Iran, Russia, China Demand Guarantees Against Further Attacks on Iranian Nuclear Sites
Sputnik – 09.09.2026
MOSCOW – Iran, Russia and China have demanded guarantees against further attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran’s mission in Vienna said on Wednesday.
“China, Iran, and Russia, in a joint statement to the [IAEA] BoG [Board of Governors] today, condemned repeated attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, together with continuing threats of further aggression. In this regard, effective assurances, in particular guarantees of the non-recurrence of such actions, are indispensable for further development of Iran’s cooperation with the Agency,” the mission wrote on X.
The prevailing security conditions have effectively made the normal implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran impossible, the mission added.
The US and Israel struck a number of Iranian nuclear facilities during the conflict of June 2025. Iranian nuclear sites were also hit during the latest escalation that began in late February 2026. Tehran blamed the US for the strikes.
The IAEA Board of Governors began its regular session on Monday in Vienna. The session, which runs until September 11, will address issues related to the implementation of safeguards in Iran and developments surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.
How the Latest Iran Sanctions Could Impact Central Asia
The US Iran strategy is working against its Central Asia strategy; Secondary sanctions may push the region closer to China and Russia.
By James D. Durso | The National Interest | September 8, 2026
On August 19, US President Donald Trump announced an “ECONOMIC D-DAY” against the Islamic Republic of Iran, warning of “tremendous economic consequences” for any country allowing its financial institutions, businesses, airports, or government entities to provide Iran a “lifeline.” On August 24, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced “Operation Economic Outcast,” which sanctions Iran and its facilitators in third countries (but no major Chinese banks), and declared, “you are either with us or against us.”
Potential secondary sanctions threaten Central Asia’s developing trade, energy, and transport links with Iran, raising costs, disruption risks, and pressure to diversify routes. The Central Asian republics are not major supporters of Iran, but Iran is becoming an increasingly important southern outlet for their trade and connectivity. The biggest risk is therefore collateral damage to legitimate commerce and transportation, rather than a confrontation over Iran policy.
The Effect of Secondary Sanctions on Central Asia’s Economy
Banking and financial services could become the most immediate problem. Central Asian banks and companies may decide that even legitimate transactions involving Iran are not worth the compliance risk. If a Kazakh or Uzbek bank processes an Iranian payment and Washington later determines the transaction constitutes a prohibited “lifeline,” the bank could lose access to the US financial system.
That creates a powerful chilling effect: the US threatens sanctions, banks become risk-averse, Iranian transactions become difficult, and Central Asia-Iran trade declines as the republics lose access to a market of over 90 million people.
Washington is already targeting Iranian shadow-banking networks and foreign facilitators for enabling Iran’s rahbar banking system. The Treasury Department said its August 7 action involved networks spanning several countries and hundreds of millions of dollars in Iranian transactions.
The result could be over-compliance: Central Asian banks might stop handling perfectly legal Iran-related transactions simply because determining what Washington will regard as a “lifeline” is too difficult. Secondary sanctions can dampen commerce even without formal designations, as private actors withdraw to avoid US financial-system exclusion or penalties.
Transportation and logistics corridors could become economically unattractive, potentially with greater strategic consequences than the direct loss of trade. A container originating in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan and traveling through Iran to a Persian Gulf port might have nothing to do with Iran politically. Still, it could require an Iranian trucking company, an Iranian railway, an Iranian port, Iranian customs services, Iranian insurance, an Iranian bank, and fuel purchased in Iran. As the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a major player in Iran’s economy, it will be tough not to deal with an IRGC-affiliated business.
If Washington interprets normal business activity as supporting the Iranian government, the entire corridor could become commercially radioactive. Iran offers a continuous land route southward and onward to the Persian Gulf petrostates, South Asia, East Asia, and East Africa.
The Central Asian republics are landlocked and have pursued pragmatic economic ties with Iran primarily for southern access to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean via ports such as Bandar Abbas and Chabahar. These routes form part of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and related rail and road networks, offering alternatives or complements to routes that transit Russia, China, or Afghanistan.
