Official Arab alignment with Israel to eliminate the resistance
By Majeb Zebda – Palestinian Information Center – May 4, 2025
The media warning issued by the Lebanese Higher Defence Council to Hamas, accusing it of undermining Lebanese national security, not only contradicts the facts that Israel is the one undermining Lebanese national security and violating Lebanese territory through killing, bombing and occupation without deterrence or accountability, but also paves the way for the disarmament of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon and suggests that they pose a threat to Lebanon’s security and territorial integrity. I will not rule out the possibility of the camp weapons issue being used to distort the image of the Palestinian resistance and to drag Hamas’s name into any future conflicts on the ground. This desire aligns with the vision of Mahmoud Abbas, who is hostile to the Palestinian resistance in general and Hamas in particular and plans to visit Lebanon to discuss the issue of weapons in the camps in the coming days.
On the other hand, the sudden Lebanese warning comes in response to the vision of the US and Israel’s arrangements for the future of the Arab region, which is being re-engineered politically and on the ground to allow for complete and undisputed Israeli domination. It also aligns with other Arab measures, including, for example, Jordan’s criminalisation of support for the Palestinian resistance and the new Syrian regime’s efforts, under American pressure, to tighten the noose on Palestinian resistance factions and prevent their activities inside Syria under the pretext of “arms control.”
This allows us to come to the conclusion that the Lebanese warning is just one scene among several others that together form the American-Israeli vision of the region. It is a bleak future for Arab dignity, in which Israel violates Arab lands and capabilities daily in a provocative and humiliating manner, while Arab regimes undertake the task of clipping the wings of the Palestinian resistance and cutting off its supply lines under the force of American pressure. The US will implement what these regimes fail to, and the American bombing of Yemen in defence of Israel, which has been ongoing for weeks, is a prime example of this.
Unfortunately, official Arab alignment with Israeli-American goals is pushing some to treat the Palestinian resistance with arrogance and condescension, describing it as the weakest link. Therefore, there is no high political price to pay for antagonising it and distorting its positive image, even though it has the legitimate and legal right to resist military occupation and defend its land, people and holy sites. This is a chance to recall the shameless insults and obscenities uttered by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas against the Palestinian resistance, which is the opposite of the official Arab approach to the criminal occupation, which violates the dignity of Arabs, their skies and their land around the clock. Yet, no one dares to threaten it or issue warnings—even as a formality—of resisting its attacks, which have become a daily occurrence on our television screens.
Arab identification with Israel’s desire to eliminate the resistance will strongly clash with the resistance’s popular support and its deep roots in the hearts of the nation’s free people. The resistance, which has persevered for 18 months against the Israeli enemies and sacrificed its best leaders and fighters without being broken, is capable of regrouping and rebuilding what the occupation has destroyed. When it does so, many of those who align with Israel’s goals today may seek to cosy up to the resistance after their strength weakens and they fail to eliminate it and uproot it from the land of Palestine and its surroundings.
Translation by MEMO
U.S. Continues Strikes on Yemen: Objectives, Criticism, and Alternatives
By Viktor Mikhin – New Eastern Outlook – May 1, 2025
U.S. President Donald Trump has confirmed that the United States will continue missile strikes on Yemen until the Houthis cease their attacks on Israel and ships in the Red Sea.
American officials have baselessly insisted that the attacks, which began on March 15, 2025, have achieved significant success. They claim to have allegedly destroyed personnel linked to the Houthis’ missile capabilities, as well as missile sites and weapons depots. However, many observers doubt the effectiveness of this campaign. While the Trump administration’s strikes have been less restrained than the bombings carried out under Biden, they have failed to eliminate Houthi leaders or undermine their missile production capabilities. Meanwhile, the Houthis continue to strike Israel and Israel-affiliated vessels, clearly demonstrating the limited effectiveness of the U.S. operation in achieving its stated goals.
Risks of Escalation and Humanitarian Consequences
Many analysts argue that the U.S. should intensify its operation by targeting critical infrastructure tied to the Houthis’ military potential. The recent barbaric bombing of the port of Ras Isa, which killed over 80 civilians, including rescue workers, may signal the start of a new phase. But experts doubt the U.S. can sustain such an operation, which has faced bipartisan criticism for lacking strategic results and for its financial cost—estimated at $1 billion in just two weeks. Some Democratic and Republican lawmakers have also stated that the Yemen operation violates the War Powers Act, which prohibits prolonged overseas military deployments without congressional approval.
Pentagon officials have also expressed concerns over U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) heavy use of long-range Tomahawk missiles in Yemen, warning that this could deplete U.S. stockpiles in the event of a future military confrontation with China.
For their part, the Houthis have a decade of experience enduring massive and sustained bombings—whether from the Saudi-led coalition since 2015 or directly from the U.S. under Biden. Neither side has achieved its primary strategic objectives. Moreover, prolonged strikes could create political pressure on the U.S. due to civilian casualties amid Yemen’s worsening humanitarian crisis. Since the beginning of the month, Trump administration strikes on Yemen have killed at least 160 civilians, including many children.
A Failed Military Approach and Pressure for Quick Results
The military setbacks, combined with pressure on Washington to deliver quick results, point to another possibility—turning to the Yemeni army. In theory, local ground forces could engage the Houthis on multiple fronts, particularly in coastal provinces, with the goal of degrading the Houthis’ military capabilities in the region and securing Red Sea shipping lanes, including vessels carrying critical supplies for aggressive Israel.
Earlier this month, the Yemeni army’s chief of staff met with the commander of U.S. CENTCOM to discuss joint military objectives and efforts to counter the Houthis. CNN, citing regional diplomatic sources, reported that a ground operation against the Houthis is being prepared in southern Yemen. The coordinated attack would be supported by Saudi and U.S. naval forces and aim to push the Houthis out of the critical port of Hodeidah. According to Yemeni sources, up to 80,000 troops have been mobilized for this purpose.
So far, there has been no official confirmation that a U.S.-backed Yemeni army offensive is in the works. In reality, this option comes with several practical challenges, not least of which are structural issues within the military apparatus of Yemen’s internationally recognized government.
While the official Yemeni army has received significant military support in training and equipment since 2015, including the formation of local militias, it remains weak and ineffective due to outdated pre-war weaponry, limited air defense capabilities, ammunition shortages, and insufficient training and maintenance. Other problems include pay disparities among soldiers from different factions and the prevalence of “ghost soldiers”—names added to payrolls for embezzlement purposes.
The Yemeni army is deeply fragmented, composed not of individual conscripts but of political and tribal factions that often hold conflicting regional, ideological, political, and even foreign allegiances. This is the main reason for poor coordination and the lack of a unified command. A joint security and defense committee was established years ago to reorganize and centralize the armed forces, but key factions—particularly the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—have resisted such efforts, preferring to maintain autonomy.
The situation is further complicated by infighting within the Presidential Leadership Council, lingering separatist sentiments in the STC, and Yemen’s economic devastation after years of civil war. These issues would not only hinder a military campaign against the Houthis but could also derail the UN-backed peace process. Even setting aside these concerns, overcoming structural problems would require extensive military and financial support from regional and international forces, long-term training and equipping, and measures to address gaps in the sanctions regime.
Diplomatic Alternatives
Reports suggest that U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations also touch on Iran’s role in the Middle East. In this context, Washington may pressure Tehran to convince the Houthis to halt attacks on Israel and Israel-linked ships in the Red Sea. This approach depends on Iran’s level of influence over the Houthis on one hand and progress on other issues—such as Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and sanctions—on the other.
A deal would benefit both sides. Iran wants to avoid a war that could cost it much of its remaining power and influence—especially after losing most of its military allies in the region—and could potentially lead to regime collapse. The U.S. wants to avoid further draining its military resources in the Middle East, preferring to conserve them for a prolonged conflict with China, which remains the current administration’s top priority. Still, the prospects of a negotiated solution to the Houthi problem remain uncertain, given its entanglement with other critical issues.
Each of the three options discussed has major drawbacks—yet none can be ruled out. The failure of one could lead to another, or two approaches could be pursued simultaneously. In the long run, Houthi attacks will likely stop. The question is how, under what terms, and what impact this will have on Yemen’s broader crisis.
If the Houthis are forced to halt due to a ground offensive, it would strengthen Yemen’s legitimate government, either compelling the Houthis to engage in peace talks or ousting them from Sanaa and restoring the official government. Conversely, if the Houthis relent due to a deal with Iran, it would solidify their control over northern Yemen.
The outcome hinges on whether the U.S. can break the Houthis or force them into peace on American-Israeli terms.
Viktor Mikhin, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Middle East Expert
Syria’s geopolitical reorientation: Unravelling a revolution, redrawing alliances
By Amro Allan – Al Mayadeen – May 1, 2025
Recent events in Syria mark a significant shift in the country’s geopolitical identity. The arrest of two senior members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) by Syria’s de-facto leaders cannot be dismissed as an isolated incident or a routine security matter. This action coincided with a meeting between Syria’s new ruler, Ahmad al-Sharaa, AKA Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, and US Congressman Cory Mills, during which al-Sharaa reportedly expressed openness to joining the “Abraham Accords”, the US-brokered framework for normalisation with “Israel”, “under the right conditions”.
