Aletho News

Inside the Trump Administration’s Venezeula Disagreements

By Ted Snider | The Libertarian Institute | October 28, 2025

In the waters of the Caribbean, a surprisingly large U.S. fleet sits with Venezuela in its sights. It includes over 10,000 troops, Aegis guided-missile destroyers, a nuclear-powered fast attack submarine, F-35B jet fighters, MQ-9 Reaper drones, P-8 Poseidon spy planes, assault ships, and a secretive special-operations ship.

The fleet is built for war on Venezuela or its drug cartels, but it is engineered to put enough pressure on Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro to push him from power. The justification for the war is stopping the flow of drugs into the United States by Venezuelan drug cartels; the justification for the coup is that Maduro is the head of those cartels.

But U.S. officials—often those in the best place to know—have disagreed with all three aspects of the military action: the significance of Venezuela’s drug cartels in the flow of drugs, and especially fentanyl, into United States; the role of Maduro in those cartels; and the use of the military to fight them. For their disagreement, many of those officials have left or been forced from their jobs.

U.S. President Donald Trump has insisted that military force is necessary to stop “narco-terrorists” who are smuggling a “deadly weapon poisoning Americans.” He has claimed that “every boat” the U.S. military strikes off the coast of Venezuela is “stacked up with bags of white powder that’s mostly fentanyl” and “kills 25,000 on average—some people say more.”

But current and former U.S. officials disagree. While most of the boats the U.S. military has sunk have been in the passageway between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, U.S. officials say that that passage is neither used to transport fentanyl nor is it used to transport drugs to the United States. 80% of the drugs that flow through that passage is marijuana, and most of the rest is cocaine. And those drugs are headed, not to the United States, but to West Africa and Europe. Most of the fentanyl that finds its way into the U.S. comes from Mexico.

The military strikes on Venezuelan boats cannot be justified by the war on drugs and “are unlikely…to cut overdose deaths in the United States,” according to officials. “When I saw [an internal document on the strikes],” a senior U.S. national security official said, “I immediately thought, ‘This isn’t about terrorists. This is about Venezuela and regime change.’”

According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 90% of the cocaine that transits into the United States enters through Mexico, not Venezuela. And Venezuela is not a source of fentanyl. The dissenting American officials are in agreement with international bodies. The  2025 UNODC World Drug Report assesses that Venezuela “has consolidated its status as a territory free from the cultivation of coca leaves, cannabis and similar crops.” The report says that “[o]nly 5% of Colombian drugs transit through Venezuela.” The European Union’s European Drug Report 2025 corroborates the United Nations report: it “does not mention Venezuela even once as a corridor for the international drug trade.”

U.S. intelligence also disagrees on the Trump administration’s claim that Maduro is at the head of the Venezuelan drug cartels. The Trump administration has insisted that “Maduro is the leader of the designated narco-terrorist organization Cartel de Los Soles.”

Again, though, U.S. officials disagree. A “sense of the community” memorandum dated April 7, 2025 that puts together the findings of the eighteen agencies in the U.S. intelligence community released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence directly contradicts the Trump administration’s claim that Maduro is the leader of Tren de Aragua (TDA) drug cartel.

The memorandum clearly states that “the Maduro regime probably does not have a policy of cooperating with TDA and is not directing TDA movement to and operations in the United States.” It states that the intelligence community “has not observed the regime directing TDA.”

Making the American case against the Maduro government even less credible, the memorandum finds that “Venezuelan intelligence, military, and police services view TDA as a security threat and operate against it in ways that make it highly unlikely the two sides would cooperate in a strategic or consistent way.” The Venezuelan National Guard has arrested TDA members and “Venezuelan security forces have periodically engaged in armed confrontations with TDA.”

The contradiction was seen as a problem. Days after the memorandum’s release, Joe Kent, then acting chief of staff for Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, told a senior intelligence analyst to do a “rethink” of the analysis and offer a new assessment. “We need to do some rewriting so this document is not used against the DNI [Director of National Intelligence] or POTUS [President of the United States],” Kent told intelligence officers.

The rewritten memo still contradicted the Trump administration’s claims about Maduro. One week later, Michael Collins, the acting chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Maria Langan-Riekhof, his deputy, were fired by Gabbard. Gabbard claims the firings were part of a campaign to stop leaks by “deep-state criminals” who are politicizing the intelligence community.

U.S. officials have objected not just to the White House’s claims about Venezuela as a narco-state and about Maduro’s role as head of the cartels, but also to the White House’s militarized answer to the problem. And the objection has come from the highest level of the U.S. military.

On October 16, Admiral Alvin Holsey, head of the U.S. Southern Command, the group that oversees all operations in Central and South America, including the current and any future military actions taken against Venezuela, announced that he was stepping down. The New York Times has reported that there were “real policy tensions concerning Venezuela” between the admiral and Pete Hegseth, the secretary of War. Current and former U.S. officials say that Holsey “had raised concerns about the mission and the attacks on the alleged drug boats.”

But there are also reports that there were questions about whether Holsey would be fired in the days before he announced his resignation. “Hegseth did not believe Holsey was moving quickly or aggressively enough to combat drug traffickers in the Caribbean.” The Washington Post reports that “Hegseth had grown disenchanted with Holsey and wanted him to step aside.” The disenchantment, according to “people familiar with the matter,” started “around the time that the Trump administration began ordering deadly strikes on alleged drug boats off the coast of Venezuela.”