Energy relationships are another vulnerability, particularly for Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Energy swaps, fuel purchases, and other transactions involving Iranian counterparties could become more expensive or difficult if banks, insurers, shippers, or trading companies conclude that they face sanctions exposure.
A prior Turkmen gas-swap arrangement involving Iran was disrupted by US sanctions, illustrating how sanctions can affect nonmilitary transactions. Tajikistan has also sought large preferential fuel supplies from Iran amid unreliable Russian supplies.
Central Asian governments may therefore face higher freight and insurance rates, longer transit times, additional compliance costs, and pressure to use alternative corridors. They may also see greater use of barter or non-US Dollar settlement mechanisms where feasible.
Trade and regional connectivity. The economic effect is likely to be less a complete collapse of trade than higher prices and greater complexity of using Iran. The region may accelerate diversification toward the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the “Middle Corridor”), Pakistani ports, or Chinese routes, although each has capacity, cost, or security limitations.
Kazakhstan is probably the most exposed, given its long-term connectivity strategy and interest in an outlet to the Persian Gulf. It has been developing multiple routes to diversify its export geography, including the Middle Corridor through the Caspian and South Caucasus, as well as routes through Iran. Its development of port infrastructure in Iran illustrates that Astana sees Iranian territory as part of its long-term connectivity portfolio.
Bilateral trade rose 26.4 percent in 2025 to about $430 million, with ambitions to reach $3 billion, supported by the Eurasian Economic Union-Iran free trade agreement. Rail freight with Iran increased 69 percent, while INSTC freight overall grew 12 percent to 3.5 million tons. In June 2026, Kazakhstan signed a 27-year Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) deal for its own logistics terminal at Bandar Abbas, aimed at Persian Gulf, South Asian, Southeast Asian, and East African markets. Secondary sanctions could delay or derail the terminal project and raise logistics costs; banks and carriers could also self-sanction and chill transactions even without formal government action.
Washington now faces a dilemma: the more aggressively it sanctions Iranian transit infrastructure, the harder it becomes for Central Asian states to build the independent trade routes Washington claims it wants them to develop.
Uzbekistan has an especially strong reason to maintain multiple southern options. Tashkent has pursued routes through Turkmenistan and Iran toward the Persian Gulf while also developing routes westward via the Middle Corridor and eastward (the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway).
Roughly 9 percent of imports and 10 percent of non-gold exports transited Iran in 2025. Officials have estimated potential losses from Middle East logistics disruptions at $1–$1.5 billion (0.7–1 percent of GDP). Sanctions pressure could force costly rerouting toward the Middle Corridor or other paths, raise freight rates, and reduce competitiveness.
In June, Tashkent concluded a successful investment forum that saw interest from 193 American companies and investors, and where Washington and Tashkent launched a joint investment platform to “identify strategic investments in Uzbekistan for the US and US allies in key sectors.” In February 2026, the United States and Uzbekistan established a critical-minerals partnership, including a framework for up to $400 million in investment in the two countries.
Uzbekistan’s president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, visited the White House in February 2026, and the leaders concluded agreements in critical minerals, energy and petrochemicals, agriculture and poultry, and irrigation and water-saving technology, the latter a critical issue in the water-stressed country. They also announced a three-year, $35 billion Economic Cooperation Program. Uzbekistan’s World Trade Organization accession got a boost, and the Board of Peace gave Uzbekistan a role in Trump’s Middle East initiative.
The Uzbek leader has made a substantial personal investment in the relationship with the United States, and Uzbekistan has an incentive to comply with US sanctions on prohibited Iranian entities while preserving legitimate transit and commercial relationships wherever possible. That said, Trump must ensure his attack on Iran’s economy doesn’t damage the economies of countries that want a serious relationship with America, as future leaders will not again expose themselves politically if the Americans are careless.
Turkmenistan could face a somewhat different problem. It has extensive energy and transportation ties with Iran and depends on its neighbors for alternative routes. At the same time, Ashgabat traditionally values neutrality (and it is official state policy) and is unlikely to want to become involved in a US-Iran confrontation.