Moreover, leaked information confirms that Damascus has signalled its approval of the majority of eight conditions set forth by the US in exchange for political and economic incentives. According to Reuters, US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria, Natasha Franceschi, gave the list of eight demands to the new Syrian foreign minister during an in-person meeting on the sidelines of a Syria donor conference in Brussels on March 18, 2025.
These conditions include the complete dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles, a commitment to ending support for what the US classifies as terrorism, cessation of threats toward regional ‘neighbours’, chiefly “Israel”, curtailment of what the US call Iranian influence, the banning of Palestinian factions’ activities on Syrian soil, primarily Hamas and the PIJ, security cooperation with Washington, and possibly granting the US permission for ‘counterterrorism’ strikes inside Syria.
In response to the US’s eight conditions, a formal message reportedly sent by the new Syrian government on April 14, 2025, pledged to prevent Syrian territory from being used as a launching ground for threats against any state, including “Israel”. It also announced the formation of a committee to monitor the activity of Palestinian groups within Syria.
These moves underscore a transformation that goes beyond surface-level diplomacy, signalling a strategic reorientation and a potential willingness to normalise relations with “Israel”.
The so-called Syrian revolution, having succeeded in ousting President Bashar al-Assad, is now entering a new phase, one defined by strategic realignment and integration into the so-called “Moderate Arab States,” accompanied by political and economic openness to the West.
This pivot implies a readiness to make concessions that would have been unthinkable under the former government, particularly those undermining Syria’s former ideological pillars and long-standing role as a bastion of pan-Arab and Islamic resistance against occupation.
This article does not seek to re-litigate the Syrian conflict, a war that has already consumed much energy and is now widely seen as a lost cause for the region’s remaining Resistance forces. Instead, it raises a pressing question: Is it accurate, or even justifiable, to continue referring to those who fought to dismantle Syria and Libya as “revolutionaries”?
Many of these uprisings were described as noble struggles for freedom and dignity. But if the result of these so-called “pure and patriotic” revolutions is the dismantling of national sovereignty and the empowerment of Western-aligned regimes, should the term “revolution” still be applied?
Typically, four justifications are presented when confronting this contradiction:
- The revolution lost its way.
- Those in power today do not represent the revolution.
- Revolution is a cumulative process: historical examples like the French Revolution are cited.
- The future will correct the mistakes of the present.
Each of these claims warrants brief examination:
- The revolution lost its way
This claim lacks analytical rigour. A popular uprising is either chaotic by nature, or it is a structured movement with clear ideological foundations and defined goals. If it achieved its stated objectives — regime change, in this case — then arguing it “lost its way” is logically inconsistent. One cannot claim both success and deviation simultaneously. - Today’s leaders do not represent the revolution
This is a form of historical revisionism. The individuals currently in power are the very figures who were celebrated in public squares and entrusted by the movement’s supporters and their affiliated media. To deny their representative status is to erase the revolution’s actual trajectory and leadership. - Revolution is a cumulative process
While true in principle, this argument is frequently misapplied. Not all revolutions are equal, and context matters. Drawing equivalence between the French Revolution and modern Arab uprisings, for instance, ignores crucial differences in geopolitical circumstances, external interventions, and ideological underpinnings. - The future will correct the present
This line of thinking defers accountability indefinitely, assuming a future revolution will rectify today’s failures, without offering a plan, timeframe, or even a clear understanding of how or why this corrective revolution will succeed. It is often promoted by the same voices that championed the first revolution, despite its evident failures.
Meanwhile, Palestinian Resistance movements are engaged in an existential struggle against a campaign of collective annihilation, orchestrated by a US-Israeli axis intent on cementing regional dominance and dismantling all forms of resistance.
In such a context, referring to those who imprison resistance fighters in “new Syria” as “revolutionaries” is not only misleading but morally and politically indefensible. Such characterisations serve only to blur the line between genuine revolutionary action and acts of sabotage dressed in revolutionary language.
Clinging to a romanticised version of the Syrian and Libyan uprisings, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, amounts to intellectual suicide. It confuses the public, paralyses future movements, and hinders the emergence of authentic revolutionary efforts rooted in critical reflection and historical awareness.
Now more than ever, a rigorous reassessment is needed. Not as an academic exercise, but as a moral and national duty. And this reassessment must take seriously the alternative readings offered by steadfast Resistance movements, from Gaza to southern Lebanon to Yemen, whose leaders remain committed to a vision of liberation that cannot be co-opted or outsourced.
This article is not an ideological attack or a rhetorical spat. It is a call to clarity. A reminder that true revolution is not a slogan but a commitment grounded in vision, sacrifice, and integrity.
Those unwilling to reassess their missteps or acknowledge the consequences of their choices should step aside from public discourse. They should not undermine the concept of revolution by associating it with ventures rooted in destruction, subservience, and betrayal.
When alignments become clear and illusions are shattered, the enduring hope lies in the memory of the people, and in the resilience of those who continue to prove that genuine revolutions are not borrowed or bought. They are born from struggle and clarity alike.
Hell freezeth over as Sharaa gets invited to Baghdad
By Rasool Majeed | The Cradle | April 30, 2025
Syrian interim President Ahmad Sharaa’s return to Iraq – once unimaginable following his departure in 2011 – now seems possible with Iraq set to host the Arab summit on 17 May. But the question of whether Sharaa will attend has become a flashpoint, highlighting deep divisions within Iraq.
At the time of his departure, Sharaa, also known as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani, was affiliated with the Al-Qaeda-linked group the Nusra Front, an early incarnation of HTS – both UN-designated terrorist organizations – and left Iraq to join the foreign-backed war against Syria.
Having been exiled from Iraq, the very idea that he could return, not as a visiting foreign dignitary but as Syria’s head of state, has stirred opposition across political, sectarian, and tribal lines. The invitation, coming from the Arab League, has stirred serious concerns about Iraq’s sovereignty and its ability to manage West Asia’s evolving challenges.
Imposed by the Arab League
Amir al-Fayez, a member of Iraq’s Foreign Relations Committee, makes it clear to The Cradle that Iraq’s role in inviting Sharaa is not voluntary. The invitation, he explains, is mandated by the Arab League, and Iraq is expected to fulfill its duties as the host nation by sending invitations to all Arab heads of state. However, Iraq itself has little to no influence on the decision to invite Sharaa.
The Arab League’s decision to reinstate Syria in 2023 after a long suspension in 2011 has only complicated Baghdad’s position. While Sharaa’s return to the Arab fold is seen as a diplomatic victory for post-Assad Syria, Iraq has faced significant backlash domestically, with many questioning the wisdom of hosting a leader who has twice been incarcerated on terror charges in Iraq and is deeply linked to the country’s violent past.
The Arab League’s push to reintegrate Syria has brought these tensions to the surface, and Iraq’s internal factions are grappling with the political fallout.
Interestingly, the Foreign Relations Committee in the Iraqi Parliament supports Sharaa’s invitation to the summit in Baghdad. Fayez notes: “As a Foreign Relations Committee, we appreciate this position on the government’s part as it is tasked with sending invitations to all Arab heads of state without exception.”
Resistance factions’ rejection
But political parties and resistance factions in Iraq, including influential groups such as Asaeb Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah, have voiced strong opposition to Sharaa’s visit. Qais al-Khazali, the leader of Asaeb Ahl al-Haq and an early backer of Iraq’s current Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, made his stance clear on social media, warning of the potential consequences if Sharaa enters Iraq.
Khazali pointed to an arrest warrant against Sharaa, emphasizing that his presence would be illegal under Iraqi law. For these factions, Sharaa is not just a foreign leader, but a figure associated with violence, instability, terror, and murder in Iraq, making his visit untenable.
On 16 April, Sudani officially invited Sharaa to participate in the upcoming Arab summit in Baghdad. Three days later, Khazali posted on X, warning against Sharaa’s entry into Iraq, saying:
“The presence of the current Syrian regime president in Iraq is premature, as it could lead to repercussions if the law is applied and he is arrested by the security forces, due to an existing arrest warrant against him. Accordingly, and in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers, the decisions of the Iraqi judiciary must be adhered to and respected by all.”
A day before Khazali’s post, Abu Ali al-Askari, the security official for Kataib Hezbollah, also posted a statement clearly rejecting Sharaa’s visit to Iraq, pointing out:
“Arab summits were held without the presence of President Assad and without Iraq or Libya. These summits will not stop just because the convicted (Abu Mohammad Al-Julani), leader of the criminal Nusra Front, does not attend.”
Shia lawmaker Yousef al-Kalabi, described Sharaa’s entry into Iraq as “a betrayal of the memory of Iraqis who suffered under terrorism.”
Regarding Sudani’s meeting with Sharaa in Doha through Qatari mediation, Firas al-Yassir, a member of the political bureau of Al-Nujaba Movement, tells The Cradle :
“There is certainly Iraqi consensus rejecting any meeting with Sharaa by any person holding an official position in the Iraqi state. According to Iraqi law, the man is wanted by the Iraqi judiciary and is accused of killing Iraqis during the days of terrorist operations.”
Yassir adds: “No individual or entity has the right to violate Iraqi law or undermine the blood of Iraqis. If it is true that Sudani’s meeting with Sharaa in Doha occurred under American and [Persian] Gulf pressure, it would be considered a setback in Iraq’s foreign policy.”
