Hamas dismisses US-backed disarmament plan as ‘collective suicide’
The Cradle | April 20, 2026
Hamas has rejected a US-backed proposal to disarm, describing it as a “trap” that risks igniting internal war in Gaza, according to Palestinian officials who spoke with Middle East Eye (MEE).
The plan was presented earlier this month in Cairo by Gaza Board of Peace envoy Nickolay Mladenov, with US officials present, as part of ongoing ceasefire talks that have stalled due to Israeli violations and unmet obligations.
Palestinian sources with direct knowledge of the negotiations said Hamas believes the proposal is designed to “ignite civil war in the Gaza Strip and destabilize Palestinian society.”
A Gaza-based source told MEE, “Hamas completely rejects this,” adding that within the Qassam Brigades, disarmament is viewed as “collective suicide.”
The resistance movement argues that surrendering weapons would leave Palestinians exposed, especially as “Israeli-backed armed gangs” continue to operate.
“They know that giving up their weapons is not an option and will not happen,” the source said.
The proposal also includes the removal of around 20,000 civil servants from Gaza’s administrative structure, which Hamas considers unworkable.
“This would be a complete disaster for any society,” the source said, questioning who would replace experienced personnel tasked with running the besieged enclave.
Hamas officials insist that any discussion of disarmament must follow full implementation of the first phase of the ceasefire.
That includes lifting restrictions on humanitarian aid, which Israel has not fulfilled, allowing only a small fraction of the required air to enter the strip.
Talks over the past two weeks have been described as tense, with Mladenov reportedly issuing a 48-hour ultimatum, warning that fighting could resume if Hamas did not respond.
Egypt has urged Hamas to accept the proposal; however, sources indicate that Hamas still insists on firm guarantees that Israel will fulfill its commitments before any second-phase negotiations move forward.
The eight-month plan presented by the Board of Peace proposes a phased process to disarm Hamas and other resistance factions while transferring governance in Gaza to a technocratic body, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).
The plan is meant to unfold across five stages, ending with a partial Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction, but it makes no mention of Palestinian statehood, indicating continued Israeli control.
Hamas official Bassem Naim rejected the proposal, accusing Mladenov of serving Israeli and US agendas and warning that linking reconstruction to disarmament “contradicts previous understandings.”
Israel Hayom recently reported that Israel is preparing to resume its genocide on Gaza as the deadline for Hamas disarmament approaches, with Tel Aviv warning it would “complete the mission” if the resistance does not surrender its weapons.
Israeli violations of the ceasefire have continued unabated, with hundreds of Palestinians killed since the agreement took effect and aid deliberately restricted to a fraction of agreed levels, leaving Gaza’s population exposed to famine conditions.
Last week, Israeli soldiers killed two UNICEF-contracted truck drivers and injured two others during a routine water delivery operation at Gaza City’s only operational filling point, disrupting critical aid as shortages deepen across the strip.
Since the so-called ceasefire was declared, at least 738 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces, including at least 214 children and dozens of women.
Israel’s war obsession and the urgency of Palestinian leverage
By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | April 20, 2026
It is tempting to argue that Israel’s new military doctrine is predicated on perpetual war—but the reality is more complex.
Not that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would object to such an arrangement. On the contrary, his relentless drive for military escalation suggests precisely that. After all, his openly declared quest for a “greater Israel” would require exactly this kind of permanent militarism—endless expansion and sustained regional destruction.
However, Israel cannot sustain an open-ended fight on multiple fronts indefinitely.
Israeli officials boast about fighting on “seven fronts,” but many of these are, in military terms, largely imaginary rather than sustained battlefields.
The real wars, however, are entirely of Israel’s making: from the genocide in Gaza to its unprovoked regional wars.
Still, that fact should not blind us to another reality: in the lead-up to the war on Iran, and in the escalation against Lebanon, there was near-total consensus among Jewish Israelis. An Israel Democracy Institute survey conducted on March 2–3 found that 93% of Jewish Israelis supported the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran. Support cut across all political camps.
The same enthusiasm for war accompanied the Gaza genocide and the various wars and escalations in Lebanon.
Even Yair Lapid—so often and so falsely marketed abroad as a “dove”—fully backed these wars, admitting after the Iran ceasefire that Israel had entered them with “rare consensus” and that he supported them “from the very first moment.”
His repeated criticisms, like those of other Israeli politicians, are not of the war but of Netanyahu’s failure to deliver a strategic outcome.
And this is the crucial distinction. Israelis mostly support the wars, but many no longer trust Netanyahu to translate destruction into strategic victory. By mid-April, 92% of Jewish Israelis gave the army high marks for its management of the Iran war, but only 38% gave high ratings to the government.
In other words, the public still believes in war but increasingly doubts the leadership waging it.
That distinction may not matter much to us, since the outcome remains mass death, devastation, and colonial violence. But in Israel’s own military and strategic calculations, it matters enormously. Its wars have historically followed a familiar model: crush resistance, impose military and political domination, and translate battlefield violence into colonial expansion.
Netanyahu delivered none of that.
This is why the uproar in Israel over the April 16 Lebanon ceasefire has been so fierce, and why the fears surrounding a possible stalemate with Iran run even deeper.
The Lebanon ceasefire clearly did not secure one of Israel’s central declared aims: the disarmament of Hezbollah. Israel kept troops in southern Lebanon, but the agreement halted offensive operations and fell far short of the promised “total victory.”
For many in Israel, any outcome that falls short of total victory is immediately read as defeat. One northern Israeli regional leader, Eyal Shtern, captured that mood with brutal clarity when he reacted to the Lebanon ceasefire by asking how Israel had gone “from absolute victory to total surrender,” in remarks reported by CNN.