Turkmenistan is expanding cooperation with Iran in transport, energy, communications, and construction. US sanctions disrupted a prior gas-swap arrangement, so secondary measures could freeze or raise the cost of energy swaps and transit.
If Washington begins sanctioning Iranian transportation or energy counterparties broadly, Turkmenistan could be forced to choose between maintaining economically useful relationships with Iran and avoiding exposure to the US financial system, an uncomfortable choice for a country that works not to take sides.
Tajikistan’s direct trade with Iran is smaller, but its exposure is growing. Freight with Iran rose 17.5 percent in the first half of 2026 to 433,000 tons, mostly by rail. Tajikistan has sought large preferential fuel supplies from Iran—2.55 million tons of crude and products, including 2 million tons of crude plus diesel, gasoline, and aviation fuel—amid unreliable Russian supplies. It has also discussed joint road corridors with Iran and Afghanistan, potentially extendable regionally and toward China.
Disruptions could therefore hit fuel access, raise costs, and complicate logistics. Tajikistan may seek alternative suppliers and routes, but those alternatives could be more expensive or less reliable.
Kyrgyzstan is less directly tied to Iran than the other republics, so immediate sanctions exposure should be lower. Nevertheless, it could feel the effects indirectly through higher regional freight costs, fuel prices, insurance costs, banking restrictions, and shared corridor dependencies.
The Strategic Consequences of US Secondary Sanctions in Central Asia
The Central Asian governments pursue multi-vector policies and generally avoid open confrontation with Washington. They are unlikely to disregard US pressure or politically champion Iran, but will manage exposure carefully, possibly scaling back high-visibility projects while seeking workarounds.
Their most likely strategy is: comply with US sanctions on prohibited Iranian entities while preserving legitimate transit and commercial relationships wherever possible. They may also seek explicit US assurances or exemptions for infrastructure projects, but that may dissuade US investors if multiple approvals are needed over a project’s lifetime. And US policy can change overnight.
Washington says it wants Central Asia to become less dependent on Russia and China, and Central Asian governments want that too; one way to do it is by developing connectivity through Iran.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined Trump’s Board of Peace, but that may not protect them if Trump decides “all hands” must support America’s crusade against Iran. The point of maximum danger for the two republics may come if Trump can’t force China to isolate Iran and tries to punish Beijing by punishing Astana and Tashkent for trans-shipping Chinese goods while allegedly concealing their true origin to take advantage of lower tariffs. There is always the chance a Trump-affiliated investor may ask the White House to attack Tashkent’s trade with Iran, $578 million in 2025, if it doesn’t like Tashkent’s terms and conditions for a deal.
Consequently, an overly broad sanctions campaign could produce greater dependence on China and Russia, the opposite of the strategic objective Washington often advocates for Central Asia, consequences that probably weren’t considered before Trump and Bessent took to social media. Russian State Railways is sanctioned by the United States and the European Union, so Central Asian businesses may be stuck between two transport options, both sanctioned by the West.
The consequences will depend on how Washington defines a “lifeline.” If “lifeline” means financing Iran’s military or IRGC, oil exports, weapons procurement, or sanctions-evasion networks, the Central Asian impact could be manageable. If it means ordinary transportation, banking, aviation, port services, and non-military government-to-government commerce involving Iran, the consequences could be much larger.
The American administration has already demonstrated that it is willing to sanction foreign transport and financial networks supporting Iran’s military and procurement activities. That distinction is central to the policy question. If Washington wants Central Asia to have “connectivity without dependence,” it may need to distinguish carefully between Iranian military lifelines and Iranian transportation infrastructure that Central Asian states use simply to reach global markets.
Central Asia probably will not be the principal target of the new sanctions, but it could be the sanctions’ most significant collateral damage. The danger is not that the republics will support Iran, but that Washington could make legitimate Iranian transit so financially risky and demand that Iran’s neighbors help quarantine the Islamic Republic, undermining Central Asia’s effort to develop alternative routes to the world to the benefit of China and Russia.