He continues: “I expect that there is a political and popular consensus rejecting Julani’s attendance at the summit, and he is not welcomed. The issues raised about him should be addressed.”
Conditional rejection
While many have outright rejected Sharaa’s visit, some figures within the Iraqi political system, like Thair Mukhayef, have called for a more nuanced approach. Mukhayef, a tribal leader and member of parliament, has stated that while he opposes Sharaa’s visit, the matter should be decided based on Iraq’s judicial system.
According to Mukhayef, if Sharaa is proven guilty of crimes committed during the Iraq War, his visit should be barred. This position underscores the tension between legal considerations and diplomatic pragmatism. Mukhayef tells The Cradle :
“Sharaa took his position in what is called a coup against his government. There has been much talk and rumors about his involvement in violent acts in Iraq, and arrest warrants have been issued against him. Therefore, we are with the law and what the judiciary issues concerning this person.”
He adds, “If this man (Sharaa) indeed committed crimes and has an arrest warrant, we do not respect anyone who sheds the blood of our sons, and then he comes to have a red carpet rolled out for him to attend conferences and lecture on Arab nation policy within Iraq. I will reject the arrival of this figure if it is proven that he is the one who exploded, killed, and planned those crimes.”
He confirms that “Sharaa’s invitation to the summit is not from Iraq. Yes, I am with the absolute rejection, and I am not justifying it. But the invitation came from the Arab League, and Iraq is hosting this conference. I repeat the confirmation, we are with the judiciary and what it says. If it is proven that Sharaa has committed violent acts, killings, and destruction in our country, we absolutely and completely reject his entry into Iraq.”
The tribal divide
Tribal leaders in Iraq, a powerful political force in the country, have also been divided over Sharaa’s invitation. They have had a significant impact on political and security events in Iraq, from the 1920 Revolution to the post-independence period, through to the US invasion of 2003 and their uprising against ISIS in 2014 and beyond. This makes their stance on Sharaa’s invitation to Iraq significant.
Shia tribes have almost unanimously rejected Sharaa’s visit, with the Unified Tribes Council of Iraq issuing a statement calling for opposition to Sharaa, citing his role in past violence against Iraqis. These tribes view his presence as a betrayal of the bloodshed suffered during the Iraq War.
However, Sunni tribes have been more divided. Some, like former politician Mishaan al-Jubouri, have expressed support for Sharaa, downplaying his past and framing his visit as a diplomatic necessity. Jubouri and others have argued that Iraq should prioritize its regional interests, including relations with Syria, and not allow historical grievances to overshadow current political realities.
On the other hand, leaders like Sheikh Mazahim al-Huwait, a Sunni tribal leader from Ninawa, have firmly rejected Sharaa’s visit. Huwait, while supportive of trade and security cooperation with Syria, has condemned Sharaa as a figure linked to Iraq’s violent past.
Huwait’s opposition is based on both Sharaa’s personal history and the broader implications of hosting a leader implicated in the bloodshed of Iraq’s sectarian conflict. He tells The Cradle :
“We reject Julani’s visit to Iraq because his hands are stained with the blood of Iraqis, and he himself has openly admitted that after his release, he participated in operations in Iraq, having been a prisoner in US jails in 2005, where he was with me in detention … Sharaa has an arrest warrant under Article 4 Terrorism issued by the Iraqi judiciary and the Counter-Terrorism Agency. Therefore, we reject his visit.”
Regarding exchanges such as Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani’s visit to Iraq or Iraqi delegations traveling to Damascus, Huwait supports them, stating: “Such visits are necessary, as cutting off trade visits and those related to security coordination is not correct. Syria is a neighboring country, and its security means Iraq’s security.”
On the Sunnis who welcome Sharaa to Iraq, Huwait opines:
“Those who welcome him, whether leaders or tribal sheikhs, are followers of the arenas of humiliation and disgrace and do not represent the Sunni community but only themselves.”
A tactical move?
While many factions and figures within Iraq oppose Sharaa’s visit on legal and moral grounds, some analysts view it as a strategic move within the larger context of Iraq’s foreign policy. Prime Minister Sudani’s meeting with Sharaa in Doha, mediated by Qatar, is believed to be part of a broader effort to enhance Iraq’s position in the region, particularly in relation to Iran.
By engaging with Sharaa, Iraq seeks to balance its ties with both Syria and Iran, which are critical to its security and political stability. Huwait, though opposed to Sharaa’s visit, acknowledges Iraq’s diplomatic role in the region and its need to engage with neighboring countries, including Syria:
“Iraq now has a significant role on the political scene, especially in the Middle East (West Asia), and it has succeeded in distancing many risks in the region, including with the Islamic Republic. There were risks concerning it with the US, and Iraq played a major role in this.”
He adds:
“It’s a heavy matter for Sudani to meet with a person who has killed his people, but Sharaa is now the president of Syria, and some countries have recognized him, and the Syrian flag is raised everywhere, including in Iraq. Sharaa asked Sudani to open dialogue with Iran, as he is in a difficult situation. He knows that opening channels with the Islamic Republic and ending conflicts with it will bring several countries, including Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and others, to his side.”
Sudani’s second term under fire
Those opposing Sharaa’s visit to Iraq base their objection on “his criminal record in the country” and his participation with extremist factions from 2005 to 2011, but some observers see this as “just an excuse.” The real aim of the rejection, they claim, is to embarrass Iraqi premier Sudani on the global stage and seize any opportunity to prevent him from securing a second term.
Speaking to The Cradle, Iraqi writer and political observer Jabar al-Mashadani argues:
“The Shia factions fighting within the Coordination Framework will seize any opportunity to prevent Prime Minister Sudani from securing a second term. Different parties within the framework want the position of prime minister after the upcoming elections. These factions exploit any political step in their favor, whether internal and highly local, like investment, reconstruction, and services issues, or external and strategic, especially regarding Iraq’s relationship with its anxious neighbor Syria, which affects Iraq’s internal security and politics.”
As the Arab summit approaches, the question of whether Sharaa will attend remains unresolved. While legal, political, and moral objections to his visit are strong, Iraq’s role as the summit host and its broader diplomatic interests may ultimately shape the outcome.
Regardless of whether Sharaa sets foot in Baghdad, his invitation has already sparked a major political divide within Iraq. The decision on Sharaa’s attendance may not only influence Iraq’s relationship with Syria, but may also shape the country’s future diplomatic course in a region marked by tension and shifting allegiances.
Are You Tired of Hearing About Antisemitism?
Simply stop killing Gazans and the anger directed at Jews might end
By Philip Giraldi • Unz Review • April 26, 2025
One might well ask how a group composed of little more than 3% of the US population has managed to gain control of the nation’s foreign policy, its legislature and executive branches, its media, its entertainment industry, its financial institutions, and its elite universities while also making the United States subservient to the wishes of a monstrous small state located seven thousand miles away and composed of its coreligionists? Well, it helps to have a great deal of money liberally applied to corrupt the existing political and economic systems, but that is not necessarily a good place to start as one might reflexively be accused of wielding a trope much favored by antisemites when discussing Zionist Jews, the group of which we are speaking. Alternatively perhaps, one might take an oblique approach by observing how the highly privileged and protected Zionists in question get rich living in America while having true loyalty to apartheid Israel, something that normally might be considered untenable if not borderline treasonous.
Recent reports suggest that there are upwards of 23,000 Americans serving in the Israeli Army (IDF), most of whom are presumably dual nationals with Israeli citizenship. Under existing law, they should all lose their US citizenship but that will not happen as Congress and the White House have both been bought. Indeed, they are being given a golden handshake by the US Congress with a new bill currently in Congress which would extend some US military benefits to the notional American citizens who are currently carrying out the Gaza genocide as members of the IDF. One such clown Congressman Brian Mast, who served in the IDF, even parades around Congress in his Israeli military uniform and no one says squat.
Beyond the Americans in the IDF, there have been several odd appointments at high levels in the US civilian bureaucracy, including the latest naming of a former Israeli Defense Department and UN Israeli Embassy employee whose husband still works at the embassy to a top position on the National Security Council. Merav Ceren will be the Director for the development of the relationship between Israel, Iran and the US. It is a highly sensitive position and one can only speculate on how she got a clearance, though it is presumed that she is a dual national, which in and of itself should have been a warning sign. Her appointment gives Israel an unusual advantage in internal policy discussions just as the Israeli government has launched a new campaign to pressure the American government to start a war with Iran rather than continue with negotiations toward a nuclear deal. Ceren previously worked at Senator Ted Cruz’s office in Washington, which may have been her stepping stone to the job as Cruz’s loyalty to Israel and all that pertains to it should be unquestioned and he is the recipient of millions of dollars in pro-Israel political “donations.” She also worked for the neocon Iran-hating Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. How she was named to the position she now holds should be considered in itself a huge security breach, one of many already experienced in Trump’s first hundred days, where loyalty to Israel trumps all other factors, as the expression might go.
The trajectory of Meyav Ceren reminds one of another Israeli woman dual national who truly stood out when it came to serving Israeli interests from inside the United States government. Sigal Pearl Mandelker might be worthy of the nickname “Queen of Sanctions” because she was the Department of the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (OTFI) under the first Trump administration. She handed out the punishment and cranked up the economic pain up for countries like Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and Russia during her time in office from June 2017 until October 2019 when she finally resigned after being under pressure from people like me.