That is the real crisis now confronting Israel: not that it has discovered the limits of permanent war, but that it has once again discovered that exterminatory violence does not automatically produce political victory.
While Iran possesses political leverage that could allow for a long-term, or even permanent, truce, Lebanon and Syria remain in a far more vulnerable position. However, no one is in a more precarious condition than the Palestinians, particularly those in Gaza.
Unlike others who retain some political margin and space to maneuver, Palestinians live under Israeli occupation, apartheid, and siege. Gaza, in particular, has been reduced to a sealed enclave of devastation.
Its hermetic siege has produced one of the most horrific humanitarian catastrophes in modern history: an entire population surviving on polluted water, with infrastructure destroyed, food critically scarce, and thousands still buried beneath the rubble.
Aside from their legendary steadfastness—sumud—Palestinians operate under severe constraints in their ability to impose conditions on Israel, particularly as it continues to receive unconditional support from the United States and its Western allies. Yet their resilience, collective action, and enduring presence remain powerful forms of leverage that cannot be easily contained.
Netanyahu—and those who will come after him—will always find in Palestine a space in which war can be waged continuously and at relatively low cost to Israel itself.
Unlike other battlefields, where war becomes politically, militarily, and economically unsustainable, Israel has turned its occupation of Palestine into a permanent battlefield.
Even if Netanyahu, now politically diminished and aging, exits the political scene, the underlying paradigm will remain intact. Future Israeli leaders will continue to wage war on Palestine, not despite its costs, but because of its perceived benefits: it is financially subsidized, colonially advantageous, and politically sustainable within Israel’s current structure.
To break this paradigm, Palestinians must generate leverage—real leverage. This cannot come from futile negotiations or appeals to long-ignored international law. It can only emerge from sustained collective resistance to colonialism, reinforced by meaningful support from Arab and Muslim states and genuine international allies, and amplified by global solidarity capable of exerting real pressure on Israel and, crucially, on its principal benefactors.
For now, Netanyahu continues his wars because he has no answer to his own strategic failures. Here, escalation is not a strength; it is the last refuge of a leadership that cannot deliver victory.
This, however, also reveals something else: Israel is entering a moment of unprecedented vulnerability.
That vulnerability must be exposed—clearly, consistently, and urgently—by all those who seek an end to these senseless wars, an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and a path toward justice that has been denied for far too long.
Israel’s Expansion Means An Unraveling of Middle East Stability
By José Niño | The Libertarian Institute | April 20, 2026
The recent ceasefire between Israel and Iran may have paused the most intense phase of direct military confrontation, but it has done nothing to resolve the deeper questions about Middle Eastern stability that have emerged since October 7, 2023. Behind the temporary calm lies a profound transformation in Israeli strategic thinking, one that has moved from containment to active regional reorganization.
Israel is not a normal democracy that abides by the rule of law or legal restraint. It is very much an expansionist state with bold ambitions and a demonstrated willingness to break international law. The events of the past two years have made this reality impossible to ignore.
The “Greater Israel” project, a term that has carried two primary meanings over the decades, has moved from the ideological fringe into the governing coalition of Israeli politics. In its narrower, post-1967 usage, “Greater Israel” referred to Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. In its maximalist, biblicist form, drawn from Genesis 15:18, it invokes the territory stretching “from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates,” a vast area encompassing parts of modern Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and potentially reaching into Iraq.
Once confined to religious nationalists and settler ideologues, this expansionist vision now sits at the cabinet table. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has called for Israel to “expand to Damascus,” displayed a map showing Jordan as part of Israel at a 2023 speech in Paris, and settler leader Daniella Weiss has publicly stated that “the real borders of Greater Israel are the Euphrates and the Nile.”
Netanyahu’s coalition agreement explicitly declares that “Jewish people have an exclusive and indisputable right to all parts of the Land of Israel” and that “the government will promote and develop settlements in all parts of the Land of Israel.” As Al Jazeera reported in February 2026, figures like Smotrich and Ben Gvir, once regarded as outside the mainstream, “are now in government, reflecting a wider radicalisation within Israeli society itself.”
Perhaps most striking is that this rhetoric is no longer confined to the religious right. Opposition leader Yair Lapid, an ostensibly secular figure, stated in February 2026 that he supports “anything that will allow the Jews a large, broad, strong land,” adding that “the borders are the borders of the Bible.” When even centrist politicians invoke biblical mandates to justify territorial expansion, the ideological transformation becomes undeniable.
The conflict with Hezbollah has catalyzed a significant shift in Israeli policy regarding Lebanon’s territorial integrity. The previous doctrine of containing Hezbollah has given way to explicit calls from senior Israeli officials for the permanent occupation and annexation of territory up to the Litani River, approximately thirty kilometers north of the current border.
Smotrich has repeatedly asserted that the military campaign in Lebanon must result in a “change of Israel’s borders.” On March 23, 2026, he told an Israeli radio program that the campaign “needs to end with a different reality entirely, both with the Hezbollah decision but also with the change of Israel’s borders.” He then declared at a Knesset faction meeting that “the Litani must be our new border with the state of Lebanon, just like the Yellow Line in Gaza and like the buffer zone and peak of the Hermon in Syria,” adding, “I say here definitively, in every room and in every discussion, too.” Al Jazeera reported that these were “the most explicit” statements by a senior Israeli official on seizing Lebanese territory since the current military operations began.
Defense Minister Israel Katz has adopted a complementary posture. He announced at the end of March that the IDF will maintain “security control over the entire area up to the Litani River” and that “hundreds of thousands of residents of southern Lebanon who evacuated northward will not return south of the Litani River until security for the residents of the north is ensured.”