At every level, Venezuela as a significant source of drug deaths in America, Maduro’s role as leader of Venezuela’s drug cartels, and the United State’s militarized solution to the problem, U.S. officials have disagreed with the Trump administration. Some of those officials have paid for doing their jobs with their jobs.

October 28, 2025 Posted by aletho | Militarism | United States, Venezuela | Leave a comment

Why is a ‘regime change’ in Venezuela a stupid idea?

By Raphael Machado | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 11, 2025

It would be a mistake to say that with Trump’s return to the White House, Venezuela is once again under pressure. It never stopped being under pressure since the final years of the Obama administration. But it is legitimate to say that Trump 2.0 has initiated a new phase in the over-10-year hybrid campaign against the Bolivarian state.

We have already seen sanctions, attempts at color revolution, attempts to install an “alternative” president, the theft of Venezuelan gold reserves, the refusal to recognize the legitimacy of elections, provocations at the borders, and even the blocking of its entry into BRICS (sadly spearheaded by Brazil).

Now, however, we see military threats looming on the horizon against Caracas.

Harbingers of this had already occurred.

In 2020, for example, there was an attempt to infiltrate Venezuelan territory with mercenaries hired by the American company Silvercorp with the goal of overthrowing the government of Nicolás Maduro.

In 2024, the CEO of the former private military company Blackwater started the “Ya casi Venezuela” project to raise funds with the alleged aim of overthrowing Nicolás Maduro. Recently, he also stated that the $50 million bounty should apply not only to Maduro’s capture but also to his assassination.

And, as we know, between late August and early September, we saw a series of events that raised tensions in the Caribbean Sea, such as the deployment of warships to the Caribbean and the bombing of four Venezuelan boats that were allegedly transporting drugs.

Now, despite the official line that U.S. maneuvers in the Caribbean Sea are aimed at combating drug trafficking, it is noteworthy that Venezuela accounts for only 3% of all drugs reaching the U.S.. Washington does not seem to be deploying the same level of effort to stifle more important sources, such as the Colombian route, for example.

Thus, even without any official declaration, one cannot rule out the possibility that the U.S. is considering moving forward with a new attempt at regime change in Venezuela – but this time in a more direct way, whether through naval and aerial bombardments, drone attacks, or a black ops operation using mercenaries and/or special forces. Or, of course, a combination of all these options.

Naturally, one thing is to set this objective, another is to achieve it, and yet another thing is to deal with the consequences afterward.

From what is known about the fall of Assad, for example, it was apparently achieved, at least in part, by bribing military officers and co-opting Syrian intelligence. The classic tactic of “divide et impera,” divide and conquer, was used to liquidate Syrian power and facilitate the state’s conquest by Al-Julani’s irregular forces.

Any similar attempt regarding Venezuela will fail. Indeed, Venezuela, as a poor country, would in theory suffer from this fragility facing the possibility of its officials being bribed by foreign economic powers, but the Venezuelan Armed Forces were built in a different way from other states, as is the very foundation of Venezuelan state power. The degree of civilian-military integration in Venezuela is such that the supervision of numerous economic activities in the country is carried out by high-ranking military officers.

The Venezuelan state is, at least in part, a military state. The military does not represent an isolated institution separate from political power, available, therefore, for the possibility of co-option and instrumentalization against other institutions. Instead, in terms explained decades ago by the Argentine philosopher Norberto Ceresole, the military constitutes the guard of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Furthermore, Venezuela’s intelligence agencies, SEBIN and DGCIM, are very closely linked to both military and political power. It is these agencies that have been instrumental in all infiltration attempts in Venezuela, and it is unlikely that dissent can be cultivated within these structures.

Finally, although the Bolivarian militias are not very useful against long-range missile attacks, from the perspective of law and order and guaranteeing national stability in the face of the possibility of trying to take advantage of a potential chaotic situation to organize a color revolution, the armed Bolivarian militias can play a subsidiary and supportive role for the authorities, stifling potential foci of dissent and rebellion.

Now, even the goal of overthrowing Nicolás Maduro’s government presents difficulties even if eventually achieved. Other hierarchs could take his place, as they would have the support of the Venezuelan Armed Forces; this could lead to a scenario of prolonged conflict on Venezuelan territory.

As in all cases of a country’s destabilization, emigration tends to increase rather than decrease, due to the greater difficulty of ensuring the common good in the first months after a hypothetical overthrow of Maduro.

Although the U.S. has a tendency to destabilize nations to keep them in a state of permanent chaos, in theory, the same could not be done in Venezuela lest the instability reach the U.S. itself through increased migration and the collapse of law and order.

U.S. security itself also depends on maintaining a stable Venezuela, so the U.S. would truly be forced into “nation-building” in Caracas, facing a heavily armed country, including at the civilian level, and one that is predominantly hostile.

Instead of such adventurous delusions, Washington should be directing its efforts towards reinforcing Venezuelan stability, especially through the withdrawal of sanctions.

October 11, 2025 Posted by aletho | Militarism | United States, Venezuela | Leave a comment