OFTI’s website proclaims that it is responsible for “safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats,” but it has from its founding been really all about safeguarding Israel’s perceived interests. Grant Smith notes how “the secretive office has a special blind spot for major terrorism generators, such as tax-exempt money laundering from the United States into illegal Israeli settlements and proliferation financing and weapons technology smuggling into Israel’s clandestine nuclear weapons complex.”
To be sure most of the Jews with whom I am in touch are appalled by that activism of the Mandelkers and the Cerens and even more so by what is happening in Gaza, Syria and Lebanon at the hands of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his extremist enablers, but what we are talking about here is institutional and tribal Jewry which together have the distinction of being referred to as the Israel Lobby, which an increasing number of observers have to come to believe to be something like all powerful and the unofficial government of the United States in many relevant areas.
Ron Unz’s recent article recent article Trump vs. Harvard in a Political Wrestling Match examines the issue of Jewish supremacism and, among other factors, identifies the various mechanisms used by Jews to enhance their enrollment at top universities. He mentions in passing how Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner got into Harvard without having the level of academic achievement that normally would have been a prerequisite. It was possibly accomplished through an institutionalized “Harvard Price,” an under the table donation of several million dollars from the wealthy Kushner family. I personally recall attending an elite university in the 1960s and hearing Jewish classmates boast of how “they” comprised 40% of the first-year students. A friend of mine at Yale told me of similar boasting among the “Sons of Eli.” Forty per cent participation for 3 per cent of the population is certainly an astonishing rate of success.
Unz uses available educational data bases to demonstrate that the disparity was not due to greater intelligence or academic performance among the Jewish applicants. He concludes that “Based on these figures, Jewish students were roughly 1,000% more likely to be enrolled at Harvard and the rest of the Ivy League than white Gentiles of similar ability. This was an absolutely astonishing result given that under-representation in the range of 20% or 30% is often treated by courts as powerful prima facie evidence of racial discrimination.”
Based on my own contact with Jews in the academic world and in government, I would prefer to describe the Jewish success with universities as a product of gaming the system, i.e. producing incentives outside academia itself to make the candidates more attractive. Whether such maneuvering might be described as corruption of the process depends pretty much on where someone stands outside the system, but the fact is that it is far easier for a Jewish high school graduate to get into an elite university than it is for a comparably educated and intelligent white Christian. And if you throw into the hopper all the “minority” other applicant groups that get preferential treatment, white males who are not Jews are definitely at the bottom of list when acceptance time comes around.
Beyond cash incentives, one might also conclude that Jews are exceptionally good at self-promoting and on translating their largely fictional collective victimhood into a sympathy vote that gives them a considerable edge as they move through education and high-profile careers. The problem is that that aggressive self-promotion does not stop at the level of personal aggrandizement and opens the door to large scale group interference in both foreign and domestic government policies that run strongly contrary to the interests of most Americans. I am of course referring to groups like the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) which serve as lobbies and support structures for the apartheid Jewish state Israel, which is currently carrying out a genocide in Gaza, without any accountability or consequences as required by current US law under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA). President John F. Kennedy was trying to get such groups to register when he was assassinated in 1963.
Other Jewish national organizations are also on board in supporting Israel as are the numerous Christian Zionists, which means that killing tens of thousands of people in the Middle East is a matter of no consequence, except that once more the Israeli Jews must be and are widely portrayed as the victims. The US is complicit in the arming of Israel and the killing and actually condones it even though a majority of American voters do not support the Jewish state. Likewise, the Jewish dominated press and other media looks the other way as the slaughter goes on, as it no doubt will, and one expects that upwards of 2 million Palestinians will eventually be deported to whatever shithole is willing to accept them under pressure from the US. Otherwise, the “Justice” recommended by Israel’s Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who is now in the United States on a “visit,” will likely be pursued, i.e. a bullet to the back of the head of every Palestinian.
And then there is the issue of the “crime” of antisemitism, which is the only thing that the Justice Department seems to think is worth addressing, to the point where people who have done nothing beyond expressing their concern over what is going on in the Middle East are being arrested without any charges being filed and detained while being processed for deportation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has publicly announced that he has authorized the arrest and deportation of 300 students for their criticism of Israel. The US House of Representatives has obligingly passed a measure equating criticism of the racist, Jewish supremacist ideology of Zionism with what they describe as a hate crime “antisemitism.” Meanwhile the Israel Lobby and its politician choral society are constantly using the Jew-controlled media to sing about how Hebrew students fear going to school due to the presence of all the “antisemites.”
This is, of course, largely a convenient fiction largely created by the media, and it is rather Jews who have been beating up peaceful demonstrators. And it is extremist Jewish-funded groups that have been stirring the pot, going after anyone who is perceived as anti-Israeli. One of the groups, Canary Mission, has run a massive disinformation operation for years, publishing the names and photos of thousands of alleged pro-Palestine activists, while another group, Betar, openly encourages targeting of student activists and brags that it has “provided names of hundreds of terror supporters” to the Trump administration. Ross Glick, the head of Betar’s US branch, believes that “Foreign students on visas in the US shouldn’t have the right to free speech.” Jews, however, should be allowed to behave with complete freedom to include carrying out murder, war crimes, and human rights violations targeting those it sees as opponents.
To be sure, protesting against any of the horrors that Israel is engaged in is regarded to be one symptom of “antisemitism” which is ipso facto considered to be something like a capital offense, even though it is pretty much generated in America by the impunity and savagery with which Israel behaves towards the rest of the world. And the parameters of what might constitute a legitimate search for “antisemites” is expanding. The US State Department will now demand from foreigners wishing to travel to the United States information on their social networking sites. Those sites will be screened for anti-Israel content and the visas will be refused. This is an extension of the anti-Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) policies now in place in 38 states in the US where a job or services will be denied to citizens if they will not sign a pledge or promise not to support the movement to boycott or punish Israel. The situation is even worse for those foreigners who are currently going through screening to become US permanent residents as it is the issue of one’s views of Israel alone that could easily determine who is allowed to become a future citizen and who is rejected.
Indeed, protecting Jews is a full-time job of the Trump Administration, even more so that under Genocide Joe Biden. Antisemitism comes up in speech after speech and fully ninety per cent of the discretionary Homeland Security Agency grants already go to Jewish groups or buildings, to the tune of more than $400 million. Interestingly, the government also appears to be constructing a data base of Jews to protect them further. The personal cellphones of dozens of current and former Barnard College employees rang last Monday evening with a text message that said it was from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, part of a review of the employment practices of Barnard. A link led to a survey that asked respondents if they were Jewish or Israeli, and if they had been subjected to harassment.
Another attack on free speech in America that is Israel related, apart from what is going on at the universities which are being destroyed from within by the government demands to protect Jews, is the role of how research institutes have traditionally been able to engage in fraternal discussions to seek action and share information with any country or government entity in the world. But researchers and university employees who engage in certain nonviolent protests or political expression over human rights conditions in Israel and Gaza may now risk loss of employment and other civil and criminal penalties, according to a new policy unveiled by the National Institutes of Health on April 21st. The agency, the largest public funder of biomedical research in the world, touches virtually every corner of the scientific community but it will now be silent over what is happening in Gaza, where every hospital has now been destroyed by Israeli-American bombs.
So there you have it. Let’s stop making excuses for Israeli behavior that depicts Jews as the perpetual victims while seeking to falsely label Israel’s enemies as the war criminals and racists. We will leave those attributes to Israel itself. Better still, arch-Zionist Donald Trump should pick up the phone in the Oval Office and call Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to tell him that America has become tired and the game is over. America will no longer be sacrificing its own interests to support a genocide and no longer will be footing the bill and providing the weapons to carry out the slaughter. “Goodbye Bibi! And don’t let the door hit you in the ass on the way out!”
Philip M. Giraldi, Ph.D., is Executive Director of the Council for the National Interest, a 501(c)3 tax deductible educational foundation (Federal ID Number #52-1739023) that seeks a more interests-based U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Website is councilforthenationalinterest.org, address is P.O. Box 2157, Purcellville VA 20134 and its email is inform@cnionline.org.
A ‘Trump deal’? Juggling war, ‘easy war’ and negotiation
By Alastair Crooke | Strategic Culture Foundation | April 24, 2025
Trump clearly is in the midst of an existential conflict. He has a landslide mandate. But is ringed by a resolute domestic enemy front in the form of an ‘industrial concern’ infused with Deep State ideology, centred primarily on preserving U.S. global power (rather than on mending of the economy).
The key MAGA issue however is not foreign policy, but how to structurally re-balance an economic paradigm in danger of an extinction event. Trump has always been clear that this forms his primordial goal. His coalition of supporters are fixed on the need to revive America’s industrial base, so as to provide reasonably well-paid jobs to the MAGA corps.
Trump may for now have a mandate, but extreme danger lurks – not just the Deep State and the Israeli lobby. The Yellen debt bomb is the more existential threat. It threatens Trump’s support in Congress, because the bomb is set to explode shortly before the 2026 midterms. New tariff revenues, DOGE savings, and even the upcoming Gulf shake-down are all centred on getting some sort of fiscal order in place, so that $9 trillion plus of short-term debt – maturing imminently – can be rolled over to the longer term without resort to eye-watering interest rates. It is Yellen-Democrat’s little trip wire for the Trump agenda.