The shift toward annexation is bolstered by the emergence of Uri Tzafon, a movement founded in late March 2024 that advocates for the establishment of Jewish civilian settlements in southern Lebanon. The group, whose name means “awaken, O North” in Hebrew, has organized conferences focused on what it describes as the “occupation of the territory and settlement” of southern Lebanon. Its leaders have invoked conquest, expulsion, and settlement as the necessary sequence for transforming the region.
Senior rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh wrote in a public letter that “after the conquest and expulsion of the hostile population, a Jewish settlement must be established, thus completing the victory.” Eliyahu Ben Asher, a founding member of Uri Tzafon, told Jewish Currents that “the Israeli-Lebanese border is a ridiculous colonial border,” building on his earlier assertion that “what is called ‘southern Lebanon’ is really and truly simply the northern Galilee.”
In mid-2024, the group used drones and balloons to drop eviction notices on Lebanese border towns, informing residents that “they are in the Land of Israel, which belongs to the Jewish people, and that they are required to evacuate immediately,” according to a post the group made on its Telegram channel. In February 2026, dozens of Uri Tzafon activists crossed the border fence near the Lebanese town of Yaroun and planted trees inside Lebanese territory in what the group called a “moral and historical step.” The IDF detained two individuals and called the crossing “a serious criminal offense.” By April 2026, Jewish Currents reported that Uri Tzafon’s once-marginal ideas had gained “broad governmental and public support,” with the movement’s leaders now setting their sights on territory beyond the Litani, toward the Zaharani River, another dozen miles deeper into Lebanon.
The pursuit of “Greater Israel” and the annexation of buffer zones draw on a lineage of Israeli strategic thought that advocates for the fragmentation of rival Arab states. This lineage includes the 1982 Yinon Plan, an article published in the Hebrew journal Kivunim (“Directions”) and authored by Oded Yinon, who had served as a senior official in the Israeli Foreign Ministry and as a journalist for The Jerusalem Post. Yinon argued that the borders drawn by colonial powers were inherently unstable and that Israel’s security would be best served by what he called the “dissolution of the military capabilities of Arab states east of Israel.” He specifically proposed that Iraq should be divided into separate Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite entities, and that Syria and Lebanon should similarly fragment along sectarian lines.
The deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey represents one of the most significant diplomatic casualties of the post-October 7 era. Israeli leadership has designated Turkey not merely as a problematic partner but as a strategic adversary whose regional ambitions require a coordinated counter-alliance.
Foreign Minister Israel Katz spearheaded this posture with highly personalized and escalatory rhetoric. Following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s July 28, 2024, speech suggesting that his country might intervene in Israel “just as we entered Karabakh, just as we entered Libya,” Katz responded on X that Erdoğan was “following in the footsteps of Saddam Hussein” and that he “should remember what happened there and how it ended,” posting a photograph of Erdoğan alongside the former Iraqi dictator. Katz also instructed Israeli diplomats to “urgently dialogue with all NATO members” to push for Turkey’s condemnation and expulsion from the alliance, calling Turkey “a country which hosts the Hamas headquarters” and describing it as part of “the Iranian axis of evil.”
Beyond rhetoric, Netanyahu has articulated a vision for a regional counter-alliance. On February 23, 2026, ahead of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel, Netanyahu announced a proposed “hexagon of alliances” that would include Israel, India, Greece, and Cyprus, along with unnamed Arab, African, and Asian states. He stated that the initiative was designed to counter “the radical axes, both the radical Shia axis, which we have struck very hard, and the emerging radical Sunni axis.” While Netanyahu did not explicitly name Turkey as leading the Sunni axis, Israeli political discourse and analysts have pointed to Turkey under Erdoğan as the primary concern, with former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett recently describing Turkey as “the new Iran.”
The shifts in Israeli rhetoric and doctrine since October 7 have had profound implications for its international standing. The “Greater Israel” rhetoric and the annexation of southern Lebanon have led to what observers describe as a “dark new phase” in Israel’s relations with the international community. Long-standing partners, including the United Kingdom, have suspended trade negotiations and imposed sanctions on individuals involved in the settler movement, citing the strident rhetoric of Israeli ministers as a primary cause.
The military campaign against Iran in early 2026 and the subsequent Iranian retaliation through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz triggered the world’s biggest oil supply disruption since the 1970s. The reclassification of the Strait as a maximum war-risk zone led to insurance premiums surging by over 1,000% contributing to a global fuel crisis and massive volatility in financial markets. Within Israel, the economic damage from the multi-front war has been estimated at over $11.5 billion.
As Israel moves to dismantle the borders of the twentieth century, the resulting shockwaves are rattling both regional alliances and global energy markets. The Jewish state’s transformation into an expansionist power has turned former partners into strategic adversaries, making the recent ceasefire feel like a brief intermission in a much larger drama. In this new Middle East, the map is being redrawn by force, and the cost of that ink is being felt from the Litani River to the Strait of Hormuz.
Why has Israel’s Security Doctrine begun targeting Turkey?
The logic of prevention
By Lorenzo Maria Pacini | Strategic Culture Foundation | April 20, 2026
To understand why Turkey has gradually come to be viewed as a strategic concern for Israel, we must start with a methodological premise: in the Middle East, security doctrines are not formulated solely in response to immediate threats, but primarily in anticipation of future power dynamics. From this perspective, security does not equate to the mere defense of borders, but rather to the ability to prevent the emergence of regional actors capable of limiting Israel’s freedom of action or altering existing strategic balances.