James Durso is a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters. Mr. Durso served in the US Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. His writing has appeared in The Hill, The National Interest, Defense News, and Responsible Statecraft. Follow him on X: @james_durso
Iran War Just Got Much Bigger / Matt Bracken & Lt Col Daniel Davis
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – September 8, 2026
Qatar Warns of ‘Industrial Catastrophe’ If Strait of Hormuz Remains Closed
By Kyle Anzalone | The Libertarian Institute | September 8, 2026
Qatar is warning that there will be significant global consequences if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened soon. Iran closed the Strait in response to the war started by the US and Israel. President Donald Trump also imposed a blockade of Iranian ports.
On Monday, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mohammed Al-Ansari, said reopening the Strait of Hormuz remains a priority, warning that the prolonged disruption could lead to an “industrial catastrophe.”
The Strait of Hormuz has become a major issue for Trump. Before the war, the Strait was treated as an international waterway. However, after the US and Israel attacked Iran, Tehran seized control of the Strait.
Since then, Tehran has limited traffic to nations that are not participating in the war against Iran. Additionally, Iran is requiring vessels to use preapproved shipping lanes and pay a “service fee.”
Tehran says any agreement to end the conflict must recognize Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait. Iran is in negotiations with Oman to establish new protocols for ships transiting the waterway. Washington is demanding that Tehran return the Strait to its pre-war status.
The US has attempted to force open the Strait of Hormuz. The US is currently escorting tankers through the waterway in hopes of defending the vessels from Iranian missiles and drones. Over the past week, US warships and tankers were targeted by Iranian missiles and drones.
While US officials have claimed that the amount of oil exiting the Strait is close to prewar levels, monitoring agencies say only a small fraction is getting out of the Persian Gulf.
Trump has attempted to pressure US allies into joining a coalition to reopen the Strait without success. The President has recently turned his focus toward South Korea. He recently scaled back war games with Seoul, in part, because South Korea refused to aid the war against Iran.
On Tuesday, Seoul said it still had not determined if it would provide assistance to the war. “We are closely consulting with the international community, including the US, on ways to make a substantive contribution toward the swift restoration of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and peace and stability in the Middle East,” Defense Ministry spokesperson Chung Bin-na said. “No specific measures have been decided at this point.”
Iran warned South Korea that any involvement in the US war would have “consequences.”
IRGC Navy seizes cutting-edge US unmanned submersible in Strait of Hormuz

Photo released by the IRGC Navy shows an advanced US underwater vehicle captured by the IRGC forces near the Strait of Hormuz on September 8, 2026
Press TV – September 8, 2026
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced that it has successfully intercepted and captured a highly advanced, unmanned American underwater vehicle at the entrance of the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
In a statement released on Tuesday, the IRGC Navy stated that the seizure was carried out in the early hours of the day following a “complex intelligence and operational action.”
The unmanned submersible incorporates some of the world’s most advanced underwater technology and was delivered to the US terrorist military in 2025, the statement said.
The IRGC announced that photographic evidence and detailed footage of the captured US asset would be released in the coming hours.
Iranian news agency Tasnim identified the captured system as a Dive-LD, an autonomous unmanned underwater vehicle developed by US defense technology company Anduril Industries and first delivered to the US Navy’s Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Group 1 in 2025.
The vehicle is approximately 5.8 meters long, has a diameter of about 1.2 meters and weighs roughly 2.7 tonnes.
Its published specifications include an endurance of up to 10 days underwater and a maximum operating depth of around 6,000 meters.
Designed as a modular autonomous platform, the Dive-LD can be configured for missions including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, seabed mapping, infrastructure inspection and mine-countermeasure operations.
The capture comes amid a sharp escalation between Iran and the United States over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints.
The waterway has increasingly become a key arena in the US war on Iran, prompting Tehran to assert greater control over maritime activity in and around the strait.
