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India’s reluctance to confront US over Chabahar attacks exposes contradictions in its Iran policy: Journalist

Press TV – July 26, 2026

India’s continued reluctance to openly challenge Washington despite the recent US attacks on Iran, including the strategic coastal city of Chabahar, has exposed the contradictions at the heart of New Delhi’s foreign policy, says an Indian journalist and foreign policy analyst.

Speaking to the Press TV website, Sanjay Kapoor, founder and editor of Hardnews magazine and president of the Editors Guild of India, said India’s approach towards Chabahar has never been independent of US policy on Iran, noting that New Delhi has consistently calibrated its engagement with the strategic Iranian port around Washington’s broader regional strategy.

“India decided to take up the Chabahar project only after then US President Barack Obama had signed the JCPOA and there was a global attempt to normalise ties with Iran,” Kapoor said.

He noted that India, like many other countries, had also severed its energy relationship with Iran after Washington instructed New Delhi to stop purchasing Iranian oil, underscoring India’s willingness to accommodate American concerns over the Islamic Republic.

“India also cut energy ties with Iran after the US told New Delhi to stop buying Persian oil. In other words, India has been mindful of US concerns on Iran,” he stated.

Kapoor said the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in New Delhi has simultaneously cultivated close strategic relations with Israel, a policy that has further aligned India’s foreign policy with that of Washington.

“Besides, this BJP government has been close to Israel also, which ensures that New Delhi stays close to the US and its foreign policy,” he told the Press TV website.

His remarks follow the recent US aggression against southern Iran, during which the port city of Chabahar was also targeted, raising questions over the future of India’s flagship connectivity project in the region and whether New Delhi can continue portraying the port as a strategic priority while avoiding direct criticism of US attacks on Iranian territory.

Located on Iran’s southeastern coast, Chabahar has long been regarded as India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, allowing it to bypass Pakistan while providing Tehran with an important regional trade hub.

India has invested in developing the Shahid Beheshti terminal of the port, viewing Chabahar as a counterweight to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Deep historical ties have not translated into strategic consistency

Despite India’s cautious approach in recent years, Kapoor told the Press TV website that relations between Iran and India rest on centuries of historical, cultural and religious interaction.

He pointed out that India is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran, adding that religious links between the two countries continue to shape people-to-people relations.

He also referred to Imam Khomeini’s old ties with his hometown, Lucknow, the capital of northern India’s biggest state, Uttar Pradesh.

“There is continuous interaction between the Shia clergy in India with their counterparts in Iran and Iraq,” he noted, adding that Iran has traditionally viewed India differently from many other countries, pointing to the longstanding cultural affinity between the two civilizations.

“Iran also never saw India as a foreign country. They also perceive Kashmir in India as Iran-e-Sagheer (little Iran),” he said, referring to the Muslim-majority Himalayan region of Kashmir in northern India.

Kapoor argued that successive governments in New Delhi believed these deep-rooted ties would allow India to preserve its relationship with Tehran even while strengthening strategic cooperation with Washington.

“The Indian government under the BJP always believed that they will manage substantial ties with Iran like they managed the Chabahar Port,” he stated.

However, he maintained that New Delhi ultimately regarded alignment with the United States as the more pressing strategic priority.

“For whatever reason, they thought they had more compelling reason to align themselves with the US. They believed that Iran could wait,” Kapoor remarked.

According to the veteran journalist, India’s reluctance to publicly support Iran stems less from hostility towards Tehran than from its determination to remain aligned with Washington’s geopolitical ambitions.

“Their reluctance to support Iran openly is due to their desperation to be on the right side of the US,” he stressed.

He believes Indian policymakers expect the current regional situation to evolve and remain confident that New Delhi’s long-standing doctrine of strategic autonomy will eventually enable it to restore any damage to bilateral relations.

“They believe that what’s happening is transitory and the final outcome will look different from now. Their resort to strategic autonomy in their foreign policy will give them a chance to make up with the Iranian government,” Kapoor said.

US attacks have exposed the fragility of India’s Chabahar strategy

Kapoor said Chabahar was originally conceived as a stable alternative to Iran’s other major ports, making it particularly attractive to India when Tehran offered New Delhi the opportunity to develop the Shahid Beheshti terminal.