Turkey is today viewed by a segment of the Israeli discourse not simply as a complex neighbor, but as a rising regional power with autonomous ambitions. This development is significant because, within the logic of Israeli security, an actor does not necessarily become a threat only when it displays direct hostility; it can also become one when it acquires sufficient military capabilities, geopolitical influence, and strategic depth to constrain Israel’s operational margin.
Israeli security doctrine has historically been associated with a preventive approach, grounded in the need to neutralize threats before they mature into a fully hostile form. This framework, applied over time to various theaters and adversaries, tends to view the growth in power of other actors as a potential long-term risk, even when it does not yet translate into a direct and immediate threat.
In this context, the issue is not merely what an actor does in the present, but what it might do in the future if it further strengthened its capabilities. For Israel, therefore, strategic analysis includes not only an assessment of intentions but also of potential. This is why attention focuses on states or organizations capable of influencing the regional balance of power, supporting alternative alliances, or limiting Israeli military superiority.
Turkey increasingly fits into this framework because it combines three key elements: a decisive geographical position, a sophisticated military apparatus, and an increasingly assertive foreign policy. Its ability to operate simultaneously in the Levant, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus makes it a geopolitical actor that cannot easily be reduced to a single bilateral dimension.
From Iran to Turkey
For years, Iran has represented the primary paradigm of strategic threat to Israel. However, Turkey’s growing centrality in Israeli discourse does not indicate a straightforward replacement, but rather an extension of the same logic of containment toward another regional actor perceived as capable of building systemic autonomy.
The statement attributed to Naftali Bennett—according to which a “new Turkish threat” is emerging and Israel should act simultaneously against Tehran and Ankara—is significant not so much for its rhetorical value as because it signals the inclusion of Turkey in a security lexicon that until recently was reserved for other regional adversaries. Similarly, the interpretation put forward by Israeli analytical and media circles emphasizes the need not to underestimate Turkey’s potential, especially as Ankara strengthens its military capabilities and consolidates alternative regional partnerships.
The most important shift is therefore conceptual: Turkey is no longer viewed merely for its immediate moves, but as a potential structural factor in the transformation of the regional order. In this light, Israeli-Turkish tensions are not a diplomatic incident, but a reflection of a broader competition for regional hegemony.
The eastern Mediterranean and Syria
One of the main theaters of this rivalry is the Eastern Mediterranean. Here, Israel has progressively strengthened its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, contributing to the formation of a security axis that also addresses concerns stemming from Turkish activism in the region. The energy issue, control of maritime routes, and the delimitation of exclusive economic zones have transformed the Eastern Mediterranean into a space of strategic competition with high political stakes.
Syria, however, remains the most sensitive issue. Following the collapse of the Assad government in December 2024, the dynamics of influence within the country rapidly shifted, and the overlap between Turkish and Israeli operations has heightened the risk of miscalculation. On the one hand, Ankara has sought to consolidate its presence and prevent the emergence of hostile entities along its southern border; on the other, Israel has pursued the need to preserve freedom of air action and the ability to strike infrastructure deemed hostile.
In this scenario, the problem is not merely the divergence between two states, but the collision between two incompatible security projects. Turkey aims for a strategic depth that allows it to project stability and influence; Israel, by contrast, tends to prefer a fragmented surrounding environment, devoid of powers capable of consolidating to the point of influencing its operational space.
Turkey’s transformation into an object of Israeli strategic attention also depends on its military evolution. The modernization of the Turkish armed forces, the development of missile systems, the extensive use of drones, and the desire to acquire autonomous regional projection capabilities reinforce the perception of Ankara as a revisionist power or, at the very least, as an actor not aligned with Israeli interests.
In terms of perception, the decisive point is that Turkey is no longer viewed merely as a difficult interlocutor or an ambiguous NATO ally, but as a power that could influence the security architecture of the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean. This explains why Israeli circles speak of a “new Turkish threat” and why political discourse has begun to place Ankara in a category close to the more established one reserved for Iran.
This perception is also fueled by Turkey’s stance on the Palestinian issue and its relations with Islamist or anti-Israeli actors. Strategically, this reinforces the idea that Turkey is not merely a regional mediator but an actor capable of forming alternative coalitions and providing political support to forces hostile to Israel.
Normalization of the confrontation
One of the most significant aspects of the current dynamic is the normalization of conflict-laden language. When a threat is repeatedly invoked by former prime ministers, analysts, the media, and strategic circles, it ceases to be a remote possibility and becomes a mentally viable option in public discourse. This does not mean that conflict is inevitable, but that the discursive and psychological conditions are being established that make a future escalation plausible.
The logic is well-known in the history of international relations: before a clash manifests itself militarily, it takes root in security discourse, in preventive doctrines, and in representations of the adversary. Speaking of a “new threat” or the “need to act simultaneously” on two fronts helps redefine the cognitive framework within which political elites interpret available options.
In this sense, the Turkish case is particularly significant because it signals a shift from diplomatic rivalry to a deeper strategic competition. Turkey is not merely criticized for certain foreign policy decisions; it is increasingly treated as a potential structural obstacle to Israeli security.
The reason why Israeli security doctrine has begun to target Turkey must therefore be sought in a combination of structural factors: Turkish geopolitical autonomy, military buildup, competition in the Eastern Mediterranean, overlapping interests in Syria, and the growing political distance between Ankara and Tel Aviv. The problem, from Israel’s perspective, is not merely what Turkey is today, but what it could become if it succeeds in consolidating a regional sphere of influence consistent with its own interests.
In this context, Israel appears to be applying to Turkey the same preventive logic it has already employed with other actors: to contain at an early stage what might, in the future, reduce Israel’s freedom of action or challenge its strategic superiority. The issue, therefore, is not merely bilateral but concerns the entire Middle Eastern power architecture.