Recent military exchanges have included US strikes on Iranian oil tankers and Iranian missile attacks targeting US naval forces.
On September 6, Iran said it had struck a US unmanned vessel attempting to enter a restricted area near Hormuz.
The capture of the unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) marks the latest in a long history of Iran intercepting and seizing advanced Western military technology.
Over the past decade, Iranian forces have successfully downed or captured numerous high-value US assets, including the RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone, MQ-9 Reaper drones, and various underwater gliders and surface vessels in the Persian Gulf.
Reverse-engineering these captured technologies has historically played a significant role in accelerating Iran’s domestic drone and unmanned naval programs.
US ambassador threatens Britain with economic retaliation over Israeli settlement trade ban
The Cradle | September 8, 2026
US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee has said Washington will certainly hit back if Britain proceeds with trade sanctions targeting illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, telling BBC that a response could come from the federal government and from individual US states.
Huckabee said acting in this way against “a partner, Israel” risked a “huge economic impact on British businesses,” which he warned could find themselves “banned” from operating “in a number of states.”
He told BBC the planned ban on illegal Israeli settlement goods would be “discrimination against the Jewish people,” singling out Florida as a state that could move against British trade.
The ambassador had already accused the British government of “Jew hate” over the weekend, responding to criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza by British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband, who is himself Jewish.
Florida Republican Congressman Randy Fine issued a parallel threat, saying legislation he pushed through as a state lawmaker “would ban any British company forced to comply from doing business with any state or local government in Florida.”
Firms joining the boycott would also be shut out of the state if they needed permits or tax dealings with authorities to function, he said.
Israeli President Isaac Herzog, in a filmed statement, said Britain would land on “the wrong side of history,” calling the step “a grave miscalculation” and “a gross interference in the democratic elections of a sovereign nation.”
This comes after UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham moved to impose a full ban on trade with illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, along with possible sanctions on Israeli ministers and individual settlers.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar has publicly attacked British Foreign Secretary Miliband, calling his statement on the E1 settlement project patronizing.
The illegal E1 settlement bloc would cut the occupied West Bank in half, isolate it from occupied East Jerusalem, and bury any prospect of a Palestinian state, an outcome Israeli officials have stated as the goal.
Is America preparing a tactical nuke for Iran?
By Martin Jay | Strategic Culture Foundation | September 6, 2026
The escalation trap is getting worse for Trump and his cabal of sycophants, as what was once a discussion which was linked to existentialism – the nuclear option – is now being dialled down to any kind of military option. Just a bigger bomb. The more Trump loses, the more Iran hits U.S. assets and allies in the Middle East, the longer the straits remain closed, and the higher gasoline and diesel costs reach in the U.S. – the more the idea of a ‘tactical’ nuke dropped on Iran becomes normal and even preferred.
But Trump is also getting madder. He is literally losing his mind, and his condition has worsened in his second term in office to the point where he is losing touch with any kind of reality. Before February 28th, the U.S. economy was not in bad shape. A lot of fundamentals were holding out. But now everything is spiralling out of control, and quite apart from blue-collar workers being hit with gas pump prices being well above $4, now diesel is being hiked – which only means that the cost of food, among other goods, is going to rise significantly, as trucking firms pass on the bill to producers, who pass it on to the consumer.
And as things start to get out of control, take a cursory glance at who is running Trump and who stands to gain if a nuclear bomb were used. It’s the same people who walked away from 9/11 laughing until their sides hurt. Israel. The Zionists are now pushing for the tactical strike option, as any escalation in the region – no matter who gets killed or whose country gets wiped out even of water – is not their worry or concern. These days, Netanyahu’s coterie can argue even more that Iran is probably making a nuclear bomb, as the one institution that Trump could turn to – the IAEA – can’t enter Iran and do its inspections. And so the default conclusion is that the U.S. president is going to be bullied again into making a cataclysmic error of judgment in hitting Iran.