So far, the general context seems plain enough. Yet, on the minutiae of how exactly to re-balance the economy; how to manage the ‘debt bomb’; and how far DOGE should go with its cuts, divisions in Trump’s team are present. In fact, the tariff war and the China tussle bring into contention a fresh phalanx of opposition: i.e. those (some on Wall Street, oligarchs, etc.) who have prospered mightily from the golden era of free-flowing, seemingly limitless, money-creation; those who were enriched, precisely by the policies that have made America subservient to the looming American ‘debt knell’.
Yet to make matters more complex, two of the key components to Trump’s mooted ‘re-balancing’ and debt ‘solution’ cannot be whispered, let alone said aloud: One reason is that it involves deliberately devaluing ‘the dollar in your pocket’. And secondly, many more Americans are going to lose their jobs.
That is not exactly a popular ‘sell’. Which is probably why the ‘re-balance’ has not been well explained to the public.
Trump launched the Liberation ‘Tariff Shock’ seemingly minded to crash-start a restructuring of international trade relations – as the first step towards a general re-alignment of major currency values.
China however, wasn’t buying into the tariff and trade restrictions ‘stuff’, and matters quickly escalated. It looked for a moment as if the Trump ‘Coalition’ might fracture under the pressure of the concomitant crisis in the U.S. bond market to the tariff fracas that shook confidence.
The Coalition, in fact, held; markets subsided, but then the Coalition fractured over a foreign policy issue – Trump’s hope to normalise relations with Russia, towards a Great Global Reset.
A major strand within the Trump Coalition (apart from MAGA populists) are the neocons and Israeli Firsters. Some sort of Faustian bargain supposedly was struck by Trump at the outset through a deal that had his team heavily peopled by zealous Israeli-Firsters.
Simply put, the breadth of coalition that Trump thought he needed to win the election and deliver an economic re-balance also included two foreign policy pillars: Firstly, the reset with Moscow – the pillar by which to end the ‘forever wars’, which his Populist base despised. And the second pillar being the neutering of Iran as a military power and source of resistance, on which both Israeli Firsters – and Israel – insist (and with which Trump seems wholly comfortable). Hence the Faustian pact.
Trump’s ‘peacemaker’ aspirations no doubt added to his electoral appeal, but they were not the real driver to his landslide. What has become evident is that these diverse agendas – foreign and domestic – are interlinked: A set-back in one or the other acts as a domino either impelling or retarding the other agendas. Put simply: Trump is dependent on ‘wins’ – early ‘wins’ – even if this means rushing towards a prospective ‘easy win’ without thinking through whether he possesses a sound strategy (and ability) to achieve it.
All of Trump’s three agenda objectives, it turns out, are more complicated and divisive than he perhaps expected. He and his team seem captivated by western-embedded assumptions such as first, that war generally happens ‘Over There’; that war in the post Cold War era is not actually ‘war’ in any traditional sense of full, all-out war, but is rather a limited application of overwhelming western force against an enemy incapable of threatening ‘us’ in a similar manner; and thirdly, that a war’s scope and duration is decided in Washington and its Deep State ‘twin’ in London.
So those who talk about ending the Ukraine war through an imposed unilateral ceasefire (ie, the faction of Walz, Rubio and Hegseth, led by Kellogg) seem to assume blithely that the terms and timing for ending the war also can be decided in Washington, and imposed on Moscow through the limited application of asymmetric pressures and threats.
Just as China isn’t buying into the tariff and trade restriction ‘stuff’, neither is Putin buying into the ultimatum ‘stuff’: (‘Moscow has weeks, not months, to agree a ceasefire’). Putin has patiently tried to explain to Witkoff, Trump’s Envoy, that the American presumption that the scope and duration of any war is very much up to the West to decide simply doesn’t gel with today’s reality.
And, in companion mode, those who talk about bombing Iran (which includes Trump) seem also to assume that they can dictate the war’s essential course and content too; the U.S. (and Israel perhaps), can simply determine to bomb Iran with big bunker-buster bombs. That’s it! End of story. This is assumed to be a self-justifying and easy war – and that Iran must learn to accept that they brought this upon themselves by supporting the Palestinians and others who refuse Israeli normalisation.
Aurelien observes:
“So we are dealing with limited horizons; limited imagination and limited experience. But there’s one other determining factor: The U.S. system is recognised to be sprawling, conflictual – and, as a result, largely impervious to outside influence – and even to reality. Bureaucratic energy is devoted almost entirely to internal struggles, which are carried out by shifting coalitions in the administration; in Congress; in Punditland and in the media. But these struggles are, in general, about [domestic] power and influence – and not about the inherent merits of an issue, and [thus] require no actual expertise or knowledge”.
“The system is large and complex enough that you can make a career as an ‘Iran expert’, say, inside and outside government, without ever having visited the country or speaking the language – by simply recycling standard wisdom in a way that will attract patronage. You will be fighting battles with other supposed ‘experts’, within a very confined intellectual perimeter, where only certain conclusions are acceptable”.
What becomes evident is that this cultural approach (the Think-Tank Industrial Complex) induces a laziness and the prevalence of hubris into western thinking. It is assumed reportedly, that Trump assumed that Xi Jinping would rush to meet with him, following the imposition of tariffs – to plead for a trade deal – because China is suffering some economic headwinds.
It is blandly assumed by the Kellogg contingent too that pressure is both the necessary and sufficient condition to compel Putin to agree to an unilateral ceasefire – a ceasefire that Putin repeatedly has stated he would not accept until a political framework was first agreed. When Witkoff relays Putin’s point within the Trump team discussion, he stands as a contrarian outside the ‘licensed discourse’ which insists that Russia only takes détente with an adversary seriously after it has been forced to do so by a defeat or serious setback.
Iran too repeatedly has said that it will not be stripped naked of its conventional defences; its allies and its nuclear programme. Iran likely has the capabilities to inflict huge damage both on U.S. forces in the region and on Israel.
The Trump Team is divided on strategy here too – crudely put: to Negotiate or to Bomb.
It seems that the pendulum has swung under intense pressure from Netanyahu and the Jewish institutional leadership within the U.S.
A few words can change everything. In an about face, Witkoff shifted from saying a day earlier that Washington would be satisfied with a cap on Iranian nuclear enrichment and would not require the dismantling of its nuclear facilities, to posting on his official X account that any deal would require Iran to “stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program … A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal”. Without a clear reversal on this from Trump, we are on a path to war.
It is plain that Team Trump has not thought through the risks inherent to their agendas. Their initial ‘ceasefire meeting’ with Russia in Riyadh, for example, was a theatre of the facile. The meeting was held on the easy assumption that since Washington had determined to have an early ceasefire then ‘it must be’.
“Famously”, Aurelien wearily notes, “the Clinton administration’s Bosnia policy was the product of furious power struggles between rival American NGO and Human Rights’ alumni – none of whom knew anything about the region, or had ever been there”.
It is not just that the team is insouciant towards the possible consequences of war in the Middle East. They are captive to manipulated assumptions that it will be an easy war.
Our 2002 Redux
By Matt Wolfson | The Libertarian Institute | April 22, 2025
In the detention of Mahmoud Khalil and the ensuing crackdown on pro-Palestinian activism by Donald Trump’s administration, a recognizable model for governance is emerging. The model is from 2002. During that year, as American citizens were distracted by the aftermath of a recession and energized from a terrorist attack, the Geoge W. Bush administration and its allies took actions to mute opposition to its Global War on Terror. These moves provoked charges from a vocal minority of Americans that the administration was acting in an unconstitutional, even a fascistic, way; and that U.S. citizens would be next to be detained or even disappeared.
What happened instead was a subtler and more insidious silencing of speech. This silencing would have been familiar to the Founders, who limited America’s government in order to encourage speech, since they knew that the mere awareness of menacing state power might be enough to forestall citizens’ willingness to speak openly in dissent. In 2002, America’s research universities and establishment media proved the Founders right. They noticed the Bush administration’s hard line and self-policed. Their silence smoothed the way for the invasion of Iraq, warrantless wiretapping, and much else we still live with today.
The 2002 plays occurred mostly behind the scenes. But they have been extensively documented by journalists sorting through their detritus.
Between September 2001 and August 2002, the Justice Department detained 762 aliens, some of them based on “minor immigration offenses,” often without proof of any actual ties to terrorism, and held them in indefinite detention rather than deporting them. To try these detainees, it set up special military courts that legal thinkers from different political persuasions, including Supreme Court Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia, believed usurped congressional power and the writ of habeas corpus. The administration created an Information Awareness Office in the Pentagon focused on “story telling, change detection, and truth maintenance” and “biologically inspired algorithms for agent control”: e.g. on the surveillance of American citizens for spreading government narratives. The Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans began releasing narratives through more traditional channels, including leaking to The New York Times about purported links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda.
The players pushing these policies and narratives were deeply linked to Israel and Saudi Arabia, which had interests in American involvement in the Middle East as a bulwark against Iraq and Iran. Powerful supporters in the media echoed them.