For this reason, interpreting the Israeli-Turkish rivalry as a simple contingent dispute would be misleading. Instead, it must be understood as an expression of a broader transformation of the regional order, in which states with autonomous ambitions and growing capabilities are viewed as potential systemic threats. It is within this logic that Turkey has entered Israel’s strategic radar.
Ex-intel officer questions Israeli strategy in Lebanon as losses mount
Al Mayadeen | April 19, 2026
A former Israeli Military Intelligence officer has questioned the Israeli occupation’s strategy in southern Lebanon, pointing to mounting losses since the ceasefire took effect.
Retired Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Neriah told i24 News that Hezbollah has emerged stronger from the war despite extensive Israeli bombing and attacks, noting that the group “represents the resistance against Israel, and this is its primary source of strength.”
“If we are sustaining daily losses in Lebanon, how long can we endure this situation?” he asked.
2 killed, dozen injured since ceasefire
The Israeli military command had announced that an Israeli reservist soldier was killed and nine others were wounded in an improvised explosive device incident in southern Lebanon on Saturday. Reports indicate that the incident occurred in the border village of Kfar Kila, opposite of Metulla, which has seen extensive periods of Israeli military occupation and incursions since the 66-day war on Lebanon in 2024.
On Sunday, Israeli media reported that an Israeli soldier was killed and nine others were wounded, including one seriously, after an explosive device detonated in an area it occupies in southern Lebanon. The soldier served in the 769th “Hiram” Regional Brigade’s 7106th Battalion.
According to an initial military probe, the incident occurred during operations in Israeli-occupied territory, where an engineering vehicle was struck by an IED planted in the area. Troops securing the machinery were caught in the blast, resulting in multiple casualties. The wounded were airlifted to hospitals, while the Israeli regime says its forces launched their own attacks near the area following the explosion.
A day earlier, Israeli media reported that another reservist, a warrant officer, was killed and three soldiers were wounded in a similar explosion in the southern Lebanese village of Jebbayn. The troops were reportedly scanning a building for weapons when the device detonated.
Continued attacks, occupation in southern Lebanon
The Israeli military command had announced that its forces would operate in a so-called “advanced defense zone” within southern occupied Lebanon, extending from Ras al-Bayyada on the coast to Shebaa in the east. The zone is seen as a prelude to a prolonged Israeli occupation and an attempt to push settlers within Lebanese territory.
The announcement comes as part of a push by the Israeli regime to impose a new status quo in areas located in a region 8-10 km from Israeli sites in occupied Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian territories.
However, the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon has emphasized that a ceasefire must include a complete halt to Israeli violations, including incursions and destruction of property.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem stated that the Resistance remains prepared to respond to any aggression, stressing that the ceasefire cannot be one-sided and must be respected by both parties. He outlined key priorities for the next phase, including a full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory, the return of displaced residents to their villages, and the launch of reconstruction efforts supported at both the national and international levels.
Sheikh Qassem also stressed the importance of strengthening Lebanese sovereignty, maintaining internal unity, and preventing foreign interference.
Netanyahu’s ‘total victory’ to total flop
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | April 19, 2026
Promising annihilation, dominance, and total victory, the Israeli leadership has found itself in a predicament no closer to victory on any front. Tactical victories sold as strategic ones have been exposed; instead of meticulously planned operations, Tel Aviv engages in aggression without any discernible long-term strategy to achieve its stated aims.
Since October 7, 2023, the Israeli regime of old is no more. Instead of implementing methodical planning, public deception, and fighting the long game, its thinking has been replaced by a ruthlessly violent vengeance scheme that seeks to try and achieve in months what it was previously aiming for over decades.
The beginning of the war on Iran was not February 28, 2026; instead, it was October 7, 2023. This was the moment when everything changed in the strategic thinking of the Israeli leadership. For them, the illusion of absolute control and superiority was crushed under the boots of a few thousand Palestinian fighters, who single-handedly dealt the most severe blow to the Zionist regime in its history.
As an event, the collapse of the Israeli southern command at the hands of a guerrilla force possessing homemade light weapons, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, represented the moment of a great shift. It wasn’t long before the decision was made to launch a genocide against the people of Gaza.
Inflicting the genocide was the whole strategy, not dealing a military defeat to Hamas or any other Palestinian organizations. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu foolishly believed that the genocide would restore the Zionist entity’s prized “deterrence capacity”, while the side effects of the genocide would mean the de facto defeat of the Resistance, destroying Palestinian will to resist that could lead to a mass ethnic cleansing event that would end up inflicting a predicament on Hamas that replicates the PLO’s defeat in 1982.
When it became clear that this strategy was not working inside Gaza itself, the Israeli military continued without any clear goals and launched operation after operation in desperate attempts to achieve their desired outcomes. The majority of the tasks performed inside Gaza by the invading ground forces were simply round-the-clock demolition work; so much that they even recruited private businesses and settler employees to aid in these efforts.
Ultimately, they ran into a major problem; after two years, they had still failed and presented a plan to try to implement a West Bank-style occupation over Gaza City, a task that experts predicted could take them a decade. This is why they accepted a ceasefire, one in which the war was simply frozen and meant they were able to engage in a prisoner exchange.
In Lebanon, they were also put into a difficult predicament. The stance of former Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had been that Lebanon would remain a support front for Gaza until the very end. “Hamas will win,” stated Nasrallah in a 2023 speech, after which he asserted that “no matter where the region is taken,” Hezbollah will stand with Gaza.