The Zionists have been busy on both sides of the Atlantic. In the UK, it’s hard not to see how their money is now reaching Nigel Farage’s far-right party, which has just been hit by another dodgy funding scandal – presenting the leader of the party as bereft of any political morals of any creed in preference for filling his pockets with dirty cash. The Zionists control UK media, and it’s interesting to see how Farage gets a pretty easy time despite the graft scandals burying him. In the U.S., it’s a similar story. For a while now, J.D. Vance has been quite critical of how Zionists are shaping U.S. politics both internationally and even domestically, and has always been quite vague about how the U.S. should move forward in Iran. But now those who have crossed a threshold and are in the pockets of Israel’s lobby are going for him.
Former South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley recently accused him of not taking a clear stance on Israel – slamming him for trying to “be both.”
“Right is right. Wrong is wrong. In life, you must choose a side. You are either with the Tucker Carlson wing of the country or you are with the pro-Israel wing of the country,” she wrote on social media. “You can’t be both.”
Haley, a former GOP presidential candidate who isn’t overburdened with a high IQ, couldn’t even hide who was directing her and even giving her reference material to attack Vance – leading some to wonder if Israel’s lobby just writes her social media posts.
She continued her post with a quote from Nobel Prize-winning writer and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, who said in his 1986 acceptance speech: “We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim.”
Meanwhile, America’s trust around the world seems to have been eroded to almost nothing. Recently, the Netherlands just pulled out its gold reserves it used to keep in the U.S. The move followed Germany a few weeks ago, which did the same. EU leaders just don’t trust Trump and can see the de-dollarisation trend gaining ground while U.S. debt continues to mount. Trump can’t do anything, of course, as his immature ideas about governance have produced a series of policies which haven’t served the country’s interests but merely backfired – reminding many that he doesn’t have one or two failed businesses under his belt like many successful entrepreneurs, but scores, which would suggest that he doesn’t really understand business at all. A nuke, he might believe, would be a reset in the Middle East and perhaps a huge distraction away from terrible numbers back home. But the precedent it would set to Russia and China would only make Iran an even greater winner than it already is in the region. Trump simply has no idea what he is doing – and all the people who could advise him have been fired.
“We Are Being Drawn Into a War We Don’t Want to Fight”: What Jordan’s Alliance with Washington Is Costing It
By Muhammad Hamid ad-Din – New Eastern Outlook – September 6, 2026
The growing public discontent with the presence of American troops in Jordan, fueled by the regional conflict and Iran’s strategy, is putting the country’s government in a serious crisis of trust, forcing the authorities to choose between a strategic alliance with the United States and the internal stability of the state.
Some 4,000 U.S. troops, bases used for strikes against Iran, Iranian missiles crossing Jordanian skies, and American soldiers killed on Jordanian ground—all raise an increasingly urgent question: has the strategic alliance with Washington become a threat to the very existence of the country?
A Letter That Could Not Be Ignored
More than 200 Jordanian politicians, cultural figures, tribal leaders, and retired military officers did something extremely rare in Jordan—they publicly challenged their own government. In an open letter to the authorities, they demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country, the cancellation or revision of the security agreement with the United States, and its submission to parliament for review.
“We affirm that their presence exposes Jordan to security, political, and economic risks that serve no national interest, and increases the likelihood of our country being dragged into a regional conflict in which it has no part,” the appeal stated.
The initiative was led by former minister and lawmaker Amjad Khazza al-Majali. Among the signatories were former secretary-general of the Islamic Action Front, Salem al-Falahat; 90‑year‑old political activist Sufyan al-Tell; retired military figures including Ali al-Habashneh; and former secretary-general of the Jordanian Communist Party, Saud Kbeilat.
The diversity of the signatories—from leftists to Islamists, from tribal chiefs to secular intellectuals—prevented the authorities from dismissing the letter as the work of a single political faction. But it would be an exaggeration to claim that it reflects the views of all Jordanians; on such sensitive matters, the kingdom simply does not conduct opinion polls, and open disagreement with the authorities has always been a risky undertaking here.