The Weekly Standard vociferously attacked those urging a cautious response after 9/11, including by offering “Susan Sontag awards.” These amounted to a regular bludgeoning of America’s foremost leftwing intellectual, after she argued in a 450 word article in The New Yorker that “a few shreds of historical awareness” might help prevent future 9/11s. The New Republic, whose literary editor publicly dropped his friendship with Sontag, began publishing an “Idiot Watch” about opponents of the rumored invasion of Iraq. Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe, who had just represented Al Gore in his losing litigation before the Supreme Court over the 2000 election, argued in The New Republic in favor of detaining prisoners via military tribunals, the position later argued against by Justice Scalia. New Republic contributor and Harvard president Larry Summers argued that petitions for American divestment in Israeli settlements, arguably a key driver of Islamic anger at America, could be “anti-Semitic in their effect if not their intent.”
In the face of the push, knowledge producing institutions cooperated. The New York Times, dependent on White House sources, reduced a series of reports that cast doubt on the connection between Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to one back page story. (The story’s author, James Risen, said later that “It’s like any corporate culture, where you know what management wants, and no one has to tell you.”) The Washington Post, similarly dependent on White House sources, backed the invasion of Iraq. University presidents and many eminent professors held a generally skeptical view as to the Iraq War’s plausible success—but they kept their dissent private.
Together, these operators created a bipartisan intelligentsia invested in or at least acceding to the Bush Administration’s “democracy agenda” in the Middle East, the “hope and change” agenda of its day.
The people resisting these moves were undone by either their even-handedness or their attention-seeking. The late Ronald Dworkin, one of America’s most eminent legal minds, wrote lucid critiques of these policies that were nonetheless unlikely to bring people to the barricades. The filmmaker Michael Moore aimed his hit documentary Fahrenheit 9/11, as its title suggests, to cash in on provocation at the expense of crossover appeal. Instead of making a difference in the debate, Moore made money as a cult hero, which he poured into progressive identity politicking. Meantime, the majority of the country supported the invasion of Iraq.
Within three years of the invasion—even before the loss of $3 trillion dollars, 7,000 Americans, and at least 80,000 Middle Eastern civilians—almost all of the liberal centrists who had backed it had bailed out, sort of. They expressed their “regret—but no shame” as well as their “pain” at their “mistake”: a mistake that was nonetheless “impossible” for them “to denounce,” since they had made the mistake for good reasons. They also expressed their disappointment with the Bush administration—and were duly featured in the pages of The New Republic, Slate, and The New Yorker. They turned their support to the Democratic Party and Barack Obama’s hope and change agenda. Obama’s Democrats, afraid of being called soft on terror, continued most of Bush’s policies, most of which continue to this day.
Since the beginning of March 2025, we appear to be in a 2002 repeat.
The Trump Administration has revoked the visas of 300 visa holders, among them college students and medical students who have expressed their opposition to American policy in the Middle East. It has equipped the State Department with artifical intelligence (AI) tools that scan the social-media posts of foreign students for posts that equate, in the administration’s view, support for Hamas. It has cancelled the appointment of a prominent anti-interventionist to the Department of Homeland Security and stalled the appointment of another to the Department of Defense. It has deepened ties with Saudi Arabia, and has likely committed to the project of razing, relocating, and rebuilding Gaza. It has started bombing the Saudis’ and Israelis’ enemies in Yemen—even though the trade benefits from this bombing mostly accrue, as Vice President J.D. Vance said, to Europe. The president has also taken a hard line on Iran, threatening bombings.
Powerful media players, like in 2002, have lent their support to these moves. The prime driver is The Atlantic, which has succeeded The New Republic as establishment Washington’s go-to magazine—and the promoter of many new bad ideas from psychological racism to restorative justice. Not only does the magazine’s majority investor have ties to Saudi Arabia but its editor is a former Israeli Defense Forces guard who, as a journalist in the 2000s, reinforced the Bush administration’s case for the Iraq War. Recently it’s become clear that The Atlantic has a line to National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, the Trump Administration’s resident interventionist. Echoing The Atlantic’s line are its contributors: many former government operators who teach at international schools of prestigious American research universities and appear at the Aspen Institute.
Universities are taking the hint. Columbia University set up an Office of Institutional Equity which has investigated students under a troublingly sweeping definition of anti-semitism. Columbia also “placed the Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African studies department and the Center for Palestine Studies under review.” And it fired its interim president, Katrina Armstrong, for failing to propitiate the Trump administration. Meantime, reportedly under similar pressure, the two leaders of Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies left their positions. New York University canceled a speech by a medic from Doctors Without Borders about Gaza which included images of injured children because these “slides about Gaza could be perceived as anti-Semitic.”
Unlike in 2002, there is broad resistance to these moves on the left and on the right. But the resisters are making many different arguments which entail complex questions; about the rights of citizens versus non-citizens; about the use of judicial review. The real issue remains what it was in 2002: the shutting down of debate inside knowledge-producing institutions with major influence over information flows. Democracy, as Susan Sontag said in 2001, promotes “candor” and “disagreement.” At least it should.
Like then, today’s shutting down is not widespread enough to provoke widespread resistance. But it’s enough to create a chill. That chill can persuade a third year college student, after a call home to worried parents, not to write an op-ed about campus speech for a school paper. It can persuade a Middle Eastern studies professor, mindful of Washington’s new interest in her classroom, to water down her lesson plan. It can persuade a second-year columnist at The Washington Post, now owned by recent Trump accomodator Jeff Bezos, not to touch the Yemen issue in her column that week or month or year. It can lead an influencer on Instagram, owned by other recent Trump accomodator Mark Zuckerberg, not to talk about Saudi human rights abuses. Anti-intervention protests will likely get smaller; the space for doubt in establishment newspapers will likely shrink. All of this amounts to the insidious silencing the Founders imagined. It probably already is.
[Some of] Trump’s genuinely populist supporters support this crackdown on the same logic as they support other Trump policies: Trump is silencing voices who aren’t citizens, who don’t seem to like America, and who are extracting resources—in this case education—from Americans. But this operation is not like the others. It affects American citizens by casting a chill on speech; and its function is to shut down opposition to an American involvement abroad.
What’s more, the people backing this play are no friends to America First. They are liberal and neoconservative centrists who, when the administration runs into difficulty, will repeat their play from the early 2000s. They will use the failure to usher into power a set of Democratic politicians who are already moving to the political center. Larry Summers is already making the play clear. Even as he applauds Harvard for changing its approach to the Middle East in response to Trump, he accuses Trump of being “dictatorial” towards universities and predicts “catastrophic” economic results from Trump’s presidency.
These centrists are dedicated above all to the maintenance of institutional power. Their rising influence in a presidency that was a referendum for popular constitutional government is cause for alarm, and for public pushback, and for debate—all of the things the institutions are trying to deny.
Seven Reasons Not to Bomb Iran
By Ted Snider | The Libertarian Institute | April 23, 2025
“There are two ways Iran can be handled,” U.S. President Donald Trump has said, “militarily, or you make a deal.” National Security Adviser Mike Waltz advocated for the military solution; Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and Vice President JD Vance advocated for diplomacy. Trump has opted for diplomacy. But all options are still on the table, and if the diplomatic path fails, Trump says “the other will solve the problem.”
But there are several reasons why all options should not be on the table and why bombing Iran to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear bomb would be absurd.
Most importantly, and the only one that really needs to be said, is that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear bomb. In 2003, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, issued a fatwa, an official religious ruling, that declared nuclear weapons to be forbidden by Islam. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment, which “reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community,” clearly states that U.S. intelligence “continue[s] to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that [Ayatollah] Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003.” That assessment maintains the 2022 U.S. Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review that concludes that “Iran does not today possess a nuclear weapon and we currently believe it is not pursuing one.” The most absurd reason for bombing Iran to prevent them from pursuing a nuclear bomb is that the U.S. knows Iran is not pursuing a nuclear bomb.
Since Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the second reason why it is absurd to bomb Iran is that it has every legal right to its civilian nuclear program. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has “the inalienable right to a civilian program that uses “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” The United States does not believe Iran has an illegal nuclear weapons program, and it would be absurd to bomb them for having a legal civilian nuclear program.
Thirdly, Iran has already demonstrated that a military solution is not necessary for the Trump administration to achieve its goal of ensuring that Iran does not enrich uranium to weapon grade levels. America’s concerns, well-founded or not, can be satisfied by establishing verifiable limits on Iran’s levels of enrichment. Iran demonstrated its willingness to comply with this nonmilitary solution when it agreed to those verifiable limitations in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. Eleven consecutive International Atomic Energy Agency reports verified that Iran was completely and consistently in compliance with the commitments made under that agreement. A military solution to America’s concerns about Iran’s civilian nuclear program is absurd because the U.S. has historical evidence that the nonmilitary solution works.
The military solution is not only absurd because it is unnecessary, it is even more absurd because it risks, not only war with Iran, but a wider, regional war. The United States has begun moving military equipment into the region, including aircraft carriers, bombers, and air defense systems. While presented as preparation for the possibility of intensified war with the Houthis, American officials have privately said “that the weaponry was also part of the planning” for a potential “conflict with Iran.” Even just that “buildup of American weaponry,” according to a new intelligence assessment provided by Tulsi Gabbard, “could potentially spark a wider conflict with Iran that the United States did not want.” Iran has stated that U.S. military action against its civilian nuclear program will elicit a military response from Iran against U.S. bases in the region. Iran’s Parliamentary Speaker, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, said, “If they threaten Islamic Iran, then, like powder kegs, America’s allies in the region and U.S. bases will be made unsafe.” A military solution risks a war with Iran and, potentially, even a wider, regional war.