“Chabahar was meant to be away from the ferment that used to be in Bandar Abbas. It was expected to be stable and peaceful. That was the unique selling point of Chabahar when its terminal, Shahid Beheshti, was offered to India by the government of Iran,” he said.

However, he said the recent US attacks around the port have fundamentally altered those assumptions.

“For some strange reason, Chabahar is facing the ire of US attacks. They have misiled and bombed the port.”

Kapoor questioned New Delhi’s claim that Indian infrastructure at the port escaped damage during the attacks.

“The Indian government says Indian infrastructure has not been lost due to the attack. That’s saying a bit much,” he added.

The senior Indian journalist noted that New Delhi invested approximately $120 million in the Shahid Beheshti terminal but deliberately limited further investment because US sanctions made financing increasingly difficult.

According to Kapoor, Russian government sources have previously indicated that Moscow helped India overcome funding shortages for the project on several occasions.

Despite maintaining its presence at Chabahar for years, Kapoor argued that New Delhi never fully embraced the project.

“Despite soldiering on for many years, India always remained a reluctant partner,” he said.

Kapoor said many Iranian experts have long argued that Tehran deliberately preserved Chabahar as an opportunity for India despite having other potential partners.

“As many Iranian experts told me, Tehran had kept Chabahar for India,” he told the Press TV website. “They argue that if they had wanted, they could have given the port to Pakistan, China or even Russia.”

He said India’s strategic calculations changed significantly after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, removing one of the principal reasons behind New Delhi’s investment in the Iranian port.

“India thought Chabahar had become untenable after the US left Afghanistan,” he said.

Rather than engaging with Afghanistan’s new Taliban-led government, Kapoor said India shifted its focus to alternative connectivity initiatives backed by Washington and several of its regional partners.

The journalist believes India’s regional priorities have increasingly shifted away from Chabahar towards the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a US-backed connectivity initiative linking India with Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israeli-occupied territories and Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Italy.

“India did not want to negotiate with the Taliban and happily became part of IMEC, which promised a lot, including a seat on the G7 high table,” he stated.

Kapoor recalled that speculation briefly emerged in Indian media about reviving New Delhi’s engagement with Chabahar following the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Tehran and Washington. However, he said those expectations quickly faded once the ceasefire broke down and US attacks on Iran resumed.

India depends on Afghanistan and Washington’s calculations

Asked whether the long-term success of Chabahar ultimately depends on Iran’s stability and sovereignty, Kapoor said New Delhi’s strategic calculations extend beyond developments inside Iran.

“Chabahar’s stability depends, in India’s estimation, on who controls Afghanistan and on how the US perceives the port,” he noted.

He explained that India’s primary motivation for investing in Chabahar was never limited to commercial interests alone but centred on gaining direct access to Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan.

According to Kapoor, changes in the regional geopolitical landscape have complicated those calculations.

“My contention may not square with the views of others, but India would only make a pitch for Chabahar if it doesn’t elicit a hostile response from its (Persian) Gulf partners and that’s only possible if Washington is backing India to help Afghanistan as well as support against Pakistan,” he said.

He argued that Pakistan remains a central factor in India’s strategic thinking, noting that the evolving military balance in South Asia following the recent war against Iran has further complicated New Delhi’s decision-making.

“After the recent war in West Asia, there has been a shift and Pakistan is better off militarily. What happens next will impact India’s policy towards Chabahar,” he remarked.

To Kapoor, India’s future investment in the port will depend primarily on the trajectory of Iran-US relations and Pakistan’s regional position.

“To sum up, India will invest in Chabahar if the US builds working relations with Iran and Pakistan is on the defensive due to this.”

Relations with Israel carry long-term risks

Kapoor said India’s growing partnership with Israel inevitably raises questions in Iran about the future direction of bilateral relations.

“Ordinarily, the trust that India and Iran enjoy should get eroded after PM Modi was in Tel Aviv just days before the war broke out,” the Indian journalist stated.

“The moot question that Iran should ask itself is whether India is a friend or a foe,” he added, pointing to the numerous interactions between Indian and Israeli leaders in recent years.

He added that despite increasing strategic cooperation with Israel and close ties with Washington, India has so far managed to preserve working relations with Iran.

According to Kapoor, New Delhi appears confident that it can maintain relations with “both sides” without suffering major diplomatic consequences.

July 26, 2026 - Posted by aletho | Economics, Wars for Israel | Afghanistan, India, Iran, Israel, United States, Zionism