people are pushed to the breaking point, they snap, and that no technocratic tyranny is immune to being brought down by its own working class. In the end, Ceausescu was at least as out of touch with the reality of his own population as most of the empty suits in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and London are with their respective populations, and only time will tell if those empty suits in those cities meet a similar fate.

The Russians (previously Soviets) had communicated clearly to their Western counterparts and obtained promises and assurances that they thought were as good as gold. The only thing we can fault President Gorbachev for is that he trusted the words of Western so-called statesmen, and he actually believed what they told him. They would later cynically proclaim, “Those promises were never in writing,” as though a verbal guarantee means nothing and it would only matter if it were written on paper. Ask the American Indians how valuable American government written guarantees were in the 19^th century, or ask the Czechs and Slovaks what they think of British written guarantees from 1938 and 1939. The West would have violated even written guarantees, because it is now obvious that the West had the intention to betray Russia from the start.

History Lessons: Why Russia Will Never Forgive NATO Expansion

The West occasionally maintains the position that no guarantees were ever given to Russia, a position I do not support. The available evidence strongly indicates that the guarantees were made, and common sense would suggest that seasoned Soviet/Russian statesmen would have procured such guarantees before undertaking the steps to dismantle the Warsaw Pact and shift forces back to the Soviet Union. However, even if the guarantees were not made, good neighborliness and political reality would dictate that the prudent course of action would be to respect Russian interests and not expand NATO, as such expansion is a needless provocation that risks much and gains little.

Russia has clearly communicated, repeatedly, “Do not expand NATO to the east,” “Do not expand NATO into former Warsaw Pact members,” and finally, “Do not expand NATO into former Soviet Republics.” The standard response the West gives Russia has come from people such as John McCain, who dismiss Russia as a “gas station masquerading as a country,” which they say isn’t worthy of listening to or taking seriously. I urge my fellow Americans, only adopt Mr. McCain’s attitude if you do not value peace and if you wish to test that hypothesis in a knock-down, drag-out fight with Russia, a fight that might end in nuclear fire.

Suffice to say, Russia is a great and historical power and cannot be flippantly dismissed as a “gas station” simply because a pseudo-statesman like John McCain said so. Such remarks are as constructive to international dialogue as a Russian dismissing the USA as a “Super Walmart pretending to be a country,” which, as far as I know, has not happened, because Russian diplomats are actually classically educated and know how to behave themselves. One-liner insults or verbal jabs are best left to comedians, not aspiring statesmen hoping to go viral while sounding “cool” for a younger audience.

The Russians seldom speak of Americans or America in the sort of denigrating or insulting terms Americans use to describe them, because it is not how mature statesmen dialogue with partners or even competitors or rivals; childish insults are generally not a tool in the box of statecraft, unless you are Bismarck trying to start a war with France in 1870. The Russians don’t seem to have the American penchant for starting unnecessary wars.

In fact, the Russians have shown incredible restraint and forbearance in an attempt to keep the peace and avoid escalation to war. Russia reluctantly accepted NATO expansion in 1999, which saw the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland incorporated into NATO, although it was in clear violation of the prior assurances made by Western leadership. It is likely that the Western powers, looking at the dire situation in Russia in the late 1990s, decided, “Russia is in crisis, the situation is terrible, we can violate the prior agreements with impunity, and Russia won’t be in any position to oppose us.”

One more round of expansion of NATO in the former Warsaw Pact and even in the former Soviet Republics occurred, and that was in 2004.

Putin at the Helm: How the Change of Power in Russia Coincided with a New Wave of NATO Expansion

Something dramatic and historically significant had happened in Russia around that time; that was the ascension to the presidency of Vladimir Putin, who was appointed prime minister in 1999 and then elected president in 2000.

The 1999 NATO expansion happened prior to the beginning of his administration, and the 2004 expansion happened while he was still stabilizing the situation in Russia and was working to resolve the internal issues of the Second Chechen War (the jihadi groups in Dagestan likely had support of CIA/Western-organized global jihadi networks such as Al Qaeda, which the CIA had formed and organized to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, which ultimately turned and bit its American master).

In 2004 the Russians very reluctantly witnessed the expansion of NATO into the Baltic States and the rest of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members who were not included in the 1999 expansion, but red lines were drawn; the message was clear: “Do not ever attempt to expand NATO into a former Soviet Republic again.”

The West went away hearing what its delusional technocratic rulers wanted to hear and what its thoroughly dishonest corporate press wanted to report: “Russia is unreasonable and threatens a peaceful military alliance simply for expanding right to its front door.” They also convinced themselves Russia was weak and could be subdued or subverted.

Two Failures of the West: Lessons of 2008 and the Fate of the Puppets

The West has only dared try to expand into former Soviet Republics on two more occasions, one in 2008, where the Western/Soros-backed pawn Mikheil Saakashvili (emboldened by ultimately empty Western guarantees of support) foolishly and recklessly ordered his military to attack Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia and found out the hard way that Western guarantees aren’t always reliable and that Russia was not as weak as his Western handlers doubtlessly assured him. Saakashvili is presently a naturalized Ukrainian citizen who claims a right to the leadership of Georgia, but he is incarcerated for his crimes against Georgia and the Georgian people. Readers may ponder on such things and contemplate the worthiness of Western guarantees, something Saakashvili will have many years to ponder on from his prison cell, where he may also contemplate that his treason against Georgia and aggression against Russia came with high price tags.

2008 was different from 1999, as Russia now had President Putin at the helm, Russia’s recovery was proceeding at full speed, and what NATO was able to get away with in 1999, it found it couldn’t manage in 2008.

I said there were “two more occasions” where the West tried to expand NATO into former Soviet Republics. One was in Georgia in 2008. The other is right now; it is history we are living in and watching unfold. We are part of a generation that is watching (in some instances writing) this history. I speak, of course, of Ukraine.

In 2008 NATO affirmed, “Ukraine will one day become a member,” and President Putin warned them not to try, not to do it; he warned of a forceful response if such a thing was attempted. NATO ignored Putin, at its own peril, and proceeded forward with operations in the Ukraine, first subverting the lawful government with the illegal (and immoral) Maidan Coup of 2014, and then turning the Ukraine into an armed camp with tens of billions of dollars of weapons from 2014 to 2022 and then finally hundreds of billions of dollars since 2022.

Russia communicated clearly, “Do not expand NATO in this manner,” and the NATO response was essentially demonstrated by deed, “We don’t care what Russia says or does, Russian responses are not relevant, and we don’t factor Russia into our calculations.”

Why does NATO seek to expand? Why does NATO even exist in the post-Cold War era? Perhaps the NATO leaders understand well something Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf: “An alliance which is not for the purpose of waging war has no meaning and no value.” So NATO exists to wage war; this much is clear. The question then is, “Against whom does NATO seek to wage war?” A question whose answer is also obvious. NATO is an aggressive dagger aimed at the heart of Russia.

Bryan Anthony Reo is a licensed attorney based in Ohio and an analyst of military history, geopolitics, and international relations.

November 15, 2025 Posted by aletho | Militarism | NATO, Russia, Ukraine, United States | Leave a comment