The fifth reason is that, for all the risk of war with Iran and, perhaps, even a wider regional war, the assessed benefit is not worth it. In a striking line that has received little attention, The New York Times reported that the goal of military plans to bomb Iran’s civilian nuclear sites being discussed by the United States and Israel “was to set back Tehran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon by a year or more.” Absurd is an understatement for risking war with Iran, and even a wider Middle East war, to set Iran’s nuclear program—a nuclear program the U.S. knows Iran does not have—to set the program back by only a year.
All of this calculation of costs and benefits and risks of war is absurd because we know that the diplomatic path can work. We know it can work because it did ten years ago with the successful solution of the JCPOA nuclear agreement. There is reason to hope that, a decade later, it can work again. In the first round of talks in Oman on April 12, Iran insisted that future direct talks would be contingent on the success of the current indirect talks. At the end of that first round, Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. chief negotiator Steve Witkoff, met directly, not momentarily as first reported, but for forty-five minutes. The first round in Oman successfully led to a second round in Rome, and the second round has now led to a third round because the second round was constructive.
And, finally, talk of a military solution by the nation that claims leadership of a world order based on international law is absurd because a pre-emptive strike on Iran without Security Council approval would be a violation of international law.
Diplomacy has a real chance of defusing the long and volatile standoff between the United States and Iran. Threats of war are not only unnecessary, they contribute only to making the diplomacy more difficult.
Seyed Mohammad Marandi: Israel Pressures US Toward War With Iran
Glenn Diesen | April 22, 2025
Seyed Mohammad Marandi is a professor, an analyst and an advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Prof. Marandi argues that Iran is ready for war, as the US and Israel disagree over attacking Iran.
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Trump’s NSC Director for Israel and Iran Previously Worked for Israeli Ministry of Defense
By Ryan Grim and Saagar Enjeti | Drop Site News | April 21, 2025
The American official overseeing White House policy toward both Israel and Iran inside the National Security Council formerly worked for the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Drop Site News has learned. Merav Ceren’s appointment as Director for Israel and Iran at the NSC has not previously been reported, but her work with Israel’s MoD is well known among GOP circles.
Ceren’s appointment gives Israel an unusual advantage in internal policy discussions just as the Israeli government has launched a new campaign to pressure the American government to start a war with Iran rather than continue with negotiations toward a nuclear deal.
NSC spokesperson Brian Hughes confirmed that Ceren is now an official at the NSC and defended her as “a patriotic American.”
“Merav is a patriotic American who has served in the United States government for years, including for President Trump, Senator Ted Cruz, and Congressman James Comer,” said Hughes. “We are thrilled to have her expertise in the NSC, where she carries out the President’s agenda on a range of Middle East issues.”
Ceren includes her time with Israel’s Ministry of Defense in her bio at the pro-Israel think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).
The Israeli campaign has forced the issue into the top echelons of government. At a high-level meeting reported on recently by the New York Times, Vice President J.D. Vance, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth all pushed back against Israel’s plan for a major strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. They were even joined by NSC Director Michael Waltz, who warned that Israel’s effort would not succeed without ample U.S. support. Waltz and CENTCOM commander, Gen. Michael Kurilla, the Times reported, had previously been open to entertaining the Israeli idea and were briefed by Israeli military officials on a range of plans.
It’s rare for a foreign country to be able to pitch American policymakers on a joint war effort and look across the table to see a former member of their own Ministry of Defense working for the Americans. As Trump debates his tariff policy, for instance, there are no high-level officials who previously worked for the Chinese Communist Party present.
Ceren’s FDD bio says that while working for the Israeli military she participated in negotiations in the West Bank between Israel’s Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and the Palestinian Authority. COGAT is the Israeli agency now refusing entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, sparking a humanitarian crisis of unspeakable proportions. Ceren is the sister of Omri Ceren, a bellicose neoconservative and longtime foreign policy adviser to Sen. Ted Cruz.
In 2021, she authored the article “The Moral Case for High-Tech Weapons” for The New Atlantis, a long-form style publication that seeks to “understand the core anxiety about tech as the threat of dehumanization.”
Will Yemen turn its missiles on the UAE and Saudi Arabia?
By Bandar Hetar | The Cradle | April 16, 2025
The US war on Yemen, now in its second round, has passed the one-month mark with no clear gains and no timeline for success. What is emerging instead is the growing risk of escalation – one that could force regional players, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, into direct confrontation.
Still, several factors may delay or even prevent such a scenario, much like what played out last year. Understanding where this war may be headed requires a clear grasp of the terrain: how Yemen views the conflict, how its Persian Gulf neighbors are reacting, and what could trigger a wider eruption or a negotiated backtrack.
Sanaa ties its military strategy to Gaza’s resistance
Even in western circles, there’s little dispute that the war on Yemen is now deeply intertwined with Israel’s brutal war on Gaza. Washington tried, under former US president Joe Biden, to separate the two. But the reality on the ground tells a different story – one where Sanaa’s military operations were in lockstep with events in Palestine.
That link became even clearer after the January 2025 ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, which prompted a pause in Yemen’s attacks – until Tel Aviv predictably walked back its commitments. US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House brought with it a resumption of strikes on Yemen, under the pretext of defending international shipping.
Yet those attacks would not have taken place had the US not already committed to shielding Israeli vessels. The new administration, unlike the last, makes no real attempt to disguise the overlap between the two fronts.
Yemen’s strategy has been clear from the outset: Its military activity is calibrated with the resistance in Gaza. Palestinian factions determine the pace of escalation or calm, while Yemen remains prepared to absorb the fallout.
Sanaa has paid a steep price for this stance. Washington has moved to freeze economic negotiations between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, effectively punishing the former for refusing to abandon its military support for Gaza. The US has dangled economic incentives in exchange for neutrality – offers readily accepted by Arab states across the region – but Sanaa has refused to fold.
Faced with a binary choice – either maintain its support for Palestine and accept a freeze on domestic arrangements, or open a second front with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – Yemen chose to stay the course.
That decision was rooted in three core beliefs: that Palestine must be supported unconditionally, even if it means sacrificing urgent national interests; that Ansarallah’s political identity is grounded in opposition to Israeli hegemony and thus incompatible with any alignment with Persian Gulf normalization; and that Yemen must deny Washington and Tel Aviv the opportunity to distract it with side wars designed to weaken its strategic focus.
Gulf frustration builds over Yemen’s defiance
Arab coalition partners Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not taken kindly to Yemen’s decision. Both countries have used the moment to begin backpedaling on the April 2022 truce and to impose punitive costs on Sanaa for throwing its weight behind Gaza.
The optics have not favored either of the Gulf monarchies. Abu Dhabi is fully normalized with Israel, while Riyadh is edging ever closer. Yemen, meanwhile – still scarred from years of Saudi–Emirati aggression – has moved swiftly to back the Palestinian cause. The contrast could not be more stark: The Arab state most brutalized by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi is now standing up for Palestine while the aggressors look away.
Yemen’s stance also clashes with the broader geopolitical alignment of both Persian Gulf states, which remain deeply embedded in Washington’s orbit. But their frustration has remained mostly rhetorical.
Despite their roles in the so-called “Prosperity Guardian” alliance, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE has made major military moves against Yemen since the new round of US airstrikes began. Initially, Riyadh attempted to tie Yemen’s maritime operations in the Red Sea to the Gaza war, but that framing soon gave way to vague talk of threats to commercial shipping – code for backpedaling.
Saudi political messaging shifted sharply in January when it refused to take part in joint US–UK bombing raids. Its defense ministry moved quickly to deny reports that Saudi airspace had been opened for US strikes, and later distanced itself from any Israeli involvement. The message from Riyadh was clear: It does not want to be dragged into another full-scale war with Yemen – not now.
Yemen counters with a policy of containment
Despite Saudi Arabia’s retreat from its prior commitments, Yemen has actively encouraged Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to maintain a posture of neutrality. This is not out of optimism but pragmatism: Avoiding a wider war with the Persian Gulf would prevent a dangerous regional blowout. Sanaa’s goal has been to steer Saudi and Emirati decision-making away from military confrontation, proxy mobilization, or economic escalation.
That last point nearly tipped the balance in July 2024, when Riyadh instructed its puppet government in Aden to relocate Yemen’s central banks from Sanaa. It was a clear economic provocation – and a red line.
Within days, Ansarallah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi delivered a sharp warning, framing the Saudi move as part of an Israeli–American playbook.
“The Americans are trying to entangle you [Saudi Arabia], and if you want that, then try it … The move towards aggressive escalation against our country is something we can never accept,” he revealed in a 7 July 2024 speech.
He warned Riyadh that falling for this trap would be “a terrible mistake and a great failure, and it is our natural right to counter any aggressive step.”
Sanaa responded with an unmistakable deterrent equation: “banks for banks, Riyadh Airport for Sanaa Airport, ports for ports.”
The Saudi maneuver may have been a test of Yemen’s resolve, possibly based on the assumption that Sanaa was too overextended – facing down a US-led coalition and spiraling domestic hardships – to respond decisively.