When an Ally Becomes a Target
Jordan has long been one of the United States’ main military partners in the Middle East. Some 4,000 American troops are stationed on its territory. However, the war between the U.S. and Iran, which resumed after the collapse of the June ceasefire, has turned that presence from an abstract diplomatic arrangement into a tangible threat.
Iranian missiles and drones aimed at Israeli or American facilities regularly cross Jordanian airspace. Some strikes hit installations used by U.S. forces. As a result, American soldiers are being killed—and this is no longer just news from another continent, but events occurring on Jordanian soil.
As The Jerusalem Post noted, the Iranian strikes against Jordan were a calculated move: Tehran sought to “sow discord within Jordan and create governmental chaos.” Professor Ronen Itzhak commented on the situation as follows: “This is exactly what Iran was trying to achieve by launching missiles at Jordan. Its goal is to pressure the Jordanian population into demanding the removal of the American presence.”
And Iran is succeeding. Every new attack reinforces the position of critics of the U.S. presence: the alliance with Washington is costing Jordan in direct security losses.
Storm in Parliament: Condolences to “Child Killers”
A particularly telling episode occurred in the Jordanian parliament in late July. Deputy Ali al-Khalayleh proposed sending official condolences to the U.S. Congress over the deaths of American servicemen on Jordanian soil.
The proposal sparked a storm. Other legislators fiercely attacked al‑Khalayleh. They called the United States “the biggest supporter of Israel, which has committed a massacre in Gaza,” and branded American soldiers “child killers.” “The Jordanian people are above such condolences,” their opponents declared.
What made the situation especially delicate was that al‑Khalayleh himself had earlier described the U.S. military presence in Jordan as “a walk with shepherds.” Now he was proposing that parliament express formal condolences to Washington—and he was jeered by his colleagues.
What matters is that opposition to American policy in parliament came not from fringe activists, but from elected representatives within an official political institution. This indicates that discontent with the U.S. alliance is penetrating the highest levels of Jordan’s political system.
Trump’s Double Game
U.S. President Donald Trump, for his part, also fanned the flames. After the deaths of American soldiers in Jordan, he effectively blamed Jordanian forces for incompetence. “If we had different air defense operators, this would not have happened,” Trump said, hinting that the Jordanians had failed to provide adequate protection for U.S. troops. “When you let others do your work… sometimes things go wrong,” the president added.
For Jordanian critics of the American presence, these words were yet another confirmation of their position: Washington itself does not consider Jordan a safe place for its troops and is ready to shift the blame for their deaths onto local authorities.
The Jordanian government, by contrast, could have used the same attacks as proof of the need to strengthen air defense in cooperation with the United States. But amid growing public dissatisfaction, that argument sounds increasingly weak.
Iran Plays on the Divide
Iran’s strategy in this conflict is anything but subtle, yet at the same time highly professional. Tehran consistently draws a distinction between the Jordanian people and the Jordanian government. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued a direct appeal to Jordanians, stating that Iran is “not hostile to Jordan” and that its grievances are only with the American military presence.
“America is using bases on Jordanian soil to wage aggression and commit massacres against our people. It is our legitimate right to strike the aggressor wherever he launches his attacks,” the Iranian military declared. And in the view of many analysts, Tehran has a point on this issue.
Moreover, Iranian propaganda went further: the IRGC claimed that information about the location of U.S. troops in Jordan had been provided by Jordanian civilians and military personnel themselves and expressed gratitude to the Jordanian people for their cooperation.
In this way, Iran is trying to deepen the rift between the authorities and society, using the Palestinian cause as a lever. Support for Palestine is deeply rooted in Jordanian society, and the war in Gaza and Washington’s backing of Israel have only intensified anti‑American sentiment. That is precisely why Iranian statements fall on fertile ground.
Media Blockade and Information Gap
Paradoxically, despite the significance of the letter and the many prominent signatories, major Jordanian media outlets did not publish it in full. Critics of the government saw this as evidence of severe restrictions on political and media space in Jordan. Analysts argued that the limited room for dissent means that the level of opposition visible in the media is likely lower than the actual discontent in society.