The daily operations by Hezbollah were a thorn in its side, which is why the Israelis began planning to escalate in an unprecedented way. Through their terrorist indiscriminate pager attacks, followed by the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and most of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, the Israelis believed they had dealt a death blow to Hezbollah.
Selling this lie to the public, the Israeli leadership claimed a major victory and alleged to have taken out around 80% of Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal.
In March, when Hezbollah began responding to the some 15,400 ceasefire violations committed by the Zionists, suddenly the Israeli public was jolted back by the power and coordination with which Hezbollah managed to attack, especially as these operations were carried out alongside Iran’s missile and drone strikes.
Eventually, failing to score victories in key towns like Bint Jbeil and Khiam, the Israelis begrudgingly accepted a temporary ceasefire, one that they immediately violated.
If it were true that the Israelis were close to, or even believed that a victory over Hezbollah was possible, they would not take any ceasefire agreement of any description. Instead, they were forced to go back to the drawing board.
Similarly, they launched the 12-day war on Iran and came out empty-handed. They also used their US allies to launch an air assault on Yemen and failed to achieve any of their goals. Then came the February 28 attack on Iran, where the largest blows were landed during the first 24 hours, yet even with the US on their side, their aspirations for regime change quickly faded into a distant memory.
When Yemen’s Ansar Allah joined the war in support of Iran and Hezbollah, the Israelis didn’t even launch strikes on Yemen, likely due to it being a useless endeavour.
So as it stands, the Lebanon front is again open, the Iran front was fought to a standstill with no goals achieved, Yemen is open whenever there is aggression on their allies, and Gaza is a temporarily frozen arena that they still have no plan for. Even in Syria, the constant aggression is like playing with fire.
Meanwhile, the delusional Zionist leadership is still chasing its aspirations of a “Greater Israel”, threatening even Turkey with retaliation for simply criticizing them. What this behaviour and all of their decision-making since October 7 point to is an irrational inability to close any conflict, lacking any coherent plans to win.
Therefore, the Israelis will use any and all ceasefire agreements in order to go back to the drawing board, in order to conjure up new plans for further aggression. Whether it’s a Lebanon, Gaza, or Iran ceasefire, they are not about to give up on attacking everyone mercilessly.
This means that despite all of its efforts and attacks over the past two and a half years, the predicament they find themselves in has not changed. A ceasefire kicks the can down the road, simply delaying the inevitable resumption of war. Either the Israelis are totally defeated in battle, or they will continue to attack again and again. This will go around in circles until they are eventually defeated.
Hezbollah denies involvement in deadly attack on UNIFIL in south Lebanon
Al-Mayadeen | April 18, 2026
Hezbollah has denied any involvement in an incident targeting United Nations observers in southern Lebanon earlier today.
In a statement, the group said it “calls for caution in issuing judgments and responsibilities regarding the incident,” urging restraint until facts are fully established.
The movement specifically rejected any responsibility for the incident involving UNIFIL forces in the al-Ghandourieh–Bint Jbeil area, stressing that blame should not be assigned before the Lebanese Army completes its investigation and clarifies the circumstances.
Emphasis on coordination and stability
Hezbollah also highlighted the importance of maintaining cooperation between local residents, UNIFIL, and the Lebanese Army. It emphasized the need for coordination between the army and UN peacekeepers, particularly given the current sensitive conditions.
The group further “expressed surprise at the [parties] that rushed to throw accusations arbitrarily, while remaining silent when Israeli forces target UNIFIL personnel.”
Earlier today, UNIFIL said a patrol clearing explosive ordnance along a road in the village of Ghandourieh came under small-arms fire “from non-state actors”, leaving one observer dead and three others wounded, including two in serious condition.
UNIFIL warns IOF movement limits threaten mission logistics flow
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has reported that a routine convoy carrying military and civilian peacekeepers, along with essential contractors, was stopped by Israeli forces a few kilometres from its destination in Naqoura on Tuesday afternoon.
UNIFIL said the incident is not isolated, adding that similar restrictions, whether through physical roadblocks or the reversal of prior clearances, have affected both peacekeepers and essential supporting personnel.
The incidents are part of a broader pattern of Israeli aggression targeting the UNIFIL’s presence on the ground.
Late last month, a UNIFIL patrol was subjected to an Israeli attack on the Bani Hayyan-Tallouseh road, resulting in two peacekeepers killed and two others injured, with a helicopter from the Naqoura area intervening to evacuate the wounded.
The prospect of an expanded and far more violent war
By Kurt Nimmo | Another Day in the Empire | April 18, 2026
… Earlier this month, Israeli minister Bezalel Smotrich declared an official start to the Greater Israel project. He included Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine in the project. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Zionists have strived to weaken neighboring states, dismantle their military capacity, and worked to reshape the balance of power in West Asia. The original plan called for occupying and ethnically cleansing the entirety of Palestine, all of Jordan, south Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, and northern Saudi Arabia.
The Nazis had a similar plan during their occupation of Europe in the Second World War. It was called the “Greater Germanic Reich” (Großgermanisches Reich). In the autumn of 1933, Adolf Hitler made plans to annex territories including Bohemia, parts of western Poland, and Austria to Germany. He also aimed to create satellite or puppet states that would lack independent economies or policies. Nazi racial theories classified the Germanic peoples of Europe as part of a racially superior Nordic subset within the broader Aryan race, which they considered to be the sole true bearers of civilized culture.