If so, Riyadh miscalculated. Houthi’s reply was blunt:
“This is not a matter of allowing you to destroy this people and push it to complete collapse so that no problems arise. Let a thousand problems arise. Let matters escalate as far as they may.”
No appetite in Riyadh or Abu Dhabi for a war without guarantees
The day after Houthi’s warning, massive protests erupted across Yemen. Millions marched in condemnation of Saudi provocations, offering the clearest signal yet that public opinion was firmly aligned behind the resistance – and willing to escalate.
Riyadh knows this. Even before the latest crisis, much of Yemeni society held Saudi Arabia and the UAE responsible for what even the UN called the world’s worst humanitarian disaster. Any new conflict would only deepen that anger.
Faced with the threat of direct retaliation, Riyadh backed off its banking gambit. The memory of past Yemeni strikes on Saudi oil facilities – particularly those between 2019 and 2021 –still haunts the Saudi leadership.
Today, Yemen’s capabilities have expanded. It now possesses hypersonic missiles and increasingly sophisticated drone technologies. And it is precisely because of these advances that Washington has failed to strong-arm the Gulf into renewed warfare. There are no meaningful US security guarantees on the table – nothing that would shield Saudi oil fields, critical infrastructure, or commercial shipping lanes from blowback.
The failures are already evident. The “Prosperity Guardian” coalition has done little to stop Yemeni strikes on Israeli-linked vessels, and US–UK airstrikes have failed to stem Yemen’s ability to hit deep inside Israel. These battlefield realities have changed the calculus in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Escalation, for now, is off the table.
Yemen’s red lines are expanding
That does not mean Washington has stopped trying to drag Saudi Arabia and the UAE into the fight. The Biden administration failed to do so. The Trump team, however, is seen as more aggressive and more likely to provide advanced weapons systems that might tempt Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to take the plunge.
There is also the perception among Gulf elites that this is a strategic opening: Syria’s collapse, Hezbollah’s supposed decline, and shifting regional dynamics may provide a rare window to redraw the map.
But for the Saudis, Yemen remains the central concern. A liberated, ideologically defiant state on their southern border is an existential threat – not only to security, but to the cultural rebranding project that the Kingdom has invested so heavily in. The UAE shares similar anxieties. A rising Yemeni Resistance Axis threatens its carefully curated image as a regional player in sync with Israeli and western interests.
That is why Sanaa has placed its forces on high alert. Ansarallah is monitoring every move by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and their local proxies – many of whom are eager to join the war. These groups have signaled readiness to participate in an international coalition to “protect shipping,” and have already held direct meetings with US military and political officials.
But the Sanaa government knows these factions would not act without orders. If they are mobilized for a broad ground offensive, Yemen will respond by targeting the powers behind them. Any ground war will be seen as a Saudi–Emirati initiative, not a local one. The same logic applies to renewed airstrikes or deeper economic war. These are Sanaa’s red lines.
A warning to the Axis of Normalization
Abdul Malik al-Houthi laid it out clearly during a 4 April address:
“I advise you all [Arab states neighboring Yemen], and we warn you at the same time: Do not get involved with the Americans in supporting the Israelis. The American enemy is in aggression against our country in support of the Israeli enemy. The battle is between us and the Israeli enemy.
The Americans support it, protect it, and back it. Do not get involved in supporting the Israeli enemy … any cooperation with the Americans in aggression against our country, in any form, is support for the Israeli enemy, it is cooperation with the Israeli enemy, it is conspiracy against the Palestinian cause.”
He went further:
“If you cooperate with the Americans: Either by allowing him to attack us from bases in your countries. Or with financial support. Or logistical support. Or information support. It is support for the Israeli enemy, advocacy for the Israeli enemy, and backing for the Israeli enemy.”
This was not just a warning. It was a strategic declaration. Any country crossing these lines will be treated as an active participant in the war – and subject to retaliation.
The message is aimed not just at Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but at other Arab and African states that might be tempted to join the fray under the guise of “protecting international navigation.”
Yemen is preparing for all scenarios. It will not be caught off guard. And this time, it won’t be fighting alone.
Below the radar: Is the Trump-Netanyahu ‘unthinkable’ about to happen?
By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | April 15, 2025
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s latest trip to Washington was no ordinary visit. The consensus among Israeli analysts, barring a few remaining loyalists, is that Netanyahu was not invited; he was summoned by US President Donald Trump.
All of the evidence supports this assertion. Netanyahu rarely travels to the US without extensive Israeli media fanfare, leveraging his touted relationships with various US administrations as a “hasbara” opportunity to reinforce his image as Israel’s strongman.
This time, there was no room for such propaganda.
Netanyahu was informed of Trump’s summons while on an official trip to Hungary, where he was received by Hungarian President Viktor Orban with exaggerated diplomatic accolades. This was a signal of defiance against international condemnation of Netanyahu, an alleged war criminal wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Orban’s open arms welcome portrayed him as anything but an isolated leader of an increasingly pariah state.
The capstone of Netanyahu’s short-lived Hungarian victory lap was Orban’s announcement of Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC, a move with profoundly unsettling implications.
It would have been convenient for Netanyahu to use his Washington visit to divert attention from his failed war in Gaza and internal strife in Israel. However, as the Arabic saying goes, “The wind often blows contrary to the ship’s desires.”
The notion that Netanyahu was summoned by Trump rather than invited, is corroborated by Israeli media reports that he attempted to postpone the visit under various pretexts. He failed, and flew to Washington on the date determined by the White House. Initially, reports circulated that no press conference would be held, denying Netanyahu the platform to tout for Washington’s unwavering support for his military actions and to expound on the “special relationship” between the two countries.
A press conference was held, although it was dominated largely by Trump’s contradictory messages and typical rhetoric. Netanyahu spoke briefly, attempting to project the same confident body language observed during his previous Washington visit, where he sat straight-backed with legs splayed out, as if he was in full command of all around him.
This time, though, Netanyahu’s body language betrayed him.
His eyes shifted nervously, and he appeared stiff and surprised, particularly when Trump announced that the US and Iran were about to begin direct talks in Oman.
Trump also mentioned the need to end the war in Gaza, but the Iran announcement clearly shocked Netanyahu. He desperately tried to align his discourse with Trump’s, referencing Libya’s disarmament under Muammar Gaddafi. But that was never part of Israel’s official regional plan. Israel has advocated consistently for US military intervention against Iran, despite the certainty that such a war would destabilise the entire region, potentially drawing the US into a conflict far more protracted and devastating than the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Further evidence of the US divergence of views from Israel’s regional ambitions — which are centred on perpetual war, territorial expansion and geopolitical dominance — lies in the fact that key political and intellectual figures within the Trump administration recognise the futility of such conflicts. In leaked exchanges on the encrypted messaging platform Signal, Vice President JD Vance protested that escalating the war in Yemen benefits Europe, not the US, a continent with which the US is increasingly decoupling, if not actually engaging in a trade war.
The Yemen war, like a potential conflict with Iran, is perceived widely as being waged on Israel’s behalf.
Figures like Tucker Carlson, a prominent commentator, articulated the growing frustration among right-wing intellectuals in the US, tweeting that, “Anyone advocating for conflict with Iran is not an ally of the United States, but an enemy.”
Trump’s willingness to challenge Netanyahu’s policies openly remains unclear. His conflicting statements, such as calling for an end to the Gaza war while simultaneously advocating for the expulsion of Palestinians, add to the ambiguity. However, recent reports suggest a determined US intention to end the war in Gaza as part of a broader strategy, linking Gaza to Yemen, Lebanon and Iran. This aligns with Washington’s need to stabilise the region as it prepares for a new phase of competition with China, requiring comprehensive economic, political and military readiness.
Should Trump prove capable of doing what others could not, will Netanyahu finally submit to American pressure?
In 2015, the Israeli leader demonstrated Israel’s unparalleled influence on US foreign and domestic policy when he addressed both chambers of Congress. Despite a few insignificant protests, Republican and Democratic policymakers applauded enthusiastically as Netanyahu criticised the then President Barack Obama, who did not attend and appeared to be isolated by his own political class.
However, if Netanyahu believes that he can replicate that moment, he is mistaken. Those years are long gone. Trump is a populist leader who is not beholden to political balances in Congress. Now in his second and final term, he could, in theory, abandon America’s ingrained reliance on the approval of Israel and its aggressively influential lobby in Washington.
Moreover, Netanyahu’s political standing is diminished. He is perceived as a failed political leader and military strategist, unable to secure decisive victories or extract political concessions from his adversaries. He is a leader without a clear plan, grappling with a legitimacy crisis unlike any faced by his predecessors.
Ultimately, the outcome hinges on Trump’s willingness to confront Netanyahu. If he does, and sustains the pressure, Netanyahu could find himself in an unenviable position, marking a rare instance in modern history where the US dictates the terms, and Israel listens. Is the unthinkable about to happen? Let’s wait and see.
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15 Saudi ‘hijackers’ were CIA agents working for US: Scholar
Press TV – April 13, 2016
Fifteen of the 9/11 “hijackers” from Saudi Arabia were CIA agents working for the United States government, which was seeking to destroy the Middle East for Israel and to double the American military budget, says Dr. Kevin Barrett, an American academic who has been studying the events of 9/11 since late 2003…. continue
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