As a result, the letter was disseminated mainly through social networks and foreign media. The Jordanian government, for its part, sought to frame the conflict not as a geopolitical problem but as a matter of national security. Official statements emphasized border defense and Jordan’s refusal to take part in the war.
However, in the age of social media, traditional methods of managing information are working less and less effectively. Citizens see videos online, read international reports, and compare them with official statements. The growing gap between the official version and what people see with their own eyes is undermining trust in the authorities.
The Price of Alliance
Jordan’s economy was already under severe strain due to inflation, unemployment, and declining purchasing power. The conflict dealt an additional blow to the tourism sector, which accounts for up to 18% of the country’s revenues. In the first half of 2026, income from tourism and Jordanian expatriates fell by 12%, from American tourists by 25%, and from European tourists by 28%. At the same time, the United States provides Jordan with about $1.65 billion annually in economic and military aid.
King Abdullah II’s government finds itself between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the alliance with the United States brings billions in aid and security guarantees. On the other hand, that same alliance turns the country into a target, undermines internal stability, and erodes citizens’ trust in the authorities.
As Professor Itzhak noted, “The King of Jordan has the sovereignty to make independent decisions in accordance with the constitution, so it is unlikely that he will change the country’s policy.” But the question is how much longer Jordanian society can endure being held hostage to a geopolitical game in which it has no voice.
The open letter from Jordanian public figures is not just a protest against foreign troops. It is a symptom of a deep crisis of trust between the authorities and society, between the government’s strategic calculations and the real interests of its citizens. War, the Palestinian question, the American military presence, and national sovereignty have become tightly interwoven—a knot that Amman is finding increasingly difficult to untie.
Traditional methods of managing public opinion are working less and less effectively in the age of social media. Jordanians are no longer passive recipients of official messages—they actively seek out alternative sources of information and compare them with government statements. And this growing comparison may prove to be the biggest challenge for the Jordanian government, because in today’s world, controlling the flow of information is far harder than controlling the country’s borders or its airspace.
Muhammad Hamid ad‑Din is a prominent Palestinian journalist
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Seyed M. Marandi: U.S. Intel Warns Iran Is Preparing a MAJOR Escalation
Dialogue Works | September 5, 2026
US approves $5 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia as it renews aggression against Iran
Press TV | September 5, 2026
Washington has approved a potential $5 billion arms package for Saudi Arabia that would sharply expand the kingdom’s precision-strike capabilities as the United States escalates its war of aggression against Iran.
The deal includes more than 10,000 guidance kits designed to convert conventional bombs into extended-range, steerable precision weapons.
The State Department cleared the sale on Friday. The package also covers more than 10,000 general-purpose bombs requested by Riyadh, both 500-pound (230 kg) and 2,000-pound (900 kg) variants.
These guidance systems would turn unguided “dumb bombs” into accurate munitions capable of striking targets at greater distances with far higher precision.
Washington claims the transfer serves US foreign-policy and national-security interests by strengthening Saudi Arabia, which it calls a major non-NATO ally and an important contributor to political stability and economic development in the Persian Gulf.
The State Department said the weapons would enhance Saudi Arabia’s ability to conduct airborne strikes against current and potential regional threats, improve the kingdom’s defensive capabilities, and increase compatibility between Saudi systems and those used by US forces and other Persian Gulf partners.
Boeing, the Virginia-based US defense contractor, has been designated the principal contractor for the potential sale.
The approval comes as Washington expands arms transfers and military cooperation across the Persian Gulf while renewing its illegal war against Iran.
On February 28, the United States and Israel launched another round of aggression against Iran, eight months after carrying out unprovoked attacks on the country. Iran swiftly retaliated with barrages of missiles and drones against Israeli-occupied territories as well as US bases and interests across the region.
A ceasefire took effect on April 7. On June 18, the presidents of Iran and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding to end the war and begin a 60-day diplomatic process to resolve outstanding differences.
Renewed US strikes have once again triggered Iranian retaliation.