In Deuteronomy, the Jewish God chooses Israel to be his holy (kadosh) and treasured (segulah) people. Deuteronomy 14:2 states God has chosen the Jews “to be a people for Himself, a special treasure above all the peoples who are on the face of the earth.” According to the Torah, “Eretz Israel” (“Land of Israel” in Hebrew), now defined as “Greater Israel,” was “given” to the “children of Abraham” and serves as the basis for “a merger of religious fundamentalism and modern political ethno-nationalism, whereby ancient texts are used to justify a modern military expansionist state.” In regard to Lebanon, the Zionists believe Greater Israel extends up to the Sidon and Litani rivers.
According to Amichai Friedman, a rabbi in the Israeli Army, “This land is ours, the whole land, including Gaza, including Lebanon,” while Daniella Weiss, a Jewish ethnonationalist and former mayor of Kedumim, called for the “invasion of Lebanon” immediately after the war in Gaza. Lebanon-born Israeli journalist Edy Cohen posted to social media that areas of Lebanon, including Faraya and Kesrouan, will also suffer the fate of Gaza, that is to say ethnic cleansing, massacres, and wholesale theft of land, homes (those not demolished), and infrastructure. … Full article
Israeli soldiers kill UNICEF truck drivers delivering water to Gaza families

The Cradle | April 18, 2026
Israeli soldiers killed two Palestinian truck drivers hired by UNICEF and injured two others during routine water delivery operations at a filling point in northern Gaza on 17 April.
“UNICEF is outraged by the killing of two drivers of trucks contracted by UNICEF to provide clean water to families in the Gaza Strip,” a statement from the UN agency reads.
UNICEF added the victims were “killed by Israeli fire in an incident that took place early this morning at the Mansoura water filling point in northern Gaza.”
The attack occurred during normal operations, with no changes in the convoy’s movements or procedures that morning.
UNICEF has since told its contractors to stand down at the site until conditions are safe enough to return.
“The Mansoura water filling point is currently the only operational truck filling point for the Mekorot water supply line serving Gaza City,” UNICEF said, highlighting the significance of the disruption.
“UNICEF and humanitarian partners use it multiple times a day to sustain critical water trucking operations for hundreds of thousands of people, including children.”
UNICEF called on Israeli authorities to “investigate this incident, and ensure full accountability,” adding that “Humanitarian workers, essential service providers, and civilian infrastructure, including critical water facilities, must never be targeted.”
In March, Israel slashed already restricted aid flows into Gaza, allowing just 640 trucks to enter out of 6,000 expected under existing arrangements – around 10 percent of the required amount.
Palestinian officials warn that the cuts have intensified shortages and pushed the strip closer to famine, with fuel, food, and basic goods increasingly scarce.
UNICEF said prices for essential items had surged by 200 to 300 percent, placing more than 1.5 million people at risk of severe food insecurity.
At the same time, Israeli attacks on the besieged Strip have continued despite the so-called ceasefire.
Earlier this month, Israeli forces shot and killed nine-year-old Palestinian schoolgirl Ritaj Reihan inside a tent classroom in northern Gaza, around two kilometers from the so-called ‘Yellow Line,’ in front of dozens of her classmates.
US Middle East Policy: The Growing Propensity for Genocide
Arab Center Washington DC | April 10, 2026
Professor John Mearsheimer discusses the #IranWar, the #Gaza genocide, and the US policy toward the Middle East.
His remarks were the keynote address for Arab Center’s Eleventh Annual Conference.
John J. Mearsheimer is an American political scientist and international relations scholar who serves as the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and is the author of How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, and The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, among other works.
Israeli General: War with Iran does not serve Israel as global standing erodes over Gaza
MEMO | April 17, 2026
A former Israeli General close to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned of the strategic and political consequences of the ongoing conflict, saying a military confrontation with Iran is not in Israel’s interest.
Major General (res.) Giora Eiland, former head of Israel’s National Security Council, said in remarks reported by Israeli media platform Walla that Israel’s international standing has sharply declined over the past three years, adding that the war in Gaza is the main driver of this deterioration.
He said the prevailing view among political circles in Europe and the United States is that Netanyahu has drawn Washington into an unnecessary confrontation.
Eiland added that these tensions have caused tangible harm to the global economy and threatened its stability, fuelling international public opinion against Israeli policies.
He stressed that the erosion of Israel’s standing is no longer limited to international institutions, but has become “clear and evident” within the United States, Israel’s closest ally.
The collapse is real – Lebanon ceasefire marks a historic strategic defeat
By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | April 17, 2026
A ceasefire in Lebanon was announced on Thursday by US President Donald Trump, but its reality tells a very different story. The ceasefire was not the product of American diplomacy, nor Israeli strategic calculation. It was imposed—largely as a result of sustained Iranian pressure.
Washington, Tel Aviv, and their allies—including some within Lebanon itself—will continue to deny this reality. Acknowledging Iran’s role would mean admitting that a historic precedent has been set: for the first time, forces opposing the United States and Israel have succeeded in imposing conditions on both.
This is not a minor development. It is a strategic rupture. But it is not the only fundamental shift now underway: Israel’s very approach to war and diplomacy is itself changing.
After failing to secure victory through overwhelming violence, Israel is increasingly relying on coercive diplomacy to impose political outcomes.
Over the past two to three decades, this Israeli strategy has become unmistakably clear: achieving through diplomacy what it has failed to impose on the battlefield.
‘Diplomacy’ as War
Israeli ‘diplomacy’ does not conform to the conventional meaning of the term. It is not negotiation between equals, nor a genuine pursuit of peace. Rather, it is diplomacy fused with violence: assassinations, sieges, blockades, political coercion, and the systematic manipulation of internal divisions within opposing societies. It is diplomacy as an extension of war by other means.
Likewise, Israel’s conception of the ‘battlefield’ is fundamentally different. The deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure is not incidental, nor merely ‘collateral damage’; it is central to the strategy itself.
Nowhere is this clearer than in Gaza. Following the ongoing genocide, vast swathes of Gaza have been reduced to rubble, with estimates indicating that around 90 percent of the whole of Gaza has been destroyed. According to the Gaza Ministry of Health, women and children consistently account for roughly 70 percent of all of Gaza’s casualties.
This is not collateral damage. It is the deliberate destruction of a civilian population, an act of genocide that is designed to force mass displacement and remake the political and demographic reality in Israel’s favor.
The same logic extends beyond Gaza. It shapes Israel’s wars in Lebanon against Hezbollah and its broader confrontation with Iran.
The United States, Israel’s principal ally, has historically operated within a similar paradigm. From Vietnam to Iraq, civilian populations, infrastructure, and even the environment itself have borne the brunt of American warfare.
A Faltering Model
It is often argued that Israel turned to ‘diplomacy’ following its forced withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 under resistance pressure. While this moment was pivotal, it was not the beginning.
Earlier precedents exist. The First Intifada (1987–1993) demonstrated that a sustained popular uprising could not be crushed through brute force alone. Despite Israel’s extensive repression, the revolt endured.
It was in this context that the Oslo Accords emerged—not as a genuine peace process, but as a strategic lifeline. Through Oslo, Israel achieved politically what it could not impose militarily: the pacification of the uprising, the institutionalization of Palestinian political fragmentation, and the transformation of the Palestinian Authority into a mechanism for internal control.
Meanwhile, settlement expansion accelerated, and Israel reaped the global legitimacy of appearing as a ‘peace-seeking’ state.
Yet the last two decades have exposed the limits of this model.
From Lebanon in 2006 to repeated wars on Gaza (2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, and the ongoing genocide since 2023), Israel has failed to secure decisive strategic victories. Its ongoing confrontations with Hezbollah and Iran further underscore this failure
Not only has Israel been unable to achieve its stated military objectives, but it has also failed to translate overwhelming firepower—even genocide—into lasting political gains.
Some interpret this as a shift toward perpetual war under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But this reading is incomplete.
Perpetual War?
Netanyahu understands that these wars cannot be sustained indefinitely. Yet ending them without victory would carry even greater consequences: the collapse of Israel’s deterrence doctrine and, potentially, the unraveling of its broader project of regional dominance.
This dilemma strikes at the heart of Zionist ideology, particularly Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s concept of the ‘Iron Wall’—the belief that overwhelming, unrelenting force would eventually compel indigenous resistance to surrender.
Today, that premise is being tested—and found wanting.
Netanyahu has repeatedly framed current wars as existential, comparable in significance to 1948—the war that resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians during the Nakba and the establishment of Israel.
Indeed, the parallels are unmistakable: mass displacement, civilian terror, systematic destruction, and unwavering Western backing—once from Britain, now from the United States.
But there is a critical difference: The 1948 war led to the creation of Israel; the current wars are about its survival as an exclusivist settler colonial project.
And herein lies the paradox: the longer these wars continue, the more they expose Israel’s inability to secure decisive outcomes. Yet ending them without victory risks a historic defeat—not only for Netanyahu, but for the ideological foundations of the Israeli state itself.
Israeli society appears to recognize the stakes. Polls throughout 2024 and 2025 have shown overwhelming support among Israeli Jews for continued military campaigns in Gaza and confrontations with Iran and Lebanon.
Public discourse frames this support in terms of ‘security’ and ‘deterrence’. But the underlying reality is deeper: a collective recognition that the long-standing project of military supremacy is faltering.
Having failed to subdue Gaza despite the genocide, Israel is now attempting to achieve through diplomatic maneuvering what it could not secure through war. Proposals for international oversight, stabilization forces, and externally imposed governance structures are all variations of this approach
But these efforts are unlikely to succeed.
Gaza is no longer isolated. The regional dimension of the conflict has expanded, linking Lebanon, Iran, and other actors into a broader, interconnected front.
Balance is Shifting
In Lebanon, Israel has been repeatedly forced toward ceasefire arrangements not out of choice, but because it failed to defeat Hezbollah or break the will of the Lebanese people.
This dynamic extends to Iran. Following the joint aggression on Iran starting February 28, both the United States and Israel were compelled to accept de-escalation frameworks after failing to achieve rapid or decisive outcomes.
The expectation that Iran could be quickly destabilized—replicating the models of Iraq or Libya—proved illusory. Instead, the confrontation revealed the limits of military escalation and forced a return to negotiations.
This is the essence of Israel’s current predicament.
Diplomacy, in this model, is not an alternative to war—it is a pause within it. A temporary tool used to regroup before the next phase of confrontation.
But in Israel’s case, this aggressive ‘diplomacy’ is increasingly becoming the only available tool, precisely because its military strategy has failed to deliver victory.
Lebanon was meant to be the exception—a theater where Israel could isolate and defeat Hezbollah. Instead, it became further evidence of strategic failure.
Efforts to separate the fronts—Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran—have collapsed. Iran has explicitly linked its diplomatic engagement to developments on other fronts, forcing Israel into a broader strategic entanglement it cannot control.
This marks a profound shift.
The foundational pillars of Israeli strategy—overwhelming force, fragmentation of adversaries, narrative control, and political engineering—are no longer functioning as they once did
Yet Netanyahu continues to project victory, declaring success at regular intervals, invoking deterrence, and framing ongoing wars as strategic achievements.
But these narratives ring hollow.
The reality, increasingly evident to observers across the region and beyond, is that the balance is finally shifting.
For the first time in decades, the trajectory of history is no longer bending in Israel’s favor.
